APCR Vs UOI

SYNOPSIS
The Petitioner is filing the present public interest litigation under Article 32 of
the Constitution of India challenging the Constitutional validity of Section 35
and Section 36 of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 (hereinafter
referred to as “UAPA”) as amended by the UAPA Amendment Act 2019, to
the extent it applies to an individual on the ground that it infringes the
Fundamental Rights guaranteed under Article 14, 19(1)(a), 21 of the
Constitution of India.
The Petitioner is a non-profit and non- governmental civil rights group that
was setup in 2006 to defend the rights of the underprivileged section of the
society. APCR has in the past provided legal aid to the victims of illegal
detention, custodial death, fake encounter, communal riots and other human
rights violations.
THE AMENDMENT VIOLATES THE RIGHTS OF THE INDIVIDUAL

UNDER ARTICLE 21 OF THE CONSTITUTION
The Amendment infringes upon the right to reputation and dignity which is a
fundamental right under Article 21, without substantive and procedural due
process. Notifying an individual as a terrorist without giving him an
opportunity of being heard violates the individual’s right to reputation and
dignity which is a facet of Right to life and personal liberty under Article 21
of the Constitution. Condemning a person unheard on a mere belief of the
Government is unreasonable, unjust, unfair, excessive, disproportionate and

violates due process. A person who is designated a terrorist, even if he is
denotified subsequently faces a lifelong stigma and this tarnishes his
reputation for life.
Additionally, S.35 does not mention when a person can be designated as
terrorist. Whether on a mere registration of an FIR or upon conviction in a
terrorism related case. Designating a person as a terrorist on a mere of the
belief of the Government is arbitrary and excessive. A person is never
informed of the grounds of his notification so the remedy of challenging his
notification S.36, provided for in the Act, is rendered practically otiose.
A bare perusal of the amendment would reveal that there is no criminal
consequence that follows a person’s designation as a terrorist. No new
offence has been created or new punishment provided. The amendment is
grossly disproportionate and has no rationale nexus between the objects and
means adopted to meet them. The statement of the object and reasons of
the bill indicates that the amendment has been brought in to give effect to
various Security Council resolutions. It is unclear as to what legitimate aim
does the State seek to achieve by declaring a person as a terrorist without
even providing an efficacious remedy to challenge his notification.
Firstly, the challenge to notification is before the same Central Government
that has notified a person as a terrorist u/s 36. Thereafter, upon rejection, an
application is made to a Review Committee. No oral hearing has been
provided at any stage. There is no requirement of furnishing to the person
designated as a terrorist the grounds of his designation, which renders the
entire process of challenging the notification nugatory. There is no judicial

determination or adjudication. The amendment is unjust, unfair and
unreasonable and violates procedural and substantive due process.
THE AMENDMENT VIOLATES THE FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS OF THE

INDIVIDUALS UNDER ARTICLE 14 OF THE CONSTITUTION
The Amendment is unjust, unreasonable and manifestly arbitrary. As per the
Statement of Objects and Reasons, the Amendment was necessitated to
comply with various Security Council resolutions. The question is whether
domestic constitutional rights could be subverted for the sake compliance
with international obligations. There are various International treaties and
conventions, which say that in fight against terrorism- human rights, should
not be compromised.
The Amendment gives unfettered power to the Central Government to
declare an individual as a terrorist only if it believes that it is involved in
terrorism is arbitrary and violates Article 14 inasmuch as it is manifestly
arbitrary and gives unbridled powers to the Central Government to declare
an individual as a terrorist. It is a blanket power with no specified guidelines.
Though Terrorism has not been defined under the Act.S.15 of the Act defines
“terrorist act” and includes an act that is “likely to threaten” of “likely to strike
terror in people”, gives unbridled power to the government to brand any
ordinary citizen including an activist without these acts being actually
committed. There is no requirement of giving reasons. Further, S.35(3)of the
Act, has also been amended and the Amended provision reads as under:-
S.35(3) of the Act provides that:-

“For the purposes of sub section (2), an organization or an
individual shall be deemed to be involved in terrorism if it-
(a) commits or participates in acts of terrorism, or
(b) prepares for terrorism, or
(c) promotes or encourages terrorism, or
(d) is otherwise involved in terrorism”
A bare reading of S.35(3) of the Act will make it evidence that the provision
suffers from the vice of vagueness. There is no mention of when an individual
is deemed to have “committed”, “prepares”, “promotes” or “otherwise
involved in terrorism”. Commission, preparation, promotion and involvement-
Is it upon conviction of an individual under the Act or at the stage of a mere
registration of an FIR. The present S.36 and S.35 also do not contemplate
any oral hearing at any stage.
Under the parent Act, u/s 35 the Central Government was empowered to
declare by notification an organization which it believes is involved in
terrorism. Membership of such terrorist organization is an offence u/s 38.
Giving support to such terrorist organization is an offence u/s 39. S.40 makes
raising funds for a terrorist organization an offence. As the parent Act had
sufficient provisions to deal with individuals associated with Terrorist
organization, the present amendment appears to be unnecessary and
unwarranted and targets individuals who are not members of any terrorist
organization and who the Central Government believes is involved in
terrorism and can be subject to wanton abuse.
UNREASONABLE CLASSIFICATION BETWEEN THE PROCESS OF

DECLARING AN ASSOCIATION AS “UNLAWFUL” UNDER CHAPTER II
AND DECLARING AN INDIVIDUAL AS TERRORIST UNDER CHAPTER
VI AND THIS CLASSIFICATION HAS NO VALID NEXUS WITH THE
OBJECT IT SEEKS TO ACHIEVE
The Amendment provides no safeguards to a person notified as a terrorist.
Challenging the notification is absence of requirement to furnish grounds and
oral hearing makes the process practically inefficacious. The declaration of an
association as unlawful under chapter II requires the notification to specify
the ground on which notification is issued. S.3(3) of UAPA provides that for
the notification to be effective, the same has to be confirmed by the Tribunal.
Thereafter, u/s 4 the Tribunal has to follow a procedure and is required to
decide after notice to the association to show cause. The inquiry and judicial
determination process by the tribunal is provided u/s 5. Further, S.6 provides
that the notification remains effective for a period of 5 years. However, the
process for declaration of an individual has no such safeguard. There is no
judicial adjudication- before a person is declared a terrorist. In fact, the power
to declare a person as a terrorist gives unbridled power to the executive,
without any statutory safeguards. And the fact that the amendment does not
provide any consequence following a person’s notification as a terrorist; it is
unclear what object the amendment seeks to achieve. There is no reason
behind the classification and it has no nexus with object it seeks to achieve.
Since the power to declare an individual as a terrorist u/s 35 UAPA impinges
on the fundamental rights of an individual, required the law to have greater
safeguards. The safeguards should have been greater to that provided to an

unlawful association under Chapter II. Absence of any statutory safeguard
makes the provision manifestly arbitrary.
NO SAFEGUARDS AND CHILLING EFFECT ON FREE SPEECH UNDER

ARTICLE 19(1)(A)
The unfettered power to the executive without any safeguards to notify
individuals as Terrorists can be abused to muzzle free speech and abused by
the executive to declare activists and dissenters as Terrorists and hence
would amount to chilling effect on free speech.
Hence, the present Writ Petition.
CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF RELEVANT EVENTS
DATE PARTICULARS
30-12-1967 The Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 (the “UAPA”)
was by enacted by the Parliament and signed by the
President on 30-12-1967. The Act in its original form
contained only 21 sections.
23-05-1985 To combat the growing terrorism, the Parliament passed the
Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act, 1985
(“TADA I”). TADA I received the assent of the President on
23-05-1985 and was published in official Gazette of India

also on 23-05-1985 and came into force on 24-05-1985 for
a period of 2 years.
23-05-1987 Since, TADA I was about to expire on 23-05-1987, and both
the house of Parliament was not in session and it was
necessary to take immediate action, the President
promulgated the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities
(Prevention) Ordinance, 1987 on 23-05-1987 which came
into force w.e.f 24-05-1987.
03-09-1987 TADA II repealed the above ordinance and received the
assent of the President on 03-09-1987 and was published in
the official Gazette on 03-09-1987.
1994 The constitutional validity of TADA I and TADA II was
challenged in the Supreme Court in the case of Kartar Singh
v State of Punjab (1994) 3 SCC 569, wherein while
upholding the constitutional validity of TADA, this Court
observed that it was necessary to ensure that the provisions
of TADA were not misused by the security agencies/police.
Certain guidelines were set out to ensure that confessions
obtained in pre indictment interrogation by the police will be
in conformity with the principles of fundamental fairness.
This Court also indicated that the Central Government should
take note of those guidelines by incorporating them in TADA
and the Rules framed there under by appropriate

amendments. The Court also held that in order to prevent
the misuse of the provisions of TADA, there must be some
Screening or Review Committees.
1995 TADA was allowed to lapse.
24-10-2001 The Prevention of Terrorism Ordinance, 2001, was
promulgated on 24-10-2001.
30-12-2001 The Prevention of Terrorism (Second) Ordinance
promulgated on 30-12-2001.
2002 The Prevention of Terrorism Act, 2002 (“POTA” for short)
was enacted replacing the Prevention of Terrorism (Second)
Ordinance, 2001.
2004 The Constitutional validity of POTA was challenged in
People’s Union for Civil Liberties v Union of India (2004) 9
SCC 580, wherein this Hon’ble Court upheld the validity of
the Act.
21-09-2004 In view of the adverse reports about the misuse of the
provisions of POTA in some States, Parliament repealed
POTA, by the Prevention of Terrorism (Repeal) Ordinance,
2004 promulgated on 21-09-2004, later replaced by the
Prevention of Terrorism (Repeal) Act, 2004.
29-12-2004 Upon the repeal of POTA, the UAPA was amended which
added provisions from the repealed POTA. The amendment

came into force on 29-12-2004. Chapter VI that deals with
“Terrorist Organisations” was inserted.
07-05-2012 Section 35 of UAPA Act, 1967 came to be challenged before
this Hon’ble Court in a Writ Petition titled ‘Humam Ahmad
Siddiqui & Anr. Vs. UOI’ bearing W.P.(C) No. 138 of 2012.
This Hon’ble Court by its Order dated 07-05-2012 was
pleased to issue notice.
01-02-2013 S.35 was further amended w.e.f 01-02-2013 and inter alia
“order” u/S. 35 was substituted with “notification” and S.
35(4) and S.35(5) was added.
08-08-2019 The Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Amendment Act, 2019
got the assent of the President of India on 08-08-2019 and
it was published in the official gazette thereafter.
As per the 2019 Amendment, the amended Chapter VI reads
as under:
CHAPTER VI
TERRORIST ORGANISATIONS AND INDIVIDUALS
35. Amendment of Schedule, etc.-(1) The Central
Government may, by order, in the Official Gazette,-
(a) add an organisation to the First Schedule or the
name of an individual in the Fourth Schedule;
(b) add also an organisation to the First Schedule,
which is identified as a terrorist organisation in a
resolution adopted by the Security Council under
Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations or the
name of an individual in the Fourth Schedule, to combat
international terrorism;
(c) remove an organisation from the First Schedule; or
the name of an individual in the Fourth Schedule
(d) amend the First Schedule in some other way or the
Fourth Schedule.
(2) The Central Government shall exercise its power
under clause (a) of sub-section (1) in respect of an
organisation or an individual only if it believes that such
organisation or individual is involved in terrorism.
(3) For the purposes of sub-section (2), an organisation
or an individual shall be deemed to be involved in
terrorism if such organisation or individual- (a) commits
or participates in acts of terrorism, or (b) prepares for
terrorism, or (c) promotes or encourages terrorism, or
(d) is otherwise involved in terrorism.
(4) The Central Government may, by notification in the
Official Gazette, add to or remove or amend the Second
Schedule or Third Schedule and thereupon the Second
Schedule or the Third Schedule, as the case may be,
shall be deemed to have been amended accordingly.
(5)- Every notification issued under sub section (1) or
sub section (4) shall, as soon as may be after it is
issued, be laid before Parliament.”
36. Denotification of a terrorist organization or

individual.-(1) An application may be made to the
Central Government for the exercise of its power under
clause (c) of sub-section (1) of section 35 to remove an
organisation from the First Schedule, or as the case
may be, the name of the individual from the Fourth
Schedule.
(2) An application under sub-section (1)may be made
by-
(a) the organisation, or
(b) any person affected by inclusion of the organisation
in the First Schedule as a terrorist organisation, or
(c) any person affected by inclusion of his name in the
Fourth Schedule as a terrorist.
(3) The Central Government may prescribe the
procedure for admission and disposal of an application
made under this section.
(4) Where an application under sub-section (1) has
been rejected the applicant may apply for a review to
the Review Committee constituted by the Central
Government under sub-section (1) of section 37 within
one month from the date of receipt of the order of such
refusal by the applicant.
(5) The Review Committee may allow an application for
review against rejection to remove an organisation from
the First Schedule or the name of an individual from the
Fourth Schedule, if it considers that the decision to
reject was flawed when considered in the light of the
principles applicable on an application for judicial
review.
(6) Where the Review Committee allows review under
sub-section (5) by or in respect of an organization or
an individual, it may make an order to such effect.
(7) Where an order is made under sub-section (6), the
Central Government shall, as soon as the certified copy
of the order is received by it, make an order removing
the organisation from the First Schedule or the name of
an individual from the Fourth Schedule.
37. Review Committees.-(1) The Central Government
shall constitute one or more Review Committees for the
purposes of section 36.
(2) Every such Committee shall consist of a Chairperson
and such other members not exceeding three and
possessing such qualifications as may be prescribed.
(3) A Chairperson of the Committee shall be a person
who is, or has been, a Judge of a High Court, who shall
be appointed by the Central Government and in the
case of appointment of a sitting Judge, the concurrence
of the Chief Justice of the concerned High Court shall
be obtained.
22-08-2019 Hence, the Writ Petition.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

ORIGINAL CIVIL JURISDICTION
(UNDER ARTICLE 32 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA)
WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) No._________ OF 2019
IN THE MATTER OF:
MEMO OF PARTIES
1. ASSOCIATION FOR PROTECTION OF

CIVIL RIGHTS (APCR)
Through its National Coordinator,
Mr. Abu Bakr Sabbaq, Office at E-89,
1st Floor, Flat No. 104, Hari Kothi
Lane, Abul Fazal Enclave, Jamia
Nagar, New Delhi-110025 …PETITIONER
VERSUS
1. UNION OF INDIA
Through Ministry of Law and Justice,
Government of India, 4th Floor, A-
Wing, Shastri Bhawan, New Delhi –
110 011 … RESPONDENT
PUBLIC INTEREST LITIGATION UNDER ARTICLE 32 OF THE

CONSTITUTION OF INDIA CHALLENGING THE CONSTITUTIONAL
VALIDITY OF SECTION 35 AND 36 OF THE UNLAWFUL ACTIVITIES
(PREVENTION) ACT, 1967 (HEREINAFTER REFERRED TO AS
“UAPA”) AS AMENDED BY THE UNLAWFUL ACTIVITIES
(PREVENTION) AMENDMENT ACT, 2019TO THE EXTENT IT APPLIES
TO AN INDIVIDUAL ON THE GROUND THAT IT INFRINGES THE
FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS UNDER ARTICLES 14, 19(1)(a) AND 21 OF
THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA.
TO,
THE HON’BLE CHIEF JUSTICE OF INDIA
AND HIS COMPANION JUDGES OF THE
SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
THE HUMBLE PETITION OF THE
PETITIONER ABOVENAMED
MOST RESPECTFULLY SHOWETH:
1. The Petitioner is filing the present public interest litigation under Article
32 of the Constitution of India challenging the Constitutional validity of
Section 35 and Section 36 of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act,
1967 (hereinafter referred to as “UAPA”) as amended by the UAPA
Amendment Act 2019, to the extent it applies to an individual on the
ground that it infringes the Fundamental Rights guaranteed under
Article 14, 19(1)(a), 21 of the Constitution of India.
2. The Petitioner is a Civil Rights Group comprising of advocates, social
activists and social workers dedicated to using the law to protect and
advance the cause of civil and human rights in India. The Petitioner is
a non-profit and non- governmental civil rights group that was setup in
2006 to defend the rights of the underprivileged section of the society.
APCR has in the past provided legal aid to the victims of illegal
detention, custodial death, fake encounter, communal riots and other
human rights violations. APCR is also providing legal aid to persons
accused in Bijnore Blast Case that is presently pending in Lucknow
Court.
A True Copy of the Memorandum of Association of the Petitioner
Organisation, dated 03-08-2006 is annexed herewith as ANNEXURE
P-1 (Pages________to_______)
2.1 The Petitioner Organization actively participates in protecting the
rights of the victims and has filed a writ petition before this
Hon’ble Court titled ‘Association for Protection of Civil Rights Vs.
The State of Bihar.’ W.P. (Crl.) No. 195 of 2011 against the
incident of police firing and subsequent killing of OBC Muslims in
Bhajanpur, Forbesganj, Bihar. The matter is pending before this
Hon’ble Court.
2.2 The Petitioner has offices in 17 states i.e. Jharkhand, Kerala,
Karnataka, Goa, Tamil Nadu, Maharashtra, Rajasthan, West
Bengal, Gujarat, Delhi, U.P (West and Uttarakhand), U.P (East),
Bihar, Assam, Haryana, Madhya Pradesh and Telangana. APCR
also organizes training workshops and legal awareness camps.
2.3 The Petitioner is represented through its National Coordinator,
Mr. Abu Bakr Sabbaq who is a practicing advocate with an
experience of about five years and extensively deals in cases
regarding UAPA, communal riots, fake encounters, human rights
violation, etc.
2.4 The Petitioner is filing this Writ Petition as a Public Interest
Litigation (PIL). The Petitioner humbly submits that it has no
personal interest, individual gain, oblique motive for filing the
present PIL. The Petitioner organization is not involved in any
litigation, which has or could have any nexus whatsoever with
the issues involved in the present matter.
2.5 The Petitioner has not filed any other petition, either before this
Hon’ble Court or in any other High Court seeking similar relief.
2.6 The Petitioner’s complete name and complete postal address has
been given in the memo of parties. The contact number of the
representative of Petitioner is 9540450308. His email address is

[email protected] and his Aadhar Card Number is
652240900672. The Pan Card number of the Petitioner
Organisation is AAAAA9077G and has an income of Rupees
Thirty Two Lacs, Twenty Six Thousand, Three Hundred and
Twenty Seven only (Rs.32,26,327/-) for the financial year 2018-
19.
2.7 The Respondent No.1 is the Union of India through Ministry of
Law and Justice, which is a necessary party for adjudication of
the present Writ Petition.
3. FACTUAL BACKGROUND:
3.1 The Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act (the “UAPA”) was enacted
by the Parliament and signed by the President on 30-12-1967. The
Act in its original form contained only 21 sections.
3.2 Thereafter, to combat the growing terrorism, the Parliament
passed the Terrorist and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Act,
1985 (“TADA I”). TADA I received the assent of the President on
23-05-1985 and was published in official Gazette of India also on
23-05-1985. It came into force on 24-05-1985 for an initial period
of 2 years.
3.3 Since, TADA I was about to expire on 23-05-1987, and both the
house of Parliament was not in session and it was necessary to
take immediate action, the President promulgated the Terrorist

and Disruptive Activities (Prevention) Ordinance, 1987 on 23-05-
1987 which came into force w.e.f 24-05-1987.
3.4 TADA II repealed the above ordinance and received the assent of
the President on 03-09-1987 and was also published in the official
Gazette on 03-09-1987.
3.5 The constitutional validity of TADA I and TADA II was challenged
in the Supreme Court in the case of Kartar Singh v State of
Punjab (1994) 3 SCC 569 and it was heard by a bench of 5
judges. While upholding the constitutional validity of TADA, this
Court also observed that it was necessary to ensure that the
provisions of TADA were not misused by the security
agencies/police. Certain guidelines were set out to ensure that
confessions obtained in pre indictment interrogation by the police
will be in conformity with the principles of fundamental fairness.
This Court also indicated that the Central Government should take
note of those guidelines by incorporating them in TADA and the
Rules framed there under by appropriate amendments. The Court
also held that in order to prevent the misuse of the provisions of
TADA, there must be some Screening or Review Committees. In
the lead judgment, Pandian. J held:-
“265. In order to ensure higher level of scrutiny and

applicability of TADA Act, there must be a screening
Committee or a Review Committee constituted by the Central
Government consisting of the Home Secretary, Law Secretary
and other secretaries concerned of the various Departments
to review all the TADA cases instituted by the Central
Government as well as to have a quarterly administrative
review, reviewing the States' action in the application of the
TADA provisions in the respective. States, and the incidental
questions arising in relation thereto. Similarly, there must be
a Screening or Review Committee at the State level
constituted by the respective States consisting of the Chief
Secretary, Home Secretary, Law Secretary, Director General
of Police (Law and Order) and other officials as the respective
Government may think it fit, to review the action of the
enforcing authorities under the Act and screen the cases
registered under the provisions of the Act and decide the
further course of action in every matter and so on.”
A True Copy of the Judgment titled ‘Kartar Singh v State of Punjab’
(1994) 3 SCC 569, dated NIL, is annexed herewith as ANNEXURE
P-2 (Pages________to_______)
3.6 In 1995, TADA was allowed to lapse.
3.7 A few years later, the Prevention of Terrorism Ordinance, 2001,
was promulgated on 24-10-2001, followed by the Prevention of
Terrorism (Second) Ordinance that was promulgated on 30-12-
2001.
3.8 In 2002, the Prevention of Terrorism Act, 2002 (“POTA”) was
enacted replacing the Prevention of Terrorism (Second)

Ordinance, 2001. Chapter III of POTA was titled “Terrorist
Organisation”. The relevant portion has been extracted below:-
18. Declaration of an organisation as a terrorist

organization.-
(1) For the purposes of this Act, an organisation is a terrorist
organisation if—
(a) it is listed in the Schedule, or
(b) it operates under the same name as an organisation
listed in that Schedule.
(2) The Central Government may by order, in the Official
Gazette,—
(a) add an organisation to the Schedule;
(b) remove an organisation from that Schedule;
(c) amend that Schedule in some other way.
(3) The Central Government may exercise its power under
clause (a) of sub-section (2) in respect of an organisation
only if it believes that it is involved in terrorism.
(4) For the purposes of sub-section (3), an organisation shall
be deemed to be involved in terrorism if it—
(a) commits or participates in acts of terrorism,
(b) prepares for terrorism,
(c) promotes or encourages terrorism, or
(d) is otherwise involved in terrorism.
19. Denotification of a terrorist organization.-

(1) An application may be made to the Central Government
for the exercise of its power under clause (b) of sub-section
(2) of section 18 to remove an organisation from the
Schedule.
(2) An application may be made by— (a) the organisation,
or (b) any person affected by inclusion of the organisation
in the Schedule as a terrorist organisation.
(3) The Central Government may make rules to prescribe
the procedure for admission and disposal of an application
made under this section.
(4) Where an application under sub-section (1) has been
refused, the applicant may apply for a review to the Review
Committee constituted by the Central Government under
sub-section (1) of section 60 within one month from the date
of receipt of the order by the applicant.
review against refusal to remove an organisation from the
Schedule, if it considers that the decision to refuse was
flawed when considered in the light of the principles
applicable on an application for judicial review.
(6) Where the Review Committee allows review under sub-
section (5) by or in respect of an organisation, it may make
an order under this sub-section.
Central Government shall, as soon as the certified copy of
the order is received by it, make an order removing the
organisation from the list in the Schedule.
S.60 provided for the constitution of Review Committee to
discharge the function specified inter alia u/s 19(4) of POTA. The
Act provided that every such Committee would consist of a
Chairperson and such other members not exceeding three and
possessing such qualifications as may be prescribed. It also
provided that the Chairperson of the Committee would be a person
who is, or has been a, a Judge of a High Court, who shall be
appointed by the Central Government or as the case may be.
3.9 The Constitutional validity of POTA was challenged in People’s
Union for Civil Liberties v Union of India, (2004) 9 SCC 580
and this Hon’ble Court upheld the validity of the Act. This Hon’ble
Court upheld the designation of the Terrorist Organisation and
held the following:-

“40. Sections 18 and 19 deal with the notification and
denotification of terrorist organisations. The petitioners
submitted that under Section 18(1) of POTA a Schedule has
been provided giving the names of terrorist organisations
without any legislative declaration; that there is nothing
provided in the Act for declaring organisations as terrorist
organisations; that this provision is therefore,
unconstitutional as it takes away the fundamental rights of
an organization under Articles 14, 19(1)(a) and 19(1)(c) of
the Constitution; that under Section 18(2) of the Act, the
Central Government has been given unchecked and
arbitrary powers to “add” or “remove” or “amend” the
Schedule pertaining to terrorist organisations; that under
the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 an
organization could have been declared unlawful only after
the Central Government has sufficient material to form an
opinion and such declaration has to be made by a
notification wherein grounds have to be specified for making
such declaration; that therefore such arbitrary power is
violative of Articles 14, 19 and 21 of the Constitution.
Pertaining to Section 19 the main allegation is that it
excessively delegates power to the Central Government in
the appointment of members to the Review Committee and
they also pointed out that the inadequate representation of
judicial members will affect the decision-making and
consequently, it may affect the fair judicial scrutiny; that,
therefore, Section 19 is not constitutionally valid.
41. The learned Attorney General contended that there is
no requirement of natural justice which mandates that
before a statutory declaration is made in respect of an
organization which is listed in the schedule a prior
opportunity of hearing or representation should be given to
the affected organization or its members; that the rule
of audi alteram partem is not absolute and is subject to
modification; that in light of the post-decisional hearing
remedy provided under Section 19 and since the aggrieved
persons could approach the Review Committee there is
nothing illegal in the section; that furthermore, the
constitutional remedy under Articles 226 and 227 is also
available; that therefore, having regard to the nature of the
legislation and the magnitude and prevalence of the evil of
terrorism it cannot be said to impose unreasonable
restrictions on the fundamental rights under Article 19(1)(c)
of the Constitution.
42. The right of citizens to form associations or unions that
is guaranteed by Article 19(1)(c) of the Constitution is
subject to the restrictions provided under Article 19(4) of the
Constitution. Under Article 19(4) of the Constitution the
State can impose reasonable restrictions, inter alia, in the
interest of sovereignty and integrity of the country. POTA is
enacted to protect sovereignty and integrity of India from
the menace of terrorism. Imposing restriction under Article
19(4) of the Constitution also includes declaring an
organization as a terrorist organization as provided under
POTA. Hence Section 18 is not unconstitutional.
43. It is contended that before making the notification
whereby an organization is declared as a terrorist
organization there is no provision for pre-decisional hearing.
But this cannot be considered as a violation of audi alteram
partem principle, which itself is not absolute. Because in the
peculiar background of terrorism it may be necessary for the
Central Government to declare an organization as terrorist
organization even without hearing that organization. At the
same time under Section 19 of POTA the aggrieved persons
can approach the Central Government itself for reviewing its
decision. If they are not satisfied by the decision of the
Central Government they can subsequently approach the
Review Committee and they are also free to exercise their
constitutional remedies. The post-decisional remedy
provided under POTA satisfies the audi alteram
partem requirement in the matter of declaring an
organization as a terrorist organization. (See Mohinder
Singh Gill v. Chief Election Commr. [(1978) 1 SCC
405], Swadeshi Cotton Mills v. Union of India [(1981) 1 SCC
664], Olga Tellis v. Bombay Municipal Corpn. [(1985) 3 SCC
545] and Union of India v. Tulsiram Patel [(1985) 3 SCC
398: 1985 SCC (L&S) 672].) Therefore, the absence of pre-
decisional hearing cannot be treated as a ground for
declaring Section 18 as invalid.
44. It is urged that Section 18 or 19 is invalid based on the
inadequacy of judicial members in the Review Committee.
As per Section 60, Chairperson of the Review Committee will
be a person who is or has been a Judge of a High Court. The
mere presence of non-judicial members by itself cannot be
treated as a ground to invalidate Section 19. (See Kartar
Singh case [(1994) 3 SCC 569: 1994 SCC (Cri) 899: (1994)
2 SCR 375] at p. 683, para 265 of SCC.)
45. As regards the reasonableness of the restriction
provided under Section 18, it has to be noted that
the factum of declaration of an organization as a terrorist
organization depends upon the “belief” of the Central
Government. The reasonableness of the Central
Government's action has to be justified based on material
facts upon which it formed the opinion. Moreover, the
Central Government is bound by the order of the Review
Committee. Considering the nature of legislation and
magnitude or presence of terrorism, it cannot be said that
Section 18 of POTA imposes unreasonable restrictions on
fundamental right guaranteed under Article 19(1)(c) of the
Constitution. We uphold the validity of Sections 18 and 19.”
(Emphasis Added)
A True Copy of Judgment titled ‘People’s Union for Civil Liberties v
Union of India’ (2004) 9 SCC 580, dated NIL is annexed herewith
as ANNEXURE P-3 (Pages________to_______)
3.10 In view of the adverse reports about the misuse of the provisions
of POTA in some States, Parliament repealed POTA, by the
Prevention of Terrorism (Repeal) Ordinance, 2004 promulgated
on 21-09-2004, which was later replaced by the Prevention of
Terrorism (Repeal) Act, 2004. [(2009) 2 SCC 1]
3.11 Upon the repeal of POTA, the UAPA was amended which added
provisions from the repealed POTA. The amendment came into
force on 29-12-2004. Chapter VI that deals with “Terrorist
Organisations” was inserted. The relevant provisions are
extracted below.
CHAPTER VI TERRORIST ORGANISATIONS

(a) add an organisation to the Schedule;
(b) add also an organisation to the Schedule, which is
identified as a terrorist organisation in a resolution adopted
by the Security Council under Chapter VII of the Charter of
the United Nations, to combat international terrorism;
(c) remove an organisation from the Schedule;
(d) amend the Schedule in some other way.
(2) The Central Government shall exercise its power under
clause (a) of sub-section (1) in respect of an organisation
only if it believes that it is involved in terrorism.
(3) For the purposes of sub-section (2), an organisation shall
be deemed to be involved in terrorism if it- (a) commits or
participates in acts of terrorism, or (b) prepares for
terrorism, or (c) promotes or encourages terrorism, or (d) is
otherwise involved in terrorism.
36. Denotification of a terrorist organization.-(1) An

application may be made to the Central Government for the
exercise of its power under clause (c) of sub-section (1) of
section 35 to remove an organisation from the Schedule.
(2) An application under sub-section (1) may be made by-
(b) any person affected by inclusion of the organisation in
the Schedule as a terrorist organisation.
(3) The Central Government may prescribe the procedure
for admission and disposal of an application made under this
section.
rejected the applicant may apply for a review to the Review
of receipt of the order of such refusal by the applicant.
review against rejection to remove an organisation from the
Schedule, if it considers that the decision to reject was
flawed when considered in the light of the principles
applicable on an application for judicial review.
section (5) by or in respect of an organisation, it may make
an order to such effect.
organisation from the Schedule.
37. Review Committees.-(1) The Central Government shall

constitute one or more Review Committees for the purposes
of section 36.
(2) Every such Committee shall consist of a Chairperson and
such other members not exceeding three and possessing
such qualifications as may be prescribed.
(3) A Chairperson of the Committee shall be a person who
is, or has been, a Judge of a High Court, who shall be
appointed by the Central Government and in the case of
appointment of a sitting Judge, the concurrence of the Chief
Justice of the concerned High Court shall be obtained.
3.12 In a Writ Petition titled ‘Humam Ahmad Siddiqui & Anr. Vs. UOI’
bearing W.P.(C) No. 138 of 2012, various provisions of UAPA
including S.35 was challenged. This Hon’ble Court by its Order
dated 07-05-2012 was pleased to issue notice.
A True Copy of the Order dated 07-05-2012 passed by this Hon’ble
Court in W.P.(C) No. 138 of 2012 titled ‘Humam Ahmad Siddiqui
& Anr. Vs. UOI’ is annexed herewith as ANNEXURE P-4
(Pages________to_______)
3.13 S.35 was further amended w.e.f 01-02-2013 and inter alia “order”
u/s 35 was substituted with “notification” and S. 35(4) and S.35(5)
was added. These are provided below:-
“S.35(4)– The Central Government may, by notification in

the Official Gazette, add to or remove or amend the Second
Schedule or the Third Schedule, as the case may be, shall
be deemed to have been amended accordingly.
S.35(5)- Every notification issued under sub section (1) or
sub section (4) shall, as soon as may be after it is issued, be
laid before Parliament.”
3.14 Thereafter, UAPA Amendment Bill, 2019 that further empowered
the Central Government to notify an individual as a terrorist was
passed by the Parliament. The statement of object and reasons
for the amendment mentioned in the bill is as follows:-
“1…
2. Presently, the National Investigation Agency faces many
difficulties in the process of investigation and prosecution of
terrorism related cases. With a view to overcome such
difficulties being faced by the National Investigation Agency
in the investigation and prosecution of terrorism related
cases due to certain legal infirmities and also to align the
domestic law with the international obligations as mandated
in several Conventions and Security Council Resolutions on
the issue, the Government proposes to amend the said Act
and for the said purpose, introduce the Unlawful Activities
(Prevention)Amendment Bill, 2019.” (Emphasis Added)
A True Copy of UAPA Amendment Bill, 2019, dated NIL is annexed
herewith as ANNEXURE P-5 (Pages________to_______)
3.15 The President assented to the Amendment on 08-08-2019 and it
was published in the official gazette thereafter.
A True Copy of the Gazette dated 08-08-2019 is annexed herewith
as ANNEXURE P-6 (Pages________to_______)
3.16 The amended Chapter VI reads as under:

CHAPTER VI
TERRORIST ORGANISATIONS AND INDIVIDUALS
(a) add an organisation to the First Schedule or the name of
an individual in the Fourth Schedule;
(b) add also an organisation to the First Schedule, which is
identified as a terrorist organisation in a resolution adopted
by the Security Council under Chapter VII of the Charter of
the United Nations or the name of an individual in the Fourth
Schedule, to combat international terrorism;
(c) remove an organisation from the First Schedule; or the
name of an individual in the Fourth Schedule
(d) amend the First Schedule in some other way or the Fourth
Schedule.
(2) The Central Government shall exercise its power under
clause (a) of sub-section (1) in respect of an organisation or
an individual only if it believes that such organisation or
individual is involved in terrorism.
(3) For the purposes of sub-section (2), an organisation or
an individual shall be deemed to be involved in terrorism if
such organisation or individual- (a) commits or participates
in acts of terrorism, or (b) prepares for terrorism, or (c)
promotes or encourages terrorism, or (d) is otherwise
involved in terrorism.
(4) The Central Government may, by notification in the
Official Gazette, add to or remove or amend the Second
Schedule or the Third Schedule, as the case may be, shall be
deemed to have been amended accordingly.
(5)- Every notification issued under sub section (1) or sub
section (4) shall, as soon as may be after it is issued, be laid
before Parliament.”
36. Denotification of a terrorist organization or individual.-(1)

An application may be made to the Central Government for
the exercise of its power under clause (c) of sub-section (1)
of section 35 to remove an organisation from the First
Schedule, or as the case may be, the name of the individual
from the Fourth Schedule.
(2) An application under sub-section (1) may be made by-
(b) any person affected by inclusion of the organisation in
the First Schedule as a terrorist organisation, or
(c) any person affected by inclusion of his name in the Fourth
Schedule as a terrorist.
(3) The Central Government may prescribe the procedure for
admission and disposal of an application made under this
section.
rejected the applicant may apply for a review to the Review
of receipt of the order of such refusal by the applicant.
review against rejection to remove an organisation from the
First Schedule or the name of an individual from the Fourth
Schedule, if it considers that the decision to reject was flawed
when considered in the light of the principles applicable on
an application for judicial review.
section (5) by or in respect of an organization or an
individual, it may make an order to such effect.
organisation from the First Schedule or the name of an
individual from the Fourth Schedule.
37. Review Committees.-(1) The Central Government shall

constitute one or more Review Committees for the purposes
of section 36.
(2) Every such Committee shall consist of a Chairperson and
such other members not exceeding three and possessing
such qualifications as may be prescribed.
(3) A Chairperson of the Committee shall be a person who is,
or has been, a Judge of a High Court, who shall be appointed
by the Central Government and in the case of appointment
of a sitting Judge, the concurrence of the Chief Justice of the
concerned High Court shall be obtained.
3.17 The 2019 Amendment is being challenged on the following
grounds:-
4. GROUNDS
THE AMENDMENT VIOLATES THE RIGHTS OF THE INDIVIDUAL

UNDER ARTICLE 21 OF THE CONSTITUTION
Right to Reputation and dignity is a Fundamental Right and

the amendment deprives an individual of this right without the
due process of law.
A. Because the Amendment infringes upon the right to reputation and
dignity which is a fundamental right under Article 21, without
substantive and procedural due process. Notifying an individual as
a terrorist without giving him an opportunity of being heard violates
the individual’s right to reputation and dignity which is a facet of
Right to life and personal liberty under Article 21 of the Constitution.
Condemning a person unheard on a mere belief of the Government,
is unreasonable, unjust, unfair, excessive, disproportionate and
violates due process. A person who is designated a terrorist, even if
he is denotified subsequently faces a lifelong stigma and this
tarnishes his reputation for life.
B. Additionally, S.35 does not mention when a person can be
designated as terrorist. Whether on a mere registration of an FIR or
upon conviction in a terrorism related case. Designating a person as

a terrorist on a mere of the belief of the Government is arbitrary
and excessive. A person is never informed of the grounds of his
notification so the remedy of challenging his notification S.36,
provided for in the Act, is rendered practically otiose.
C. Because, a bare perusal of the amendment would reveal that there
is no criminal consequence that follows a person’s designation as a
terrorist. No new offence has been created or new punishment
provided. The amendment is grossly disproportionate and has no
rationale nexus between the objects and means adopted to meet
them. The statement of the object and reasons of the bill indicates
that the amendment has been brought in to give effect to various
Security Council resolutions. It is unclear as to what legitimate aim
does the State seek to achieve by declaring a person as a terrorist
without even providing an efficacious remedy to challenge his
notification.
D. Because first, the challenge to notification is before the same
Central Government that has notified a person as a terrorist u/s 36.
Thereafter, upon rejection, an application is made to a Review
Committee. No oral hearing has been provided at any stage. There
is no requirement of furnishing to the person designated as a
terrorist the grounds of his designation, which renders the entire
process of challenging the notification nugatory. There is no judicial

determination or adjudication. The amendment is unjust, unfair and
unreasonable and violates procedural and substantive due process.
E. In Subramanian Swamy v. Union of India, (2016) 7 SCC 221,
this Hon’ble Court held that the right to reputation is a facet of
Article 21:-
“132. … The submission of the respondents is that right to

life as has been understood by this Court while interpreting
Article 21 of the Constitution covers a wide and varied
spectrum. Right to life includes the right to life with human
dignity and all that goes along with it, namely, the bare
necessities of life such as nutrition, clothing and shelter and
facilities for reading, writing and expressing oneself in diverse
forums, freely moving about and mixing and commingling
with fellow human beings and, therefore, it is a precious
human right which forms the arc of all other rights
(see Francis Coralie Mullin v. UT of Delhi[Francis Coralie
Mullin v. UT of Delhi, (1981) 1 SCC 608 : 1981 SCC (Cri) 212]
). It has also been laid down in the said decision that the right
to life has to be interpreted in a broad and expansive spirit so
as to invest it with significance and vitality which may endure
for years to come and enhance dignity of an individual and
worth of a human being. In Chameli Singh v. State of
U.P. [Chameli Singh v. State of U.P., (1996) 2 SCC 549], the
Court has emphasized on social and economic justice which
includes the right to shelter as an inseparable component of
meaningful right to life. The respect for life, property has been
regarded as essential requirement of any civilized society
in Siddharam Satlingappa Mhetre v. State of Maharashtra
[Siddharam Satlingappa Mhetre v. State of Maharashtra,
(2011) 1 SCC 694 : (2011) 1 SCC (Cri) 514] . Deprivation of
life, according to Krishna Iyer, J. in Babu Singh v. State of
U.P. [Babu Singh v. State of U.P., (1978) 1 SCC 579: 1978
SCC (Cri) 133] has been regarded as a matter of grave
concern. Personal liberty, as used in Article 21, is treated as a
composition of rights relatable to various spheres of life to
confer the meaning to the said right. Thus perceived, the right
to life under Article 21 is equally expansive and it, in its
connotative sense, carries a collection or bouquet of rights. In
the case at hand, the emphasis is on right to reputation which
has been treated as an inherent facet of Article 21. In Haridas
Das v. Usha Rani Banik [Haridas Das v. Usha Rani Banik,
(2007) 14 SCC 1: (2009) 1 SCC (Cri) 750], it has been stated
that a good name is better than good riches. In a different
context, the majority in S.P. Mittal v. Union of India [S.P.
Mittal v. Union of India, (1983) 1 SCC 51 : AIR 1983 SC 1] ,
has opined that man, as a rational being, endowed with a
sense of freedom and responsibility, does not remain satisfied
with any material existence. He has the urge to indulge in
creative activities and effort is to realize the value of life in
them. The said decision lays down that the value of life is
incomprehensible without dignity.
133. In Charu Khurana v. Union of India [Charu
Khurana v. Union of India, (2015) 1 SCC 192: (2015) 1 SCC
(L&S) 161], it has been ruled that dignity is the quintessential
quality of a personality, for it is a highly cherished value. Thus
perceived, right to honour, dignity and reputation are the
basic constituents of right under Article 21. The submission of
the learned counsel for the petitioners is that reputation as an
aspect of Article 21 is always available against the high-
handed action of the State. To state that such right can be
impinged and remains unprotected inter se private disputes
pertaining to reputation would not be correct. Neither can this
right be overridden and blotched notwithstanding malice, vile
and venal attack to tarnish and destroy the reputation of
another by stating that the same curbs and puts unreasonable
restriction on the freedom of speech and expression. There is
no gainsaying that individual rights form the fundamental
fulcrum of collective harmony and interest of a society. There
can be no denial of the fact that the right to freedom of speech
and expression is absolutely sacrosanct. Simultaneously, right
to life as is understood in the expansive horizon of Article 21
has its own significance. We cannot forget the rhetoric
utterance of Patrick Henry:
“Is life so dear, or peace so sweet, as to be purchased at the
price of chains and slavery? Forbid it, Almighty God! I know
not what course others may take, but as for me, give me
liberty, or give me death!” [Patrick Henry, Speech in House of
Burgesses on 23-3-1775 (Virginia).]
F. This Hon’ble Court in S. Nambi Narayanan v. Siby Mathews,
(2018) 10 SCC 804 quoted with approval:-
“37. In Kiran Bedi v. Committee of Inquiry [Kiran

Bedi v. Committee of Inquiry, (1989) 1 SCC 494], this Court
reproduced an observation from the decision in D.F.
Marion v. Davis [D.F. Marion v. Davis, 55 ALR 171: 217 Ala 16
(1927)] : (SCC pp. 515, para 25)
“25. … ‘The right to the enjoyment of a private reputation,
unassailed by malicious slander is of ancient origin, and is
necessary to human society. A good reputation is an
element of personal security, and is protected by the
Constitution equally with the right to the enjoyment of life,
liberty and property.’”
38. Reputation of an individual is an insegregable facet of his
right to life with dignity. In a different context, a two-Judge
Bench of this Court in Vishwanath Agrawal v. Sarla
Vishwanath Agrawal [Vishwanath Agrawal v. Sarla
Vishwanath Agrawal, (2012) 7 SCC 288 : (2012) 4 SCC (Civ)
224 : (2012) 3 SCC (Cri) 347] has observed: (SCC pp. 307,
para 55)
“55. … reputation which is not only the salt of life, but also
the purest treasure and the most precious perfume of life.
It is extremely delicate and a cherished value this side of
the grave. It is a revenue generator for the present as well
as for the posterity.”
G. Because this Hon’ble Court in Danial Latifi v Union of India
(2001) 7 SCC 740 held that right to live with dignity is included in
right to life and personal liberty.
H. Because, recently, a 9 judge bench of this Hon’ble Court in K.S.
Puttaswamy v. Union of India, (2017) 10 SCC 1, emphasized on
the importance on protection of reputation.
“623. An individual has a right to protect his reputation from

being unfairly harmed and such protection of reputation
needs to exist not only against falsehood but also certain
truths. It cannot be said that a more accurate judgment about
people can be facilitated by knowing private details about
their lives — people judge us badly, they judge us in haste,
they judge out of context, they judge without hearing the
whole story and they judge with hypocrisy. Privacy lets people
protect themselves from these troublesome judgments.”
(Emphasis Added)
I. Because, this Hon’ble Court in K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of
India, (2017) 10 SCC 1, held that dignity is an important facet of
right to privacy which is a fundamental right under Article 21 of the
Constitution. This Court held :-
“108. Over the last four decades, our constitutional

jurisprudence has recognised the inseparable relationship
between protection of life and liberty with dignity. Dignity as
a constitutional value finds expression in the Preamble. The
constitutional vision seeks the realisation of justice (social,
economic and political); liberty (of thought, expression, belief,
faith and worship); equality (as a guarantee against arbitrary
treatment of individuals) and fraternity (which assures a life
of dignity to every individual). These constitutional precepts
exist in unity to facilitate a humane and compassionate
society. The individual is the focal point of the Constitution
because it is in the realisation of individual rights that the
collective well-being of the community is determined. Human
dignity is an integral part of the Constitution. Reflections of
dignity are found in the guarantee against arbitrariness
(Article 14), the lamps of freedom (Article 19) and in the right
to life and personal liberty (Article 21).
109. In Prem Shankar Shukla v. Delhi Admn. [Prem Shankar
Shukla v. Delhi Admn., (1980) 3 SCC 526 : 1980 SCC (Cri)
815] , which arose from the handcuffing of the prisoners,
Krishna Iyer, J. speaking for a three-Judge Bench of this Court
held: (SCC pp. 529-30 & 537, paras 1 & 21)
“1. … the guarantee of human dignity, which forms part of
our constitutional culture, and the positive provisions of
Articles 14, 19 and 21 spring into action when we realise
that to manacle man is more than to mortify him; it is to
dehumanise him and, therefore, to violate his very
personhood, too often using the mask of “dangerousness”
and security.
***
21. The Preamble sets the humane tone and temper of the
Founding Document and highlights justice, equality and
the dignity of the individual.”
110. A Bench of two Judges in Francis Coralie Mullin v. UT of
Delhi [Francis Coralie Mullin v. UT of Delhi, (1981) 1 SCC 608
: 1981 SCC (Cri) 212] (“Francis Coralie”) while construing the
entitlement of a detenue under the Conservation of Foreign
Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities (COFEPOSA)
Act, 1974 to have an interview with a lawyer and the members
of his family held that: (SCC pp. 618-19, paras 6-8)
“6. … The fundamental right to life which is the most precious
human right and which forms the ark of all other rights must
therefore be interpreted in a broad and expansive spirit so as
to invest it with significance and vitality which may endure for
years to come and enhance the dignity of the individual and
the worth of the human person.
7. … the right to life enshrined in Article 21 cannot be
restricted to mere animal existence. It means something
much more than just physical survival.
8. … We think that the right to life includes the right to live
with human dignity and all that goes along with it, namely,
the bare necessaries of life such as adequate nutrition,
clothing and shelter and facilities for reading, writing and
expressing oneself in diverse forms, freely moving about and
mixing and commingling with fellow human beings. … Every
act which offends against or impairs human dignity would
constitute deprivation pro tanto of this right to live and it
would have to be in accordance with reasonable, fair and just
procedure established by law which stands the test of other
fundamental rights.”
111. In Bandhua Mukti Morcha v. Union of India [Bandhua
Mukti Morcha v. Union of India, (1984) 3 SCC 161: 1984 SCC
(L&S) 389], a Bench of three Judges of this Court while
dealing with individuals who were living in bondage observed
that: (SCC p. 183, para 10)
“10. …This right to live with human dignity enshrined in Article
21 derives its life breath from the directive principles of State
policy and particularly clauses (e) and (f) of Article 39 and
Articles 41 and 42 and at the least, therefore, it must include
protection of the health and strength of the workers, men and
women, and of the tender age of children against abuse,
opportunities and facilities for children to develop in a healthy
manner and in conditions of freedom and dignity, educational
facilities, just and humane conditions of work and maternity
relief. These are the minimum requirements which must exist
in order to enable a person to live with human dignity, and no
State — neither the Central Government nor any State
Government — has the right to take any action which will
deprive a person of the enjoyment of these basic essentials.”
113. Human dignity was construed in M. Nagaraj v. Union of
India [M. Nagaraj v. Union of India, (2006) 8 SCC 212: (2007)
1 SCC (L&S) 1013] by a Constitution Bench of this Court to be
intrinsic to and inseparable from human existence. Dignity,
the Court held, is not something which is conferred and which
can be taken away, because it is inalienable: (SCC pp. 243 &
247-48, paras 26 & 42)
“26. … The rights, liberties and freedoms of the individual are
not only to be protected against the State, they should be
facilitated by it. … It is the duty of the State not only to protect
the human dignity but to facilitate it by taking positive steps
in that direction. No exact definition of human dignity exists.
It refers to the intrinsic value of every human being, which is
to be respected. It cannot be taken away. It cannot give (sic
be given). It simply is. Every human being has dignity by
virtue of his existence. …
***
42. India is constituted into a sovereign, democratic republic
to secure to all its citizens, fraternity assuring the dignity of
the individual and the unity of the nation. The sovereign,
democratic republic exists to promote fraternity and the
dignity of the individual citizen and to secure to the citizens
certain rights. This is because the objectives of the State can
be realised only in and through the individuals. Therefore,
rights conferred on citizens and non-citizens are not merely
individual or personal rights. They have a large social and
political content, because the objectives of the Constitution
cannot be otherwise realised.”
(emphasis supplied)
119. To live is to live with dignity. The draftsmen of the
Constitution defined their vision of the society in which
constitutional values would be attained by emphasising,
among other freedoms, liberty and dignity. So fundamental is
dignity that it permeates the core of the rights guaranteed to
the individual by Part III. Dignity is the core which unites the
fundamental rights because the fundamental rights seek to
achieve for each individual the dignity of existence. Privacy
with its attendant values assures dignity to the individual and
it is only when life can be enjoyed with dignity can liberty be
of true substance. Privacy ensures the fulfilment of dignity
and is a core value which the protection of life and liberty is
intended to achieve.” (Emphasis Supplied)
J. BECAUSE, while it is correct that the right to dignity and reputation
is not absolute. This Hon’ble Court in Puttaswamy has observed
that:-
“In the context of Article 21 an invasion of privacy must be

justified on the basis of a law which stipulates a procedure
which is fair, just and reasonable. The law must also be valid
with reference to the encroachment on life and personal
liberty under Article 21. An invasion of life or personal liberty
must meet the threefold requirement of (i) legality, which
postulates the existence of law; (ii) need, defined in terms of
a legitimate State aim; and (iii) proportionality which ensures
a rational nexus between the objects and the means adopted
to achieve them.
K. Because in Nikesh Tarachand Shah v. Union of India, (2018)
11 SCC 1, while holding that S.45 of PMLA violated Article 21 of the
Constitution, this Hon’ble Court held that after Maneka Gandhi and
RC Cooper, law under Article 21 implies due process, procedurally
and substantively :
“24. Article 21 is the Ark of the Covenant so far as the

Fundamental Rights Chapter of the Constitution is concerned.
It deals with nothing less sacrosanct than the rights of life and
personal liberty of the citizens of India and other persons. It
is the only article in the Fundamental Rights Chapter (along
with Article 20) that cannot be suspended even in an
emergency [see Article 359(1) of the Constitution]. At
present, Article 21 is the repository of a vast number of
substantive and procedural rights post Maneka
Gandhi v. Union of India [Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India,
(1978) 1 SCC 248] . Thus, in Rajesh Kumar [Rajesh
Kumar v. State, (2011) 13 SCC 706: (2012) 2 SCC (Cri) 836]
at pp. 724-26, this Court held: (SCC paras 56-63)
“56. Article 21 as enacted in our Constitution reads as
under:
’21. Protection of life and personal liberty.—No
person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty
except according to procedure established by law.’
57. But this Court in Bachan Singh [Bachan
Singh v. State of Punjab, (1980) 2 SCC 684 : 1980
SCC (Cri) 580] held that in view of the expanded
interpretation of Article 21 in Maneka Gandhi [Maneka
Gandhi v. Union of India, (1978) 1 SCC 248] , it
should read as follows: (Bachan Singh case [Bachan
Singh v. State of Punjab, (1980) 2 SCC 684 : 1980
SCC (Cri) 580] , SCC p. 730, para 136)
‘136. … “No person shall be deprived of his life or
personal liberty except according to fair, just and
reasonable procedure established by valid law.”
In the converse positive form, the expanded article
will read as below:
“A person may be deprived of his life or personal
liberty in accordance with fair, just and reasonable
procedure established by valid law.” ’
58. This epoch-making decision in Maneka Gandhi [Maneka
Gandhi v. Union of India, (1978) 1 SCC 248] has substantially
infused the concept of due process in our constitutional
jurisprudence whenever the court has to deal with a question
affecting life and liberty of citizens or even a person. Krishna
Iyer, J. giving a concurring opinion in Maneka
Gandhi [Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, (1978) 1 SCC 248]
elaborated, in his inimitable style, the transition from the
phase of the rule of law to due process of law. The relevant
statement of law given by the learned Judge is quoted below:
(SCC p. 337, para 81)
’81. … “Procedure established by law”, with its lethal
potentiality, will reduce life and liberty to a precarious
plaything if we do not ex necessitate import into those
weighty words an adjectival rule of law, civilized in its
soul, fair in its heart and fixing those imperatives of
procedural protection absent which the processual tail
will wag the substantive head. Can the sacred essence
of the human right to secure which the struggle for
liberation, with “do or die” patriotism, was launched
be sapped by formalistic and pharisaic prescriptions,
regardless of essential standards? An enacted
apparition is a constitutional illusion. Processual
justice is writ patently on Article 21. It is too grave to
be circumvented by a black letter ritual processed
through the legislature.’
59. Immediately after the decision in Maneka
another Constitution Bench of this Court rendered decision
in Sunil Batra v. State (UT of Delhi) [Sunil Batra v. State (UT
of Delhi), (1978) 4 SCC 494 : 1979 SCC (Cri) 155] specifically
acknowledged that even though a clause like the Eighth
Amendment of the United States Constitution and concept of
“due process” of the American Constitution is not enacted in
our Constitution text, but after the decision of this Court
in Rustom Cavasjee Cooper [Rustom Cavasjee
Cooper v. Union of India, (1970) 1 SCC 248] and Maneka
the consequences are the same. The Constitution Bench of
this Court in Sunil Batra [Sunil Batra v. State (UT of Delhi),
(1978) 4 SCC 494: 1979 SCC (Cri) 155] speaking through
Krishna Iyer, J. held: (Sunil Batra case [Sunil Batra v. State
(UT of Delhi), (1978) 4 SCC 494 : 1979 SCC (Cri) 155] , SCC
p. 518, para 52)
’52. True, our Constitution has no “due process”
clause or the Eighth Amendment; but, in this branch
of law, after Cooper [Rustom Cavasjee
Cooper v. Union of India, (1970) 1 SCC 248]
and Maneka Gandhi [Maneka Gandhi v. Union of
India, (1978) 1 SCC 248], the consequence is the
same.’
60. The Eighth Amendment (1791) to the Constitution of the
United States virtually emanated from the English Bill of
Rights (1689). The text of the Eighth Amendment reads,
“excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines
imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted”. The
English Bill of Rights drafted a century ago postulates, “That
excessive bail ought not to be required, nor excessive fines
imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted”.
61. Our Constitution does not have a similar provision but
after the decision of this Court in Maneka Gandhi
case [Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, (1978) 1 SCC 248]
jurisprudentially the position is virtually the same and the
fundamental respect for human dignity underlying the Eighth
Amendment has been read into our jurisprudence.
62. Until the decision was rendered in Maneka
Gandhi [Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, (1978) 1 SCC 248],
Article 21 was viewed by this Court as rarely embodying the
Diceyian concept of the rule of law that no one can be
deprived of his personal liberty by an executive action
unsupported by law. If there was a law which provided some
sort of a procedure it was enough to deprive a person of his
life or personal liberty. In this connection, if we refer to the
example given by S.R. Das, J. in his judgment in A.K.
Gopalan [A.K. Gopalan v. State of Madras, AIR 1950 SC 27 :
(1950) 51 Cri LJ 1383] that if the law provided the Bishop of
Rochester “be boiled in oil” it would be valid under Article 21.
But after the decision in Maneka Gandhi [Maneka
Gandhi v. Union of India, (1978) 1 SCC 248] which marks a
watershed in the development of constitutional law in our
country, this Court, for the first time, took the view that Article
21 affords protection not only against the executive action but
also against the legislation which deprives a person of his life
and personal liberty unless the law for deprivation is
reasonable, just and fair. And it was held that the concept of
reasonableness runs like a golden thread through the entire
fabric of the Constitution and it is not enough for the law to
provide some semblance of a procedure. The procedure for
depriving a person of his life and personal liberty must be
eminently just, reasonable and fair and if challenged before
the court it is for the court to determine whether such
procedure is reasonable, just and fair and if the court finds
that it is not so, the court will strike down the same.
63. Therefore, “law” as interpreted under Article 21 by this
Court is more than mere “lex”. It implies a due process, both
procedurally and substantively.”
L. The US Supreme Court decision in Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee
Committee v. McGrath (341 US 123(1951), while heavily relying
on due process held that the orgainsations that were included in the
list of designated communist organisation have the right to
challenge their designation. Justice Frankfurter in his concurring
judgment held that :-
“This designation imposes no legal sanction on these

organizations other than that it serves as evidence in ridding
the Government of persons reasonably suspected of
disloyalty. It would be blindness, however, not to recognize
that in the conditions of our time such designation drastically
restricts the organizations, if it does not proscribe them.
Potential members, contributors or beneficiaries of listed
organizations may well be influenced by use of the
designation, for instance, as ground for rejection of
applications for commissions in the armed forces or for
permits for meetings in the auditoriums of public housing
projects. Compare Act of April 3, 1948, § 110(c), 62 Stat. 143,
22 U.S.C. (Supp. III) §1508(c), 22 U.S.C.A. § 1508(c). Yet,
designation has been made without notice, without disclosure
of any reasons justifying it, without opportunity to meet the
undisclosed evidence or suspicion on which designation may
have been based, and without opportunity to establish
affirmatively that the aims and acts of the organization are
innocent. It is claimed that thus to maim or decapitate, on the
mere say-so of the Attorney General, an organization to all
outward-seeming engaged in lawful objectives is so devoid of
fundamental fairness as to offend the Due Process Clause of
the Fifth Amendment.
This Court is not alone in recognizing that the right to be heard
before being condemned to suffer grievous loss of any kind,
even though it may not involve the stigma and hardships of a
criminal conviction, is a principle basic to our society. Regard
for this principle has guided Congress and the Executive.
Congress has often entrusted, as it may, protection of
interests which it has created to administrative agencies
rather than to the courts. But rarely has it authorized such
agencies to act without those essential safeguards for fair
judgment which in the course of centuries have come to be
associated with due process. See Switchmen's Union of North
America v. National Mediation Board,
MANU/USSC/0143/1943: 320 U.S. 297, 64S.Ct. 95, 88 L.Ed.
61; Tutun v. United States, MANU/USSC/0134/1926: 270
U.S.568, 576, 577, 46 S.Ct. 425, 426, 70 L.Ed. 738;
Pennsylvania R. Co. v. United States Railroad Labor Board,
MANU/USSC/0176/1923 : 261 U.S. 72, 43 S.Ct. 278, 67
L.Ed.536.35 And When Congress has given an administrative
agency discretion to determine its own procedure, the agency
has rarely chosen to dispose of the rights of individuals
without a hearing, however informals.
The heart of the matter is that democracy implies respect for
the elementary rights of men, however suspect or unworthy;
a democratic government must therefore practice fairness;
and fairness can rarely be obtained by secret, one-sided
determination of facts decisive of rights.”
Presumption of innocence is a basic human right and the
present Amendment violates it.
M. Because notifying a person as a terrorist without hearing him or
even informing him of the grounds of his notification as a terrorist
violates the presumption of innocence which is a recognized human
right.
N. Because this Hon’ble Court in Ranjitsing Brahmajeetsing
Sharma v. State of Maharashtra, (2005) 5 SCC 294 observed as
under:
“35. Presumption of innocence is a human right.

(See Narendra Singh v. State of M.P. [(2004) 10 SCC 699:
2004 SCC (Cri) 1893], SCC para 31.) Article 21 in view of its
expansive meaning not only protects life and liberty but also
envisages a fair procedure. Liberty of a person should not
ordinarily be interfered with unless there exist cogent grounds
therefore Sub-section (4) of Section 21 must be interpreted
keeping in view the aforementioned salutary principles. Giving
an opportunity to the Public Prosecutor to oppose an
application for release of an accused appears to be reasonable
restriction but clause (b) of sub-section (4) of Section 21 must
be given a proper meaning.”
O. In Nitesh Tarakchand Shah v State of Maharashtra, it has
been observed that:-
“We must not forget that Section 45 is a drastic provision

which turns on its head the presumption of innocence which
is fundamental to a person accused of any offence. Before
application of a section which makes drastic inroads into the
fundamental right of personal liberty guaranteed by Article
21 of the Constitution of India, we must be doubly sure that
such provision furthers a compelling State interest for tackling
serious crime.”
Of course there is compelling state interest in countering terrorism,
however, it is submitted that essential human and constitutional
rights of individuals cannot be compromised.
THE AMENDMENT VIOLATES THE FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS OF

THE INDIVIDUALS UNDER ARTICLE 14 OF THE
CONSTITUTION
The Amendment is unjust, unreasonable and manifestly

arbitrary.
P. As per the Statement of Objects and Reasons, the Amendment was
necessitated to comply with various Security Council resolutions.
The question is whether domestic constitutional rights could be
subverted for the sake compliance with international obligations.
There are various International treaties and conventions, which say
that in fight against terrorism- human rights, should not be
compromised.
Q. Because the Amendment gives power to the Central Government to
declare an individual as a terrorist only if it believes that it is involved
in terrorism is arbitrary and violates Article 14 inasmuch as it is
manifestly arbitrary and gives unbridled powers to the Central
Government to declare an individual as a terrorist. It is a blanket

power with no specified guidelines. Though Terrorism has not been
defined under the Act.S.15 of the Act defines “terrorist act” and
includes an act that is “likely to threaten” of “likely to strike terror
in people”, gives unbridled power to the government to brand any
ordinary citizen including an activist without these acts being
actually committed. There is no requirement of giving reasons.
Further, S.35(3)of the Act, has also been amended and the
Amended provision reads as under:-
S.35(3) of the Act provides that:-
“For the purposes of sub section (2), an organization or an

individual shall be deemed to be involved in terrorism if it-
(e) commits or participates in acts of terrorism, or
(f) prepares for terrorism, or
(g) promotes or encourages terrorism, or
(h) is otherwise involved in terrorism”
A bare reading of S.35(3) of the Act will make it evidence that the
provision suffers from the vice of vagueness. There is no mention
of when an individual is deemed to have “committed”, “prepares”,
“promotes” or “otherwise involved in terrorism”. Commission,
preparation, promotion and involvement- Is it upon conviction of an
individual under the Act or at the stage of a mere registration of an
FIR.
The present S.36 and S.35 also do not contemplate any oral hearing
at any stage.
R. Because under the parent Act, u/s 35 the Central Government was
empowered to declare by notification an organization which it
believes is involved in terrorism. Membership of such terrorist
organization is an offence u/s 38. Giving support to such terrorist
organization is an offence u/s 39. S.40 makes raising funds for a
terrorist organization an offence. As the parent Act had sufficient
provisions to deal with individuals associated with Terrorist
organization, the present amendment appears to be unnecessary
and unwarranted and targets individuals who are not members of
any terrorist organization and who the Central Government believes
is involved in terrorism and can be subject to wanton abuse.
S. Because this Hon’ble Court in People’s Union for Civil Liberties
v. Union of India, (2004) 9 SCC 580 has observed that:
“15. The protection and promotion of human rights under the

rule of law is essential in the prevention of terrorism. Here
comes the role of law and court’s responsibility. If human
rights are violated in the process of combating terrorism, it
will be self-defeating. Terrorism often thrives where human
rights are violated, which adds to the need to strengthen
action to combat violations of human rights. The lack of hope
for justice provides breeding grounds for terrorism. Terrorism
itself should also be understood as an assault on basic rights.
In all cases, the fight against terrorism must be respectful to
the human rights. Our Constitution laid down clear limitations
on State actions within the context of the fight against
terrorism. To maintain this delicate balance by protecting
“core” human rights is the responsibility of court in a matter
like this. Constitutional soundness of POTA needs to be
judged by keeping these aspects in mind.”
T. Because in Shayara Bano v. Union of India and others, (2017)
9 SCC 1. The majority, in an exhaustive review of case law
under Article 14, which dealt with legislation being struck down on
the ground that it is manifestly arbitrary, has observed:
“87. The thread of reasonableness runs through the entire

fundamental rights chapter. What is manifestly arbitrary is
obviously unreasonable and being contrary to the rule of law,
would violate Article 14. Further, there is an apparent
contradiction in the three-Judge Bench decision in McDowell
[State of A.P. v. McDowell and Co., (1996) 3 SCC 709] when
it is said that a constitutional challenge can succeed on the
ground that a law is “disproportionate, excessive or
unreasonable”, yet such challenge would fail on the very
ground of the law being “unreasonable, unnecessary or
unwarranted”. The arbitrariness doctrine when applied to
legislation obviously would not involve the latter challenge but
would only involve a law being disproportionate, excessive or
otherwise being manifestly unreasonable. All the aforesaid
grounds, therefore, do not seek to differentiate between State
action in its various forms, all of which are interdicted if they
fall foul of the fundamental rights guaranteed to persons and
citizens in Part III of the Constitution.
Unreasonable Classification between the process of declaring

an association as “Unlawful” under Chapter II and declaring
an individual as a Terrorist under Chapter VI and this
classification has no valid nexus with the object it seeks to
achieve
U. Because the Amendment provides no safeguards to a person
notified as a terrorist. Challenging the notification is absence of
requirement to furnish grounds and oral hearing makes the process
practically inefficacious. The declaration of an association as
unlawful under chapter II requires the notification to specify the
ground on which notification is issued. S.3(3) of UAPA provides that
for the notification to be effective, the same has to be confirmed by
the Tribunal. Thereafter, u/s 4 the Tribunal has to follow a
procedure and is required to decide after notice to the association
to show cause. The inquiry and judicial determination process by
the tribunal is provided u/s 5. Further, S.6 provides that the
notification remains effective for a period of 5 years. However, the
process for declaration of an individual has no such safeguard.
There is no judicial adjudication- before a person is declared a
terrorist. In fact, the power to declare a person as a terrorist gives
unbridled power to the executive, without any statutory safeguards.
And the fact that the amendment does not provide any consequence
following a person’s notification as a terrorist, it is unclear what
object the amendment seeks to achieve. There is no reason behind
the classification and it has no nexus with object it seeks to achieve.

V. Since the power to declare an individual as a terrorist u/s 35 UAPA
impinges on the fundamental rights of an individual, required the
law to have greater safeguards. The safeguards should have been
greater to that provided to an unlawful association under Chapter
II. Absence of any statutory safeguard makes the provision
manifestly arbitrary.
Violation of Natural Justice Violates Article 14.
W. A bare reading of S. 36 and S.35 of the UAPA would show that there
is no oral hearing at any stage. Not only is an individual heard before
being designated a terrorist, he is also never informed of the
grounds on which he has been designated a terrorist. The
denotification process u/s S.36 and S.35 is rendered otiose because
neither is there any oral hearing before the Central Government or
the review committee nor is the individual ever informed of the
grounds on which he has been designated a terrorist. Hence, being
unaware of the reasons for his designation, an individual cannot no
effectively challenge the same.
X. The Constitution Bench of this Hon’ble Court in Union of India v.
Tulsiram Patel, (1985) 3 SCC 398 has observed that:-
“95. The principles of natural justice have thus come to be

recognized as being a part of the guarantee contained in
Article 14 because of the new and dynamic interpretation
given by this Court to the concept of equality which is the
subject-matter of that article. Shortly put, the syllogism runs
thus: violation of a rule of natural justice results in
arbitrariness which is the same as discrimination; where
discrimination is the result of State action, it is a violation of
Article 14: therefore, a violation of a principle of natural justice
by a State action is a violation of Article 14. Article 14,
however, is not the sole repository of the principles of natural
justice. What it does is to guarantee that any law or State
action violating them will be struck down. The principles of
natural justice, however, apply not only to legislation and
State action but also where any tribunal, authority or body of
men, not coming within the definition of State in Article 12, is
charged with the duty of deciding a matter. In such a case,
the principles of natural justice require that it must decide
such matter fairly and impartially.”
Y. S. 35(3) of the Act, does not elaborate when is the person
“otherwise involved in terrorism”. This provision so far as it is
applicable against an individual is vague and deserves to be set
aside.
Z. In Kartar Singh v State of Punjab, a constitution bench of this
Hon’ble Court held that :-
“130. It is the basic principle of legal jurisprudence that an

enactment is void for vagueness if its prohibitions are not
clearly defined. Vague laws offend several important values.
It is insisted or emphasized that laws should give the person
of ordinary intelligence a reasonable opportunity to know
what is prohibited, so that he may act accordingly. Vague laws
may trap the innocent by not providing fair warning. Such a
law impermissibly delegates basic policy matters to policeman
and also judges for resolution on an ad hoc and subjective
basis, with the attendant dangers of arbitrary and
discriminatory application. More so uncertain and undefined
words deployed inevitably lead citizens to ‘steer far wider of
the unlawful zone…. Than if the boundaries of the forbidden
areas were clearly marked”.
NO SAFEGUARDS AND CHILLING AFFECT ON FREE SPEECH

UNDER ARTICLE 19(1)(A)
AA. Because the Home Minister while introducing the legislation in Lok
Sabha had remarked that:-
“And then there are those who attempt to plant terrorist

literature and terrorist theory in the minds of the young.
Guns do not give rise to terrorists. The roots of terrorism is
the propaganda that is done to spread it, the frenzy that is
spread”
In response to Supriya Sule (Member of Parliament), he further
remarked:-
“those who work for Urban Maoists will not be spared”
BB. Because the Speech by the Home Minister in Parliament in support
of the bill displays the object behind by the legislation. The
unfettered power to the executive without any safeguards to notify
individuals as Terrorists can be abused to muzzle free speech and
abused by the executive to declare activists and dissenters as
Terrorists and hence would amount to chilling effect on free speech.

CC. This Hon’ble Court has held that the speeches made by the mover
of the Bill or Minister may be referred to for the purpose of finding
out the object intended to be achieved by the Bill (see K.S.
Paripoornan’s case ).
DD. BECAUSE J. S. Verma J in R.Y. Prabhoo (Dr.) v. P.K. Kunte, (1995)
7 SCALE 1 made extensive reference to the speech of the then Law
Minister Shri A.K. Sen for construing the word ‘his’ occurring in
subsection (3) of section 123 of the Representation of People Act
1951. Similarly, Supreme Court in P.V. Narsimha Rao v State, AIR
1998 SC 2120 agreeing with the view taken in Pepper v Hart (Supra)
has observed:
“It would thus be seen that as per the decisions of this Court,
the statement of the Minister who had moved the Bill in
Parliament can be looked at to ascertain mischief sought to
be remedied by the legislation and the object and purpose for
which the legislation is enacted. The statement of the Minister
who had moved the Bill in Parliament is not taken into account
for the purpose of interpreting the provision of the
enactment.” (Para 77).
The Supreme Court in Sushila Rani Vs. CIT and another, (2002) 2
SCC 697 referred to the speech of the Minister to find out the object
of ‘Kar Vivad Samadhan Scheme 1998’.
EE. The amendment has a chilling effect on free speech and exercise of
the fundamental right u/a 19(1)(a) of the Constitution.
PRAYERS
It is therefore most respectfully prayed that this Hon’ble Court may be
graciously pleased:
a) Issue a Writ of certiorari or any other appropriate writ to declare Section
35, of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 as amended by the
Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Amendment Act, 2019 to the extent it
applies to an Individual as unconstitutional and void as it violates Articles
14, Article 19(1)(a) and Article 21 of the Constitution of India; AND
b) Issue a Writ of certiorari or any other appropriate writ to declare Section
36, of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 as amended by the
Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Amendment Act, 2019 to the extent it
applies to an Individual as unconstitutional and void as it violates Articles
14, Article 19(1)(a) and Article 21 of the Constitution of India; AND
c) to pass any other or further orders as this Hon’ble Court may deem fit and
proper in the facts and circumstances of the present case.
AND FOR THIS ACT OF KINDNESS AND JUSTICE, THE PETITIONER, SHALL,
AS IN DUTY BOUND, EVER PRAY.
FILED BY:
____________
FAUZIA SHAKIL
Advocate for the Petitioner
Drafted by: Fauzia Shakil, Adv.

Drawn on: 21-08-2019
Filed on: 22-08-2019
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
CIVIL WRIT JURISDICTION
UNDER ARTICLE 32 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA
WRIT PETITION (C) NO. OF 2019
IN THE MATTER OF:
ASSOCIATION FOR PROTECTION OF CIVIL RIGHTS (APCR)

…PETITIONER
VERSUS
UNION OF INDIA …RESPONDENT
AFFIDAVIT
I, Abu Bakr Sabbaq, Aged about 34 years, S/o Mohd Enayatullah, R/O F-155,
Shaheen Bagh, Okhla, New Delhi-110025, do hereby solemnly affirm and
state as under:-
1. That I am the National Coordinator of the Petitioner Organisation. I am
well acquainted with the facts and circumstances of the present case and
competent to swear this affidavit.
2. The accompanying petition including Synopsis and List of Dates (pages B
to L), Writ Petition (pages 1 to 48 ) (paras 1 to 4 ) has been drafted
and filed by my counsel on my instructions and have been explained to
me. I have fully understood the contents of the same. The averments
contained therein are true and correct to the best of my knowledge and
belief. No part thereof is false and nothing material has been concealed
there from.
3. That the annexures to the accompanying Writ Petition are true copies of
their respective originals.

DEPONENT
VERIFICATION
Verified at New Delhi, on this the 22nd day of August, 2019 that the contents
of paragraph 1 to 3 of the present affidavit are true and correct to the best
of my knowledge and belief. Nothing material has been withheld there from.
DEPONENT

APCR Vs UOI

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SYNOPSIS

the Constitution of India challenging the Constitutional validity of Section 35

and Section 36 of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 (hereinafter

referred to as “UAPA”) as amended by the UAPA Amendment Act 2019, to

the extent it applies to an individual on the ground that it infringes the

Fundamental Rights guaranteed under Article 14, 19(1)(a), 21 of the

THE AMENDMENT VIOLATES THE RIGHTS OF THE INDIVIDUAL

process. Notifying an individual as a terrorist without giving him an

opportunity of being heard violates the individual’s right to reputation and

of the Constitution. Condemning a person unheard on a mere belief of the

Government is unreasonable, unjust, unfair, excessive, disproportionate and

denotified subsequently faces a lifelong stigma and this tarnishes his

reputation for life.

Additionally, S.35 does not mention when a person can be designated as

terrorist. Whether on a mere registration of an FIR or upon conviction in a

terrorism related case. Designating a person as a terrorist on a mere of the

belief of the Government is arbitrary and excessive. A person is never

informed of the grounds of his notification so the remedy of challenging his

notification S.36, provided for in the Act, is rendered practically otiose.

A bare perusal of the amendment would reveal that there is no criminal

consequence that follows a person’s designation as a terrorist. No new

offence has been created or new punishment provided. The amendment is

various Security Council resolutions. It is unclear as to what legitimate aim

does the State seek to achieve by declaring a person as a terrorist without

even providing an efficacious remedy to challenge his notification.

Firstly, the challenge to notification is before the same Central Government

application is made to a Review Committee. No oral hearing has been

provided at any stage. There is no requirement of furnishing to the person

designated as a terrorist the grounds of his designation, which renders the

entire process of challenging the notification nugatory. There is no judicial

unreasonable and violates procedural and substantive due process.

THE AMENDMENT VIOLATES THE FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS OF THE

The Amendment is unjust, unreasonable and manifestly arbitrary. As per the

Statement of Objects and Reasons, the Amendment was necessitated to

comply with various Security Council resolutions. The question is whether

domestic constitutional rights could be subverted for the sake compliance

with international obligations. There are various International treaties and

The Amendment gives unfettered power to the Central Government to

declare an individual as a terrorist only if it believes that it is involved in

terrorism is arbitrary and violates Article 14 inasmuch as it is manifestly

arbitrary and gives unbridled powers to the Central Government to declare

an individual as a terrorist. It is a blanket power with no specified guidelines.

terror in people”, gives unbridled power to the government to brand any

ordinary citizen including an activist without these acts being actually

committed. There is no requirement of giving reasons. Further, S.35(3)of the

S.35(3) of the Act provides that:-

suffers from the vice of vagueness. There is no mention of when an individual

is deemed to have “committed”, “prepares”, “promotes” or “otherwise

involved in terrorism”. Commission, preparation, promotion and involvement-

Is it upon conviction of an individual under the Act or at the stage of a mere

any oral hearing at any stage.

declare by notification an organization which it believes is involved in

terrorism. Membership of such terrorist organization is an offence u/s 38.

sufficient provisions to deal with individuals associated with Terrorist

organization, the present amendment appears to be unnecessary and

organization and who the Central Government believes is involved in

terrorism and can be subject to wanton abuse.

UNREASONABLE CLASSIFICATION BETWEEN THE PROCESS OF

The Amendment provides no safeguards to a person notified as a terrorist.