Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 96492 November 26, 1992

ROMEO REYES, ANGEL PARAYAO, and EMILIO MANANGHAYA, petitioners,

vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, EUFROCINA DE LA CRUZ and VIOLETA DELOS
REYES, respondents.

NOCON, J.:

Petitioners Romeo Reyes, Angel Parayao and Emilio Mananghaya question the respondent
Court's decision promulgated on November 22, 1990,   which affirmed with modification the
1

agrarian court's decision promulgated January 10, 1990,  which ordered them and the other
2

defendants therein to, among others, restore possession of the disputed landholding to private
respondent, Eufrocina Vda. dela Cruz. Said respondent court's decision is now final and
executory as to Olympio Mendoza and Severino Aguinaldo, the other petitioners in the
respondent court, since they did not appeal the same.

Since petitioners do not dispute the findings of fact of the respondent Court, the same shall be
quoted verbatim and are as follows:

It appears from the records that Juan Mendoza, father of herein defendant
Olympio Mendoza, is the owner of Farm Lots Nos. 46 and 106, Block 2, Psd-
38453 of the Bahay Pare Estate, Bahay Pare, Candaba, Pampanga, with an area
of 23,000 square meters and 19,000 square meters, respectively. Devoted to the
production of palay, the lots were tenanted and cultivated by Julian dela Cruz,
husband of plaintiff Eufrocina dela Cruz. Julian died on September 25, 1979.

In her complaint, Eufrocina alleged that upon the death of Julian, she succeeded
him as bona fide tenant of the subject lots; that between July 7 to July 15, 1984,
Olympio Mendoza, in conspiracy with the other defendants, prevented her
daughter Violeta and her workers through force, intimidation, strategy and stealth,
from entering and working on the subject premises; and that until the filing of the
instant case, defendants had refused to vacate and surrender the lots, thus
violating her tenancy rights. Plaintiff therefore prayed for judgment for the
recovery of possession and damages with a writ of preliminary mandatory
injunction in the meantime.

Defendants Reyes, Parayao, Aguinaldo and Mananghaya, duly elected and/or

appointed barangay officials of Bahay Pare, Candaba, Pampanga, denied
interference in the tenancy relationship existing between plaintiff and defendant
Mendoza, particularly in the cultivation of the latter's farm lots. Claiming that they
have always exercised fairness, equity, reason and impartiality in the discharge
of their official functions, they asked for the dismissal of the case and claimed
moral damages and attorney's fees in the total amount of P165,000.00 (Answer
with Counterclaim, Records, pp. 48-51).
 For his part, defendant Mendoza raised abandonment, sublease and mortgage of
the farm lots without his consent and approval, and non-payment of rentals,
irrigation fees and other taxes due the government, as his defenses. He also
demanded actual and exemplary damages, as well as attorney's fees (Answer,
pp. 77-78).

During the pendency of the case in the lower court, Mendoza of the case in the
lower court, Mendoza was in possession of the subject lots and had cultivated the
same. Upon motion of plaintiff, the court directed its Deputy Sheriff to supervise
the harvesting of the palay crops, to cause the threshing thereof and to deposit
the net harvest (after deducting from the expenses incurred), in a bonded
warehouse of the locality subject to the disposition of the court. 3

The respondent Court rendered judgment affirming the appealed agrarian court's decision with
the modification that Lot 106 is not covered by it.

The dispositive portion of the appealed decision, which was modified, states as follows:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered, in favor of plaintiff and against

defendants:

On the Mandatory Injunction:

1. Ordering said defendants to restore possession of the landholding subject of

the action to the plaintiff and enjoining said defendants and any person claiming
under them to desist from molesting them or interfering with the possession and
cultivation of the landholding descriptive in paragraph 3 of the complaint, to wit:

Farm Lots Nos. 46 and 106, Block 2, Psd-38453 of the Bahay

Pare Estate, Bahay Pare, Candaba, Pampanga, with a total area
of 23,969 square meters, more or less, owned by a certain Juan
Mendoza, and devoted principally to the production of palay, as
evidenced by a Certification from the Ministry of Agrarian Reform
issued on July 30, 1984.

2. a) Ordering the defendants to vacate the premises of the two landholding in

question and to respect the tenancy rights of plaintiff with respect to the same;

b) Ordering defendants, jointly and severally to pay unto plaintiff 220 cavans of
palay or its equivalent in cash of P33,000.00 from the principal crop year of 1984,
and every harvest time until defendants finally vacate and surrender possession
and cultivation of the landholding in question to plaintiff.

c) the prayer for moral damages, not having been sufficiently proved, the same is
denied.

d) Ordering defendants jointly and severally, to pay the costs of suit.

The awards herein provided should first be satisfied from the deposits of the
harvests ordered by the Court from which the planting and harvesting expenses
have been paid to defendant Olympio Mendoza; and if said net deposits with the
Court or the warehouses as ordered by the Court are insufficient, then the
balance should be paid by defendants, jointly and severally.  4
Defendants who are the petitioners in this case, in a Petition for Review on Certiorari, present for
the consideration of the Court:

[T]he lone issue of whether or not they can be held liable, jointly and severally,
with the other defendants, for the harvests of the litigated property, Lot No. 46, or
the money equivalent thereof starting from the principal crop years of 1984 and
every harvest time thereafter until the possession and cultivation of the
aforestated landholding are finally surrendered to the private respondent.  5

It is the position of petitioners that they are not liable jointly and severally with Olympio Mendoza
and Severino Aguinaldo because the present petition involves Lot No. 46, Block 2, Psd-38453 of
the bahay Pare Estate, bahay Pare, Candaba, Pampanga and not Lot No. 106 of the estate,
which lot was purchased by petitioner Romeo Reyes from Olympio Mendoza's father, Juan, and
which he later donated to the barangay Bahay Pare of Candaba, Pampanga, for the construction
of the Bahay Pare Barangay High School.   As to their supposed participation in the
6

dispossession of private respondent from the disputed landholding, petitioners present the
September 30, 1987 Resolution of Investigating Fiscal Jesus M. Pamintuan, as approved by
Pampanga Provincial Fiscal Villamor I. Dizon, in I.S. No. 8576,   wherein private respondent's
7

complaint against petitioners and the other defendants in the agrarian court for violation of P.D.
583  was dismissed, to show that private respondent's "point is already settled and considered
8

closed."   lastly, petitioners claim that they were included in the present controversy so that their
9

political career would be destroyed. 10

Private respondents deny petitioners' allegations and contend that it was petitioners who
conspired with Olympio Mendoza and Severino Aguinaldo in ejecting them not only from Lot No.
46 but also from Lot No. 106. They maintain that it was in Farmlot No. 46 from where they were
ejected and dispossessed, so much so that even if Farmlot No. 106 was removed by the Court of
Appeals from the judgment, as Farmlot No. 46 was harvesting palay worth at least P33,000.00
per year since 1989, private respondents, who are entitled to the possession and peaceful
enjoyment of the farmlot as provided for in Section 23 of the Agrarian Reform Law, should be
compensated for the lost income by the petitioners who are solidarily liable with Olympio
Mendoza and Severino Aguinaldo.  11

We find for the private respondents.

It is clear that petitioners are asking Us to re-examine all the evidence already presented and
evaluated by the trial court and re-evaluated again by the respondent appellate court. Said
evidence served as basis in arriving at the trial court and appellate court's findings of fact. We
shall not analyze such evidence all over again but instead put finis to the factual findings in this
case. Settled is the rule that only questions of law may be raised in a petition for review
on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court   absent the exceptions which do not obtain in
12

the instant case. 13

We agree with the appellate court in its retiocination, which We adopt, on why it has to dismiss
the appeal. Said the Court:

In her Complaint, plaintiff-appellee alleged that she "is the tenant of Farm Lots
Nos. 46 and 106 Block 2, Psd-38453 of the Bahay Pare Estate, Bahay Pare,
Candaba, Pampanga, with a total area of 23,969 square meters, more or
less . . ." (Complaint, Record, vol. 1, p.1). However, during Violeta's testimony,
she clarified that actually only Lot No. 106, which contains an area of P19,000
square meters, is not included in this controversy (T.S.N., August 10, 1989, p. 5;
May 8, 1989, p. 12). This statement was corroborated by plaintiff's counsel, Atty.
Arturo Rivera, who informed the court that the 19,000 square meter lot is subject
of a pending case before the MTC of Sta. Ana, Pampanga (Ibid., p. 15). The
inconsistency between the averment of the complaint and the testimony of the
 witness should not only because there was no showing that she intended to
mislead defendants and even the trial court on the subject matter of the suit. It
would in the complaint since together with Lot 106 had been include in the
complaint since together with Lot 46, it is owned by Olympio's father.

We also concur with the trial court's finding on the participation of the other
appellants in the dispossession of appellee. They not only knew Olympio
personally, some of them were even asked by Olympio to help him cultivate the
land, thus lending credence to the allegation that defendant Olympio, together
with his co-defendants, prevented plaintiff and her workers from entering the land
through "strong arm methods". (Decision of RTC, records, vol. II p. 564).

Finally, we rule that the trial court did not err when it favorably considered the
affidavits of Eufrocina and Efren Tecson (Annexes "B" and "C") although the
affiants were not presented and subjected to cross-examination. Section 16 of
P.D. No. 946 provides that the "Rules of Court shall not be applicable in agrarian
cases even in a suppletory character." The same provision states that "In the
hearing, investigation and determination of any question or controversy, affidavits
and counter-affidavits may be allowed and are admissible in evidence".

Moreover, in agrarian cases, the quantum of evidence required is no more than

substantial evidence. This substantial evidence rule was incorporated in section
18, P.D. No. 946 which took effect on June 17, 1976 (Castro vs. CS, G.R. No.
34613, January 26, 1989). In Bagsican vs. Hon. Court of Appeals, 141 SCRA
226, the Supreme Court defined what substantial evidence is:

Substantial evidence does not necessarily import preponderant

evidence, as is required in an ordinary civil case. It has been
defined to be such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might
accept as adequate to support a conclusion and its absence is not
shown by stressing that there is contrary evidence on record,
direct or circumstantial, for the appellate court cannot substitute
its own judgment or criteria for that of the trial court in determining
wherein lies the weight of evidence or what evidence is entitled to
belief.
14

WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error in the decision appealed from, the petition is hereby
DENIED for lack of merit. The decision of the Court of Appeals promulgated on November 22,
1990 is AFFIRMED in toto. Costs against the petitioners.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa, C.J., Feliciano, Regalado, Nocon and Campos, JJ., concur.

Footnotes

1 Decision, CA-G.R. No. SP 20528 (CAR), penned by Justice Alfredo L.

Benipayo and concurred in by Justices Cesar D. Francisco and Fortunato A.
Vailoces.

2 Decision of the RTC, Branch XLVI, 3rd Judicial Region, San Fernando,
Pampanga acting as an agrarian court; penned by Judge Norberto C. Ponce.
 3 Op cit., pp. 3-4; Rollo, pp. 25-26.

4 Original Records, pp. 565-566.

5 Petitioners' Memorandum, p.7; Rollo, p. 62.

6 Petitioners' Memorandum, p. 10; Rollo, p.65.

7 Annex "B", Petition; Rollo, pp. 20-21.

8 Prescribing Penalties for the Unlawful Ejectment, Exclusion, Removal or Ouster

of Tenant-farmers from their Farmholdings.

9 Petitioners' Memorandum, pp. 10-11; Rollo, pp. 65-66.

10 Petition, p. 9; Rollo, p.17.

11 Private respondents' Memorandum, pp. 4-5; Rollo, pp. 73-74.

12 Decision, Misa vs. CA, G.R. No. 97291, August 5, 1992, pp. 4-5.

13 The case of Medina v. Asistio, G.R. No. 75450, 191 SCRA 218, 223-224
(1990) enumerates several instances when findings of fact may be passed upon
and reviewed by this Court, none of which obtain herein:

(1) When the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation, surmises

or conjectures (Joaquin v. Navarro, 93 Phil. 257 [1953]); (2) When the inference
made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible (Luna v. Linatok, 74 Phil. 15
[1942]); (3) Where there is a grave abuse of discretion (Buyco v. People, 95 Phil.
453 [1955]); (4) When the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts
(Cruz v. Sosing, L-4875, Nov. 27, 1953); (5) When the findings of fact are
conflicting (Casica v. Villaseca, L-9590 Ap. 30, 1957; unrep.); (6) When the Court
of Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case and the
same is contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee (Evangelista v.
Alto Surety and Insurance Co., 103 Phil 401 [1958]; (7) The findings of the Court
of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court (Garcia v. Court of Appeals, 33
SCRA 622 [1970]); Sacay v. Sandiganbayan, 142 SCRA 593 [1986]); (8) When
the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which
they are based(Ibid.,); (9) When the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the
petitioners' main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondents (Ibid.,); and
(10) The findings of fact of the Court of Appeals is premised on the supposed
absence of evidence and is contraindicated by the evidence on record (Salazar v.
Gutierrez, 33 SCRA 242 [1970]).

Facts:
Petitioners Romeo Reyes, Angel Parayao and Emilio Mananghaya question the respondent
Court’s decision, which affirmed with modification the agrarian court’s decision, which ordered
them and the other defendants therein to, among others, restore possession of the disputed
landholding to private respondent, Eufrocina Vda. dela Cruz.

Juan Mendoza, father of defendant Olympio, is the owner of farm lots in Bahay Pare, Candaba,
Pampanga. Devoted to the production of palay, the lots were tenanted and cultivated by now
deceased Julian dela Cruz, husband of plaintiff Eufrocina dela Cruz.

Eufrocina alleged that her husband’s death, she succeeded him as bona fide tenant of the subject
lots; that Olympio, in conspiracy with the other defendants, prevented her daughter Violeta and
her workers through force, intimidation, strategy and stealth, from entering and working on the
subject premises; and that until the filing of the instant case, defendants had refused to vacate
and surrender the lots, thus violating her tenancy rights. Plaintiff therefore prayed for judgment
for the recovery of possession and damages with a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction in
the meantime.
Defendant barangay officials denied interference in the tenancy relationship existing between
plaintiff and defendant Mendoza, particularly in the cultivation of the latter’s farm lots and asked
for the dismissal of the case, moral damages and attorney’s fees.

Mendoza raised abandonment, sublease and mortgage of the farm lots without his consent and
approval, and non-payment of rentals, irrigation fees and other taxes due the government, as his
defenses.

Petitioners now bring the present Petition for Review on Certiorari.

Issue:
W/N the court erred in holding petitioners liable
 

Held:
No. The evidence presented before the trial court and CA served as basis in arriving at their
findings of fact. The Supreme Court will not analyze such evidence all over again because settled
is the rule that only questions of law may be raised in a petition for review on certiorari under
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court absent the exceptions which do not obtain in the instant case.
REPORT THIS AD

In agrarian cases, the quantum of evidence is no more than substantial evidence. Substantial

evidence does not necessarily import preponderant evidence, as is required in an ordinarily civil
case. It has been defined to be such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to support a conclusion and its absence is not shown by stressing that there is contrary
evidence on record, direct or circumstantial, for the appellate court cannot substitute its own
judgment or criteria for that of the trial court in determining wherein lies the weight of evidence
or what evidence is entitled to belief.

Facts:
Juan Mendoza, father of herein defendant Olympio Mendoza, is the owner of Farm Lots
Nos. 46 and 106, Block 2, Psd-38453 of the Bahay Pare Estate, Bahay Pare, Candaba,
Pampanga
Devoted to the production of palay, the lots were tenanted and cultivated by Julian dela
Cruz, husband of plaintiff Eufrocina dela Cruz. Julian died on September 25, 1979.
In her complaint, Eufrocina alleged that upon the death of Julian, she succeeded him as
bona fide tenant of the subject lots;
Olympio Mendoza, in conspiracy with the other defendants, prevented... her daughter
Violeta and her workers through force, intimidation, strategy and stealth, from entering
and working on the subject premises... defendants had refused to vacate and surrender
the lots, thus violating her tenancy rights.
Defendants... denied interference in the tenancy relationship existing between plaintiff
and defendant Mendoza, particularly in the cultivation... of the latter's farm lots...
defendant Mendoza raised abandonment, sublease and mortgage of the farm lots
without his consent and approval, and non-payment of rentals, irrigation fees and other
taxes due the government, as his defenses.
The respondent Court rendered judgment affirming the appealed agrarian court's
decision with the modification that Lot 106 is not covered by i
Ordering said defendants to restore possession of the landholding subject of the action
to the plaintiff and enjoining said defendants and any person claiming under them to
desist from molesting them or interfering with the possession and cultivation of the...
landholding descripted in paragraph 3 of the complaint, to wit:
Issues:
We find for the private respondents.
Ruling:
We shall not analyze such evidence all over again but instead put finis to the factual
findings in this case. Settled is the rule that only questions of law may be raised in a
petition for review on certiorari... under Rule 45 o... of the Rules of Court[12] absent the
exceptions which do not obtain in the instant case.[13]... we rule that the trial court did
not err when it favorably considered the affidavits of Eufrocina and Efren Tecson
(Annexes "B" and "C") although the affiants were not presented and subjected to cross-
examination. Section 16 of P.D. No. 946 provides that the
'Rules of Court shall not be applicable in agrarian cases even in a suppletory character.'
The same provision states that 'In the hearing, investigation and determination of any
question or controversy, affidavits and counter-affidavits may be allowed and are
admissible in... evidence.'
Moreover, in agrarian cases, the quantum of evidence required is no more than
substantial evidence. T
Principles:

G.R. No. 101527

REGALADO, J.:
This original petition for certiorari  seeks to annul the decision[1] of the
National Labor Relations Commission (hereafter, respondent
commission), dated June 28, 1991, finding that herein private
respondent Angie Mendoza was illegally dismissed and awarding her
three years backwages and separation pay.

We quote the undisputed facts as found by respondent commission:

"Appellant Angie Mendoza had been employed with appellee since 1977.
She rose from the ranks from the position of secretary to the Finishing
Department Head to secretary to the Executive Vice President, and later
to personnel manager up to March 7, 1986. Her latest salary was
P6,190.00. In the latter part of 1986, a new management group took over
appellee. Appellant, who was on leave, found out about the changes and
consequently wrote the widow of the former president of appellee, to wit:
xxx

'Dear Mrs. Salazar:

'In compliance with my verbal promise and in abiding by the company

rules and regulations, the undersigned reported to your goodself on
March 7, the expiration of an approved one month vacation leave.

'It is sad to know that during my absence, major changes took place in
ITM. There was a take-over of new management, appointment and
reorganization of new officers and other key positions have been
effected. Needless to say, the position of the undersigned as Personnel
Manager was also filled up by a newcomer.

'In view of the above circumstances, I deem it proper and wise to cease
my employment; but with equivalent separation pay from the company. I
am happy to announce that I am one of the pioneer employees, having
employed (sic) in 1971 as secretary to then Finishing Dept. Head. Being
an experienced and competent secretary, after two months I rose to the
position of secretary to the Exec. Vice President. In January 1975, I was
appointed to succeed and execute the duties and responsibilities of the
resigned Personnel Manager and at same time as secretary to the
executives of the company. During the period June 1984 to June 1985, I
was appointed in the concurrent capacity as Personnel Manager of
Grand Alliance Mills, sister company of ITM.

'For fifteen years of stay, I could proudly say that I dedicated one-third of
my life in serving the company honestly and efficiently, my employment
records can fully vouch for that.

'I sincerely hope that you will merit this request with your usual kind
consideration and immediate attention.'

                        Respectfully yours,

                        Angie S. Mendoza"
"On June 6, 1986, the instant complaint for illegal dismissal was filed.
Complainant alleged that she was dismissed without sufficient grounds
after 14 years of service.

"In its defense, respondent averred that complainant voluntarily

resigned and if she was terminated such termination was due to valid
and just grounds. Being a managerial employee she could be terminated
for loss of trust and confidence."[2]
Thereafter, the parties submitted their respective position papers.
Petitioner then filed a motion to dismiss[3] alleging that: (1) private
respondent's position paper is unverified and should be stricken off the
record; and (2) complainant failed to appear despite notice, thereby
depriving petitioner of its right to cross-examine her. In an order [4] dated
May 25, 1988, the labor arbiter dismissed the complaint without
prejudice, on the ground that complainant's absence deprived herein
petitioner of the opportunity to cross-examine her.

On appeal, respondent commission reversed the labor arbiter in a

decision[5] dated October 28, 1988, holding that under Article 221 of the
Labor Code, respondent commission and the labor arbiter have the
authority to decide cases based on position papers and documents
submitted by the parties without resorting to technical rules of evidence;
and that herein petitioner was not denied due process because on the
basis of the records of the case, an, intelligent decision could be arrived
at without resorting to a formal hearing. Petitioner went to this Court on
a petition for certiorari, entitled "Imperial Textile Mills, Inc. vs. National
Labor Relations, et. al.," docketed as G.R. No. 86663, which was however
dismissed in our resolution[6] of February 15, 1989.

The case was thereafter remanded to the labor arbiter who subsequently
rendered a decision[7] on April 10, 1990 declaring the dismissal of
complainant as legally effected on the ground that she resigned
voluntarily and that her dismissal was for a valid cause, that is, loss of
trust and confidence. On appeal, respondent commission rendered its
questioned decision reversing the findings of the labor arbiter and
holding that herein private respondent was illegally dismissed, thus:

"Was appellant illegally dismissed? We believe so. The letter dated

March 31, 1986 clearly stated that she was asking for separation pay
because she found out that she had already been replaced during her
leave of absence. x x x Appellant's resignation and request for separation
pay was prompted solely by her removal as indicated in her letter. In
short, complainant was forced to resign.

"If it was loss of confidence that prompted appellee to remove appellant,

appellee had the burden of proving it. Appellee had not adduced an iota
of evidence that would account for the alleged 'loss of confidence.'

"Considering, however, that complainant appears to have sought

employment elsewhere in lieu of reinstatement, an award of separation
pay and three years backwages, consistent with the rulings of the
Supreme Court, is but proper."[8]
Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied in a
resolution[9] dated August 16, 1991, hence the instant petition.

1. Petitioner inceptively asserts that it was denied due process when it

was not given the opportunity to cross-examine herein private
respondent during the hearing before the labor arbiter.

It is a basic rule that it is not the denial of the right to be heard but the
deprivation of the opportunity to be heard which constitutes a violation
of the due process clause. As held in Var-Orient Shipping Co., Inc., et al.
vs. Achacoso, etc., et al.,[10] and subsequently reiterated in Bautista, et
al. vs. Secretary of Labor and Employment, et al.: [11] "Equally
unmeritorious is petitioners' allegation that they were denied due
process because the decision was rendered without a formal hearing. The
essence of due process is simply an opportunity to be heard, or, as
applied to administrative proceedings, an opportunity to explain one's
side, or an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling
complained of."

There was sufficient compliance with the requirement of due process as

petitioner was given the opportunity to present its case through a motion
to dismiss and a position paper filed with the labor arbiter.

2. It is contended that while the decisions of respondent commission

may be rendered based on position papers, such rule is not applicable to
the case at bar where the position paper submitted by the private
respondent is not verified. The contention is without merit.

First, the issue on the admissibility of the unverified position paper has
been passed upon by this Court in its disposition of the aforementioned
petition in G.R. No. 86663 which upheld the decision of respondent
commission, reversing the order of dismissal of the labor arbiter on the
ground that the case could be resolved on the basis of the position papers
submitted by the parties. In effect, it was there held by necessary
implication that the unverified position paper submitted by herein
private respondent is deemed sufficient. Besides, even the labor arbiter
in his order dated May 25, 1988 admits that the unverified position
paper is a mere procedural infirmity which does not affect the merits of
the case.[12]

Second, well-settled is the rule that procedural technicalities do not

strictly apply to proceedings before labor arbiters for they may avail
themselves of all reasonable means to speedily ascertain the facts of a
controversy.[13]

3. Petitioner claims that the findings of respondent commission to the

effect that the former failed to adduce an iota of evidence that would
account for the alleged "loss of confidence" is erroneous. Petitioner
raised in its position paper filed before the labor arbiter the following
facts which allegedly constitute the basis for the loss of trust and
confidence, to wit:

"Complainant, during the trying times of new management take over,

beset by shaky industrial relations, culminating in mass action, despite
requests by new managers was nowhere to be found. If she was
interested to maintain her position, she could have at least reported to
the company and brief the new managers of the existing personnel
problems. This, she opted not to do, in fact her 'leave of absence' (was
placed under quote as there is nothing on record that she was granted a
one month leave of absence), ended March 7, 1986, it was only on March
31, 1986 that she wrote the letter opting for resignation."[14]
Although loss of confidence is a valid cause to terminate an employee, it
must nonetheless rest on an actual breach of duty committed by the
employee and not on the employer's caprices.[15] The burden of proof
rests upon the employer to establish that the dismissal is for cause[16] in
view of the security of tenure that employees enjoy under the
Constitution and the Labor Code.[17] The failure of the employer to do so
would mean that the dismissal is not justified.[18] It is likewise essential
that there be substantial evidence to support a charge of loss of
confidence. The employer's evidence must clearly and convincingly
establish the facts upon which the loss of confidence in the employee
may fairly be made to rest.[19]

In the case at bar, the facts relied upon by petitioner barely, establish any
basis for the alleged loss of confidence. As it is, the same is, at most, a
mere allegation.

In addition, we have ruled that to constitute a valid dismissal, two

requisites must concur: (1) the dismissal must be for any of the causes
provided for under Article 282 of the Labor Code, and (2) only after the
employee has been notified in writing and given the opportunity to be
heard and defend himself as required under Sections 2 and 5, Rule XIV,
Book V of the Implementing Rules.[20] In the case at bar, petitioner
categorically stated in its position paper that "(t)here was never any
official communication from the new management group of the company
addressed to the complainant, that her services were terminated,"[21] and
yet it does not deny that it had appointed a replacement for private
respondent even before she wrote her aforequoted letter of March 31,
1986.

4. Finally, petitioner asserts that findings of fact of the labor arbiter

should be accorded respect and finality. Besides, the decision of the labor
arbiter had become final considering that the appeal made by private
respondent with respondent commission was filed out of time. Records
show that the decision of the labor arbiter was received by private
respondent on May 2, 1990, whereas the appeal was filed with
respondent commission only on May 17, 1990, which is already beyond
the 10-day reglementary period provided in the Labor Code.

While it is true that factual findings of the labor arbiter are usually
binding on this Court, such situation does not obtain in this case. As we
have earlier declared, the alleged loss of confidence was never
sufficiently proven by herein petitioner.

It appears that the appeal with respondent commission was indeed filed
late. The general rule is that the perfection of an appeal in the manner
and within the period prescribed by law is not only mandatory but
jurisdictional. Failure to conform to the rules will render the judgment
sought to be reviewed final and unappealable.[22]

We also note, in passing, that contrary to the Solicitor General's

allegation that petitioner failed to raise the issue of timeliness of appeal
before the respondent commission and is, therefore, deemed to have
waived its right to question the same, herein petitioner did raise this
issue albeit belatedly, in its reply to private respondent's memorandum
of appeal.[23]

Nevertheless, in some instances, this Court has disregarded such

unintended lapses so as to give due course to appeals filed beyond the
reglementary period on the basis of strong and compelling reasons, such
as serving the ends of justice and preventing a grave miscarriage thereof.
[24]
 We are of the opinion and so hold that in consideration of the merits
of this case, substantial justice could be rightfully invoked by way of an
exception. This is one such case where we are convinced that substance
should prevail over and not be sacrificed for form.

5. Petitioner asseverates that since private respondent is already

employed elsewhere, respondent commission erred in awarding
separation pay and three years backwages. We disagree.

In the case of Torillo vs. Leogardo, Jr., etc., et. al.,[25] we held:

"Backwages and reinstatement are two reliefs given to an illegally

dismissed employee. They are separate and distinct from each other.
However, in the event that reinstatement is no longer possible,
separation pay is awarded to the employee. Thus, the award of
separation pay is in lieu of reinstatement and not of backwages. In other
words, an illegally dismissed employee is entitled to (1) either reinstate-
ment, if viable, or separation pay if reinstatement is no longer viable and
(2) backwages."
The payment of backwages is one of the reliefs which an illegally
dismissed employee prays the labor arbiter and the National Labor
Relation Commission to render in his favor as a consequence of the
unlawful act committed by the employer. The award thereof is not
private compensation or damages but is in furtherance and effectuation
of the public objectives of the Labor Code. Even though the practical
effect is the enrichment of the individual, the award of backwages is not
in redress of a private right, but, rather, is in the nature of a command
upon the employer to make public reparation for his violation of the
Labor Code,[26] such as the dismissal of an employee due to the unlawful
act of the employer or the latter's bad faith.[27] Hence, we have ruled that
where the ground of loss of confidence has neither been established nor
sufficient basis thereof presented, the finding that respondent employee
was illegally dismissed was well taken and said employee, although not
reinstated, was awarded three years backwages.[28]

With respect to the award of separation pay, we declared in Santos vs.

National Labor Relations Commission, et. al.,[29] that where the decision
ordering the reinstatement of the employee may no longer be enforced,
or is no longer feasible because of the strained relations between the
parties, the employee may be awarded separation pay as an alternative to
reinstatement. Such a situation obtains in this case and considering
further the confidential nature of private respondent's position, we find
no reason why the foregoing doctrine should not here apply.

WHEREFORE, no grave abuse of discretion having been committed by

respondent commission, the present petition is hereby DISMISSED for
lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., (Chairman), Feliciano, N

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 109454 June 14, 1994

JOSE C. SERMONIA, petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, Eleventh Division, HON. DEOGRACIAS FELIZARDO,
Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Br. 151, and JOSEPH SINSAY, respondents.

Quasha, Asperilla, Ancheta, Peña and Nolasco for petitioner.

Ponciano L. Escuadra for private respondent.

BELLOSILLO, J.:

Bigamy is an illegal marriage committed by contracting a second or subsequent marriage before

the first marriage has been legally dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been declared
presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered in the proper proceedings.  Bigamy carries
1

with it the imposable penalty of prision mayor. Being punishable by an afflictive penalty, this
crime prescribes in fifteen (15) years.  The fifteen-year prescriptive period commences to run
2

from the day on which the crime is discovered by the offended party, the authorities, or their
agents . . .
3

That petitioner contracted a bigamous marriage seems impliedly admitted.  At least, it is not
4

expressly denied. Thus the only issue for resolution is whether his prosecution for bigamy is
already time-barred, which hinges on whether its discovery is deemed to have taken place from
the time the offended party actually knew of the second marriage or from the time the document
evidencing the subsequent marriage was registered with the Civil Registry consistent with the
rule on constructive notice.

The antecedents: In an information filed on 26 May 1992, petitioner Jose C. Sermonia was
charged with bigamy before the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Br. 151, for contracting marriage
with Ma. Lourdes Unson on 15 February 1975 while his prior marriage to Virginia C. Nievera
remained valid and subsisting. 5

Petitioner moved to quash the information on the ground that his criminal liability for bigamy has
been extinguished by prescription.

In the order of 1 October 1992, respondent judge denied the motion to quash. On 27 October
1992, he likewise denied the motion to reconsider his order of denial.
Petitioner challenged the above orders before the Court of Appeals through a petition
for certiorari and prohibition. In the assailed decision of
21 January 1993, his petition was dismissed for lack of merit.  6

In this recourse, petitioner contends that his criminal liability for bigamy has been obliterated by
prescription. He avers that since the second marriage contract was duly registered with the
Office of the Civil Registrar in 1975,  such fact of registration makes it a matter of public record
7

and thus constitutes notice to the whole world. The offended party therefore is considered to
have had constructive notice of the subsequent marriage as of 1975; hence, prescription
commenced to run on the day the marriage contract was registered. For this reason, the
corresponding information for bigamy should have been filed on or before 1990 and not only in
1992.

Petitioner likewise takes issue with the "alleged concealment of the bigamous marriage" as
declared by the appellate court, insisting that the second marriage was publicly held at Our Lady
of Nativity Church in Marikina on
15 February 1975, and adding for good measure that from the moment of registration the
marriage contract was open to inspection by any interested person.

On the other hand, the prosecution maintains that the prescriptive period does not begin from the
commission of the crime but from the time of discovery by complainant which was in July 1991.

While we concede the point that the rule on constructive notice in civil cases may be applied in
criminal actions if the factual and legal circumstances so warrant,  we agree with the view
8

expounded by the Court of Appeals that it cannot apply in the crime of bigamy notwithstanding
the possibility of its being more favorable to the accused. The appellate court succinctly explains
—

Argued by the petitioner is that the principle of constructive notice should be

applied in the case at bar, principally citing in support of his stand, the cases
of People v. Reyes (175 SCRA 597); and People v. Dinsay (40 SCRA 50).

This Court is of the view that the principle of constructive notice should not be
applied in regard to the crime of bigamy as judicial notice may be taken of the
fact that a bigamous marriage is generally entered into by the offender in secrecy
from the spouse of the previous subsisting marriage. Also, a bigamous marriage
is generally entered into in a place where the offender is not known to be still a
married person, in order to conceal his legal impediment to contract another
marriage.

In the case of real property, the registration of any transaction involving any right
or interest therein is made in the Register of Deeds of the place where the said
property is located. Verification in the office of the Register of Deeds concerned
of the transactions involving the said property can easily be made by any
interested party. In the case of a bigamous marriage, verification by the offended
person or the authorities of the same would indeed be quite difficult as such a
marriage may be entered into in a place where the offender is not known to be
still a married person.

Be it noted that in the criminal cases cited by the petitioner wherein constructive
notice was applied, involved therein were land or property disputes and certainly,
marriage is not property.

The non-application to the crime of bigamy of the principle of constructive notice

is not contrary to the well entrenched policy that penal laws should be construed
liberally in favor of the accused. To compute the prescriptive period for the
 offense of bigamy from registration thereof would amount to almost absolving the
offenders thereof for liability therefor. While the celebration of the bigamous
marriage may be said to be open and made of public record by its registration,
the offender however is not truthful as he conceals from the officiating authority
and those concerned the existence of his previous subsisting marriage. He does
not reveal to them that he is still a married person. He likewise conceals from his
legitimate spouse his bigamous marriage. And for these, he contracts the
bigamous marriage in a place where he is not known to be still a married person.
And such a place may be anywhere, under which circumstance, the discovery of
the bigamous marriage is rendered quite difficult and would take time. It is
therefore reasonable that the prescriptive period for the crime of bigamy should
be counted only from the day on which the said crime was discovered by the
offended party, the authorities or their agency (sic).

Considering such concealment of the bigamous marriage by the offender, if the

prescriptive period for the offense of bigamy were to be counted from the date of
registration thereof, the prosecution of the violators of the said offense would
almost be impossible. The interpretation urged by the petitioner would encourage
fearless violations of a social institution cherished and protected by law. 
9

To this we may also add that the rule on constructive notice will make
de rigueur the routinary inspection or verification of the marriages listed in the National Census
Office and in various local civil registries all over the country to make certain that no second or
even third marriage has been contracted without the knowledge of the legitimate spouse. This is
too formidable a task to even contemplate.

More importantly, while Sec. 52 of P.D. 1529 (Property Registration Decree) provides for
constructive notice to all persons of every conveyance, mortgage, lease, lien, attachment, order,
judgment, instrument or entry affecting registered land filed or entered in the office of the
Register of Deeds for the province or city where the land to which it relates lies from the time of
such registering, filing or entering, there is no counterpart provision either in Act
No. 3753 (Act to Establish a Civil Register) or in Arts. 407 to 413 of the Civil Code, which leads
us to the conclusion that there is no legal basis for applying the constructive notice rule to the
documents registered in the Civil Register.

Finally, petitioner would want us to believe that there was no concealment at all because his
marriage contract with Ms. Unson was recorded in the Civil Registry which is open to all and
sundry for inspection. We cannot go along with his argument because why did he indicate in the
marriage contract that he was "single" thus obviously hiding his true status as a married man? Or
for that matter, why did he not simply tell his first wife about the subsequent marriage in Marikina
so that everything would be out in the open. The answer is obvious: He knew that no priest or
minister would knowingly perform or authorize a bigamous marriage as this would subject him to
punishment under the Marriage Law.  Obviously, petitioner had no intention of revealing his
10

duplicity to his first spouse and gambled instead on the probability that she or any third party
would ever go to the local civil registrar to inquire. In the meantime, through the simple
expedience of having the second marriage recorded in the local civil registry, he has set into
motion the running of the fifteen-year prescriptive period against the unwary and the
unsuspecting victim of his philandering.

Were we to put our imprimatur to the theory advanced by petitioner, in all likelihood we would be
playing right into the hands of philanderers. For we would be equating the contract of marriage
with ordinary deeds of conveyance and other similar documents without due regard for the
stability of marriage as an inviolable social institution, the preservation of which is a primary
concern of our society.
WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error in the questioned decision of the Court of Appeals, the
same is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

Facts:
That petitioner contracted a bigamous marriage seems impliedly admitted.
In an information filed on 26 May 1992, petitioner Jose C. Sermonia was charged with
bigamy... for contracting marriage with Ma. Lourdes Unson on 15 February 1975 while
his prior marriage to Virginia C. Nievera... remained valid and subsisting.
Petitioner moved to quash the information on the ground that his criminal liability for
bigamy has been extinguished by prescription.
petitioner contends that his criminal liability for bigamy has been obliterated by
prescription. He avers that since the second marriage contract was duly registered with
the Office of the Civil Registrar in 1975,[7] such fact of registration makes it a matter of
public record and thus constitutes notice to the whole world. The offended party
therefore is considered to have had constructive notice of the subsequent marriage as of
1975;
For this reason, the corresponding information for bigamy should have been filed on or
before 1990 and not only in 1992.
the prosecution maintains that the prescriptive period does not begin from the
commission of the crime but from the time of discovery by complainant which was in July
1991.
Issues:
whether his prosecution for bigamy is already time-barred,... whether its discovery is
deemed to have taken place from the time the offended party actually knew of the
second marriage or from the time the document evidencing the subsequent marriage
was registered with the Civil Registry consistent with the rule on constructive notice
Ruling:
To compute the prescriptive period for the offense of bigamy from... registration thereof
would amount to almost absolving the offenders thereof for liability therefor. While the
celebration of the bigamous marriage may be said to be open and made of public record
by its registration, the offender however is not truthful as he conceals from the...
officiating authority and those concerned the existence of his previous subsisting
marriage. He does not reveal to them that he is still a married person. He likewise
conceals from his legitimate spouse his bigamous marriage. And for these, he contracts
the bigamous marriage in... a place where he is not known to be still a married person.
And such a place may be anywhere, under which circumstance, the discovery of the
bigamous marriage is rendered quite difficult and would take time. It is therefore
reasonable that the prescriptive period... for the crime of bigamy should be counted only
from the day on which the said crime was discovered by the offended party, the
authorities or their agency (sic).
Considering such concealment of the bigamous marriage by the offender, if the
prescriptive period for the offense of bigamy were to be counted from the date of
registration thereof, the prosecution of the violators of the said offense would almost be
impossible.
Finally, petitioner would want us to believe that there was no concealment at all because
his marriage contract with Ms. Unson was recorded in the Civil Registry which is open to
all and sundry for inspection. We cannot go along with his argument because why did he
indicate... in the marriage contract that he was "single" thus obviously hiding his true
status as a married man? Or for that matter, why did he not simply tell his first wife about
the subsequent marriage in Marikina so that everything would be out in the open. The
answer is obvious: He... knew that no priest or minister would knowingly perform or
authorize a bigamous marriage as this would subject him to punishment under the
Marriage Law.
Obviously, petitioner had no intention of revealing his duplicity to his... first spouse and
gambled instead on the probability that she or any third party would ever go to the local
civil registrar to inquire. In the meantime, through the simple expedience of having the
second marriage recorded in the local civil registry, he has set into motion the... running
of the fifteen-year prescriptive period against the unwary and the unsuspecting victim of
his philandering.
Were we to put our imprimatur to the theory advanced by petitioner, in all likelihood we
would be playing right into the hands of philanderers. For we would be equating the
contract of marriage with ordinary deeds of conveyance and other similar documents
without... due regard for the stability of marriage as an inviolable social institution, the
preservation of which is a primary concern of our society.

SUMMARY:
In 1992, petitioner was charged with bigamy before the RTC-Pasig for
contracting marriage with Ma. Lourdes Unson on February 15, 1975 while
his prior marriage to Virginia C. Nievera remained valid and subsisting.
Petitioner contends that the 15-years prescriptive period for prosecuting
bigamy should be counted from the date it was registered with the Civil
Registrar (1975) and not from the time the 2nd marriage was discovered
(1991). Thus, the case should have been filed on or before 1990. The RTC,
CA and Supreme Court all disagreed with the petitioner.

DOCTRINES:
Were we to put our imprimatur to the theory advanced by petitioner, in all
likelihood we would be playing right into the hands of philanderers. For
we would be equating the contract of marriage with ordinary deeds of
conveyance and other similar documents without due regard for the
stability of marriage as an inviolable social institution, the
preservation of which is a primary concern of our society.
FACTS:
In 1992, petitioner was charged with bigamy before the RTC-Pasig for
contracting marriage with Ma. Lourdes Unson on February 15, 1975 while
his prior marriage to Virginia C. Nievera remained valid and subsisting.

Petitioner filed a motion to quash the information on the ground that his
criminal liability for bigamy has been extinguished by prescription.

Respondent judge denied the motion to quash. He likewise denied the

motion to reconsider his order of denial.

Petitioner challenged the above orders before the Court of Appeals

through a petition for certiorari and prohibition. The CA dismissed his
petition for lack of merit.

Petitioner avers that since the second marriage contract was duly
registered with the Office of the Civil Registrar in 1975, such fact of
registration makes it a matter of public record and thus constitutes notice
to the whole world.

The offended party therefore is considered to have had constructive notice

of the subsequent marriage as of 1975; hence, prescription commenced to
run on the day the marriage contract was registered.

For this reason, the corresponding information for bigamy should have
been filed on or before 1990 (15-years prescriptive period for offenses
punishable by prision mayor) and not in 1991 when the first wife
discovered the second marriage.

ISSUE:
WON the 15-year prescriptive period for bigamy should be counted from
the registration of the 2nd marriage with the Civil Registrar. (NO, from
discovery)
RATIO:
While we concede the point that the rule on constructive notice in civil
cases may be applied in criminal actions if the factual and legal
circumstances so warrant, we agree with the CA that it cannot apply in the
crime of bigamy notwithstanding the possibility of its being more
favorable to the accused.

The rule on constructive notice will make de rigueur the routinary

inspection or verification of the marriages listed in the National Census
Office and in various local civil registries all over the country to make
certain that no second or even third marriage has been contracted without
the knowledge of the legitimate spouse.

More importantly, while Sec. 52 of P.D. 1529 (Property Registration

Decree) provides for constructive notice to all persons of every entry made
in the office of the Register of Deeds there is no counterpart provision
either in Act No. 3753 (Act to Establish a Civil Register) or in Arts. 407 to
413 of the Civil Code, which leads us to the conclusion that there is no
legal basis for applying the constructive notice rule to the documents
registered in the Civil Register.

Were we to put our imprimatur to the theory advanced by petitioner, in all

likelihood we would be playing right into the hands of philanderers.

For we would be equating the contract of marriage with ordinary

deeds of conveyance and other similar documents without due regard
for the stability of marriage as an inviolable social institution, the
preservation of which is a primary concern of our society.

DISPOSITIVE:
WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error in the questioned decision of
the Court of Appeals, the same is AFFIRMED.

[G.R. No. 130817. August 22, 2001.]

PRESIDENTIAL AD HOC FACT-FINDING COMMITTEE ON BEHEST LOANS

represented by MAGTANGGOL C. GUNIGUNDO, PCGG Chairman & ORLANDO
L. SALVADOR, as Consultant, Technical Working Group of the Presidential
Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans, Petitioner, v. HON.
ANIANO A. DESIERTO, as Ombudsman, P. O. DOMINGO, MARIO ORTIZ &
ALEJANDRO CRUZ, Philippine National Bank Officers, and ENRIQUE T.
GALAN, SEBASTIAN C. COSCOLLUELA, ARSENIO L. DEL ROSARIO & JOSE
HAUTEA, Officers of Calinog-Lambunao Sugar Mills, Inc., Respondents.

DECISION

PARDO, J.:

The Case

The case before the Court is a special civil action for certiorari to annul and set aside
the resolution of the Ombudsman 1 dismissing the complaint against respondents
and to order the Ombudsman to file the necessary information for violation of the
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act against them. 2

The Facts

Atty. Orlando Salvador was PCGG Consultant on detail with the Presidential Ad Hoc
Committee on Behest Loans. 3 Likewise, he was the coordinator of the Technical
Working Group (TWG) composed of officers and employees of different Government
Financing Institutions (GFI). 4

Among the accounts referred to the TWG of the Behest Loans Committee was the
loan of Calinog-Lambunao Sugar Mills, Inc. 5 with the Philippine National Bank
(PNB). chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

In 1968, Calinog applied to the PNB for a stand-by irrevocable confirmed letter of
credit amounting to $22,109,412.00 to cover importation of sugar machinery and
equipment on "turn-key" basis, construction, plantation and money loans in
connection with its proposed 4,000 TCD Sugar Central. On March 20, 1968, the PNB
approved the loan. 6 On May 8, 1968, the approved loan was increased to
$22,132,377.00. 7

On March 24, 1997, Atty. Orlando Salvador filed with the Ombudsman 8 a complaint
against Calinog-Lambunao Sugar Mills, Inc. (Calinog), alleging: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"5. Pursuant to Administrative Order No. 13 dated October 18, 1992, creating the
Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on Behest Loans and further defined its
scope under Memorandum Order No. 61 dated November 9, 1992, (copies
attached), the Committee unanimously resolved that the presence of two or more of
the eight (8) criteria mentioned under Memorandum No. 61 will classify the account
as Behest Loan.

"In the instant case, the Committee endorsed the account to be behest loan.

"1. It is undercollateralized;
"2. The borrower corporation is undercapitalized;

"3. Non-feasibility of the project for which financing is being sought.

"6. It appears from the foregoing facts and circumstances on record that the
provisions of Section 3 (e) and (g) of RA 3019 among other laws, were violated: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"SECTION 3. Corrupt Practice of Public Officers. — In addition to the acts or

omissions of public officers already penalized by existing law, the following shall
constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are hereby declared to be
unlawful: chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

x           x          x

"7. . . .

"8. As of April 30, 1986, (the) firm has an outstanding and unpaid balance of
P348.291 million representing bid price of foreclosed assets (Evidence 8)" 9

On May 29, 1997, the Ombudsman dismissed the complaint on the ground of
prescription. The resolution reads: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"The loan transactions subject of this complaint occurred in the years 1968, 1978,
1979 and 1982, respectively. A cursory look at the said loan transactions would
readily disclose the fact that the fifteen (15) year prescriptive period for offenses
punishable under R.A. 3019, as amended has already passed from the time the
alleged offenses were committed. If there is nothing that was concealed or needed
to be discovered, because the entire series of transactions was by public
instruments, duly recorded, the crime of estafa committed in connection with said
transactions was known to the offended party when it was committed and the period
of prescription commenced to run from the date of its commission (People v. Dinsay,
C.A. 40 O.G., 12 Supp. 50).

"Applying now the foregoing decision of the Court in the case at bar, the prescriptive
period of fifteen (15) years shall commence to run from the date of commission.
Hence, the subject offenses have already prescribed following the pronouncement of
the Court in the foregoing case. chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

"WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, it is respectfully recommended that the

instant charges against herein respondents be dismissed on the ground of
prescription.

"SO RESOLVED.

"Manila, Philippines, May 29, 1997." 10

Hence, this petition. 11

On October 28, 1999, the Ombudsman manifested to the Court his willingness to
have the case remanded to his Office for preliminary investigation. Thus —

"In view of the fact that the case involves an alleged behest loan which Public
Respondent dismissed on the sole ground of prescription, Public Respondent
manifests its willingness to have the case remanded to the Office of the Ombudsman
for preliminary investigation.

Prayer

"Wherefore, it is respectively prayed of this Honorable Court that this Manifestation

be NOTED." 12

The Court’s Ruling

The subject loans were given in 1968, 1978, 1979 and 1982. On March 24, 1997,
petitioner filed a complaint with the Ombudsman for violation of R.A. No. 3019. 13

Respondents contend that the action is barred by prescription inasmuch as petitioner

filed the complaint twenty nine (29) years after the crime was committed, well
beyond the 15-year prescriptive period provided by law.

In resolving the issue of prescription of the offense charged, the following shall be
considered: (1) the period of prescription for the offense charged; (2) the time the
period of prescription started to run; and (3) the time the prescriptive period was
interrupted. 14

Looking closely at the provisions of R.A. No. 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act), the law provides for its own prescriptive period.

"SECTION 11. Prescription of offenses. — All offenses punishable under this Act shall
prescribe in fifteen years." (Emphasis supplied)

However, since R.A. No. 3019, as amended, is a special law, the applicable rule in
the computation of the prescriptive period is provided in Act No. 3326, Section 2 15
as amended, which provides: jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"SECTION 2. Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of the
violation of the law, and if the same be not known at the time, from the discovery
thereof and the institution of judicial proceedings for its investigation and
punishment.

"The prescription shall be interrupted when proceedings are instituted against the
guilty person, and shall begin to run again if the proceedings are dismissed for
reasons not constituting jeopardy." cralaw virtua1aw library

This implies that if the commission of the crime were known, the prescriptive period
shall commence to run on the day the crime was committed. However, if the
violation of the special law was not known at the time of its commission, the
prescription begins to run only from the discovery thereof; i.e., discovery of the
unlawful nature of the constitutive act or acts. 16

In cases involving violations of R.A. No. 3019 committed prior to the February 1986
Edsa Revolution that ousted President Ferdinand E. Marcos, we ruled that the
government as the aggrieved party could not have known of the violations at the
time the questioned transactions were made. 17 Moreover, no person would have
dared to question the legality of those transactions. Thus, the counting of the
prescriptive period commenced from the date of discovery of the offense in 1992
after an exhaustive investigation by the Presidential Ad Hoc Committee on Behest
Loans.

As to when the period of prescription was interrupted, the second paragraph of

Section 2, Act No. 3326, as amended, provides that prescription is interrupted
"when proceedings are instituted against the guilty person." cralaw virtua1aw library

In this case, the prescriptive period was interrupted upon the filing of the complaint
with the Ombudsman on March 24, 1997, five (5) years from the time of discovery
in 1992. chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

Thusly, the filing of the complaint was well within the prescriptive period.

WHEREFORE, the Court hereby GRANTS the petition and SETS ASIDE the Resolution
of the Ombudsman in Case No. OMB-0-97-0724, dated May 29, 1997.

The Court further DIRECTS the Ombudsman to conduct preliminary investigation in

Case No. OMB-0-97-0724 with deliberate dispatch.

No costs.

SO ORDERED. chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-26053             February 21, 1967

CITY OF MANILA, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
GERARDO GARCIA — CARMENCITA VILLANUEVA, MODESTA PARAYNO — NARCISO
PARAYNO, JUAN ASPERAS, MARIA TABIA — SIMEON DILIMAN, AQUILINO BARRIOS —
LEONORA RUIZ, LAUREANO DIZO, BERNABE AYUDA — LEOGARDA DE LOS SANTOS,
ISABELO OBAOB — ANDREA RIPARIP, JOSE BARRIENTOS, URBANO RAMOS, 1 ELENA
RAMOS, ESTEFANIA NEPACINA, MODESTA SANCHEZ, MARCIAL LAZARO, MARCIANA
ALANO, HONORIO BERIÑO — SEDORA ORAYLE, GLORIA VELASCO, WILARICO
RICAMATA, BENEDICTO DIAZ, ANA DEQUIZ — (MRS.) ALUNAN, LORENZO CARANDANG,
JUAN PECAYO, FELICIDAD MIRANDA — EMIGDIO EGIPTO, defendants-appellants.

Mauricio Z. Alunan for defendants-appellants.

City Fiscal's Office for plaintiff-appellee.

SANCHEZ, J.:

Plaintiff City of Manila is owner of parcels of land, forming one compact area, bordering Kansas,
Vermont and Singalong streets in Malate, Manila, and covered by Torrens Titles Nos. 49763,
37082 and 37558. Shortly after liberation from 1945 to 1947, defendants entered upon these
premises without plaintiff's knowledge and consent. They built houses of second-class materials,
again without plaintiff's knowledge and consent, and without the necessary building permits from
the city. There they lived thru the years to the present.
In November, 1947, the presence of defendants having previously been discovered, defendants
Felicidad Miranda (Emigdio Egipto), Modesta C. Parayno, Benedicto Diaz, Laureano Dizo, Jose
Barrientos, Elena Ramos, Estefania Nepacina, Modesta Sanchez, Honorio Beriño, Gloria
Velasco, Ana Dequis Alunan and Benedicto Ofiaza (predecessor of defendant Carandang) were
given by Mayor Valeriano E. Fugoso written permits — each labeled "lease contract" — to
occupy specific areas in the property upon conditions therein set forth. Defendants Isabelo
Obaob and Gerardo Garcia (in the name of Marta A. Villanueva) received their permits from
Mayor Manuel de la Fuente on January 29 and March 18, respectively, both of 1948. The rest of
the 23 defendants exhibited none.

For their occupancy, defendants were charged nominal rentals. 1äwphï1.ñët

Following are the rentals due as of February, 1962:

Amt. due from

Area Monthly
NAME date of delinquency
in sq.m. Rental
to Feb. 1962
1. Gerardo Garcia 66.00 P7.92 P1,628.97
2. Modesta C. Parayno 87.75 10.53 379.08
3. Juan Asperas 39.00 4.68 9.36
4. Maria Tabia 35.20 5.76 570.24
5. Aquilino Barrios
54.00 4.32 99.36
(Leonora Ruiz)
6. Laureano Dizo 35.00 2.80 22.40
7. Bernabe Ayuda 39.60 3.17 323.34
8. Isabelo Obaob 75.52 9.06 208.38
9. Jose Barrientos 39.53 4.74 744.18
10. Cecilia Manzano in Paid up to
lieu of Urbano Ramos (deceased) 46.65 5.60 Feb. 1962.
11. Elena Ramos 34.80 2.78 186.26
12. Estefania Nepacina 41.80 3.34 504.34
13. Modesta Sanchez 33.48 2.68 444.88
14. Marcial Lazaro 22.40 1.79 688.32
15. Marciana Alano 25.80 2.06 255.44
16. Honorio Beriño 24.00 1.92 188.16
17. Gloria Velasco 32.40 2.59 56.98
18. Wilarico Ricamata 45.83 3.67 739.68
Paid up to
19. Benedicto Diaz 40.20 4.82
March 1962.
20. Ana Dequis Alunan 64.26 7.71 30.84
21. Lorenzo Carandang 45.03 5.40 437.40
22. Juan N. Pecayo 25.52 3.06 30.60
 23. Felicidad Miranda 48.02 5.76 132.48

P7,580.69

Epifanio de los Santos Elementary School is close, though not contiguous, to the property. Came
the need for this school's expansion; it became pressing. On September 14, 1961, plaintiff's City
Engineer, pursuant to the Mayor's directive to clear squatters' houses on city property, gave each
of defendants thirty (30) days to vacate and remove his construction or improvement on the
premises. This was followed by the City Treasurer's demand on each defendant, made in
February and March, 1962, for the payment of the amount due by reason of the occupancy and
to vacate in fifteen (15) days. Defendants refused. Hence, this suit to recover possession. 2

The judgment below directed defendants to vacate the premises; to pay the amounts heretofore
indicated opposite their respective names; and to pay their monthly rentals from March, 1962,
until they vacate the said premises, and the costs. Defendants appealed.

1. We are called upon to rule on the forefront question of whether the trial court properly
found that the city needs the premises for school purposes.

The city's evidence on this point is Exhibit E, the certification of the Chairman, Committee
on Appropriations of the Municipal Board. That document recites that the amount of
P100,000.00 had been set aside in Ordinance 4566, the 1962-1963 Manila City Budget,
for the construction of an additional building of the Epifanio de los Santos Elementary
School. It is indeed correct to say that the court below, at the hearing, ruled out the
admissibility of said document. But then, in the decision under review, the trial judge
obviously revised his views. He there declared that there was need for defendants to
vacate the premises for school expansion; he cited the very document, Exhibit E,
aforesaid.

It is beyond debate that a court of justice may alter its ruling while the case is within its
power, to make it conformable to law and justice.3 Such was done here. Defendants'
remedy was to bring to the attention of the court its contradictory stance. Not having done
so, this Court will not reopen the case solely for this purpose. 4

Anyway, elimination of the certification, Exhibit E, as evidence, would not profit

defendants. For, in reversing his stand, the trial judge could well have taken — because
the was duty bound to take — judicial notice5 of Ordinance 4566. The reason being that
the city charter of Manila requires all courts sitting therein to take judicial notice of all
ordinances passed by the municipal board of Manila. 6 And, Ordinance 4566 itself
confirms the certification aforesaid that an appropriation of P100,000.00 was set aside for
the "construction of additional building" of the Epifanio de los Santos Elementary School.

Furthermore, defendants' position is vulnerable to assault from a third direction.

Defendants have absolutely no right to remain in the premises. The excuse that they
have permits from the mayor is at best flimsy. The permits to occupy are recoverable on
thirty days' notice. They have been asked to leave; they refused to heed. It is in this
factual background that we say that the city's need for the premises is unimportant. The
city's right to throw defendants out of the area cannot be gainsaid. The city's dominical
right to possession is paramount. If error there was in the finding that the city needs the
land, such error is harmless and will not justify reversal of the judgment below. 7

2. But defendants insist that they have acquired the legal status of tenants. They are
wrong.
They entered the land, built houses of second-class materials thereon without the
knowledge and consent of the city. Their homes were erected without city permits.

These constructions are illegal. In a language familiar to all, defendants are squatters:

Since the last global war, squatting on another's property in this country has become a
widespread vice. It was and is a blight. Squatters' areas pose problems of health,
sanitation. They are breeding places for crime. They constitute proof that respect for the
law and the rights of others, even those of the government, are being flouted. Knowingly,
squatters have embarked on the pernicious act of occupying property whenever and
wherever convenient to their interests — without as much as leave, and even against the
will, of the owner. They are emboldened seemingly because of their belief that they could
violate the law with impunity. The pugnaciousness of some of them has tied up the hands
of legitimate owners. The latter are thus prevented from recovering possession by
peaceful means. Government lands have not been spared by them. They know, of
course, that intrusion into property, government or private, is wrong. But, then, the mills
of justice grind slow, mainly because of lawyers who, by means, fair or foul, are quite
often successful in procuring delay of the day of reckoning. Rampancy of forcible entry
into government lands particularly, is abetted by the apathy of some public officials to
enforce the government's rights. Obstinacy of these squatters is difficult to explain unless
it is spawned by official tolerance, if not outright encouragement or protection. Said
squatters have become insensible to the difference between right and wrong. To them,
violation of law means nothing. With the result that squatting still exists, much to the
detriment of public interest. It is high time that, in this aspect, sanity and the rule of law be
restored. It is in this environment that we look into the validity of the permits granted
defendants herein.

These permits, erroneously labeled "lease" contracts, were issued by the mayors in 1947
and 1948 when the effects of the war had simmered down and when these defendants
could have very well adjusted themselves. Two decades have now elapsed since the
unlawful entry. Defendants could have, if they wanted to, located permanent premises for
their abode. And yet, usurpers that they are, they preferred to remain on city property.

Defendants' entry as aforesaid was illegal. Their constructions are as illegal, without
permits.8 The city charter enjoins the mayor to "safeguard all the lands" of the City of
Manila.9

Surely enough, the permits granted did not "safeguard" the city's land in question. It is
our considered view that the Mayor of the City of Manila cannot legalize forcible entry into
public property by the simple expedient of giving permits, or, for that matter, executing
leases.

Squatting is unlawful and no amount of acquiescence on the part of the city officials will
elevate it into a lawful act. In principle, a compound of illegal entry and official permit to
stay is obnoxious to our concept of proper official norm of conduct. Because, such permit
does not serve social justice; it fosters moral decadence. It does not promote public
welfare; it abets disrespect for the law. It has its roots in vice; so it is an infected bargain.
Official approval of squatting should not, therefore, be permitted to obtain in this country
where there is an orderly form of government.

We, accordingly, rule that the Manila mayors did not have authority to give permits,
written or oral, to defendants, and that the permits herein granted are null and void.

3. Let us look into the houses and constructions planted by defendants on the premises.
They clearly hinder and impair the use of that property for school purposes. The courts
may well take judicial notice of the fact that housing school children in the elementary
 grades has been and still is a perennial problem in the city. The selfish interests of
defendants must have to yield to the general good. The public purpose of constructing
the school building annex is paramount.10

In the situation thus obtaining, the houses and constructions aforesaid constitute public
nuisance per se. And this, for the reason that they hinder and impair the use of the
property for a badly needed school building, to the prejudice of the education of the youth
of the land.11 They shackle the hands of the government and thus obstruct performance
of its constitutionally ordained obligation to establish and maintain a complete and
adequate system of public education, and more, to "provide at least free public primary
instruction".12

Reason dictates that no further delay should be countenanced. The public nuisance
could well have been summarily abated by the city authorities themselves, even without
the aid of the courts.13

4. Defendants challenge the jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance of Manila. They say
that the case should have been started in the municipal court. They prop up their position
by the averment that notice for them to vacate was only served in September, 1961, and
suit was started in July, 1962. Their legal ground is Section 1, Rule 70 of the Rules of
Court. We have reached the conclusion that their forcible entry dates back to the period
from 1945 to 1947. That entry was not legalized by the permits. Their possession
continued to remain illegal from incipiency. Suit was filed long after the one-year
limitation set forth in Section 1 of Rule 70. And the Manila Court of First Instance has
jurisdiction.14

Upon the premises, we vote to affirm the judgment under review. Costs against defendants-
appellants. So ordered.

CITY OF MANILA V. GERARDO GARCIA

G.R. No. L-26053             February 21, 1967

FACTS

Plaintiff City of Manila is owner of parcels of land, forming one compact area in Malate, Manila, and covered
by Torrens Titles. Shortly after liberation from 1945 to 1947, defendants entered upon these premises without
plaintiff's knowledge and consent. They built houses of second-class materials, again without plaintiff's
knowledge and consent, and without the necessary building permits from the city. There they lived thru the
years to the present.

Few years thereafter, defendants were given written permits — each labeled "lease contract" — to occupy
specific areas in the property upon conditions therein set forth. For their occupancy, defendants were charged
nominal rentals.

Epifanio de los Santos Elementary School is close, though not contiguous, to the property. Came the need for
this school's expansion, plaintiff's City Engineer, pursuant to the Mayor's directive to clear squatters' houses on
city property, gave each of defendants to vacate and remove his construction or improvement on the premises.
This was followed by the City Treasurer's demand on each defendant for the payment of the amount due by
reason of the occupancy and to vacate.
The judgment below directed defendants to vacate the premises. Defendants appealed.

ISSUE

Whether the trial court properly found that the city needs the premises for school purposes.

RULING

Ordinance 4566 itself confirms the certification that an appropriation of P100,000.00 was set aside for the
"construction of additional building" of the Epifanio de los Santos Elementary School. The defendants were
wrong in insisting that they have acquired the legal status of tenants. They entered the land, built houses of
second-class materials thereon without the knowledge and consent of the city. Their homes were erected without
city pemits, thus, illegal. In a language familiar to all, defendants are squatters.

These permits, erroneously labeled "lease" contracts, were issued when the effects of the war had simmered
down and when these defendants could have very well adjusted themselves. Two decades have now elapsed
since the unlawful entry. Defendants could have, if they wanted to, located permanent premises for their abode.
And yet, usurpers that they are, they preferred to remain on city property. Defendants' entry as aforesaid was
illegal. Their constructions are as illegal, without permits.

The houses and constructions planted by defendants on the premises clearly hinder and impair the use of that
property for school purposes. The courts may well take judicial notice of the fact that housing school children in
the elementary grades has been and still is a perennial problem in the city. The selfish interests of defendants
must have to yield to the general good. The public purpose of constructing the school building annex is
paramount.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 85423             May 6, 1991

JOSE TABUENA, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and EMILIANO TABERNILLA, JR., respondents.

Ramon Dimen for petitioner.

Dionisio A. Hernandez for private respondent.

CRUZ, J.:

The petitioner faults the decision of the trial court, as affirmed by the respondent court, for lack of
basis. It is argued that the lower courts should not have taken into account evidence not
submitted by the private respondent in accordance with the Rules of Court.
The subject of the dispute is a parcel of residential land consisting of about 440 square meters
and situated in Poblacion, Makato, Aklan. In 1973, an action for recovery of ownership thereof
was filed in the Regional Trial Court of Aklan by the estate of Alfredo Tabernilla against Jose
Tabuena, the herein petitioner. After trial, judgment was rendered in favor of the plaintiff and the
defendant was required to vacate the disputed lot. 1

As the trial court found, the lot was sold by Juan Peralta, Jr. sometime in 1926 to Alfredo
Tabernilla while the two were in the United States. Tabernilla returned to the Philippines in 1934,
and Damasa Timtiman, acting upon her son Juan's instruction, conveyed the subject land to
Tabernilla. At the same time, she requested that she be allowed to stay thereon as she had been
living there all her life. Tabernilla agreed provided she paid the realty taxes on the property,
which she promised to do, and did. She remained on the said land until her death, following
which the petitioner, her son and half-brother of Juan Peralta, Jr., took possession thereof. The
complaint was filed when demand was made upon Tabuena to surrender the property and he
refused, claiming it as his own.

The trial court rejected his defense that he was the absolute owner of the lot, which he inherited
from his parents, who acquired it even before World War II and had been living thereon since
then and until they died. Also disbelieved was his contention that the subject of the sale between
Peralta and Tabernilla was a different piece of land planted to coconut trees and bounded on
three sides by the Makato River.

Tabuena appealed to the respondent court, complaining that, in arriving at its factual findings, the
trial court motu proprio took cognizance of Exhibits "A", "B" and "C", which had been marked by
the plaintiff but never formally submitted in evidence. The trial court also erred when, to resolve
the ownership of the subject lot, it considered the proceedings in another case involving the
same parties but a different parcel of land.

The said exhibits are referred to in the pre-trial order as follows:

Plaintiff proceeded to mark the following exhibits: Exh. "A", letter dated October 4, 1921
addressed in Makato, Capiz, Philippines; Exh. "A-1", paragraph 2 of the letter indicating
that the amount of P600.00—the first P300.00 and then another P300.00 as interest
since October 4, 1921; Exh. "A-2", is paragraph 3 of the letter; Exh. "B", a Spanish
document; Exh. "C", deed of conveyance filed by Tomasa Timtiman and Alfredo
Tabernilla in 1923; and Exh. "C-1", paragraph 4 of Exh. "C".

In sustaining the trial court, the respondent court held that, contrary to the allegations of the
appellant, the said exhibits were in fact formally submitted in evidence as disclosed by the
transcript of stenographic notes, which it quoted at length.  The challenged decision also upheld
2

the use by the trial court of testimony given in an earlier case, to bolster its findings in the second
case.

We have examined the record and find that the exhibits submitted were not the above-described
documents but Exhibits "X" and "T" and their sub-markings, which were the last will and
testament of Alfredo Tabernilla and the order of probate. It is not at all denied that the list of
exhibits does not include Exhibits "A", "B" and "C". In fact, the trial court categorically declared
that "Exhibits "A-1, "A-2", "B", "C" and "C-l," were not among those documents or exhibits
formally offered for admission by plaintiff-administratrix." This is a clear contradiction of the
finding of the appellate court, which seems to have confused Exhibits "A," "B" and "C" with
Exhibits "X" and "Y", the evidence mentioned in the quoted transcript.

Rule 132 of the Rules of Court provides in Section 35 thereof as follows:

Sec. 35. Offer of evidence.—The court shall consider no evidence which has not been
formally offered. The purpose for which the evidence is offered must be specified.
The mere fact that a particular document is marked as an exhibit does not mean it has thereby
already been offered as part of the evidence of a party. It is true that Exhibits "A," "B" and "C"
were marked at the pre-trial of the case below, but this was only for the purpose of identifying
them at that time. They were not by such marking formally offered as exhibits. As we said
in Interpacific Transit, Inc. vs. Aviles,  "At the trial on the merits, the party may decide to formally
3

offer (the exhibits) if it believes they will advance its cause, and then again it may decide not to
do so at all. In the latter event, such documents cannot be considered evidence, nor can they be
given any evidentiary value."

Chief Justice Moran explained the rationale of the rule thus:

. . . The offer is necessary because it is the duty of a judge to rest his findings of facts
and his judgment only and strictly upon the evidence offered by the patties at the trial. 4

We did say in People vs. Napat-a  that even if there be no formal offer of an exhibit, it may still be
5

admitted against the adverse party if, first, it has been duly identified by testimony duly recorded
and, second, it has itself been incorporated in the records of the case. But we do not find that
these requirements have been satisfied in the case before us. The trial court said the said
exhibits could be validly considered because, even if they had not been formally offered, one of
the plaintiffs witnesses, Cunegunda Hernandez, testified on them at the trial and was even cross-
examined by the defendant's counsel. We do not agree. Although she did testify, all she did was
identify the documents. Nowhere in her testimony can we find a recital of the contents of the
exhibits.

Thus, her interrogation on Exhibit "A" ran:

LEGASPI: That is this Exh. "A" about ?

A The translation of the letter.

Q What is the content of this Exh. "A", the letter of the sister of Juan Peralta to Alfredo
Tabernilla?

Court: The best evidence is the document. Proceed. 6

She also did not explain the contents of the other two exhibits.

The respondent court also held that the trial court committed no reversible error in taking judicial
notice of Tabuena's testimony in a case it had previously heard which was closely connected
with the case before it. It conceded that as a general rule "courts are not authorized to take
judicial notice, in the adjudication of cases pending before them, of the contents of the records of
other cases, even when such cases have been tried or are pending in the same court, and
notwithstanding the fact that both cases may have been heard or are actually pending b before
the same judge.  Nevertheless, it applied the exception that:
7

. . . in the absence of objection, and as a matter of convenience to all parties, a court may
properly treat all or any part of the original record of a case filed in its archives as read
into the record of a case pending before it, when, with the knowledge of the opposing
party, reference is made to it for that purpose, by name and number or in some other
manner by which it is sufficiently designated; or when the original record of the former
case or any part of it, is actually withdrawn from the archives by the court's direction, at
the request or with the consent of the parties, and admitted as a part of the record of the
case then pending. 8
It is clear, though, that this exception is applicable only when, "in the absence of objection," "with
the knowledge of the opposing party," or "at the request or with the consent of the parties," the
case is clearly referred to or "the original or part of the records of the case are actually withdrawn
from the archives" and "admitted as part of the record of the case then pending." These
conditions have not been established here. On the contrary, the petitioner was completely
unaware that his testimony in Civil Case No. 1327 was being considered by the trial court in the
case then pending before it. As the petitioner puts it, the matter was never taken up at the trial
and was "unfairly sprung" upon him, leaving him no opportunity to counteract.

The respondent court said that even assuming that the trial court improperly took judicial notice
of the other case, striking off all reference thereto would not be fatal to the plaintiff's cause
because "the said testimony was merely corroborative of other evidences submitted by the
plaintiff." What "other evidences"? The trouble with this justification is that the exhibits it intends
to corroborate, to wit, Exhibits "A", "B" and "C", have themselves not been formally submitted.

Considering the resultant paucity of the evidence for the private respondent, we feel that the
complaint should have been dismissed by the trial court for failure of the plaintiff to substantiate
its allegations. It has failed to prove that the subject lot was the same parcel of land sold by Juan
Peralta, Jr. to Alfredo Tabernilla and not another property, as the petitioner contends. Even
assuming it was the same lot, there is no explanation for the sale thereof by Juan Peralta, Jr.,
who was only the son of Damasa Timtiman. According to the trial court, "there is no question that
before 1934 the land in question belonged to Damasa Timtiman." Juan Peralta, Jr. could not
have validly conveyed title to property that did not belong to him unless he had appropriate
authorization from the owner. No such authorization has been presented.

It is true that tax declarations are not conclusive evidence of ownership, as we have held in many
cases.  However, that rule is also not absolute and yields to the accepted and well-known
1âwphi1

exception. In the case at bar, it is not even disputed that the petitioner and his predecessors-in-
interest have possessed the disputed property since even before World War II. In light of this
uncontroverted fact, the tax declarations in their name become weighty and compelling evidence
of the petitioner's ownership. As this Court has held:

While it is true that by themselves tax receipts and declarations of ownership for taxation
purposes are not incontrovertible evidence of ownership they become strong evidence of
ownership acquired by prescription when accompanied by proof of actual possession of
the property.9

It is only where payment of taxes is accompanied by actual possession of the land

covered by the tax declaration that such circumstance may be material in supporting a
claim of ownership.10

The tax receipts accompanied by actual and continuous possession of the subject
parcels of land by the respondents and their parents before them for more than 30 years
qualify them to register title to the said subject parcels of land.
11

The Court can only wonder why, if Alfredo Tabernilla did purchase the property and
magnanimously allowed Damasa Timtiman to remain there, he did not at least require her to pay
the realty taxes in his name, not hers. The explanation given by the trial court is that he was not
much concerned with the property, being a bachelor and fond only of the three dogs he had
bought from America. That is specious reasoning. At best, it is pure conjecture. If he were really
that unconcerned, it is curious that he should have acquired the property in the first place, even
as dacion en pago. He would have demanded another form of payment if he did not have the
intention at all of living on the land. On the other hand, if he were really interested in the property,
we do not see why he did not have it declared in his name when the realty taxes thereon were
paid by Damasa Timtiman or why he did not object when the payments were made in her own
name.
In comparison, all the acts of Damasa Timtiman and Jose Tabuena indicate that they were the
owners of the disputed property. Damasa Timtiman and her forebears had been in possession
thereof for more than fifty years and, indeed, she herself stayed there until she died.  She paid
12

the realty taxes thereon in her own name.  Jose Tabuena built a house of strong materials on the
13

lot.  He even mortgaged the land to the Development Bank of the Philippines and to two private
14

persons who acknowledged him as the owner.  These acts denote ownership and are not
15

consistent with the private respondent's claim that the petitioner was only an overseer with mere
possessory rights tolerated by Tabernilla.

It is the policy of this Court to accord proper deference to the factual findings of the courts below
and even to regard them as conclusive where there is no showing that they have been reached
arbitrarily. The exception is where such findings do not conform to the evidence on record and
appear indeed to have no valid basis to sustain their correctness. As in this case.

The conclusions of the trial court were based mainly on Exhibits "A", "B" and "C", which had not
been formally offered as evidence and therefore should have been totally disregarded,
conformably to the Rules of Court. The trial court also erred when it relied on the evidence
submitted in Civil Case No. 1327 and took judicial notice thereof without the consent or
knowledge of the petitioner, in violation of existing doctrine. Thus vitiated, the factual findings
here challenged are as an edifice built upon shifting sands and should not have been sustained
by the respondent court.

Our own finding is that the private respondent, as plaintiff in the lower court, failed to prove his
claim of ownership over the disputed property with evidence properly cognizable under our
adjudicative laws. By contrast, there is substantial evidence supporting the petitioner's contrary
contentions that should have persuaded the trial judge to rule in s favor and dismiss the
complaint.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The appealed decision is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE, with costs against the private respondent. It is so ordered.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-28100 November 29, 1971

GABRIEL BAGUIO, plaintiff-Appellant,
vs.
TEOFILA L. VDA. DE JALAGAT, for herself and in representation of her minor children,
DOMINADOR, LEA and TEONIFE all surnamed JALAGAT; ANABELLA JALAGAT and
EMMANUEL JALAGAT, defendants-appellees.

Bonifacio P. Legaspi for plaintiff-appellant.

Cecilio P. Luminarias for defendants-appellees.

FERNANDO, J.:
The specific legal question raised in this appeal from an order of dismissal by the Court of First
Instance of Misamis Oriental, presided by the Hon. Benjamin K. Gorospe, one which has not as
yet been the subject of a definitive ruling is whether or not on a motion to dismiss on the ground
of res judicata that the cause of action is barred by a prior judgment, a lower court may take
judicial notice of such previous case decided by him resulting in the prior judgment relied upon.
Judge Gorospe answered in the affirmative. So do we. An affirmance is thus called for.

The case started with the complaint for the quieting of title to real property filed by plaintiff, now
appellant, Gabriel Baguio, on February, 14, 1966. There was on March 7, 1966 a motion to
dismiss filed by defendants, now appellees, on the ground that the cause of action is barred by a
prior judgment. This was the argument advanced: "The instant complaint or case, besides being
clearly unfounded and malicious, is identical to or the same as that Civil Case No. 1574 filed by
the same plaintiff and against Melecio alias Mening Jalagat, now deceased and whose legal
heirs and successors in interest are the very defendants in the instant complaint or Civil Case
No. 2639. Said Civil Case No. 1574 was filed on October 7, 1958 for 'Recovery of Possession
and Ownership of Real Estate' and entitled Gabriel Baguio, plantiff, versus Melecio alias Mening
Jalagat, defendant, involving practically the same property and practically the same parties as
defendants are the widow and the children, respectively, thus the legal or forced heirs of the
deceased Melecio Jalagat. That the said Case No. 1574, which is identical to or is the same case
as the instant one, has already been duly and finally terminated as could be clear from [an] order
of this Honorable Court [dated December 6, 1965]."  There was an opposition on the part of
1

plaintiff made on March 26, 1966 on the ground that for prior judgment or res judicata to suffice
as a basis for dismissal it must be apparent on the face of the complaint. It was then alleged that
there was nothing in the complaint from which such a conclusion may be inferred. Then, on
September 26, 1966, came the order complained of worded thus: "Acting on the motion to
dismiss filed by counsel for the defendants under date of March 4, 1966, anchored on the ground
that plaintiff's cause of action is barred by a prior judgement which this Court finds to be well-
founded as it has already dismissed plaintiff's complaint in Civil Case No. 1574 against Melecio
Jalagat alias Mening Jalagat, defendants predecessor in interest from whom they have derived
their rights, in an order dated December 6, 1965, pursuant to Section 3 of Rule 17 of the new
Rules of Court, which case involved the same parcel of land as the one in the instant case, as
prayed for, Civil Case No. 2639 should be as it is hereby [dismissed]. The Court's previous
dismissal of Civil Case No. 1574 has the effect of an adjudication upon the merits and
consequently is a bar to and may be pleaded in abatement of any subsequent action against the
same parties over the same issues and the same subject-matter by the same plaintiff. [So
ordered]"  Hence, this appeal.
2

The order of dismissal, as noted at the outset, must be sustained. It is in accordance with law.

1. The sole error assigned is that a bar by prior judgement cannot be raised in a motion to
dismiss when such ground does not appear on the face of the complaint. What immediately calls
attention in the rather sketchy and in conclusive discussion in the six-page brief of applicant is
that there was no denial as to the truth of the statement made by Judge Gorospe that there was
a previous dismissal the same plaintiff's complaint against the predecessor-in-interest of
defendants, who as expressly admitted by appellant was the deceased husband of one of them
and father of the rest. There was no denial either of the property involved being the same and of
the finality of the decsion in the previous case which would show that appellant's claim was
devoid of any support in law. It would be therefore futile for the court to continue with the case as
there had been such a prior judgment certainly binding on appellant. What then was there for the
lower court to do? Was there any sense in its being engaged in what was essentially a fruitless,
endeavor as the outcome was predictible?

Certainly, the law would lend itself to a well-deserved reproach if the Rules of Court would
sanction such a proceeding distinguished by nothing but its futility. It ought to be clear even to
appellant that under the circumstances, the lower court certainly could take judicial notice of the
finality of a judgment in a case that was previously pending and thereafter decided by it. That
was all that was done by the lower court in decreeing the dismissal. Certainly such an order is
not contrary to law. A citation from the comments of former Chief Justice Moran is relevant. Thus:
"Courts have also taken judicial notice of previous cases to determine whether or not the case
pending is a moot one, or whether or not a previous ruling is applicable in the case under
consideration."3

2. There is another equally compelling consideration. Appellant undoubtedly had recourse to a

remedy which under the law then in force could be availed of. It would have served the cause of
justice better, not to mention the avoidance of needless expense on his part and the vexation to
which appellees were subjected if he did reflect a little more on the matter. Then the valuable
time of this Tribunal would not have been frittered away on a useless find hopeless appeal. It
has, ever been the guiding principle from Alonso v. Villamor,  a 1910 decision, that a litigant
4

should not be allowed to worship at the altar of technicality. That is not to dispense justice
according to law. Parties, and much more so their counsel, should ever keep such an imperative
of our legal system in mind.
5

WHEREFORE, the order of dismissal of September 26, 1966 is hereby affirmed. With costs
against plaintiff.