1

Assignment no:
2
Submitted by:
Samina Zahoor
Submitted to:
Tariq Mahmood
Roll no:
Bs554523
Semester:
4th
Subject Code:
4668
Course: Political & Constitutional Development in Pakistan-
II (4668) Semester: Spring, 2020
ASSIGNMENT No. 2
Q.1 Discuss in detail Pakistan People's Party as a political party by focusing on is
establishment, manifesto, its elections strategies and its role as a party of the
government from 1972 to 1977. How it become a mass party? Explain on the
basis of facts.

Nawaz Sharif rode to power on a wave of anti-PPP sentiment that included that of
many disenchanted PPP members. The IJI, whose central core was the revived Punjab
Muslim League, now reached out to the parties dominating the politics of the North-
West Frontier Province and Balochistan. Moreover, Sharif adopted Zia ul
Haq‟s Islamization program as his own, bolstered alliances with the religious parties,
and succeeded in getting the National Assembly to approve the Shariat Bill, with its
special references to the Qurʾān and Sharīʿah as the law of the land. Like Zia before
him, Sharif was able to enlist the support of the Muslim orthodoxy and made its
allegiance a central tenet of his rule. But while Sharif was prepared to honour the
more devout members of the religious community, he could not ignore his
dependency on Pakistanis in the commercial and banking world. In the end, the prime
minister could not meet the expectations of his different constituencies, and his
coalition crumbled. Sustained civil disobedience, acts of lawlessness, and failed
economic policies produced dissatisfaction. Despite the collapse of the communist
regime in Kabul in 1992, conditions in Afghanistan remained unstable,
and the Pakistani military sought to restore order by supporting an ultraconservative
religious regime—soon known as the Taliban—that came to dominate most of strife-
torn Afghanistan. Relations between the prime minister, president, and army remained
problematic. Nawaz Sharif had replaced army chief of staff Baig with
Gen. Asif Nawaz in 1991; but when Asif Nawaz died suddenly and somewhat
mysteriously two years later, Ishaq Khan took it upon himself to appoint Lieut. Gen.
Abdul Waheed Kakar his successor, without consulting the prime minister. A struggle
ensued between Nawaz Sharif and Ishaq Khan, with Sharif arguing the need to
eliminate the viceregal powers of the president.
In April 1993, before Sharif could act, Ishaq Khan struck back. Using his
constitutional powers, the president dismissed the Sharif government and again
dissolved the national assembly. Sharif appealed to the Supreme Court, claiming The
president had acted arbitrarily and contrary to constitutional principle. The court
unexpectedly agreed with Sharif‟s petition and ruled that the prime minister should be
reinstated. Challenged by the unprecedented court action and acknowledging that both
Sharif and Ishaq Khan had lost their credibility, the army again intervened and
convinced both men that it would be in the country‟s interest for them to resign their
respective offices in July. With both the presidency and the prime minister‟s office
vacant, it was the army that ensured a smooth transition to still another caretaker
government. Senate chairman Wasim Sajjad assumed the office of president, and
Moeen Qureshi, a former World Bank official living in New York City, agreed to act
as interim prime minister. The Moeen Qureshi administration proved to be a unique
experience in the history of Pakistan. With full support from the country‟s armed
forces, the interim prime minister moved quickly to implement reforms that
included devaluing the Pakistan rupee (the national currency), exposing corrupt
practices in and outside government, and demanding that monies owed the
government be paid forthwith. Qureshi cracked down on the granting of public land to
politicians, on the failure to pay utility bills, and on loan defaulters, who were
estimated in the thousands. Insisting on austerity measures and demanding that the
country learn to live within its means, his administration was a breath of fresh air in
an environment known for profligacy and inefficiency.
The prime minister struck a blow against the landed gentry by imposing a temporary
levy on agriculture, and he made no secret of his intention to strike at the big absentee
landlords and their carefully hidden sources of wealth. Qureshi‟s tactics brought new
funds into the Pakistan treasury, but even then they were hardly enough to return
the country to solvency. Nevertheless, he persisted, even moving against the drug
lords and demanding police reform so that law enforcement could more effectively
deal with a deepening national problem of narcotics addiction. However, Qureshi‟s
reforms also produced problems and a stable of critics. The devaluation of the
rupee and the restrictions imposed on the country‟s commercial life elevated the price
of gasoline, natural gas, and electricity, as well as staple food commodities. Generally
speaking, though, the criticism leveled against the interim prime minister‟s policies
emanated from the sidelined politicians who suddenly posed themselves as
benefactors of the country‟s poorer classes. National elections were held again in
October 1993. In a close contest, the PPP won a plurality—though not a majority—of
seats in the National Assembly; Nawaz Sharif‟s new Pakistan Muslim League (N)
(PML-N) was a somewhat distant second, though his party received a slightly higher
percentage of the popular vote. Fewer than half of registered voters cast a ballot, and
election results were close throughout the country. Overall, however, Balochistan was
the only province where the PPP failed to outdistance the PML-N. In alliance with
Junejo‟s Pakistan Muslim League (J) (PML-J), the PPP formed the new civilian
government, and, after three years in the opposition, Benazir Bhutto returned to the
premiership.
The PML-J helped the PPP take control of the Punjab, an objective that Bhutto could
not attain in her earlier administration. Nonetheless, Nawaz Sharif‟s party was able to
form coalition provincial governments in Balochistan and the North-West Frontier
Province. The power, however, was in Bhutto‟s hands, and it was for her to determine
the country‟s course. Having spoken of democracy for so long, it was the prime
minister‟s task to realize what had escaped her grasp during her previous
administration. Moreover, Bhutto had the good fortune of having one of her own
party, Farooq Leghari, assume the office of the president. Yet, the country remained
economically unstable, and Pakistanis were far from developing a genuine civil
society. Bhutto, favoured by the Americans, had to juggle relations with them and the
Pakistani people: Pakistan came under U.S. pressure to freeze Pakistan‟s popular
nuclear program and to reach a settlement over Kashmir. Furthermore, in 1993, the
United States (at New Delhi‟s urging) had placed Pakistan on a “watch list” as a state
sponsor of terrorism. India cited Islamabad‟s support of jihadi movements operating
in Kashmir, but the Pakistani public, as well as Pakistan‟s military establishment, had
long encouraged and supported the development of a variety of resistance groups in
what they had always termed “occupied Kashmir.” The U.S. pressure therefore was
judged offensive and denounced by the Pakistanis.
Political crises both major and minor abounded, and Bhutto faced the added indignity
of having a major family squabble spill over into the media when the prime minister‟s
brother Murtaza Bhutto accused her husband, Asif Ali Zardari, of corruption. The
incident soon spun out of control, with Bhutto‟s mother taking Murtaza‟s side. The
prime minister was able to do little to push her legislative agenda, and Nawaz Sharif
released documents that cited Bhutto‟s personal excesses; when the prime minister
herself became embroiled in a banking scandal, it was almost impossible for her to
mount a credible defense. President Leghari himself could not
escape criticism, and it was alleged that he profited from a land deal that was linked to
his PPP associations. Bhutto, like Sharif earlier, had become bogged down responding
to accusations of corruption and extortion, while the government foundered.
Nationwide, chaos reigned. In Sind, another round of sectarian fighting erupted, and
strife between Sunni and Shīʿite Muslims contributed to the mayhem. In the North-
West Frontier Province tribal leaders had become the target of assassins, while others
were implicated in trafficking weapons and drugs. The army earlier had pledged a
hands-off policy in political matters, but domestic conditions had so deteriorated that
that promise had to be reconsidered. Moreover, in October 1995 some 40 army
officers were arrested for allegedly plotting to overthrow the government and kill the
president and prime minister. Given the intensifying woes, Bhutto no longer saw eye
to eye with President Leghari, and when he ignored her advice in dealing with the
army high command and with changes in the Supreme Court, their relationship
reached the breaking point. Leghari, uncomfortable with the constant intrigue, was
ready to take direct action against Bhutto and her husband. That moment came in
September 1996, when Benazir‟s brother Murtaza Bhutto was killed in a police
shootout, and Asif Ali Zardari was accused of complicity in Murtaza‟s death. In
November, Leghari dismissed Bhutto‟s government.
The Meraj Khalid interim government was meant to keep the country on the rails, not
to correct Pakistan‟s multidimensional problems. Bureaucrats were purged for
compromising their professionalism by colluding with the PPP, the national economy
underwent scrutiny by expert economists, and a serious effort was made to restore law
and order. In the meantime, the politicians clamoured for a return to more-formal
civilian politics. Bhutto was the most vociferous, having accused Leghari of stabbing
her in the back. Ignoring these assaults, the interim government began the process of
establishing a Council for Defense and National Security (CDNS), comprising the
president, the prime minister, the defense minister, the interior minister, and the
chairman and members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Although high-ranking military
officers appeared favourably disposed to the formation of the CDNS, many politicians
were wary and were reluctant to lend their support. Bhutto‟s appeal to the Supreme
Court that her government had been unconstitutionally dissolved was denied, and the
1997 elections, which went forward on schedule, were judged fair in spite of claims of
fraud by the PPP. Of the more than 200 seats contested in the National Assembly, the
PPP won fewer than 20. Only in Sind did the PPP have anything resembling a
respectable showing. The PML-N of Nawaz Sharif was the big winner, taking all the
provinces either outright or through coalitions with provincial parties. Although only
one third of the eligible electorate had voted, no party in the history of Pakistan had
done better in an election (taking two-thirds of the vote), and Sharif could claim a
veritable mandate. With the armed forces standing by, and with the president still
armed with extraordinary powers, Sharif assembled another government. Mindful of
the need to limit the power of the president, Nawaz Sharif gained parliamentary
approval of the 13th amendment to the constitution, which withdrew the president‟s
authority to remove a government at his own discretion. A 14th amendment, which
prevented party members from violating party discipline, was struck down by the
Supreme Court, an action that set the stage for a confrontation between the prime
minister and the high court. Sharif attempted to have the number of Supreme Court
members reduced from 17 to 12. However, this attempt to tamper with the judiciary
stirred up the Pakistani bar, which entered the fray and demanded that Sharif be
disqualified as a member of the parliament. Although the prime minister relented, by
December 1997 Sharif, with assistance from the parliament, had extended his powers
to such a degree that even President Leghari was forced to resign. Sharif also accrued
enough power to relieve the chief justice of the Supreme court.

Q.2 Critically analyze the agrarian reforms introduced by Z. A.

LAND reforms in Pakistan have a long and somewhat chequered history. The British
had less of an interest in the matter as they relied on the support of several influential
landlords. Although there had been some limited reforms in the years leading up to
1947, all major reforms date from the years after independence. Almost immediately
the various provincial legislatures passed several statutes whereby the jagir dari
systems were abolished and tenants protected. The major reforms, however, came in
three stages: the first during Ayub Khan's martial law in 1959; the second and third
during Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto's rule in the 1970s. Ayub Khan's government passed the
first major piece of legislation concerning land reforms in Pakistan. This
legislation was the West Pakistan Land Reforms Regulation 1959 (Regulation 64 of
1959). The salient features of this regulation included a ceiling on individual holdings.
No one individual could own more than 500 acres of irrigated and 1,000 acres of
unirrigated land or a maximum of 36,000 Produce Index Units (PIU), whichever was
greater. It further allowed that land be redistributed amongst tenants and others. In
addition, the regulation contained provisions which provided for security of tenants as
well as for preventing the subdivision of land holdings.
These land reforms stayed in force until 1972 and the next great wave of land reforms.
Bhutto, despite being a major landowner himself, was determined to institute reforms,
having been a minister under Ayub Khan. Bhutto, seeing the former's land reforms as
inadequate, was responsible for two major land reform regimes. The first was by way
of a martial law regulation, the Land Reform Regulation 1972 by which the West
Pakistan Land Reforms Regulation 1959 was repealed through paragraph 32. As per
paragraph 8(1) no individual holdings were to be in excess of 150 acres of irrigated
land or 300 of unirrigated land, or irrigated and unirrigated land the aggregate area of
which exceeded 150 acres of irrigated land (one acre of irrigated land being reckoned
as the equivalent of two acres of unirrigated land), or an area equivalent to 15,000
PIU of land, whichever was greater. Paragraph 18(1) of the regulations also provided
for excess land to be surrendered and utilised for the benefit of tenants shown to be in
the process of cultivating it.
By 1977, the country had an elected parliament. It would be this body which passed
the last major piece of legislation dealing with land reforms; the Law Reforms Act
1977 (Act II of 1977) and the only one ironically which came the way of a
democratically elected legislature as opposed to a military junta. It did not repeal the
1972 regulations, but was designed to operate concurrently with the same. The most
important and relevant change it made was that individual holdings, including shares
in shamilat , if any, in excess of 100 acres of irrigated land or 200 acres of unirrigated
land, or irrigated and unirrigated land the aggregate of which exceeded 100 acres of
irrigated land (again, one acre of irrigated land being reckoned as equivalent to two
acres of unirrigated land). Furthermore, notwithstanding the above, no land holding
could (per section 3) be greater than an area equivalent to 8,000 PIU of land
calculated on the basis of classification of soil as entered in the revenue records for
kharif. The end of the Bhutto era also signalled the end of the era of statutory land
reform in Pakistan. During Ziaul Haq's reign only major new laws were passed. Only
two amending ordinances came into being. The first in 1979 declared that where the
provincial government had decided to lease out surrendered land, the person who
surrendered it would have first priority, and the second allowed the federal
government to exempt any educational institution or cooperative farming society from
the operation of the 1977 act. Land reforms were always controversial. It was alleged
by opponents that they were un-Islamic and that they infringed on the right to own,
use and enjoy property as protected by the constitution. Matters finally came to a
head before the Supreme Court in the case of Qazalbash Waqf v Chief Land
Commissioner in which both the 1972 regulations were attacked as being against
Islamic injunctions and unconstitutional. The Supreme Court agreed. Of the 1972
regulations, the Supreme Court declared that paragraphs 7, 8, 9, 10, 13 and 14 and
thus consequently 18 were unconstitutional as being against Islamic injunctions. The
striking down of paragraphs 8 and 18 overturned the main reforms achieved.
Similarly in the same case the Supreme Court overturned the entire sections — 3, 4, 5,
6, 7(5), 8, 9, 10 — and consequently sections 11-17 of the act as being
unconstitutional and against Islamic injunctions. The striking down of sections 3 and
17 undid the main reforms promulgated in the act. The laws stated to be
unconstitutional ceased to have effect on March 23, 1990 (the day the judgement was
handed down).
The net result of the Qazalbash Waqf v Chief Land Commissioner is that land reforms
in Pakistan are now at the same level as they were in 1947, as the 1972 regulations
and the 1977 act have seen their main provisions being struck down and the 1959
regulations have been repealed. To commence land reforms and to ensure they
contain at least the same measure of reforms as the 1972 regulations and the 1977 act
did will at the very least require a constitutional amendment which allows parliament
to enact legislation regarding land reform notwithstanding the relevant constitutional
provisions. Failing the above, any proposed reforms would have to be more limited in
their ambit than the previous reforms to avoid unconstitutionality or their lordships
would have to overrule the judgment in the Qazalbash Waqf v Chief Land
Commissioner in another case.
Q.3 Discuss in detail the circumstance which provided justification to
Zia-ul-Haq to enforce Martial Law in 1977. Do you agree with the
reasons put forth for Martial Law by Zia regime? Argue in favour or
against those reasons.

Although there‟s little conclusive evidence that General Zia‟s declaration of martial
law was premeditated, or that he extended active support to PNA leaders to create
conditions favorable to the military take-over, the events leading up to the 1977
elections and what transpired later however, cast doubt on the credibility of men in
uniform. It seems unlikely that the coup was anything but carefully thought out. By
1977, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, then-prime minister of Pakistan, had already successfully
averted two botched coups by the military establishment since he assumed office in
1971. The military was constantly looking for excuses to get power back from
civilians. Bhutto gave plenty of excuses to the generals by arbitrarily sacking
government officials, persecuting his political opponents, and nettling the generals by
making new security and intelligence agencies — notably the Federal Investigation
Agency (FIA) and the Federal Security Force (FSF) — that arguably set Bhutto on a
collision course with GHQ. However, that alone was not enough to help military
wrestle power from the most popular and charismatic leader with a wide and
ferocious fan-base in Sindh and Punjab. Clearly, the military wanted something
concrete to hedge their bets which, according to Husain Haqqani, could reasonably be
achieved if a legitimacy crisis was engineered through a “political disorder.” As
Haqqani wrote in Pakistan: Between Mosque and Military, “Bhutto‟s legitimacy as a
civilian leader derived from his success in a general election; only electoral defeat or
election victory attained by questionable means could render Bhutto‟s political
legitimacy questionable. The military could not topple Bhutto without [first]
delegitimizing his leadership position [among the populace].”
Hence, as Haqqani argues, the Inter-Services Intelligence‟s (ISI) position paper to
Bhutto recommending that he hold early elections should be interpreted—although
not conclusively—as an incipient attempt by the military leadership to entrap Bhutto.
The first paper came in April 1976 and a second followed on October 5. Entitled
“General Elections” and signed by General Jilani, then director-general of ISI, the 53-
page paper suggested that
“Bhutto was at the height of his popularity and would sweep the polls in the face of a
divided opposition.”
Indeed, in hindsight, while facing trial before the Supreme Court and in the deposed
prime minister‟s private conversations, Haqqani notes, “Bhutto hinted [at] the
possibility of having been trapped in a conspiracy by the military and intelligence
services.” However, as Haqqani cautions, Bhutto would likely not have taken the
military‟s recommendations on their face if the empirical evidence had not strongly
laid on his side.

In the article “The March 1977 Elections in Pakistan: Where Everyone Lost,” Marvin
Winbaum notes the many
reasons Bhutto had to be confident: “the rate of inflation at 6 percent was down from
an average of 25 percent between 1972 and 1975. Real GNP was growing at 5
percent, up from a 3 percent a year earlier. The agricultural sector was growing after
years of stagnation with the help from „heavy public investment in tube wells and
subsidies for fertilizer, pesticides and other farm inputs.‟” Overall, although Bhutto
had several
potential pitfalls on his side in terms of mass-scale nationalization of industries and
his suppression of opponents, he fared well in many sectors, including law and order,
political stability, economic progress, and human development. That might have
convinced him to reap the political dividends before any spoiler could arise. Thus the
polls date for national assembly elections was set as March 7, 1977, with elections for
the provincial assemblies on March 10. The elections, however, did not go as
smoothly as predicted. There were incidents of violence and the stealing of ballot
boxes from polling stations. The Pakistan Peoples‟ Party (PPP) government
was accused of rigging the elections and the conglomerate of opposition political
parties took to the streets. Bhutto ordered the military to “act in aid of civil power”—a
constitutional right of the federal government— to control the protesters. Nearly 200
people died with even more wounded in less than four months, from March 7
to July 4.
However, that does not mean the warring parties could not have come to the
negotiating table. In fact, Saudibrokered negotiations followed on the heels of the
demonstrations. By mid-June, Bhutto had agreed to hold parliamentary elections
afresh in October and the PNA agreed to drop its insistence on Bhutto‟s resignation.
However, Bhutto then went on a tour of Middle Eastern countries, leaving everything
up in the air. Although he might have breathed a sigh of relief in the hope that an
agreement had been reached and a political cyclone had passed, the opposition and
military, on the other hand, got the impression that Bhutto perhaps was insincere or
indifferent to the grievances of the opposition. Upon his return Bhutto was amazed to
learn that the opposition was still up in arms. In fact, there are indications that the
military was playing the role of a “spoiler” rather than of a “facilitator.” Asghar Khan
and a coterie of his PNA hardliners, for instance, tried to block the conciliatory efforts
of the PNA moderates under the “iron-clad guarantee from the army headquarters”
that generals would hold “free and fair elections within three months of ousting
Bhutto,” according to Aqil Shah in The Army and Democracy: Military Politics in
Pakistan. This account is corroborated by Ghafoor Ahmed, then-secretary general of
the PNA and a key negotiator in the talks, who later admitted that “we were under
constant pressure from the hawks to abort the negotiations. It could not have been just
a bluff. Asghar Khan could not have claimed to speak on behalf of the army without
the high command‟s nod.” Similar claims were made by Nawabzada Nasrullah Khan,
a key figure in the PNA. In his words, “the ISI was playing each side against the
other, sowing mistrust in the minds of the PNA regarding Bhutto and vice versa” (For
more, see Shah, pp. 137-138 and Haqqani, pp. 124-25). The military‟s spoiler role, if
any, notwithstanding, the warring political parties still reached an agreement in the
first week of July 1977. As host Farrukh Sohail Goindi explained in an interview with
General Faiz A. Chishti,
“the government and PNA had reached an agreement on July 3, 1977. On July 4, both
parties had a press conference and on July 5, they were set to sign the agreement. But
before that could happen, Zia struck the axe of martial law on the night of July 5.”
According to Chishti however, when asked if it was the right decision by the military
establishment to impose martial law on July 5, the answer was yes. Chishti explained
that the decision to impose martial law was justified but what came later—the
prolongation of martial law and reneging on the promise to hold elections within 90
days—was not. It‟s plausible. Martial law is a slippery slope, whereby a general and
what Chishti calls his “loyal lieutenants” (and Chishti himself was one of them),
initially driven by a desire to stabilize law and order later deem themselves too
indispensable to cede power to civilians. However, the fundamental question remains:
was the sky really falling when General Zia imposed martial law? In other words, was
it really the case that law and order was in shambles and the country was at the brink
of collapse? The empirical evidence on ground does not fully support coup-makers‟
claim that the situation was so terribly bad or that the country was on the brink of
disintegration. Intuitively, the crisis should have peaked before the negotiations
started and incrementally deflated after the parleys seemed to be working. If accounts
from Goindi, Shah, and Haqqani, among others, are reliable, then the parties had
reached a workable agreement on July 2-3. In that case, the crisis should have
subsided if not fully eliminated, (assuming there were only two parties to the
agreement and no one was left aggrieved) and the coup would have become anything
but warranted.
Indeed, as Shah notes, “After the initial wave of heightened protest and violence
between March and April, the levels of violence had [actually] gone down, and
curfews in the main cities had been relaxed.” According to PPP sources, “the general
law and order situation in the country had remained calm since at least May 26, and
there was no immediate necessity for action on July 5, 1977.” Counterintuitively
named as “Operation Fairplay,” the martial law declared on July 5 would be the
longest and the most brutal in Pakistan‟s politico-constitutional history. Initially, both
the senior leadership of PPP, including Bhutto, and the PNA leadership were taken
into custody, but later released. Only Bhutto was taken into custody again. He was
convicted in a sham trial for the murder of a political opponent and executed. Zia
would not hold elections for more than 90 months, after originally promising polls
within 90 days. But before that, Zia got himself elected president in a questionable
referendum that gave him 97.7 percent support from the electorate. Yet, despite
winning a nearly absolute majority, Zia never doffed his military uniform and
continued to wear two hats—the chief of army staff and the president. During that
period, most of the parties that made up the PNA (including Jamaat-e-Islami and the
Pakistan Democratic Alliance) joined Zia‟s cabinet rather than pressing for early
elections. However, Nawabzada Nasrullah Khan, the head of the Pakistan Democratic
Alliance, later withdrew from Zia‟s cabinet and joined the Movement for the
Restoration of Democracy (MRD), which he co-founded with the PPP to oppose the
military rule and restore the democracy. The government brutally tortured and killed
the MRD activists and leaders but never ceded power to the civilians. In 1985,
General Zia held parliamentary elections—albeit on a non-party basis—and devolved
power to the newly elected prime minister, Muhammad Khan Junejo. Critics such as
Craig Baxter argue that Zia organized elections under U.S. pressure and never
transferred real power to the prime minister—simply because the power to sack the
government, notably under article 58(2)b, still remained with Zia himself. Burki and
Baxter cite evidence to point out that the first victim of article 58(2)b was none other
than Junejo himself, as Zia dismissed the government when he saw Pakistan‟s
controlled democracy getting out of hand. Nonetheless, it‟s significant to note that in
1985 Zia still kept his promise to hold elections and devolved power to the elected
government. The fault for the new government‟s inability to perform better and stay
in power

Q.4 Make a critical analysis of Provisional Constitutional Order (PCO) of 1981.

Judges of the superior courts and officials of the armed forces also take the oath with
an additional requirement for armed forces personnel — they are required to steer
clear of political activities. If the Constitution stands suspended, the oath of a judge
remains intact because he acts according to law which includes a suspended
Constitution, essentially an extraordinary situation. A judge, having taken oath under
the Provisional Constitution Order (PCO), can declare both the suspension of the
Constitution and the PCO illegal. The country has seen constitutions abrogated in
1958 and 1969 and martial laws imposed. But the judicial system continued as it was,
without any removal of judges. In 1971, after the war with India and the consequent
fall of Dhaka, West Pakistan saw Zulfikar Ali Bhutto become president and the first
civilian CMLA. The martial law imposed in 1969 continued, with many government
officers being dismissed and retired on grounds of misconduct, without a mandatory
inquiry. However, some were retired following scrutiny of their record and in
consultation with the chief justices of the high courts. In 1977, General Ziaul Haq
imposed martial law, suspending the Constitution instead of abrogating it as was
done on two previous occasions. The Supreme Judicial Council was approached to
investigate whether any judges in the high courts were selected for political reasons
and, after an inquiry and the right of personal hearing, several were retired as political
appointees. As if this was not enough, the 1981 PCO was promulgated after the
Supreme Court granted validation to the martial law, empowering the CMLA to
amend the Constitution. As a result, many judges were retired from the Supreme
Court and the high courts without having their say. This PCO came after a delay of
four years as the Supreme Court had granted conditional validation that required all
orders and regulations passed by the regime to be subject to judicial review by
superior courts. Hence, such orders were often challenged in the courts, much to the
chagrin of the martial law authorities. The martial law administration also wanted the
courts cleared of non-cooperative, independent judges; hence a list from the federal
ministry of law ensured that the selected ones were not invited to take oath. In 1981, I
was a judge in the Sindh High Court. The Chief Justice was instructed by the federal
law secretary in Islamabad to meet the governor of Sindh, and he returned from the
meeting to announce that two judges from the Sindh High Court, Abdul Hafeez
Memon and G.M. Shah, would not be allowed to take oath. All other judges were
asked to appear before the governor at 2 pm. Some in the Sindh High Court argued
that if all judges boycotted the oath-taking and bowed out, other pliant ones would
replace them and therefore it was far wiser to fight from within. Meanwhile, events in
other high courts were kept under wraps. After the oath, it transpired that countless
judges had not been called and all those who declined to take the oath became heroes,
garnering much admiration from members of the bar and the public. In fact, despite
attempts to conceal the events in the Supreme Court, certain proceedings did come to
light. Chief Justice Maulvi Mushtaq of the Lahore High Court, who headed the bench
of five judges and sentenced Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto to death, had fallen
out with President Zia. Maulvi Mushtaq had been elevated to the Supreme Court but,
although ready to take oath, he was not invited. Chief Justice of Pakistan (CJP)
Anwar-ul-Haq invited all the judges of the apex court to his chamber to discuss
this matter and the fact that the PCO barred the jurisdiction of the courts.
The CJP began with the junior-most on the list, ad hoc Judge Fakhruddin G. Ebrahim,
who replied that although he was not party to the judgment in Nusrat Bhutto's case, he
had followed it and since the PCO curtailed the jurisdiction of the court and
nullifiedthe effect and object of the judgment, he would not take oath. For similar
reasons, Justice Dorab Patel also refrained but all other judges agreed and lastly the
CJP declared that since he was the author of the judgment, he too would opt out.
The actual facts remain with the federal ministry of law but rumour has it that only
Maulvi Mushtaq was not invited. If this is true then apart from Fakhruddin
G.Ebrahim, hats off to Dorab Patel who refused to become the CJP. It is worth a
mention here that Dorab Patel, Mohammad Haleem and G. Safdar Shah had acquitted
Mr Bhutto. It thus became clear that General Zia believed that under the PCO of
1981, he had the right to pick and choose judges favoured by the government and axe
others. On Oct 12, 1999 General Pervez Musharraf suspended the Constitution.
Another PCO replaced the Constitution. One of the seven points in the speech the
general gave shortly after taking over was his pledge to rebuild institutions.
Interestingly, the Supreme Court came under attack again. Finally after a delay of
three months, 15 judges were not given an oath under the PCO. These included five
judges of the Supreme Court who chose to stay out.
However, General Pervez Musharraf has the unique distinction of imposing 'martial
law' twice in the same tenure. On Nov 3, 2007 he imposed emergency-plus with the
suspension of the Constitution and promulgated the PCO under which he sent home
13 out of 17 judges of the Supreme Court, including Chief Justice Iftikhar
Mohammad Chaudhry, and prevented about 50 judges of the high courts from taking
oath. This is how the entire judicial system was demolished to avoid a judgment from
the apex court that restricted Musharraf from holding dual office — that of the army
chief and the president's — and denied him eligibility in the elections if he chose to
stay in uniform. President Musharraf succeeded in obtaining an interim order to
proceed with the polls. Apprehending a judgment against him, the president
introduced the PCO to turn the judiciary around and the new Supreme Court issued a
judgment in his favour on the basis of the law of necessity. It is surprising how the
western powers have been able to digest this unconstitutional and malafide action of
dismantling the judiciary, an essential pillar of democracy. How this issue has been
sidelined in favour of the elections is amazing. If the elections are held, President
Musharraf may have a hung parliament of his choice and the issue of restoration of
judges will certainly recede into oblivion.

Q.5 Critically analyze the performance of first government Benazir Bhutto. Why
she had dissatisfied the people of Pakistan and her proponents in the West.

Benazir Bhutto, the first woman prime minister of a modern Muslim state, is clearly
the beneficiary of dynastic politics and of the emotional ties of a large section of the
electorate to her charismatic family. However, this legacy as the daughter of Zulfiqar
Ali Bhutto has proven to be a mixed political blessing. Although she inherited her
father's party, the PPP, and has led it to victory, the party won a very narrow plurality
in the 1988 elections and was therefore forced to enter into a coalition with the MQM
(representing Pakistan's muhajir community) and several other parties in order to form
a government. Benazir wanted to repeal the Eighth Amendment in order to strengthen
her position as prime minister but could not muster sufficient political support and
soon abandoned the effort. Benazir also faced not only the old problems of the
political role of the military forces, the division of power between the central and
provincial governments, and the role of Islam, but also pressing new ones, including a
large budget deficit and growing ethnic violence. Several early actions appeared to
strengthen Benazir's ability to deal with these problems. In choosing her cabinet, for
example, Benazir kept the portfolios of finance and defense for herself but appointed
a seasoned bureaucrat, Wasim Jafari, as her top adviser on finance and economic
affairs. Her retention of Zia's foreign minister, Sahibzada Yaqub Khan, signaled
continuity in pursuit of the country's policy on Afghanistan. Also, when working out
their political coalition, the MQM agreed to support the PPP government at both
federal and provincial levels. The agreement, signed by the Sindh-based MQM and
the head of the PPP in Sindh, pledged to protect and safeguard the interests of all the
people of Sindh, regardless of language, religion, or origin of birth, as well as to
stamp out violence and to support the rule of law. The agreement--short-lived, as it
turned out--was an effort to achieve peace and cooperation between the indigenous
population and the muhajirs in Benazir's troubled home province.
Benazir's assumption of office brought great expectations from inside as well as
outside Pakistan. In her first address to the nation, Benazir pledged to work for a
progressive and democratic Pakistan--one guided by Islamic principles of
brotherhood, equality, and tolerance. At the same time, she invoked the Quaid-i-
Azam's vision for a Pakistan that would grow as a modern state. Benazir's rhetoric
soared, promising much to an expectant nation: strengthened relations with the United
States, the Soviet Union, and China; protected minority rights; increased provincial
autonomy; improvement of education; introduction of a comprehensive national
health policy; enhanced rights for women, with equal pay for equal work; and the like.
When faced with the hard realities of government, however, most of Benazir's
rhetoric did not translate into action. Although she was successful in advancing the
democratization process in Pakistani politics and was able to achieve warmer relations
with the United States and, for a short while, with India as well, Benazir's first term in
office is usually
looked back upon, by both foreign and domestic observers, as ineffectual--a period of
governmental instability. Within months she had lost much of her political support.
The scion of the feudal elite of Sindh, the Harvardand Oxford-educated Benazir was
often described as autocratic during her first term. Although she spoke of healing
wounds and putting an end to the past, she was inexorably tied to her father's political
legacy, which included harsh repression of political opposition. Further, her
appointment of her mother, Nusrat, as a senior minister without portfolio, followed by
the selection of her father-in-law as chairman of the parliamentary public accounts
committee, was viewed in some quarters as illadvised nepotism. Benazir's
government also set up the controversial Placement Bureau, which made political
appointments to the civil bureaucracy, although the bureau was later abolished.
Benazir let the political legacy of her family intrude, for example, when able public
servants, who had earlier harbored disagreements with her father, were dismissed for
reasons other than job performance. Benazir also had to contend with growing
political opposition. As a political power broker, she was in the late 1980s no match
for her main rival, then chief minister of Punjab, Nawaz Sharif. In the 1988 elections
that brought Benazir to power, her party had won the largest number of seats in the
National Assembly but controlled only one of the four provinces. Punjab, the most
populous province, with over half of Pakistan's population, came under the control of
the opposition IJI and of its leader, Nawaz Sharif, who was the only major political
figure from the Zia era to survive the reemergence of the PPP. To maintain her power
and implement her programs, Benazir would have needed to maneuver successfully
between a powerful president and the military elite and to reach a political
accommodation with Nawaz Sharif. Instead, she pursued a course of confrontation,
including unsuccessful efforts to overthrow him in the provincial assembly. In
addition, the failure of the PPP to share power and spoils with its coalition partners
caused further alienation, including the withdrawal of the MQM from the government
in October 1989. The public's sense of disillusionment deepened as the government
failed to deliver its promised employment and economic development programs.
Inflation and unemployment were high, and the country's burgeoning population put
increased pressure on already overburdened education and health systems. The
government also failed to deal with the country's growing drug abuse problem, and
there was opposition from religious conservatives who distrusted the degree of
Benazir's commitment to the state's Islamic principles. Despite tensions,
disagreements, and mutual misgivings, however, Benazir continued to be supported
by the armed forces. The chief of the army staff, General Mirza Aslam Beg, publicly
stated his intention to maintain a politically neutral army. Benazir narrowly survived a
no-confidence motion in the National Assembly in October 1989. Her government did
not compile a record of accomplishment that might have helped to offset her other
difficulties. No new legislation was passed, and fewer than a dozen bills, all minor
amendments to existing legislation, passed the National Assembly. Benazir
complained that legislation was stymied because the Senate was dominated by her
opposition. Benazir's problems were further accentuated in February 1990 when an
MQM-directed strike in Karachi escalated into rioting that virtually paralyzed the city.
The strike had been called to protest the alleged abduction of MQM supporters by the
PPP. The resulting loss of life and property forced Benazir to call in the army to
restore order. In addition to the violence in Sindh and elsewhere, she had to cope with
increasing charges of corruption leveled not only at her associates, but at her husband,
Asif Ali Zardari, and father-in-law. On the international front, Pakistan faced
heightened tensions with India over Kashmir and problems associated with the
unresolved Afghan war.
Finally, on August 6, 1990, President Ghulam Ishaq Khan dismissed the Benazir
government, dissolved the National Assembly as well as the Sindh and North-West
Frontier Province provincial assemblies, and appointed a caretaker government
headed by Ghulam Mustafa Jatoi, the leader of the Combined Opposition Parties in
the National Assembly. In accordance with the constitution, the president scheduled
national and provincial elections for October 1990. Ishaq Khan said his actions were
justified because of corruption, incompetence, and inaction; the release of convicted
criminals under the guise of freeing political prisoners; a failure to maintain law and
order in Sindh; and the use of official government machinery to promote partisan
interests. A nationwide state of emergency was declared, citing both "external
aggression and internal disturbance." Benazir called her dismissal "illegal,
unconstitutional, and arbitrary" and implied that the military was responsible. She
added that the PPP would not take to the streets to avoid giving Ghulam Ishaq Khan's
regime's any pretext for not holding scheduled elections. The military proclaimed that
its only interest was in maintaining order.