Salas V Jarencio
Salas V Jarencio
Salas V Jarencio
735
granted, no rights therein passed to the municipalities, and, in any event, the
ultimate title remained in the sovereign (City of Manila vs. Insular Government, 10
Phil. 327).
Same; Same; Same; Rule as to ownership of land in possession of municipality.—It
may be laid down as a general rule that regardless of the source or classification of land
in the possession of a municipality, excepting those acquired with its own funds in its
private or corporate capacity, such property is held iv trust for the State for the benefit
of its inhabitants, whether it be for governmental or proprietary purposes. It holds such
lands Rubiect to the paramount power of the legislature to dispose of the same, for after
all it owes its creation to it as an agent for the performance of a part of its public work,
the municipality being but a subdivision or instrumentality thereof for purposes of local
administration.
Constitutional Law; Separation of powers; Legislative classification of land not
subject to judicial review.—The Congress has dealt with the land involved as one
reserved for communal use (terreno comunal). The act of classifying State property calls
for the exercise of wide discretionary legislative power and it should not be interfered
with by the Courts.
Constitutional law; Statutes; Presumption of constitutionality of statutes.—It is now
well established that the presumption is always in favor of the constitutionality of a law.
www.central.com.ph/sfsreader/session/000001745c9a712964f6e5b7003600fb002c009e/t/?o=False 1/12
9/5/2020 CentralBooks:Reader
To declare a law unconstitutional, the repugnancy of that law to the Constitution must
be clear and unequivocal, for even if a law is aimed at the attainment of some public
good, no infringement of constitutional rights is allowed. To strike down a law there
must be a clear showing that what the fundamental law condemns or prohibits, the
statute allows it to be done.
Municipal corporations; City of Manila; No presumption of State grant of ownership
to municipality where land remained idle.—Since the City of Manila did not actually use
said land for any recognized public purpose and allowed it to remain idle and
unoccupied for a long time until it was overrun by squatters, no presumption of State
grant of ownership in favor of the City may be acquiesced in to justify the claim that it is
its own private or patrimonial property.
Constitutional law; Eminent domain; City of Manila; Republic Act 4118 merely
confirmed character of property in possession of the City of Manila.—Republic Act 4118
was never intended to expropriate the properly involved but merely to confirm its
character as communal land of the State and to make-it available for disposition by the
National Government; the subdivision of the land and conveyance of the resulting
subdivi-
736
ESGUERRA, J.:
This is a petition for review of the decision of the Court of First Instance of
Manila, Branch XXIII, in Civil Case No. 67946, dated September 23, 1968, the
dispositive portion of which is as follows:
“WHEREFORE, the Court renders judgment declaring Republic Act No. 4118
unconstitutional and invalid in that it deprived the City of Manila of its property
without due process and payment of just compensation. Respondent Executive Secretary
and Governor of the Land Authority are hereby restrained and enjoined from
implementing the provisions of said law. Respondent Register of Deeds of the City of
Manila is ordered to cancel Transfer Certificate of Title No. 80876 which he had issued
in the name of the Land Tenure Administration and reinstate Transfer Certificate of
Title No. 22547 in the name of the City of Manila which he cancelled, if that is feasible,
or issue 1a new certificate of title for the same parcel of land in the name of the City of
Manila.”
The facts necessary for a clear understanding of this case are as follows:
On February 24, 1919, the 4th Branch of the Court of First Instance of
Manila, acting as a land registration court, rendered judgment in Case No. 18,
G.L.R.O. Record No. 111, declaring the City of Manila the owner in fee simple
_______________
1 Pages 79-80. Rollo.
737
of a parcel of land known as Lot No. 1, Block 557 of the Cadastral Survey of the
City of Manila, containing an area of 9,680.8 square meters, more or less,
Pursuant to said judgment the Register of Deeds of Manila on August 21, 1920,
issued in favor of the City of Manila, Original Certificate of Title No. 4329
covering the aforementioned parcel of kind. On various dates in 1924, the City
of Manila sold portions of the aforementioned parcel of land in favor of Pura
Villanueva. As a consequence of the transactions Original Certificate of Title
No. 4329 was cancelled and transfer certificates of title were issued in favor of
Pura Villanueva for the portions purchased by her. When the last sale to Pura
Villanueva was effected on August 22, 1924, Transfer Certificate of Title No.
21974 in the name of the City of Manila was cancelled and in lieu thereof
Transfer Certificate of Title (T.C.T,) No. 22547 covering the residue thereof
known as Lot 1-B-2-B of Block 557, with an area of 7,490.10 square meters,
was issued in the name of the City of Manila.
On September 21, 1980, the Municipal Board of Manila, presided by then
Vice-Mayor Antonio J. Villegas, adopted a resolution requesting His
Excellency, the President of the Philippines to consider the feasibility of
declaring the City property bounded by Florida, San Andres, and Nebraska
Streets, under Transfer Certificate of Title Nos. 25545 and 22547, containing a
total area of 7,450 square meters as a patrimonial property of the City 2 of
Manila for the purpose of reselling these lots to the actual occupants thereof.
The said resolution of the Municipal Board of the City of Manila was
officially transmitted to the President of the Philippines by then Vice-Mayor
Antonio J. Villegas on September 21, 1960, with the information that the same
resolution was, on the same date, transmitted to3 the Senate and House of
Representatives of the Congress of the Philippines.
_______________
2 Annex “E” to the Partial Stipulation of Facts, page 121, Records.
3 Annex “E-l” to the Partial Stipulation of Facts, page 122, Records.
738
During the First Session of the Fifth Congress of the Philippines, House Bill
No. 191 was filed in the House of Representatives by then Congressman
Bartolome Cabangbang seeking to declare the property in question as
patrimonial property of the City of Manila, and for other purposes. The
explanatory note of the Bill gave the grounds for its enactment, to wit:
“In the particular case of the property subject of this bill, the City of Manila does not
seem to have use thereof as a public communal property. As a matter of fact, a
resolution was adopted by the Municipal Board of Manila at its regular session held on
September 21, 1960, to request the feasibility of declaring the city property bounded by
Florida, San Andres and Nebraska Streets as a patrimonial property of the City of
Manila for the purpose of reselling these lots to the actual occupants thereof. Therefore,
it will be to the best interest of society that the said property be used in one way or
another. Since this property has been occupied for a long time by the present occupants
thereof and since said occupants have expressed their 4
willingness to buy the said
property, it is but proper that the same be sold to them.”
There is therefore a precedent that this parcel of land could be subdivided and sold to
bona fide occupants. This parcel of land will not serve any useful public project because
it is bound-
_______________
4 Annex “F” to the Partial Stipulation of Facts, page 123, Records.
739
ed on all sides by private properties which were formerly parts of this lot in question.
“Approval of this bill will implement the policy of the Administration of land for the
landless and the Fifth Declaration of Principles of the Constitution, which states that
the promotion of Social Justice to insure the well-being and economic security of all
people should be the concern of the State. We are ready and willing to enact legislation
promoting the social and economic well-being of the people whenever an opportunity for
enacting such kind of legislation arises.
In view of the foregoing consideration and to insure fairness and justice 5
to the
present bona fide occupants thereof, approval of this Bill is strongly urged.”
The Bill having been passed by the House of Representatives, the same was
thereafter sent to the Senate where it was thoroughly discussed, as evidenced
by the Congressional Records for May 20, 1964, pertinent portion of which is as
follows:
“SENATOR FERNANDEZ: Mr. President, it will be recalled that when the late Mayor
Lacson was still alive, we approved a similar bill. But afterwards, the late Mayor Lacson
came here and protested against the approval, and the approval was reconsidered. May
I know whether the defect in the bill which we approved, has already been eliminated in
this present bill?
“SENATOR TOLENTINO: I understand Mr. President, that that has already been
eliminated, and that is why the City of Manila has no more objection to this bill.
“SENATOR FERNANDEZ: Mr. President, in view of that manifestation and
considering that Mayor Villegas and Congressman Albert of the Fourth District of
Manila are in favor of the bill. I would not want to pretend to know more what is good
for the City of Manila.
“SENATOR TOLENTINO: Mr. President, there being no objection, I move that we
approve this bill on second reading.
“PRESIDENT PRO-TEMPORE: The bill is approved on second reading after several
Senators said aye and nobody said nay.”
________________
5 Annex “F-1”, page 128, Records.
740
The bill was passed by the Senate, approved by the President on June 20, 1964,
and became Republic Act No. 4118. It reads as follows:
Lot 1-B-2-B of Block 557 of the cadastral survey of the City of Manila, situated in the
District of Malate. City of Manila, which is reserved as communal property, is hereby
converted mto disposal or alienable land of the State, to be placed under ihe disposal of
the Land Tenure Administration. The Land Tenure Administration shall subdivide the
property into small lots, none of which shall exceed one hundred and twenty square
meters in area and sell the same on installment basis to the tenants or bona fide
occupants thereof and to individuals, in the order mentioned: Provided, That no down
payment shall be required of tenants or bona fide occupants. who cannot afford to pay
such down payment: Provided, further, That no person can purchase more than one
lot: Provided, furthermore, That if the tenant or bona fide occupant of any given lot is
not able to purchase the same, he shall be given a lease from month to month until such
time that he is able to purchase the lot: Provided, still further, That in the event of lease
the rentals which may be charged shall not exceed eight per cent per annum of the
assessed value of the property leased: And provided, finally, That in fixing the price of
www.central.com.ph/sfsreader/session/000001745c9a712964f6e5b7003600fb002c009e/t/?o=False 4/12
9/5/2020 CentralBooks:Reader
each lot, wMch shall not exceed twenty pesos per square meter, the cost of subdivision
and survey shall not be included.
“Sec. 2. Upon approval of this Act no ejectment proceedings against any tenant
or bona fide occupant of the above lots shall be instituted and any ejectment proceedings
pending in court against any such tenant or bona fide occupant shall be dismissed upon
motion of the defendant: Provided, That any demolition order directed against any
tenant or bona fide occupant shall be lifted.
“Sec. 3. Upon approval of this Act, if the tenant or bona fide occupant is in arrears in
the payment of any rentals, the amount legally due shall be liquidated and shall be
payable in twenty-four equal monthly installments from the date of liquidation.
“Sec. 4. No property acquired by virtue of this Act shall be transferred, sold,
mortgaged, or otherwise disposed of within a period of five years from the date full
ownership thereof has been vested in the purchaser without the consent of the Land
Tenure Administration,
“Sec. 5. In the event of the death of the purchaser prior to the complete payment of
the price of the lot purchased by
741
him, his widow and children shall succeed in all his rights and obligations with respect
to his lot.
“Sec. 6. The Chairman of the Land Tenure Administration shall implement and issue
such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the provisions of this Act.
“Sec. 7. The sum of one hundred fifty thousand pesos in appropriated out of any funds
in the National Treasury not otherwise appropriated, to carry out the purposes of this
Act.
“Sec. 8. All laws or parts of laws inconsistent with this Act are repealed or modified
accordingly.
“Sec. 9. This Act shall take effect upon its approval.
“Approved, June 20, 1964.”
To implement the provisions of Republic Act No. 4118, and pursuant to the
request of the occupants of the property involved, then Deputy Governor Jose
V. Yap of the Land Authority (which succeeded the Land Tenure
Administration) addressed a letter, dated February 18, 1965, to Mayor Antonio
Villegas, furnishing him with a copy of the proposed subdivision plan of said lot
as prepared for the Republic of the Philippines6 for resale of the subdivision lots
by the Land Authority to bona fide applicants.
On March 2, 1965, the City Mayor of Manila, through his Executive and
Technical Adviser, acknowledged receipt of the proposed subdivision plan of the
property in question attd informed the Land Authority that his office would
interpose no objection to the implementation
7
of said law, provided that its
provisions be strictly complied with.
With the above-mentioned written conformity of the City of Manila for the
implementation of Republic Act No. 4118, the Land Authority, thru then
Deputy Governor Jose V. Yap, requested the City Treasurer of Manila, thru the
City Mayor, for the surrender and delivery to the former of the owner’s
duplicate of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 22547 m order to obtain title
thereto in the name of the Land Au-
_______________
6 Annex “J”, page 142, Records.
7 Annex “K”, page 145, Records.
742
thority. The request was8 duly granted with the knowledge and consent of the
Office of the City Mayor.
With the presentation of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 22547, which had
been yielded as above stated by the City authorities to the Land Authority,
www.central.com.ph/sfsreader/session/000001745c9a712964f6e5b7003600fb002c009e/t/?o=False 5/12
9/5/2020 CentralBooks:Reader
Transfer Certificate of Title (T.C.T. No. 22547) was cancelled by the Register of
Deeds of Manila and in lieu thereof Transfer Certificate of Title No. 80876 was
issued in the name of the Land Tenure Administration 9
(now Land Authority)
pursuant to the provisions of Republic Act No. 4118.
But due to reasons which do not appear in the record, the City of Manila
made a complete turn-about, for on December 20, 1966, Antonio J. Villegas, in
his capacity as the City Mayor of Manila and the City of Manila as a duly
organized public corporation, brought an action for injunction and/or
prohibition with preliminary injunction to restrain, prohibit and enjoin the
herein appellants, particularly the Governor of the Land Authority and the
Register of Deeds of Manila, from further implementing Republic Act No. 4118,
and praying for the declaration of Republic Act No. 4118 as unconstitutional.
With the foregoing antecedent facts, which are all contained in the partial
stipulation of facts submitted to the trial court and approved by respondent
Judge, the parties waived the presentation of further evidence and submitted
the case for decision. On September 23, 1968, judgment was rendered by the
trial court declaring Republic Act No. 4118 unconstitutional and invalid on the
ground that it deprived the City of Manila of its property without due process
of law and payment of just compensation. The respondents were ordered to
undo all that had been done to carry out the provisions of said Act and were
restrained from further implementing the same.
Two issues are presented for determination, on the resolution of which the
decision in this case hinges, to wit:
I. Is the property involved private or patrimonial property of the City of Manila?
________________
8 Annexes “L” and “L-l”, pages 145-147, Records.
9 Annexes “A” and “N”, pages 148-150, Records.
743
II. Is Republic Act No. 4118 valid and not repugnant to the Constitution?
I.
As regards the first issue, appellants maintain that the land involved is a
communal land or “legua comunal” which is a portion of the public domain
owned by the State; that it came into existence as such when the City of
Manila, or any pueblo or town in the Philippines for that matter, was founded
under the laws of Spain, the former sovereign; that upon the establishment of a
pueblo, the administrative authority was required to allot and set aside
portions of the public domain for a public plaza, a church site, a site for public
buildings, lands to serve as common pastures and for streets and roads; that in
assigning these lands some lots were earmarked for strictly public purposes,
and ownership of these lots (for public purposes) immediately passed to the
new municipality; that in the case of common lands or “legua comunal”, there
was no such immediate acquisition of ownership by the pueblo, and the land
though administered thereby, did not automatically become its property in the
absence of an express grant from the Central Government, and that the reason
for this arrangement is that this class of land was not absolutely needed for the
discharge of the municipality’s governmental functions.
It is argued that the parcel of land involved herein has not been used by the
City of Manila for any public purpose and had not been officially earmarked as
a site for the erection of some public buildings; that this circumstance confirms
the fact that it was originally “communal” land al-loted to the City of Manila by
the Central Government not because it was needed in connection with its
organization as a municipality but simply for the common use of its
inhabitants; that the present City of Manila as successor of the Ayuntamiento
de Manila under the former Spanish sovereign merely enjoys the usufruct over
said land, and its exercise of acts of ownership by selling parts thereof did not
www.central.com.ph/sfsreader/session/000001745c9a712964f6e5b7003600fb002c009e/t/?o=False 6/12
9/5/2020 CentralBooks:Reader
necessarily convert the land into a patrimonial property of the City of Manila
nor divest the State of its paramount title.
744
745
the Municipal Board of Manila that the land in question was communal land did not
make it so. The Municipal Board had no authority to do that.
“The respondents, however, contend that Congress had the power and authority to
declare that the land in question was ‘communal’ land and the courts have no power or
authority to make a contrary finding. This contention is not entirely correct or accurate.
Congress has the power to classify ‘land of the public domain’, transfer them from one
classification to another and declare them disposable or not. Such power does not,
however, extend to properties which are owned by cities, provinces and municipalities in
their ‘patrimonial’ capacity.
“Art. 324 of the Civil Code provides that properties of provinces, cities and
municipalities are divided into properties for public use and patrimonial property. Art.
424 of the same code provides that properties for public use consist of provincial roads,
city streets, municipal streets, the squares, fountains, public waters, promenades and
public works for public service paid for by said province, cities or municipalities. All
other praperty possessed by any of them is patrimonial. Tested by this criterion the
Court finds and holds that the land in question is patrimonial property of the City of
Manila.
“Respondents contend that Congress .has declared the land in question to be
‘communal’ and, therefore, such designation is conclusive upon the courts. The Courts
holds otherwise. When a statute is assailed as unconstitutional the Courts have the
power and authority to inquire into the question and pass upon it. This has long ago
www.central.com.ph/sfsreader/session/000001745c9a712964f6e5b7003600fb002c009e/t/?o=False 7/12
9/5/2020 CentralBooks:Reader
been settled in Marbury vs. Madison, 2 L. ed. 60, when the United States Supreme
Court speaking thru Chief Justice Marshall held:
‘x x x If an act of the legislature, repugnant to the constitution, is void, does it, notwithstanding its
validity, bind the courts, and oblige them to give effect? It is emphatically the province and duty of
the judicial department to say what the law is ... So if a law be in opposition to the constitution; if
both the law and the constitution apply to a particular case, so that the court must either decide
that case conformable to the constitution, disregarding the law, the court must determine which of
these conflicting rules governs the case. This is of the very essence of unconstitutional judicial
duty.’”
Appellees finally concluded that when the courts declare a law unconstitutional
it does not mean that the judicial power is superior to the legislative power. It
simply means that the power of the people is superior to both and that
746
municipality and the streets and roads which were to intersect the new town were laid
out, x x x.” (Municipality of Catbalo-gan vs. Director of Lands, 17 Phil. 216, 220) (Italics
supplied)
It may, therefore, be laid down as a general rule that regardless of the source
or classification of land in the possession of a municipality, excepting those
acquired with its own funds in its private or corporate capacity, such property
is held in trust for the State for the benefit of its inhabitants, whether it be for
governmental or proprietary purposes. It holds such lands subject to the
paramount power of the legislature to dispose of the same, for after all it owes
its creation to it as an agent for the performance of a part of its public work, the
municipality being but a subdivision or instrumentality thereof for purposes of
local administration. Accordingly, the legal situation is the same as if the State
itself holds the property and puts it to a different use (2 McQuilin, Municipal
Corporations, 3rd Ed., p. 197, citing Monagham vs. Armatage, 218 Minn. 27, 15
N. W. 2nd 241).
True it is that the legislative control over a municipal corporation is not
absolute even when it comes to its property devoted to public use, for such
control must not be exercised to the extent of depriving persons of their
property or rights without due process of law, or in a manner impairing the
obligations of contracts. Nevertheless, when it comes to property of the
municipality which it did not acquire in its private or corporate capacity with
its own
748
The Congress has dealt with the land involved as one reserved for communal
use (terreno comunal). The act of classifying State property calls for the
exercise of wide discretionary legislative power and it should not be interfered
with by the courts.
This brings Us to the second question as regards the validity of Republic Act
No. 4118, viewed in the light of Article III, Sections 1, subsection (1) and (2) of
the Con-
749
www.central.com.ph/sfsreader/session/000001745c9a712964f6e5b7003600fb002c009e/t/?o=False 9/12
9/5/2020 CentralBooks:Reader
stitution which ordain that no person shall be deprived of his property without
due process of law and that no private property shall be taken for public use
without just compensation.
II.
The trial court declared Republic Act No. 4118 unconstitutional for allegedly
depriving the City of Manila of its property without due process of law and
without payment of just compensation. It is now well established that the
presumption is always in favor of the constitutionality of a law (U.S. vs. Ten
Yu, 24 PhiL 1; Go Ching, et al vs. Dinglasan, et al., 45 O.G. No. 2, pp. 703, 705).
To declare a law unconstitutional, the repugnancy of that law to the
Constitution must be clear and unequivocal, for even if a law is aimed at the
attainment of some public good, no infringement of constitutional rights is
allowed. To strike down a law there must be a clear showing that what the
fundamental law condemns or prohibits, the statute allows it to be done (Morfe
vs. Mutuc, et al., G.R. No. L-20387, Jan. 31, 1968; 22 SCRA 424). That
situation does not obtain in this case as the law assailed does not in any
manner trench upon the constitution as will hereafter be shown.
Republic Act No. 4118 was intended to implement the social justice policy of
the Constitution and the Government program of “Land for the Landless”. The
explanatory note of House Bill No. 1453 which became Republic Act No. 4118,
reads in part as follows:
“Approval of this bill will implement the policy of the administration of ‘land for the
landless’ and the Fifth Declaration of Principles of the Constitution which states that
‘the promotion of social justice to insure the well-being and economic security of all
people should be the concern of the State.’ We are ready and willing to enact legislation
promoting the social and economic well-being of the people whenever an opportunity for
enacting such kind of legislation arises.’ ”
The respondent Court held that Republic Act No. 4118, “by converting the land
in question—which is the patrimonial property of the City of Manila into
disposable alien-
750
able land of the State and placing it under the disposal of the Land Tenure
Administration—violates the provisions of Article III (Secs. 1 and 2) of the
Constitution which ordain that “private property shall not be taken for public
use without just compensation, and that no person shall be deprived of life,
liberty or property without due process of law”. In support thereof reliance is
placed on the ruling in Province of Zamboanga del Norte vs. City of
Zamboanga, G.R. No. 2440, March 28, 1968; 22 SCRA 1334, which holds that
Congress cannot deprive a municipality of its private or patrimonial property
without due process of law and without payment of just compensation since it
has no absolute control thereof. There is no quarrel over this rule if it is
undisputed that the property sought to be taken is in reality a private or
patrimonial property of the municipality or city. But it would be simply begging
the question to classify the land in question as such. The property, as has been
previously shown, was not acquired by the City of Manila with its own funds in
its private or proprietary capacity. That it has in its name a registered title is
not questioned, but this title should be deemed to be held in trust for the State
as the land covered thereby was part of the territory of the City of Manila
granted by the sovereign upon its creation. That the National Government,
through the Director of Lands, represented by the Solicitor General, in the
cadastral proceedings did not contest the claim of the City of Manila that the
land is its property, does not detract from its character as State property and in
no way divests the legislature of its power to deal with it as such, the state not
being bound by the mistakes and/or negligence of its officers.
www.central.com.ph/sfsreader/session/000001745c9a712964f6e5b7003600fb002c009e/t/?o=False 10/12
9/5/2020 CentralBooks:Reader
One decisive fact that should be noted is that the City of Manila expressly
recognized the paramount title of the State over said land when by its
resolution of September 20, 1960, the Municipal Board, presided by then Vice-
Mayor Antonio Villegas, requested “His Excellency the President of the
Philippines to consider the feasibility of declaring the city property bounded by
Florida, San Andres and Nebraska Streets, under Transfer Certificate of Title
Nos.
751
at the instance or upon the request of the City of Manila itself. The subdivision
of the land and conveyance of the resulting subdivision lots to the occupants by
Congressional authorization does not operate as an exercise of the power of
eminent domain without just compensation in violation of Section 1, subsection
(2), Article III of the Constitution, but simply as a manifestation of its right and
power to deal with state property.
It should be emphasized that the law assailed was enacted upon formal
written petition of the Municipal Board o£ Manila in the form of a legally
approved resolution* The certificate of title over the property in the name of
the City of Manila was accordingly cancelled and another issued to the Land
Tenure Administration after the voluntary surrender of the City’s duplicate
certificate of title by the City Treasurer with the knowledge and consent of the
City Mayor. To implement the provisions of Republic Act No. 4118, the then
Deputy Governor of the Land Authority sent a letter, dated February 18, 1965,
to the City Mayor furnishing him with a copy of the “proposed subdivision plan
of the said lot as prepared for the Republic of the Philippines for subdivision
www.central.com.ph/sfsreader/session/000001745c9a712964f6e5b7003600fb002c009e/t/?o=False 11/12
9/5/2020 CentralBooks:Reader
and resale by the Land Authority to bona fide applicants.” On March 2, 1965,
the Mayor of Manila, through his Executive and Technical Adviser,
acknowledged receipt of the subdivision plan and informed the Land Authority
that his Office ‘Viii interpose no objection to the implementation of said law
provided that its provisions are strictly complied with.” The foregoing sequence
of events, clearly indicate a pattern of regularity and observance of due process
in the reversion of the property to the National Government. All such acts were
done in recognition by the City of Manila of the right and power of the Congress
to dispose of the land involved.
Consequently, the City of Manila was not deprived of anything it owns,
either under the due process clause or under the eminent domain provisions of
the Constitution. If it failed to get from the Congress the concession it sought
753
of having the land involved given to it as its patrimonial property, the Courts
possess no power to grant that relief. Republic Act No. 4118 does not, therefore,
suffer from any constitutional infirmity.
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is hereby reversed, and petitioners
shall proceed with the free and untrammeled implementation of Republic Act
No, 4118 without any obstacle from the respondents. Without costs.
Concepcion,
C.J., Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro, Fernando, Teehankee and Antonio,
JJ., concur.
Barredo, J., did not take part.
Makasiar, J., took no part.
Decision reversed.
————————
754
www.central.com.ph/sfsreader/session/000001745c9a712964f6e5b7003600fb002c009e/t/?o=False 12/12