Human Rights Cases With Syllabus
Human Rights Cases With Syllabus
Human Rights Cases With Syllabus
the Council of Elders/Leaders who participated in the attempt to settle the dispute
SECOND DIVISION that the same has not been resolved.
THE CITY GOVERNMENT OF G.R. No. 180206
BAGUIO CITY, represented by Same; Same; Same; Temporary Restraining Orders; The National Commission on
REINALDO BAUTISTA, JR., Present: Indigenous Peoples (NCIP) may issue temporary restraining orders and writs of
City Mayor; THE ANTI-SQUATTING injunction without any prohibition against the issuance of the writ when the main
COMMITTEE, represented by ATTY. QUISUMBING, J., action is for injunction.—As can be gleaned from the foregoing provisions, the NCIP
MELCHOR CARLOS R. RAGANES, Chairperson, may issue temporary restraining orders and writs of injunction without any
CITY BUILDINGS and CARPIO MORALES, prohibition against the issuance of the writ when the main action is for injunction.
ARCHITECTURE office, represented TINGA, The power to issue temporary restraining orders or writs of injunction allows parties
by OSCAR FLORES; and PUBLIC VELASCO, JR., and to a dispute over which the NCIP has jurisdiction to seek relief against any action
ORDER and SAFETY OFFICE, BRION, JJ. which may cause them grave or irreparable damage or injury. In this case, the
Represented by EMMANUEL REYES, Regional Hearing Officer issued the injunctive writ because its jurisdiction was
Petitioners. called upon to protect and preserve the rights of private respondents who are
undoubtedly members of ICCs/IPs.
- versus -
Promulgated: Same; Same; Same; No restraining order or preliminary injunction may be issued by
February 4, 2009 any inferior court against the National Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP)
ATTY. BRAIN MASWENG, Regional in any case, dispute or controversy arising from or necessary to the interpretation of
Officer-National Commission on the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997 (IPRA) and other laws relating to
Indigenous People-CAR, ELVIN ICCs/IPs and ancestral domains.—In order to reinforce the powers of the NCIP, the
GUMANGAN, NARCISO BASATAN IPRA even provides that no restraining order or preliminary injunction may be
and LAZARO BAWAS, issued by any inferior court against the NCIP in any case, dispute or controversy
Respondents. arising from or necessary to the interpretation of the IPRA and other laws relating to
ICCs/IPs and ancestral domains.
x--------------------------------------------------------------------------x
Same; Same; Indigenous People’s Rights Act of 1997 (R.A. No. 8371); The
exemption of Baguio City from the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997 (IPRA)
DECISION cannot ipso facto be deduced because the law concedes the validity of prior land
rights recognized or acquired through any process before its effectivity.—Petitioners
argue that Baguio City is exempt from the provisions of the IPRA, and necessarily
Administrative Law; National Commission on Indigenous Peoples (R.A. No. 8371);
the jurisdiction of the NCIP, by virtue of Sec. 78 thereof, x x x The foregoing
Administrative Agencies; The National Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP) provision indeed states that Baguio City is governed by its own charter. Its
is the primary government agency responsible for the formulation and
exemption from the IPRA, however, cannot ipso facto be deduced because the law
implementation of policies, plans and programs to protect and promote the rights concedes the validity of prior land rights recognized or acquired through any process
and well-being of indigenous cultural communities/indigenous peoples (ICCs/IPs)
before its effectivity. The IPRA demands that the city’s charter respect the validity of
and the recognition of their ancestral domains as well as their rights thereto; The these recognized land rights and titles.
National Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP) is vested with jurisdiction over
all claims and disputes involving the rights of ICCs/IPs.—The NCIP is the primary Same; Same; Same; Proclamation No. 15 does not appear to be a definitive
government agency responsible for the formulation and implementation of policies,
recognition of private respondents’ ancestral land claim.—Proclamation No. 15,
plans and programs to protect and promote the rights and wellbeing of indigenous however, does not appear to be a definitive recognition of private respondents’
cultural communities/indigenous peoples (ICCs/IPs) and the recognition of their
ancestral land claim. The proclamation merely identifies the Molintas and Gumangan
ancestral domains as well as their rights thereto. In order to fully effectuate its families, the predecessors-in-interest of private respondents, as claimants of a portion
mandate, the NCIP is vested with jurisdiction over all claims and disputes involving
of the Busol Forest Reservation but does not acknowledge vested rights over the
the rights of ICCs/IPs. The only condition precedent to the NCIP’s assumption of
jurisdiction over such disputes is that the parties thereto shall have exhausted all
VILLARAMA, JR., Same; Appeals; Pleadings and Practice; Where an appeal from the Regional Trial
Court raises purely questions of law, recourse should be by a petition for review on
PEREZ, certiorari filed directly with the Supreme Court.—Section 9(3) of the Judiciary
MENDOZA,* and Reorganization Act of 1980 vests in the CA appellate jurisdiction over the final
judgments or orders of the RTCs and quasi-judicial bodies. But where an appeal
SERENO,** JJ. from the RTC raises purely questions of law, recourse should be by a petition for
review on certiorari filed directly with this Court. The question in this case is
THE HONORABLE EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY, THE HONORABLE whether or not CMU’s appeal from the RTC’s order of dismissal raises purely
SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF questions of law.
ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL
Same; Same; Questions of Fact; Questions of Law; Whether the Regional Trial
RESOURCES, THE CHAIRPERSON AND
Court (RTC) in fact prematurely decided the constitutionality of the Presidential
COMMISSIONERS OF THE NATIONAL
COMMISSION ON INDIGENOUS PEOPLES, Proclamation, resulting in the denial of petitioner’s right to be heard on the same, is
and THE LEAD CONVENOR OF THE a factual issue that was proper for the Court of Appeals to hear and ascertain from
NATIONAL ANTI-POVERTY COMMISSION, the parties.—As to the second reason, the CMU claimed that the Malaybalay RTC
deprived it of its right to due process when it dismissed the case based on the ground
Respondents. Promulgated: that Presidential Proclamation 310, which it challenged, was constitutional. CMU
points out that the issue of the constitutionality of the proclamation had not yet been
properly raised and heard. NCIP, et al had not yet filed an answer to join issue with
The Court finds no merit in petitioners' contention that jurisdiction of the court In sum, the Court finds no substantial argument in petitioners' motions for
over the subject matter of a case is not merely based on the allegations of reconsideration to justify a reversal of its ruling that jurisdiction over the
the complaint in certain cases where the actual issues are evidenced by subject matter of respondents' original and amended complaint based on the
subsequent pleadings. It is well settled that the jurisdiction of the court allegations therein lies with the RTC.
cannot be made to depend on the defenses raised by the defendant in the
answer or a motion to dismiss; otherwise, the question of jurisdiction would The crucial issue in this case, however, revolves around the complex nature
depend almost entirely on the defendant. 15 Suffice it also to state that the of the jurisdiction of the NCIP, as shown by the different but well reasoned
Court is unanimous16 in denying the petition for review on certiorari on the opinions of the Associate Justices concerned vis-a-vis the arguments in
ground that the CA correctly ruled that the subject matter of the original and petitioners' motions for reconsideration.
amended complaint based on the allegations therein is within the jurisdiction
of the RTC.
To recall, the ponencia has held that pursuant to Section 66 of the IPRA, the
NCIP shall have jurisdiction over claims and disputes involving rights of
In his Concurring Opinion, Justice Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr. concurred with ICCs/IPs only when they arise between or among parties belonging to the
the ponencia that the RTC has jurisdiction over the case: same ICC/IP group. When such claims and disputes arise between or among
parties who do not belong to the same ICC/IP group, the case shall fall under
Both original and amended complaints, accion reivindicatoria and injunction, the jurisdiction of the regular courts, instead of the NCIP. Thus, even if the
respectively, are incapable of pecuniary estimation; thus falling within the real issue involves dispute over a land which appear to be located within the
jurisdiction of the R TC. As correctly pointed out by ancestral domain of an ICC/IP, it is not the NCIP but the RTC which has the
the ponencia, ''jurisdiction over the subject matter of a case is conferred by power to hear, try and decide the case. In exceptional cases1 under Sections
law and determined by the allegations in the complaint which comprise a 52, 54 and 62 of the IPRA, the NCIP shall still have jurisdiction over such
Section 83 of the IPRA, the repealing clause, only specifies Presidential Concurrent or coordinate jurisdiction is that which is "exercised by different
Decree No. 410, Executive Order Nos. 122B and 122C as expressly courts at the same time over the same subject matter and within the same
repealed. While the same section does state that "all other laws, decrees, territory, and wherein litigants may in the first instance resort to either court
orders, rules and regulations or parts thereof inconsistent with this Act are indifferently, that of several different tribunals, each authorized to deal with
hereby repealed or modified accordingly," such an implied repeal is the same subject matter, and when a proceeding in respect of a certain
Sen. Flavier So we ae going b. Titled lands with registered Certificate of Land Ownership Awards (CLO
to adopt the As), Emancipation Patents (EPs ), and Patents within Certificate of Ancestral
senate version Domain Title (CADT)/Certificate of Ancestral Land Title (CALT)/Certificate of
minus the words Ancestral Domain Claim (CADC)/Certificate of Ancestral Land Claim (CALC).
"exclusive
original"?
c. Resource access/development instruments issued by the DENR over
Rep. Zapata Yes, Mr. lands within Ancestral Land/Domain Claims such as, but not limited to,
Chairman, that's Community-Based Forest Management Agreement (CBFMA), Integrated
my proposal Forest Management Agreement (IFMA), Socialized Forest Management
Sen. Flavier No, problem. Agreement (SIFMA), Protected Area Community""Based Resources
Okay, approved. Management Agreement (PACBRMA), Forest Land Grazing Management
Agreement (FLGMA), Co-Management Agreement, Certificate of
Rep. Zapata xxxx46 Stewardship Contract (CSC), Certificate of Forest Stewardship
Agreement (CFSA), Wood Processing Plant Permit (WPPP), Special Land
The Bicameral Committee's removal of the words "exclusive and original" Use Permit (SLUP), Private Land Timber Permit (PLTP), Special Private
mean that the NCIP shares concurrent jurisdiction with the regular courts. Land Timber Permit (SPLTP), and Foreshore Lease
Thus, I agree with the revised ponencia that it would be ultra vires for the Agreement/Permit (FLAIFLP).
NCIP to promulgate rules and regulations stating that it has exclusive
jurisdiction.47 d. Exploration Permit (EP), Financial or Technical Assistance
Agreement (FTAA); Mineral Agreement (either Production Sharing, Co-
Another cogent reason why the NCIP's quasi-judicial jurisdiction over claims Production or Joint Venture) issued within CARP-covered areas.
and disputes involving rights of ICCs/IPs under Section 66 of the IPRA
cannot be exclusive and original, is because of the so-called "Contentious e. Reservations, proclamations and other special law-declared areas a
Areas/Issues" identified in the Joint Department of Agriculture-Land portion or the entirety of which is subsequently issued a CADT/CALT.
Registration Authority-Department of Environment and Natural Resources-
National Commission on Indigenous Peoples (DARDENR- LRA- f. Areas with existing and/or vested rights after the registration of the
NCIP) Administrative Order No. 01, Series of 2012. 48 Such contentious CADTs/CAL Ts but for any reason not segregated/excluded.
matters arose in the course of the implementation of the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Law,49 the IPRA, the Public Land Act, 50 and the Land g. Other jurisdictional and operational issues that may arise between and
Registration Act,51 as amended by the Property Registration Decree, 52 which amongst the DAR, the DENR and the NCIP as may be determined by the
created not only issues of overlapping jurisdiction between the DAR, DENR National/Regional/Provincial Joint Committees, as created under Section 19
and NCIP, but also operational issues and conflicting claims in the of the Joint Administrative Order.
implementation of their respective programs.
h. Formal complaints filed by concerned ICCs/IPs or by the NCIP in behalf of
Section 12 of the Joint DAR-DENR-LRA-NCIP Administrative Order defines the ICCs/IPs over those identified titled areas found within the AD/AL.
those contentious areas/issues which are subject of operational issues and
conflicting claims between and among the DAR, the DENR and the NCIP, as
It is inevitable that disputes will arise involving the above-stated contentious
follows:
areas/issues, and affecting the rights of parties who are non-IPs or those
who belong to different ICCs/IPs groups. As a matter of fair play and due
process, however, such parties cannot be compelled to comply with the two
conditions53 before such disputes may be brought before the NCIP under
xxxx Section 72 of the IPRA provides that any person who violates the Rights of
ICCs/IPs shall be punished "in accordance with the customary laws of the
Section 16. CARP Coverage of Titled Properties. Titled lands under the ICCs/IPs concerned .... without prejudice to the right of the ICC/IP concerned
Torrens System issued prior to IPRA are deemed vested rights pursuant to to avail of the protection of "existing laws . . .[i]n which case," the penalty
the provision of Section 56 of IPRA. Accordingly, the DAR shall proceed with shall be imprisonment and/or fine, and damages, "upon the discretion of the
the CARP coverage of said lands, unless a Restraining Order is issued by court."
the Supreme Court without prejudice, however, to the rights of the ICCs/IPs
to question the validity of these titles before a court or body of competent
jurisdiction. 55
Since the regular courts, not the NCIP, have jurisdiction over national laws, It also bears emphasis that the right of ICCs/IPs to use their own commonly
then the NCIP's jurisdiction is limited to punishment under customary laws. accepted justice systems, conflict resolution institutions, peace building
processes or mechanism under Section 1563 of the IPRA pertains only to
those customary laws and practices within their respective communities, as
The NCIP's power to impose penalties under customary laws presents two
may be compatible with the national legal system and with internationally
important issues: first, whether it is legally possible to punish non-ICCs/IPs
recognized human rights. In this regard, it is fitting to quote the Separate
with penalties under customary laws; and second, whether a member of a
Opinion of Justice Santiago M. Kapunan in Cruz v. Secretary of Environment
particular ICC/IP could be punished in accordance with the customary laws
& Natural Resources64 on the constitutionality of Sections 63, 65 and other
of another ICC/IP.
related provisions, like Section 15, of the IPRA:
Laws that provide for fines, forfeitures, or penalties .for their violation or
Anent the use of customary laws in determining the ownership and extent of
otherwise impose a burden on the people, such as tax and revenue
ancestral domains, suffice it to say that such is allowed under paragraph 2,
measures, must be published.
Section 5 of Article XII of the Constitution. Said provision states, "The
Congress may provide for the applicability of customary laws governing
Most customary laws are not written, much less published. Hence, it is highly property rights and relations in determining the ownership and extent of the
unlikely that the NCIP or even the regular courts have the power to penalize ancestral domains." Notably, the use of customary laws under IPRA is not
non-ICCs/IPs with these penalties under customary laws. A contrary ruling absolute, for the law speaks merely of primacy of use. xxx
would be constitutionally infirm for lack of due process.
xxxx
Similarly, an ICC/IP cannot be punished under the customary law of another.
Otherwise, the former would be forced to observe a nonbinding customary
The application of customary law is limited to disputes concerning property
law.
rights or relations in determining the ownership and extent of the ancestral
domains, where all the parties involved are members of indigenous peoples,
Therefore, while the NCIP has jurisdiction over violations of ICC/IP rights, its specifically, of the same indigenous group. It therefore follows that when one
jurisdiction is limited to those committed by and against members of the of the parties to a dispute is a nonmember of an indigenous group, or when
same ICC/IP. the indigenous peoples involved belong to different groups, the application of
customary law is not required.
This view does not detract from the IPRA's policy to "protect the rights· of
ICCs/IPs." ICCs/IPs, whose rights are violated by non-ICCs/IPs or by
Indeed, non-ICCs/IPs cannot be subjected to the special and limited WHEREFORE, the Motion for Reconsideration and the Supplemental Motion
jurisdiction of the NCIP even if the dispute involves rights of ICCs/IPs for Reconsideration are DENIED for lack of merit.
since the NCIP has no power and authority to decide on a controversy
involving as well rights of non-ICCs/IPs which may be brought before a·
SO ORDERED.
court of general jurisdiction within the legal bounds of rights and
remedies. Even as a practical concern, non-IPs and nonmembers of ICCs
ought to be excepted from the NCIP's competence since it cannot determine
the right-duty correlative, and breach thereof, between opposing parties who
are ICCs/IPs and non-ICCs/IPs, the controversy necessarily contemplating
application of other laws, not only customs and customary law of the
ICCs/IPs. In short, the NCIP is only vested with jurisdiction to determine the
rights of ICCs/IPs based on customs and customary law in a given
controversy against another ICC/IP, but not the applicable law for each and
every kind of ICC/IP controversy even against an opposing non-ICC/IP. 66
Anent what Justice Perez described as the "implicit affirmation" done in The
City Government of Baguio City v. Masweng 67 of the NCIP' s jurisdiction over
DECISION Same; Same; Statutory Construction; The intent of the statute is the law.—It bears
mention that the intent of the statute is the law and that this intent must be
Anti-Violence against Women and Their Children Act of 2004 (R.A. No. 9262); effectuated by the courts. In the present case, the express language of R.A. No. 9262
Conspiracy; Words and Phrases; “Violence against Women and Their Children,” reflects the intent of the legislature for liberal construction as will best ensure the
Defined; While Section 3 of R.A. No. 9262 provides that the offender be related or attainment of the object of the law according to its true intent, meaning and spirit—
connected to the victim by marriage, former marriage, or a sexual or dating the protection and safety of victims of violence against women and children.
relationship, it does not preclude the application of the principle of conspiracy
under the Revised Penal Code (RPC).—Section 3 of R.A. No. 9262 defines Same; Same; Same; Words and Phrases; The maxim “expressio unios est exclusio
‘‘[v]iolence against women and their children’’ as “any act or a series of acts alterius” is only an ancillary rule of statutory construction which should be applied
committed by any person against a woman who is his wife, former wife, or against a only as a means of discovering legislative intent which is not otherwise manifest and
woman with whom the person has or had a sexual or dating relationship, or with should not be permitted to defeat the plainly indicated purpose of the legislature.—
whom he has a common child, or against her child whether legitimate or illegitimate, Contrary to the RTC’s pronouncement, the maxim “expressio unios est exclusio
within or without the family abode, which result in or is likely to result in physical, alterius” finds no application here. It must be remembered that this maxim is only an
sexual, psychological harm or suffering, or economic abuse including threats of such “ancillary rule of statutory construction.” It is not of universal application. Neither is
acts, battery, assault, coercion, harassment or arbitrary deprivation of liberty.” While it conclusive. It should be applied only as a means of discovering legislative intent
the said provision provides that the offender be related or connected to the victim by
On April 18, 1999, Sharica Mari L. Go-Tan (petitioner) and Steven L. Tan (Steven) WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENTS-SPOUSES
were married.[3] Out of this union, two female children were born, Kyra Danielle[4] and PERFECTO & JUANITA, PARENTS-IN-LAW OF SHARICA, MAY
Kristen Denise.[5] On January 12, 2005, barely six years into the marriage, petitioner BE INCLUDED IN THE PETITION FOR THE ISSUANCE OF A
filed a Petition with Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary Protective Order (TPO) PROTECTIVE ORDER, IN ACCORDANCE WITH REPUBLIC
[6]
against Steven and her parents-in-law, Spouses Perfecto C. Tan and Juanita L. Tan ACT NO. 9262, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE ANTI-VIOLENCE
(respondents) before the RTC.She alleged that Steven, in conspiracy with AGAINST WOMEN AND THEIR CHILDREN ACT OF 2004.[17]
respondents, were causing verbal, psychological and economic abuses upon her in Petitioner contends that R.A. No. 9262 must be understood in the light of the
violation of Section 5, paragraphs (e)(2)(3)(4), (h)(5), and (i)[7] of Republic Act (R.A.) provisions of Section 47 of R.A. No. 9262 which explicitly provides for
No. 9262,[8] otherwise known as the Anti-Violence Against Women and Their Children the suppletory application of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) and, accordingly, the
Act of 2004. provision on conspiracy under Article 8 of the RPC can be suppletorilyapplied to R.A.
On January 25, 2005, the RTC issued an Order/Notice [9] granting petitioner's prayer No. 9262; that Steven and respondents had community of design and purpose in
for a TPO. tormenting her by giving her insufficient financial support; harassing and pressuring her
to be ejected from the family home; and in repeatedly abusing her verbally,
On February 7, 2005, respondents filed a Motion to Dismiss with Opposition to the emotionally, mentally and physically; that respondents should be included as
Issuance of Permanent Protection Order Ad Cautelam and Comment on the Petition, indispensable or necessary parties for complete resolution of the case.
[10]
contending that the RTC lacked jurisdiction over their persons since, as parents-in-
law of the petitioner, they were not covered by R.A. No. 9262. On the other hand, respondents submit that they are not covered by R.A. No. 9262
since Section 3 thereof explicitly provides that the offender should be related to the
On February 28, 2005, petitioner filed a Comment on Opposition[11] to respondents' victim only by marriage, a former marriage, or a dating or sexual relationship; that
Motion to Dismiss arguing that respondents were covered by R.A. No. 9262 under a allegations on the conspiracy of respondents require a factual determination which
liberal interpretation thereof aimed at promoting the protection and safety of victims of cannot be done by this Court in a petition for review; that respondents cannot be
violence. characterized as indispensable or necessary parties, since their presence in the case
is not only unnecessary but altogether illegal, considering the non-inclusion of in-laws
On March 7, 2005, the RTC issued a Resolution [12] dismissing the case as to as offenders under Section 3 of R.A. No. 9262.
respondents on the ground that, being the parents-in-law of the petitioner, they were
not included/covered as respondents under R.A. No. 9262 under the well-known rule The Court rules in favor of the petitioner.
of law expressio unius est exclusio alterius.[13]
Section 3 of R.A. No. 9262 defines ''[v]iolence against women and their children'' as
On March 16, 2005, petitioner filed her Verified Motion for any act or a series of acts committed by any person against a woman who is his wife,
Reconsideration[14] contending that the doctrine of necessary implication should be former wife, or against a woman with whom the person has or had a sexual or dating
applied in the broader interests of substantial justice and due process. relationship, or with whom he has a common child, or against her child whether
legitimate or illegitimate, within or without the family abode, which result in or is likely to
On April 8, 2005, respondents filed their Comment on the Verified Motion for result in physical, sexual, psychological harm or suffering, or economic abuse including
Reconsideration[15] arguing that petitioner's liberal construction unduly broadened the threats of such acts, battery, assault, coercion, harassment or arbitrary deprivation of
liberty.
ART. 10. Offenses not subject to the provisions of this It must be further noted that Section 5 of R.A. No. 9262 expressly recognizes that the
Code. Offenses which are or in the future may be punishable under acts of violence against women and their children may be committed by an offender
special laws are not subject to the provisions of this Code. This through another, thus:
Code shall be supplementary to such laws, unless the latter
should specially provide the contrary. (Emphasis supplied) SEC. 5. Acts of Violence Against Women and Their Children. -
The crime of violence against women and their children is
Hence, legal principles developed from the Penal Code may be applied in a committed through any of the following acts:
supplementary capacity to crimes punished under special laws, such as R.A.
No. 9262, in which the special law is silent on a particular matter. x x x
Thus, in People v. Moreno,[18] the Court applied suppletorily the provision on
subsidiary penalty under Article 39 of the RPC to cases of violations of Act No. 3992, (h) Engaging in purposeful, knowing, or reckless conduct,
otherwise known as the Revised Motor Vehicle Law, noting that the special law did not personally or through another, that alarms or causes substantial
contain any provision that the defendant could be sentenced with subsidiary emotional or psychological distress to the woman or her child. This
imprisonment in case of insolvency. shall include, but not be limited to, the following acts:
In People v. Li Wai Cheung,[19] the Court applied suppletorily the rules on the service
of sentences provided in Article 70 of the RPC in favor of the accused who was found (1) Stalking or following the woman or her child in public or private
guilty of multiple violations of R.A. No. 6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous places;
Drugs Act of 1972, considering the lack of similar rules under the special law. (2) Peering in the window or lingering outside the residence of the
[20]
In People v. Chowdury, the Court applied suppletorily Articles 17, 18 and 19 of the woman or her child;
RPC to define the words principal, accomplices and accessories under R.A. No. 8042, (3) Entering or remaining in the dwelling or on the property of the
otherwise known as the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995, because woman or her child against her/his will;
said words were not defined therein, although the special law referred to the same
terms in enumerating the persons liable for the crime of illegal recruitment. (4) Destroying the property and personal belongings or inflicting
harm to animals or pets of the woman or her child; and
In Yu v. People,[21] the Court applied suppletorily the provisions on subsidiary
imprisonment under Article 39 of the RPC to Batas Pambansa (B.P.) Blg. 22, (5) Engaging in any form of harassment or violence;
otherwise known as the Bouncing Checks Law, noting the absence of an express x x x. (Emphasis supplied)
provision on subsidiary imprisonment in said special law.
In addition, the protection order that may be issued for the purpose of
preventing further acts of violence against the woman or her child may include
Michelle Ang (Michelle), Rustan’s wife, testified that she was sure Irish sent 4. Whether or not the RTC properly admitted in evidence the
the six pictures. Michelle claims that she received the pictures and hid the obscene picture presented in the case.
memory card (Exhibit 8) that contained them because she was jealous and
angry. She did not want to see anything of Irish. But, while the woman in the The Court’s Rulings
pictures posed in sexy clothing, in none did she appear naked as in Exhibit
A. Further, the face of the woman in Exhibits 2, 4, 5 and 6 could not be seen. Section 3(a) of R.A. 9262 provides that violence against women includes an
Irish denied that she was the woman in those four pictures. As for Exhibits 3 act or acts of a person against a woman with whom he has or had a sexual
and 7, the woman in the picture was fully dressed. or dating relationship. Thus:
After trial, the RTC found Irish’s testimony completely credible, given in an SEC. 3. Definition of Terms. – As used in this Act,
honest and spontaneous manner. The RTC observed that she wept while
recounting her experience, prompting the court to comment: "Her tears were (a) "Violence against women and their children" refers to any act or a
tangible expression of pain and anguish for the acts of violence she suffered series of acts committed by any person against a woman who is his
in the hands of her former sweetheart. The crying of the victim during her wife, former wife, or against a woman with whom the person has or
testimony is evidence of the credibility of her charges with the verity borne had a sexual or dating relationship, or with whom he has a common
out of human nature and experience." 6 Thus, in its Decision dated August 1, child, or against her child whether legitimate or illegitimate, within or
2001, the RTC found Rustan guilty of the violation of Section 5(h) of R.A. without the family abode, which result in or is likely to result in
9262. physical, sexual, psychological harm or suffering, or economic abuse
including threats of such acts, battery, assault, coercion, harassment
On Rustan’s appeal to the Court of Appeals (CA), 7 the latter rendered a or arbitrary deprivation of liberty.
decision dated January 31, 2008,8 affirming the RTC decision. The CA
denied Rustan’s motion for reconsideration in a resolution dated April 25, xxxx
2008. Thus, Rustan filed the present for review on certiorari.
Section 5 identifies the act or acts that constitute violence against
The Issues Presented women and these include any form of harassment that causes
substantial emotional or psychological distress to a woman. Thus:
The principal issue in this case is whether or not accused Rustan sent Irish
by cellphone message the picture with her face pasted on the body of a nude
3. The harassment alarms or causes substantial emotional or An "away-bati" or a fight-and-kiss thing between two lovers is a common
psychological distress to her. occurrence. Their taking place does not mean that the romantic relation
between the two should be deemed broken up during periods of
One. The parties to this case agree that the prosecution needed to prove that misunderstanding. Explaining what "away-bati" meant, Irish explained that at
accused Rustan had a "dating relationship" with Irish. Section 3(e) provides times, when she could not reply to Rustan’s messages, he would get angry
that a "dating relationship" includes a situation where the parties are at her. That was all. Indeed, she characterized their three-month romantic
romantically involved over time and on a continuing basis during the course relation as continuous.10
of the relationship. Thus:
Two. Rustan argues that the one act of sending an offensive picture should
(e) "Dating relationship" refers to a situation wherein the parties live as not be considered a form of harassment. He claims that such would unduly
husband and wife without the benefit of marriage or are romantically involved ruin him personally and set a very dangerous precedent. But Section 3(a) of
over time and on a continuing basis during the course of the relationship. A R.A. 9262 punishes "any act or series of acts" that constitutes violence
casual acquaintance or ordinary socialization between two individuals in a against women. This means that a single act of harassment, which translates
business or social context is not a dating relationship. (Underscoring into violence, would be enough. The object of the law is to protect women
supplied.) and children. Punishing only violence that is repeatedly committed would
license isolated ones.
Here, Rustan claims that, being "romantically involved," implies that the
offender and the offended woman have or had sexual relations. According to Rustan alleges that today’s women, like Irish, are so used to obscene
him, "romance" implies a sexual act. He cites Webster’s Comprehensive communications that her getting one could not possibly have produced alarm
Dictionary Encyclopedia Edition which provides a colloquial or informal in her or caused her substantial emotional or psychological distress. He
Three. Rustan argues that, since he was arrested and certain items were WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition and AFFIRMS the decision of
seized from him without any warrant, the evidence presented against him the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR 30567 dated January 31, 2008 and its
should be deemed inadmissible. But the fact is that the prosecution did not resolution dated April 25, 2008.
present in evidence either the cellphone or the SIM cards that the police
officers seized from him at the time of his arrest. The prosecution did not
need such items to prove its case. Exhibit C for the prosecution was but a SO ORDERED.
photograph depicting the Sony Ericsson P900 cellphone that was used,
which cellphone Rustan admitted owning during the pre-trial conference.
Actually, though, the bulk of the evidence against him consisted in Irish’s
testimony that she received the obscene picture and malicious text
messages that the sender’s cellphone numbers belonged to Rustan with
whom she had been previously in communication. Indeed, to prove that the
Dolina of course alleged that Vallecera had been abusing her and her
child.1avvphil But it became apparent to the RTC upon hearing that this was
not the case since, contrary to her claim, neither she nor her child ever lived
with Vallecera. As it turned out, the true object of her action was to get
financial support from Vallecera for her child, her claim being that he is the
father. He of course vigorously denied this.
Dolina’s remedy is to file for the benefit of her child an action against
Vallecera for compulsory recognition in order to establish filiation and then
demand support. Alternatively, she may directly file an action for support,
where the issue of compulsory recognition may be integrated and resolved. 11
It must be observed, however, that the RTC should not have dismissed the
entire case based solely on the lack of any judicial declaration of filiation
between Vallecera and Dolina’s child since the main issue remains to be the
alleged violence committed by Vallecera against Dolina and her child and
whether they are entitled to protection. But of course, this matter is already
water under the bridge since Dolina failed to raise this error on review. This
omission lends credence to the conclusion of the RTC that the real purpose
of the petition is to obtain support from Vallecera.
Same; Same; Appeals; The Supreme Court is not a trier of facts, and the factual
findings of the Sandiganbayan must be respected by, if not indeed conclusive upon,
[G.R. No. 140604. March 6, 2002] the Tribunal, where no cogent reasons have been sufficiently shown to now hold
otherwise. —The Supreme Court is not a trier of facts, and the factual findings of the
Sandiganbayan must be respected by, if not indeed conclusive upon, the tribunal, no
cogent reasons having been sufficiently shown to now hold otherwise. The
DR. RICO S. JACUTIN, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE assessment on the credibility of witnesses is a matter best left to the trial court
PHILIPPINES, respondent. because of its unique position of being able to observe that elusive and
incommunicable evidence on the deportment of witnesses at the stand, an
opportunity that is denied the appellate court.
DECISION
Same; Same; Damages; Moral damages are not intended to enrich a complainant
Criminal Law; Anti-Sexual Harassment Act (R.A. No. 7877); Words and Phrases; but are awarded only to enable an injured party obtain some means that would help
“Sexual Harassment,” Defined.—The above contentions of petitioner are not obviate the sufferings sustained on account of the culpable action of an offender.—
meritorious. Section 3 of Republic Act 7877 provides: “SEC. 3. Work, Education or Conformably with prevailing jurisprudence, the grant of moral and exemplary
Training-related Sexual Harassment Defined.—Work, education or trainingrelated damages by the Sandiganbayan must be tempered to reasonable levels. Moral
sexual harassment is committed by an employer, employee, manager, supervisor, damages are not intended to enrich a complainant but are awarded only to enable an
agent of the employer, teacher, instructor, professor, coach, trainor, or any other injured party obtain some means that would help obviate the sufferings sustained on
person who, having authority, influence or moral ascendancy over another in a work account of the culpable action of an offender. Its award must not appear to be the
or training or education environment, demands, requests or otherwise requires any result of passion or undue prejudice, and it must always reasonably approximate
sexual favor from the other, regardless of whether the demand, request or extent of injury and be proportional to the wrong committed. Indeed, Juliet should be
requirement for submission is accepted by the object of said Act. “(a) In a work- recompensed for her mental anguish. Dr. Merlita F. Adaza, a psychological
related or employment environment, sexual harassment is committed when: “(1) The counseling expert, has found Juliet to be emotionally and psychologically disturbed
sexual favor is made as a condition in the hiring or in the employment, re- and suffering from post trauma stress following her unpleasant experience with
employment or continued employment of said individual, or in granting said petitioner. The Court finds it fitting to award in favor of Juliet Yee P30,000.00 moral
individual favorable compensation, terms, conditions, promotions, or privileges; or damages. In addition, she should be entitled to P20,000.00 exemplary damages to
the refusal to grant the sexual favor results in limiting, segregating or classifying the serve as a deterrent against, or as a negative incentive to curb, socially deleterious
employee which in any way would discriminate, deprive or diminish employment actions.
opportunities or otherwise adversely affect said employee.”
VITUG, J.:
Same; Same; While the City Mayor has the exclusive prerogative in appointing city
personnel, it should stand to reason, nevertheless, that a recommendation from the In an accusatory Information, dated 22 July 1996, petitioner, City Health
City Health Officer in the appointment of personnel in the municipal health office Officer Rico Jacutin of Cagayan de Oro City, was charged before the
carry good weight.—While the City Mayor had the exclusive prerogative in Sandiganbayan, Fourth Division, with the crime of Sexual Harassment,
appointing city personnel, it should stand to reason, nevertheless, that a thusly:
recommendation from petitioner in the appointment of personnel in the municipal
health office could carry good weight. Indeed, petitioner himself would appear to That sometime on or about 01 December 1995, in Cagayan de Oro City, and
have conveyed, by his words and actions, an impression that he could facilitate within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court pursuant to the provisions of
Juliet’s employment. Indeed, petitioner would not have been able to take undue RA 7975, the accused, a public officer, being then the City Health Officer of
liberalities on the person of Juliet had it not been for his high position in the City Cagayan de Oro City with salary grade 26 but a high ranking official by
Health Office of Cagayan de Oro City. The findings of the Sandiganbayan were express provision of RA 7975, committing the offense in relation to his official
DECISION Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; “Battered Woman”, defined; In order to be
classified as a battered woman, the couple must go through the battering cycle at
least twice.—A battered woman has been defined as a woman “who is repeatedly
Criminal Law; Parricide; Evidence; Witnesses; Appeals; The findings of the trial
subjected to any forceful physical or psychological behavior by a man in order to
court on the credibility of witnesses and their testimonies are entitled to a high
coerce her to do something he wants her to do without concern for her rights.
degree of respect and will not be disturbed on appeal in the absence of any showing
Battered women include wives or women in any form of intimate relationship with
that the trial judge gravely abused his discretion.—The first six assigned errors
men. Furthermore, in order to be classified as a battered woman, the couple must go
raised by appellant are factual in nature, if not collateral to the resolution of the
through the battering cycle at least twice. Any woman may find herself in an abusive
principal issues. As consistently held by this Court, the findings of the trial court on
relationship with a man once. If it occurs a second time, and she remains in the
the credibility of witnesses and their testimonies are entitled to a high degree of
situation, she is defined as a battered woman.”
respect and will not be disturbed on appeal in the absence of any showing that the
trial judge gravely abused his discretion or overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied
material facts or circumstances of weight and substance that could affect the Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Battered women exhibit common personality
outcome of the case traits.—Battered women exhibit common personality traits, such as low self-esteem,
traditional beliefs about the home, the family and the female sex role; emotional
dependence upon the dominant male; the tendency to accept responsibility for the
Same; Same; Same; Relationship; The key element in parricide is the relationship of
batterer’s actions; and false hopes that the relationship will improve.
the offender with the victim.—The key element in parricide is the relationship of the
offender with the victim. In the case of parricide of a spouse, the best proof of the
relationship between the accused and the deceased is the marriage certificate. In the Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; “Cycle of Violence”; Phases; Tension-Building
absence of a marriage certificate, however, oral evidence of the fact of marriage may Phase; During the tension-building phase, minor battering occurs—it could be
be considered by the trial court if such proof is not objected to. verbal or slight physical abuse or another form of hostile behavior.—During the
tension-building phase,minor battering occurs—it could be verbal or slight physical
abuse or another form of hostile behavior. The woman usually tries to pacify the
Same; Same; Same; Admission; Exceptions; Axiomatic is the rule that a judicial
batterer through a show of kind, nurturing behavior; or by simply staying out of his
admission is conclusive upon the party making it, with exceptions.—Axiomatic is the
way. What actually happens is that she allows herself to be abused in ways that, to
rule that a judicial admission is conclusive upon the party making it, except only
her, are comparatively minor. All she wants is to prevent the escalation of the
when there is a showing that (1) the admission was made through a palpable mistake,
violence exhibited by the batterer. This wish, however, proves to be double-edged,
or (2) no admission was in fact made.
because her “placatory” and passive behavior legitimizes his belief that he has the
right to abuse her in the first place. However, the techniques adopted by the woman
Same; Same; Justifying Circumstances; Self-defense; In criminal cases, self-defense in her effort to placate him are not usually successful, and the verbal and/or physical
shifts the burden of proof from the prosecution to the defense.—When the accused abuse worsens. Each partner senses the imminent loss of control and the growing
admits killing the victim, it is incumbent upon her to prove any claimed justifying tension and despair. Exhausted from the persistent stress, the battered woman soon
circumstance by clear and convincing evidence. Well-settled is the rule that in withdraws emotionally. But the more she becomes emotionally unavailable, the more
WHEREFORE, after all the foregoing being duly considered, the Court finds With the assistance of her counsel, [5] appellant pleaded not guilty during
the accused, Marivic Genosa y Isidro, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of her arraignment on March 3, 1997.[6] In due course, she was tried for and
the crime of Parricide as provided under Article 246 of the Revised Penal convicted of parricide.
Code as restored by Sec. 5, RA No. 7659, and after finding treachery as a
generic aggravating circumstance and none of mitigating circumstance,
hereby sentences the accused with the penalty of DEATH. The Facts
The Court likewise penalizes the accused to pay the heirs of the deceased
the sum of fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00), Philippine currency as
Version of the Prosecution
indemnity and another sum of fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00), Philippine
currency as moral damages.[2]
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) summarizes the prosecutions
The Information[3] charged appellant with parricide as follows: version of the facts in this wise:
3. After their marriage, they lived first in the home of Bens parents, together He did not hear them quarreling while he was across the road from the
with Bens brother, Alex, in Isabel, Leyte. In the first year of marriage, Marivic Genosa residence. Basobas admitted that he and Ben were always at the
and Ben lived happily. But apparently, soon thereafter, the couple would cockpits every Saturday and Sunday. He claims that he once told Ben before
quarrel often and their fights would become violent. when he was stricken with a bottle by Marivic Genosa that he should leave
her and that Ben would always take her back after she would leave him so
4. Bens brother, Alex, testified for the prosecution that he could not many times.
remember when Ben and Marivic married. He said that when Ben and
Marivic quarreled, generally when Ben would come home drunk, Marivic Basobas could not remember when Marivic had hit Ben, but it was a long
would inflict injuries on him. He said that in one incident in 1993 he saw time that they had been quarreling. He said Ben even had a wound on the
Marivic holding a kitchen knife after Ben had shouted for help as his left hand right forehead. He had known the couple for only one (1) year.
was covered with blood. Marivic left the house but after a week, she returned
apparently having asked for Bens forgiveness. In another incident in May 22,
1994, early morning, Alex and his father apparently rushed to Bens aid again 6. Marivic testified that after the first year of marriage, Ben became cruel to
and saw blood from Bens forehead and Marivic holding an empty bottle. Ben her and was a habitual drinker. She said he provoked her, he would slap her,
and Marivic reconciled after Marivic had apparently again asked for Bens sometimes he would pin her down on the bed, and sometimes beat her.
forgiveness.
xxxxxxxxx xxxxxxxxx
Marivic said she did not provoke her husband when she got home that night Dra. Cerillo said that there is only one injury and that is the injury involving
it was her husband who began the provocation. Marivic said she was the skeletal area of the head which she described as a fracture. And that
frightened that her husband would hurt her and she wanted to make sure she based on her examination, Ben had been dead 2 or 3 days. Dra. Cerillo did
would deliver her baby safely. In fact, Marivic had to be admitted later at the not testify as to what caused his death.
Rizal Medical Centre as she was suffering from eclampsia and hypertension,
and the baby was born prematurely on December 1, 1995. Dra. Cerillo was not cross-examined by defense counsel.
Marivic testified that during her marriage she had tried to leave her husband 11. The Information, dated November 14, 1996, filed against Marivic Genosa
at least five (5) times, but that Ben would always follow her and they would charged her with the crime of PARRICIDE committed with intent to kill, with
reconcile. Marivic said that the reason why Ben was violent and abusive treachery and evidence premeditation, x x x wilfully, unlawfully and
towards her that night was because he was crazy about his recent girlfriend, feloniously attack, assault, hit and wound x x x her legitimate husband, with
Lulu x x x Rubillos. the use of a hard deadly weapon x x x which caused his death.
On cross-examination, Marivic insisted she shot Ben with a gun; she said 12. Trial took place on 7 and 14 April 1997, 14 May 1997, 21 July 1997, 17,
that he died in the bedroom; that their quarrels could be heard by anyone 22 and 23 September 1997, 12 November 1997, 15 and 16 December 1997,
passing their house; that Basobas lied in his testimony; that she left for 22 May 1998, and 5 and 6 August 1998.
Manila the next day, November 16, 1995; that she did not bother anyone in
Manila, rented herself a room, and got herself a job as a field researcher 13. On 23 September 1998, or only fifty (50) days from the day of the last
under the alias Marvelous Isidro; she did not tell anyone that she was leaving trial date, the Hon. Fortunito L. Madrona, Presiding Judge, RTC-Branch 35,
Leyte, she just wanted to have a safe delivery of her baby; and that she was Ormoc City, rendered a JUDGMENT finding Marivic guilty beyond
arrested in San Pablo, Laguna. reasonable doubt of the crime of parricide, and further found treachery as an
aggravating circumstance, thus sentencing her to the ultimate penalty of
Answering questions from the Court, Marivic said that she threw the gun DEATH.
away; that she did not know what happened to the pipe she used to smash
him once; that she was wounded by Ben on her wrist with the bolo; and that 14. The case was elevated to this Honorable Court upon automatic review
two (2) hours after she was whirled by Ben, he kicked her ass and dragged and, under date of 24 January 2000, Marivics trial lawyer, Atty. Gil Marvel P.
her towards the drawer when he saw that she had packed his things. Tabucanon, filed a Motion to Withdraw as counsel, attaching thereto, as a
precautionary measure, two (2) drafts of Appellants Briefs he had prepared
9. The body of Ben Genosa was found on November 18, 1995 after an for Marivic which, for reasons of her own, were not conformed to by her.
investigation was made of the foul odor emitting from the Genosa residence.
This fact was testified to by all the prosecution witnesses and some defense The Honorable Court allowed the withdrawal of Atty. Tabucanon and
witnesses during the trial. permitted the entry of appearance of undersigned counsel.
10. Dra. Refelina Y. Cerillo, a physician, was the Municipal Health Officer of 15. Without the knowledge of counsel, Marivic Genosa wrote a letter dated
Isabel, Leyte at the time of the incident, and among her responsibilities as 20 January 2000, to the Chief Justice, coursing the same through Atty.
such was to take charge of all medico-legal cases, such as the examination Teresita G. Dimaisip, Deputy Clerk of Court of Chief Judicial Records Office,
of cadavers and the autopsy of cadavers. Dra. Cerillo is not a forensic wherein she submitted her Brief without counsels to the Court.
Dr. Pajarillo said that an abnormal family background relates to an 20. No rebuttal evidence or testimony was presented by either the private or
individuals illness, such as the deprivation of the continuous care and love of the public prosecutor. Thus, in accord with the Resolution of this Honorable
the parents. As to the batterer, he normally internalizes what is around him Court, the records of the partially re-opened trial a quo were elevated.[9]
within the environment. And it becomes his own personality. He is very
competitive; he is aiming high all the time; he is so macho; he shows his
strong faade but in it there are doubts in himself and prone to act without Ruling of the Trial Court
thinking.
xxxxxxxxx Finding the proffered theory of self-defense untenable, the RTC gave
credence to the prosecution evidence that appellant had killed the deceased
Dr. Pajarillo emphasized that even though without the presence of the while he was in bed sleeping. Further, the trial court appreciated the generic
precipator (sic) or the one who administered the battering, that re- aggravating circumstance of treachery, because Ben Genosa was
experiencing of the trauma occurred (sic) because the individual cannot supposedly defenseless when he was killed -- lying in bed asleep when
control it. It will just come up in her mind or in his mind. Marivic smashed him with a pipe at the back of his head.
The capital penalty having been imposed, the case was elevated to this
xxxxxxxxx Court for automatic review.
Dr. Pajarillo said that a woman suffering post traumatic stress disorder try to
defend themselves, and primarily with knives. Usually pointed weapons or Supervening Circumstances
any weapon that is available in the immediate surrounding or in a hospital x x
x because that abound in the household. He said a victim resorts to weapons
when she has reached the lowest rock bottom of her life and there is no other On February 19, 2000, appellant filed an Urgent Omnibus Motion
recourse left on her but to act decisively. praying that this Court allow (1) the exhumation of Ben Genosa and the
reexamination of the cause of his death; (2) the examination of appellant by
xxxxxxxxx qualified psychologists and psychiatrists to determine her state of mind at the
time she had killed her spouse; and (3) the inclusion of the said experts
Dr. Pajarillo testified that he met Marivic Genosa in his office in an interview reports in the records of the case for purposes of the automatic review or, in
he conducted for two (2) hours and seventeen (17) minutes. He used the the alternative, a partial reopening of the case for the lower court to admit the
psychological evaluation and social case studies as a help in forming his experts testimonies.
diagnosis. He came out with a Psychiatric Report, dated 22 January 2001.
On September 29, 2000, this Court issued a Resolution granting in part
appellants Motion, remanding the case to the trial court for the reception of
xxxxxxxxx expert psychological and/or psychiatric opinion on the battered woman
syndrome plea; and requiring the lower court to report thereafter to this Court
The Issues
Collateral Factual Issues
Appellant assigns the following alleged errors of the trial court for this
Courts consideration: The first six assigned errors raised by appellant are factual in nature, if
not collateral to the resolution of the principal issues. As consistently held by
this Court, the findings of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses and
1. The trial court gravely erred in promulgating an obviously hasty decision
their testimonies are entitled to a high degree of respect and will not be
without reflecting on the evidence adduced as to self-defense.
disturbed on appeal in the absence of any showing that the trial judge
gravely abused his discretion or overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied
2. The trial court gravely erred in finding as a fact that Ben and Marivic material facts or circumstances of weight and substance that could affect the
Genosa were legally married and that she was therefore liable for parricide. outcome of the case.[14]
3. The trial court gravely erred finding the cause of death to be by beating In appellants first six assigned items, we find no grave abuse of
with a pipe. discretion, reversible error or misappreciation of material facts that would
reverse or modify the trial courts disposition of the case. In any event, we will
now briefly dispose of these alleged errors of the trial court.
4. The trial court gravely erred in ignoring and disregarding evidence
adduced from impartial and unbiased witnesses that Ben Genosa was a First, we do not agree that the lower court promulgated an obviously
drunk, a gambler, a womanizer and wife-beater; and further gravely erred in hasty decision without reflecting on the evidence adduced as to self-defense.
concluding that Ben Genosa was a battered husband. We note that in his 17-page Decision, Judge Fortunito L. Madrona
summarized the testimonies of both the prosecution and the defense
5. The trial court gravely erred in not requiring testimony from the children of witnesses and -- on the basis of those and of the documentary evidence on
Marivic Genosa. record -- made his evaluation, findings and conclusions. He wrote a 3-page
discourse assessing the testimony and the self-defense theory of the
6. The trial court gravely erred in concluding that Marivics flight to Manila accused. While she, or even this Court, may not agree with the trial judges
and her subsequent apologies were indicia of guilt, instead of a clear attempt conclusions, we cannot peremptorily conclude, absent substantial evidence,
to save the life of her unborn child. that he failed to reflect on the evidence presented.
Neither do we find the appealed Decision to have been made in an
7. The trial court gravely erred in concluding that there was an aggravating obviously hasty manner. The Information had been filed with the lower court
circumstance of treachery. on November 14, 1996. Thereafter, trial began and at least 13 hearings were
held for over a year. It took the trial judge about two months from the
8. The trial court gravely erred in refusing to re-evaluate the traditional conclusion of trial to promulgate his judgment. That he conducted the trial
elements in determining the existence of self-defense and defense of foetus and resolved the case with dispatch should not be taken against him, much
in this case, thereby erroneously convicting Marivic Genosa of the crime of less used to condemn him for being unduly hasty. If at all, the dispatch with
parricide and condemning her to the ultimate penalty of death. [13]
The final phase of the cycle of violence begins when the acute battering Q How many times did this happen?
incident ends. During this tranquil period, the couple experience profound
A Several times already.
relief. On the one hand, the batterer may show a tender and nurturing
behavior towards his partner. He knows that he has been viciously cruel and Q What did you do when these things happen to you?
tries to make up for it, begging for her forgiveness and promising never to
Q You said that you saw a doctor in relation to your injuries? A 1. May 12, 1990 - physical findings are as follows: Hematoma (R)
lower eyelid and redness of eye. Attending physician: Dr.
A Yes, sir. Lucero;
Q Who inflicted these injuries? 2. March 10, 1992 - Contusion-Hematoma (L) lower arbital
area, pain and contusion (R) breast. Attending physician: Dr.
A Of course my husband.
Canora;
Q You mean Ben Genosa?
3. March 26, 1993 - Abrasion, Furuncle (L) Axilla;
A Yes, sir.
4. August 1, 1994 - Pain, mastitis (L) breast, 2 o to trauma.
Attending physician: Dr. Caing;
xxxxxxxxx
5. April 17, 1995 - Trauma, tenderness (R) Shoulder.
[Court] /to the witness Attending physician: Dr. Canora; and
Q How frequent was the alleged cruelty that you said? 6. June 5, 1995 - Swelling Abrasion (L) leg, multiple contusion
Pregnancy. Attending physician: Dr. Canora.
A Everytime he got drunk.
Q Among the findings, there were two (2) incidents wherein you
Q No, from the time that you said the cruelty or the infliction of were the attending physician, is that correct?
injury inflicted on your occurred, after your marriage, from that
time on, how frequent was the occurrence? A Yes, sir.
A Everytime he got drunk. Q Did you actually physical examine the accused?
A Yes, sir.
Q What is meant by furuncle axilla? Q Being a doctor, can you more engage at what stage of
pregnancy was she?
A It is secondary of the light infection over the abrasion.
A Eight (8) months pregnant.
Q What is meant by pain mastitis secondary to trauma?
Q So in other words, it was an advance stage of pregnancy?
A So, in this 4th episode of physical injuries there is an
inflammation of left breast. So, [pain] meaning there is A Yes, sir.
tenderness. When your breast is traumatized, there is Q What was your November 6, 1995 examination, was it an
tenderness pain. examination about her pregnancy or for some other findings?
Q So, these are objective physical injuries. Doctor? A No, she was admitted for hypertension headache which
complicates her pregnancy.
xxxxxxxxx
Q When you said admitted, meaning she was confined?
Q Were you able to talk with the patient? A Yes, sir.
A Yes, sir. Q For how many days?
Q What did she tell you? A One day.
A As a doctor-patient relationship, we need to know the cause of Q Where?
these injuries. And she told me that it was done to her by her
husband. A At PHILPHOS Hospital.
Q Will you tell this Court what was his disposition? A He was about to attack me so I run to the room.
A He was drunk again, he was yelling in his usual unruly behavior. Q What do you mean that he was about to attack you?
Q What was he yelling all about? A When I attempt to run he held my hands and he whirled me and I
fell to the bedside.
A His usual attitude when he got drunk.
Q So when he whirled you, what happened to you?
Q You said that when you arrived, he was drunk and yelling at
you? What else did he do if any? A I screamed for help and then he left.
A Outside the bedroom and he wanted to get something and then Q Where were the children during that time?
he kept on shouting at me that you might as well be killed so A My children were already asleep.
there will be nobody to nag me.
Q You mean they were inside the room?
Q So you said that he dragged you towards the drawer?
A Yes, sir.
A Yes, sir.
Q You said that he dropped the blade, for the record will you
Q What is there in the drawer? please describe this blade about 3 inches long, how does it
A I was aware that it was a gun. look like?
COURT INTERPRETER: A Three (3) inches long and 1/2 inch wide.
Q You referred a while ago to severity. What are the qualifications Q As you were saying[,] it x x x obfuscated her rationality?
in terms of severity of the postraumatic stress disorder, Dr.
A Of course obfuscated.[73]
Pajarillo?
In sum, the cyclical nature and the severity of the violence inflicted upon
A The severity is the most severe continuously to trig[g]er this
appellant resulted in cumulative provocation which broke down her
post[t]raumatic stress disorder is injury to the head, banging of
psychological resistance and natural self-control, psychological paralysis,
the head like that. It is usually the very very severe stimulus
and difficulty in concentrating or impairment of memory.
that precipitate this post[t]raumatic stress disorder. Others are
suffocating the victim like holding a pillow on the face, Based on the explanations of the expert witnesses, such manifestations
strangulating the individual, suffocating the individual, and were analogous to an illness that diminished the exercise by appellant of her
boxing the individual. In this situation therefore, the victim is will power without, however, depriving her of consciousness of her
heightened to painful stimulus, like for example she is acts. There was, thus, a resulting diminution of her freedom of action,
pregnant, she is very susceptible because the woman will not intelligence or intent. Pursuant to paragraphs 9 [74] and 10[75] of Article 13 of
only protect herself, she is also to protect the fetus. So the the Revised Penal Code, this circumstance should be taken in her favor and
anxiety is heightened to the end [sic] degree. considered as a mitigating factor. [76]
Q But in terms of the gravity of the disorder, Mr. Witness, how do In addition, we also find in favor of appellant the extenuating
you classify? circumstance of having acted upon an impulse so powerful as to have
naturally produced passion and obfuscation. It has been held that this state
A We classify the disorder as [acute], or chronic or delayed or
of mind is present when a crime is committed as a result of an uncontrollable
[a]typical.
burst of passion provoked by prior unjust or improper acts or by a legitimate
Q Can you please describe this pre[-]classification you called stimulus so powerful as to overcome reason. [77] To appreciate this
delayed or [atypical]? circumstance, the following requisites should concur: (1) there is an act, both
unlawful and sufficient to produce such a condition of mind; and (2) this act is
A The acute is the one that usually require only one battering and not far removed from the commission of the crime by a considerable length
the individual will manifest now a severe emotional instability, of time, during which the accused might recover her normal equanimity. [78]
higher irritability remorse, restlessness, and fear and probably
in most [acute] cases the first thing will be happened to the Here, an acute battering incident, wherein Ben Genosa was the unlawful
individual will be thinking of suicide. aggressor, preceded his being killed by Marivic. He had further threatened to
kill her while dragging her by the neck towards a cabinet in which he had
Q And in chronic cases, Mr. Witness? kept a gun. It should also be recalled that she was eight months pregnant at
Respondent (petitioner herein), Jesus Chua Garcia, is hereby: f) Not to dissipate the conjugal business.
a) Ordered to remove all his personal belongings from the conjugal g) To render an accounting of all advances, benefits, bonuses and
dwelling or family home within 24 hours from receipt of the other cash he received from all the corporations from 1 January 2006
Temporary Restraining Order and if he refuses, ordering that he be up to 31 March 2006, which himself and as President of the
removed by police officers from the conjugal dwelling; this order is corporations and his Comptroller, must submit to the Court not later
enforceable notwithstanding that the house is under the name of 236 than 2 April 2006. Thereafter, an accounting of all these funds shall
Realty Holdings Inc. (Republic Act No. 9262 states "regardless of be reported to the court by the Comptroller, copy furnished to the
ownership"), this is to allow the Petitioner (private respondent herein) Petitioner, every 15 days of the month, under pain of Indirect
to enter the conjugal dwelling without any danger from the Contempt of Court.
Respondent.
h) To ensure compliance especially with the order granting support
After the Respondent leaves or is removed from the conjugal pendente lite, and considering the financial resources of the
dwelling, or anytime the Petitioner decides to return to the conjugal Respondent and his threat that if the Petitioner sues she will not get
dwelling to remove things, the Petitioner shall be assisted by police a single centavo, the Respondent is ordered to put up a BOND TO
officers when re-entering the family home. KEEP THE PEACE in the amount of FIVE MILLION PESOS, in two
sufficient sureties.
The Chief of Police shall also give the Petitioner police assistance on
Sunday, 26 March 2006 because of the danger that the Respondent On April 24, 2006, upon motion 19 of private respondent, the trial court
will attempt to take her children from her when he arrives from issued an amended TPO,20 effective for thirty (30) days, which
Manila and finds out about this suit. included the following additional provisions:
b) To stay away from the petitioner and her children, mother and all i) The petitioners (private respondents herein) are given the
her household help and driver from a distance of 1,000 meters, and continued use of the Nissan Patrol and the Starex Van which they
shall not enter the gate of the subdivision where the Petitioner may are using in Negros Occidental.
be temporarily residing.
j) The petitioners are given the continued use and occupation of the
c) Not to harass, annoy, telephone, contact or otherwise house in Parañaque, the continued use of the Starex van in Metro
communicate with the Petitioner, directly or indirectly, or through Manila, whenever they go to Manila.
other persons, or contact directly or indirectly her children, mother
and household help, nor send gifts, cards, flowers, letters and the k) Respondent is ordered to immediately post a bond to keep the
like. Visitation rights to the children may be subject of a modified peace, in two sufficient sureties.
TPO in the future.
l) To give monthly support to the petitioner provisionally fixed in the
sum of One Hundred Fifty Thousand Pesos (Php 150,000.00) per
Two days later, or on April 26, 2006, petitioner filed an Opposition to the f) That respondent shall pay petitioner educational expenses of the
Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for Renewal of the TPO 21 seeking the denial of the children upon presentation of proof of payment of such expenses. 23
renewal of the TPO on the grounds that it did not (1) comply with the three-
day notice rule, and (2) contain a notice of hearing. He further asked that the Claiming that petitioner continued to deprive them of financial support; failed
TPO be modified by (1) removing one vehicle used by private respondent to faithfully comply with the TPO; and committed new acts of harassment
and returning the same to its rightful owner, the J-Bros Trading Corporation, against her and their children, private respondent filed another
and (2) cancelling or reducing the amount of the bond from ₱5,000,000.00 to application24 for the issuance of a TPO ex parte. She alleged inter
a more manageable level at ₱100,000.00.
alia that petitioner contrived a replevin suit against himself by J-Bros Trading,
Subsequently, on May 23, 2006, petitioner moved 22 for the modification of the Inc., of which the latter was purportedly no longer president, with the end in
TPO to allow him visitation rights to his children. view of recovering the Nissan Patrol and Starex Van used by private
respondent and the children. A writ of replevin was served upon private
On May 24, 2006, the TPO was renewed and extended yet again, but subject respondent by a group of six or seven policemen with long firearms that
only to the following modifications prayed for by private respondent: scared the two small boys, Jessie Anthone and Joseph Eduard. 25
a) That respondent (petitioner herein) return the clothes and other While Joseph Eduard, then three years old, was driven to school, two men
personal belongings of Rosalie and her children to Judge Jesus allegedly attempted to kidnap him, which incident traumatized the boy
Ramos, co-counsel for Petitioner, within 24 hours from receipt of the resulting in his refusal to go back to school. On another occasion, petitioner
Temporary Protection Order by his counsel, otherwise be declared in allegedly grabbed their daughter, Jo-Ann, by the arm and threatened
Indirect Contempt of Court; her.26 The incident was reported to the police, and Jo-Ann subsequently filed
a criminal complaint against her father for violation of R.A. 7610, also known
b) Respondent shall make an accounting or list of furniture and as the "Special Protection of Children Against Child Abuse, Exploitation and
equipment in the conjugal house in Pitimini St., Capitolville Discrimination Act."
Subdivision, Bacolod City within 24 hours from receipt of the
Temporary Protection Order by his counsel; Aside from the replevin suit, petitioner's lawyers initiated the filing by the
housemaids working at the conjugal home of a complaint for kidnapping and
c) Ordering the Chief of the Women's Desk of the Bacolod City illegal detention against private respondent. This came about after private
Police Headquarters to remove Respondent from the conjugal respondent, armed with a TPO, went to said home to get her and her
dwelling within eight (8) hours from receipt of the Temporary children's belongings. Finding some of her things inside a housemaid's
Protection Order by his counsel, and that he cannot return until 48 (Sheryl Jamola) bag in the maids' room, private respondent filed a case for
hours after the petitioners have left, so that the petitioner Rosalie and qualified theft against Jamola.27
her representatives can remove things from the conjugal home and
make an inventory of the household furniture, equipment and other On August 23, 2006, the RTC issued a TPO, 28 effective for thirty (30) days,
things in the conjugal home, which shall be submitted to the Court. which reads as follows:
d) Deliver full financial support of Php200,000.00 and Php50,000.00 Respondent (petitioner herein), Jesus Chua Garcia, is hereby:
for rental and Php25,000.00 for clothes of the three petitioners (sic)
children within 24 hours from receipt of the Temporary Protection 1) Prohibited from threatening to commit or committing, personally or
Order by his counsel, otherwise be declared in indirect contempt of through another, acts of violence against the offended party;
Court;
6) Directed to deliver educational expenses for 2006-2007 the x x x it appearing further that the hearing could not yet be finally terminated,
amount of Php75,000.00 and Php25,000.00; the Temporary Protection Order issued on August 23, 2006 is hereby
renewed and extended for thirty (30) days and continuously extended and
7) Directed to allow the continued use of a Nissan Patrol with Plate renewed for thirty (30) days, after each expiration, until further orders, and
No. FEW 508 and a Starex van with Plate No. FFD 991 and should subject to such modifications as may be ordered by the court.
the respondent fail to deliver said vehicles, respondent is ordered to
provide the petitioner another vehicle which is the one taken by J After having received a copy of the foregoing Order, petitioner no longer
Bros Tading; submitted the required comment to private respondent's motion for renewal
of the TPO arguing that it would only be an "exercise in futility." 33
8) Ordered not to dissipate, encumber, alienate, sell, lease or
otherwise dispose of the conjugal assets, or those real properties in Proceedings before the CA
the name of Jesus Chua Garcia only and those in which the conjugal
partnership of gains of the Petitioner Rosalie J. Garcia and During the pendency of Civil Case No. 06-797, petitioner filed before the
respondent have an interest in, especially the conjugal home located Court of Appeals (CA) a petition34 for prohibition (CA-G.R. CEB-SP. No.
in No. 14, Pitimini St., Capitolville Subdivision, Bacolod City, and 01698), with prayer for injunction and temporary restraining order,
other properties which are conjugal assets or those in which the challenging (1) the constitutionality of R.A. 9262 for being violative of the due
conjugal partnership of gains of Petitioner Rosalie J. Garcia and the process and the equal protection clauses, and (2) the validity of the modified
respondent have an interest in and listed in Annexes "I," "I-1," and "I- TPO issued in the civil case for being "an unwanted product of an invalid
law."
of R.A. 9262 through a petition for prohibition seeking to annul the protection Before delving into the arguments propounded by petitioner against the
orders issued by the trial court constituted a collateral attack on said law. constitutionality of R.A. 9262, we shall first tackle the propriety of the
dismissal by the appellate court of the petition for prohibition (CA-G.R. CEB-
His motion for reconsideration of the foregoing Decision having been denied SP. No. 01698) filed by petitioner.
in the Resolution37 dated August 14, 2007, petitioner is now before us
alleging that – As a general rule, the question of constitutionality must be raised at the
earliest opportunity so that if not raised in the pleadings, ordinarily it may not
The Issues be raised in the trial, and if not raised in the trial court, it will not be
considered on appeal.39 Courts will not anticipate a question of constitutional
I. law in advance of the necessity of deciding it.40
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DISMISSING THE PETITION ON In defending his failure to attack the constitutionality of R.A. 9262 before the
THE THEORY THAT THE ISSUE OF CONSTITUTIONALITY WAS NOT RTC of Bacolod City, petitioner argues that the Family Court has limited
RAISED AT THE EARLIEST OPPORTUNITY AND THAT, THE PETITION authority and jurisdiction that is "inadequate to tackle the complex issue of
CONSTITUTES A COLLATERAL ATTACK ON THE VALIDITY OF THE constitutionality."41
LAW.
We disagree.
II.
Family Courts have authority and jurisdiction to consider the constitutionality
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED SERIOUS ERROR IN FAILING of a statute.
TO CONCLUDE THAT R.A. 9262 IS DISCRIMINATORY, UNJUST, AND
VIOLATIVE OF THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE. At the outset, it must be stressed that Family Courts are special courts, of the
same level as Regional Trial Courts. Under R.A. 8369, otherwise known as
III. the "Family Courts Act of 1997," family courts have exclusive original
jurisdiction to hear and decide cases of domestic violence against women
and children.42 In accordance with said law, the Supreme Court designated
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE MISTAKE IN NOT
from among the branches of the Regional Trial Courts at least one Family
FINDING THAT R.A. 9262 RUNS COUNTER TO THE DUE PROCESS
Court in each of several key cities identified. 43 To achieve harmony with the
CLAUSE OF THE CONSTITUTION.
first mentioned law, Section 7 of R.A. 9262 now provides that Regional Trial
Courts designated as Family Courts shall have original and exclusive
IV. jurisdiction over cases of VAWC defined under the latter law, viz:
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE LAW SEC. 7. Venue. – The Regional Trial Court designated as a Family Court
DOES VIOLENCE TO THE POLICY OF THE STATE TO PROTECT THE shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction over cases of violence against
FAMILY AS A BASIC SOCIAL INSTITUTION. women and their children under this law. In the absence of such court in the
place where the offense was committed, the case shall be filed in the
That the proceedings in Civil Case No. 06-797 are summary in nature should
xxxx
not have deterred petitioner from raising the same in his Opposition. The
question relative to the constitutionality of a statute is one of law which does
Thus, contrary to the posturing of petitioner, the issue of constitutionality of not need to be supported by evidence. 54 Be that as it may, Section 25 of A.M.
R.A. 9262 could have been raised at the earliest opportunity in his No. 04-10-11-SC nonetheless allows the conduct of a hearing to determine
Opposition to the petition for protection order before the RTC of Bacolod City, legal issues, among others, viz:
which had jurisdiction to determine the same, subject to the review of this
Court.
SEC. 25. Order for further hearing. - In case the court determines the need
for further hearing, it may issue an order containing the following:
Section 20 of A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC, the Rule on Violence Against Women
and Their Children, lays down a new kind of procedure requiring the
(a) Facts undisputed and admitted;
respondent to file an opposition to the petition and not an answer. 49 Thus:
The mere fact that a statute is alleged to be unconstitutional or invalid, does Wednesday, December 10, 2003
not of itself entitle a litigant to have the same enjoined. 57 In Younger v. Harris,
Jr.,58 the Supreme Court of the United States declared, thus: Senator Pangilinan. I just wanted to place this on record, Mr. President.
Some women's groups have expressed concerns and relayed these
I think Senator Sotto has something to say to that. Mr. President, this measure is intended to harmonize family relations and to
protect the family as the basic social institution. Though I recognize the
Senator Legarda. Mr. President, the reason I am in support of the measure. unequal power relations between men and women in our society, I believe
Do not get me wrong. However, I believe that there is a need to protect we have an obligation to uphold inherent rights and dignity of both husband
women's rights especially in the domestic environment. and wife and their immediate family members, particularly children.
As I said earlier, there are nameless, countless, voiceless women who have While I prefer to focus mainly on women, I was compelled to include other
not had the opportunity to file a case against their spouses, their live-in family members as a critical input arrived at after a series of
partners after years, if not decade, of battery and abuse. If we broaden the consultations/meetings with various NGOs, experts, sports groups and other
scope to include even the men, assuming they can at all be abused by the affected sectors, Mr. President.
The President Pro Tempore. Yes, with the permission of the other senators. Senator Sotto. – more than the women, the children are very much abused.
As a matter of fact, it is not limited to minors. The abuse is not limited to
Senator Sotto. Yes, with the permission of the two ladies on the Floor. seven, six, 5-year-old children. I have seen 14, 15-year-old children being
abused by their fathers, even by their mothers. And it breaks my heart to find
out about these things.
The President Pro Tempore. Yes, Sen. Vicente C. Sotto III is recognized.
xxxx The President Pro Tempore. Effectively then, it will be women AND
CHILDREN.
Senator Estrada. The amendment is accepted, Mr. President.
Senator Sotto. Yes, Mr. President.
The President Pro Tempore. Is there any objection?
Senator Estrada. It is accepted, Mr. President.
xxxx
The President Pro Tempore. Is there any objection? [Silence] There being
Senator Sotto. x x x May I propose an amendment to the amendment. none, the amendment, as amended, is approved.66
The President Pro Tempore. Before we act on the amendment? It is settled that courts are not concerned with the wisdom, justice, policy, or
expediency of a statute.67 Hence, we dare not venture into the real
motivations and wisdom of the members of Congress in limiting the
Senator Sotto. Yes, Mr. President.
protection against violence and abuse under R.A. 9262 to women and
children only. No proper challenge on said grounds may be entertained in
The President Pro Tempore. Yes, please proceed. this proceeding. Congress has made its choice and it is not our prerogative
to supplant this judgment. The choice may be perceived as erroneous but
Senator Sotto. Mr. President, I am inclined to believe the rationale used by even then, the remedy against it is to seek its amendment or repeal by the
the distinguished proponent of the amendment. As a matter of fact, I tend to legislative. By the principle of separation of powers, it is the legislative that
agree. Kung may maaabuso, mas malamang iyong babae kaysa sa lalake. determines the necessity, adequacy, wisdom and expediency of any
At saka iyong mga lalake, puwede na talagang magulpi iyan. Okey lang iyan. law.68 We only step in when there is a violation of the Constitution. However,
But I cannot agree that we remove the children from this particular measure. none was sufficiently shown in this case.
So, if I may propose an amendment – R.A. 9262 does not violate the guaranty of equal protection of the laws.
The guaranty of equal protection of the laws is not a guaranty of equality in According to the Philippine Commission on Women (the National Machinery
the application of the laws upon all citizens of the state. It is not, therefore, a for Gender Equality and Women's Empowerment), violence against women
requirement, in order to avoid the constitutional prohibition against inequality, (VAW) is deemed to be closely linked with the unequal power relationship
that every man, woman and child should be affected alike by a statute. between women and men otherwise known as "gender-based violence".
Equality of operation of statutes does not mean indiscriminate operation on Societal norms and traditions dictate people to think men are the leaders,
persons merely as such, but on persons according to the circumstances pursuers, providers, and take on dominant roles in society while women are
surrounding them. It guarantees equality, not identity of rights. The nurturers, men's companions and supporters, and take on subordinate roles
Constitution does not require that things which are different in fact be treated in society. This perception leads to men gaining more power over women.
in law as though they were the same. The equal protection clause does not With power comes the need to control to retain that power. And VAW is a
forbid discrimination as to things that are different. It does not prohibit form of men's expression of controlling women to retain power. 71
legislation which is limited either in the object to which it is directed or by the
territory within which it is to operate. The United Nations, which has long recognized VAW as a human rights
issue, passed its Resolution 48/104 on the Declaration on Elimination of
The equal protection of the laws clause of the Constitution allows Violence Against Women on December 20, 1993 stating that "violence
classification. Classification in law, as in the other departments of knowledge against women is a manifestation of historically unequal power relations
or practice, is the grouping of things in speculation or practice because they between men and women, which have led to domination over and
agree with one another in certain particulars. A law is not invalid because of discrimination against women by men and to the prevention of the full
simple inequality. The very idea of classification is that of inequality, so that it advancement of women, and that violence against women is one of the
goes without saying that the mere fact of inequality in no manner determines crucial social mechanisms by which women are forced into subordinate
the matter of constitutionality. All that is required of a valid classification is positions, compared with men."72
that it be reasonable, which means that the classification should be based on
substantial distinctions which make for real differences; that it must be Then Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno traced the historical and social context
germane to the purpose of the law; that it must not be limited to existing of gender-based violence and developments in advocacies to eradicate
conditions only; and that it must apply equally to each member of the class. VAW, in his remarks delivered during the Joint Launching of R.A. 9262 and
This Court has held that the standard is satisfied if the classification or its Implementing Rules last October 27, 2004, the pertinent portions of which
distinction is based on a reasonable foundation or rational basis and is not are quoted hereunder:
palpably arbitrary. (Emphasis supplied)
History reveals that most societies sanctioned the use of violence against
Measured against the foregoing jurisprudential yardstick, we find that R.A. women. The patriarch of a family was accorded the right to use force on
9262 is based on a valid classification as shall hereinafter be discussed and, members of the family under his control. I quote the early studies:
as such, did not violate the equal protection clause by favoring women over
men as victims of violence and abuse to whom the State extends its
protection. Traditions subordinating women have a long history rooted in patriarchy – the
institutional rule of men. Women were seen in virtually all societies to be
naturally inferior both physically and intellectually. In ancient Western
I. R.A. 9262 rests on substantial distinctions. societies, women whether slave, concubine or wife, were under the authority
of men. In law, they were treated as property.
The unequal power relationship between women and men; the fact that
women are more likely than men to be victims of violence; and the The Roman concept of patria potestas allowed the husband to beat, or even
widespread gender bias and prejudice against women all make for real kill, his wife if she endangered his property right over her. Judaism,
differences justifying the classification under the law. As Justice McIntyre
Unjust On the other hand, no reliable estimates may be obtained on domestic abuse
90 50 59 59 83 703 183 155
Vexation and violence against men in the Philippines because incidents thereof are
relatively low and, perhaps, because many men will not even attempt to
6,2 5,3 4,8 5,7 6,9 9,4 15,1 12,9
Total
Human Rights Law (Rights of Women) Page 83 of 174
71 74 81 29 05 85 04 48
report the situation. In the United Kingdom, 32% of women who had ever them to "double victimization" – first at the hands of the offender and then of
experienced domestic violence did so four or five (or more) times, compared the legal system.79
with 11% of the smaller number of men who had ever experienced domestic
violence; and women constituted 89% of all those who had experienced 4 or Our own Senator Loi Estrada lamented in her Sponsorship Speech for
more incidents of domestic violence.75Statistics in Canada show that spousal Senate Bill No. 2723 that "(w)henever violence occurs in the family, the
violence by a woman against a man is less likely to cause injury than the police treat it as a private matter and advise the parties to settle the conflict
other way around (18 percent versus 44 percent). Men, who experience themselves. Once the complainant brings the case to the prosecutor, the
violence from their spouses are much less likely to live in fear of violence at latter is hesitant to file the complaint for fear that it might later be withdrawn.
the hands of their spouses, and much less likely to experience sexual This lack of response or reluctance to be involved by the police and
assault. In fact, many cases of physical violence by a woman against a prosecution reinforces the escalating, recurring and often serious nature of
spouse are in self-defense or the result of many years of physical or domestic violence."80
emotional abuse.76
Sadly, our own courts, as well, have exhibited prejudices and biases against
While there are, indeed, relatively few cases of violence and abuse our women.
perpetrated against men in the Philippines, the same cannot render R.A.
9262 invalid. In a recent case resolved on March 9, 2011, we fined RTC Judge Venancio
J. Amila for Conduct Unbecoming of a Judge. He used derogatory and
In a 1960 case involving the violation of a city ordinance requiring drivers of irreverent language in reference to the complainant in a petition for TPO and
animal-drawn vehicles to pick up, gather and deposit in receptacles the PPO under R.A. 9262, calling her as "only a live-in partner" and presenting
manure emitted or discharged by their vehicle-drawing animals in any public her as an "opportunist" and a "mistress" in an "illegitimate relationship."
highways, streets, plazas, parks or alleys, said ordinance was challenged as Judge Amila even called her a "prostitute," and accused her of being
violative of the guaranty of equal protection of laws as its application is motivated by "insatiable greed" and of absconding with the contested
limited to owners and drivers of vehicle-drawing animals and not to those property.81 Such remarks betrayed Judge Amila's prejudices and lack of
animals, although not utilized, but similarly pass through the same streets. gender sensitivity.
The ordinance was upheld as a valid classification for the reason that, while The enactment of R.A. 9262 aims to address the discrimination brought
there may be non-vehicle-drawing animals that also traverse the city roads, about by biases and prejudices against women. As emphasized by the
"but their number must be negligible and their appearance therein merely CEDAW Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women,
occasional, compared to the rig-drawing ones, as not to constitute a menace addressing or correcting discrimination through specific measures focused
to the health of the community."77 The mere fact that the legislative on women does not discriminate against men. 82Petitioner's
classification may result in actual inequality is not violative of the right to 83
contention, therefore, that R.A. 9262 is discriminatory and that it is an "anti-
equal protection, for every classification of persons or things for regulation by male," "husband-bashing," and "hate-men" law deserves scant consideration.
law produces inequality in some degree, but the law is not thereby rendered As a State Party to the CEDAW, the Philippines bound itself to take all
invalid.78 appropriate measures "to modify the social and cultural patterns of conduct
of men and women, with a view to achieving the elimination of prejudices and
C. Gender bias and prejudices customary and all other practices which are based on the idea of the
inferiority or the superiority of either of the sexes or on stereotyped roles for
From the initial report to the police through prosecution, trial, and sentencing, men and women."84 Justice Puno correctly pointed out that "(t)he paradigm
crimes against women are often treated differently and less seriously than shift changing the character of domestic violence from a private affair to a
other crimes. This was argued by then United States Senator Joseph R. public offense will require the development of a distinct mindset on the part of
Biden, Jr., now Vice President, chief sponsor of the Violence Against Women the police, the prosecution and the judges." 85
Act (VAWA), in defending the civil rights remedy as a valid exercise of the
U.S. Congress' authority under the Commerce and Equal Protection Clauses. II. The classification is germane to the purpose of the law.
He stressed that the widespread gender bias in the U.S. has institutionalized
historic prejudices against victims of rape or domestic violence, subjecting
Towards this end, the State shall exert efforts to address violence committed a) rape, sexual harassment, acts of lasciviousness, treating
against women and children in keeping with the fundamental freedoms a woman or her child as a sex object, making demeaning
guaranteed under the Constitution and the provisions of the Universal and sexually suggestive remarks, physically attacking the
Declaration of Human Rights, the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms sexual parts of the victim's body, forcing her/him to watch
of Discrimination Against Women, Convention on the Rights of the Child and obscene publications and indecent shows or forcing the
other international human rights instruments of which the Philippines is a woman or her child to do indecent acts and/or make films
party. thereof, forcing the wife and mistress/lover to live in the
conjugal home or sleep together in the same room with the
In 1979, the U.N. General Assembly adopted the CEDAW, which the abuser;
Philippines ratified on August 5, 1981. Subsequently, the Optional Protocol to
the CEDAW was also ratified by the Philippines on October 6, 2003. 86 This b) acts causing or attempting to cause the victim to engage
Convention mandates that State parties shall accord to women equality with in any sexual activity by force, threat of force, physical or
men before the law87 and shall take all appropriate measures to eliminate other harm or threat of physical or other harm or coercion;
discrimination against women in all matters relating to marriage and family
relations on the basis of equality of men and women. 88 The Philippines c) Prostituting the woman or child.
likewise ratified the Convention on the Rights of the Child and its two
protocols.89 It is, thus, bound by said Conventions and their respective
protocols. C. "Psychological violence" refers to acts or omissions causing or likely to
cause mental or emotional suffering of the victim such as but not limited to
intimidation, harassment, stalking, damage to property, public ridicule or
III. The classification is not limited to existing humiliation, repeated verbal abuse and marital infidelity. It includes causing
or allowing the victim to witness the physical, sexual or psychological abuse
conditions only, and apply equally to all members of a member of the family to which the victim belongs, or to witness
pornography in any form or to witness abusive injury to pets or to unlawful or
Moreover, the application of R.A. 9262 is not limited to the existing conditions unwanted deprivation of the right to custody and/or visitation of common
when it was promulgated, but to future conditions as well, for as long as the children.
safety and security of women and their children are threatened by violence
and abuse. D. "Economic abuse" refers to acts that make or attempt to make a woman
financially dependent which includes, but is not limited to the following:
R.A. 9262 applies equally to all women and children who suffer violence and
abuse. Section 3 thereof defines VAWC as: 1. withdrawal of financial support or preventing the victim
from engaging in any legitimate profession, occupation,
x x x any act or a series of acts committed by any person against a woman business or activity, except in cases wherein the other
who is his wife, former wife, or against a woman with whom the person has spouse/partner objects on valid, serious and moral grounds
or had a sexual or dating relationship, or with whom he has a common child, as defined in Article 73 of the Family Code;
or against her child whether legitimate or illegitimate, within or without the
4. controlling the victims' own money or properties or solely R.A. 9262 is not violative of the
controlling the conjugal money or properties. due process clause of the Constitution.
It should be stressed that the acts enumerated in the aforequoted provision Petitioner bewails the disregard of R.A. 9262, specifically in the issuance of
are attributable to research that has exposed the dimensions and dynamics POs, of all protections afforded by the due process clause of the
of battery. The acts described here are also found in the U.N. Declaration on Constitution. Says he: "On the basis of unsubstantiated allegations, and
the Elimination of Violence Against Women.90 Hence, the argument practically no opportunity to respond, the husband is stripped of family,
advanced by petitioner that the definition of what constitutes abuse removes property, guns, money, children, job, future employment and reputation, all in
the difference between violent action and simple marital tiffs is tenuous. a matter of seconds, without an inkling of what happened."95
There is nothing in the definition of VAWC that is vague and ambiguous that A protection order is an order issued to prevent further acts of violence
will confuse petitioner in his defense. The acts enumerated above are easily against women and their children, their family or household members, and to
understood and provide adequate contrast between the innocent and the grant other necessary reliefs. Its purpose is to safeguard the offended parties
prohibited acts. They are worded with sufficient definiteness that persons of from further harm, minimize any disruption in their daily life and facilitate the
ordinary intelligence can understand what conduct is prohibited, and need opportunity and ability to regain control of their life. 96
not guess at its meaning nor differ in its application. 91 Yet, petitioner
insists92that phrases like "depriving or threatening to deprive the woman or "The scope of reliefs in protection orders is broadened to ensure that the
her child of a legal right," "solely controlling the conjugal or common money victim or offended party is afforded all the remedies necessary to curtail
or properties," "marital infidelity," and "causing mental or emotional anguish" access by a perpetrator to the victim. This serves to safeguard the victim
are so vague that they make every quarrel a case of spousal abuse. from greater risk of violence; to accord the victim and any designated family
However, we have stressed that the "vagueness" doctrine merely requires a or household member safety in the family residence, and to prevent the
reasonable degree of certainty for the statute to be upheld – not absolute perpetrator from committing acts that jeopardize the employment and support
precision or mathematical exactitude, as petitioner seems to suggest. of the victim. It also enables the court to award temporary custody of minor
Flexibility, rather than meticulous specificity, is permissible as long as the children to protect the children from violence, to prevent their abduction by
metes and bounds of the statute are clearly delineated. An act will not be the perpetrator and to ensure their financial support."97
held invalid merely because it might have been more explicit in its wordings
or detailed in its provisions.93 The rules require that petitions for protection order be in writing, signed and
verified by the petitioner98 thereby undertaking full responsibility, criminal or
There is likewise no merit to the contention that R.A. 9262 singles out the civil, for every allegation therein. Since "time is of the essence in cases of
husband or father as the culprit. As defined above, VAWC may likewise be VAWC if further violence is to be prevented,"99 the court is authorized to
committed "against a woman with whom the person has or had a sexual or issue ex parte a TPO after raffle but before notice and hearing when the life,
dating relationship." Clearly, the use of the gender-neutral word "person" who limb or property of the victim is in jeopardy and there is reasonable ground to
has or had a sexual or dating relationship with the woman encompasses believe that the order is necessary to protect the victim from the immediate
even lesbian relationships. Moreover, while the law provides that the offender and imminent danger of VAWC or to prevent such violence, which is about to
be related or connected to the victim by marriage, former marriage, or a recur.100
sexual or dating relationship, it does not preclude the application of the
principle of conspiracy under the Revised Penal Code (RPC). Thus, in the There need not be any fear that the judge may have no rational basis to
case of Go-Tan v. Spouses Tan,94 the parents-in-law of Sharica Mari L. Go- issue an ex parte order. The victim is required not only to verify the
Tan, the victim, were held to be proper respondents in the case filed by the
We reiterate here Justice Puno's observation that "the history of the women's
movement against domestic violence shows that one of its most difficult
struggles was the fight against the violence of law itself. If we keep that in
mind, law will not again be a hindrance to the struggle of women for equality
but will be its fulfillment."118 Accordingly, the constitutionality of R.A. 9262 is,
as it should be, sustained.
SO ORDERED
In its Reply, petitioner adopts a different and bolder theory. It claims that by Specifically, urban renewal or development and the construction of low-cost
virtue of the vesture of eminent domain powers in it by its charter, it is housing are recognized as a public purpose, not only because of the
thereby not bound by the requirements of Sections 9 and 10 of R.A. No. expanded concept of public use but also because of specific provisions in the
7279. It also asserts its right to immediately enter the subject property Constitution. x x x The 1987 Constitution [provides]:
because not only is its complaint supposedly sufficient in form and substance
but also because it has already deposited ₱1M cash with the bank in trust for
respondent. It reiterates that the dismissal of its complaint constitutes a The State shall promote a just and dynamic social order that will ensure the
denial of due process because all the issues propounded by respondent, prosperity and independence of the nation and free the people from poverty
initially in her motion to dismiss and all the way in the present appeal, must through policies that provide adequate social services, promote full
be resolved in a full-blown trial. employment, a rising standard of living and an improved quality of life for all.
(Article II, Section 9)
Prefatorily, the concept of socialized housing, whereby housing units are
distributed and/or sold to qualified beneficiaries on much easier terms, has
Inasmuch as the 1997 Rules had just taken effect when this case arose, we
believe that in the interest of substantial justice, the petitioner should be
given an opportunity to file its answer to the Complaint for expropriation in
accordance with Section 3, Rule 67 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.x x
x53
SO ORDERED.
Same; Same; Where it appears that nowhere in the judgment did it appear, nor can Same; Same; Social justice cannot condone the violation of law nor does it consider
it be inferred therefrom, that the court’s disposition took into account any agreement that very wrong to be a justification for priority in the enjoyment of a right.—In
or concessions made by the parties, the judgment is not based on a compromise closing, we find it fitting to advert to the following pronouncements made in the case
agreement but a decision rendered entirely on the merits.—In the present suit, the of Martires vs. Court of Appeals: “While we sympathize with the millions of our
assailed decision, far from being a judgment based on a compromise agreement, is people who are unable to afford the basic necessity of shelter, let alone the comforts
undoubtedly a decision rendered entirely on the merits. Contrary to petitioners’ of a decent home, this sympathy cannot extend to squatting, which is a criminal
assertion, the dispositive portion of the decision is very explicit in exclusively offense. Social justice cannot condone the violation of law nor does it consider that
adverting to RA 7279 as the basis for the judgment. Nowhere did it appear nor can it very wrong to be a justification for priority in the enjoyment of a right. This is what
be inferred therefrom that respondent court’s disposition took into account any the petitioner wants us to grant him. But we cannot heed his unjust plea because the
agreement or concessions made by the parties that is indicative of a judgment on a rule of law rings louder in our ears.”
compromise. A scrutiny of the assailed portions of the decision allegedly embodying
the compromise agreement revealed that the same are nothing but admissions made FRANCISCO, J.:
by the parties intended to clarify the applicable provisions of RA 7279. In fact the
said admissions are expressly laid out in Section 28(c)(8) of RA 7279 and thus could In an effort to uplift the living conditions in the poorer sections of the
not have been the subject of any compromise agreement as the same are already communities in urban areas, the legislature enacted Republic Act No. 7279
provided in the law. otherwise known as the "Urban Development and Housing Act of 1992",
envisioned to be the antidote to the pernicious problem of squatting in the
Squatting; Statutes; R.A. 7279; Although private individuals are not prohibited from metropolis. Nevertheless, the courts continue to be swamped with cases
taking part in the relocation of squatters, there is nothing in the law either that arising from disputes in the proper implementation of the aforementioned
compels them to undertake such task on a mandatory basis.—Anent petitioners’ legislation, particularly on matters involving the eviction, demolition and
claim that private respondent must also share the responsibility of relocating resettlement of squatters. The present suit is among such cases.
petitioners, the same is also without any basis. The aforecited provision is very
explicit that the task of relocating the homeless and the underprivileged shall be the The instant petition for review on certiorari seeks to annul the decision of
responsibility of the local government unit concerned and the National Housing respondent Court of Appeals dated September 20, 1994 in CA-G.R. SP No.
33761 entitled "Crisanta Galay, et al. vs. Judge Mariano I. Bacalla and
Authority with the assistance of the other government agencies. Although private
Virginia Wong, represented by her Administrator, Atty. Reynaldo B.
individuals are not prohibited from taking part in the relocation, there is nothing in
Material hereto are the following antecedents: Thereafter, petitioners again sought recourse from the Court of Appeals via
Petition for Certiorari with Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining
Private respondent Virginia Wong, as represented by her Administrator and Order, claiming that the latter order was tainted with grave abuse of
Attorney-in fact, Reynaldo B. Hernandez filed an ejectment suit (Civil Case discretion for being arbitrary, unjust and oppressive, and reiterating that they
No. 38-5830) against herein petitioners, who were alleged to have been cannot be evicted unless there is compliance with Section 28(c) of R.A.
illegally occupying private respondents' 405 square meter lot located in 7279.7
Quezon City which is covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 51589 of
the Registry of Deeds of Quezon City. On April 28, 1994, respondent Court of Appeals gave due course to the
petition and granted petitioners' prayer for preliminary injunction, enjoining
Although petitioners do not claim ownership over the subject premises, they the ejection of petitioners until further orders from the court. 8
however disputed private respondents' claim of ownership and alleged that
they have been in possession of the property in question since 1972 by virtue On July 18, 1994, counsel for private respondent filed a Motion To Lift
of the tolerance and permission of the alleged real owner, Dr. Alejo Lopez. And/Or Dissolve Preliminary Injunction, contending among others that the
Urban Poor Affairs Office [People's Bureau] has already been notified, as
On August 3, 1992, judgment was rendered by the Metropolitan Trial Court of mandated by RA 7279, and that more than 45 days had already lapsed since
Quezon City, Branch 38, ordering the ejectment of the petitioners from the the notice was made in April, 1994. Thus, private respondent has
disputed premises.1 substantially complied with the requirements of RA 7279 and therefore the
enforcement of the final judgment and ejectment of petitioners is in
order.9 Objecting to private respondent's motion, petitioners argued that RA
Upon appeal to the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 83, the
7279 requires not only the 45-day notice, but also the relocation of petitioners
decision of the Metropolitan Trial Court was affirmed in toto.2
and the grant of financial assistance to them prior to their relocation.
Furthermore, petitioners maintain that there is no extreme urgency for
Still not satisfied, petitioners proceeded to the Court of Appeals and filed a petitioners' eviction on account of private respondent's affluence. 10
petition for review, but the petition was dismissed outright for failure to state
the material dates to show that the petition was filed on time and for not
The case was subsequently set for hearing and oral argument, after which,
being accompanied by certified true copies of the disputed decision. 3
respondent court rendered the assailed decision on September 20, 1994
ordering as follows:
No further appeal was interposed by petitioner, hence, the judgment became
final. This prompted private respondent to file a Motion for Issuance of an
WHEREFORE, pursuant to RA 7279, the People's Bureau is hereby
Alias Writ of Execution which was granted by the Metropolitan Trial Court in
ordered to relocate the herein petitioners from subject lot of private
its order dated March 25, 1994,4 taking into account that the judgment has
respondent not later than October 30, 1994. Should the relocation of
already become final and executory.
petitioners be not finished on or before October 30, 1994, the
People's Bureau shall pay petitioners a daily allowance of P145.00
In an attempt to prevent the execution of the judgment and their consequent for every day of delay of relocation but in no case shall such
eviction, petitioners filed a complaint for Injunction with Preliminary Injunction allowance last for more than sixty (60) days.
and Temporary Restraining Order before the Regional Trial Court at Quezon
City, Branch 216,5 alleging that herein private respondent must first comply
Petitioners are hereby ordered to vacate the premises in question
with the mandatory requirements of Section 28(c) of R.A. 7279 regarding
not later than October 30, 1994, on which date the private
eviction and demolition by court order.
respondent shall have the right to take over possession thereof and,
if necessary, to ask for a writ of execution for the implementation of
this disposition. No pronouncement as to costs.
On October 25, 1994, a new counsel entered his appearance for petitioners Petitioners adamantly argue that the decision of respondent court dated
and filed a motion to set aside the aforequoted decision. 12 As initially September 20, 1994 was based on an unauthorized compromise agreement,
mentioned, petitioners assert that the assailed decision was rendered based sans their knowledge, consent and authority. Additionally, petitioners
on a compromise agreement to which they never gave their consent nor interpose the following issues: 1) whether there can be eviction and
authorized their former counsel to enter into, and for which reason said demolition without actual relocation; 2) can the petitioners be considered as
former counsel has withdrawn his appearance as counsel of record. homeless and underprivileged?; and 3) whose duty is it to relocate them?
Petitioners contend that the judgment of respondent Court of Appeals was A compromise is a bilateral act or transaction that is expressly acknowledged
indeed based on a compromise agreement which is evident from the as a juridical agreement by the Civil Code. It is defined in Article 2208 of the
following portions of the decision: Code as "a contract whereby the parties by making reciprocal concessions,
avoid a litigation or put an end to one already commenced". 15 Thus, a
xxx xxx xxx judgment upon a compromise is a judgment embodying a compromise
agreement entered into by the parties in which they make reciprocal
concessions in order to terminate a litigation already instituted. 16
When the case was called for hearing on September 14, 1994, as
scheduled, both parties were represented. Atty. Rogelio Directo
stood up for the People's Bureau (Urban Poor Affairs Office). And In the present suit, the assailed decision, far from being a judgment based on
the parties, including the said representative of the People's Bureau, a compromise agreement, is undoubtedly a decision rendered entirely on the
agreed that petitioners herein are all qualified to avail of the merits. Contrary to petitioners' assertion, the dispositive portion of the
protection and benefits under RA 7279 and through counsel, decision is very explicit in exclusively adverting to RA 7279 as the basis for
manifested their willingness and readiness to be relocated in the judgment. Nowhere did it appear nor can it be inferred therefrom that
accordance with said law. It was likewise agreed by all concerned respondent court's disposition took into account any agreement or
that should petitioners be not relocated within the period of 45 days, concessions made by the parties that is indicative of a judgment on a
from September 15 to October 30, 1994, the People's Bureau shall compromise. A scrutiny of the assailed portions of the decision allegedly
pay them an allowance of P145.00, equivalent to the minimum wage, embodying the compromise agreement revealed that the same are nothing
per day of delay of relocation, until their actual transfer to the but admissions made by the parties intended to clarify the applicable
relocation site to be designated for them. It is understood, however, provisions of RA 7279. In fact the said admissions are expressly laid out in
that the daily allowance for petitioners shall be for a period not Section 28(c) (8) of RA 7279 and thus could not have been the subject of any
exceeding sixty (60) days, starting October 31, 1994. In other words, compromise agreement as the same are already provided in the law.
should the delay of relocation of petitioners be for more than sixty
(60) days, they shall only be entitled to the daily allowance of Further negating petitioners' contention are the following ratiocinations made
P145.00 per day of delay of relocation for not more than sixty (60) by respondent court in denying the Motion to Set Aside Decision, with which
days. we are in complete accord:
It was likewise agreed that on October 31, 1994, whether petitioners After a careful study, We find movant's stance barren of merit. Our
shall have been relocated or not, the private respondent shall then Decision promulgated on September 20, 1994 in this case was not
be entitled to the execution and implementation of this judgment, and rendered as a Judgment by Compromise. It resolved the petition on
to cause the ejectment of petitioners from subject property litigated the merits, after the lawyers of the parties and the representative of
upon. (Emphasis supplied).13 the Urban Poor Affairs Office agreed on the applicability of Rep. Act
No. 7279 to petitioner's situation. As a result of such development of
In its Resolution dated May 4, 1995, respondent Court of Appeals denied the case, Our judgment granted petitioners more than what they
petitioners' Motion to Set Aside Decision 14and reiterated that the assailed have came here for. All they prayed for was to hold in abeyance
decision dated September 20, 1994 was a decision based on the merits and execution of subject final and executory Decision of the Quezon
not upon a compromise agreement. Metropolitan Trial Court, ordering their ejectment; until after the