Ochosa v. Alano

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SO ORDERED.

Carpio (Chairperson), Abad, Perez** and Mendoza, JJ.,


concur.

Petition denied, judgment and resolution affirmed.

Note.·The power of taxation is sometimes called also


the power to destroy. Therefore it should be exercised with
caution to minimize injury to the proprietary rights of a
taxpayer. It must be exercised fairly, equally and uniformly,
lest the tax collector kill the „hen that lays the golden egg.‰
(Philippine Health Care Providers, Inc. vs. Commissioner of
Internal Revenue, 600 SCRA 413 [2009])
··o0o··

G.R. No. 167459. January 26, 2011.*

JOSE REYNALDO B. OCHOSA, petitioner, vs. BONA J.


ALANO and REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,
respondents.

Civil Law; Family Code; Marriages; Psychological Incapacity;


Declaration of Nullity of Marriage; Psychological incapacity must be
characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c)
incurability.·In the landmark case of Santos v. Court of Appeals,
we observed that psychological incapacity must be characterized by
(a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and (c) incurability. The
incapacity must be grave or serious such that the party would be
incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in marriage;
it must be rooted in the history of the party antedating the
marriage, although the overt manifestations may emerge only after
marriage; and it

_______________

** Designated as an additional member in lieu of Associate Justice


Antonio Eduardo B. Nachura, per raffle dated January 24, 2011.
* FIRST DIVISION.

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Ochosa vs.Alano

must be incurable or, even if it were otherwise, the cure would be


beyond the means of the party involved.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Article 36 of the Family Code
does not really dissolve a marriage; it simply recognizes that there
never was any marriage in the first place.·It is also established in
jurisprudence that from these requirements arise the concept that
Article 36 of the Family Code does not really dissolve a marriage; it
simply recognizes that there never was any marriage in the first
place because the affliction·already then existing·was so grave
and permanent as to deprive the afflicted party of awareness of the
duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond he or she was to
assume or had assumed.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Article 36 of the Family Code
is not to be confused with a divorce law that cuts the marital bond at
the time the causes therefore manifest themselves.·We have
stressed time and again that Article 36 of the Family Code is not to
be confused with a divorce law that cuts the marital bond at the
time the causes therefore manifest themselves. It refers to a serious
psychological illness afflicting a party even before the celebration of
the marriage.

PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and


resolution of the Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Oscar T. Zaldivar for petitioner.
The Solicitor General for public respondent.

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45
of the Rules of Court seeking to set aside the Decision1
dated October 11, 2004 as well as the Resolution2 dated
March 10,

_______________

1 Rollo, pp. 28-39; penned by Associate Justice Rebecca de Guia-


Salvador with Associate Justices Portia Aliño-Hormachuelos and Aurora
Santiago-Lagman, concurring.
2 Id., at p. 41.

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Ochosa vs.Alano

2005 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 65120,


which reversed and set aside the Decision3 dated January
11, 1999 of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch
140 in Civil Case No. 97-2903. In the said January 11, 1999
Decision, the trial court granted petitioner Jose Reynaldo
OchosaÊs (Jose) petition for the declaration of nullity of
marriage between him and private respondent Bona J.
Alano (Bona).
The relevant facts of this case, as outlined by the Court
of Appeals, are as follows:

„It appears that Jose met Bona in August 1973 when he was a
young lieutenant in the AFP while the latter was a seventeen-year-
old first year college drop-out. They had a whirlwind romance that
culminated into sexual intimacy and eventual marriage on 27
October 1973 before the Honorable Judge Cesar S. Principe in
Basilan. The couple did not acquire any property. Neither did they
incur any debts. Their union produced no offspring. In 1976,
however, they found an abandoned and neglected one-year-old baby
girl whom they later registered as their daughter, naming her
Ramona Celeste Alano Ochosa.
During their marriage, Jose was often assigned to various parts
of the Philippine archipelago as an officer in the AFP. Bona did not
cohabit with him in his posts, preferring to stay in her hometown of
Basilan. Neither did Bona visit him in his areas of assignment,
except in one (1) occasion when Bona stayed with him for four (4)
days.
Sometime in 1985, Jose was appointed as the Battalion
Commander of the Security Escort Group. He and Bona, along with
Ramona, were given living quarters at Fort Bonifacio, Makati City
where they resided with their military aides.
In 1987, Jose was charged with rebellion for his alleged
participation in the failed coup dÊetat. He was incarcerated in Camp
Crame.
It appears that Bona was an unfaithful spouse. Even at the onset
of their marriage when Jose was assigned in various parts of the
country, she had illicit relations with other men. Bona apparently

_______________

3 Id., at pp. 42-46.

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Ochosa vs.Alano

did not change her ways when they lived together at Fort Bonifacio;
she entertained male visitors in her bedroom whenever Jose was
out of their living quarters. On one occasion, Bona was caught by
Demetrio Bajet y Lita, a security aide, having sex with JoseÊs driver,
Corporal Gagarin. Rumors of BonaÊs sexual infidelity circulated in
the military community. When Jose could no longer bear these
rumors, he got a military pass from his jail warden and confronted
Bona.
During their confrontation, Bona admitted her relationship with
Corporal Gagarin who also made a similar admission to Jose. Jose
drove Bona away from their living quarters. Bona left with Ramona
and went to Basilan.
In 1994, Ramona left Bona and came to live with Jose. It is Jose
who is currently supporting the needs of Ramona.
Jose filed a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage,
docketed as Civil Case No. 97-2903 with the RTC of Makati City,
Branch 140, seeking to nullify his marriage to Bona on the ground
of the latterÊs psychological incapacity to fulfill the essential
obligations of marriage.
Summons with a copy of the petition and its annexes were duly
served upon Bona who failed to file any responsive pleading during
the reglementary period.
Pursuant to the order of the trial court, the Public Prosecutor
conducted an investigation to determine whether there was
collusion between the parties. Said prosecutor submitted a report
that she issued a subpoena to both parties but only Jose appeared;
hence, it can not be reasonably determined whether or not there
was collusion between them.
Trial on the merits of the case ensued. Petitioner along with his
two military aides, Gertrudes Himpayan Padernal and Demetrio
Bajet y Lita, testified about respondentÊs marital infidelity during
the marriage.
The fourth and final witness was Elizabeth E. Rondain, a
psychiatrist, who testified that after conducting several tests, she
reached the conclusion that respondent was suffering from
histrionic personality disorder which she described as follows:
„Her personality is that she has an excessive emotion and
attention seeking behavior. So therefore they donÊt develop

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sympathy in feelings and they have difficulty in maintaining


emotional intimacy. In the case of Mr. Ochosa he has been a
military man. It is his duty to be transferred in different
areas in the Philippines. And while he is being transferred
from one place to another because of his assignments as a
military man, Mrs. Bona Alano refused to follow him in all
his assignments. There were only few occasions in which she
followed him. And during those times that they were not
living together, because of the assignments of Mr. Ochosa she
developed extra marital affair with other man of which she
denied in the beginning but in the latter part of their
relationship she admitted it to Mr. Ochosa that she had
relationship with respondentÊs driver. I believe with this extra
marital affair that is her way of seeking attention and
seeking emotions from other person and not from the
husband. And of course, this is not fulfilling the basic
responsibility in a marriage.‰
According to Rondain, respondentÊs psychological disorder was
traceable to her family history, having for a father a gambler and a
womanizer and a mother who was a battered wife. There was no
possibility of a cure since respondent does not have an insight of
what is happening to her and refused to acknowledge the reality.
With the conclusion of the witnessesÊ testimonies, petitioner
formally offered his evidence and rested his case.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) submitted its
opposition to the petition on the ground that „the factual settings in
the case at bench, in no measure at all, can come close to the
standards required to decree a nullity of marriage (Santos v. CA,
240 SCRA 20 [1995]).‰
In a Decision dated 11 January 1999, the trial court
granted the petition and nullified the partiesÊ marriage on
the following findings, viz.:
xxxx
Article 36 of the Family Code, as amended, provides as
follows:
ÂA marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the
celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with
the essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise
be void even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its
solemnization.Ê

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Ochosa vs.Alano

Such a ground to be invalidative (sic) of marriage, the


degree of incapacity must exhibit GRAVITY,
ANTECEDENCE and INCURABILITY.
From the evidence presented, the Court finds that the
psychological incapacity of the respondent exhibited
GRAVITY, ANTECEDENCE and INCURABILITY.
It is grave because the respondent did not carry out the
normal and ordinary duties of marriage and family
shouldered by any average couple existing under everyday
circumstances of life and work. The gravity was manifested in
respondentÊs infidelity as testified to by the petitioner and his
witnesses.
The psychological incapacity of the respondent could be
traced back to respondentÊs history as testified to by the
expert witness when she said that respondentÊs bad
experience during her childhood resulted in her difficulty in
achieving emotional intimacy, hence, her continuous illicit
relations with several men before and during the marriage.
Considering that persons suffering from this kind of
personality disorder have no insight of their condition, they
will not submit to treatment at all. As in the case at bar,
respondentÊs psychological incapacity clinically identified as
Histrionic Personality Disorder will remain incurable.‰4
(Emphasis supplied.)

Thus, the dispositive portion of the trial court Decision


dated January 11, 1999 read:

„WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby


rendered DECLARING the marriage of JOSE REYNALDO B.
OCHOSA and BONA J. ALANO on October 27, 1973 at Basilan City
VOID AB INITIO on ground of psychological incapacity of the
respondent under Article 36 of the Family Code as amended with
all the effects and consequences provided for by all applicable
provisions of existing pertinent laws.
After this Decision becomes final, let copies thereof be sent to the
Local Civil Registrar of Basilan City who is directed to cancel the

_______________

4 Id., at pp. 28-33.

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said marriage from its Civil Registry, and the Local Civil Registrar
of Makati City for its information and guidance.‰5

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) appealed the


said ruling to the Court of Appeals which sided with the
OSGÊs contention that the trial court erred in granting the
petition despite JoseÊs abject failure to discharge the
burden of proving the alleged psychological incapacity of
his wife, Bona, to comply with the essential marital
obligations.
Thus, the Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the
trial court Decision in its assailed Decision dated October
11, 2004, the dispositive portion of which states:

„WHEREFORE, the appeal is GRANTED, the appealed Decision


dated 11 January 1999 in Civil Case No. 97-2903 of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City, Branch 140, is accordingly
REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and another is entered DISMISSING
the petition for declaration of nullity of marriage.‰6

Jose filed a Motion for Reconsideration but this was


denied by the Court of Appeals for lack of merit in its
assailed Resolution dated March 10, 2005.
Hence, this Petition.
The only issue before this Court is whether or not Bona
should be deemed psychologically incapacitated to comply
with the essential marital obligations.
The petition is without merit.
The petition for declaration of nullity of marriage which
Jose filed in the trial court hinges on Article 36 of the
Family Code, to wit:

„A marriage contracted by any party who, at the time of the


celebration, was psychologically incapacitated to comply with the
_______________

5 Id., at p. 46.
6 Id., at p. 39.

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Ochosa vs.Alano

essential marital obligations of marriage, shall likewise be void


even if such incapacity becomes manifest only after its
solemnization.‰

In the landmark case of Santos v. Court of Appeals,7 we


observed that psychological incapacity must be
characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical antecedence, and
(c) incurability. The incapacity must be grave or serious
such that the party would be incapable of carrying out the
ordinary duties required in marriage; it must be rooted in
the history of the party antedating the marriage, although
the overt manifestations may emerge only after marriage;
and it must be incurable or, even if it were otherwise, the
cure would be beyond the means of the party involved.
Soon after, incorporating the three basic requirements of
psychological incapacity as mandated in Santos, we laid
down in Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina8 the
following guidelines in the interpretation and application of
Article 36 of the Family Code:

„(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage


belongs to the plaintiff. Any doubt should be resolved in favor of the
existence and continuation of the marriage and against its
dissolution and nullity. This is rooted in the fact that both our
Constitution and our laws cherish the validity of marriage and
unity of the family. Thus, our Constitution devotes an entire Article
on the Family, recognizing it „as the foundation of the nation.‰ It
decrees marriage as legally „inviolable,‰ thereby protecting it from
dissolution at the whim of the parties. Both the family and
marriage are to be „protected‰ by the state.
The Family Code echoes this constitutional edict on marriage
and the family and emphasizes their permanence, inviolability and
solidarity.
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be (a)
medically or clinically identified, (b) alleged in the complaint, (c)
sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the deci-
_______________

7 310 Phil. 21, 39; 240 SCRA 20, 33 (1995).


8 335 Phil. 664; 268 SCRA 198 (1997).

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sion. Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity


must be psychological·not physical, although its manifestations
and/or symptoms may be physical. The evidence must convince the
court that the parties, or one of them, was mentally or physically ill
to such an extent that the person could not have known the
obligations he was assuming, or knowing them, could not have
given valid assumption thereof. Although no example of such
incapacity need be given here so as not to limit the application of
the provision under the principle of ejusdem generis, nevertheless
such root cause must be identified as a psychological illness and its
incapacitating nature fully explained. Expert evidence may be given
by qualified psychiatrists and clinical psychologists.
(3)  The incapacity must be proven to be existing at „the time of
the celebration‰ of the marriage. The evidence must show that the
illness was existing when the parties exchanged their „I doÊs.‰ The
manifestation of the illness need not be perceivable at such time,
but the illness itself must have attached at such moment, or prior
thereto.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or
clinically permanent or incurable. Such incurability may be
absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not
necessarily absolutely against everyone of the same sex.
Furthermore, such incapacity must be relevant to the assumption of
marriage obligations, not necessarily to those not related to
marriage, like the exercise of a profession or employment in a job.
Hence, a pediatrician may be effective in diagnosing illnesses of
children and prescribing medicine to cure them but may not be
psychologically capacitated to procreate, bear and raise his/her own
children as an essential obligation of marriage.
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the
disability of the party to assume the essential obligations of
marriage. Thus, „mild characteriological peculiarities, mood
changes, occasional emotional outburst‰ cannot be accepted as root
causes. The illness must be shown as downright incapacity or
inability, not a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In
other words, there is a natal or supervening disabling factor in the
person, an adverse integral element in the personality structure
that effectively incapacitates the person from really accepting and
thereby complying with the obligations essential to marriage.

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(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced


by Article 68 up to 71 of the Family Code as regards the husband
and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in
regard to parents and their children. Such non-complied marital
obligation(s) must also be stated in the petition, proven by evidence
and included in the text of the decision.
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate
Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the Philippines,
while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by
our courts. It is clear that Article 36 was taken by the Family Code
Revision Committee from Canon 1095 of the New Code of Canon
Law, which became effective in 1983 and which provides:
„The following are incapable of contracting marriage:
Those who are unable to assume the essential obligations of
marriage due to causes of psychological nature.‰
Since the purpose of including such provision in our
Family Code is to harmonize our civil laws with the religious
faith of our people, it stands to reason that to achieve such
harmonization, great persuasive weight should be given to
decisions of such appellate tribunal. Ideally·subject to our
law on evidence·what is decreed as canonically invalid
should also be decreed civilly void.
This is one instance where, in view of the evident source
and purpose of the Family Code provision, contemporaneous
religious interpretation is to be given persuasive effect. Here,
the State and the Church·while remaining independent,
separate and apart from each other·shall walk together in
synodal cadence towards the same goal of protecting and
cherishing marriage and the family as the inviolable base of
the nation.
(8)  The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal
and the Solicitor General to appear as counsel for the state. No
decision shall be handed down unless the Solicitor General issues a
certification, which will be quoted in the decision, briefly stating
therein his reasons for his agreement or opposition, as the case may
be, to the petition. The Solicitor General, along with the prosecuting
attorney, shall submit to the court such certification within fifteen
(15) days from the date the case is deemed submitted for resolution
of the court. The Solicitor General shall discharge the equivalent

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function of the defensor vinculi contemplated under Canon 1095.‰9


(Citations omitted.)

In Marcos v. Marcos,10 we previously held that the


foregoing guidelines do not require that a physician
examine the person to be declared psychologically
incapacitated. In fact, the root cause may be „medically or
clinically identified.‰ What is important is the presence of
evidence that can adequately establish the partyÊs
psychological condition. For, indeed, if the totality of
evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of
psychological incapacity, then actual medical examination
of the person concerned need not be resorted to.
It is also established in jurisprudence that from these
requirements arise the concept that Article 36 of the
Family Code does not really dissolve a marriage; it simply
recognizes that there never was any marriage in the first
place because the affliction·already then existing·was so
grave and permanent as to deprive the afflicted party of
awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the
matrimonial bond he or she was to assume or had
assumed.11
A little over a decade since the promulgation of the
Molina guidelines, we made a critical assessment of the
same in Ngo Te v. Yu-Te,12 to wit:

„In hindsight, it may have been inappropriate for the Court to


impose a rigid set of rules, as the one in Molina, in resolving all
cases of psychological incapacity. Understandably, the Court was
then alarmed by the deluge of petitions for the dissolution of
marital bonds, and was sensitive to the OSGÊs exaggeration of
Article 36 as the „most liberal divorce procedure in the world.‰ The
unintended consequences of Molina, however, has taken its toll on
people who have to live with deviant behavior, moral insanity and
sociopathic

_______________
9 Id., at pp. 676-680; p. 213.
10 397 Phil. 840, 850; 343 SCRA 755, 760 (2000).
11 Toring v. Toring, G.R. No. 165321, August 3, 2010, 626 SCRA 389.
12 G.R. No. 161793, February 13, 2009, 579 SCRA 193.

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personality anomaly, which, like termites, consume little by little


the very foundation of their families, our basic social institutions.
Far from what was intended by the Court, Molina has become a
strait-jacket, forcing all sizes to fit into and be bound by it.
Wittingly or unwittingly, the Court, in conveniently applying
Molina, has allowed diagnosed sociopaths, schizophrenics,
nymphomaniacs, narcissists and the like, to continuously debase
and pervert the sanctity of marriage. Ironically, the Roman Rota
has annulled marriages on account of the personality disorders of
the said individuals.‰13

However, our critique did not mean that we had declared


an abandonment of the Molina doctrine. On the contrary,
we simply declared and, thus, clarified in the same Te case
that there is a need to emphasize other perspectives as well
which should govern the disposition of petitions for
declaration of nullity under Article 36. Furthermore, we
reiterated in the same case the principle that each case
must be judged, not on the basis of a priori assumptions,
predilections or generalizations but according to its own
facts. And, to repeat for emphasis, courts should interpret
the provision on a case-to-case basis; guided by experience,
the findings of experts and researchers in psychological
disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals.14
In the case at bar, the trial court granted the petition for
the declaration of nullity of marriage on the basis of Dr.
Elizabeth RondainÊs testimony15 and her psychiatric
evaluation report16 as well as the individual testimonies of
Jose17 and his military aides·Mrs. Gertrudes Himpayan
Padernal18 and Corporal Demetrio Bajet.19

_______________

13 Id., at pp. 224-225.


14 Id., at p. 228.
15 TSN, September 14, 1998.
16 Records, pp. 70-74.
17 TSN, March 3, 1998.
18 TSN, July 1, 1998.
19 TSN, August 21, 1998.

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We are sufficiently convinced, after a careful perusal of


the evidence presented in this case, that Bona had been, on
several occasions with several other men, sexually disloyal
to her spouse, Jose. Likewise, we are persuaded that Bona
had indeed abandoned Jose. However, we cannot apply the
same conviction to JoseÊs thesis that the totality of BonaÊs
acts constituted psychological incapacity as determined by
Article 36 of the Family Code. There is inadequate credible
evidence that her „defects‰ were already present at the
inception of, or prior to, the marriage. In other words, her
alleged psychological incapacity did not satisfy the
jurisprudential requisite of „juridical antecedence.‰
With regard to BonaÊs sexual promiscuity prior to her
marriage to Jose, we have only the uncorroborated
testimony of Jose made in open court to support this
allegation. To quote the pertinent portion of the transcript:
Q: So, what was the reason why you have broken with your wife after
several years·
A: Well, I finally broke up with my wife because I can no longer bear
the torture because of the gossips that she had an affair with other
men, and finally, when I have a chance to confront her she admitted
that she had an affair with other men.
Q: With other men. And, of course this·her life with other men of
course before the marriage you have already known·
A: Yes, your honor.
Q: So, that this gossips·because you said that you thought that this
affair would go to end after your marriage?
A: Yes, I was thinking about that.
Q: So, that after several years she will not change so thatÊs why you
canÊt bear it anymore?
A: Yes, maÊam.20

_______________
20 TSN, March 3, 1998, p. 8.

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Ochosa vs.Alano

Dr. RondainÊs testimony and psychiatric evaluation


report do not provide evidentiary support to cure the
doubtful veracity of JoseÊs one-sided assertion. Even if we
take into account the psychiatristÊs conclusion that Bona
harbors a Histrionic Personality Disorder that existed prior
to her marriage with Jose and this mental condition
purportedly made her helplessly prone to promiscuity and
sexual infidelity, the same cannot be taken as credible proof
of antecedence since the method by which such an
inference was reached leaves much to be desired in terms
of meeting the standard of evidence required in
determining psychological incapacity.
The psychiatristÊs findings on BonaÊs personality profile
did not emanate from a personal interview with the subject
herself as admitted by Dr. Rondain in court, as follows:
Q: How about, you mentioned that the petitioner came for
psychological test, how about the respondent, did she come for
interview and test?
A: No, maÊam.
Q: Did you try to take her for such?
A: Yes, maÊam.
Q: And what did she tell you, did she come for an interview?
A: There was no response, maÊam.21

As a consequence thereof, Dr. Rondain merely relied on


her interview with Jose and his witness, Mrs. Padernal, as
well as the court record of the testimonies of other
witnesses, to wit:
Q: And you said you did interviews. Who did the interview?
A: I interviewed Mr. Ochosa and their witness Padernal, maÊam.
Q: When you say Padernal are you referring to Gertrudes Himpayan
Padernal who testified in this court?
A: Yes, maÊam.
xxxx

_______________
21 TSN, September 14, 1998, p. 8.

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Q: Other than the interviews what else did you do in order to evaluate
members of the parties?
A: I also interviewed (sic) the transcript of stenographic notes of the
testimonies of other witnesses, maÊam.
xxxx
Q: Was there also a psychological test conducted on the respondent?
A: Yes, your honor.
Q: It was on the basis of the psychological test in which you based your
evaluation report?
A: It was based on the psychological test conducted and clinical
interview with the other witnesses, your Honor.22

Verily, Dr. Rondain evaluated BonaÊs psychological


condition indirectly from the information gathered solely
from Jose and his witnesses. This factual circumstance
evokes the possibility that the information fed to the
psychiatrist is tainted with bias for JoseÊs cause, in the
absence of sufficient corroboration.
Even if we give the benefit of the doubt to the
testimonies at issue since the trial court judge had found
them to be credible enough after personally witnessing Jose
and the witnesses testify in court, we cannot lower the
evidentiary benchmark with regard to information on
BonaÊs pre-marital history which is crucial to the issue of
antecedence in this case because we have only the word of
Jose to rely on. In fact, BonaÊs dysfunctional family portrait
which brought about her Histrionic Personality Disorder as
painted by Dr. Rondain was based solely on the assumed
truthful knowledge of Jose, the spouse who has the most to
gain if his wife is found to be indeed psychologically
incapacitated. No other witness testified to BonaÊs family
history or her behavior prior to or at the beginning of the
marriage. Both Mrs. Padernal and Corporal Bajet came to
know Bona only during their employment in petitionerÊs
household during the marriage. It is undisputed

_______________

22 Id., at pp. 6-17.


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Ochosa vs.Alano

that Jose and Bona were married in 1973 while Mrs.


Padernal and Corporal Bajet started to live with
petitionerÊs family only in 1980 and 1986, respectively.
We have previously held that, in employing a rigid and
stringent level of evidentiary scrutiny to cases like this, we
do not suggest that a personal examination of the party
alleged to be psychologically incapacitated is mandatory;
jurisprudence holds that this type of examination is not a
mandatory requirement. While such examination is
desirable, we recognize that it may not be practical in all
instances given the oftentimes estranged relations between
the parties. For a determination though of a partyÊs
complete personality profile, information coming from
persons with personal knowledge of the juridical
antecedents may be helpful. This is an approach in the
application of Article 36 that allows flexibility, at the same
time that it avoids, if not totally obliterate, the credibility
gaps spawned by supposedly expert opinion based entirely
on doubtful sources of information.23
However, we have also ruled in past decisions that to
make conclusions and generalizations on a spouseÊs
psychological condition based on the information fed by
only one side, similar to what we have pointed out in the
case at bar, is, to the CourtÊs mind, not different from
admitting hearsay evidence as proof of the truthfulness of
the content of such evidence.24
Anent the accusation that, even at the inception of their
marriage, Bona did not wish to be with Jose as a further
manifestation of her psychological incapacity, we need only
to look at the testimonial records of Jose and his witnesses
to be convinced otherwise, to wit:

_______________

23 Suazo v. Suazo, G.R. No. 164493, March 12, 2010, 615 SCRA 154.
24 Padilla-Rumbaua v. Rumbaua, G.R. No. 166738, August 14, 2009,
596 SCRA 157, 181.

533
VOL. 640, JANUARY 26, 2011 533
Ochosa vs.Alano

JOSE OCHOSAÊS TESTIMONY:


Q: How long did you stay with your wife?
A: We were married in 1973 and we separated in 1988 but in all those
years there were only few occasions that we were staying together
because most of the time IÊm in the field.
Q: Now, you said most of the time you were in the field, did you not·
your wife come with you in any of your assignments?
A: Never, but sometimes she really visited me and stayed for one (1)
day and then·
Q: And, where did your wife stayed when she leaves you?
A: She was staying with her mother in Basilan.
Q: Where were you assigned most of the time?
A: I was assigned in Davao, Zamboanga, Cotabato, Basilan.
Q: And, of course she would come to your place every now and then
because it is not very far·
A: No, maÊam, once in a while only.
Q: Did you not go home to your conjugal home?
A: I have a chanced also to go home because we were allowed to at
least three (3) days every other month.
Q: So, if you start from the marriage up to 1988 so that is 16 years you
were supposed to have been living together?
A: No, actually in 19·middle of 1987 because in 1987 I was in x x x.25
GERTRUDES PADERNALÊS TESTIMONY:
Q: Now, do you know when they lived together as husband and wife?
A: 1979.
Q: And you said that you have known the petitioner and the
respondent in this case because in fact, you lived with them
together in the same quarters. Does the quarters have different
rooms?

_______________

25 TSN, March 3, 1998, pp. 9-10.

534

534 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED


Ochosa vs.Alano

A: Yes, maÊam.
Q: But very near each other?
A: Yes, maÊam.
Q: You know them because of the proximity of the quarters?
A: Yes, maÊam.
Q: It was only during this 1980 to 1983, three (3) years that you lived
together that you have a chance to be with the spouses?
xxxx
A: Since 1980 to 1983 we lived together in the same house.
xxxx
Q: Now, Madam Witness, after 1983, where did you reside together
with your husband?
A: In Cagayan de Oro and in 1986 we came back to Manila, in Fort
Bonifacio.
Q: You mean, in the same house where petitioner and the respondent
lived together?
A: Yes. MaÊam.
Q: How long did you live in the house where the petitioner and the
respondent stay?
A: Twelve years now since 1983 to 1995.
Q: Where was the petitioner working at that time, from 1982 to 1995?
A: He is a soldier, a Colonel.
Q: Do you know where he was assigned during this time?
A: Yes, maÊam, G-3.
Q: May we know where this G-3 is?
A: Fort Bonifacio, maÊam.
Q: What about the wife, where does she stay?
A: At Fort Bonifacio, in their house.26

_______________

26 TSN, July 1, 1998, pp. 7-10.

535

VOL. 640, JANUARY 26, 2011 535


Ochosa vs.Alano

DR. ELIZABETH E. RONDAINÊS TESTIMONY:


Q: Now, they got married in 1973, am I correct?
A: Yes, maÊam.
Q: But the matter of the work or assignment of the petitioner, he was
assigned in different Provinces or Barangays in the Philippines?
A: Yes, maÊam.
Q: Now, when the wife or the respondent in this case did not go with
the husband in different places of his assignment did you ask her
why what was the reason why she did not like to go those places?
A: She just did not want to. The wife did not go with him because⁄ by
transferring from one place to another, she just donÊt want to go,
she just wanted to stay in Basilan where her hometown is, maÊam.
Q: Did the petitioner herein tell you why the respondent donÊt want to
go with him?
A: Yes, I asked, the answer of the petitioner was she simply did not
want to go with him because she did not want him to be appointed
to far away places.
Q: And would it be that since she did not like to go with the husband
in some far away different assignments she also assumed that the
assignments were in this war regions they were always fighting
considering the place in Basilan they were in fighting atmosphere?
A: It is possible but he was transferred to Manila and she also refused
to stay in Manila, maÊam.
Q: When was that that she refused to come to Manila?
A: I think, sometime in 1983, maÊam. She did not follow immediately.
She stayed with him only for four (4) months, maÊam.
Q: Now, do you know if the petitioner and the respondent were living
together as husband and wife for this period of time during the
relationship?
A: Yes, maÊam. After their marriage I believe their relationship was
good for a few months until he was transferred to Julu. I believe
during that time when they were together the husband was giving
an attention to her. The

536

536 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED


Ochosa vs.Alano

husband was always there and when the husband transferred to


Basilan, the attention was not there anymore, maÊam.27

It is apparent from the above-cited testimonies that


Bona, contrary to JoseÊs assertion, had no manifest desire
to abandon Jose at the beginning of their marriage and
was, in fact, living with him for the most part of their
relationship from 1973 up to the time when Jose drove her
away from their conjugal home in 1988. On the contrary,
the record shows that it was Jose who was constantly away
from Bona by reason of his military duties and his later
incarceration. A reasonable explanation for BonaÊs refusal
to accompany Jose in his military assignments in other
parts of Mindanao may be simply that those locations were
known conflict areas in the seventies. Any doubt as to
BonaÊs desire to live with Jose would later be erased by the
fact that Bona lived with Jose in their conjugal home in
Fort Bonifacio during the following decade.
In view of the foregoing, the badges of BonaÊs alleged
psychological incapacity, i.e., her sexual infidelity and
abandonment, can only be convincingly traced to the period
of time after her marriage to Jose and not to the inception
of the said marriage.
We have stressed time and again that Article 36 of the
Family Code is not to be confused with a divorce law that
cuts the marital bond at the time the causes therefore
manifest themselves. It refers to a serious psychological
illness afflicting a party even before the celebration of the
marriage. It is a malady so grave and so permanent as to
deprive one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities
of the matrimonial bond one is about to assume. These
marital obligations are those provided under Articles 68 to
71, 220, 221 and 225 of the Family Code.28

_______________

27 TSN, September 14, 1998, pp. 13-15.


28 Marcos v. Marcos, supra note 10 at p. 857.

537

VOL. 640, JANUARY 26, 2011 537


Ochosa vs.Alano

While we are not insensitive to petitionerÊs suffering in


view of the truly appalling and shocking behavior of his
wife, still, we are bound by judicial precedents regarding
the evidentiary requirements in psychological incapacity
cases that must be applied to the present case.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the assailed
Decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

Corona (C.J., Chairperson), Velasco, Jr., Del Castillo


and Perez, JJ., concur.

Petition denied, judgment affirmed.

Note.·There is no requirement that the


defendant/respondent spouse should be personally
examined by a physician or psychologist as a condition sine
qua non for the declaration of nullity of marriage based on
psychological incapacity. Accordingly, it is no longer
necessary to introduce expert opinion in a petition under
Article 36 of the Family Code if the totality of evidence
shows that psychological incapacity exists and its gravity,
juridical antecedence, and incurability can be duly
established. (Suazo vs. Suazo, 615 SCRA 154 [2010])
··o0o··

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