FERNANDA MENDOZA CEQUENA AND RUPERTA MENDOZA LIRIO, Petitioners, versus HONORATA

MENDOZA BOLANTE, Respondent.

G.R. No. 137944, THIRD DIVISION , April 06, 2000, PANGANIBAN, J.

FACTS:

The Petition herein refers to a parcel of land situated in Barangay Bangad, Binangonan, Province of Rizal,
having an area of 1,728 square meters and covered by Tax Declaration No. 26-0027.

Prior to 1954, the land was originally declared for taxation purposes in the name of Sinforoso Mendoza,
father of [respondent] and married to Eduarda Apiado. Sinforoso died in 1930. [Petitioners] were the
daughters of Margarito Mendoza. On the basis of an affidavit, the tax declaration in the name of
Sinforoso Mendoza of the contested lot was cancelled and subsequently declared in the name of
Margarito Mendoza. Margarito and Sinforoso are brothers. [Respondent] is the present occupant of the
land. Earlier, on October 15, 1975, [respondent] and Miguel Mendoza, another brother of [petitioners],
during the cadastral survey had a dispute on [the] ownership of the land.

The court a quo rendered its judgment in favor of petitioners.

The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court because the genuineness and the due execution of the
affidavit allegedly signed by the respondent and her mother had not been sufficiently established. The
notary public or anyone else who had witnessed the execution of the affidavit was not presented. No
expert testimony or competent witness ever attested to the genuineness of the questioned signatures.

Moreover, the appellate court held that the probative value of petitioners’ tax receipts and declarations
paled in comparison with respondent’s proof of ownership of the disputed parcel. Actual, physical,
exclusive and continuous possession by respondent since 1985 indeed gave her a better title under
Article 538 of the Civil Code.

ISSUE:

Whether CA erred in holding that respondent has been in actual and physical possession, coupled with
xxx exclusive and continuous possession of the land since 1985, which are evidence of the best kind of
circumstance proving the claim of the title of ownership and enjoys the presumption of preferred
possessor. (NO)

RULING:

The presumption in Article 541 of the Civil Code is merely disputable; it prevails until the contrary is
proven. That is, one who is disturbed in one's possession shall, under this provision, be restored thereto
by the means established by law. Article 538 settles only the question of possession, and possession is
different from ownership. Ownership in this case should be established in one of the ways provided by
law.

To settle the issue of ownership, we need to determine who between the claimants has proven
acquisitive prescription.

Ownership of immovable property is acquired by ordinary prescription through possession for ten years.
Being the sole heir of her father, respondent showed through his tax receipt that she had been in
possession of the land for more than ten years since 1932. When her father died in 1930, she continued
to reside there with her mother. When she got married, she and her husband engaged in kaingin inside
the disputed lot for their livelihood.

Respondent's possession was not disturbed until 1953 when the petitioners' father claimed the land. But
by then, her possession, which was in the concept of owner -- public, peaceful, and uninterrupted -- had
already ripened into ownership. Furthermore she herself, after her father's demise, declared and paid
realty taxes for the disputed land. Tax receipts and declarations of ownership for taxation, when coupled
with proof of actual possession of the property, can be the basis of a claim for ownership through
prescription.

In contrast, the petitioners, despite thirty-two years of farming the subject land, did not acquire
ownership. It is settled that ownership cannot be acquired by mere occupation. Unless coupled with the
element of hostility toward the true owner, occupation and use, however long, will not confer title by
prescription or adverse possession. Moreover, the petitioners cannot claim that their possession was
public, peaceful and uninterrupted. Although their father and brother arguably acquired ownership
through extraordinary prescription because of their adverse possession for thirty-two years (1953-
1985),this supposed ownership cannot extend to the entire disputed lot, but must be limited to the
portion that they actually farmed.

We cannot sustain the petitioners' contention that their ownership of the disputed land was established
before the trial court through the series of tax declarations and receipts issued in the name of Margarito
Mendoza. Such documents prove that the holder has a claim of title over the property. Aside from
manifesting a sincere desire to obtain title thereto, they announce the holder's adverse claim against
the state and other interested parties.

However, tax declarations and receipts are not conclusive evidence of ownership. At most, they
constitute mere prima facie proof of ownership or possession of the property for which taxes have been
paid.

Article(s) used:

Article 541: A possessor in the concept of owner has in his favor the legal presumption that he
possesses with a just title and he cannot be obliged to show or prove it. (448a)

Article 538: Art. 538. Possession as a fact cannot be recognized at the same time in two different
personalities except in the cases of co-possession. Should a question arise regarding the fact of
possession, the present possessor shall be preferred; if there are two possessors, the one longer in
possession; if the dates of the possession are the same, the one who presents a title; and if all these
conditions are equal, the thing shall be placed in judicial deposit pending determination of its
possession or ownership through proper proceedings.

The presumption in Article 541 of the Civil Code is merely disputable; it prevails until the contrary is
proven. That is, one who is disturbed in one's possession shall, under this provision, be restored thereto
by the means established by law. Article 538 settles only the question of possession, and possession is
different from ownership. Ownership in this case should be established in one of the ways provided by
law.
To settle the issue of ownership, we need to determine who between the claimants has proven
acquisitive prescription.

Ownership of immovable property is acquired by ordinary prescription through possession for ten years.

In this case, being the sole heir of her father, respondent showed through his tax receipt that she had
been in possession of the land for more than ten years since 1932. When her father died in 1930, she
continued to reside there with her mother. When she got married, she and her husband engaged in
kaingin inside the disputed lot for their livelihood.

Respondent's possession was not disturbed until 1953 when the petitioners' father claimed the land. But
by then, her possession, which was in the concept of owner -- public, peaceful, and uninterrupted -- had
already ripened into ownership. Furthermore she herself, after her father's demise, declared and paid
realty taxes for the disputed land. Tax receipts and declarations of ownership for taxation, when coupled
with proof of actual possession of the property, can be the basis of a claim for ownership through
prescription.

SUBIC BAY LEGEND RESORTS AND CASINOS, INC., Petitioner, vs. BERNARD C. FERNANDEZ,
Respondent.

(G.R. No. 193426, SECOND DIVISION, September 29, 2014, DEL CASTILLO, J.)

FACTS:

An operation was launched by Legenda Hotel and Casino (owned and operated by Subic Bay Legend
Resorts and Casino, Inc.) to zero-in on Ludwin. Legenda admitted in its brief that its surveillance staff
paid close attention to Ludwin simply because it was "unusual" for a Filipino to play using
dollardenominated chips.

After Ludwin and his brother Deoven were accosted by the Legenda’s internal security, they were
separately interrogated about the source of the chips they brought. The ultimatum was to confess that
the chips were given by a certain employee, Michael Cabrera, or they would not be released from
questioning. Finally, the brothers succumbed to Legenda's instruction to execute a joint statement
implicating Cabrera.

However, the brothers recanted their statement and another brother, Bernard, filed an action for
recovery of sum of money with damages against petitioner. Bernard alleged that the Legenda casino
chips worth US$6,000.00, belonged to him; that petitioner illegally confiscated his casino chips
equivalent to US$5,900.00; and that petitioner refused and continues to refuse to return the same to
him despite demand.

Petitioner's Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim essentially alleged that respondent had no cause of
action since the confiscated casino chips were stolen from it, and thus it has the right to retain them.
The trial court rendered its Decision, ordering the defendant to return to plaintiff the casino chips.
According to the trial court, the onus fell on defendant to prove that the casino chips were stolen. The
proof adduced however, is wanting.

On appeal, CA affirmed the trial court’s Decision. CA held that, applying Article 559 of the Civil Code,
respondent had the legal presumption of title to or ownership of the casino chips. This conclusion
springs from Bernard's admission that the chips represented payment by a Chinese customer for
services he rendered to the latter in his car shop. The CA added that since respondent became the
owner of the chips, he could very well have given them to Ludwin and Deoven, who likewise held them
as "possessors in good faith and for value" and with "presumptive title" derived from the respondent.

ISSUES:

Whether or not CA erred in ruling that the evidence is not sufficient to rebut the legal presumption that
a person in possession of personal property is the lawful owner of the same? (NO)

RULING:

Indeed, for purposes of this proceeding, there appears to be no evidence on record - other than mere
allegations and suppositions - that Cabrera stole the casino chips in question; such conclusion came
unilaterally from petitioner. Thus, there should be no basis to suppose that the casino chips found in
Ludwin's and Deoven's possession were stolen; petitioner acted arbitrarily in confiscating the same
without basis.

Though casino chips do not constitute legal tender, there is no law which prohibits their use or trade
outside of the casino which issues them. In any case, it is not unusual – nor is it unlikely – that
respondent could be paid by his Chinese client at the former's car shop with the casino chips in
question; said transaction, if not common, is nonetheless not unlawful. These chips are paid for anyway;
petitioner would not have parted with the same if their corresponding representative equivalent - in
legal tender, goodwill, or otherwise – was not received by it in return or exchange.

Given this premise, it is with more reason that this Court should require petitioner to prove convincingly
and persuasively that the chips it confiscated from Ludwin and Deoven were indeed stolen from it; if so,
any Tom, Dick or Harry in possession of genuine casino chips is presumed to have paid for their
representative value in exchange therefor. If petitioner cannot prove its loss, then Article 559 cannot
apply; the presumption that the chips were exchanged for value remains.

Article(s) used:

Article 559: The possession of movable property acquired in good faith is equivalent to a title.
Nevertheless, one who has lost any movable or has been unlawfully deprived thereof may recover it
from the person in possession of the same.

Given this premise that casino chips are considered to have been exchanged with their corresponding
representative value, it is with more reason that this Court should require petitioner to prove
convincingly and persuasively that the chips it confiscated from Ludwin and Deoven were indeed stolen
from it; if so, any Tom, Dick or Harry in possession of genuine casino chips is presumed to have paid for
their representative value in exchange therefor. If petitioner cannot prove its loss, then Article 559
cannot apply; the presumption that the chips were exchanged for value remains.
 LEVISTAE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM, INC., Petitioner vs. LEGASPI TOWERS 200, INC., and VIVAN Y.
LOCSIN and PITONG MARCORDE, Respondents

ENGR. NELSON Q. IRASGA, in his capacity as Municipal Building Official of Makati, Metro Manila and
HON. JOSE P. DE JESUS, in his capacity as Secretary of the Dept. (G.R. No. 199353, FIRST DIVISION,
APRIL 4, 2018, LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.)

FACTS:

Legaspi Towers is a condominium building located at Paseo de Roxas, Makati City. Lemans bought
Concession 3 and decided to build another unit ("Concession 4") on the roof deck of Concession 3.
Despite Legaspi Corporation's notice that the construction of Concession 4 was illegal, Lemans refused
to stop its construction.

When Legaspi Corporation forbade the entry of Lemans' construction materials to be used in Concession
4 in the condominium, Lemans filed a Complaint with the RTC, praying that a writ of mandatory
injunction be issued to allow the completion of the construction of Concession 4. RTC issued the writ
prayed for by Lemans.

RTC, in its Order, then found the application of Article 448 of the Civil Code and the ruling in the Depra
vs. Dumlao to be proper. Afterwards, RTC rendered the Assailed Decision, ordering Legaspi Towers to
exercise its option to appropriate the additional structure constructed on top of the penthouse within
sixty [60] days from the time the Decision becomes final and executory. Should defendant Legaspi
Towers 200, Inc. choose not to appropriate after proper indemnity, the parties shall agree upon the
terms of the lease and in case of disagreement, the Court shall fix the terms thereof.

When the case was elevated, CA affirmed the decision of the RTC of Makati City. CA held that while
Concession 4 is indeed a nuisance, Lemans has been declared a builder in good faith, and noted that
Legaspi Towers failed to contest this declaration. Since Concession 4 was built in good faith, it cannot be
demolished. Hence, LEMANS and Legaspi Towers filed separate Petitions for Review on Certiorari with
the Court.

ISSUE:

Whether Article 448 of the Civil Code and the Court’s ruling in Depra v. Dumlao are applicable to the
parties' situation? (NO)

RULING:

Significantly, the parties are no longer questioning the past rulings regarding Legaspi Towers' ownership
of the air space above Concession 3 which is the air space above the condominium building itself.

The ruling of this Court in Depra v. Dumlao extensively cited by both parties pertains to the application
of Articles 448 and 546 of the Civil Code.

Useful expenses shall be refunded only to the possessor in good faith with the same right of retention,
the person who has defeated him in the possession having the option of refunding the amount of the
expenses or of paying the increase in value which the thing may have acquired by reason thereof.
Firstly, it is recognized in jurisprudence that, as a general rule, Article 448 on builders in good faith does
not apply where there is a contractual relation between the parties. Morever, in several cases, the Court
has explained that the raison d'etre for Article 448 of the Civil Code is to prevent the impracticability of
creating a state of forced co-ownership. In accord with the principle of accession, the landowner cannot
refuse to exercise either option and compel instead the owner of the building to remove it from the
land.

In the case at bar, however, the land belongs to a condominium corporation, wherein the builder, as a
unit owner, is already in a co-ownership with other unit owners as members or stockholders of the
condominium corporation, whose legal relationship is governed by a special law, the Condominium Act.

Articles 448 and 546 of the Civil Code on builders in good faith are therefore inapplicable in cases
covered by the Condominium Act where the owner of the land and the builder are already bound by
specific legislation on the subject property (the Condominium Act), and by contract (the Master Deed
and the By-Laws of the condominium corporation).

In accordance therefore with the Master Deed, the By-Laws of Legaspi Towers, and the Condominium
Act, Legaspi Towers is correct that it has the right to demolish Concession 4 at the expense of Lemans.
Indeed, the application of Article 448 to the present situation is highly iniquitous, in that an owner, also
found to be in good faith, will be forced to either appropriate the illegal structure and impliedly be
burdened with the cost of its demolition) or to allow the continuance of such an illegal structure that
violates the law and the Master Deed, and threatens the structural integrity of the condominium
building upon the payment of rent. The Court cannot countenance such an unjust result from an
erroneous application of the law and jurisprudence.

Article(s) used:

Article 448: The owner of the land on which anything has been built, sown or planted in good faith,
shall have the right to appropriate as his own the works, sowing or planting, after payment of the
indemnity provided for in Articles 546 and 548, or to oblige the one who built or planted to pay the
price of the land, and the one who sowed, the proper rent. However, the builder or planter cannot be
obliged to buy the land if its value is considerably more than that of the building or trees. In such case,
he shall pay reasonable rent, if the owner of the land does not choose to appropriate the building or
trees after proper indemnity. The parties shall agree upon the terms of the lease and in case of
disagreement, the court shall fix the terms thereof.

Article 546: Necessary expenses shall be refunded to every possessor; but only the possessor in good
faith may retain the thing until he has been reimbursed therefor.

In the case at bar, the land belongs to a condominium corporation, wherein the builder, as a unit owner,
is already in a co-ownership with other unit owners as members or stockholders of the condominium
corporation, whose legal relationship is governed by a special law, the Condominium Act. Articles 448
and 546 of the Civil Code on builders in good faith are therefore inapplicable in cases covered by the
Condominium Act where the owner of the land and the builder are already bound by specific legislation
on the subject property (the Condominium Act), and by contract (the Master Deed and the By-Laws of
the condominium corporation).
 EASEMENT PILAR DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, Petitioner, vs. RAMON DUMADAG, EMMA
BACABAC, RONALDO NAVARRO, JIMMY PAGDALIAN, PAY DELOS SANTOS, ARMANDO TRILLOS,
FELICISIMO TRILLOS, ARCANGEL FLORES, EDDIE MARTIN, PRESILLA LAYOG, CONRADO CAGUYONG,
GINA GONZALES, ARLENE PEDROSA, JOCELYN ABELINO, ROQUE VILLARAZA, ROLANDO VILLARAZA,
CAMILO GENOVE, NILDA ROAYANA, SUSAN ROAYANA, JUANCHO PANGANIBAN, BONG DE GUZMAN,
ARNOLD ENVERSO, DONNA DELA RAZA, EMELYN HAGNAYA, FREDDIE DE LEON, RONILLO DE LEON,
MARIO MARTINEZ, and PRECY LOPEZ, Respondents.

(G.R. No. 194336, THIRD DIVISION, March 11, 2013, PERALTA, J.)

FACTS:

Pilar Development Corporation filed a Complaint for accion publiciana with damages against Dumadag,
et al. for allegedly building their shanties, without its knowledge and consent, in its 5,613- square-meter
property in Las Piñas City. It claims that said parcel of land was designated as an open space of Pilar
Village Subdivision intended for village recreational facilities and amenities for subdivision residents. In
their Answer with Counterclaim, respondents denied the material allegations of the Complaint and
briefly asserted that it is the local government, not petitioner, which has jurisdiction and authority over
them.

Trial court dismissed petitioner’s complaint, opining that respondents have a better right to possess the
occupied lot, since they are in an area reserved for public easement purposes and that only the local
government of Las Piñas City could institute an action for recovery of possession or ownership.

On appeal, CA sustained the dismissal of the case. Referring to Section 2 of A.O. No. 99-21 of the DENR,
the appellate court ruled that the 3-meter area being disputed is located along the creek which, in turn,
is a form of a stream; therefore, belonging to the public dominion. Unlike the trial court, however, the
CA noted that the proper party entitled to seek recovery of possession of the contested portion is not
the City of Las Piñas, but the Republic of the Philippines, through the OSG, pursuant to Section 101 of
C.A. No. 141 (otherwise known as The Public Land Act). Hence, this petition.

ISSUE:

(1) Whether or not the respondents have a better right to possess the subject portion of the land
because they are occupying an area reserved for public easement purposes? (NO)

(2) Who is the proper party entitled to institute the case?

RULING:

(1) While Article 630 of the Code provides for the general rule that "the owner of the servient estate
retains the ownership of the portion on which the easement is established, and may use the same in
such a manner as not to affect the exercise of the easement," Article 635 thereof is specific in saying
that "all matters concerning easements established for public or communal use shall be governed by the
special laws and regulations relating thereto, and, in the absence thereof, by the provisions of this Title
VII on Easements or Servitudes."

Certainly, in the case of residential subdivisions, the allocation of the 3-meter strip along the banks of a
stream, like the Mahabang Ilog Creek in this case, is required and shall be considered as forming part of
the open space requirement pursuant to P.D. 1216. Said law is explicit: open spaces are "for public use
and are, therefore, beyond the commerce of men" and that "[the] areas reserved for parks, playgrounds
and recreational use shall be non-alienable public lands, and non-buildable."

Running in same vein is P.D. 1067 or The Water Code of the Philippines which provides:

Art. 51. The banks of rivers and streams and the shores of the seas and lakes throughout their entire
length and within a zone of three (3) meters in urban areas, twenty (20) meters in agricultural areas and
forty (40) meters in forest areas, along their margins, are subject to the easement of public use in the
interest of recreation, navigation, floatage, fishing and salvage. No person shall be allowed to stay in this
zone longer than what is necessary for recreation, navigation, floatage, fishing or salvage or to build
structures of any kind.

Thus, the above prove that petitioner’s right of ownership and possession has been limited by law with
respect to the 3-meter strip/zone along the banks of Mahabang Ilog Creek. Despite this, the Court
cannot agree with the trial court’s opinion, that respondents have a better right to possess the subject
portion of the land because they are occupying an area reserved for public easement purposes. Similar
to petitioner, respondents have no right or title over it precisely because it is public land. Likewise, the
Court has repeatedly held that squatters have no possessory rights over the land intruded upon. The
length of time that they may have physically occupied the land is immaterial; they are deemed to have
entered the same in bad faith, such that the nature of their possession is presumed to have retained the
same character throughout their occupancy.

(2) As to the issue of who is the proper party entitled to institute a case with respect to the 3-meter
strip/zone, the Court holds that both the Republic of the Philippines, through the OSG and the local
government of Las Piñas City, may file an action depending on the purpose sought to be achieved. The
former shall be responsible in case of action for reversion under C.A. 141, while the latter may also bring
an action to enforce the relevant provisions of Republic Act No. 7279 (otherwise known as the Urban
Development and Housing Act of 1992). Under R.A. 7279, all LGUs are mandated to evict and demolish
persons or entities occupying danger areas such as esteros, railroad tracks, garbage dumps, riverbanks,
shorelines, waterways, and other public places such as sidewalks, roads, parks, and playgrounds.

Article(s) used:

Article 630: The owner of the servient estate retains the ownership of the portion on which the
easement is established, and may use the same in such a manner as not to affect the exercise of the
easement.

Article 635: All matters concerning easements established for public or communal use shall be
governed by the special laws and regulations relating thereto, and, in the absence thereof, by the
provisions of this Title.

Article 51: The banks of rivers and streams and the shores of the seas and lakes throughout their
entire length and within a zone of three (3) meters in urban areas, twenty (20) meters in agricultural
areas and forty (40) meters in forest areas, along their margins, are subject to the easement of public
use in the interest of recreation, navigation, floatage, fishing and salvage. No person shall be allowed
to stay in this zone longer than what is necessary for recreation, navigation, floatage, fishing or
salvage or to build structures of any kind.
The above prove that petitioner’s right of ownership and possession has been limited by law with
respect to the 3-meter strip/zone along the banks of Mahabang Ilog Creek. Despite this, the Court
cannot agree with the trial court’s opinion, that respondents have a better right to possess the subject
portion of the land because they are occupying an area reserved for public easement purposes. Similar
to petitioner, respondents have no right or title over it precisely because it is public land. Likewise, the
Court has repeatedly held that squatters have no possessory rights over the land intruded upon. The
length of time that they may have physically occupied the land is immaterial; they are deemed to have
entered the same in bad faith, such that the nature of their possession is presumed to have retained the
same character throughout their occupancy.

As to the issue of who is the proper party entitled to institute a case with respect to the 3-meter
strip/zone, the Court holds that both the Republic of the Philippines, through the OSG and the local
government of Las Piñas City, may file an action depending on the purpose sought to be achieved. The
former shall be responsible in case of action for reversion under C.A. 141, while the latter may also bring
an action to enforce the relevant provisions of Republic Act No. 7279 (otherwise known as the Urban
Development and Housing Act of 1992).