SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. 187378. September 30, 2013.]

RAMONITO O. ACAAC, PETAL FOUNDATION, INC., APOLINARIO M.

ELORDE, HECTOR ACAAC, and ROMEO BULAWIN , petitioners, vs .
MELQUIADES D. AZCUNA, JR., in his capacity as Mayor, and
MARIETES B. BONALOS, in her capacity as Municipal Engineer and
Building O cial-Designate, both of Lopez Jaena Municipality,
Misamis Occidental , respondents.

RESOLUTION

PERLAS-BERNABE , J : p

Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari 1 are the Decision 2 dated September
30, 2008 and Resolution 3 dated March 9, 2009 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV
No. 00284-MIN which reversed and set aside the Decision 4 dated November 26, 2004 of
the Regional Trial Court of Oroquieta City, Branch 2 (RTC) in Civil Case No. 4684 for
injunction.
The Facts
Petitioner People's Eco-Tourism and Livelihood Foundation, Inc. (PETAL) is a non-
governmental organization, founded by petitioner Ramonito O. Acaac, which is engaged in
the protection and conservation of ecology, tourism, and livelihood projects within
Misamis Occidental. 5 In line with its objectives, PETAL built some cottages made of
indigenous materials on Capayas Island (a 1,605 square meter islet) in 1995 as well as a
seminar cottage in 2001 6 which it rented out to the public and became the source of
livelihood of its bene ciaries, 7 among whom are petitioners Hector Acaac and Romeo
Bulawin.
On April 11 and May 20, 2002, however, respondents Mayor Melquiades D. Azcuna,
Jr. (Azcuna) and Building O cial Marietes B. Bonalos issued separate Notices of Illegal
Construction against PETAL for its failure to apply for a building permit prior to the
construction of its buildings in violation of Presidential Decree No. 1096, 8 otherwise
known as the "National Building Code of the Philippines," ordering it to stop all illegal
building activities on Capayas Island. When PETAL failed to comply with the requirements
for the issuance of a building permit, a Third and Final Notice of Illegal Construction was
issued by respondents against it on July 8, 2002, 9 but still the same remained unheeded.
caSDCA

It was also on July 8, 2002 that the Sangguniang Bayan of Lopez Jaena (SB)
adopted Municipal Ordinance No. 02, Series of 2002 1 0 (subject ordinance) which
prohibited, among others: (a) the entry of any entity, association, corporation or
organization inside the sanctuaries; 1 1 and (b) the construction of any structures,
permanent or temporary, on the premises, except if authorized by the local government. 1 2
On July 12, 2002, Azcuna approved the subject ordinance; hence, the same was submitted
to the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Misamis Occidental (SP), which in turn, conducted a
joint hearing on the matter. Thereafter, notices were posted at the designated areas,
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 including Capayas Island, declaring the premises as government property and prohibiting
ingress and egress thereto. 1 3
On August 23, 2002, a Notice of Voluntary Demolition was served upon PETAL
directing it to remove the structures it built on Capayas Island. Among the reasons cited
was its violation of the subject ordinance. A similar notice was also served against
individual petitioners on October 25, 2002. 1 4 ICcaST

On October 29, 2002, petitioners led an action praying for the issuance of a
temporary restraining order, injunction and damages 1 5 against respondents before the
RTC, docketed as Civil Case No. 4684, alleging that they have prior vested rights to occupy
and utilize Capayas Island. PETAL claimed that its predecessors-in-interest have been in
possession thereof since 1961, with whom it entered into a Memorandum of Agreement
for the operation of the said island as a camping, tourism, and recreational resort; thus, the
issuance of the subject ordinance was prejudicial to their interest as they were deprived of
their livelihood. Moreover, PETAL assailed the validity of the subject ordinance on the
following grounds: (a) it was adopted without public consultation; (b) it was not published
in a newspaper of general circulation in the province as required by Republic Act No. 7160,
1 6 otherwise known as "The Local Government Code of 1991" (LGC); and (c) it was not
approved by the SP. Therefore, its implementation should be enjoined. 1 7
In their Answer, 1 8 respondents averred that petitioners have no cause of action
against them since they are not the lawful owners or lessees of Capayas Island, which was
classi ed as timberland and property belonging to the public domain. Further, they
maintained that they have complied with all the publication and hearing requirements for
the passage of the subject ordinance, which was deemed approved by operation of law for
failure of the SP to take any positive action thereon as provided under the LGC. As such, it
is valid and enforceable.
The RTC Ruling
On November 26, 2004, the RTC rendered a Decision 1 9 declaring the subject
ordinance as invalid/void based on the following grounds: (a) PETAL's protest has not
been resolved and that the subject ordinance was not duly approved by the SP; (b) the said
ordinance was not published in a newspaper of general circulation nor was it posted in
public places; (c) Capayas Island is classi ed as timberland, hence, not suited to be a bird
or sh sanctuary; and (d) the authority and control over timberlands belong to the national
government, through the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR). 2 0
Based on the foregoing, respondents were ordered, among others, to desist from closing
Capayas Island to the public. 2 1 However, the petitioners were ordered to remove the
structures they built thereon without valid building permits 2 2 since they were found to
have no title over the disputed property. 2 3
Aggrieved, respondents appealed the foregoing pronouncement before the CA,
docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 00284-MIN. DaTICc

The Proceedings Before the CA

On September 30, 2008, the CA rendered a Decision 2 4 granting respondents'
appeal.
Contrary to the RTC's ruling, it held that the subject ordinance was deemed
approved upon failure of the SP to declare the same invalid within 30 days after its
submission in accordance with Section 56 of the LGC. 2 5 It also gave credence to Azcuna's
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 testimony that the subject ordinance was posted and published in conspicuous places in
their municipality, and in the bulletin board. 2 6 Moreover, public consultations were
conducted with various groups before the subject ordinance was passed. 2 7 The CA
further ruled that the Municipality of Lopez Jaena was vested with su cient power and
authority to pass and adopt the subject ordinance under Section 447 in relation to Section
16 of the LGC. 2 8 Therefore, it is not only the DENR that could create and administer
sanctuaries. 2 9 Having enacted the subject ordinance within its powers as a municipality
and in accordance with the procedure prescribed by law, the CA pronounced that the
subject ordinance is valid. 3 0
On the other hand, the CA upheld the RTC's nding that petitioners have no
proprietary rights over the Capayas Island, thereby rendering their action for injunction
improper. 3 1 AHEDaI

Petitioners' motion for reconsideration 3 2 therefrom was denied by the CA in a

Resolution 3 3 dated March 9, 2009. Hence, the instant petition.
The Issue Before the Court
The essential issue in this case is whether or not the subject ordinance is valid and
enforceable against petitioners. 3 4
The Court's Ruling
The petition lacks merit.
Section 56 of the LGC provides:
SEC. 56.Review of Component City and Municipal Ordinances or
Resolutions by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan. — (a) Within three (3) days after
approval, the secretary to the Sangguniang Panlungsod or Sangguniang Bayan
shall forward to the Sangguniang Panlalawigan for review, copies of approved
ordinances and the resolutions approving the local development plans and public
investment programs formulated by the local development councils.
(b) Within thirty (30) days after receipt of copies of such ordinances
and resolutions, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan shall examine the documents or
transmit them to the provincial attorney, or if there be none, to the provincial
prosecutor for prompt examination. The provincial attorney or provincial
prosecutor shall, within a period of ten (10) days from receipt of the documents,
inform the Sangguniang Panlalawigan in writing his comments or
recommendations, which may be considered by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan
in making its decision.aDSIHc

(c) If the Sangguniang Panlalawigan nds that such an ordinance or

resolution is beyond the power conferred upon the Sangguniang Panlungsod or
Sangguniang Bayan concerned, it shall declare such ordinance or resolution
invalid in whole or in part. The Sangguniang Panlalawigan shall enter its action in
the minutes and shall advise the corresponding city or municipal authorities of
the action it has taken.
(d) If no action has been taken by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan
within thirty (30) days after submission of such an ordinance or resolution, the
same shall be presumed consistent with law and therefore valid.

In this case, petitioners maintain that the subject ordinance cannot be deemed
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 approved through the mere passage of time considering that the same is still pending with
the Committee on Fisheries and Aquatic Resources of the SP. 3 5 It, however, bears to note
that more than 30 days have already elapsed from the time the said ordinance was
submitted to the latter for review by the SB; 3 6 hence, it should be deemed approved and
valid pursuant to Section 56 (d) above. As properly observed by the CA:
Par. (d) should be read in conjunction with par. (c), in order to arrive at the
meaning of the disputed word, "action." It is clear, based on the foregoing
provision, that the action that must be entered in the minutes of the sangguniang
panlalawigan is the declaration of the sangguniang panlalawigan that the
ordinance is invalid in whole or in part. . . . .

This construction would be more in consonance with the rule of statutory

construction that the parts of a statute must be read together in such a manner as
to give effect to all of them and that such parts shall not be construed as
contradicting each other. . . . laws are given a reasonable construction such that
apparently con icting provisions are allowed to stand and given effect by
reconciling them, reference being had to the moving spirit behind the enactment
of the statute. 3 7 CTcSIA

Neither can the Court give credence to petitioners' contentions that the subject
ordinance was not published nor posted in accordance with the provisions of the LGC. 3 8 It
is noteworthy that petitioners' own evidence reveals that a public hearing 3 9 was
conducted prior to the promulgation of the subject ordinance. Moreover, other than their
bare allegations, petitioners failed to present any evidence to show that no publication or
posting of the subject ordinance was made. In contrast, Azcuna had testi ed that they
have complied with the publication and posting requirements. 4 0 While it is true that he
likewise failed to submit any other evidence thereon, still, in accordance with the
presumption of validity in favor of an ordinance, its constitutionality or legality should be
upheld in the absence of any controverting evidence that the procedure prescribed by law
was not observed in its enactment. Likewise, petitioners had the burden of proving their
own allegation, which they, however, failed to do. In the similar case of Figuerres v. CA , 4 1
citing United States v. Cristobal, 4 2 the Court upheld the presumptive validity of the
ordinance therein despite the lack of controverting evidence on the part of the local
government to show that public hearings were conducted in light of: (a) the oppositor's
equal lack of controverting evidence to demonstrate the local government's non-
compliance with the said public hearing; and (b) the fact that the local government's non-
compliance was a negative allegation essential to the oppositor's cause of action:
However, it is noteworthy that apart from her bare assertions, petitioner
Figuerres has not presented any evidence to show that no public hearings were
conducted prior to the enactment of the ordinances in question. On the other
hand, the Municipality of Mandaluyong claims that public hearings were indeed
conducted before the subject ordinances were adopted, although it likewise failed
to submit any evidence to establish this allegation. However, in accordance
with the presumption of validity in favor of an ordinance, their
constitutionality or legality should be upheld in the absence of evidence
showing that the procedure prescribed by law was not observed in their
enactment . In an analogous case, United States v. Cristobal, it was alleged that
the ordinance making it a crime for anyone to obstruct waterways had not been
submitted by the provincial board as required by §§2232-2233 of the
Administrative Code. In rejecting this contention, the Court held:aTEHCc

From the judgment of the Court of First Instance the defendant

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 appealed to this court upon the theory that the ordinance in question was
adopted without authority on the part of the municipality and was
therefore unconstitutional. The appellant argues that there was no proof
adduced during the trial of the cause showing that said ordinance had
been approved by the provincial board. Considering the provisions of law
that it is the duty of the provincial board to approve or disapprove
ordinances adopted by the municipal councils of the different
municipalities, we will assume, in the absence of proof to the contrary, that
the law has been complied with. We have a right to assume that
o cials have done that which the law requires them to do, in the
absence of positive proof to the contrary . DTAcIa

Furthermore, the lack of a public hearing is a negative allegation

essential to petitioner's cause of action in the present case. Hence, as
petitioner is the party asserting it, she has the burden of proof. Since
petitioner failed to rebut the presumption of validity in favor of the subject
ordinances and to discharge the burden of proving that no public hearings were
conducted prior to the enactment thereof, we are constrained to uphold their
constitutionality or legality. 4 3 (Emphases supplied, citation omitted)

All told, the Court nds no reversible error committed by the CA in upholding the
validity of the subject ordinance.
In any event, petitioners have not shown any valid title 4 4 to the property in dispute
to be entitled to its possession. Besides, the RTC's order directing the removal of the
structures built by petitioners on Capayas Island without building permits was not
appealed. As such, the same should now be deemed as final and conclusive upon them.
WHEREFORE , the petition is DENIED . The Decision dated September 30, 2008 and
Resolution dated March 9, 2009 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 00284-MIN are
hereby AFFIRMED .
SO ORDERED . EHSAaD

Carpio, Brion, Del Castillo and Perez, JJ., concur.

Footnotes

1.Rollo, pp. 9-22.

2.Id. at 31-46. Penned by Associate Justice Ruben C. Ayson, with Associate Justices Rodrigo F.
Lim, Jr. and Michael P. Elbinias, concurring.
3.Id. at 25-29.
4.Id. at 55-71. Penned by Judge Bernadette S. Paredes-Encinareal.

5.Id. at 32.
6.Id. at 11.

7.Id. at 32-33.
8."ADOPTING A NATIONAL BUILDING CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES (NBCP) THEREBY REVISING
REPUBLIC ACT NUMBERED SIXTY-FIVE HUNDRED FORTY-ONE (R.A. NO. 6541)."

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 9.Rollo, p. 34.

10.Records, pp. 28-29. Entitled "AN ORDINANCE ESTABLISHING CAPAYAS ISLAND AND ITS
SURROUNDINGS, MANSABAY BAJO AND SIBULA AS BIRDS, FISH AND SHELLS
SANCTUARY LOCATED WITHIN THE MUNICIPAL WATERS OF LOPEZ JAENA WITH A
TOTAL AREA OF SIXTY THREE POINT ONE HUNDRED NINETY SEVEN (63.197)
HECTARES, THREE (3) HECTARES AND THREE (3) HECTARES RESPECTIVELY."

11.Rollo, pp. 33-34.

12.Records, p. 28. See subject ordinance.

13.Rollo, pp. 34-35.

14.Id. at 35.
15.Id. at 36.
16."AN ACT PROVIDING FOR A LOCAL GOVERNMENT CODE OF 1991."
17.Records, p. 5.
18.Id. at 76-81.

19.Rollo, pp. 55-71.

20.Id. at 67-68.
21.Id. at 71.
22.Id.
23.Id. at 70.

24.Id. at 31-46.
25.Id. at 39-40.
26.Id. at 40-41.
27.Id. at 43.

28.Id. at 42.
29.Id. at 43.
30.Id. at 42-43.
31.Id. at 45.
32.Id. at 47-53.

33.Id. at 25-29.
34.Id. at 13.
35.See id. at 14-15.
36.Id. at 14.
37.Id. at 38-39.

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 38.SEC. 511. Posting and Publication of Ordinances with Penal Sanctions. — (a)
ordinances with penal sanctions shall be posted at prominent places in the provincial
capitol, city, municipal or Barangay hall, as the case may be, for a minimum period of
three (3) consecutive weeks. Such ordinances shall also be published in a newspaper of
general circulation, where available, within the territorial jurisdiction of the local
government unit concerned, except in the case of Barangay ordinances. Unless
otherwise provided therein, said ordinances shall take effect on the day following its
publication, or at the end of the period of posting, whichever occurs later.

xxx xxx xxx

39.Records, p. 60. A "dialogue-consultation" was conducted by the SB on June 13, 2002.
40.Rollo, pp. 40-41.
41.364 Phil. 683 (1999).
42.34 Phil. 825 (1916).

43.Figuerres v. CA, supra note 41, at 692-693.

44.Rollo, p. 70.

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