Memetic Warfare The Future of War PDF

FROM THE EDITOR
This issue features two articles by Colonel Franz, Chief, Information Dominance Center (IDC), ISAF and
Lieutenants Colonel Pendall and Steffen on how the International Security Assistance Command has
implemented an information–sharing architecture to create a comprehensive common operating picture
across the Afghan theater. The IDC is the most decisive information and knowledge management effort
ever executed in Afghanistan with a focus on governance and development, key aspects that most impact
the daily lives of Afghans.
Colonel Cox presents the case for a new intelligence discipline, Document Exploitation or DOMEX. He
presents the historical context and follows through to today’s operations with comments and recommen-
dations. Major Harris and Captain Bronson describe lessons learned and observations from the deploy-
ment of the first active duty Maneuver Enhancement Brigade to Afghanistan with the mission to manage
terrain and C2 operations. Major Assadourian discusses a holistic approach to developing security met-
rics. First Lieutenant Hancock explores the emerging field of Memetics and implications for memetic op-
erations in the military environment. Claudia Baisini and James Nyce make a case for the inclusion of
Experiential Learning techniques in traditional military training to meet the challenges of fighting in non-
traditional operating environments. Chief Warrant Officer Two Negron discusses the capabilities of the
Tactical Exploitation System-Forward for use in a Communications Intelligence function. Vee Herrington,
USAICoE’s Chief of the U.S. Army’s MI Library at Fort Huachuca, describes an ongoing experiment to in-
corporate eReaders into training.
Readers will also find articles on the 2010 MI Hall of Fame inductees and the 2010 recipient of the LTG
Weinstein Award within the issue. As the Doctrine reengineering efforts continue, we offer a focus article
on the recently released FM 2-0, Intelligence.
In an effort to catch up, the October December 2009 issue is now the July September 2010 issue. That
means there will be no October December 2009 issue. You will find all of the articles and information
scheduled for that issue in the July September 2010 issue. As the Editor, I apologize for any inconvenience
to both the writers and readers of MIPB. If you have any questions regarding this please email to MIPB@
conus.army.mil.
Mark your calendars: The 2010 Intelligence Warfighters Summit—The Critical Enabler for Full
Spectrum Operations is scheduled for 6 through 10 December at Fort Huachuca.
Sterilla A. Smith
Editor
MILITARY INTELLIGENCE
PB 34-10-2 Volume 36 Number 2 April - June 2010
Commanding General
Major General John M. Custer III
Deputy to the Commanding General FEATURES
Mr. Jerry V. Proctor
Deputy Commander for Training 11 Command’s Information Dominance Center Fuels Comprehensive
Colonel Dennis A. Perkins Operations
Acting Director, Directorate of Doctrine
by Colonel George J. Franz, Lieutenant Colonel David W. Pendall, and
Mr. Stephen B. Leeder Lieutenant Colonel Jeffery D. Steffen
15 Host Nation Information Requirements: Achieving Unity of Understanding
in COIN
by Colonel George J. Franz, Lieutenant Colonel David W. Pendall, and
Lieutenant Colonel Jeffery D. Steffen
22 DOMEX: The Birth of a New Intelligence Discipline
MIPB Staff:
by Colonel Joesph M. Cox
Editor 33 Tactically Tailoring the Maneuver Enhancement Brigade
Sterilla A. Smith
by Major Marilyn Harris and Captain Carolyn Bronson
Design Director
37 Security Metrics in COIN: Effects Based Analysis
Patrick N. Franklin
by Major Charles Assadourian
Design and Layout
41 Memetic Warfare: The Future of War
Patrick N. Franklin
Lawrence Boyd by First Lieutenant Brian J. Hancock
Cover Design
47 Lethal Theory: Some Implications
Lawrence Boyd by Claudia Baisini and James M. Nyce
62 eReader Technology as USAICoE
Inside Back Cover
by Vee Herrington, PhD and Captain Ryan Gerner
Patrick N. Franklin
65 TES SIGINT: A Conventional Warfare ELINT System Supporting an
Issue Photographs
Courtesy of the U.S. Army Unconventional COMINT Fight
by Chief Warrant Officer Two Raul Negron, Jr.
Purpose: The U.S. Army Intelligence

Center of Excellence publishes the
Military Intelligence Professional
Bulletin (MIPB) quarterly under the
provisions of AR 25-30. MIPB presents
DEPARTMENTS
information designed to keep intelli-
gence professionals informed of cur- 2 Always Out Front 61 2011 MI Corps Hall of Fame
rent and emerging developments within
3 CSM Forum Nomination Criteria
the field and provides an open forum
in which ideas; concepts; tactics, tech- 6 Doctrine Update: Focus on FM 2-0 69 Professional Reader
niques, and procedures; historical per- Inside Back Cover:
55 The Military Intelligence Corps
spectives; problems and solutions, etc.,
can be exchanged and discussed for 2010 Hall of Fame Inductees Weinstein Award Recipient
purposes of professional development .
Disclaimer: Views expressed are those

of the authors and not those of the By order of the Secretary of the Army:
Department of Defense or its elements.
Official:
The contents do not necessarily reflect
official U.S. Army positions and do not
change or supersede information in any
other U.S. Army publications.
JOYCE E. MORROW GEORGE W. CASEY JR.
Administrative Assistant to the General, United States Army
Secretary of the Army Chief of Staff
1018001
Always Out Front
Major General John M. Custer III
Commanding General
U.S. Army Intelligence Center and Fort Huachuca
Currently, the intelligence warfighting function in- will compete with some growing economies for
cludes a formidable set of capabilities across all technical advantage.
echelons from “mud-to-space.” This flexible force ÊÊ By 2020, organized crime is likely to thrive in
of personnel, organizations, and equipment collec- resource-rich states now experiencing political
tively provides commanders with the timely, rele- and economic transformation.
vant, accurate, predictive, and tailored intelligence ÊÊ By 2025, urban growth will concentrate in
they need. We provide the intelligence that continu- coastal areas. The majority of urban populations
ously supports the commander in visualizing the op- will live within 60 miles of coastlines.
erational environment (OE), assessing the situation, ÊÊ By 2030, the world’s urban population will be
and directing military actions through intelligence, over 4.9 billion fostering:
surveillance, and reconnaissance synchronization ÊÊ Interdependent economies.
and the other intelligence tasks. ÊÊ The interaction of differing societies and
The intelligence warfighting function is comprised cultures.
of nine powerful intelligence disciplines. Eight of ÊÊ More powerful non-state actors.
those disciplines essentially feed the discipline of ÊÊ Porous international boundaries.
all-source intelligence which in turn is focused on ÊÊ The inability of some nation-states to fully
the commanders’ requirements. Technological ad- control their territory, economy, and to pro-
vances have enabled single-discipline analysts to vide security and services.
leverage other analysts and information and to con- ÊÊ By 2030, competition for access to and control of
duct multi-discipline analysis to an extent not pos- natural resources (energy, water, and food) will
sible in the past. However, all-source intelligence is dramatically increase areas of potential conflict.
still the nexus that integrates information and in- ÊÊ “…Cyber security risks pose some of the most se-
telligence from all units and the other intelligence rious economic and national security challenges
disciplines. of the 21st Century” according to the Presidential
Future OEs will be greatly impacted by globaliza- Cyberspace Policy Review, May 2009.
tion. “Globalization and growing economic interde- The Joint Operational Environment 2010 observes
pendence, while creating new levels of wealth and that, “with very little investment, and cloaked in a
opportunity, also create a web of interrelated vul- veil of anonymity, our adversaries will inevitably at-
nerabilities and spreads risk even further, increas- tempt to harm our national interests. Cyberspace
ing sensitivity to crises and shocks around the globe will become a main front in both irregular and tradi-
and generating more uncertainty regarding their tional conflicts. Enemies in cyberspace will include
speed and effect” according to the National Defense both states and non-states and will range from the
Strategy, June 2008. unsophisticated amateur to highly trained profes-
Key aspects of globalization include— sional hackers. Through cyberspace, enemies will
ÊÊ Non-state groups, organized crime, and cultural target industry, academia, government, as well as
and environmental change will stress already the military in the air, land, maritime, and space
fragile social and political structures. domains.”
ÊÊ American science and technology communities, In future OEs as U.S. forces conduct increasingly
both commercial and Department of Defense, complex operations, Army intelligence will con-
(Continued on page 4)
2 Military Intelligence
CSM Forum
Command Sergeant Major Gerardus Wykoff
Command Sergeant Major
U.S. Army Intelligence Center and Fort Huachuca
Currently, the U.S. is in an era of persistent global completed a 15 month deployment to Iraq on
conflict. It is a new era where our warfighters have to December 2008 and is now preparing for another
think outside the box to understand and defeat our deployment in support of Operation Enduring
enemies of today. MI Soldiers must learn and adapt Freedom. One of the many success stories for the
the intelligence disciplines to support the warfighter 319th and 519th MI Battalions is Operation Defeat
in countering these threats to our Nation. Al Qaeda in the North; an operation employing
the gamut of intelligence sensors such as Human
I will be retiring in June 2010 after 26 years of
Intelligence (HUMINT), Counterintelligence (CI), Aerial
service to the U.S. Army and the Army Intelligence
Surveillance, Long Range Surveillance, and many
Corps and I would like to use this last opportu-
more.
nity to recount some of the MI success stories I
have witnessed and to remind MI Soldiers about Another BFSB that has astounded me is the 504th
their heritage. MI personnel have been a part of out of Fort Hood, Texas. The 504th BFSB has come
the Army since its founding in 1775, but it wasn’t a long way since its first unit designation as the
until July 1962 that a number of intelligence and 137th Signal Radio Intelligence Company (Aviation)
security organizations were combined to form this during World War II. Today, the 504th has a Network
branch of service. On 1 July 1987, the MI Corps Support Company, a Forward Support Company,
was activated as a regiment under the U.S. Army and a Long Range Surveillance Troop which fur-
regimental system. Currently, most of the Corps ther help our intelligence efforts across the globe.
falls under the U.S. Army Intelligence and Security
Command (INSCOM). INSCOM had originally been Let us not forget our MI efforts in South and
formed to meet the intelligence needs of the Cold Central America, led mainly by the 470th MI
War. However, by adapting and tailoring its multi- Brigade. With its aerial exploitation, interroga-
discipline capabilities, the command had success- tion, and electronic warfare battalions, the 470th
fully positioned itself for the 21st century and is MI Brigade continues to fight the good fight for
now prepared to confront an increasingly diverse U.S. Army Southern Command in countries such
world threat and the new menaces posed by terror- as Colombia, Honduras, and Argentina.
ism, weapons proliferation, and cyber war. I could continue to name all the MI units that
Throughout my time as the MI Corps Command bring the U.S. Army success, but I want to men-
Sergeant Major, I visited many MI units from tion the one MI brigade whose battalions strive to
around the world to observe training and opera- the fullest to create the Intelligence professionals
tions. With each visit, I noted great successes of for today and the future–the 111 th MI Brigade. The
our Corps. In the process, I have also noted areas 111 th continues to successfully shape and mold
where those units could improve. I’ve taken these our HUMINT and CI Soldiers, our Intelligence
notes back to the Intelligence Center of Excellence Analysts, our Imagery Analysts, and our Signals
here in Fort Huachuca, Arizona to better improve Intelligence Soldiers, our Intelligence officers
the training we provide to new Soldiers of the and warrant officers, and the newest addition to
Corps. the Fort Huachuca School house–the MOS 09L
Linguists.
During my travels I have seen the greatness
that there is in units such as the 525th Battlefield We should all understand that we are a nation in
Surveillance Brigade (BFSB) which successfully multiple conflicts and the mission to handle each
(Continued on page 5)
April - June 2010 3

tinue to prove even more critical by providing Army tional variables and civil considerations.
warfighting commanders with predictive, knowl- ÊÊ Develop more detailed and precise intelligence
edge-based intelligence. As stated in the National and knowledge against networks and indi-
Intelligence Strategy, August 2009, the Intelligence viduals to achieve unparalleled operational
Community (IC) must “Operate as a single inte- success. This requires a flexible intelligence
grated team, employing collaborative teams structure armed with the many necessary skill
that leverage the full range of IC capabilities sets prepared to task organize as required,
to meet the requirements of our users, from the thus becoming more agile.
President to deployed tactical military units.”
ÊÊ Proactively, rather than reactively, integrate
Some current conceptual documents postulate
new technology–for example, communications,
that future operations will be significantly differ-
information processing, sensing, and hand
ent from past operations in which intelligence was
held devices–and effectively tap into global
merely viewed as a supporting operation. Today, and
data and information stores. This will assist
in the future, intelligence must not only drive op-
Army intelligence in efficiently synchronizing
erations but precisely drive operations. Therefore,
the enterprise and managing the vast amounts
Army intelligence must be prepared to: of classified intelligence and open-source infor-
ÊÊ Operate in complex and urban terrain among mation (which is still growing exponentially).
the local population. This task requires a com- The endstate is to build an overarching feder-
bination of existing and new technical means ated and networked analytical enterprise.
and expanded collection capabilities to exploit
The challenge we must meet is to develop ag-
previously unexploited signatures.
ile, innovative, critically thinking, and culturally
ÊÊ Develop a new Military Intelligence (MI) mind-
aware MI Soldiers, leaders, and civilians for this
set and culture that includes expanded capa-
future OE. These professionals must possess a
bilities to conduct political, military, economic,
balance of interpersonal skills and technical com-
social, information, infrastructure, physical
petence necessary for an effective military team.
environment, and time collection, analysis,
Our future success relies upon methodical yet
and reporting. This includes the realization
creative and adaptable MI Soldiers and leaders
that understanding the dynamics of the lo-
that are not risk-adverse and can find a way to
cal population and culture in stability opera-
meet the commander’s requirements.
tions can often be as important as maneuver
against and targeting of threat cells and orga- I am confident that the intelligence warfighting
nizations. Most operations in the future will function and the MI Corps are up to these chal-
continue to center on people, requiring an in- lenges and we will continue to make very significant
telligence force with a firm grasp of the opera- contributions to our Army.
Always Out Front!
(Continued from page 2)
of these conflicts will always entail intelligence re- “Quiet Professionals” will always prevail in times
quirements. Every day, these intelligence require- need. Before I close, I want to remind you all of the
ments need to be fulfilled by strong-willed Soldiers creed that defines the Intelligence professional:
who extract, analyze, and report information in or-
der to help combat commanders make timely deci-
sions, save lives, and neutralize enemy threats to
their missions and their Soldiers. I am a Soldier first
but an Intelligence Professional
One point I have always tried to make with many
second to none.
of the units I have visited is that Army Intelligence
is not just fighting our wars and battles in foreign With pride in my heritage,
lands, but from our own soil as well. As you are but focused on the future.
reading this, a CI Soldier is working to keep our Performing the first task of an Army
nation safe by protecting our intelligence informa-
tion; an Imagery Analyst is receiving aerial imagery To find, know, and never lose the enemy.
from different battle fronts and analyzing the im-
ages to provide intelligence products. Bottom line With a sense of urgency and of tenacity,
up front–an MI Soldiers does not need to have a Professional and physical fitness,
combat patch to show that he or she is taking part
in the fight. And above all:
Integrity–for in truth lies victory.
I want to thank all of the Soldiers of our beloved
MI Corps. Without your efforts, our Armed Forces Always at silent war while ready for a shooting
would be blind in battle. Although the U.S. Military war; the silent warrior of the Army team.
is in a struggle for the long-haul on several different
fronts around the world, your professionalism and
dedication as MI Soldiers has always and will always Soldiers of the MI Corps, thank you for your ex-
keep our ground commanders one more step ahead cellent service to the Army and the United States
of our foes. I am proud to know that this Corps of of America.
Always Out Front!
Army Strong!
(Continued from page 3)
April - June 2010 5

Focus on FM 2-0
by Major Michael A. Brake and Sterilla A. Smith
FM 2-0 Intelligence (March 2010), the Army’s keystone manual for Military Intelligence (MI), introduces
several major changes to intelligence doctrine.
Recent lessons learned from various operational
environments (OE), extensive transformational
changes in MI structure, and major revisions
in Joint and other Army doctrine dictated revi-
sions to this FM.
The Army’s operational concept is full spec-
trum operations within diverse OEs requir-
ing continuous, simultaneous combinations
of offensive, defensive, and stability or civil
support operations. Intelligence facilitates
understanding of portions of the operational
and mission variables (i.e., enemy, terrain
and weather, and civil considerations) to sup-
port the commander in decisionmaking pro-
cess to achieve success on the battlefield. The
most important role of intelligence is to drive
operations by supporting the commander’s
Relationship between the Operations and Intelligence Processes
decisionmaking.
New Concepts and Emerging Capabilities within FM 2-0

The Intelligence Warfighting Function, replacing the MI Battlefield Operating System concept, is one
of six warfighting functions (movement and maneuver, intelligence, fires, sustainment, command and con-
trol and protection.) It is the related tasks and systems that facilitate understanding of the OE, enemy,
terrain, and civil considerations. The effectiveness of the intelligence warfighting function is measured
against these criteria: accuracy, timeliness, usability, completeness, precision, and reliability. Effective
intelligence must also be relevant, predictive, and tailored to support the commander’s concept of the
operation.
Within the FM, the intelligence tasks are updated to include: support to force generation; intelligence,
surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR); support to situational understanding, and support to targeting
and information superiority, all of which are driven by the needs of the commander.
The intelligence warfighting function architecture, a flexible force of personnel, organizations, and equip-
ment also provides specific intelligence and communication structures at each echelon from national
through tactical levels.
The Intelligence Process was updated to combine the collection and processing steps and to place
greater emphasis on the Commander’s Input as commanders are responsible for driving the intelligence
process. While it is not a part of the intelligence process itself, commander’s input is the primary mecha-
nism used to focus the intelligence warfighting function. Information gained through the “assess continu-
ing activity” triggers the intelligence staff to request the commander’s input.
The commander’s input directly influences a unit’s ISR effort. Each commander determines which in-
telligence products are developed as well as the products’ formats. Commanders provide input at their
discretion and at any point during the intelligence process. The staff must then carefully focus ISR plans
on answering the commander’s requirements and enable the quick retasking of units and assets as the
situation changes.
For intelligence purposes, there are three types of requirements that result from ISR synchronization–
PIRs, intelligence requirements,
and information requirements.
Each requirement is broken
down into discrete pieces to an-
swer that requirement. These
pieces are referred to as indi-
cators and specific information
requirements (SIRs), which fa-
cilitate the answering of the re-
quirements. The indicators and
SIRs are used by ISR planners
to develop the ISR plan. The il-
lustration (right) shows the pro-
cess of developing requirements
and integrating them into the
ISR process.
Requirements development and integration into the ISR process
FM 2-0 now defines an intelligence requirement as a type of information requirement developed

by subordinate commanders and the staff (including subordinate staffs) that requires dedicated
ISR collection for the elements of threat, terrain and weather, and civil considerations. Intelligence
requirements must be answered to facilitate operations. They require ISR collection assets to be assigned
for their collection, second in priority to PIRs.
Another change to the Intelligence Process
was the addition of a fourth continuing ac-
tivity occurring across the four steps of the
intelligence process, Generate Intelligence
Knowledge. This activity formalizes the in-
telligence description of the OE with appro-
priate emphasis on operational (PMESII-PT)
and mission (METT-TC) considerations.
Generate intelligence knowledge is a con-
tinuous user defined activity driven by the
commander. It begins before mission receipt
and continues throughout the operation by
providing the necessary relevant knowledge
about the OE for the conduct of operations.
This activity occurs whenever there is a need
to analyze and understand the broad scope
of the OE beyond the narrow focus of a spe-
cific mission.
The Intelligence Process
It serves as the foundation for performing intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) and mission
analysis. As soon as the intelligence officer and other staff sections begin to collect data on the OE, they
organize that data into databases that meet the commander’s visualization requirements. The primary
products of generating intelligence knowledge are the initial data files and the initial intelligence survey.
April - June 2010 7

Generate intelligence knowledge continues beyond the initial planning of the mission and provides addi-
tional context to the mission-specific planning that occurs after the initial IPB.
Generate intelligence knowledge includes five tasks. Each of the first four tasks is translated into a da-
tabase or data files based on the commander’s guidance to support his visualization:
ÊÊ Develop the foundation to define threat characteristics.
ÊÊ Obtain detailed terrain information and intelligence.
ÊÊ Obtain detailed weather and weather effects information and intelligence.
ÊÊ Obtain detailed civil considerations information and intelligence.
ÊÊ Complete studies.
Generate intelligence knowledge is also the basis for developing a unit’s initial Intelligence Survey.
Developing the intelligence survey is a process that assists intelligence officers in identifying ISR asset col-
lection capabilities and limitations within the projected area of operations (AO) for potential employment
in support of force generation. Developing the intelligence survey is a five step process:
ÊÊ Develop comprehensive information, collection capability, and analytical baselines for the projected AO.
ÊÊ Determine key intelligence gaps.
ÊÊ Determine key gaps in analytical and ISR collection capabilities.
ÊÊ Develop an understanding of the information and intelligence that can be collected with unit intelli-
gence assets and, when appropriate, ISR assets in the projected AO, as well as how and where it may
best be collected.
ÊÊ Determine a method of understanding when changes to the information, collection capability, or ana-
lytical baselines occur that are significant or of intelligence interest.
The intelligence survey is developed over time and continuously updated. It provides the unit intelligence
officer with an initial assessment that forms the basis for recommending intelligence asset apportionment
and the best use of the unit’s intelligence assets within the projected AO. It takes into account technical
and tactical considerations across all disciplines. For example, one portion of the projected AO may be un-
suited for unit Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) asset collection due to terrain or lack of threat transmitters.
The same area may be well suited for human intelligence (HUMINT) collection teams (HCTs). The intelli-
gence officer may recommend to the commander that unit SIGINT collection assets not be deployed to that
area and that additional HCTs would be a valuable source of intelligence collection in that same area.
This assessment includes determining what nonstandard ISR assets, including quick reaction capabili-
ties and off-the-shelf capabilities and systems, are available. Additionally, when reviewing concept plans
and operation plans, intelligence officers use the intelligence survey to update the plan based on new tech-
nologies, capabilities, or sources of information and intelligence.
The survey also assists in determining what communication capabilities will be required for projected intelli-
gence operations and addresses any apparent gaps in intelligence standing operating procedures. Additionally,
it is the basis for determining what additional or specialized intelligence assets the unit may require.
Within the framework of the intelligence warfighting function, the intelligence tasks and the intelli-
gence process, intelligence personnel focus further on conducting intelligence from an Army Intelligence
Enterprise perspective. An enterprise is a cohesive organization whose structure, governance systems,
and culture support a common purpose. This approach educates and empowers leaders to take a holistic
view of organizational objectives and processes. It encourages leaders to act cohesively, for the good of the
whole, to achieve required output with greater efficiency.
The Army intelligence enterprise is the sum total of the networked and federated systems, and efforts of
MI personnel (including collectors and analysts), sensors, organizations, information, and processes that
allow the focus necessary to use the power of the entire intelligence community. Its purpose is to provide
technical support and guidance as well as an information and intelligence architecture that efficiently and
effectively synchronizes ISR operations and intelligence analysis and production to produce intelligence to
support the commander’s situational understand-
ing. The illustration (right) exemplifies the tactical
portion of the Army intelligence enterprise.
As an emerging capability, the Distributed
Common Ground Station-Army (DCGS-A) provides
a net-centric, enterprised ISR, weather, geospatial
engineering, and space operations capability to or-
ganizations of all types, at all echelons—from battal-
ion to joint task force levels. DCGS-A will be the ISR
component of the modular and future force Battle
Command System and the Army’s primary system
for ISR tasking, posting, processing, and conducting
analysis concerning the threat, terrain and weather,
and civil considerations at all echelons.
DCGS-A core functions are:
ÊÊ Receipt and processing of selected ISR sensor
data.
ÊÊ Control of selected Army sensor systems.
ÊÊ Facilitation of ISR synchronization.
ÊÊ Facilitation of ISR integration.
ÊÊ Fusion of sensor information. Example of the tactical portion of the Army intelligence enterprise
ÊÊ Direction and distribution of relevant threat information and intelligence.
ÊÊ Facilitation of the distribution of friendly and environmental (weather and terrain) information.
Other New Concepts and Emerging Capabilities
Biometrics Enabled Intelligence is the intelligence information associated with biometrics data that
matches a specific person or unknown identity to a place, activity, device, component, or weapon that sup-
ports terrorist or insurgent networks and related pattern analysis; facilitates high-value individual target-
ing; reveals movement patterns, and confirms identities (DODD 8521).
Commanders require the ability to link identity information to a given individual. Biometric systems are
employed to deny threat forces freedom of movement within the populace and to positively identify known
threats. These systems collect biometric data and combine them with contextual data to produce an elec-
tronic dossier on the individual.
The ability to positively identify and place an individual within a relevant context adds a level of certainty
that significantly enhances the overall effectiveness of the mission. Personal identification enabled by bio-
metric technology can help identify and locate specific individuals in support of targeting. This capability is
necessary for force protection and security missions as well as when an operational capability is required
to achieve an advantage in all operational themes and across the spectrum of conflict.
Human Terrain Analysis Teams assist with socio-cultural research and analysis. As part of build-
ing their situational understanding, commanders consider how culture (both their own and others within
the AO) affects operations. Culture is examined as part of the mission variable-civil considerations.
Understanding the culture of a particular society or group within a society significantly improves the
force’s ability to accomplish the mission.
Document and Media Exploitation (DOMEX) is the systematic extraction of information from all media in re-
sponse to commander’s collection requirements. When conducted properly, DOMEX operations are intended to:
ÊÊ Maximize the value of intelligence gained from captured enemy documents.
ÊÊ Provide the commander with timely and relevant intelligence to effectively enhance awareness of the
enemy’s capabilities, operational structures, and intent.
April - June 2010 9

ÊÊ Assist in criminal prosecution or legal processes by maintaining chain of custody procedures and pre-
serving the evidentiary value of captured materials.
For DOMEX products to be a force multiplier, the rapid exploitation of captured materials must occur
at the lowest echelon possible. DOMEX assets pushed down to the tactical level provide timely and ac-
curate intelligence support to warfighters. This practice not only enables rapid exploitation and evacua-
tion of captured materials, but also hastens the feedback commanders receive from the higher echelon
analysis.
Red Teaming provides commanders with an enhanced capability to explore alternatives during plan-
ning, preparation, execution, and assessment. Whenever possible, commanders employ red teams to ex-
amine plans from a threat’s perspective. A red team is a special staff section whose members primarily
participate in planning future operations and plans cells unless integrated into another cell. Red team
members anticipate cultural perception of partners, enemies, adversaries, and others. They conduct inde-
pendent critical reviews and analyses.
Red teaming provides commanders alternative perspectives by challenging planning assumptions, as-
sisting in defining the problem and end state, identifying friendly and enemy vulnerabilities, and iden-
tifying assessment measures. These alternative perspectives help commanders account for the threat
and environment in plans, concepts, organizations, and capabilities. These perspectives also address the
standpoints of multinational partners, enemies, adversaries, and others in the AO.
Actionable intelligence is an example of bringing the characteristics of effective intelligence together
with the effective integration of intelligence into ongoing operations to support the commander. Army per-
sonnel have used the concept of actionable intelligence to reflect the joint concept of critical intelligence.
In current operations, the concept of actionable intelligence is used by Army personnel to describe infor-
mation that answers operational requirements (See JP 2-0). Army personnel also use it to describe specific
commander’s guidance in the attack guidance matrix to a sufficient degree and with sufficient reliability
to support the commander’s targeting decisions.
Ideally, the staff thoroughly integrates intelligence into the operations process to ensure the collection
and reporting of timely, relevant, accurate, predictive, and tailored information and intelligence. This in-
tegration is accomplished by using the characteristics of effective intelligence as well as conducting a
successful ISR plan through detailed ISR synchronization and integration, so commanders can fight the
threat based on knowledge rather than assumptions.
Critical thinking is disciplined reasoning which allows individuals to formulate ideas about what to be-
lieve or do. It involves determining the meaning and significance of what is observed or expressed. It also
involves determining whether adequate justification exists to accept conclusions as true, based on a given
inference or argument.
Critical thinking is essential to understanding situations, identifying problems, finding causes, arriving
at justifiable conclusions, and formulating sound courses of action. The intelligence staff must be able to
tell the commander clearly and accurately “what they know and why they know it; what they think and
why they think it.”
Other Additions and Updates

The number of intelligence disciplines addressed in FM 2-0 has increased from seven to nine by adding
Geospatial Intelligence and Open Source Inelligence.
An appendix has been added to discuss the general content of the Intelligence Running Estimate, the
Intelligence Estimate, and the Intelligence Summary.
The language support appendix has been updated adding to include a discussion of language
technology.
April - June 2010 11
Host Nation Information Requirements:
Achieving Unity of Understanding in COIN
The opinions contained are those of the authors and do not reflect the views of NATO, the U.S. Department of
Defense or the U.S. Army.
Reprinted from Small Wars Journal, posted 15 January 2010 at http://smallwarsjournal.com/blog/journal/
docs-temp/348-franz.pdf.
by Colonel George J. Franz, Lieutenant Colonel David W. Pendall,

and Lieutenant Colonel Jeffery D. Steffen
Introduction
Understanding the complex operational environ- tion requirements (CCIR). More than just asking
ment (OE) in Afghanistan means seeing the local the right questions, the ISAF and Afghan operat-
conditions and activities and how they affect peo- ing forces along with civilian partners in the field,
ple’s lives. If the Government of the Islamic Republic must understand what the answers are that will
of Afghanistan (GIRoA) and NATO’s International drive resources and prioritization, providing bet-
Security Assistance Force-Afghanistan (ISAF) are ter insight into the real issues and perceptions at
truly focused on gaining the support of the peo- local levels. The IJC has created a reporting sys-
ple, we must better understand the lens through tem and fusion process to bring this information
which the people are watching our efforts play out to the command in a timely, accurate and com-
and we must know what may drive them away prehensive way.
from supporting the government. This means un- The Need for HNIR, Why Now?
derstanding not only the nature of the threats to Things have gotten worse for the Afghan people
security posed by negative influences, insurgents, since 2005. Despite significant financial and secu-
and terrorists but also the aspects of Governance rity contributions of the international community
and Development that most impact their daily lives. and from the Afghan people, in terms of dollars,
Host Nation Information Requirements (HNIR) is a time and lives, many areas of Afghanistan are now
category of reporting on these critical factors affect- less secure and less governed. The reasons are
ing the people in Afghanistan. likely two-fold: a strategy that embraced counter-
More important than the structure of government, insurgency (COIN) concepts but failed to apply it at
people are most concerned about the extension of the operational and local levels, and a near-absence
governmental services and the ability for their na- of synchronicity coupled with disunity of effort
tional and local officials to deliver basic necessities among ISAF, the International Community and the
and support for a functioning community–to include Government of Afghanistan, to include the Afghan
security. But the OE in Afghanistan is much more security ministries. These two root problems have
complex, nuanced and dynamic than just answering been identified by informed and not-so informed ob-
the question of satisfactory governance–rendering a servers. The inability to adjust course has been sty-
basic collection of facts, polling data, anecdotal ref- mied by inertia to change, organizational culture,
erences and statistics insufficient for true under- complacency, in some cases apathy and greed; and
standing within the partnered commands. perhaps most importantly, an inability to develop,
The ISAF Joint Command (IJC) instituted a bot- see, share, and understand information falling out-
tom up, inclusive information system to answer side traditional information spheres.
key information gaps and assist ISAF and Afghan The current doctrinal approach to CCIR in a COIN
Partners with clear commander critical informa- environment is insufficient to address the key el-

ements that affect the perceptions and support of
the population. This information gap hovers directly
over the Center of Gravity in a COIN environment–
the people’s support to the Host Nation government.
With this informational gap, commanders in the
past have been served disparate bits of information
from across the staff, functional experts, battlefield
circulation, and special advisors. There was no de-
liberate mechanism or process to effectively iden-
tify, share, analyze, and disseminate the crucially
important, population-centric information within
the current bounds of CCIR. There must be an ex-
pansion or broadening of the definition of Critical
Information.
The U.S. Army’s manual for COIN and NATO
guidelines emphasize the importance of the support is not available, the gap is there because the infor-
of the local population as both the national govern- mation is not viewed as operationally critical infor-
ment and insurgency vie for power, authority, influ- mation and is not systematically shared, processed,
ence, and active support. With the populace actively and analyzed as part of the CCIR.
supporting the national and local government, the Provincial reconstruction teams (PRTs) diligently
support for the insurgency withers. Careful and de- report information about projects, key district lead-
liberate operations further relegate insurgents to ers, status of infrastructure and “atmospherics.”
the extreme margins of society with no tangible in- Within the same operational space, the U.S. Army
fluence over the population. So, if this is the crux of Corps of Engineers, nongovernmental organiza-
the issue–societal and political competition involv- tions (NGOs), combat forces, host nation partners,
ing the use of coercive force, then we require a bet- and the media all report similar or widely dissimi-
ter means to design, collect and assess the critical lar information within an alphabet soup of report-
components of the OE that produce a supportive ing channels and independent information sharing
population, and feed that assessment into the COIN processes. And in the end, the commander and se-
operational decisionmaking processes. nior staff are left to sort out the answers to some of
NATO CCIR currently contains three primary com- the most important questions in the COIN environ-
ponents; one is threat-focused, one details the comment. Expanding the CCIR to include information
mander’s own forces, and the third is oriented on gathered on the influencers of the population from
operational security priorities. Closing the informa- within the area of operations and establishing an
tion gap between threat forces, commonly under- effective data sharing and reporting system would
stood as priority intelligence requirements (PIR) and close this information gap.
friendly force information requirements (FFIR) and The key to enabling the military command-
essential elements of friendly information (EEFI), is ers at the local level in the districts and prov-
the key to operating effectively in a counterinsur- inces of Afghanistan is accurately representing
gency. Within this gap lie many answers and the in- their requirements as they shape, clear, hold,
sight to address operational and tactical decisions and build within their battlespace. These deci-
about where to adjust operations, apply additional sions of military, but more importantly, civilian
resources, engage with key civil leaders, and im- capacity-building resource allocation are dis-
prove support to essential services. cussed, prioritized, integrated, and funded in the
This gap exists because of the many organiza- national- and sub-national working groups. HNIR
tional approaches and often stove piped staff pro- provides that holistic view of the local operating
cesses used to gather information regarding the environment and will empower key leaders with
population and the civil environment. Said another the necessary assessments to negotiate within
way–the gap is not there because the information authoritative working groups that make district-
level decisions. Indeed, the IJC must advocate the The intelligence function is an important compo-
local commander’s district-level awareness across nent in answering the HNIR but the preponderance
the spectrum of operations into the decisionmak- of information will come from unclassified contrib-
ing processes of military, governmental, nongov- utors. The information is available in a variety of
ernmental, and civilian organizations. Only then reporting processes or can be readily obtained by
will the Regional Commands and subordinate el- overt means, and often from non-military sources.
ements benefit from the unity of effort across all Whereas intelligence is usually related to data and
levels of command and government. specific information an enemy is deliberately try-
ing to conceal or keep secret, the information on
What are HNIRs?
the friendly nation characteristics and local cir-
HNIRs represent a commander-driven cultural
cumstances is visible and collectable in the normal
change within the ISAF Joint Command. They are
course of operations and trust-based interaction
more than just questions─they are tailored and are
among partners in a COIN environment. Certainly,
the “right questions” to drive effective population
there is a place for intelligence collection to provide
based COIN. HNIR enable the commander to make
certain details and discern the existence of decep-
informed decisions and allow him to more effec-
tion or bias within the HNIR, but the vast majority
tively conduct the full spectrum of military and ci-
of the information is openly exchanged.
vilian activities that will achieve popular support for
government. Information at local levels is system- Specific examples of HNIR may include:
atically collected by organizations across the com- ÊÊ What influences are inhibiting the extension of
mand, fused, and analyzed to produce knowledge governance in district X? (Governance)
and understanding. ÊÊ Who are the key influencers and community
HNIR is information the commander needs about leaders that will determine the right projects for
friendly nation institutions or organizations in order economic development? (Development)
to partner effectively, develop plans, make decisions, ÊÊ What partnership activities should we take to
and integrate with civilian activities. Depending on ensure sustainable freedom of movement for the
the circumstances, information may include the population? (Security)
status of provincial, district or local governance, ÊÊ What resources are required to facilitate the ac-
economic development, infrastructure, or security cess to justice for the district Y? (Justice)
forces. Other examples include: ÊÊ What grievances are present and are inhibiting
ÊÊ Popular support–sympathizers and active supporters. trust between the local tribal elders and the dis-
ÊÊ Population conditions, beliefs, and structures. trict administrators? (Governance)
ÊÊ Infrastructure, services, and economy. ÊÊ Where and when can we enhance the growth of
government capacity to serve the population?
ÊÊ Governance development, capacity, and tactics–
(Governance)
central government, engagement/empowerment
of traditional governmental structures, overall Understanding with Context
governance, power brokers. We approached the development of HNIR with a
ÊÊ Host Nation security force development, capac- key related question at the forefront of the process
ity, and impacts (tactical and institutional.) design: How can we contextualize the HNIR ques-
The scope of HNIR is designed to be compre- tions to help our experts identify collectable data
hensive. These information requirements are far and information that will lead to an informed as-
broader than “intelligence,” rely on functional ex- sessment supporting the commander’s decisions?
perts and integrated processing, and every orga- Examples: The number of sitting judges (data
nization is a potential contributor and “sensor” in point) doesn’t matter to the Rule of Law if they see
the field. The challenge is to harness the staff ex- no cases nor make judgments (harder to measure).
pertise and information flow to inform the com- What would indicate change in the Rule of Law?
mander and staff so that the context, subtleties, How about tribally accepted Informal Justice? In
and biases inherently important in COIN are sur- fact, thinking through the judicial question leads
faced and understood. to another─how to assess satisfaction with the ju-

dicial system, formal or otherwise. For instance, Why is this different? It is about maneuver-
while a district may have a full complement of ing information to the commander. It is about
three judges and supporting administrative staff, achieving more effective partnership through
the population may not assess the judicial system shared “unity of understanding.”
as effectively rendering justice if the judges don’t
see many cases, are viewed as corrupt, or do not
Enabling HNIR
make timely rulings. Enabling and synchronizing HNIR integration is
a cross-organization, multi-functional, and unity
If a project is being considered for a local com-
of effort driven task. Full-time and thematic analy-
munity, has that project been approved by local
sis will coalesce at a single location with tethers
elders and village leadership or is it being pushed
from the information integration center reaching
from a higher level official without consultation in
back to each staff specialty and their experts. This
the community for actual need or support? Are the
center will rely upon central databases ingesting
funds flowing through the province to the district
classified and unclassified information from mul-
and then to the community contractor? Is the con-
tiple sources and agencies providing data and as-
tracted price fair or is the price a reflection of cor-
sessment at all levels of operations, in and outside
ruption and graft?
the area of operations. This brings challenges of
While these examples can seem like simple “met- size and composition of the analysis cell and the
rics,” and it is true they may serve that purpose, access to the central databases for all organiza-
they also provide answers to the fundamental and tions who traditionally have provided limited hori-
contextually important questions required to assess zontal dissemination of data.
the OE in terms of seeing the terrain and under-
standing the perspectives of the population. The commander, through HNIR, will drive the
process which will provide continuous friendly
The commander must be served with answers to
nation analysis essential to effectively executing
real and complex issues without losing context as
the operations process. To develop initial require-
data is brought forward and presented as “truth.”
ments and to answer the overarching questions
If the commander is served only with threat infor-
that would best support the commander and deci-
mation (PIR) and friendly force information (FFIR),
sionmaking process, command intent documents,
decisions can (and often do) skew toward security
doctrinal references, interagency studies, and ISAF
operations and leave civil considerations and capac-
headquarters sources were available, all address-
ity questions unresolved. If we go too fast in the se-
ing key aspects of COIN.
curity line of operations we may outpace efforts in
governance and development, leading to unmet ex- Developing an approach to organize, prioritize,
pectations and worse yet, failure, in the eyes of the and synchronize the development, sharing, analysis,
population. We then have a net loss in popular sup- and dissemination of the HNIR started with lever-
port and trust, creating new conditions for the in- aging the Intelligence Process and following the six
surgents to exploit. adapted intelligence, surveillance, and reconnais-
sance synchronization activities: Develop require-
With HNIR in place, we can better assess and un-
ments, develop HNIR synchronization plan, support
derstand the whole environment and Host Nation ca-
HNIR integration, disseminate, assess HNIR opera-
pability, thus synchronizing all efforts through HNIR
tions, and update HNIR operations.
information sharing and ground up, local refinement.
The GIRoA governance and security partners, nongov- The horizontal integration of HNIR analysis is the
ernmental partners, PRTs, and ISAF forces that have key to ensuring current understanding of the nu-
the boots and “shoes” on the ground will gather and ances and subtleties in the OE throughout the staff
share this information. ISAF Joint Command forces and the staff integration and synchronization events
and partners will support and enable a common situ- at the headquarters. Leveraging web based tools for
ational awareness through coordinated and synchro- full and open access to assessments and specific in-
nized reporting and sharing of information with Host tegrated staff products will be the basis of effective
Nation, international organizations, national embassy sharing. A complementary dissemination process
staffs and United Nation’s (UN) representatives. will be deliberate dissemination to all organizations,
internal and external to the command, based on spe- provide subject matter experts to work in and with
cific informational requirements. an analytical cell designed to integrate HNIR assess-
ments across the headquarters.
Enabling the Command: Building the
Process, the Team, and Making this Step 1: Identify Advocacy and Expertise:
Work ÊÊ Within the IJC and ISAF staff functions.
Assessing and updating HNIR operations will fall ÊÊ Within governmental and NGOs from both the
on a cross functional center and working group that international community and Afghanistan.
reviews the quality, quantity, analysis, and produc-
ÊÊ Within IJC subordinate commands and the
tion cycle to ensure the HNIR are answered appro-
ANSF.
priately for the commander.
ÊÊ Within professional specialties from both inter-
Expertise and Partnership. It became clear that national community and Afghanistan.
each staff element would be able to provide only a
portion of the information required, leaving the chal- Endstate: A fully developed contact network along
lenge to assign and qualify staff advocacy for each organizational and professional authorities and ex-
HNIR. This responsibility would require the staff pertise to refine HNIR and assist with the develop-
section to validate the HNIR including developing ment of reporting criteria.
indicators and specific information requirements; Developing the “Right Questions.” Further anal-
ensure collection; ensure data is ingested into com- ysis of the HNIR was required to identify or refine
mon databases for easy access and analysis, and indicators or information requirements across the

staff. The first step was to determine which staff Bureaus, Centers, Cells, and Working Groups devel-
element would take the lead for developing and oped to support organizational and strategic aware-
refining indicators based on staff functions and ex- ness and operations. Each contributes information
pertise. Experts in the fields may have additional at all echelons of command and across all levels of
or different indicators that help answer the HNIR. government.
Identifying indicators and developing specific in-
Synchronization and Collection of Information.
formation requirements (SIRs) became the task of
The IJC developed a HNIR sharing strategy and
the staff proponent. These indicators and informa-
tasking process that recognizes the need to “ask”
tion requirements are analytical tools and describe
rather than “task” for much of the information. This
the information required (including the location,
is why unity of effort and senior leadership engaging
where, when, and how the information can be
in peer leadership–beside, below, and behind part-
collected and disseminated), outline specific ob-
nered organizations is so important.
servables that support the HNIR, and establish
what must be collected, in what format, and how Step 3: Link SIR to the Source of the
it is integrated into the information environment. Information.
Developing requirements in this complex OE, inte- ÊÊ Identify the organization, element, team or indi-
grating feedback from staff functions and experts vidual who can provide the information, through
across the military and civilian community paints direction or cooperation.
a powerful mosaic across all levels of command ÊÊ Providing access to the information sharing and
and leadership. dissemination architecture to facilitate full inte-
Step 2: Develop and Refine HNIR with Expert gration of information to all mission partners.
and Partnered Input to Produce SIRs. Endstate: A synchronized sharing environment
ÊÊ Develop indicators and SIRs–key analytical that integrates all sources and expertise available to
tools. support unity of effort through shared understand-
ing of the environment.
ÊÊ Describe the information required which may in-
clude both the location where and the time dur- Synthesis and Dissemination. The last step is to
ing which the information can be collected. ensure synthesis and dissemination of the data, in-
ÊÊ Outline specific observables that support the formation, and assessments. We must make this
HNIR. HNIR knowledge available across the information en-
ÊÊ Establish what must be shared, in what format, vironment. This means sharing horizontally across
and integration into the information architecture. the command, vertically within the command, and
externally to other key governmental and nongov-
Endstate: A comprehensive list of SIRs that drives ernmental actors in the OE will contribute directly
sharing of data and information that will facilitate to the unity of effort.
greater understanding of the OE and support unity
Step 4: Synthesize and Disseminate.
of effort with all mission partners.
ÊÊ Develop a multi-functional environment, en-
The parallel effort to develop a coordinated ap-
abled by an analytic center, to synthesize avail-
proach to assemble HNIR information started with
able HNIR information across all specialties.
identifying all the elements that currently or poten-
ÊÊ Identify and fill information gaps.
tially could have access to the required information
ÊÊ Share extensively across the information envi-
across the command and staff but more impor-
ronment to facilitate common understanding of
tantly, identifying what other agencies and organi-
critical “atmospherics.”
zations were potential sources of HNIR-supporting
information. This led to a multi-dimensional knowl- ÊÊ Integrate into staff planning and informa-
edge management matrix that included Regional tion sharing events within and without the
Commands, IJC staff elements, higher headquar- command.
ters, Afghan security and governmental organiza- Endstate: Understanding of the Afghanistan OE,
tions, international governmental organizations with district-level awareness, across the spectrum
(i.e., the UN), NGOs, and all the associated Boards, of operations. Sharing the knowledge with all mis-
sion partners to enable effective decisionmaking ing a shared understanding of the environment, and
processes for military, governmental, nongovern- enabling all partners to cooperate more effectively to
mental, and civilian organizations. achieve positive results. The IJC and its mission part-
Conclusion ners, in support of the GIRoA, are involved in a com-
plex argument between an elected government and
As with most processes executed during COIN op-
negative influences for the support of the population.
erations, this HNIR effort will never be complete. The
As we do those things that most benefit the people
intended outcome of creating an HNIR information
of this country, understanding the environment in
sharing system is to increase the understanding of a
which they live will be the most critical knowledge we
complex OE and to present a coherent, comprehensive
will all need to be successful. HNIR is just one step,
common operational picture, not piecemealed and re-
albeit an important one for the IJC Commander and
ported as independent packets of data or information.
staff, in the right direction.
Based on analysis of eight years of operations in
Afghanistan, a new category of critical information
has emerged as the central driving force for the IJC Colonel George Franz is the Chief, IDC for the ISAF Joint
Command, Kabul, Afghanistan.
commander. The design of the HNIR process is to
bring Host Nation and population centric informa- Lieutenant Colonel David Pendall is the Chief CJ2 Planner for
tion to the forefront of command decisionmaking. the ISAF Joint Command Future Operations Planning Team in
The development of an Afghanistan Information Kabul, Afghanistan.
Environment will enable a more open and holistic Lieutenant Colonel Jeffery Steffen is the Knowledge
information sharing process; recognized across the Manager within the IDC for the ISAF Joint Command, Kabul,
command and by our partners as critical to develop- Afghanistan.
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DOMEX: The Birth of
a New Intelligence
Discipline
by Colonel Joseph M. Cox
The views expressed in this article are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the Army,
Department of Defense, or the U.S. Government.
Introduction
Prior to 9/11, Document and Media Exploitation and what steps can be taken to enhance operations,
(DOMEX) capabilities were neither well defined and then offer recommendations on how the IC and
nor sufficiently developed or understood to ad- the Department of Defense (DOD) can better orga-
equately support combat operations. Despite les- nize, train, man, and equip itself to meet DOMEX
sons learned from previous conflicts, U.S. forces challenges in the future.
entered the War of Terror without mechanisms Historical Context
to properly collect, process, and disseminate in- The U.S. military and other branches of our govern-
telligence derived from DOMEX. In the past 18 ment relied on what was originally titled Document
months, the volume of captured digital information Exploitation (DOCEX) for as long as we have prac-
from law enforcement, intelligence, and civil court ticed the art of intelligence. Discovering the enemy’s
cases has exploded. Recent investigations of Umar intentions through examination and exploitation
Farouk Abdulmutallab, the alleged terrorist who of captured documents was nothing new. In war-
attempted to detonate plastic explosives on board fare, exploitation of adversary documents normally
a commercial airliner, and U.S. Army Major Nidal begins at the point of capture and progressively
Malik Hasan, the man accused of killing Soldiers becomes more detailed and sophisticated as the
at Fort Hood, rely extensively on close examination document moves through a process of triage, trans-
of personal computer data by federal law enforce- lation, and promulgation.2
ment agencies. These are just two cases amid an
The Civil War provides many examples of troops
avalanche of harvested digital media that create a
capturing and attempting to exploit enemy doc-
national security issue which merits a system that
uments. The assassination of President Lincoln
can reliably sift intelligence and quickly share it in
caused a detailed review of captured Confederate
order to protect lives and preserve security.
documents once thought trivial or of little value for
In response to a recent congressional inquiry, two military operations, seeking proof that Southern
respected leaders of the Intelligence Community (IC) leaders were linked to the assassination plot.3
commented that “there is no doubt that “DOMEX By 1920, the U.S. Army War Department intelli-
provides critical intelligence unavailable through any gence regulation emphasized the value of DOCEX:
other discipline.”1 Without question, our DOMEX ca- “Experience has shown that the information derived
pabilities have evolved into an increasingly special- from documents is second in value only to that se-
ized full-time mission that requires a professional cured by the actual examination of prisoners. Too
force, advanced automation and communications much stress cannot be laid upon the importance of
support, analytical rigor, expert translators, and the rapid and systematic examination of every doc-
proper discipline to process valuable information ument captured.”4
into intelligence. Unfortunately, DOCEX was never a high priority
This article will examine the historical roots of in terms of training and resources as the Army en-
DOMEX operations to present day activities, explain tered World War II. In Europe, the 1st Army had a to-
why DOMEX should be an intelligence discipline, tal of five personnel assigned to their DOCEX team
review how the Army improved DOMEX capabilities, for combat operations from January 1944 to May
1945.5 This team would disseminate intelligence manpower at our level to conduct any type of ex-
reports after documents were reviewed and trans- tensive DOCEX.”9 From the outset of Operations
lated, usually 48 hours after capture. But with the Enduring Freedom/Iraqi Freedom (OEF/OIF),
capture of between 250 to 1,000 pounds of docu- there was a shortage of trained HUMINT collec-
ments each day, the organization was of marginal tors and they were a precious resource. Major
assistance to tactical operations. General Barbara Fast, the Multi-National Corps-
Iraq C2, stated that “it became imperative once we
1st Army reached several conclusions about
were in Iraq to establish a strong HUMINT capa-
DOCEX intelligence: “documents arrived too late for
bility to understand the situation on the ground,
operational exploitation” and “sufficient personnel
but we lacked the number and some of the skills
were not trained to help Corps and Division levels”.6
required to be as successful as we needed to be.”10
Through the Korean War and into Vietnam, DOCEX
Predictably, the scant numbers of HUMINT collec-
remained relevant and necessary to gain intelligence
tors were in high demand just for their core mis-
on the enemy, but it was viewed as something tem-
sion sets: tactical questioning, debriefings, source
porary in nature. When we needed it, we built or-
operations, and interrogation of detainees. DOCEX
ganizations to meet the demand, then forgot about
wasn’t a priority.
lessons learned after conflicts ended.
DOMEX Goes National
Why was U.S. Army DOMEX Not
As the military struggled with DOMEX activities
Prepared for 9/11?
between 2001 and 2003, the first tangible effort to
The first problem was that after Vietnam, U.S.
institutionalize DOMEX at the National and strategic
Army DOCEX missions and functions were doc-
level came with the creation of Defense Intelligence
trinally pinned to interrogators: “the first intel-
Agency’s (DIA) National Media Exploitation Center
ligence specialists who could examine or exploit
(NMEC) in 2003.11 The NMEC was created to serve
captured documents, in addition to interrogating
as the lead government agency for the rapid pro-
prisoners of war, and will scan documents and ex-
cessing, exploitation, dissemination and sharing of
tract information.”7 Accordingly, DOCEX proce-
all acquired documents and media between strate-
dures became firmly rooted within the interrogator
gic/national through tactical/local levels across the
Field Manual (FM) under the human intelligence
Intelligence, Counterintelligence (CI), military, and
(HUMINT) discipline.
Law Enforcement (LE) communities to enhance the
The second problem was the direct result of plac- safety and security of the Nation.12
ing DOCEX responsibilities on interrogators within The swift expansion of DOMEX enterprise created
HUMINT. There simply weren’t enough collectors (CI many different efforts across the IC and DOD which
and interrogators) to accomplish the DOCEX mis- required significant funding from congress. In 2005,
sion. As the Army reduced its force size in the early the U.S. Senate Select Committee on Intelligence
70s under a transformation initiative called “Army of (SSCI) conducted an audit to review the practices
Excellence (AOE),” it became apparent that an inter- of collecting, processing, translating, and reporting
rogation force would not be a large one. Close study intelligence obtained from overtly captured and/or
of the AOE with respect to interrogator strength re- clandestinely acquired paper documents and elec-
vealed early concerns that there weren’t enough in- tronic media.13 The SSCI wanted to analyze and
terrogators in Army inventories to conduct HUMINT evaluate the intelligence value of DOMEX efforts
missions and equally support DOCEX missions.8 and assess the budget implications for sustaining
What Were the Consequences of Not DOMEX over the long term. The SSCI audit findings
Being Prepared? concluded that:
One intelligence leader stated: “DOCEX didn’t ÊÊ DOMEX had become an integral source of valuable
work; we did our own DOCEX when we could. intelligence information supporting both tactical
Otherwise, it was sent to some CJTF-76 DOCEX operations in OEF/OIF and Iraq and strategic anal-
section for processing that was virtually a black ysis in national intelligence agencies,14 but there
hole because I never received any feedback from was a perception of slight duplication of effort and
anything we sent forward. We just didn’t have the redundancy in terms of reporting intelligence.

ÊÊ The IC allowed the DOMEX expertise to atrophy Doctrine–DOCEX incorrectly resided under HUMINT
after each major conflict which caused a rou- with interrogators as lead.
tine “reinvention of the wheel” phenomenon.
Organizations–No Army units, to include intelligence
This proved insufficient, and allowed for an in-
units, were structured to conduct the function.
formation vacuum to exist during periods when
policy makers and military planners most need Training–Training was never formalized. Theaters
DOMEX data. established their own procedures and training. No
ÊÊ IC leadership needs to make tough decisions in effective blueprint existed for standardized DOCEX
the near term in order to improve the efficiency instruction.
and effectiveness of DOMEX activities.15 Materiel–There was no family of systems to cover a
The Office of the Director of National Intelligence DOCEX end-to-end approach.
(ODNI), as the head of the IC, oversees and directs Leadership–HUMINT staff directorates were
the implementation of the National Intelligence overwhelmed.
Program and, by extension, provides oversight to
Personnel–No professionalized force to accomplish
DOMEX intelligence activities. The ODNI published
the mission.
Intelligence Community Directive (ICD) 302 in July
2007 assigning national DOMEX oversight to the Facilities–Not applicable. DOMEX shortfalls were
Assistant Deputy Director of National Intelligence for not caused by inadequate infrastructure.
Open Source Intelligence (ADDNI/OS), the NMEC, The 2008 U.S. Army Training and Doctrine
and the IC agencies. Command (TRADOC) and 2007-2009 Office of the
One item within ICD 302 represents the center of Secretary of Defense overlapping studies assessed
gravity for the publication–NMEC became the DNI conventional and special operations forces and de-
center for the national DOMEX enterprise and be- termined that a relatively small number of core and
came chartered to: enabling capabilities was essential to sustaining an
intelligence campaign against a networked adver-
ÊÊ Support the development of the ODNI’s
sary. The studies revealed one of the driving capa-
DOMEX strategy, policy, and programmatic
bilities of the “find, fix, finish, exploit, access, and
recommendations.
disseminate” cycle was DOMEX.16
ÊÊ Ensure prompt and responsive DOMEX support
to meet the needs of intelligence, defense, home- Here are some thoughts and recommendations
land security, law enforcement, and other U.S. within the DOTMLPF framework which require im-
Government consumer, to include provision of mediate attention from the U.S. Army, and which
timely and accurate collection, processing, ex- other military services can digest, to capitalize on
ploitation, and dissemination of DOMEX. critical momentum generated by DOMEX over a rel-
ÊÊ Implement policies and guidance on DOMEX in- atively short period of time:
cluding handling and dissemination polices. Doctrine. Figure 1 highlights that DOMEX spans
ÊÊ Develop training and tradecraft programs all five steps of the Joint intelligence cycle and
that expose all IC personnel to the benefits of should be viewed as an intelligence discipline. JP
DOMEX. 1-02 states that an intelligence discipline is “a well
What the U.S. Army Fixed in DOMEX, defined area of intelligence collection, processing,
What Can Be Improved, and What Can exploitation, and reporting using a specific cate-
Other Services Learn? gory of technical or human resources.”17 Without
a doubt, DOMEX meets the doctrinal specifica-
For over 50 years, and until recently, U.S. Army in-
tions outlined in the joint publication.
telligence doctrine preserved the DOMEX function
within the HUMINT discipline and failed to main- It’s also noteworthy to point out that ICD 302
tain sufficient capability to conduct the mission. A states that “DOMEX activities support a wide range
post-mortem appraisal of the U.S. Army’s OEF/OIF of intelligence activities, including all source anal-
DOMEX experiences along the DOTMLPF framework ysis, Open Source Intelligence (OSINT), HUMINT,
offers lessons learned for other services: Signals Intelligence (SIGINT), Geospatial Intelligence
the core HUMINT missions of tactical questioning,
debriefing, source operations, and interrogation.21
This must be changed immediately. We already
know that Army DOMEX operations were not suc-
cessful in the early stages of OEF/OIF because
we expected interrogators to conduct the mission
based on our doctrine. Recommendation: Publish
an interim change to the FM and clarify DOMEX
functions and responsibilities.
4. The U.S. Army Intelligence Center of Excellence
(USAICoE) diligently worked the timely release
of Training Circular (TC) 2-91.8 DOMEX Enabled
Intelligence.22 The publication codifies DOMEX
Figure 1. doctrine and general tactics, techniques, and pro-
(GEOINT), and Measurements and Signatures cedures from tactical to strategic environments.
Intelligence (MASINT)–DOMEX reporting and anal- Unfortunately, based on restrictions on the num-
ysis are considered intelligence products”.18 Aside ber of FMs, the TRADOC Commander limits MI
from correct recognition of DOMEX as an intelli- Doctrine to only four FMs. A DOMEX FM could
gence discipline, the U.S. Army must also correct better serve as a blueprint for other military ser-
several doctrinal disconnects to set a better course vices to follow as they develop their organization
for the future. Below are four key doctrinal items and training models. Recommendation: The U.S.
that Army intelligence leaders must address: Army should convert the TC into an FM and ti-
tle the FM “DOMEX Operations” not DOMEX–
1. The most recent final draft of FM 2-0 Intelligence Enabled Intelligence. Saying that there is
incorrectly states that DOMEX is “an emerging DOMEX–enabled intelligence is akin to stat-
capability” but goes into profound detail spell- ing there is bullet-enabled infantry.
ing out the fundamentals of all other intelligence
Organization. The need for tactical DOMEX
disciplines.19 The FM misses a tremendous op-
capabilities across the services has never been
portunity to devote a short chapter to DOMEX
greater; the services must address this organi-
and bring together the central thoughts and
zational gap immediately. The Army learned that
themes thinly spread throughout the document
designating HUMINT Collection Teams (HCTs)
into a single, concise framework that reinforces
for DOMEX missions was a poor strategy.23 The
what DOMEX actually is–an intelligence disci-
Department of the Army (DA) G2 quickly recog-
pline. Recommendation: Use FM 2-0 to state that
nized this and established Multi-Functional Teams
DOMEX is an intelligence discipline.
(MFTs) within the Army’s Battlefield Surveillance
2. TRADOC’s Concept Capability Plan (CCP) for Brigade. The MFT task organization uses four
Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance intelligence military occupational specialty
(ISR) for 2015-2024 fails to clearly articulate
Army DOMEX capabilities required to suc-
ceed as we face future threats. The CCP barely
mentions the term DOMEX and incorrectly
states that DOMEX capabilities are required
with HUMINT.20 This doctrinal miscue makes
it look as though TRADOC is out of step with
current Army intelligence and ISR doctrine.
Recommendation: TRADOC must develop a com-
prehensive DOMEX capabilities list in the CCP.
3. FM 2-22.3 HUMINT Collector Operations incor-
rectly maintains that “DOCEX” vice DOMEX is a
HUMINT collection function and mixes DOMEX in

(MOS) career fields: 35L CI Agent; 35M HUMINT force that is responsive to global demands, not
Collector; 35N SIGINT Analyst; 35P Cryptologic just the urgent needs in Iraq and Afghanistan.
Communications Interceptor/Locator, and 35S DOMEX collection is not a task limited to intelli-
Signals Collector/Analyst.24 gence Soldiers. Any Soldier can collect materials
which require exploitation. Just as all Soldiers
Each MFT fields sufficient personnel and equip-
must be prepared to fight as infantry, they must
ment to exploit captured enemy materials (doc-
also serve as information collectors. This is the
uments, media, and personal electronic devices),
premise for the “Every Soldier is a Sensor” model.
link biometrics data within the collection effort,
Tactical collection skills are taught to Soldiers in
and fuse tactical all source intelligence efforts
all MOSs under the umbrella of Site Exploitation
for battalion and brigade S2s. Recommendation:
(SE) training. In SE, Soldiers enter and actively
Other military services should develop a similar
observe details at a site, use their cognitive skills
approach as the MFT model within their intelli-
to recognize information, materials, and per-
gence organizations in order to provide a trained,
sonnel at the site that may help to answer the
tactically oriented, professionalized force to con-
commanders’ information requirements. 25 The
duct DOMEX below National levels.
graphic below portrays the relationship of the
Training. The Army and other services must SE functional capabilities within levels of com-
bring order and discipline to our DOMEX train- mand and highlights the use of the Distributed
ing approaches to professionalize a DOMEX Common Ground System-Army.
With respect to U.S. Army intelligence train- integrate across existing core, collection, process-
ing, I recommend that a new MOS be designated ing, and dissemination intelligence systems.29
that specifically covers DOMEX (exploitation of Leadership. From a tactical and operational staff
documents, media, and personal electronic de- perspective, G2/J2/C2 (HUMINT) staffs are in posi-
vices) or at a minimum, an additional skill identi- tion to supervise DOMEX. The 2X staff directorates
fier (ASI). Currently, USAICoE provides baseline are fully engaged in coordinating and managing nu-
intelligence skills training for eight enlisted in- merous HUMINT and CI collection activities across
telligence MOS career fields, the five MOSs men- the areas of operation; they cannot be responsible
tioned in the MFT organization and MOSs 35F for the management and integration of DOMEX
Intelligence Analyst and 35G/H Imagery/Common assets on the battlefield. I believe that we should
Ground Station Analyst.26 Only MOSs 35M and closely examine the pilot strategy, underway in U.S.
35T Military Intelligence Systems Maintainer/ Forces Afghanistan, which created a J2E–the “E”
Integrator receive some DOMEX training. This is standing for exploitation. By separating DOMEX
a start but it’s not enough. Recommendation: At a from the HUMINT organization and assigning an in-
minimum, I recommend that the MOSs 35F, 35M, telligence officer to manage the DOMEX intelligence
35L receive DOMEX training as well. Mobile train- cycle, we are better postured to provide quality con-
ing teams from the Defense Cyber Investigations trol of the entire DOMEX system. We can also look
Training Academy (DCITA) and National Ground at methods to fuse science and technology (biomet-
Intelligence Center (NGIC) could also assist rics, crime scene forensics, etc.) along the DOMEX
USAICoE to provide specialized computer forensic path to leverage opportunities to positively link in-
training to Soldiers.27 dividuals to networks. I expect lessons learned from
Materiel. Because DOMEX functions were the J2E concept will make a solid case for keeping
historically linked to HUMINT as a function, a DOMEX out of direct HUMINT management.
HUMINT reporting system Personnel. Each service must determine which
was the only Program of personnel in their force will be the primary opera-
Record (POR) to support tors of DOMEX equipment and assess what support
DOMEX. The CI/HUMINT personnel are required to maintain their programs.
Automated Tool Set pro- Support personnel are required to cover mainte-
vided an HCT with a ca- nance requirements and operate across the five
pability to collect, process functions of the Joint intelligence cycle. It’s also im-
and disseminate infor- portant that the services track their DOMEX trained
mation obtained through personnel with an ASI or separate MOS. Military of-
document exploitation.28 ficer and enlisted personnel management systems
It wasn’t nearly capable need to recognize and codify the new skill sets.
enough to satisfy a broad Perhaps now is the time to develop and codify the
range of DOMEX equipment and software re- multi-functional intelligence staff officer that has
quirements to fully exploit information within training in DOMEX tasks. These leaders will help
computers, portable storage devices, video imag- intelligence manage three additional tasks (analyze,
ery, and a host of other items. disseminate, and assess) that continually occur.
Today’s the Army’s DOMEX equipment suite of- Thoughts on the Future of DOMEX
fers significant advances over what was available The true significance of DOMEX lies in the fact
to theater forces three years ago. The U.S. Army that terrorists, criminals, and other adversaries
Intelligence and Security Command, DA G2, and never expected their material to be captured. The
the Army DOMEX program manager worked hard to intelligence produced from exploitation is not
field a standardized set of DOMEX equipment that marked with deception, exaggeration, and mis-
met operational needs in support of OIF/OEF across direction that routinely appear during live ques-
the Army and ensure that the equipment was com- tioning of suspects.30 As our adversaries continue
patible with inter-agency standards. The Army must to move from paper to digital-based technologies,
align these QRC efforts into PORs which seamlessly the exploitation of digital media, personal elec-

tronic devices, and video will require even more a representative to the DOMEXCOM if the U.S. Navy,
personnel and resources to maintain decision U.S. Marine Corps, and U.S. Air Force desire success-
advantage. The ODNI has outlined six DOMEX ful DOMEX programs.
priorities for the IC in order to create, mature, Development of NMEC as our National DOMEX
and sustain an efficient national DOMEX capa- Enterprise CoE. I recommend that the DOD/USD-I
bility with a global reach.31 Within the framework convert the NMEC into a National DOMEX Agency
of these priorities, I offer some thoughts and (NDA) to become the Program and Mission Manager
recommendations: for the IC. By converting NMEC to the NDA to govern
Effective Governance. I recommend that the DOMEX, we would then follow the same approach
ODNI establish DOMEX as an intelligence discipline used in the creation of the National Geospatial-
via an ICD. ICD 302 states that DOMEX activities Intelligence Agency (NGA) to produce GEOINT; NSA
will support a wide range of intelligence activities.32 to produce SIGINT,35 and CIA to be the center of
Making DOMEX an intelligence discipline would be gravity for HUMINT.36 If there is no NDA, then NMEC
fully in line with the Under Secretary of Defense for will fail to meet its responsibilities as detailed in
Intelligence (USD-I) draft DOD DOMEX Directive.33 ICD 302 and not be in a position to “advise and as-
Collaborative and Integrated Planning/ sist the ODNI in identifying requirements, develop-
Programming/Execution. If you search the ing budgets, managing finances, and evaluating the
Internet for the term “DOMEX,” a web page from IC’s performance.”37
the U.S. Department of Justice’s National Drug
Intelligence Center (NDIC) will appear and read-
ers can learn how the center supports National
level policymakers and the IC by preparing stra-
tegic analytical studies on the trafficking of ille-
gal drugs. NDIC provides real-time support to LE
and ICs by conducting DOMEX associated with
counterdrug and counterterrorism investiga-
tions. Like NDIC, the Central Intelligence Agency
(CIA), the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI),
and the DOD run their own DOMEX programs to
support the missions and requirements of their
unique organizations.
Unfortunately, these organizations have many
cultural and security firewalls which limit their
ability to provide access to their intelligence
holdings to the IC stakeholders. We must con-
tinuously work to open these barriers through
If we don’t commit ourselves to long overdue orga-
improved cooperative arrangements that provide
nizational changes, make DOMEX an intelligence
the right information to a wider audience in or-
discipline, and expand NMEC resources then the
der to reduce our intelligence gaps.
IC will not be able to achieve DOMEX goals and
ICD 302 created the DOMEX Executive Committee missions established by ODNI. One noteworthy
(DOMEXCOM)34 which includes senior mem-
bers from the DIA, CIA, FBI, Defense Cyber Crime
Center (DC3), U.S. Army, National Security Agency
(NSA), Department of Homeland Security (DHS),
and the Drug Enforcement Administration. The
DOMEXCOM is great forum to hammer out agree-
ments and roadmap strategies to enhance effective-
ness of DOMEX across the IC. I recommend that the
ADDNI/OS request that each military service provide
data point reveals that since Fiscal Year 2005, ing of Army tactical DOMEX teams. In this capacity,
DOMEX data at NMEC has witnessed nearly a the NGIC/DOMEX PM worked closely with NMEC
tenfold increase while government employees as- over the past three years to field and sustain an
signed to manage one of the most challenging in- Army tactical DOMEX presence in OIF/OEF. To
telligence missions in the IC has remained fairly better support strategic through tactical DOMEX
flat (around 50 employees). research, development, test and evaluation appro-
priation initiatives, the ADO should serve as the
With the ever increasing demands for DOMEX,
DOD lead and action arm for the NDA. The ADO
flowing from homeland security LE activities (FBI,
would be for DOMEX what the Army Cryptologic
DHS, etc.), we are now at a critical junction to ei-
Office is for SIGINT, placing it in an ideal position to
ther make a change to improve capacity to handle
assist the other services reach their DOMEX equip-
the volume of expected data or continue on course
ment and standardization goals.
and risk not being in a position to thwart terrorist
acts while in the early stages of planning. Deployment of a Federated DOMEX IT
Infrastructure. I recommend that the NMEC and
The FBI’s National Virtual Translation Center ADO publish collection and processing standards
(NVTC) should be realigned within the newly cre- to industry in order to select the best solutions for
ated NDA to gain more efficiency on the manage- our DOMEX architecture. Clearly an advanced IT
ment of translation resources not only for timely infrastructure is required at the National level to
and accurate translations of foreign intelligence, help quickly organize, process, and disseminate
but for DOMEX as well. The NVTC is currently the captured information in virtually all formats in
clearinghouse for facilitating interagency use of many languages. If the National DOMEX architec-
translators, partnering with elements of the U.S. ture is to truly be a “single, dynamic, integrated,
Government, academia, and private industry to and federated system, with cutting edge auto-
identify translator resources and engage their ser- mation using the best-of-breed tools,” 39 then our
vices. NVTC is a DNI Center, and the FBI is its collection and processing systems must tackle
Executive Agent. 38 two distinct problems that Dr. Simon Garfinkel
The USD-I should direct the establishment of a labels “deep” and “broad”.40
Military Support Branch in the NDA under the lead- The deep DOMEX problem covers the kind of doc-
ership of a one-star general. The military support ument or data-storage device (a hard drive, DVD, or
branch should include liaison officers from each personal electronic device) that is captured and be-
combatant command (COCOM) in order to improve comes available for analysis. The analytical goal is
global mission management of DOMEX activities. to find out everything possible about the data stor-
The support branch could help COCOMs link their age device. The DOMEX operators and analysts who
DOMEX priorities into the NDA and better harness receive a laptop, for example, want to know every-
national DOMEX holdings to consumers support- thing possible about it; not just the content, but the
ing host nation counterterrorist efforts. Creation application programs, the configuration settings,
of a military support branch at NDA would fol- the other computers with which these machines
low similar constructs already in place at NSA and had come into contact, and so on.41
NGA. The lack of a military support branch assist-
The broad DOMEX problem is the reverse.
ing NDA prevents traction to fully synchronize and
Instead of having unlimited resources to spend
leverage DOMEX collection capabilities across the
on a particular item, analysts are given a large
services and align large-scale DOMEX procure-
number of digital objects and a limited amount
ments and solutions for the services as research
of time to find something useful to their mission.
and development drives change.
In recent years the volume of captured digital in-
The USD-I should direct that the U.S. Army desig- formation seized on the battlefield or within LE
nate the Army DOMEX Office (ADO) as DOD lead for investigations has exploded. The landslide of digi-
service DOMEX program procurement. DA G2 des- tal media makes the broad problem quite compel-
ignated NGIC as the dedicated DOMEX Program ling from both a national security and commercial
Manager responsible for the development and train- perspective, a system that can reliably find the

“good stuff” can save money, time, and perhaps their needs and culture. Inconsistency in content,
even lives.42 quantity, and quality of training across the DOMEX
community persists through varied processes for
developing training requirements and standards.
The result is costly duplication of effort, uneven per-
formance during deployments, and significant un-
met training requirements, particularly with regard
to DOMEX analysis and technology integration.
The military services and IC must maintain a pro-
fessionalized DOMEX force that follows a standard-
ized and certifiable training program. We also lack
Future DOMEX collection systems (hardware and
a single set of standards or roadmap that outlines
software) must provide solutions to cover the deep
which DOMEX skills are required to meet basic, in-
and broad DOMEX problems and minimize the
termediate, and advanced DOMEX requirements at
number of stand-alone systems the operators must
every level (tactical through strategic).
learn, use, and maintain. We should take advantage
of equipment already fielded rather than providing There are numerous training venues which are
more “boxes.” This is not to say that there will not be considered “accredited” to meet DOMEX mission
some need for unique stand-alone systems to ensure requirements but there is no published commu-
needed capabilities. Each military service must en- nity directive or message that aligns the total IC.
sure their DOMEX systems (hardware) fit within their Successful DOMEX operations hinge on proper
Command, Control, Communications, Computers, collection; all military services must be organized
and Intelligence construct and integrate into a cohe- to conduct tactical collection in land or maritime
sive and seamless entity within the national system. operations. Most im-
Global Presence. Global presence starts by link- portantly, the IC and
ing state and federal LE entities through Homeland DOD must be pre-
Defense mechanisms and into our National ICs (CIA, pared to assist other
DOD, and other government agencies). For example, nations in under-
we must be able to share and connect intelligence standing the value of
from a captured computer in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia DOMEX and aid in
to our federal LE efforts to opportunities for our adver- training their forces
saries to conduct successful attacks. as well. The proper
inventory and col-
NOTE: All DOMEX operations conducted by Army
lection of captured
intelligence personnel must comply with the legal
materials is no lon-
restrictions in AR 381-10, and be conducted within
ger confined to intelligence personnel, anyone can
the guidelines of U.S. law and applicable policies.
collect. That cultural shift is based on lessons
DOMEX practitioners who posses linguistic skills learned from combat operations. “It became clear
or provide access to linguists, must be strategi- that the existing intelligence gathering, analysis,
cally positioned (forward based) throughout our and evidence collection methods were all inade-
COCOMs to capitalize on opportunities as the pres- quate for countering an insurgency, our ability to
ent themselves. Ideally, the NDA could provide fly- successfully prosecute intelligence operations was
away teams who are trained to operate in austere directly linked to the ability of our Soldiers to col-
environments and have ready access worldwide to lect, preserve, and exploit evidence.”44 The organi-
essential equipment, communications, and imme- zational requirements above tactical collection are
diate reachback to the IC.43 primarily intelligence-based and make up the pro-
Professional Skills and Training. Despite heavy cessing, exploitation, and dissemination process.
investment in DOMEX training programs since This is the layer that includes personnel from the
9/11, there has been uneven emphasis across or- Army’s Multifunctional Teams, the Marine Corps
ganizational and training programs as ICs focus on HUMINT Exploitation Teams, U.S. Air Force Office
of Special Investigations, or sailors from the Office 6. Ibid., 84.
of Naval Intelligence. 7. FM 30-15, Intelligence Interrogation, March 1969, 3-7.
One thing is certain–all military services must 8. Mark S. Partridge, “Asking Questions: Will Army Tactical
identify DOMEX training requirements for their Interrogation Be Ready For War?” School of Advanced Military
forces and develop an appropriate communica- Studies Monograph, 17 December, 1986, 37.
tions infrastructure to relay DOMEX intelligence 9. Operational Leadership Experiences Project, Combat Studies
laterally and upward into the national intelli- Institute, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, Interview with CW3 Kenneth
Kilbourne, February 2009, 8.
gence system. I recommend that the ADDNI/OS
or USD-I designate the Navy and Marine Corps 10. Donald P. Wright and Timothy R. Reese, On Point II, Transition
Intelligence Training Center, and USAICoE as the to the New Campaign: Operation Iraqi Freedom, June 2008, 195.
(Interview with MG Fast, CJTF-7 C2)
primary DOMEX institutional training bases for the
military services. The roles and functions of the 11. ODNI, 2009 DOMEX Annual Report.
Joint Military Intelligence Training Center and the 12. NMEC Mission Statement, 2009.
DCITA as authorized training venues need to be
13. U.S Senate, Select Committee on Intelligence. Report Number
clearly spelled out within an ICD or USD-I mes- 111-16, Period Covered–4 January 2007 to 2 January 2009, 42.
sage to clarify their interaction with the IC and
14. SSCI Audit of IC Domex, April 2007.
DOD DOMEX education system.
15. Dan Butler, Paula Briscoe, Roy Apselloff, ODNI, National
We must take several additional steps to strengthen Document and Media Exploitation Enterprise Vision Pamphlet,
each of the six ODNI priorities in order to achieve Message from DOMEX Seniors, April 2009.
an enduring DOMEX capability across the national, 16. Richard P. Zahner, “Rebalancing the Army Military Intelligence
military, intelligence, homeland security, and law Force,” AUSA Green Book, October 2009, 186.
enforcement communities, at all levels–strategic,
17. JP 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and
operational, and tactical. Associated Terms, 31 August 2005.
Conclusion 18. ODNI Intelligence Community Directive 302, Document and

We have reached the point where a national deci- Media Exploitation, 6 July 2007.
sion is required to designate DOMEX as an intel- 19. FM 2-0, Intelligence (Final Draft), March 2009, 1-30.
ligence discipline and to create a National DOMEX 20. TRADOC Pam 525-7-9, Version 1.0, 12 August 2008, 40.
Agency. Similar conditions and decisions were made
21. FM 2-22.3, Human Intelligence Collector Operations, September
over 50 years ago as our government created agen-
2006, 1-6.
cies for HUMINT and SIGINT. If the strategic objec-
tives are to extend intelligence to all who need it 22. TC 2-91.8, Document and Media Exploitation Enabled
Intelligence (Final Draft), 25 July 2008.
and to facilitate Homeland Defense through exten-
sive collaboration, then if we fail to create a National 23. FM 2-22.3, 2-6.
DOMEX Agency, then I believe DOMEX will return 24. U.S. Army MI BN (BFSB) MTOE, DOCNO 34105GFC18, Para
to its previous condition of atrophy across the IC 206, Lines 02-17.
and DOD and our nation will not be in a position to 25. U.S. Army Combined Arms Center, Site Exploitation Concept of
effectively safeguard itself from multiple threats. Operations (CONOPS), 2010-2016.
26. Army Enlisted Job Descriptions, About.com: US Military at

Endnotes http://usmilitary.about.com/od/enlistedjo2/a/35.-xiW.htm.
1 Response to Congressionally Directed Action, LTG Maples and Dr.
27. DOD Cyber Crime Center at http://www.dc3.mil/dcita/
Briscoe, 1 March 2009.
dcitaAbout.php.
2 Kevin M. Woods, Captured Records–Lessons from the Civil War
28.CHATS AN/PYQ-3(V)3 at http://chams.it.northropgrumman.
through World War II, Institute for Defense Analysis, 2009.
com/brochures/CHATS%20V3%20Factsheet.pdf.
3. Ibid.
29. Intelligence Programs and Systems, at http://www.globalsecurity.
4. Intelligence Regulations, U.S. War Department, Washington, DC, org/intell/systems/index.html.
1920, 39-40.
30. NMEC, 2009 Resource Management Plan, 5.
5. Jared B. Schopper, “The Collection and Processing of Combat
31. ODNI, National DOMEX Enterprise Vision Pamphlet.
Intelligence During Operations in Northern Europe,” Command and
General Staff College Monograph, June 1964, 82. 32. ICD 302, DOMEX.

33. USD(I), DOD Directive 3300.aa, Document and Media 41. Ibid.
Exploitation (DOMEX), Draft.
42. Ibid.
34. ICD 302, DOMEX.
43. ODNI, National Document and Media Exploitation Enterprise
35. Mission statement at http://www.nsa.gov/about/mission/ Vision Pamphlet.
index.shtml.
44. Ralph O. Baker, “Developing Actionable Intelligence in the Urban
36. Establishment of the National Clandestine Service, CIA, 13 COIN Environment,” Military Review, March-April 2007.
October 2005 at https://www.cia.gov/news-information/press-
releases-statements/press-release-archive-2005/pr10132005.
html.
37. Deputy Director of National Intelligence for Policy, Plans, and Colonel Joseph Cox served as Commander, 519 th MI
Requirements, 2009 National Intelligence: A Consumer’s Guide. Battalion (BfSB) during OIF 07-09 between September
2007 and December 2008. He is a 1987 graduate of OCS
38. Ibid
and has also served in the 525th MI Brigade; 82d Airborne
39. ODNI, National Document and Media Exploitation Enterprise Division; 75th Ranger Regiment; 205th MI Brigade, and
Vision Pamphlet, the 525 th BfSB. He recently completed a U.S. Army Senior
40. Simson L. Garfinkle, “Document and Media Exploitation,” Service College Fellowship Program in Washington, D.C.
Association for Computer Machinery, accessed at http://queue. and is now the Commander, 501 st MI Brigade, Korea.
acm.org/detail.cfm?id=1331294. Colonel Cox may be reached at [email protected].
by Major Marilyn Harris and Captain Carolyn Bronson
Introduction the other deployed BCTs, the agile construct of TF

Army intelligence is supposed to “provide timely, Warrior allowed for the flexibility to simultaneously
relevant, accurate, and synchronized intelligence conduct decisive stability and support operations
support to tactical, operational, and strategic com- across four lines of effort (LOEs)–security, gover-
manders from force projection planning to the execu- nance, development, and information.
tion of full spectrum operations.”1 However, without Although the security conditions within much of
the requisite intelligence collection means at the tac- the TF Warrior’s area of operation (AO) were semi-
tical level, a brigade commander cannot adequately permissive (meaning that security conditions were
visualize the battlespace or identify decision points relatively good within much of the region), chal-
to employ nonlethal and lethal resources against his lenges existed in 7 of the 31 districts. Within those
full spectrum mission set. Lessons learned and ob- friction areas, TF Warrior units habitually con-
servations from operations in Afghanistan revealed ducted offensive operations in Taliban and Hezb-e
the importance of a battlespace owner (BSO) pos- Islami Gulbuddin insurgent controlled areas.
sessing dedicated tactical intelligence, surveillance,
and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities in a counter- Extensive targeting–nonlethal and lethal, was
insurgency (COIN) environment. conducted against all four LOEs. In all areas it was
critical for the brigade commander to possess an ac-
Non-Standard Brigade Combat Team curate assessment of the operational environment
(BCT) (OE). Moreover his understanding of the threat
During Operation Enduring Freedom IX, the 1st against all four LOEs and the social and civil fac-
Maneuver Enhancement Brigade–the first active tors was the linchpin in determining the type and
duty maneuver enhancement brigade (MEB), orga- frequency of resources to commit in order to obtain
nized as Task Force (TF) Warrior, forward deployed the desired objectives of his campaign plan.
to manage terrain and command and control opera- As of 15 AUG 09 X
TF Warrior
I
1 HHC
tions within four provinces of Regional Command
East, Afghanistan. The nascent MEB concept is the I I (-)
DSTB 82
3 PRT PRT 410 MP 455 ESFS
result of the Army’s transformation to a modular TF GLADIUS TF KORRIGAN Parwan/Kapisa
II
Bamyan
I
structure whereby multifunctional brigades are tai- HHC
HQ 110 2 MP 410
NE
ADT ECP 1 ESFS
I I (-)
lored to conduct full spectrum operations. This was A 755ECES/FET ESFS
E
ECP 3
A 15
the inaugural combat deployment of a MEB during B
I I (-) I
TWRS
CA ESFS
PRT 755 ECES/UD
which it served as BSO. TF Warrior was uniquely CA
B
426
PRIME BEEF
/QRF
ESFS
tailored with a mix of international partners, sev- 3 MP 410
337
410
MP BASE
OPS
SAA
Human Bagram AF
eral types of battalions, Provincial Reconstruction (-)
PMT
PMT
Terrain FOB Salerno
FOB Fenty
BSB FOB Sharana
Teams (PRTs), an Agribusiness Development Team, B 57 Partnership
X
E
SECFOR
634 Camp Eggers
(ADCON)
ETT
ETT
a Human Terrain Team (HTT), two Police Mentor E 2/43
COORDINATION
ANP
3 201
OPCON
Teams (PMTs), and an Embedded Training Team

Panjshir
1 MP 410
TACON
Parwan I I II NATO OPCON
SF Bamyan
2 23 3 4 CSS CSS 5
NATO TACON
(ETT) for its mission against the complex, adaptive,

Kapisa ADCON
PMT Kapisa Kapisa Kapisa Parwan DIRECT SUPPORT
asymmetric threat of the COIN environment. Like Figure 1. TF Warrior’s Organization.

There were various sources of information avail- with tactical level unmanned aerial surveillance
able for the brigade commander to visualize his bat- (UAS) platforms from which a brigade level BSO can
tlespace and aid him in the identification of decision request resources. As the Army increases the ver-
points to employ nonlethal and lethal resources satility of units through the transformation process
against his full spectrum mission set. Daily we re- to provide “BCT-like” capabilities, they also need to
ceived reports and assessments from PRT leaders re- increase the capabilities of MI enablers, specifically
garding social dynamics, the status of development surveillance and reconnaissance assets to support
projects, area atmospherics, and their interaction multifunctional organizations.
with provincial and district leaders. The anthropolo- During the Afghanistan mission the lack of or-
gists within the HTTs were also a great source of in- ganic or attached ISR assets was a detriment to the
formation regarding area atmospherics (perceptions effectiveness and combat capability of TF Warrior.
and population sentiment regarding coalition opera- The commander and staff conducted the military
tions, local powerbrokers and the span of influence decisionmaking process to identify critical infor-
and control of anti-Afghan insurgent leaders and mation about the OE that the commander required
the threat they posed to TF Warrior’s objectives.) to make decisions. However, we essentially did not
Similar information was provided by ETT, PMT have access to the full capabilities of a traditional
units and patrol leaders. We also devised creative functional BCT whereby we could commit dedi-
solutions to bridge the gap between information re- cated ISR assets to monitor whether we were see-
ceived from Coalition Forces and the Afghan people. ing indicators of the commander’s established PIR.
Through an exchange workshop developed under Moreover, because we lacked the persistent col-
our Police Intelligence Operations cell, we obtained lection systems from Imagery Intelligence (IMINT)
information through host nation law enforcement and Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) sub-disciplines,
and intelligence channels to corroborate informa- we lacked the ability to ensure seamless horizon-
tion and obtain evidentiary material to provide in- tal and vertical situational understanding of our
telligence that could answer “Warrior 6’s” priority provinces.
intelligence requirements (PIRs). Local Afghans and Collection Gaps
various casual contacts would provide information. The purpose of ISR is to enable commanders to
However, critical intelligence gaps prevented this direct military operations toward a defined objec-
information obtained through human sources from tive area at a time and in a manner which allows
being cross-cued with collection assets from other him the best advantage. “ISR operations allow units
intelligence subdisciplines and subsequently pre- to produce intelligence about the enemy and OE
vented this information from being transformed into necessary decisions. . . . Timely and accurate intel-
actionable intelligence. ligence encourages audacity and can facilitate ac-
MEB Limitations tions that may negate enemy tactics and material.”2
While executing diverse missions across the The converse is also true. The lack of organic ISR as-
broad geographic AO and complex OE, it was evi- sets and dedicated tactical level ISR assets resulted
dent that there were organizational and materiel in information gaps that greatly hindered the abil-
shortfalls and it was evident that the MEB was not ity of the TF staff to answer the commander’s PIRs
properly resourced for its mission set. The brigade and hindered the staff’s ability to effectively recom-
headquarters was robustly staffed with diverse mend asset employment strategies. The ability to
functional and operations planning cells, however, have dedicated ISR assets would have contributed
the brigade itself contained no organic units other immensely in supporting the TF mission across all
than its HHC and Signal Company. One key en- lines of effort.
abler that failed to be tactically tailored in support For example, the limitation of dedicated ISR as-
of TF Warrior’s formation in light of the mission assets hindered our ability to detect patterns of move-
signment, was a Military Intelligence (MI) enabler. ment among suspected enemy routes and prevented
Currently Battlefield Surveillance Brigades, a prod- us from confirming or denying these enemy lines of
uct of the Army’s modularity concept which provide communication. This ultimately limited our ability
ISR support to Corp-level units, are not organized to detect enemy staging locations for attacks and
infiltration routes and exfiltration routes in vicinity governance, development and information efforts
of attack sites. There was limited visibility on sus- throughout the TF AO.
pected enemy supply routes, which precluded the Challenges–MEB ISR Comparison
TF from interdicting insurgent movements of weap-
Theater level ISR assets were recurrently allocated
ons, ammunition and explosives.
in support of TF Warrior operations for a limited du-
In the development LOE, this paucity of assets ration during the execution of offensive operations.
prevented us from monitoring the many develop- However, due to the dynamic nature of the OE, the
ment projects that were in construction through- sparsely allocated full motion video support did not
out the AO. These projects primarily included provide us the required persistent surveillance ca-
road and bridge construction and the establish- pability. Limited duration ISR coverage is insuf-
ment of new government facilities. Many of these ficient for a COIN environment. Due to shortages
projects were consistently threatened for attacks of Theater ISR assets, mission priorities often pre-
by insurgent forces. Key bridges were destroyed cluded the allocation of ISR in support of TF Warrior
to preclude Coalition Forces aiding defending operations.
Afghan forces against insurgent forces. Once re- As a result of constraints, the MEB ISR assets
paired these key areas continued to receive ad- were not on par with BCT peers. TF Warrior’s ISR
ditional threats of attacks. The low visibility of capabilities were severely limited in comparison to
these projects constricted our views of the overall other BSOs. Although its OE was much more per-
security and progression of these projects, which missive, information requirements existed outside
directly affected the freedom of movement of the of the security LOE that were critical in aiding the
local populace. commander to monitor measures of effectiveness of
There were numerous reports suggesting that his decision points in governance, development and
key and influential personnel in government and information LOEs. All BSOs should have dedicated
Afghan security positions were cooperating with ISR capability whether from organic, direct support
known insurgents throughout the AO. These re- or general support enablers. This augmentation
ports remained unconfirmed due to a lack of dedi- should be considered during the sourcing phase for
cated assets that could assist in monitoring all unit deployment to ensure units are properly tai-
activity of these individuals to known insurgents’ lored for mission execution.
AOs. In addition there was limited coverage of all
Tailoring for the Operational
activity in vicinity of mosques that were reported
Environment
to be used for insurgent meetings and pre-staging
Modified table of organization and equipment
locations for attacks. This limited our knowledge
(MTOE) design shortfalls revealed that force develop-
of any anti-coalition and anti-Afghan govern-
ers should consider ISR augmentation of UAS pla-
ment rhetoric that was being used in support of
toon and tactical SIGINT support for the MEB during
insurgent information operations, which inevita-
bly caused issues in our ability to promote a suc-
BCTs v. MEB Collection Assets
cessful pro-Government of the Islamic Republic of International
BCT 1 BCT 2 BCT 3 TF WARRIOR
Afghanistan and Afghan National Security Forces BATTLE GROUP
IMINT IMINT IMINT IMINT NMC IMINT

campaign targeting the local populace. NMC
GCS GCS GCS
The overall effect of a lack of ISR assets dedicated GCS GCS GCS
to the TF was a huge limitation on lethal and non- JSTARS CGS CGS JSTARS CGS CGS JSTARS CGS CGS
lethal targeting opportunities on known insurgents HUMINT HUMINT HUMINT HUMINT HUMINT
and the overall ability to prevent/deter/detect in- CI HCT HCT CI HCT HCT CI HCT HCT HCT HCT CI
FR
HT
FR
HCT
surgent activities. Just as “intelligence drives oper-

CI HCT HCT CI HCT HCT CI HCT HCT HCT HCT
HT
FR
HCT HCT HCT HCT HCT HCT HCT
HT
HCT HCT HCT HCT HCT HCT
ations,” the lack of adequate intelligence also drives HCT
HCT
HCT
OMT
HCT
HCT
operations. The inability to visualize the battle space SIGINT SIGINT

OMT
SIGINT SIGINT SIGINT

subsequently hindered the movement and capabili- PS
PS
STG
STG
LLVI
LLVI
PS
PS
STG LLVI
LLVI
PS
PS
STG LLVI
LLVI
LLVI
FR
LLVI
FR
STG
LLVI LLVI LLVI LLVI
ties of all coalition units throughout the AO, and

LLVI
LLVI SIGINT LLVI NZ
LLVI
LLVI SIGINT LLVI LLVI
LLVI SIGINT LLVI
consequently hindered the progression of security, Figure 2. Comparison

Organic/DS GS Asset of ISR Collection Assets.
LLVI

forward deployments. The absence of brigade and mendation for a change to the MEB personnel MTOE.
below level ISR assets (UAS and SIGINT) for persis- The S2 section organization must be updated to reflect
tent surveillance inhibited the brigade commander’s operational needs as much as possible. Single source
ability to continuously monitor his named areas of intelligence disciplines (SIGINT, IMINT, and HUMINT)
interest and inhibited the unit’s “find” capability dur- Soldiers should be part of the MEB MTOE to contrib-
ing the targeting cycle. As mentioned this resulted in ute to the total intelligence fusion process.
intelligence gaps of threat group patterns and igno- Personnel Recommendations for MEB S2 Section
rance of threat tactics, techniques, and procedures.
MAJ 35 D S2 S2NCOIC NCOIC E-8 35F
One of the drawbacks identified was that the target-

ing battle staff could not action time sensitive intelli- CPT 35 A
CUOPS/
CPT 35F CPT 35 A
CW2 351M
MI DET CM&D NCOIC 35L E-7 CW2 351F
PLANS NCOIC 35L E-7
S2X
gence due to lack of organic assets to establish positive
NCOIC E-7 35M
NCO 35F E-6
IFC NCOIC 35F E-7
NCO 35F E-6
NCO 35F E-6
ANALYST 35F
NCO E-6 35M
NCO 35F E-5
identification of threat personalities or confirm target

ANALYST x 2 35F
SIGINT IMINT
location. Operations were often postponed because 1LT 35G 1LT 35C CPT 31
CRIMINT
of the inability to confirm or deny enemy presence or
NCOIC 35L E-6 NCOIC 35 E-6 CW3 CID
NCO 35L E-5 NCO 35 E-5 NCO E-7/E-6 31B
conduct target acquisition. Our recommendation is VULNERABILITY LEP
for force developers to update the MTOE for the MEB, NCOIC E-7 31B
NCO E-6 31B
4 X CIVILIAN LEPs
*During FWD Deployments only

taking combat mission deployments into account and Figure 4. Recommended Personnel MTOE for the MEB S2 Section.
augment the MEB with an MI detachment. Conclusion
An MI detachment (with MI company functions Force developers have the challenging task of provid-
and capabilities) consisting of organic UAS platforms ing the right unit to support combatant commanders
and tactical SIGINT assets and required personnel in contingency operations. The 1st MEB successfully
and equipment for tasking, processing, exploitation completed its mission as a “fourth BCT,” however
and dissemination should be allocated for each BSO the lack of a dedicated MI collection unit attached for
conducting fullspectrum operations. mission execution, was a detriment to the effective-
ness and combat capability of TF Warrior. Due to the
Detachment in support of a MEB lack of dedicated collection resources, there were too
In addition to equipment and collection systems, many unknowns which prevented the brigade staff
the personnel MTOE of the MEB was inadequate for from accurately defining the OE for the commander.
TF Warrior operations. In theater we discovered that Moreover, we lacked the ability to adequately measure
our mission expanded beyond what we observed dur- the effectiveness of both our nonlethal and lethal tar-
ing the predeployment site survey and required the geting efforts against all four LOEs. These observa-
S2 section to have specialized expertise in various dis- tions from within the TF Warrior AO clearly revealed
ciplines and access to other systems, databases and the importance of a BSO possessing dedicated tacti-
software that were utilized by the CJ2 staff for single- cal ISR capabilities in a COIN environment to comple-
source processing of intelligence. All-source analysts ment other sources of intelligence.
had to execute the functions of specialized intelligence
technicians and quickly underwent on-the-job training References
1. FMI 2-01, ISR Synchronization, November 2008. 1-5, 1-6 para
on SIGINT, Human Intelligence (HUMINT), and IMINT
1-28.
analytical tools and systems.
Recommendations WeMI
for MEB offer a strong recom-
Detachment 2. FMI 2-01. 1-2, para 1-11.
Major Marilyn Harris is the 1st MEB Intelligence Officer. She

CPT/1LT
MI DET
35 D
served as the 1st MEB S2 OIC in support of OEF. Previous
assignments include the CFSOCC Collection Manager. MAJ
ISR SIGINT UAS TAC Harris holds a Master’s in Strategic Intelligence and attended
INT PLT PLT HUMINT
the 35G SIGINT Course at Fort Huachuca, Arizona. She may
SHADOW RAVEN be contacted at [email protected].
CI OMT
STG LLVI Captain Carolyn Bronson is the 1st MEB Assistant S2. She
HCTs
served as the S2 Plans Officer and Collection Manager for the
HCTs 1st MEB in support of OEF. CPT Bronson holds a BA in Political
Science from Norwich University. She may be contacted at
Figure 3. Recommended Structure of a MEB MI Detachment. [email protected].
by Major Charles Assadourian
Introduction
The methods of measuring progress in any large ends in conviction of the insurgent. Prior to this, the
endeavor are essential, yet often difficult to agree security forces must capture the individual and ex-
upon.1 This is particularly true when the endeavor ploit all available evidence at the point of capture or
requires qualitative measures. Public debate re- other relevant location. Prior to capture, the secu-
garding counterinsurgency (COIN) often raises this rity forces must have a warrant or positive identifi-
issue, but attention span in the news cycle does cation of incriminating activity. Prior to the warrant
not permit complex answers to complex problems.2 the security forces must receive tips or reporting of
This complexity stems in part from the numerous incriminating activity, such as the assembly of an
entities involved which include external or foreign improvised explosive device. Prior to the tips or re-
forces, host nation (HN) forces, HN government porting, the insurgent must attempt an attack or
agencies, subsets of the population, and insurgent activity which would lead to a kinetic attack. Thus,
elements. Given this complexity, how can leaders six different metrics result from the timeline in
translate the desired end state into specific tasks case studies with positive outcomes. The acronym
for Soldiers? Answering this question first requires SLTWC2 captures these benchmarks for success.
clarification of desired outputs of the tasks.
Traditional measures of security in COIN often fo-
cus on the number of attacks executed or number
of detainees captured.3 While these are valid mea-
sures, a more holistic approach requires an exami-
nation of instances resulting in positive outcomes.
In this, HN government and population activities
are as important as enemy activities. Appropriate
measures include events on the timeline in cases
SLTWC2 Security Metrics
with successful outcomes. Such measures can
shape priority intelligence requirements and rein- 1. SIGACTS.
force or shape the commander’s assessment of the 2. Local security force networking.
environment. 3. Tips and reports.
Based on this, an examination of the “success- 4. Warrants.
ful event” timeline or process, starting from the last 5. Captures and sensitive site exploitation.
event back to the beginning significant activity or in- 6. Convictions.
criminating act, produces measurable data points. These metrics serve to evaluate the effects on
Apart from a lack of casualties, the ideal situation the environment as well as those on the enemy.

In order of priority, desired effects on the enemy accurately before insurgents do. Security forces
include reconciliation, capture, kill, marginaliza- must establish roots in the community and fight
tion, or exile. The criteria used to assess as green, to maintain them. This is true for both the foreign
amber, or red will vary based on local conditions forces as well as the HN force. It takes a network to
and the desired end state. Each of the six met- defeat a network, and nodal analysis is critical.6 A
rics has unique linkages with each of these effects key leader engagement with a local leader is good
which can occur at any point in the SLTWC2 cycle. for a foreign force, but there is generally more
When tied to geographic areas, the six measures value added between two or more HN elements.
serve to indicate progress, stagnation, or regres- The frequency and outputs of HN key leader en-
sion and the boundaries between one or more of gagements allow opportunities for both qualitative
these assessments of the terrain. In all cases, HN and quantitative measures, the two categories of
buy-in dramatically increases the probability of data points in determining success.7
success. What represents an external threat to In addition to engagements a number of other
the external force is a domestic threat to the HN. factors impact success. The existence of liaison of-
A simple matrix captures the essential bits of ficers, an active internal affairs, professionaliza-
information for each of these metrics. A work- tion (consisting of expertise, corporateness, and
book, such as the type typically used for SIGACTs, responsibility),8 clear roles and responsibilities (ju-
serves as an excellent tracking tool for the six risdiction), the ability to gain biometric entries and
components. An elaboration of each metric offers intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance re-
insight into the headings for each worksheet in quests are some instances which provide oppor-
the workbook, as well as their relationship to the tunities to enhance COIN networking. All these
five desired effects. organizations merit nodal diagrams which run ver-
SIGACTS. While SIGACTs only provide a portion of tically and horizontally and show informal rela-
the information necessary to effectively evaluate the tionships. Every driver of instability in a particular
environment,4 they remain valid as one of a num- environment ties into one or more of the networks
ber of measures of effectiveness. SIGACTs and the in the environment. Network challenges include va-
events and resources which precede them are criti- cant positions; the transition of former insurgents;
cal as incriminating evidence in the development of the replacement of corrupt, complicit, or incompe-
the rule of law. When combined with other informa- tent leaders, and political motivations.
tion, SIGACT data can help explain the reasons for Security force networking measures also include
boundaries between permissive and non-permissive nonlethal aspects of COIN. The details of SWEAT-
areas. SIGACTs also indicate threat group capabili- MTA (sewage, water, electricity, academics, trash,
ties through the identification, elimination, or pro- medical, transportation, and agriculture) and other
liferation of new or signature tactics, techniques, elements of intelligence preparation of the environ-
and procedures. ment offer inject points to enhance both the COIN
Key to most successful SIGACT responses is and civil service networks. Hosting meetings to dis-
the forensic exploitation of biometrics and ballis- cuss various drivers of instability offers opportuni-
tics. A qualified investigative officer must be part ties to increase interaction internal to local COIN
of this process from the beginning. Depending on and other environmental networks.
the volume and nature of most SIGACTs, the type COIN leaders from all agencies should shape a
of crime qualifying as a SIGACT may be broadened common assessment of the enemy and intelligence
or narrowed to include a meaningful yet manage- preparation of the environment. Good networking
able volume. helps prevent overreactions to significant events.
Local Security Force Networking. Local secu- Security forces and other community leaders such
rity forces are a critical component for evaluation.5 as essential service, social, and business leaders
Even when the actual perpetrator is captured or must be perceived as a consistently united front
killed on sight, after a SIGACT occurs the coun- and key to a better future. This strengthens rule of
terinsurgent must know who to call to gain addi- law. The external security force must seek to be a
tional information or to explain the circumstances catalyst for HN COIN efforts. Local security forces
must actually be in the lead, and not just appear to include a trained and certified investigative officer
be in the lead. Networking effects are primarily rec- to supervise biometric and forensic collection and
onciliation of insurgent elements and fence sitters processing of evidence. The capture must lead to
but also lead to the other four effects. initial and follow on judicial reviews. Proper chain of
custody helps determine admissibility in court. This
Tips and Reporting. As networking begins, tips
requires timely release of the details of the capture
and reports will begin to flow in to the extent that
to HN authorities. Understanding HN investigative
support for COIN exists within the community.
standards and any gap with desired standards aids
These can vary from mere rumors to incriminating
the foreign force in providing assistance.
physical evidence and come from initial contacts
or historical relationships. It is important to get The significance of captures varies according to
sworn statements, and when possible, testimony. the detainee’s place in the threat order of battle and
Atmospherics, early warning, cache, or high value the willingness to provide information in interroga-
target locations are most meaningful in areas with- tion. Cache significance varies according to size and
out significant prior reporting. content. Detention orders following an unplanned
detention reflect positively on the legal environ-
Counterinsurgents must be alert to filter false ac- ment. Dry holes, indicators of early warning, or
cusations or deceptive information. Tracking the subsequent releases often reflect negatively. While
volume, accuracy, tone, and geography of reporting a desired end state in itself, capture can often lead
yields key insights into both the enemy and the op- to the other four desired end states.
erational environment. An increase in tips and re-
Convictions. True success following a capture in-
porting often indicates an increase in reconciliation
cludes a conviction in an HN court. This requires
and can lead to other desired effects.
the political will to prosecute and knowledge of spe-
Warrants. Following a stream of reporting the cific judicial preferences. Key aspects of conviction
counterinsurgent should seek a warrant. Critical outcomes include judicial throughput, length of
to this are topics such as appropriate jurisdiction, sentences, number of pardons, conviction/acquit-
judicial independence, and biometric matches. tal rate, specific roles of the defendants, and the de-
After obtaining a warrant, wanted posters and tails of testimony. It is important to consider that
other targeting efforts possess a greater level of le- the need for judicial independence must have a sig-
gitimacy. The ability to obtain a warrant depends nificant impact on meetings with judges.
upon available evidence and probable cause, ju- Failure to convict can result from complicity, in-
dicial independence, resistance to corruption and competence, investigative or judicial corruption,
political connections, and investigative and judi- or exposure of false accusations. While most pre-
cial competence. fer to think of courts as apolitical, courts often
Investigative officers must be able to analyze and demonstrate a certain legal threshold which may
summarize incriminating information as well as or may not be met by available evidence. This re-
gather and present evidence. Warrants are also crit- quires significant HN administrative skill sets.
ical for the release of detainees into HN police cus- Within this metric, convictions in cases of exter-
tody from external force custody. The publishing of nal force casualties weigh more heavily than HN
warrants generally results in one of three things: victims, as the threshold is generally higher for
the insurgent is turned in (capture), flees (exile), or the external force. Regardless, each conviction
claims innocence (reconcile). In all three instances, marginalizes or exiles a specific threat but can
case development does not end at this point, as the also lead to the other effects.
ideal case ends in successful prosecution. Conclusion
Captures and Sensitive Site Exploitation. After The use of SLTWC2 enhances planning to better
obtaining a warrant, the counterinsurgent typically define and apply resources to influence the envi-
enjoys increased legitimacy to conduct detentions. ronment. These metrics flow from the desired end
Conversely, extra-legal actions reduce security force states and the events which precede them. SLTWC2
credibility and the perception of professionalism. offers opportunities in subordinate criteria to exam-
Like SIGACTs, capture and search actions should ine both quantitative and qualitative measures. It

also offers commanders opportunities to translate at http://ricks.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2010/02/08/kilcullen_i_
here_s_what_not_to_measure_in_a_coin_campaign.
intent into specific tasks for subordinates.
5. Tom Ricks, “Kilcullen (IV): How to measure Afghan army and
I have successfully used these metrics to evaluate police units,” Foreign Policy, 11 February 2010. Accessed at
security in partnership with Iraqi forces. While the http://ricks.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2010/02/11/kilcullen_iv_
variables may not be entirely independent, a posi- how_to_measure_afghan_army_and_police_units.
tive change in SLTWC2 data points coincided with 6. John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt, Networks and Netwars
anecdotal atmospheric evidence of success. This (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2001), 15.
success resulted in the reconciliation, capture, kill- 7. Jack D. Kem, “Assessment: Measures of Performance and
ing, marginalization, or exile of significant threat el- Measures of Effectiveness,” Military Intelligence Professional
ements. Organization of data collection efforts along Bulletin, April-June 2009, 49.
these lines can increase the capture of appropriate 8. Samuel Huntington, The Soldier and the State: The Theory
information which better enables commanders to and Politics of Civil-Military Relations (Cambridge, MA: Belknap
influence the environment. Press, 1957), 8.
Endnotes
1. David Kilcullen, Testimony before the House Armed Services Major Charles L. Assadourian is currently the S2 for 2nd
Committee Hearing on HR 1886, the Pakistan Enduring Assistance Brigade, 1st Calvary Division and recently returned from
and Cooperation Enhancement (PEACE) Act 2009, 23 April 2009. 3. deployment in MND-N. His last assignment was as the
2. Eli J. Margolis, “How to Measure Insurgencies,” Small Wars S2X for 1st Brigade, 1st Cavalry Division where he served in
Journal Posting, 12 September 2007. MND-B from October 2006 to January 2008. He is a 1997
graduate of the U.S. Military Academy at West Point where
3. Jonathan J. Schroden, “Measures for Security in a
he received a BA in Political Science. He is a graduate of
Counterinsurgency,” Journal of Strategic Studies, 32, 5 (October
2009): 715.
the Air Assault School, FAOBC, MICCC, and the Signals
Intelligence Officer Course. Major Assadourian can be
4. Tom Ricks, “Kilcullen (I): Here’s what not to measure in a reached at [email protected].
COIN campaign,” Foreign Policy, 8 February 2010. Accessed
Memetic Warfare: The Future of War
tute itself, requiring the U.S. to intervene once more
by First Lieutenant Brian J. Hancock at the cost of additional lives and other resources.
This article will explore how an emerging subfield
Introduction of psychology known as memetics can be used to
The War on Terror pits the large conventional units identify and target the specific root causes of insur-
of the U.S. against small, agile, and adaptable en- gency and other challenging social problems such
emies around the world. The post modern world of as youth gang violence, the welfare cycle, or the de-
warfare is characterized by a threat which can raise terioration of the public school system.2 Finally a
funds within the boundaries of the country it wishes practical model for constructing and propagating
to attack, train and acquire equipment within those benevolent memes in theatre, at the brigade level,
same boundaries, and then ultimately execute its will be presented.
mission. Memetics Defined
The response of the U.S. to this unprecedented chal- The Oxford English Dictionary defines a meme
lenge is embodied in the 2006 revision of FM 3-24 as “an element of culture that may be considered
Counterinsurgency. This counterinsurgency (COIN) to be passed on by non-genetic means, especially
manual is a significant improvement over its prede- imitation.” In his landmark book, The Selfish Gene,
cessors. It recognizes how non-military aspects of the author Richard Dawkins coined the word meme to
environment bear significantly on shaping insurgency describe cultural replicators which spread through
and fueling terrorist movements. It devotes signifi- the social body akin to how genes spread through
cant attention to recognizing these factors, and pro- the biological body.3 Memes form the invisible but
vides frameworks for analyzing and addressing them. very real DNA of human society. A meme is essen-
Two such frameworks are ASCOPE (areas, structures, tially an idea, but not every idea is a meme. In or-
capabilities, organizations, people, and events) and der for an idea to become a meme it must be passed
PMESII-PT (political, military, economic, social, infor- on—or replicated to another individual. Much like a
mation, infrastructure, physical environment, time). virus moves from body to body, memes move from
mind to mind. Just as genes organize themselves
While the revision of FM 3-24 is a significant im-
into DNA, cells, and chromosomes, so too do repli-
provement over its predecessors, it does have short-
cating elements of culture organize themselves into
comings. As insurgent movements continue to
memes, and co-adaptive meme complexes or “me-
evolve, the most successful operate in complex ur-
meplexes.” The study of these replicating elements
ban terrain, receive indirect support from criminal
of culture is known as memetics.
activities and external agencies which reduces their
need for popular support, and have an ideologi- Sample memes include “Look both ways before
cal appeal grounded in religious fundamentalism. you cross the street,” “Just say no,” the first four
The new manual devotes only a single paragraph notes of Beethoven’s 5th symphony, or “If you martyr
to this environmental change indicating that urban yourself you will receive 72 virgins in the afterlife.”
insurgencies are “difficult to counter” because they As illustrated by the last example it is important to
require little or no popular support.1 Even more note that memes do not necessarily have to be true
significantly, the doctrine of breaking up the rich in order to be successful at replicating themselves.
tapestry of a society into bite size pieces is an at- The memes an individual possesses forms the ba-
tempt to apply a reductionist mindset to a complex sis of his artifacts and behaviors. Some memes
adaptive system. The predicable end result is that replicate more successfully as a related set, or me-
the symptoms of the insurgency are treated in the meplex, than as individual elements. Sample meme-
hopes that the insurgency will go away, while the plexes include the scientific method, communism,
actual root causes–pathogenic memes, or viruses of and radical Islam.
the mind–are never addressed. This leaves open the Genes are measured along three principal axes,
possibility that in time, the insurgency will reconsti- specifically fidelity, fecundity, and longevity.4 Genes

replicate digitally through the process of mitosis. ing per capita income or an unstable government–
Discounting occasional mutation, translocation, such are merely shaping operations which allow the
etc., the copy fidelity of DNA is very high. Memes true problem, a disease of the mind, to sweep through
however, aside from transmission via digital media, the weakened body politic. It has been postulated
are often passed on through the asynchronous pro- that prior to armed military conflict, xenophobic war
cess of conversation which has a much lower copy memes must reach a certain critical mass within
fidelity. Anyone who has ever played the game of the host population in order to support aggressive
telephone or Chinese whispers knows that the mes- action.8 The cure for war then, and the key to pre-
sage given at the beginning of the chain is often very venting future wars, is to identify, track, isolate, and
different than what the last person in the chain re- eliminate the specific memes which form the basis
ceives. Fecundity of DNA is only moderate, as the for the conflict. This is a task for which the intelli-
organism has to grow to sexual maturity and then gence community (IC) is uniquely qualified. The ex-
pass its genes on through sexual reproduction. This tinction of certain pathogenic memes would have an
process is relatively slow, taking an entire genera- effect as profound as the eradication of smallpox.
tion to occur. By comparison, memetic evolution is
extremely fast.5 In the span of a couple of minutes
Memetic Cults
several memes can be transmitted from one person Certain organizations, such as al-Qaeda, utilize
to another. Memetic evolution is exponentially faster modern brainwashing techniques in order to turn
than genetic evolution, so it should be no surprise otherwise ordinary people into memeoids with which
that memes have surpassed genes as the dominant they can then inflict upon their memetic opposition.
driver in human behavior.6 The human brain, despite its large capacity, can only
hold a finite number of memes. This forms the basis
Finally genes are measured in terms of their lon- of memetic selection. Additionally, some memes are
gevity–defined by the life of the individual who carries diametrically opposed. Xenophobic memes which
them and their existence within the larger gene pool. espouse rigid control over society, and most espe-
As memes exist in the minds of human hosts they cially its female members, are being challenged on a
possess similar constraints on their preservation–both daily basis by western liberalism. The clash of these
within the individual–and within the meme pool which opposed memes and memeplexes leads to reaction-
is comprised of books, recordings, and other storage ary memetic cults such as al-Qaeda.
devices. Just as genes with higher fidelity, fecundity,
and longevity can overwrite and replace lesser genes, Al-Qaeda isolates its potential new members in or-
the same is true of memes as well. der to expose them to a single meme set many times
a day for months, or years, without contact from other
Viruses of the Mind memes. Exclusive exposure to one meme (also known
While most memes are beneficial, or at least rela- as brainwashing) induces a “dependent mental state”
tively harmless, some memes such as the Nazi mas- in some people.9 They also employ tested and true
ter race meme or the Pol Pot communist mutation techniques of bypassing the human action-attention-
are responsible for many human deaths. When in- reward (AAR) complex which is a fundamental part of
dividuals are so consumed by a meme/memeplex the human psyche. Status among primates is defined
that the entire purpose of their existence becomes by attention integrated over time. When human beings
to spread the meme, they have become memeoids. receive lots of attention, it elevates their status, and
These individuals are willing to throw away their causes their brains to release dopamine and endor-
own genetic reproductive potential by strapping phins giving them a “high.” 10 Cults like al-Qaeda heap
on bombs or flying airliners into buildings in or- large amounts of attention on prospective martyrs in
der to promote the memeplex that consumes them. order to bypass the natural AAR pathway and release
Pathogenic memes which have potentially disas- pleasure chemicals in the brain of the recipient. The re-
trous effects on their hosts and their neighbors are cipient then misconstrues this positive feeling with the
termed “viruses of the mind.”7 meme set of the organization causing them to internal-
With this frame of reference it is possible to see ize the beliefs of the cult as the source of their pleasure.
the actual root cause of terrorism and insurgency. Al-Qaeda employs many other modern brainwashing
Terrorists and insurgents do not suffer from declin- techniques to propagate their narrative (memeplex).
The discovery of John Walker Lindh (The American mander may direct memetic operations to support
Taliban) brought to light one of the critical short- democracy. While democracy is not a perfect form
comings of modern COIN practice. As the U.S. does of government, it is more stable and peaceful than
not practice COIN at home, it can neither predict other forms of government. With the objective estab-
nor defend against home grown extremists. John lished the next step is to break down the individual
Walker was rushed to justice, and as a result very components of the memeplex of democracy that will
little intelligence was gained from him and a valu- have to be propagated within the target audience. The
able opportunity to understand the extremist move- Organization of American States has sub-divided de-
ment was lost.11 The application of memetics affords mocracy into six essential elements:
the understanding that John Walker was in fact ÊÊ Freedom
suffering from a disease of the mind. Had he been
ÊÊ Human Rights
de-programmed, and inoculated against the cult
ÊÊ Rule of Law
memeplex, it would have been possible to re-insert
ÊÊ Free Regular Elections
him as a double agent and begin taking the Taliban
apart from within. ÊÊ Pluralistic Political System
ÊÊ Separation of Powers
Curing Insurgency and Terrorism These components happen to be memeplexes in
The ultimate long term cure for terrorism and in- their own right, and if this was an actual operation,
surgent movements is to attack them at the atomic they would have to be further sub-divided into their
level through a process of memetic warfare. By respective memes. In the interest of simplicity (and
identifying, cataloguing, and tracing the pathogenic brevity) this step will be overlooked. The process of
memes that lead to these behaviors it will be possi- memetic component definition is summarized in
ble to predict when and where they will occur. When Figure 1.
the IC perceives that a certain dangerous meme set
Determine the Memes Needed to Support a Goal Idea
is reaching critical levels within a community, it can
trigger operations to quarantine the area and send
in an expert team of educators to execute an inocu-
lative and preventative education program on the . .
tactics of mind control and destructive cults.
Memetic Warfare
The principle of memetic warfare is to displace, or
overwrite dangerous pathogenic memes with more
benign memes. Once a critical level of saturation of
the new meme set is achieved in the target popu-
?
lation, undesirable human artifacts and behaviors
such as weapon caches and IED attacks will disap-
pear. Ideally the virus of the mind being targeted
will be overwritten with a higher fidelity, fecundity,
and longevity memeplex in order to assure long term
sustainability. When this is not practical, it is still
possible to displace a dangerous memeplex, by cre-
.
ating a more contagious benign meme utilizing cer-
tain packaging, replication, and propagation tricks.
The process of offensive memetic operations down
range should be sanctioned via a memetic annex in
the Theatre level operations order. This annex will
.
clearly articulate the commander’s intent for the
end state of the process. For instance, in order to
facilitate stability and support operations, the com- Figure 1. Memetic Component Definition.

With the specific memetic components defined, involves proffering a very attractive meme such
the next step is to incorporate packaging and rep- as sex, and having a less attractive meme such
lication tricks in order to make the message more as beer sales ride on its coat tails. The target in-
attractive–and hence more likely to be passed on. dividual is effectively seduced into accepting the
Successful memetic packaging involves incorpo- entire memetic package as a whole, including the
rating key elements that resonate with the human less desirable elements.
psyche, often on a very primitive level, within the
Finally, there are a number of propagation tech-
context of the message. A list of primal and second-
niques that can expedite the saturation of the tar-
ary human buttons can be found in Table 1.12
get message. Repetition breeds familiarity, and
Table 1 Memetic packaging–primary and secondary when combined with multiple media formats ap-
behavioral hot buttons. peals to a wide range of personality types. Key
leaders can quickly influence their followers to ac-
Primary Buttons Secondary Buttons
• Anger • Belonging cept a message; and gaining their endorsement
• Fear • Distinguishing Yourself should be an integral part of any propagation
• Hunger • Caring plan. Finally placing someone in a state of cog-
• Lust • Approval
• Obeying Authority nitive dissonance can open a window of opportu-
nity for changing that individual’s meme set. High
For example, when Richard Brodie wrote his book pressure salesmen make extensive use of this
on memetics, he did not title it “Introduction to technique.
Memetics.” He instead opted for the title “Virus of the
Mind” because he knew that would tie into the hu- When the memetic packaging, replication, and
man primal button of fear. Humans will go to great propagation strategy is complete, the next step is
lengths to learn about and avoid perceived threats, to begin the process of indoctrination of the tar-
and this fueled the sales of his book. While the pri- get population in order to achieve the target level
mal and secondary buttons have universal appeal, of message saturation. The initial focus should be
there are differentiated male and female buttons, on community leaders with influence networks.
especially with regards to sexuality.13 Judicious use Through incorporation of a feedback loop, propa-
of the buttons enumerated in Table 2 enables gen- gation measures are refined and continued until
der specific targeting of the memetic message. the desired end state has been achieved. This pro-
cess is mapped in Figure 2.
Table 2 Memetic packaging–male buttons, female buttons,
and repetition tricks. Memetic operations in the military environment
Male Buttons Female Buttons Repetition Tricks
require the use of broad spectrum assets, both or-
• Power • Security • Altruism ganic and inorganic. The central hub, or brain of
• Dominance • Commitment • Gifting the operation, is the intelligence staff. The theatre
• Window of • Investment • The Truth
Opportunity • Catchy level commander’s intent is filtered down through
• Mnemonics the Division Analysis and Control Element (ACE)
• Trojan Horse
to the Brigade S2 which is in charge of memetic
Table 2 also lists a number of replication tricks
construction, propagation oversight, and feed-
which can further enhance the appeal of the mes-
back analysis. Command level support will be re-
sage. Altruistic messages, for instance, are well re-
quired to coordinate non-organic assets such as
ceived. Additionally altruistic individuals tend to
the Air Force Commando Solo psychological op-
have more friends and are held in higher regard,
erations platform, Cyber Warfare (CW), and Public
making it more likely that others will imitate them
Affairs (PAO).
and spread their memes.14 Gifting is a powerful
technique as human beings are psychologically High level support will also be required to syn-
hard-wired to reciprocate when given something. chronize and deconflict other aspects of state power
The Hari Krishna cult took advantage of this by which form additional propagation platforms such
giving people a free flower, and in exchange peo- as non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and pri-
ple reciprocated by accepting their memes. The vate volunteer organizations (PVOs) as well as the
Trojan Horse technique is an insidious trick that Office of the Secretary of State. The assets required
sensors within their specific areas of expertise to col-
Introduce under cover agents into
society you wish to infect with goal lect and channel feedback to the Military Intelligence
ideas(s). (MI) control cell. The MI staff will make any nec-
essary adjustments to the message to achieve the
Agents indentify and indoctrinate
community leaders that are already
commander’s intent, while mitigating second and
suspectible to infection with third order effects, and then push the refined mes-
memetic structure of goals(s).
sage through the appropriate propagation platforms
once more.
Achieving the desired level of memetic satura-
. tion will result in the target population exhibit-
ing the artifacts and behaviors that will support
the ongoing coalition mission. It is important to
note, that the memetic process does not end here.
If a process of monitoring is not put in place to
ensure that the memetic message maintains a
critical mass, the target population may revert to
previous undesirably artifacts and behaviors. For
a relatively cheap ongoing investment, memetic
monitoring can insure that unforeseen and/or
emergent entities do not unravel the meme set
and compromise future security. This critical pro-
cess is detailed in Figure 4.
.
.
Figure 2. Memetic Indoctrination and Saturation Assessment.

to conduct brigade level memetic projection are
summarized in Figure 3.
The same assets which are utilized to propagate
the approved memetic message will also serve as
Feedback Loop Feedback Loop YES
Commando Solo
HCT
Target
ACE MI CA Audience
NGOs/PVOs
IO
CW YES
Key: PAO
HCT = Humint Collection Team
CA = Civil Affairs
IO = Information Operations Diplomats
CW = Cyber Warfare Feedback Loop
- - - = Inorganic Asset
Figure 3. Brigade Level Memetic Propagation Model. Figure 4. Memetic Status Monitor.

Conclusion–Implications of Memetics Memetics after all is only a tool, and tools when
Memetic theory provides a framework for dealing properly employed can be used to build peace,
with the most troubling social and military prob- hope, prosperity, and a better way of life.
lems at the root causal level. The relentless ad-
vance of technology will continue to make weapons
of mass destruction (WMD) increasingly deadly, Endnotes
miniaturized, and available. Today memeoids are 1. Frank G. Hoffman, “Neo-Classical Counterinsurgency?”
Parameters, Summer 2007, 77.
able to wreak considerable havoc by flying airlin-
ers into buildings or bombing key infrastructure. 2. Richard Brodie, Virus of the Mind (Seattle: Integral Press, 1996),
Inside cover.
When these individuals are able to reliably ob-
tain WMD, the survival of humanity will hinge on 3. Susan Blackmore, The Meme Machine (New York: Oxford
a preventative approach to terrorism and insur- University Press, 1999), 6.
gency rather than a reactive response. Memetics 4. Ibid., 100.
provides the key to identifying, tracking, quar-
5. Ibid., 59-62.
antining, and ultimately eradicating pathogenic
memes before they result in deadly consequences. 6. Ibid., 162.
The IC is uniquely positioned to incorporate and 7. Brodie, 57-64.
exploit this new model to protect U.S. interests at
home and abroad. 8. H. Keith Henson, “Evolutionary Psychology, Memes, and the
Origin of War,” Kuro5hin, 20 April 2006. 13.
As society continues to become more competitive
9. H. Keith Henson, “Memetics and the Modular Mind,” Analog.
at every level, human beings are forced to evolve August 1987, 6.
mentally and physically in order to be success-
10. H. Keith Henson, “Sex, Drugs, and Cults. An evolutionary
ful. These selection pressures will inevitably lead
psychology perspective on why and how cult memes get a drug-like
to genetic (and memetic) engineering. Future par- hold on people, and what might be done to mitigate the effects,” The
ents will do everything in their power to ensure Human Nature Review. Volume 2: August 23 2002, 343.
that their progeny are able to successfully compete 11. “John Walker and the fatal flaw in our war on terrorism!”
by supplying them with the best possible DNA and FACTNet Newsletter, January 2002, 2-3.
mental programming (memes). As high fidelity digi-
12. Brodie, 90-93.
tal media technologies continue to proliferate, and
with the expected debut of Artificial Intelligence ca- 13. Brodie, 119-120.
pable of natural language recognition and common 14. Blackmore, 162-174.
sense, the perfect tools to analyze, propagate, and
engineer memes at the societal level will be within
human reach.
While this raises profound moral implications,
the reality is that this development is unavoid-
able. While the free thinking people of the U.S.
may be loathe to utilize technologies which can
be construed as mind control, its enemies have
no such compunctions. It is vital to the interests
of the U.S. and its people that memetic theory is
fully explored, if for no other reason than to de-
velop defenses against foreign memetic attack.
Memetic operations do not require a presence in
1LT Brian Hancock was an Information Executive who joined
the target country. For a fraction of the cost of de-
the U.S. Army and completed basic training in 2006. He is the
ploying troops on the ground, the enemies of the 2007 U.S. Army Reserve Soldier of the Year. He accepted a
U.S. could conduct devastating memetic based direct commission in October 2007. 1LT Hancock is currently
information warfare against America. It is time the Executive Officer of the 7th Psychological Operations
for the IC to turn this threat into an opportunity. Group Headquarters Support Company.
Lethal Theory:
Some Implications
by Claudia Baisini and James M. Nyce
Introduction a deeper understanding of the local culture is criti-
The conflicts in which our Armed Forces are en- cal to the squad leader’s reading of the operational
gaged are increasingly characterized by large civilian situation due to the high density of civilian popula-
presence and involvement, difficulties in identify- tion in military operations in urban terrain.
ing possible threats, high tempo, and dense terrain. The findings suggested the issue of context is the
The concept of the “three block war,” introduced by most relevant way to think about culture, with an
General Krulak, reiterates the necessity of making emphasis on the visual dimension. In other words,
a broad range of decisions in little or no time at the to support the role of a unit’s leader in populated
micro tactical level.1 Far more complex than “shoot, settings–the three blocks, what he sees and reads
don’t shoot,” the group leader has considerable rein the social landscape turned out to be paramount.
sponsibility in decisionmaking. In order for him to Furthermore, while it is possible to derive a generic
have the best possible situational awareness, he system of values that reflect the structure of the lo-
must have the necessary skills (not tools or rules). cal culture, it has to be kept in mind that countries
He must be provided with the capability of learning such as Afghanistan are highly fragmented among
from the operational context, stretching his mental diverse ethnic groups, tribes, and kinships. It is
models and transcending the obvious. necessary to gain a deeper local understanding, one
Research suggests that visual orientation is an that cannot be easily extrapolated from more gen-
important ability for a group leader in urban com- eral statements about a culture. It is highly context-
bat; what one sees and how one interprets what is dependent.
seen can be decisive. What has received less atten- U.S. Army and Marine Corps doctrines raise
tion is the fact that the ability to make fast decisions the issue of “learning” and, particularly, “learning
in a critical situation depends also on the ability to while acting” as paramount in the complex coun-
make the right judgment of the situation; to perceive terinsurgency (COIN) operational environment.
and understand context appropriately. Such ability Both FM 3-07 Stability Operations and FM 3-24
requires sophisticated context-based training that Counterinsurgency also stress the “bottom up” na-
gives the group leader the mindset to learn and un- ture of such operations. While orders come from
derstand the context appropriately while deployed. above, it is only at the local tactical level that proper
This following discussion stems from a study con- situational awareness can be achieved.4
ducted at the Swedish National Defense College in If we look at the squad leader in a three block war
2006 which focused on identifying the most rele- environment, what is crucial to him is the context
vant issues for conducting military operations in a which culture, of course, informs. Whether he is
built up area in a distributed operation.2,3 In distrib- leading his squad in patrolling (observation) or close
uted operations a battalion’s squads are generally quarter battle (CQB) or engaging against rebels or
autonomous and are spread throughout the opera- being ambushed, he needs to learn how to watch
tion area; thus, the squad leader has considerable and interpret what he sees and he must refer to the
decisionmaking power. The focus is on the squad local context (understand what he sees in relation
leader’s competence, judgment, and decisionmak- to where he is) rather than interpreting it based on
ing capabilities, which are highly dependent on his preconceived ideas or prior de-contextualized knowl-
situational awareness. The study’s premise was that edge/information. Furthermore, he must do it fast,

which is why the visual dimension emerged as so intuitive thought.”11 From the many definitions of in-
critical. He must experience that “Coup d’Oeil” that tuition three common traits can be identified:
was considered crucial by Napoleon and by many ÊÊ It is a phenomenon of subconscious thought.
after him. He needs to develop that intuition that ÊÊ It relies heavily on experience-based knowledge.
General Krulak considers the most important char-
ÊÊ It is a comprehensive, unrestrained thought
acteristic of young leaders. The question is: How?
process.12
Intuition and Le Coup d’Oeil The traditional military decisionmaking process is
“The human mind’s intuitive process is an mostly described as analytical and prescriptive. It is
irreplaceable determinant of combat success” 5 a systematic, methodical approach that breaks the
According to Krulak, decisionmaking is a cen- situation down into manageable tasks. While such
tral human factor in warfare, the foremost means an approach is effective in long term planning, by
of lifting the “fog of war.”6 Usually, inexperienced its very nature it carries risks identified in the lit-
leaders under extreme conditions wait until they erature as “bounded rationality.”13 An alternate ap-
have gained as much information as possible before proach is the Intuitive (or Naturalistic) Theory of
making a decision, which leads to missed opportu- decisionmaking, based on the premise that people
nities. “History has demonstrated that battles have often use less formal, but much faster decisionmak-
been lost more often by a leader’s failure to make ing strategies in real time situations.14
a decision than by his making a poor one.”7 This is When talking about military intuition many au-
relevant in combat, but also to other aspects con- thors refer to Napoleon and his Coup d’Oeil or the
sidered crucial in COIN operations, such as under- instant, global understanding of a situation. This
standing and responding to local population(s). is particularly appropriate to the subject discussed
Napoleon referred to the intuitive capability to rap- here because it refers to what the eye seizes, both
idly assess a situation and make a fast decision as literally and metaphorically. It is the ability to see
“Coup d’Oeil” or “strike of the eye” which he believed the whole and also to see what is not there, and
was a gift of nature.8 In fact, behavioral psycholo- act.
gists have identified the creative-intuitive personal- According to Klein, whose Recognition Primed
ity as being “alert, confident, foresighted, informal, Decision Model is a milestone in decisionmaking
spontaneous and independent. He is not afraid of theory, the first source of power is intuition, which
his experiences, himself, or his world. He accepts he defines as use of experience to recognize key pat-
challenges readily. He is unconventional, yet com- terns that indicate the dynamics of a situation.15
fortable in this role. He can live with doubt and un- This includes recognizing what is happening but
certainty. He is willing and able to create and is not also what isn’t happening, as both can provide clues.
afraid of exposing to criticism.”9 This ability comes from experience, one is able to
Historically, militaries believed that although he- see the pieces of the event that are not perceptible
redity and personality certainly play a role, intu- to someone with less experience or expertise.16
ition can be cultivated and developed. Prior to World Intuition as Socially Constructed
War II the Japanese called it “sixth sense” and the
If we accept from Klein’s definition of intuition
Germans “character.” They tried to identify this
as based on “experience to recognize key patterns
trait during recruitment and to cultivate it through
that indicate the dynamic of a situation,” a problem
stressful decisionmaking training under extreme
arises. If a Soldier has no experience of the local
conditions.10
environment in which he is deployed, his intuition
Intuition has been defined as “a developed men- would be based on experiences, patterns and dy-
tal faculty which involves the automatic retrieval and namics that generate from, and are applicable to,
translation of subconsciously stored information into his own social context, but not necessarily applica-
the conscious realm to make decisions and perform ble to the context in which he is deployed. Or even
actions. Organized databases of knowledge gained worse, they might be misleading when applied be-
through education–experiences, memorization, sen- cause the meaning is different. Such issues are the
sations and relationships–are the building blocks for key to “understanding” and “learning” about the
operational environment. The way in which an in- These two images (below left and right), represent-
dividual sees the world is the product of the indi- ing how a main road in Malawi looks, may seem un-
vidual’s personal history, experiences, upbringing, usual to most Westerners. What is unusual to us is
personality, and his social context. The interaction that there is always someone walking aside the road,
between the individual and the social context has any time of the day or night. Always. If this is related
the double effect of constructing how the individual and read through our Western experience, it would
sees the world (hence the way he acts) and, in turn, never be considered a main road. This is because ac-
constructing his social context.17 To put in Kurt cording to what is normal for us on a main road there
Lewin’s words behavior is a function of personality will be vehicular traffic and no pedestrians. We would
and context.18 suspect that something is wrong if we were driving on
The way we look at a situation defines (and limits) an interstate and saw many people walking along it.
what approach we will have in relating to that par- Hence, if we found ourselves in Malawi and saw
ticular situation. Everyday interaction tends to re- the road as illustrated in the first image, we would
confirm and reinforce previous habitus. To illustrate perceive the situation as normal. The very fact that
how our intuition can mislead us when it comes to the road looks normal to us (no people) is the most
understanding a variety of local contexts— relevant indicator for local people (or an intuitively
skilled warfighter) that there is something wrong.
This could be a main road to a rural community
anywhere. Also, what may be seen as normal in Malawi may not
be the case for a country road (Image 1) in Zimbabwe,
1
a neighboring country to Malawi. This raises the
question as to what extent we can generalize knowl-
edge about local conditions. There is a tendency to
either over generalize or over particularize knowledge
especially when it comes to cultures other than own.
This article will suggest a third, alternative path.
As Heuer19 describes, we tend to see what we ex-
pect to see, but we would like to add that what we
expect to see, what guides our attention, is a prod-
uct of our social context.20 Most attempts to take
local context into account have taken the route of
either learning basic content knowledge about oth-
ers or attempting to memorize normative rules and
principles that proscribe certain behavior. This ap-
Now look at the next pictures. proach to learning about local context has at least
2 3

two problems. One is whether the uptake of con- son’s predictive context. Preconceived ideas, like
textual knowledge in these forms balances out the what an interstate looks like, can bias not only how
economic costs. Second, and more importantly, can we make sense of what we see, but also what we ac-
knowledge learned this way be readily and easily ap- tually see (and what we don’t see or overlook.)
plied in tactical situations?21 The temptation to rely
So how can warfighters both learn and respond to
on virtual simulations stems from the equation that
appropriate cultural cues? Further, how can we em-
close to reality experience and participation can re-
bed knowledge of this kind in such a format so that
sult in a kind of direct “transmission” from what the
it can be available to them without the need for di-
simulation shows to what exists in an operational
rect conscious intervention? Having to think rather
context itself. This finesses the question we address
than immediately react and respond appropriately
here of how to use one’s intuition so that it is situ-
as warfighters shift from context to context is what
ationally appropriate and yields more directly un-
we are trying to address.
derstood tactical signals outside one’s own country.
To understand how this might occur takes us to the Change Blindness and Inattentional
idea of visual cognition and cueing. Blindness
Contextual Cueing Two other phenomena that relate to visual cogni-
The contextual cueing paradigm developed by Chun tion and are highly relevant to our group leaders
and Jiang states that “visual context can assist lo- are change blindness and inattentional blindness.
calization of individual objects via an implicit learn- Change blindness, what Chun calls “the dark side
ing mechanism.”22 Several experiments have shown of visual attention,” is the failure to detect changes
that invariant spatial context can cue the location of in the presence, identity or location of objects in
a target which happens unconsciously, leading to the scenes.28 In experiments, over half of observers
conclusion that implicit memory of visual context can failed to note a change in the identity of a person
provide top-down guidance for attention and aware- that they were conversing with when changes (brief
ness. In other words, with repeated experience the vi- interruptions) occurred. The inattentional blindness
sual system picks up on invariant spatial relationships phenomenon is closely related to this. Individuals
and uses this information to guide attention, without failed to notice stimuli appearing in front of their
the need for direct conscious intervention.23, 24 eyes when they were preoccupied with an atten-
However, “objects can be recognized without con- tion demanding task. In other words “what you see
text but when dealing with less familiar objects, is what you set.”29 Experiments demonstrated that
complex scenes, or degraded information, the im- people focused on observing players passing a ball
portance of context increases”25 The same ex- to each other failed to notice a man in a gorilla cos-
periments have also demonstrated that there are tume who suddenly appeared on the scene. While
constraints at work here–“contextual cueing only oc- inattentional blindness can be detectable often im-
curs when the target was embedded within the pre- mediately, change blindness proved to be more dif-
dictive context.”26 Visual context’s function is that of ficult to detect even when the subject expects and
guiding attention and facilitating recognition of ob- actively searches for such changes.30
jects within a scene; we are more likely to look for a Research suggests that “our expectations and
breadbox than a drum when looking at the picture knowledge of a scene influence how we perceive ob-
of a kitchen, which guides us to detect the breadbox jects associated with that scene. Identification of
much faster.27 objects is impaired when the given object is incon-
Once again, it is worth mentioning that the pre- gruent with the context of a paired scene.”31 The
dictive context is determined by what we are used contextual cueing paradigm further shows how con-
to, what is obvious to us. A person who has grown textual information assists visual search and that
up in a context where the laundry is done in the implicit learning takes place, as observers during
kitchen would more easily identify a clothes washer experiments learned which contexts were predic-
in the kitchen rather than a person whose laundry tive and what markers were salient through implicit
is done in the bathroom. In the latter case a clothes learning of repeated displays.32 Finally, the change
washer in the kitchen would not be part of this per- blindness paradigm refers to the difficulty of detect-
ing change, revealing that attention is crucial for The method was developed by necessity. Streets
the detection of change. and alleys were often mined, entry points into build-
These results challenge traditional training and ings were watched or booby-trapped. An alternative
simulation paradigms that attempt to reproduce re- to usual ways of exit and entrance had to be in-
ality (the context) as perfectly as possible, to train vented or discovered; this is where creative thinking
the Soldier to a sort of automatic “internalized and came into the picture. Aviv Kokhavi, commander of
reflexive response.” We need to take these represen- the paratrooper brigade, had just returned from a
tations one step further. The role played by what leave during which he studied philosophy, social
the subject expects to see cannot be handled well science, and architecture; subjects that influenced
in photorealistic simulations as presently imple- his way to envisage battle. As he explained:
mented. These kinds of simulations do not help ac- “This space that you look at, this room that you
tors internalize the sort of reflex that guides quick look at, is nothing but your interpretation of
it. Now, you can stretch the boundaries of your
response to certain stimuli. What is often crucial in
interpretation, but not in an unlimited fashion,
operations in close interaction with civilian popula- after all, it must be bound by physics, as it
tion is to be able to see what we are not conditioned contains buildings and alleys. The question is
to see. To achieve this, we need to move education, how do you interpret the alley? Do you interpret
training, and simulation technology beyond a con- the alley as a place, like every architect and town
cern with detecting and reinforcing certain rules of planner, to walk through, or do you interpret the
behavior or by producing “better” reproductions of alley as a place forbidden to walk through? This
depends only on interpretation. We interpreted
reality. The task should be to support staff capabil-
the alleys as places forbidden to walk through,
ity to recognize what is salient in that reality, and to and the door as a place forbidden to pass
teach them to move beyond the paradigms of what is through, and the window as a place forbidden to
obvious to them in order to understand the context look through, because a weapon awaits us in the
in which they are immersed, and act accordingly. alley, and a booby trap waits up behind the doors.
This is because the enemy interprets space in a
Transcending the Obvious: Lethal traditional, classical manner, and I do not want
Theory to obey this interpretation and fall into his traps.
Eyal Weizman’s Lethal Theory illustrates a way Not only do I not want to fall into his traps, I want
to surprise him! This is the essence of war. I need
of thinking that transcends the obvious. In a 2002
to win. I need to emerge from an unexpected place.
operation in Nablus the IDF (Israel Defense Force) And this is what we tried to do.”36
conducted a maneuver their commander described
Weizman’s argument is that to become effective
as “inverse geometry,” the reorganization of the ur-
warfighters in urban contexts it is necessary to:
ban syntax by means of a series of micro-tactical
actions.”33 By reinventing the way the topography 1. Realize what common sense representations
of a whole town is regarded soldiers literally moved are.
“through walls.” They did not use any roads, streets, 2. Use high order social theory to destabilize the
courtyards, etc. that constitute the logical, alleged “taken for granted” order of things.
common sense syntax of the city. They did not use 3. Use the same theoretical set to identify strategic
windows or doors. Rather “they moved horizontally advantage.
through walls and vertically through holes blasted In other words, the capability to visualize opportu-
in ceilings.”34 Walls are no longer barriers and nities that otherwise would be masked by common
streets are no longer ways through; all conventional sense. What is relevant is not so much that the end
geographic marks of a city were inverted or turned result is that the topography of an urban setting is
upside down. “Rather than submit to the authority exploited (that of course is the endpoint of any doc-
of conventional spatial boundaries and logic, move- trine and strategy.) Rather it is to deconstruct the nat-
ment became constitutive of space. […] The IDF ural order of things as one’s opponent understands
strategy of “walking through walls” involved a con- it and from this deconstruction gain operational ad-
ception of the city as not just the site, but the very vantage. What Weizman does not discuss in detail is
medium of warfare–a flexible, almost liquid, medium how this might be taught to frontline warfighters. It
that is forever contingent and in flux.”35 appears that he assumes that an adequate grasp of

the theoretical models he argues can immediately be Problem Based Learning
translated into operational knowledge of this kind. PBL was developed for use in medical schools
Charles Jennings (Chief of the Clinical Psychology during the 1960s to help medical students learn
function, School of Aerospace Medicine, Brooks Air to solve problems by transcending the obvious.
Force Base) long ago spoke of the need for pilots to Traditional basic knowledge is not taught through
learn “to transcend the obvious.”37 According to him PBL, it is assumed to be already embedded in the
“pilots are taught appropriate responses to prob- curriculum. This method is based on presenting
lems that can be reasonably forecasted. However, small groups of students with vaguely formulated
these responses can become fixations. Pilots need sets of problems (real clinical cases). Critical to
to develop untested theories quickly, to enable them the method is the formulation of the problem and
to “rise above the obvious,” since many times they the acknowledgement that the students’ prior for-
will encounter entirely unexpected challenges in mal knowledge is in itself insufficient for them to
flight to which there are no obvious solutions.”38 understand the problem in depth. Therefore they
This kind of thinking applies as well to modern mili- must train themselves to break down the problem
tary operations, especially dispersed units operat- in its components as well as look at it from all pos-
ing in CQB or patrolling. sible angles and then decide what additional infor-
mation they need in order to solve it. The method
Learning Contextual Intuition
is about refocusing the learning around a scenario
As we illustrated, intuition and perception are
or trigger rather than upon the curriculum content
driven and informed by the predictive context which,
itself.41 The students usually work in groups in or-
in turn, is socially constructed. So, how do we man-
der to engage with a particular scenario.
age to educate and train young leaders who can
apply their intuition to a context other than their This method fosters:
socially constructed one? We suggest an education
ÊÊ The ability to evaluate a situation, see what is
and training method focused on:
wrong, and make decisions about appropriate
1. Increased awareness of one’s own framing. The actions based on the particular context.
way we see the world is a part of us, it is not
ÊÊ The acquisition, retention, and use of a variety
something that can be taken off or put on as
of types of knowledge.
a pair of glasses. Increasing awareness of what
ÊÊ Transfer. The ability to see similarities in appar-
such framing is made of, and in what way it
ently very different situations by “reading be-
guides our perception of the world, helps us rec-
tween the lines.”
ognize when we are interpreting other contexts
according to frames we habitually use. ÊÊ Enhancement of self-directed learning. The indi-
2. Exercises and drills based on experiential learn- vidual acquires the capability to search for ad-
ing principles. Problem Based Learning (PBL) is ditional information appropriately.
aimed at unfreezing the dominant framing and ÊÊ The development of inquiry skills and creativ-
developing the competences and skills neces- ity. There is strong evidence that heroes are in
sary to learn from the context by engaging with reality not so much rash brave beings rather
it, and by exploiting our framing to detect rel- highly creative men who perceive more than
evant elements through “opposition.”39 In other their comrades.”42
words, this phase aims at teaching how to ex- ÊÊ Group cohesion and working towards a com-
ploit differences in order to learn what the rel- mon goal. 43
evant categories and dynamics are at play in the Traditional simulations might profit by embedding
operational context. PBL, it would be useful as a design strategy because
3. Exercises and drills based on Situated it is a method that does not look at the “learners” as
Learning. This will foster a mindset that tran- empty jars that need to be filled with knowledge or
scends the obvious and enables warfighters to information. On the contrary, it forces them to take
perform such cognitive and perceptual labor charge of the problem at hand, think critically, cre-
intuitively, automatically, and without much atively, and challenge their assumptions striving to
direct cognitive overhead.40 “transcend the obvious.”
Experiential and Situated Learning ways of thinking, one has to be less bound by what
Lave, contrasting with most traditional classroom is perceived as obvious or passively learned such
learning activities that involve abstract, but not asas “typical behavior of the local culture,” to being
necessarily contextualized knowledge argues that more receptive, agile, and prone to catch reality in
learning is situated, learning is embedded within ac- its whole and its details: le Coup d’Oeil.
tivity, context, and culture.44 Knowledge needs to be
Endnotes
presented in authentic contexts–settings and situa-
tions that would normally involve that knowledge. 1. General Charles C. Krulak, “Cultivating Intuitive Decision
Making,” Marine Corps Gazette, May, 1999. Accessed at
Not only should it be presented in authentic http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/usmc/cultivating_
contexts, we would argue, but the method should intuitive_d-m.htm
also combine such contextualization with ac- 2, 3. Claudia Baisini and James M. Nyce, ”Mapping Culture (MAC),”
tive participation. Kolb developed the concept Concept Study Final Report, Swedish National Defense College,
January 2007.
of Experiential Learning from the work of Kurt
Lewin. According to Lewin little substantial learn- 4. FM 3-24/USMC 3-33.5 Counterinsurgency, December 2006 and
ing takes place without the involvement of some FM 3-07 Stability Operations, October 2008.
or all of the following dimensions: 5. Major Brian R. Reinwald, “Tactical Intuition,” Military Review,
September-October 2000, 88.
ÊÊ Watching.
6. Krulak.
ÊÊ Thinking.
ÊÊ Feeling. 7. Ibid.
ÊÊ Doing.45 8. Ibid.
Without engaging such dimensions we remain 9. Colonel James E. Mrazek, “Intuition: An Instantaneous Backup
System?”Air University Review, January-February 1972. Accessed
not much more than passive recipients and passive
at http://www.airpower.au.af.mil/airchronicles/aureview/1972/
learning alone does not engage our higher brain func- jan-feb/mrazek.html.
tions or stimulate our senses to the point where we
10. Krulak.
incorporate the lessons into our existing schemes.46
11. Reinwald, 86.
We must put our knowledge into action.
12. Ibid., 80.
Conclusion
13. Lieutenant Colonel Kelly A. Wolgast, “Command Decision
Well designed education and training that aims at
Making: Experience Counts,” USAWC Strategy Research Project,
developing the necessary competencies and skills to Carlisle Barracks, 2005, 2. Accessed at http://www.au.af.mil/au/
learn about a new context (while engaging with it) is awc/awcgate/army-usawc/cmd-decis-mkg.pdf.
what is needed to prepare our Soldiers to meet the 14. David J. Bryant, PhD, Robert D.G. Webb, PhD, and Carol
challenges of the complex operational enviroment. McCann, “Synthesizing Two Approaches to Decision-making in
Such education would be one that forces them to take Command and Control,” Canadian Military Journal, Spring 2003.
Accessed at http://www.journal.forces.gc.ca/vo4/no1/command-
charge of the problem at hand, break it down, turn it,
ordre-01-eng.asp.
look at it from all angles, and decide what more infor-
mation they need to make a decision about what to do 15. Gary A. Klein, Sources of Power: How People Make Decisions
(Cambridge: MIT Press, 1998).
next. This is what simulation technology might profit-
ably be used for–to allow the staff to learn how to liter- 16. Wolgast, 7.
ally look through a building, break it down in pieces, 17. Peter L. Berger and Thomas Luckmann, The Social Construction
turn it, rotate it, and consider a variety of options– of Reality: A Treatise in the Sociology of Knowledge (Garden City:
Anchor Books, 1966).
some intuitive, some not so obvious.
18. Kurt Lewin, “Field Theory in Social Science: Selected Theoretical
It is not the simulator that should do this for Papers,” D. Cartwright, ed. (New York: Harper and Row, 1951).
them; nor is it necessary in order to achieve this
19. Richards J. Heuer, Jr., Psychology of Intelligence Analysis
kind of competence to reproduce a populated “vil- (Hauppauge: Nova Science Publishers Inc., 2006).
lage” for them. Rather the task here is to help them
20. Social context that is generated by interactions among people,
to play with what we think reality is, and go beyond
but also among people and things. For more about this see John Law
it, in other words to transcend the obvious. In or- and John Hassard, “Actor Network Theory and After,” Sociological
der to stimulate the development of more creative Review Monographs (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 1999).

21. And do we really believe that we can reproduce reality in all its 41. Andrew Roberts, “Problem Based Learning and the Design
facets and nuances? Studio,” CEBE Transactions 1 (2) (December 2004).
22. Marvin M. Chun and Ingrid R. Olson, “Perceptual Constraints on 42. Mrazek.
Implicit Learning of Spatial Context,” Visual Cognition 9 (3) (2002):
43. Geoffrey R. Norman and Henk G. Schmidt, “The Psychological
273-302.
Basis of Problem-based Learning: A Review of the Evidence,”
23. Justin A. Junge, Brian J. Scholl, and Marvin M. Chun, “How Academic Medicine 67 (9) (September 1992).
is Spatial Context Learning Integrated over Signal Versus Noise? A 44. Jean Lave, Cognition in Practice: Mind, Mathematics, and Culture
Primacy Effect in Contextual Cueing,” Visual Cognition 15 (1) (2007): in Everyday Life (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998).
1-11.
45. David A. Kolb, Experiential Learning: Experience as the Source
24. Marvin M. Chun, “Scene Perception and Memory.” Accessed at of Learning and Development (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall Inc.,
http://camplab.psych.yale.edu/articles/Chun_03PLM.pdf. 1984).
25. Ullman in Chun and Olson, “Perceptual Constraints on Implicit 46. Ibid.
Learning of Spatial Context,” Visual Cognition 9 (3) (2002): 273.
26. Ibid., 284.
27. Marvin M. Chun, “Contextual Cueing of Visual Attention,” Claudia Baisini, M.Sc. attended the University of Milan, and
Trends in Cognitive Sciences 4 (5) (May 2000):170-177. Aberdeen King’s College completing studies in Organizational
28. Marvin M. Chun and Rene Marois, “The Dark Side of Visual
Studies, Cross Cultural Strategy, International Business, and
Attention,” Current Opinion in Neurobiology 12 (2002), 184-189. Organizational Change and Learning. Following a term at
Copenhagen Business School in Cross Cultural Marketing
29. Steven B. Most, Brian J. Scholl, Erin R. Clifford, and Daniel J. Strategy she took her M.Sc. in International Management
Simons, “What you See is What You Set: Sustained Inattentional
at the Graduated Business School of the University of
Blindness and the Capture of Awareness,” Psychological Review 112
Gothenburg, Sweden. Her Master’s Thesis was on “Knowledge
(1) (2005): 217-242.
in Knowledge Intensive Organizations: The Case of Crime
30. Chun and Marois, “The Dark Side of Visual Attention.” Investigation and Consulting Firms.” She joined the staff of
31. Todd A. Kelley, Marvin M. Chun, and Kao-Ping Chua, “Effects of the Swedish National Defense College in Stockholm 2004
Scene Inversion on Change Detection of Targets Matched for Visual where she participated in such projects as Planning under
Salience,” Journal of Vision 2 (2003), 1. Time and Pressure in COIN (PUT) and squad leader Situational
Awareness in MOUT. Her current focus is on the development
32. Ibid., 1-5.
of a method to understand the mindset of relevant actors
33. Eyal Weizman, Hollow Land: Israel’s Architecture of Occupation in the area of operations, based on how our biases and
(London: Verso, 2007), 53. categorizations influence our own understanding. She is
34. Ibid. also researching the development of education, training,
and methods to enhance observation skills and foster
35. Ibid. meta-cognition and re-framing. The project is conducted in
36. Brigadier General Aviv Kokhavi in Eyal Weizman “Hollow Land: cooperation with the FBI Academy (Behavioral Science Unit,
Israel’s Architecture of Occupation” (London: Verso, 2007), 55-56. Terrorism Research and Analysis Project) and USJFCOM
J9 within the framework of MNE6. Ms. Baisini is a PhD
37. Mrazek, 6.
candidate in Neuroscience at Karolinska Institute, Stockholm
38. Ibid. Brain Institute. Her doctoral project combines her previous
49. Lewin. knowledge in Organizational Theories with Neuroscience in
research on neurological implications of learning creativity
40. As an example, for a micro-tactical exercise squad leaders
(divergent thinking), re-framing and plasticity. She is an
might be given an operational task in a built up area that they must
adjunct lecturer of Anthropology at Ball State University and
perform using a glass model (Glass-Box™) of the built up area. This
model represents all the structural elements of small, multi-level
may be reached at [email protected].
Middle East urban area, is transparent on all sides, and can be
assembled and reassembled (deconstructed) in many different ways. James M. Nyce, PhD is an associate professor in the
It is designed to support both visualization and decomposition of Department of Anthropology, Ball State University. He is
what both the problem and a solution might look like. The Glass- a visiting professor in military technology and war science
Box™ design also adds the very important tactile dimension to
at the National Defense College, Stockholm, Sweden from
the drill. Soldiers could use the model, possibly divided into two
1998 through 2000 and 2005 to the present. Since 2005,
competing teams, to find situationally appropriate solutions to
the task, since an obvious common sense solution, (such as going
he has been scientific advisor to a research project that has
through doors and windows) is forbidden by the exercise’s rules. focused on the military intelligence function, organizational/
What Glass-Box™ methods and exercises are designed to support is technological change and professional development. He
the kind of intuitive, reflexive operational context specific awareness is also visiting professor in Lund University’s Master’s
we have discussed and argued for here. Program in Human Factors.
1st School Brigade. It is here that he revitalized
training and incorporated students in the Officer
Basic Course as junior leaders.
In January 1985, he headed to Turkey where
he would serve as the OIC of Space Operations
(Hippodrome), Field Station Sinop, until January
1986. In February 1986, CPT Baker was assigned
to the Pentagon as both Staff Action Officer and the
Staff Action Control Officer. In June 1989, Major
Baker returned to Germany as the Intelligence
Officer to the 2nd Armored Calvary Regiment,
Nurnburg Germany. In June 1990, he took com-
mand of 502nd MI Company and conducted intel-
ligence operations in support of Operation Desert
Storm. In November 1991, he assumed the duties
of the Deputy Regimental Executive Officer, 2nd
Armored Cavalry Regiment.
After three years in Germany, Lieutenant Colonel
Baker took command of the 124th MI Battalion, 24th
Infantry Division (Mech), Fort Stewart, Georgia. As
Commander, he built and tested the first Analysis
and Control Element in the Army. He pioneered this
new MI concept and developed the tactics, tech-
niques, and procedures that became the basis for
Colonel Daniel Baker (U.S. Army, subsequent Army doctrine.
Retired)
Colonel Daniel Baker enlisted in the U.S. Army He left command in June 1994 to attend the
in 1970 and later commissioned in 1976 as a National War College at Fort McNair, Washington,
Second Lieutenant, Military Intelligence (MI), D.C. LTC Baker returned to the Pentagon where
completing the MI Officer Basic Course at Fort he held the position of Intelligence Coordination
Huachuca, Arizona. His first assignment as a 2LT Officer (Europe), J2 Joint Staff/Defense Intelligence
was serving as the Deputy Officer in Charge (OIC), Agency for two months before transitioning to the
Detachment I, 201st Army Security Agency (ASA) J2’s Executive Officer. Fifteen months later he filled
Company, Wurzburg and then Detachment M, the role of J2 Special Assistant for seven months fol-
Stuttgart, Germany. He later moved to Augsburg lowed directly by the position of the Assistant J2.
and assumed duties as the Operations Officer In June 1998, Colonel Baker assumed command
of the 201 st ASA Company. In February of 1981, of the 513th MI Brigade, U.S. Army Intelligence
Captain Baker returned to Fort Huachuca where and Security Command, Fort Gordon, Georgia.
he assumed duties as the Branch Chief/ Senior There he introduced new enduring operational
Instructor of the Advanced Individual Training constructs and capabilities, including the Army’s
Company, U.S. Army Intelligence Center. He was first operations level Measurement and Signature
also the Commanding General’s Aide-de Camp Intelligence Exploitation. In July 2000, he became
and Commander, Delta Company, 2 nd Battalion, the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence (G2),

3rd U.S. Army/Army Forces Central Command at
Fort McPherson, Georgia.
His final assignment was as the Deputy Chief of
Staff for Intelligence, Coalition/Joint Forces Land
Component Command at Camp Doha, Kuwait for
eight months. In December 2002, he retired from ac-
tive duty after having served honorably for 32 years.
He continued his intelligence career as a member of
the Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence, G2.
COL Baker’s civilian education includes a BS
in Business Administration from Northwestern
University, an MA in Management from Webster
University, and an MS in National Security from
the National Defense University. His military ed-
ucation includes the Defense Language Institute
(Russian); MI Officer Basic and Advanced Courses;
the Basic Electronic Warfare/Cryptologic Officer
Course; the Combined Arms and Services Staff
Course; the Command General Staff College, and
the National War College.
COL Baker’s awards and badges include the
Distinguished Service Medal; Defense Superior
Service Medal; Legion of Merit; Bronze Star Medal;
Defense Meritorious Service Medal (8 OLCs); Army of equipment, he served as a Counterintelligence
Commendation Medal; Army Achievement Medal; Coordinator. After two and an half years, SP5 Chunn
Joint Meritorious Unit Award (1 OLC); Valorous assumed duties as an Aerial Sensor Specialist for
Unit Award; Army Good Conduct Medal; National the 73rd Combat Intelligence Company, Stuttgart,
Defense Service Medal (2 Bronze Service Stars); Germany.
Armed Forces Expeditionary Medal; Southwest In 1980, he left Germany and returned to Fort
Asia Service Medal (3 Bronze Service Stars); Armed Huachuca where Staff Sergeant Chunn served as an
Forces Reserve Medal; Noncommissioned Officer’s Instructor, and later a Senior Instructor, for Bravo
Professional Development Ribbon; Army Service Company, 2d Battalion, 1st School Brigade. During
Ribbon; Overseas Service Ribbon (4th Award); his time as an Instructor, SSG Chunn was twice
Kuwait Liberation Medal (SA); Kuwait Liberation honored as Instructor of the Quarter. He also served
medal (KU); Global War on Terrorism Service Medal; as the First Sergeant for MI Officer Basic Course
Global War on Terrorism Expeditionary Medal; Joint and as a project NCO for the New Systems Training
Chiefs of Staff Identification Badge, and Army Staff Office.
Identification Badge.
In 1984, after four years at Fort Huachuca, Sergeant
Command Sergeant Major Scott First Class Chunn returned to Germany and was as-
Chunn (U.S. Army, Retired) signed as the Battalion Operations Sergeant for the
Command Sergeant Major Scott Chunn enlisted 1st MI Battalion, Wiesbaden. In July 1985, he be-
in April 1971 and reported to Airborne Sensor came the 1SG for Alpha Company, 1st MI Battalion.
Specialist Course at Fort Huachuca, Arizona. His In 1987, Master Sergeant Chunn was assigned to the
first assignment was as a Specialist (SP5) serving 7th Infantry Division (Light), Fort Ord, California with
in an Aerial Surveillance and Target Acquisition duty as the Intelligence (G2) Operations Sergeant. In
Platoon at Fort Wainwright, Alaska. In 1974 he was January 1988, MSG Chunn served as the G2 Sergeant
assigned as a Senior Data Terminal Operator, 9th MI Major for the 107th MI battalion. In 1989, he was se-
Company, Fort Lewis, Washington, but due to lack lected for the U.S. Army Sergeants Major Course.
Upon graduating in January 1990, MSG Chunn Brigadier General Richard T. Ellis (U.S.
was assigned as the I Corps Tactical Operations Army, Deceased)
Center Support Element Sergeant Major at Fort Brigadier General Richard T. Ellis was commis-
Lewis. In March 1990, he deployed in support of sioned as a Second Lieutenant, Military Intelligence
Team Spirit, Republic of Korea, and while deployed (MI) in 1978 and reported to MI Officer Basic Course
was notified of his selection to Sergeant Major and at Fort Huachuca. His first assignment was serv-
appointment to Command Sergeant Major. Once ing as the Foreign Area Officer and later Intelligence
he returned to Fort Lewis, he assumed duties as Contingency Fund Class A Agent, 500th MI Group,
the CSM, 109th MI Battalion. After the inactivation Camp Zama, Japan. In August 1980, First Lieutenant
of 109th in May 1991, CSM Chunn was assigned Ellis became the Administration Officer of the 149th
as the CSM of the 14th MI Battalion, 201st MI Military Detachment, 500th MI Group. In August
Brigade. He subsequently served as the Brigade 1981, he was assigned to the 500th MI Group as
CSM for the 201st MI Brigade before moving to the the Assistant Operations Officer/Team Chief of the
524th MI Battalion, 501st MI Brigade in 1993. In Foreign Liaison Detachment.
March 1995, CSM Chunn assumed duties as the
CSM of the 748th MI Battalion in San Antonio, Upon his return to the U.S. in 1982, 1LT Ellis at-
Texas. After ten months, he was reassigned to tended the MI Officer Advanced Course at Fort
Fort Meade, Maryland to serve as the CSM of the Huachuca. In March 1983, after his promotion to
704th MI Brigade from 1996 to 1998. Captain, he headed to Fort Bragg, North Carolina,
where he assumed duties as the Counterintelligence
CSM Chunn’s final assignment was as the CSM
(CI) Team Chief and later the Intelligence Officer of
of the U.S. Army Intelligence School and Fort
1st Battalion, 7th Special Forces Group (Airborne),
Huachuca. In this post, he initiated the Enlisted
Joint Task Force-11, Honduras. After approximately
Assignment Council and a local chapter of the
two years, CPT Ellis became the Chief of Combined
Sergeant Audie Murphy Club. He also established
Security Element and Assistant Intelligence Officer of
the Doctor Mary Walker Award Program, recogniz-
the 1st Special Forces Operational Detachment-Delta
ing outstanding service for volunteers as well as the
CSM (Retired) Doug Russell Award Program, recog-
nizing junior MI enlisted soldiers. In January 2001,
CSM Chunn retired from active duty after serving
honorably for 30 years.
CSM Chunn’s civilian education includes a BA in
Liberal Arts from the University of the State of New
York and an MA in Management from the University
of Phoenix. His military education includes the
Airborne Sensor Specialist Course; the Basic
Leadership Course; the Advanced Noncommissioned
Officer’s Course; the Criminal Investigation Course;
the Instructor System Development Course; and the
Sergeants Major Academy.
His military awards and badges include the
Distinguished Service Medal; the Meritorious
Service Medal (7 OLCs); the Army Commendation
Medal (3 OLCs); the Army Achievement Medal; the
Good Conduct Medal (10th award); the Air Force
Outstanding Unit Award; the Joint Meritorious Unit
Award; the Army Service ribbon; the Overseas Service
Ribbon; the Noncommissioned Officer Professional
Development Ribbon; the National Defense Service
Medal, and the Senior Aircraft Crewmember Badge.

(Airborne) at Fort Bragg. In January 1989, he took active duty, having served honorably for 31 years.
command of Charlie Company, 313th MI Battalion
His civilian education included a BA in Criminal
(Airborne), 82nd Airborne Division. From there he de-
Justice and Political Science from the University
ployed to Panama to participate in Operation Just
of Nevada and an MS in National Security and
Cause. In January 1990, he took command of his sec-
Strategic Studies from the National War College.
ond company, Area Operations Element, 1st Special
BG Ellis’ military education included the Ranger
Forces Operational Detachment-Delta (Airborne).
Course; MI Officer Basic and Advanced Courses;
In August 1992 Major Ellis commanded Personnel Management Staff Officer Course;
Detachment K, U.S. Army Foreign Intelligence Military Operations Training Course; Special
Activity, Korea and in December 1993 he took Forces Qualification Course; Combined Arms and
command of Detachment B, U.S. Army Foreign Services Staff Course; Jumpmaster Course; the
Intelligence Activity, Fort Meade, Maryland. After Command General Staff College, and the National
over two years of command, he became the Senior War College.
Instructor of the Special Training Center at the BG Ellis’ awards and badges include the Defense
Defense Intelligence Agency, Washington, D.C. Less Superior Service Medal; the Legion of Merit; the
than three years later in 1997, Lieutenant Colonel Bronze Star Medal; the Defense Meritorious Service
Ellis again took a command position, this time Medal (3 OLCs); the Meritorious Service Medal (2
as commander of the 319th MI Battalion, 525th MI OLCs); the Joint Service Commendation Medal (1
Brigade, XVIII Airborne Corps, Fort Bragg. OLC); the Army Commendation Medal (2 OLCs);
In July 1999, LTC Ellis returned to Washington, the Joint Service Achievement Medal; the Army
D.C. to serve as the Director of Intelligence, Office Achievement Medal; the Armed Forces Expeditionary
of Military Support. During his year there he served Medal (2 Bronze Service Stars); the Bronze Assault
as the Intelligence Officer (J2), U.S. Intelligence Arrowhead, and the NATO Medal. His badges in-
Cell, U.S. European Command, Supreme Allied cluded the Special Forces Tab; the Ranger Tab;
Commander, Europe and for the Commander, Master Parachutist Badge (Combat Star), and the
Stabilization Force, Operation JOINT FORGE, Honduran Parachute Badge. He was posthumously
Bosnia. Once LTC Ellis returned from deployment awarded the Distinguished Service Medal, and the
he attended the National War College, Fort McNair, National Intelligence Distinguished Service Medal,
Washington, D.C. After completion of the National and the Distinguished Intelligence Medal.
War College, Colonel Ellis took his seventh com-
Major General Barbara G. Fast (U.S.
mand position, this time with the 650th MI Group
Army, Retired)
(CI), U.S. Army Europe, SHAPE, Belgium.
Major General Barbara G. Fast was one of the last
In June 2004, COL Ellis returned to Fort Bragg to members of the Women’s Army Corps when she re-
serve as the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, G2, ceived her direct commission in January 1976 as a
XVIII Airborne Corps, and deployed as the J2, Multi- Second Lieutenant. She subsequently attended the
National Corps-Iraq. In August 2006, he became the MI Officer Basic Course and Tactical Surveillance
Director of Intelligence, J2, U.S. Southern Command, Course at Fort Huachuca, Arizona. Her first assign-
Miami, Florida. As the J2, he led efforts to transform ment was as the Assistant Operations Officer for
and improve the Human Intelligence (HUMINT) capa- Training and Education, 66th MI Group, Munich,
bilities of our nation into a more relevant and inte- Germany. Soon thereafter she served as the Officer
grated community in the fight on terrorism. in Charge, Soviet Orientation Team, 5th MI Company.
Before returning to the U.S., Captain Fast held
Brigadier General Ellis served at the National
positions as the Assistant S3 (Operations), 18th
Counterterrorism Center for nearly a year before
MI Battalion, as well as the Commander of the
moving on to his final assignment. BG Ellis’ fi-
Headquarters, Headquarters Company, 18th MI
nal assignment was as Deputy Director, National
Battalion, Munich, Germany.
Clandestine Service for Community HUMINT,
Central Intelligence Agency, Washington, D.C. On 4 In February 1982, CPT Fast reported to Fort
May 2009, BG Richard Ellis tragically died while on Hood, Texas where she would serve as the Chief of
then as the first S1, Signals Intelligence Directorate,
National Security Agency at Fort Meade, Maryland.
In 2001, BG Fast assumed duties as the Director
of Intelligence, J2, U.S. European Command in
Stuttgart, Germany where she served with dis-
tinction for two years. Following her time in
Germany, BG Fast returned to Fort Huachuca
where she had begun her career 25 years earlier.
There she served as the Assistant Commandant
of the U.S. Army Intelligence Center and Fort
Huachuca. While in this position she deployed
to Iraq to become the first Director of Intelligence
(C2) for Combined Joint Task Force-7, then Multi-
National Forces-Iraq, Operation Iraqi Freedom.
Upon returning from Iraq, Major General Fast
served as the Senior Intelligence Officer before as-
suming command of the U.S. Army Intelligence
Center and Fort Huachuca where she served as
the Commanding General for over two years.
MG Fast’s final assignment was the Deputy
Director of the Army Capability Integration
Center and G9 at the U.S. Training and Doctrine
Intelligence Production Section, then Adjutant in
Command, Fort Monroe, Virginia. In July 2008,
the 303rd MI Battalion. In June 1983, she was se-
MG Fast retired from active duty in the U.S. Army
lected over numerous combat arms nominees to be-
after having served honorably for over 32 years.
come the first female Aide-de-Camp to the Deputy
Commanding General, III Corps. In 1984, CPT Fast She is a graduate of the MI Officer Basic and
headed to Alexandria, Virginia where she served first Advanced Courses; Intelligence Staff Officer
as the MI Professional Development Officer, then as Course; Tactical Surveillance Officer Course;
the Captain’s Assignment Officer, MI Branch, and Defense Sensor Interpretation and Application
finally as the Special Operations Assignment Officer Training Course; the Armed Forces Staff College,
at the U.S. Army Military Personnel Center. and the U.S. Army War College. She holds BS in
Education degrees in German and Spanish from
In July 1987, Major Fast was assigned as the Chief
the University of Missouri, an MS in Business
of the Advanced Systems Section, J2, U.S. European
Administration from Boston University, and an
Command at Stuttgart, Germany. After two years,
Honorary Doctorate of Laws from Central Missouri
MAJ Fast became the Executive Officer of the 18th
State University.
MI Battalion, Munich, Germany. While assigned to
Munich she also served as Deputy, and then later, MG Fast’s awards and badges include the Defense
as the Chief of the Intelligence Division, 66th MI Superior Service Medal (1 OLC); the Legion of Merit;
Brigade. In 1992, Lieutenant Colonel Fast assumed the Bronze Star Medal; the Defense Meritorious
command of the 163rd MI Battalion, Fort Hood, Service Medal; the Meritorious Service Medal (4 OLCs);
Texas. Following command, LTC Fast became the the Joint Service Commendation Medal; the Army
first ever female Division G2, 2nd Armored Division Commendation Medal; the Army Achievement Medal
at Fort Hood, Texas. In 1996, Colonel Fast took (1 OLC); the National Defense Service Medal with one
on a third command, this time the 66th MI Group Bronze Service Star; the Global War on Terrorism
(Provisional) in Augsburg, Germany. Returning to Expeditionary Medal; the Army Service Ribbon; the
the U.S., Brigadier General Fast embarked upon a Overseas Service Ribbon; the Joint Meritorious Unit
new position as the Associate Deputy Director for Award; the Meritorious Unit Commendation, and the
Operations/Deputy Chief, Central Security Service, Army Superior Unit Award.

Intelligence Corps (CIC), or the “Silent Warriors,”
was charged with maintaining the secrecy and se-
curity of the Manhattan Project, under the support
of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, Manhattan
District. Lieutenant Colonel Lansdale’s official ti-
tle became Director of Intelligence and Security,
Manhattan Project.
During his time as Director, Colonel Lansdale
completed several other missions vital to the proj-
ect’s success. In June and July of 1945, COL
Lansdale headed a small mission to Brazil aimed
at negotiating the purchase of monazite sands. He
led a subsequent mission to London and Sweden
in order to obtain kolm deposits, a substance re-
portedly rich in uranium. COL Lansdale would
also lead the Alsos Mission, which actively partic-
ipated in the recovery of uranium ore in Germany
Colonel John Lansdale, Jr. (U.S. Army, and the capture of several prominent German sci-
Deceased) entists. By January 1946 approximately 325 CIC
Colonel John Lansdale was commissioned as an personnel still remained in the Manhattan Project
Artillery Second Lieutenant in 1933 while serv- Security and Intelligence Group commanded by
ing as a member of the Army Reserves. After COL Lansdale. His post-war duties included the
commissioning, 2LT Lansdale attended Harvard establishment of a London based liaison office
Law School and was later promoted to First with British Intelligence, before returning to his
Lieutenant in 1937. In May 1941, 1LT Lansdale civilian career as a lawyer at Squire, Sanders, and
received a letter from former roommate and fu- Dempsey, LLP in Cleveland, Ohio.
ture secretary to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Frank In the mid-fifties, COL Lansdale was a defense
McCarthy. McCarthy warned of the upcoming war witness for the scientific director of the Los
and suggested he request a call to active duty Alamos Laboratory, Manhattan Project, Dr. J.
serving in the Military Intelligence Division of Robert Oppenheimer. Dr. Oppenheimer was ac-
the War Department General Staff. On 10 June cused of participation in Communist Party activi-
1941 1LT Lansdale reported for active duty to the ties, and was charged with being a traitor and a
Investigation Branch of the Office of the Assistant spy. Years earlier, it was COL Lansdale, alongside
Chief of Staff, G2, War Department General Staff. General Groves, who had made the call to award
In February 1942, Captain Lansdale reported to Dr. Oppenheimer his security clearance. Later,
Dr. James B. Conant who was, at the time, presi- many would recount his testimony as the most
dent of Harvard University and Chairman of the famous moment in the courtroom, and which
National Defense Research Committee. It was at became the basis for the Broadway play “In the
this assignment that he learned of the efforts being Matter of J. Robert Oppenheimer.” It is reported
made in a race to develop the atomic bomb. He was that during COL Lansdale’s five years of active
charged with safegurading the intelligence behind service from 1941 to 1946, he rarely took a single
these efforts at the Radiation Laboratory at the day of leave, showing his austere devotion to the
University of California, Berkeley, California. In project, the mission, and his country. He died on
September of the same year General Leslie Groves 22 August 2003.
recruited CPT Lansdale to aid in the atomic bomb COL Lansdale’s civilian education includes a
project renamed the Manhattan Project now un- BA from the Virginia Military Institute and a law
der the responsibility of the U.S. Army. He was degree from Harvard Law School. His awards in-
charged with the mission of establishing a branch clude the U.S. Legion of Merit, and the Order of
of military intelligence personnel. The Counter the British Empire, CBE.
2011 Military Intelligence Corps
Hall of Fame Nomination Criteria
ALWAYS OUT FRONT

All Commissioned Officers, Warrant Officers, Enlisted Soldiers or professional civilians who have
served in a U.S. Army intelligence unit or in an intelligence position in the U.S. Army are eligible for
nomination. Only nominations for individuals will be accepted. Individuals cannot be self-nominated.
No unit or group nominations will be considered. The following criteria must be met by all nominees:
1. Nominees may not be serving on active duty and must have been retired a minimum of three years
before consideration; however, they may be employed by the U.S. Government in either a civilian or
contractor position, to include continued service in an intelligence role. Government civilians who
have not previously served in uniform but who are otherwise qualified and have been retired a mini-
mum of three years may be considered.
2. Although nominees must have served with Army intelligence in some capacity, the supporting justi-
fication for their nomination may include accomplishments from any portion of their career, not merely
their period of service in Army intelligence.
3. A nominee must have made a significant contribution to MI that reflects favorably on the MI Corps.
When appropriate, the nomination may be based on heroic actions and valorous awards rather than on
documented sustained service and a significant contribution to Army intelligence.
Nominations to the MI Corps Hall of Fame must be received by 30 September 2010 in order to be repre-
sented at the 2011 Nomination Board, which will meet in October.
Nominations should be sent to:
Command Historian, US Army Intelligence Center of Excellence,
ATTN: ATZS-HIS, 1903 Hatfield Street, Building 62711,
Fort Huachuca, Arizona 85613-7000
For additional information, email either [email protected] or [email protected].

by Vee Herrington, PhD and Captain Ryan Gerner
This is the Digital Age! Why are we printing millions tive technologies might just be eReader technology.
of pages per year? This set the stage for launching a series of eReader
—Major General John M. Custer III, trials throughout 1st and 2nd quarters of 2010.
Commanding General, USAICoE, March 2009
It seemed timely to pursue this, since the U.S.
Introduction Army Training and Doctrine Command had just
The above statement from the Commanding General sent a memorandum on 3 April 2009 supporting
(CG) was the impetus kicking off the explora- eReaders for reducing printing: “eReaders can pro-
tion of using eReader technology at the U.S. Army vide one possible solution for the current practice
Intelligence Center of Excellence (USAICoE) instead of printing and physical distribution of courseware,
of traditionally printing and distributing course training support materials and products.” In addi-
materials to the hundreds of students attending tion, several universities throughout the country
classes. The CG was referring to the fact that the (University of Washington, Arizona State University,
Training Materials Support Branch (TMSB) in 2009 Princeton, Case Western Reserve University, and the
printed almost 20 million pages of courseware for University of Virginia) had jumped on the eReader
the classes at the Intelligence School. For example, bandwagon and were conducting trials. The focus of
the MI Captains Career Course alone issues 60 doc- these university studies was mainly on environmen-
uments to 880 students in 27 classes during the tal issues, cost savings, and the impact on learning.
year–many of these documents are Field Manuals
and consist of hundreds of pages. Selecting an eReader for the Trials
eReaders were emerging technology in the summer
Instead of issuing a huge package of printed materi-
of 2009 and few were on the market. The iPad was
als (Field Manuals, Army Regulations, student hand-
just a rumor and other devices such as the Plastic
outs, practical exercises, etc.), why not issue a small
Logic Que were many months from hitting the mar-
device which holds all of the documents? This de-
ket. As such, only four eReader devices were evalu-
vice is called an eReader, which is a small hand-held
ated based on the prioritized requirements of the
digital reading device. It is lightweight, portable, and
school. As Table 1 shows, the JetBook, the Amazon
reads and feels like a book. Many are wireless, allow
Kindle DX, the Sony and the iRex were all consid-
notetaking and some even read to you. The devices
ered for the trials. The prioritized requirements were
are searchable, so if you want to find information on
the following: the screen had to be large enough to
a topic you can search hundreds of documents and
read PDF documents; content had to be searchable;
books residing on the eReader in an instant.
and the device had to have the capabilities for book-
Background marking and notetaking. Although more costly than
In June 2009, the CG asked Dr. Vee Herrington, Table 1 eReader Requirements
the Chief of the Library Division, which also includes

TMSB and the Virtual Footlocker, to investigate al-
ternative ways to deliver the course materials. He
asked, “If the future is wireless and digital, how do
we get there—how can we cut down all of the print-
ing we do?” The CG’s 2010 Guidance calls for the
MI Library division to seek innovative technologies
to provide better training material access to our stu-
dents. The Virtual Footlocker, had been launched a
few years back, providing a searchable repository
on the Intelligence Knowledge Network of the course
materials. The next logical step in providing innova-
the Sony, the Kindle DX was selected because of the nary Kindle trial results showed that the students
larger screen size. liked the idea of eReader technology but felt that the
Kindle lacked some of the capabilities. They wanted
eReader Trials and the Endstate
a touch screen and thought the Kindle was too slow
Requirements
and would often freeze up–especially during quiz-
Prior to embracing an emerging technology,
zes! The following classes were selected for the trials:
USAICoE needed to run trials to look at the impact
Basic Officer Leaders Course (BOLC), Senior Leaders
on learning of using eReaders. Will the instructors
Course (SLC), Brigade Combat Team S2 Course (BCT
and students find them an acceptable alternative to
S2) and the Warrant Officer Basic Course (WOBC).
paper? Will eReaders be durable enough? Will they
Table 3 Conduct of eReader Trials
have the features and capabilities that students want
in an eReader? Cost savings was also an issue–over
the next five years, would eReader technology save
money over printing costs?
An endstate is the set of required conditions that
defines achievement of the commander’s objectives.
The eReader endstate is:
ÊÊ USAICoE adopts eReader technology as the main
training material source.
ÊÊ Best eReader on the market, based on value,
capabilities, and durability is selected.
ÊÊ Students and instructors find the eReader an Before each trial, class training was conducted on
acceptable alternative to paper. how to use the eReader. A survey instrument was
ÊÊ eReader does not degrade learning. created to measure behaviors and attitudes toward
ÊÊ USAICoE saves money over printing costs and eReader technology. In addition to collecting demo-
students read more books on the CG’s Reading graphic data, 17 survey questions focused on the
List with better availability. ease of use of the eReader, the attitudes of using
eReader technology instead of paper copies for class
Measures of Effectiveness
materials, reading and study habits, capabilities
The Army uses measures of effectiveness (MOEs) to
they desired in an eReader, and problems encoun-
give insight into how effectively a unit is performing.
tered during quizzes and tests using an eReader.
For the eReader project the MOEs in Table 2 were de-
veloped so an informed decision regarding the future The instructors also were surveyed and asked
of eReader technology at the school could be made. questions related to instructional issues. For exam-
Do trial results support continuing and expanding ple, they were asked if they had to change the way
the eReader project to include future classes? they instructed because the students were using the
Table 2 Measures of Effectiveness eReader. Did the instructors give the students more
time during quizzes and tests or did they teach at
a slower pace? Also, the instructors were surveyed
about whether they felt the class did as well aca-
demically as previous classes. In addition to the in-
structor survey questions, the grade point averages
(GPAs) of previous classes were obtained.
Results
Besides the survey instrument questions, after ac-
tion review comments were collected. Even though
Five trials were conducted between September 2009 the majority of the participants agreed they would
and March 2010. The Kindle DX was the main focus prefer eReader technology to carrying around a pile
of the trials. However, a smaller trial of 20 students of books and documents, they felt that neither the
using the Sony Reader was conducted since prelimi- Sony nor the Kindle DX was the perfect solution.

The participants commented that the Kindle DX will be replaced with other technology and new ap-
was more difficult to navigate than the Sony, was plications will make non-eReaders (i.e., computers,
too slow, and would often freeze during quizzes. The mobile phones) more eBook friendly. Why purchase
students also felt that the Kindle needed better ca- a single-function reading device, when you can pur-
pabilities such as touch screen, stylus and folders. chase a dual purpose device? Unlike the Amazon
The majority provided feedback that they liked Kindle DX which mainly does a good job of just
the Sony better than the Kindle DX, but it also has reading books, future eReaders will come with thou-
some flaws that were problematic. The participants sands of applications. Forrester says, “As anyone
indicated that the Sony screen is too small for view- with an iPhone knows, apps are where the magic
ing the PDF documents. They also complained that happens.” A color map application for the Military
they could not view while charging the Sony and Intelligence students might be very beneficial!
there were device delays while notetaking. With more devices coming out in the next few years
with better features at lower prices, the school is not
ready yet to commit to a course of action regard-
ing the mass purchasing of a particular eReader or
other hand-held learning device. More trials with
more devices are needed. The trials are encourag-
ing, however, and indicate that the students and
instructors are very favorable towards eReader
Summary of Results technology–they just don’t feel that the optimal de-
Table 4 eReader Advantages/Disadvantages vice has been found yet. The adoption of this kind of
technology will be another step towards focusing on
the student centered approach to learning and the
adult learning model.
Endnote
1. Sarah Rotman Epps and James McQuivey, “Ten Predictions
for the E-Reader/E-Book Market in 2010,” Forrester Research, 1
December 2009, accessed at http://paidcontent.org/article/419-
ten-predictions-for-the-e-book-market-in-2010
Dr. Herrington received a PhD in Education from Arizona State

University and a Master’s degree in School Psychology from the
University of Cincinnati. After 15 years as a school psychologist
and school administrator, she re-careered and obtained a
Master’s in Information/Library Science from the University of
Conclusion Tennessee at Knoxville. In 2003, she became the Chief of the
Since starting these trials, the eReader market U.S. Army MI Library at Fort Huachuca, Arizona. Within two
has more than tripled and Forrester Research pre- years the MI Library won the 2005 Library of Congress Federal
dicts that 2010 will see many more devices hitting Information Center of the Year Award. Much of the success of
the market with great new features, applications, the library was due to the non-traditional approach to library
and lower prices. The Apple iPad was released to services–with its “Barnes and Noble” atmosphere. The library
environment is relaxed and very customer centered. In 2008,
stores in April 2010 and is expected to challenge
the MI Library Division was expanded to include TMSB and
Amazon’s Kindle. The iPad does much more than the Virtual Footlocker. Dr. Herrington won the 2008 Federal
just read ebooks. It has hundreds of applications, Librarian of the Year Award and accepted the award with the
plays music, video and games and browses the web. CG at the Library of Congress in October 2009. She may be
The eReaders are moving from being just a book reached at [email protected] or at (520) 533-8631.
reader to being more like a small, hand-held full
Captain Ryan Gerner was commissioned as a Second
service computer. Forrester Research1 reports that Lieutenant from Johns Hopkins University and completed the
2009 was a breakout year for eReaders and ebooks, Infantry Officer Basic Course and Ranger School. He deployed
device sales tripled and content sales were up 176 to OIF with the 1BCT, 82nd Airborne Division and served as a
percent for 2009. The company predicts that eInk Scout Platoon Leader in the 3rd Squadron, 73rd Calvary.
by Chief Warrant Officer Two Raul Negron, Jr.
Yesterday, Today, and Tomorrow: The Army began fielding the TES-FWD during the
Facts and Misconceptions early part of this decade, as a Corps and Echelons
The Tactical Exploitation System-Forward (TES- above Corps system used to support Corps and
FWD) is an integrated Tactical Exploitation of Theater Commander’s priority intelligence require-
National Capabilities (TENCAP) System, the lin- ments (PIR). The TES-FWD was built to merge the
eage of which can be traced back to the Modernized functions of the MIES, ETRAC, and AEPDS into a
Imagery Exploitation System (MIES), the Enhanced single system. The system reduced tactical foot-
Tactical Radar Correlator (ETRAC), and the prints and improved the ability to leverage National
Advanced Electronic Processing and Dissemination and theater level Imagery Intelligence (IMINT) and
System (AEPDS). The MIES received and processed SIGINT data in support of warfighting capabilities.
National imagery data. The ETRAC system pro- The TES-FWD is recognized for its Electronic
cessed Advanced Synthetic Aperture Radar data Intelligence (ELINT) capabilities. Providing ELINT
from theater intelligence, surveillance, reconnais- support to commanders is critically important, as it
sance platforms, while the AEPDS was responsible provides details of adversary radar and Electronic,
for receiving and processing theater and nationally Missile, and Ground Orders of Battle. ELINT contin-
derived Signals Intelligence (SIGINT) data. All three ues to provide the U.S. and its allies with situational
were stand-alone systems, serving as pre-proces- awareness and indications and warnings (I&W) re-
sors for the All Source Analysis System. garding threat countries’ radar, missile, and ground
force postures and intentions. ELINT supported
conflicts such as the Cold War, Operations Desert
Storm/Desert Shield, and will continue to support
major conflicts of the future. The threat of a high
intensity conflict still exists, and as in the plan-
ning and execution coordinated by Coalition Forces
in support of the initial phase of Operation Iraqi
Freedom (OIF), ELINT will always be one of the pri-
mary intelligence disciplines used to support major
combat operations of the future.
Often overlooked are the TES’ Communications
Intelligence (COMINT) capabilities. Understanding the
TES’ full capabilities also allows commanders to lever-
age COMINT data. Today’s conflicts–OIF, Operation
Enduring Freedom (OEF), the Horn of Africa, the
CW2 Raul Negron in Baghdad, Iraq. Next to him is the TES-FWD’s
Advanced Miniaturized Data Acquisition System antenna, which Philippines, and other theaters of interest–are COMINT
provides access to SIGINT data. orientated fights. Fully utilizing the TES’ COMINT ca-

pabilities ensures commanders receive relevant and for the Corps Commander and staff requirements.
timely SIGINT in support of current conflicts. The TES-FWD’s network-to-network interface and
the system’s VSat capabilities relay data to subor-
Combat Support via Multiple Links,
dinate units.
Comms Paths, and Accesses
Connectivity to supported echelons and reach-
The TES-FWD’s ability to interface with a myriad
back to the National intelligence community is
of National, theater, and tactical systems and its di-
possible through the TES-FWD’s ability to inter-
rect access to raw intelligence make it truly unique.
face with the TROJAN Special Purpose Integrated
When fully utilized, the TES-FWD can function as a
Remote Intelligence (SPIRIT) communications sys-
stand-alone SIGINT and IMINT system.
tem. TROJAN SPIRIT systems provide Secret Internet
In its first deployment, I Corps’ TES-FWD Soldiers Protocol Router Network and Joint Worldwide
have capitalized on the opportunity to fully employ Intelligence Communications Systems (JWICS) con-
the system’s unique SIGINT capabilities. The TES- nectivity to the TES-FWD.
FWD’s strength resides in its versatile communica-
The TES-FWD’s Tactical Communications Support
tions architecture. SIGINT data is retrieved from a
Processor (TCSP) transmits and receives NRT high-
multitude of worldwide intelligence agencies and
priority COMINT message traffic and intelligence re-
support sites. Intelligence dissemination to higher
porting. Messages are routed to the TCSP via the
headquarters and major subordinate command
TROJAN SPIRIT’s JWICS connectivity from mul-
commanders is seamless because of its robust com-
tiple sources, ranging from tactical messages to
munication paths.
National level reports. These reports provide imme-
The TES’ data sharing capabilities are transmit- diate situational awareness to commanders during
ted and received through satellite communications events of high interest as they occur throughout the
(SATCOM) access. With this connectivity, the TES- battlespace.
FWD can perform its doctrinal functions by provid-
TROJAN SPIRIT JWICS connectivity allows data-
ing indications of enemy radar and missile activity.
base COMINT information exchange between the
Additionally, its ability to receive and display Blue
TES-FWD’s internal databases and National in-
Force Tracking data complements the command-
telligence repositories. TES’ graphic display and
er’s common operating picture. Improvised explo-
analysis software allow analysts to directly query
sive device intelligence data can also be analyzed
National agency databases. The results are dis-
with the TES-FWD. All of these capabilities are pro-
played within the analysts’ workstations. The data-
cessed and received by the TES-FWD in near-real
base information exchange is also arranged so that
time (NRT) basis, providing situational awareness
the TES-FWD’s databases automatically refresh ev-
ery ten to fifteen minutes without user interaction.
This ensures data redundancy should a National
database be inaccessible, such as during database
maintenance. Over the past year, retrieved COMINT
data was used to assess threat activity in support
of counter-smuggling operations, as well as other
MultiNational Corps-Iraq (MNC-I) PIR.
The TES’ JWICS capability allows TES analysts
to remotely log into Sensitive Compartmented
Information (SCI) databases. The TES’ SCI connec-
tivity is the primary gateway used to provide in-
depth and detailed COMINT data for analysis. As a
result, TES-FWD SIGINT analysts in Iraq supplied
commanders with intelligence that facilitated secu-
rity operations and counterterrorism operations.
I Corps’ TES-FWD vehicles in convoy formation, in preparation for
re-deployment to Fort Lewis, WA. I Corps’ TES-FWD completed its Additionally, NRT JWICS network feeds are received
first deployment while in support of OIF 09-11. through the TES-FWD’s TROJAN SPIRIT connectiv-
ity. The TES’ JWICS network feeds are similar to mized footprint system has been consistent with the
the SATCOM feeds. However, unlike the SATCOM Army’s force modularization process.
feeds, the network feeds contain intelligence data The threat of conventional warfare against the
of a higher classification. This intelligence data en- U.S. remains a reality. The TES-FWD is ready and
hances the Secret level data received via the TES’ able to support such a conflict. Its various ELINT
SATCOM broadcasts, which results in increased sit- processing capabilities will ensure commanders
uational awareness across the battlefield. and their forces are provided the most timely and
Combat support takes place on the TES’ Secret accurate enemy missile, radar, and ground disposi-
level network. This level of intelligence is relayed tions. Today, however, the TES-FWD is also able to
to units supporting numerous types of operations. support the OIF and OEF unconventional COMINT
In Iraq, units based their Electronic Warfare (EW) fights. The TES-FWD’s multiple receive and trans-
support on the intelligence exploited and analyzed mit paths and its inherent ability to interface with
by TES analysts. TES SIGINT analysts monitored communications enabling systems and National
historic and immediate intelligence reporting, and systems has proven to be the TES-FWD’s strength.
when required, disseminated NRT I&W to convoys As an integral part of MNC-I, the I Corps TES-FWD
within their areas of responsibility. TES analysts has supported elements that range from logistics
also cross-cued simultaneously with National, the- and support units, to special operations units, and
ater ISR, and EW assets to refine threat reporting. to Corps and above customers.
High interest tippers were relayed over chat chan-
nels to EW personnel, who relayed threat reporting
to ground units and EW support. The cross-cueing
results undoubtedly saved Coalition Force lives dur-
ing convoy operations.
The TES-FWD’s ability to interoperate and
cross-cue with National systems is what truly
makes the system distinct. It receives real-time
downlinks from select National systems. The
downlinks are received and processed within the
system’s internal servers and processors and are
used to conduct SIGINT analysis. The results
were used to provide EW analytical support to
special operations units during time-sensitive
targeting missions. Throughout the course of
their deployment, I Corps TES SIGINT analysts
Courage!
helped facilitate the detainment of persons of in-
terest. The downlinked data was also used to con- The misconception that TES only provides ELINT
duct COMINT searches. Typically, the COMINT support and is only suited for conventional warfare
searches were used to provide situational aware- nearly resulted in leaders overlooking the SIGINT
ness in support of counter-smuggling and coun- capabilities organic to it. TES is equally capable of
terinsurgency requirements. providing SIGINT support to the unconventional
Conclusion fight, as clearly demonstrated by the I Corps TES
Over the last 20 years, TENCAP SIGINT sup- team during OIF 09-11.
port systems have provided direct access to intel- As the War on Terror continues, the TES-FWD’s
ligence for commanders. The capabilities of these design makes it configurable and tailorable to sup-
systems improved as technological advancements port large scale or smaller conflicts. Its deployability
made the gathering, processing, and exploitation of is based on the intelligence requirements necessary
intelligence data more accessible and timely. Their for commanders to accomplish their missions and
migration from many stand-alone and large foot- offers commanders an expeditionary capability. OIF
print systems to a single multi-purpose and mini- requirements have called for the full employment of

the TES-FWD’s SIGINT and IMINT capabilities, and demonstrated that a conventional warfare system
the system and its analysts have more than met the can support an unconventional fight.
challenges.
Acknowledgements
Within the near future, much of the TES-FWD’s ca- Special thanks to the I Corps TES SIGINT team,
pabilities will be encompassed under the Distributed SFC Robert D. Hoffstetter, SSG Erica J. Fuchs,
Common Ground System-Army architecture. Until SGT Ryan J. Fuhrmann, SGT Iain A. Evans, SPC
that migration process is complete, however, the Kimberly M. Pine, SPC Jason T. Linton, SPC David
TES-FWD will continue to support commanders with Cundiff, wingman CW2 Kevin Rinehart, and long-
its unique IMINT and SIGINT (ELINT and COMINT) time mentor CW4 (Ret.) Robert D. Rounds (congrat-
capabilities. ulations, buddy).
The TES-FWD has always had dynamic organic
SIGINT capabilities. I Corps’ TES-FWD warrant
officers, noncommissioned officers, and Soldiers, CW2 Raul Negron currently serves as TES SIGINT OIC, I
teamed with the Army Special Program Office engi- Corps G2 ACE, Fort Lewis, Washington. He may be contacted
neers, technical advisors, civilians, and contractors at [email protected].
Current UMI Courses
• Cryptologic Linguist Reclassification-Phase 1 • Intelligence in Combating Terrorism-Terrorist Threat Assess

• Dari Familiarization Course • Intelligence Oversight
• Defense Strategic Debriefing Course • Intelligence Support to Garrison Operations
• Division Electronic Interceptor Analyst Course • Iraqi Language Training
• Every Soldier a Sensor Leader • ISR Synchronization
• Garrison S2 Coordinating Staff • MI Anthropology: Afghanistan
• Imagery Analyst Course • MI Anthropology: Iraq
• Information Security • Pashto Familiarization Course
• Intelligence Analyst Military Decision-Making Process • Pashto Headstart
• Intelligence in Combating Terrorism • Pashto Headstart-Font Downloads and Instructions
• Intelligence in Combating Terrorism-Analytical Methods • Stability Operations & Support Operations (v.2)
• Intelligence in Combating Terrorism-Anti-Terrorism • Tactical Questioning
Professional Reader
A Vietnam War Reader: A Documentary
History from American and Vietnamese
Perspectives
by Michael H. Hunt, Ed.,
(The North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill, NC, 2010)
256 pages, $59.95, ISBN 978-08078-5991-9
One of the characteristics of a good book is the pre-
sentation of both sides to a story. This is what the au- However, the gist of the book is really about the
thor has done in providing a masterful commentary Vietnam War period and American involvement in it
of the Vietnam War and the American involvement through a Vietnamese perspective. It is in this time
in it. He has gathered a wide variety of viewpoints frame that readers are exposed to a series of com-
and sources of information about one of America’s munications made by a wide variety of individuals
most controversial wars showing the reader how it on both sides who were affected by the Vietnam War
affected many different individuals. The uniqueness or who felt a need to comment on it. These com-
of the book is that we as Americans and others get munications contain comments made all the way
important insights into how the North Vietnamese from low ranking soldiers on both sides of the con-
viewed the war, what they did, and how it affected flict to major world leaders such as the president
them. However, there is also considerable coverage of the U.S. and the leader of North Vietnam. For
of how it affected the Americans who served in that example, a private first class who fought for North
controversial war. Vietnam in the Tet Offensive and who was later cap-
The book, however, is not just about America’s tured, notes that he wanted to liberate the country
relation to the war or Vietnamese participation in from the American imperialist. (155) On the other
it. For example, the author begins the work with a hand, a young American army soldier wrote to his
basic chronology of events affecting Vietnam and Mom and Dad that “Everything is just fine—in fact
ends it with American diplomatic relations being it’s better than I thought it would be,” even though
established with Vietnam in 1995. The amount he was later killed. (127) Contrasting views of one’s
of information found in the book before the huge involvement, perceptions, and experiences of indi-
American military presence comes about is quite viduals on both sides of the war are what make this
interesting and valuable because it helps to un- book so interesting and different from other books
derstand the motivation and characteristics of about the Vietnam War which generally give just
the Vietnamese people. What we see is a country one side’s view. The North Vietnamese are pictured
dominated for a long time by foreigners and ex- as being motivated in the war by a strong sense of
ploited in various ways by outsiders. We also see patriotism and a desire to unite Vietnam into one
a strong sense of unity among the people, coupled country, while the U.S. is pictured as fighting to
with a feeling of nationalism, and a desire for in- stop the spread of communism. A need recognized
dependence. For generations, indigenous leaders by the North Vietnamese to enlist the popular sup-
had sprung up in Vietnam to improve the coun- port of ordinary peasants is also contrasted with the
try, but were often made ineffective by outside po- My Lai Massacre where a large number of unarmed
litical interests. After the Vietnam War and the peasants were killed by the American soldiers.
Americans depart the country once becomes uni- Although the book does contain reflections of mili-
fied with a hope for improvements. tary personnel on both sides, there is plenty of com-

mentary about politicians and prominent citizens in parts of Vietnam. In the U.S. domestic dissent and
terms of their views regarding the war. For example, opposition to the war became major events of the
Ho Chi Minh’s comments to the Politburo about the time. It is in this type of environment that the au-
need to be able to fight a protracted war against thor has chosen to seek out information about how
the Americans are interesting, and so are those individuals were affected by the war.
of Senator Stennis made to the American Legion The book itself is not very long. It can easily be
National Convention where he calls for a more ag- read in a couple of evenings, perhaps even sooner
gressive war policy toward North Vietnam. because of the human interest brought to it by fo-
It’s also interesting to see the author’s compari- cusing on some of the personal recollections of in-
son of the North Vietnamese fighters to American dividuals associated with the war. It should be of
servicemen. They had a cause in which most could interest to anyone today who has been affected by
believe. The multiple personal reasons to fight were the war, and that means many of us. Special inter-
reinforced by a steady, systematic party-directed ef- est in the book will probably be taken by those who
fort at keeping morale high. But these same fighters served in that war. Its reliance on primary sources
had to confront a much greater likelihood of death of information such as documents and speeches
than Americans ever did. They were in the strug- lifts it to a level of scholarship that will also be ap-
gle for the duration, not just twelve months, and preciated by academics who are either interested
they faced a foe with an overwhelming advantage in in various views of the war or who are looking for
weaponry. They had to absorb the punishment the a valuable supplement to be used in a university
far more powerful Americans could throw at them course dealing with it.
and then line up and take the punishment again. For many reasons, the Vietnam War will remain of
(124) interest to us for a very long time. Perhaps one rea-
Of course, the struggle in Vietnam did not just in- son is that it was a controversial war which means
volve combat between various military individuals. that individuals have different views about it. This
There were other effects on the domestic scene as book will be a substantial contribution to knowledge
well. Large numbers of civilians were killed, prop- about the Vietnam War from different and varying
erty was destroyed, and normal social functions personal accounts, and perhaps lead to a better un-
such as family matters were interrupted in both derstanding of it.
Reviewed by William E. Kelly, PhD, Auburn University
Read any
good books
lately?
We welcome reviews of books related to
Intelligence or Military History. Please re-
view our list of available books and book
review submission standards under the
Professional Reader Program at https://
icon.army.mil/apps/mipb_mag/.
Email your book reviews along with

your contact information to MIPB@
conus.army.mil.
Professional Reader
The Enemy in Our Hands
by Robert C. Doyle,
(The University Press of Kentucky, Lexington, KY, 2010)
496 pages, $34.95, ISBN: 978-0-8131-2589-3
This book is about the treatment of enemy prison- both sides at times seemed to be lacking as exem-
ers of war (EPWs) held by the Americans. Its author, plified by events present at the Union POW camp in
Robert C. Doyle, has published two other works Elmira, New York and the Confederate POW camp
dealing with the subject of POW status. He has also at Andersonville, Georgia.
been a consultant for a number of documentary film
As mentioned above, a country’s culture also af-
projects and has made presentations regarding his
fected the way EPWs were treated. Japan (during
professional interests at various prestigious institu-
World War II) is cited as an example. Examples of
tions such as the U.S. Air Force Academy. Hence, he
Japanese culture of the times that may have influ-
is quite capable of writing on the subject of POWs.
enced how Americans treated Japanese prisoners
The author notes that “the objective of this work is
are illustrated in the following quotes: “Because they
to contribute to filling in some blanks left hazy, and
believed that surrender was an act of shame and dis-
in many cases, empty in the many studies of the
grace to all soldiers of all nations, the white flag of
American experience of war.” (xvii)
surrender meant little to the Japanese. Regardless
The scope of the book is quite large since it covers of how deceitful it may have seemed, Japanese sol-
the period from the Revolutionary War to the cur- diers often lured their enemies into open death
rent War on Terror. One of questions researched by traps where, instead of surrendering honorably,
Doyle was how the U.S. treated its enemy EPWs. The they waited in ambush. Wounded men kept hand
answers depended on a number of factors such as grenades for use against unsuspecting enemy sol-
what wars, what times, and who the enemy was at diers who attempted to help them.” (206)
the time of the war. Other factors could also explain Another part of the book quotes an individual who
the treatment toward EPWs such as their behavior served Japan when the Americans invaded Saipan.
while imprisoned, the attitudes of their captors, the “In those days, Japanese soldiers really accepted
Geneva Convention, and the culture of a particular the idea that they must die. If you were taken alive
country which holds POWs. as a prisoner you could never face your own fam-
Upon reading the book one learns that during ily. Those unable to move were told to die by a hand
a major war against a nation state like Germany grenade or by taking cyanide. …Ones like me, who
and Japan, soldiers who became prisoners of the from the beginning were thinking about how to be-
Americans and incarcerated in the U.S. were gener- come prisoners, were real exceptions.”(209)
ally treated in a humane manner. This was also true The time frame of World War II is viewed as a com-
during the American Revolutionary War with the mendable period in American treatment of the EPWs
exception perhaps of the Loyalists who sided with incarcerated in the U.S. Perhaps the reasons for
England during the conflict. However, during the this type of favorable treatment by the Americans
Civil War humane treatment of captured soldiers by was the Geneva Convention of 1929 which man-

dated humane treatment toward prisoners of war, ing the Iraq War. The book makes it quite clear that
as well as a hope that the enemy would reciprocate having an identified military status with a country
in its treatment of our prisoners. The book cites sev- does make a difference in terms of treatment by the
eral examples of where EPWs held in the U.S. actu- Americans.
ally benefitted from their incarceration experience. The author also seems to advocate a view that it
The author notes: “World War II was, without doubt is in everyone’s best interest to treat EPWs fairly
America’s finest hour in terms of its treatment of and humanely. This is understandable for a num-
EPWs.” (342) ber of reasons. For example, the idea of reciproc-
When one reads this book it is interesting to note ity is advantageous to both sides in a conflict. This
that the status of a captured person could affect the implies that if the Americans treat their EPWs hu-
treatment of the individual by the Americans. For manely, there might be more of a chance that their
example, the author seems to suggest that gener- own soldiers will be treated in a similar fashion
ally those individuals who were readily identified as upon capture. Secondly, the treatment of EPWs
captured soldiers in the uniform of an opposing na- in a humane manner projects a favorable image
tion were generally treated well by the Americans. of a country which is advantageous in interna-
When it comes to other individuals who were not tional affairs. In addition, there is the possibility
clearly identified as soldiers of an opposing nation that today’s POW may become tomorrow’s ally as
involved in war with the U.S., the treatment of them demonstrated by those German World War II pris-
could be harsh. An indication of this is in the au- oners of war held by the Americans who later be-
thor’s description of American military treatment of came allies with their American captors against
detainees at the infamous Abu Ghraib prison dur- the former Soviet Union.
Reviewed by William E. Kelly, PhD, Auburn University
https://ikn.
In honor of LTG Weinstein, the Military Intelligence (MI) Corps created the LTG Sidney T. Weinstein
Award for Excellence in Military Intelligence in 2008. Each year the award recognizes one outstand-
ing MI Captain who, through his or her actions, demonstrates the values and ideals for which LTG
Weinstein stood: Duty, Honor, and Country.
Captain Charles Bailey enlisted in the U.S. Army as a Counterintelligence (CI) Agent following graduation
from Keene State College with a BA in History. Upon completion of his initial training, he was assigned to
a CI team with the 202nd MI Battalion, Fort Gordon, Georgia.
Selected to attend Officer Candidate School, CPT Bailey earned his commission as an Infantry Officer
in January 2003, and subsequently attended and graduated from Airborne and Ranger schools. His first
assignment was as a Rifle Platoon Leader with the 1-17 Infantry Regiment, 172nd Stryker Brigade Combat
Team. He was then selected to lead the reconnaissance platoon, both in garrison and in Mosul, Iraq in
support of Operation Iraqi Freedom. CPT Bailey led numerous offensive operations resulting in the death
or capture of more than 100 armed insurgents. In June 2006, he was wounded in a suicide vehicle borne
improvised explosive device attack and assigned to Walter Reed Army Medical Center. Determined to con-
tinue to serve his country, he re-branched into MI.
Following attendance of the MI Captains Career Course, CPT Bailey was assigned to the 66th MI Brigade
where he briefly served as Assistant Battalion S3 before being selected to lead the Headquarters and
Operations Company of the 105th MI Battalion. Following the inactivation of the 105th, he was selected to
command the Stuttgart MI Detachment and the Communications and Technology Detachment-Europe,
2nd MI Battalion in June 2008. During his command, he provided vital CI and force protection support to
one of the more critically important garrisons in Europe and to senior leaders in European Command and
Africa Command.
Captain Bailey’s awards and decorations include the Bronze Star Medal, Purple Heart, Army Commendation
Medal (1 OLC), Army Achievement Medal (1 OLC), Valorous Unit Award, Iraq Campaign Medal, Global War
on Terrorism Service Medal, Combat Infantryman Badge, Ranger Tab, and Airborne Badge.
ATTN: MIPB (ATZS-CDI-DM-12)
BOX 2001
BLDG 51005
FORT HUACHUCA AZ 85613-7002
Headquarters, Department of the Army.

This publication is approved for public release.
Distribution unlimited. PIN:100114-000

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What is the purpose of the Military Intelligence Professional Bulletin?

What is the purpose of the Military Intelligence Professional Bulletin?

What articles are featured in this issue of MIPB?

What articles are featured in this issue of MIPB?

FROM THE EDITOR

Purpose: The U.S. Army Intelligence

Disclaimer: Views expressed are those

April - June 2010 3

Always Out Front!

(Continued from page 2)

Always Out Front!

(Continued from page 3)

April - June 2010 5

New Concepts and Emerging Capabilities within FM 2-0

FM 2-0 now defines an intelligence requirement as a type of information requirement developed

April - June 2010 7

April - June 2010 9

Other Additions and Updates

by Colonel George J. Franz, Lieutenant Colonel David W. Pendall,

April - June 2010 15

April - June 2010 17

April - June 2010 19

The University of Military Intelligence (UMI) is a training portal of MI

UMI is undergoing improvement and expansion to become

Use of the UMI requires:

April - June 2010 21

April - June 2010 23

April - June 2010 25

April - June 2010 27

April - June 2010 29

Conclusion 18. ODNI Intelligence Community Directive 302, Document and

26. Army Enlisted Job Descriptions, About.com: US Military at

April - June 2010 31

Introduction the other deployed BCTs, the agile construct of TF

Teams (PMTs), and an Embedded Training Team

(ETT) for its mission against the complex, adaptive,

asymmetric threat of the COIN environment. Like Figure 1. TF Warrior’s Organization.

April - June 2010 33

IMINT IMINT IMINT IMINT NMC IMINT

surgent activities. Just as “intelligence drives oper-

HCT HCT HCT HCT HCT HCT

ations,” the lack of adequate intelligence also drives HCT

operations. The inability to visualize the battle space SIGINT SIGINT

SIGINT SIGINT SIGINT

LLVI LLVI LLVI LLVI

ties of all coalition units throughout the AO, and

LLVI SIGINT LLVI

consequently hindered the progression of security, Figure 2. Comparison

April - June 2010 35

One of the drawbacks identified was that the target-

identification of threat personalities or confirm target

conduct target acquisition. Our recommendation is VULNERABILITY LEP

*During FWD Deployments only

Major Marilyn Harris is the 1st MEB Intelligence Officer. She

April - June 2010 37

April - June 2010 39

April - June 2010 41

April - June 2010 43

Figure 2. Memetic Indoctrination and Saturation Assessment.