ISAGANI CRUZ Vs - SECRETARY OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL RESOURCES

128 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Cruz vs. Secretaryof Environmentand Natural

Resources
*
G.R. No. 135385. December 6, 2000.
ISAGANI CRUZ and CESAR EUROPA, petitioners, vs.SECRETARY OF ENVIRONMENT AND NATURAL
RESOURCES, SECRETARY OF BUDGET AND MANAGEMENT and CHAIRMAN and COMMISSIONERS
OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON INDIGENOUS PEOPLES,respondents.
x ----------------------------------------------------------------------- x
HON. JUAN M. FLAVIER, HON. PONCIANO BENNAGEN, BAYANI ASCARRAGA, EDTAMI
MANSAYANGAN, BASILIO WANDAG, EVELYN DUNUAN, YAOM TUGAS, ALFREMO CARPIANO,
LIBERATO A. GABIN, MATERNIDAD M. COLAS, NARCISA M. DALUPINES, BAI KIRAM-CONNIE
SATURNO, BAE MALOMO-BEATRIZ T. ABASALA, DATU BALITUNGTUNG-ANTONIO D. LUMANDONG,
DATU MANTUMUKAW TEOFISTO SABASALES, DATU EDUARDO BANDA, DATU JOEL UNAD, DATU
RAMON BAYAAN, TIMUAY JOSE ANOY, TIMUAY MACARIO D. SALACAO, TIMUAY EDWIN B.
ENDING, DATU SAHAMPONG MALANAW VI, DATU BEN PENDAO CABIGON, BAI NANAPNAY-LIZA
SAWAY, BAI INAY DAYA-MELINDA S. REYMUNDO, BAI TINANGHAGA HELINITA T. PANGAN, DATU
MAKAPUKAW ADOLINO L. SAWAY, DATU MAUDAYAW-CRISPEN SAWAY, VICKY MAKAY, LOURDES
D. AMOS, GILBERT P. HOGGANG, TERESA GASPAR, MANUEL S. ONALAN, MIA GRACE L. GIRON,
ROSEMARIE G. PE, BENITO CARINO, JOSEPH JUDE CARANTES, LYNETTE CARANTES-VIVAL,
LANGLEY SEGUNDO, SATUR S. BUGNAY, CARLING DOMULOT, ANDRES MENDIGORIN, LEOPOLDO
ABUGAN,
_______________
* EN BANC.
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Cruz vs. Secretary of Environment and Natural
Resources
VIRGILIO CAYETANO, CONCHITA G. DESCAGA, LEVY ESTEVES, ODETTE G. ESTEVEZ, RODOLFO C.

AGUILAR, MAURO VALONES, PEPE H. ATONG, OFELIA T. DAVI, PERFECTO B. GUINOSAO, WALTER
N. TIMOL, MANUEL T. SELEN, OSCAR DALUNHAY, RICO O. SULATAN, RAFFY MALINDA, ALFREDO
ABILLANOS, JESSIE ANDILAB, MIRLANDO H. MANGKULINTAS, SAMIE SATURNO, ROMEO A.
LINDAHAY, ROEL S. MANSANGCAGAN, PAQUITO S. LIESES, FILIPE G. SAWAY, HERMINIA S.
SAWAY, JULIUS S. SAWAY, LEONARDA SAWAY, JIMMY UGYUB, SALVADOR TIONGSON, VENANCIO
APANG, MADION MALID, SUKIM MALID, NENENG MALID, MANGKATADONG AUGUSTO DIANO,
JOSEPHINE M. ALBESO, MORENO MALID, MARIO MANGCAL, FELAY DIAMILING, SALOME P.
SARZA, FELIFE P. BAGON, SAMMY SALNUNGAN, ANTONIO D. EMBA, NORMA MAPANSA GONOS,
ROMEO SALIGA, SR., JERSON P. GERADA, RENATO T. BAGON, JR., SARING MASALONG, SOLEDAD
M. GERARDA, ELIZABETH L. MENDI, MORANTE S. TIWAN, DANILO M. MALUDAO, MINORS
MARICEL MALID, represented by her father CORNELIO MALID, MARCELINO M. LADRA, represented by
her father MONICO D. LADRA, JENNYLYN MALID, represented by her father TONY MALID, ARIEL M.
EVANGELISTA, represented by her mother LINAY BALBUENA, EDWARD M. EMUY, SR., SUSAN
BOLANIO, OND, PULA BATO B’LAAN TRIBAL FARMER’S ASSOCIATION, INTER-PEOPLE’S
EXCHANGE, INC. and GREEN FORUM-WESTERN VISAYAS, intervenor.
x ----------------------------------------------------------------------- x
COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, intervenor.
x ----------------------------------------------------------------------- x
IKALAHAN INDIGENOUS PEOPLE and HARIBON FOUNDATION FOR THE CONSERVATION OF
NATURAL RESOURCES, INC., intervenor.
Supreme Court; Judgments; Judicial Review; Where the votes in the Court en banc are equally divided and the
necessary majority is not obtained, the case is redeliberated upon, but if after deliberation, the voting
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remains the same, the petition is dismissed pursuant to Rule 56, Section 7 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.—After due
deliberation on the petition, the members of the Court voted as follows: Seven (7) voted to dismiss the petition. Justice
Kapunan filed an opinion, which the Chief Justice and Justices Bellosillo, Quisumbing, and Santiago join, sustaining the
validity of the challenged provisions of R.A. 8371. Justice Puno also filed a separate opinion sustaining all challenged
provisions of the law with the exception of Section 1, Part II, Rule III of NCIP Administrative Order No. 1, series of 1998,
the Rules and Regulations Implementing the IPRA, and Section 57 of the IPRA which he contends should be interpreted as
dealing with the large-scale exploitation of natural resources and should be read in conjunction with Section 2, Article XII
of the 1987 Constitution. On the other hand, Justice Mendoza voted to dismiss the petition solely on the ground that it
does not raise a justiciable controversy and petitioners do not have standing to question the constitutionality of R.A. 8371.
Seven (7) other members of the Court voted to grant the petition. Justice Panganiban filed a separate opinion expressing
the view that Sections 3 (a)(b), 5, 6, 7 (a)(b), 8, and related provisions of R.A. 8371 are unconstitutional. He reserves
judgment on the constitutionality of Sections 58, 59, 65, and 66 of the law, which he believes must await the filing of
specific cases by those whose rights may have been violated by the IPRA. Justice Vitug also filed a separate opinion
expressing the view that Sections 3(a), 7, and 57 of R.A. 8371 are unconstitutional. Justices Melo, Pardo, Buena, Gonzaga-
Reyes, and De Leon join in the separate opinions of Justices Panganiban and Vitug. As the votes were equally divided (7 to
7) and the necessary majority was not obtained, the case was redeliberated upon. However, after redeliberation, the voting
remained the same. Accordingly, pursuant to Rule 56, Section 7 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the petition is
DISMISSED.
PUNO, J.,Separate Opinion:
National Patrimony; Regalian Doctrine; Natural Resources; Public Lands; The “Regalian Doctrine” or jura regalia is a

Western legal concept that was first introduced by the Spaniards into the country through the Laws of the Indies and the
Royal Cedulas.—The capacity of the State to own or acquire property is the state’s power of dominium. This was the
foundation for the early Spanish decrees embracing the feudal theory of jura regalia. The “Regalian Doctrine” or jura
regalia is a Western legal concept that was first introduced by the Spaniards into the country through the Laws of the
Indies and the Royal Cedulas.
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Same; Same; Same; Same; Words and Phrases; The Public Land Act (Act No. 926) operated on the assumption that title
to public lands in the Philippine Islands remained in the government, and that the government’s title to public land sprung
from the Treaty of Paris and other subsequent treaties between Spain and the United States; The term “public land” referred
to all lands of the public domain whose title still remained in the government and are thrown open to private appropriation
and settlement, and excluded the patrimonial property of the government and the friar lands.—Act No. 926, the first Public
Land Act, was passed in pursuance of the provisions of the Philippine Bill of 1902. The law governed the disposition of
lands of the public domain. It prescribed rules and regulations for the homesteading, selling, and leasing of portions of the
public domain of the Philippine Islands, and prescribed the terms and conditions to enable persons to perfect their titles to
public lands in the Islands. It also provided for the “issuance of patents to certain native settlers upon public lands,” for
the establishment of town sites and sale of lots therein, for the completion of imperfect titles, and for the cancellation or
confirmation of Spanish concessions and grants in the Islands.” In short, the Public Land Act operated on the assumption
that title to public lands in the Philippine Islands remained in the government; and that the government’s title to public
land sprung from the Treaty of Paris and other subsequent treaties between Spain and the United States. The term
“public land” referred to all lands of the public domain whose title still remained in the government and are thrown open
to private appropriation and settlement, and excluded the patrimonial property of the government and the friar lands.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Land Titles; Enacted by the Philippine Commission, Act 496 placed all public and private
lands in the Philippines under the Torrens system.—Grants of public land were brought under the operation of the Torrens
system under Act 496, or the Land Registration Law of 1903. Enacted by the Philippine Commission, Act 496 placed all
public and private lands in the Philippines under the Torrens system. The law is said to be almost a verbatim copy of the
Massachusetts Land Registration Act of 1898, which, in turn, followed the principles and procedure of the Torrens system
of registration formulated by Sir Robert Torrens who patterned it after the Merchant Shipping Acts in South Australia.
The Torrens system requires that the government issue an official certificate of title attesting to the fact that the person
named is the owner of the property described therein, subject to such liens and encumbrances as thereon noted or the law
warrants or reserves. The certificate of title is indefeasible and imprescriptible and all claims to the parcel of land are
quieted upon issuance of said certificate. This system highly facilitates land conveyance and negotiation.
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Same; Same; Same; Same; The delegates to the 1935 Constitutional Convention very well knew that the concept of State
ownership of land and natural resources was introduced by the Spaniards, however, they were not certain whether it was
continued and applied by the Americans, so to remove all doubts, the Convention approved the provision in the Constitution
affirming the Regalian doctrine.—The Regalian doctrine was enshrined in the 1935 Constitution. One of the fixed and
dominating objectives of the 1935 Constitutional Convention was the nationalization and conservation of the natural
resources of the country. There was an overwhelming sentiment in the Convention in favor of the principle of state
ownership of natural resources and the adoption of the Regalian doctrine. State ownership of natural resources was seen
as a necessary starting point to secure recognition of the state’s power to control their disposition, exploitation,
development, or utilization. The delegates to the Constitutional Convention very well knew that the concept of State
ownership of land and natural resources was introduced by the Spaniards, however, they were not certain whether it was
continued and applied by the Americans. To remove all doubts, the Convention approved the provision in the Constitution
affirming the Regalian doctrine.
Same; Indigenous Peoples Rights Act (RA. No. 8371); Ancestral Domains: Ancestral Lands; Customary Laws; The
Indigenous Peoples Rights Act (IPRA) grants the indigenous cultural communities or indigenous peoples (ICCs/IPs) the
ownership and possession of their ancestral domains and ancestral lands, and defines the extent of these lands and
domains, and the ownership given is the indigenous concept of ownership under customary law which traces its origin to
native title.—Republic Act No. 8371 is entitled “An Act to Recognize, Protect and Promote the Rights of Indigenous
Cultural Communities/Indigenous Peoples, Creating a National Commission on Indigenous Peoples, Establishing
Implementing Mechanisms, Appropriating Funds Therefor, and for Other Purposes.” It is simply known as “The
Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997” or the IPRA. The IPRA recognizes the existence of the indigenous cultural
communities or indigenous peoples (ICCs/IPs) as a distinct sector in Philippine society. It grants these people the ownership
and possession of their ancestral domains and ancestral lands, and defines the extent of these lands and domains. The
ownership given is the indigenous concept of ownership under customary law which traces its origin to native title.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Words and Phrases; Indigenous Cultural Communities or Indigenous Peoples refer to a
group of people or homogeneous societies who have continuously lived as an organized community on communally bounded
and defined territory.—Indigenous Cultural Com-
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munities or Indigenous Peoples refer to a group of people or homogeneous societies who have continuously lived as an
organized community on communally bounded and defined territory. These groups of people have actually occupied,
possessed and utilized their territories under claim of ownership since time immemorial. They share common bonds of
language, customs, traditions and other distinctive cultural traits, or, they, by their resistance to political, social and
cultural inroads of colonization, non-indigenous religions and cultures, became historically differentiated from the Filipino
majority. ICCs/IPs also include descendants of ICCs/IPs who inhabited the country at the time of conquest or colonization,
who retain some or all of their own social, economic, cultural and political institutions but who may have been displaced
from their traditional territories or who may have resettled outside their ancestral domains.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The abrogation of the Filipinos’ ancestral rights in land and the introduction of the concept
of public domain were the most immediate fundamental results of Spanish colonial theory and law.—All lands lost by the
old barangays in the process of pueblo organization as well as all lands not assigned to them and the pueblos, were now
declared to be crown lands or realengas, belonging to the Spanish king. It was from the realengas that land grants were
made to non-Filipinos. The abrogation of the Filipinos’ ancestral rights in land and the introduction of the concept of public
domain were the most immediate fundamental results of Spanish colonial theory and law. The concept that the Spanish
king was the owner of everything of value in the Indies or colonies was imposed on the natives, and the natives were
stripped of their ancestral rights to land.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Colonialism tended to divide and rule an otherwise culturally and historically related
populace through a colonial system that exploited both the virtues and vices of the Filipinos.—The Moros and infieles
resisted Spanish rule and Christianity. The Moros were driven from Manila and the Visayas to Mindanao; while the
infieles, to the hinterlands. The Spaniards did not pursue them into the deep interior. The upland societies were naturally
outside the immediate concern of Spanish interest, and the cliffs and forests of the hinterlands were difficult and
inaccessible, allowing the infieles, in effect, relative security. Thus, the infieles, which were peripheral to colonial
administration, were not only able to preserve their own culture but also thwarted the Christianization process, separating
themselves from the newly evolved Christian community. Their own political, economic and social systems were kept
constantly alive and vibrant. The pro-Christian or pro-Indio attitude of colonialism brought about a generally mutual
feeling of suspicion, fear, and hostility between the Christians on the one hand and the non-
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Christians on the other. Colonialism tended to divide and rule an otherwise culturally and historically related
populace through a colonial system that exploited both the virtues and vices of the Filipinos.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Under the 1973 Constitution, for the first time in Philippine history, the “non-Christian
tribes” or the “cultural minorities” were addressed by the highest law of the Republic, and they were referred to as “cultural
communities.”—It was in the 1973 Constitution that the State adopted the following provision: “The State shall consider
the customs, traditions, beliefs, and interests of national cultural communities in the formulation and implementation of
State policies.” For the first time in Philippine history, the “non-Christian tribes” or the “cultural minorities” were
addressed by the highest law of the Republic, and they were referred to as “cultural communities.” More importantly this
time, their “uncivilized” culture was given some recognition and their “customs, traditions, beliefs and interests” were to be
considered by the State in the formulation and implementation of State policies. President Marcos abolished the CNI and
transferred its functions to the Presidential Adviser on National Minorities (PANAMIN). The PANAMIN was tasked to
integrate the ethnic groups that sought full integration into the larger community, and at the same time “protect the
rights of those who wish to preserve their original lifeways beside the larger community.” In short, while still adopting the
integration policy, the decree recognized the right of tribal Filipinos to preserve their way of life.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The Aquino government signified a total shift from the policy of integration to one of
preservation.—The Aquino government signified a total shift from the policy of integration to one of preservation. Invoking
her powers under the Freedom Constitution, President Aquino created the Office of Muslim Affairs, Office for Northern
Cultural Communities and the Office for Southern Cultural Communities all under the Office of the President.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The State, by recognizing the right of tribal Filipinos to their ancestral lands and domains,
has effectively upheld their right to live in a culture distinctly their own.—The 1987 Constitution carries at least six (6)
provisions which insure the right of tribal Filipinos to preserve their way of life. This Constitution goes further than the
1973 Constitution by expressly guaranteeing the rights of tribal Filipinos to their ancestral domains and ancestral lands.
By recognizing their right to their ancestral lands and domains, the State has effectively upheld their right to live in a
culture distinctly their own.
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Same; Same; Same; Same; Land Titles; Land titles do not exist in the indigenous peoples’ economic and social system—
the concept of individual land ownership under the civil law is alien to them.—Land titles do not exist in the indigenous
peoples' economic and social system. The concept of individual land ownership under the civil law is alien to them.
Inherently colonial in origin, our national land laws and governmental policies frown upon indigenous claims to ancestral
lands. Communal ownership is looked upon as inferior, if not inexistent.
Same; Same; Same; Same; It was to address the centuries-old neglect of the Philippine indigenous peoples that the
Tenth Congress passed and approved the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act (IPRA) of 1997.—It was to address the centuries-
old neglect of the Philippine indigenous peoples that the Tenth Congress of the Philippines, by their joint efforts, passed
and approved R.A. No. 8371, the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act (IPRA) of 1997. The law was a consolidation of two Bills—
Senate Bill No. 1728 and House Bill No. 9125.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Words and Phrases; “Ancestral Domains,” Explained.—Ancestral domains are all areas
belonging to ICCs/IPs held under a claim of ownership, occupied or possessed by ICCs/IPs by themselves or through their
ancestors, communally or individually since time immemorial, continuously until the present, except when interrupted by
war, force majeure or displacement by force, deceit, stealth or as a consequence of government projects or any other
voluntary dealings with government and/or private individuals or corporations. Ancestral domains comprise lands, inland
waters, coastal areas, and natural resources therein and includes ancestral lands, forests, pasture, residential, agricultural,
and other lands individually owned whether alienable or not, hunting grounds, burial grounds, worship areas, bodies of
water, mineral and other natural resources. They also include lands which may no longer be exclusively occupied by
ICCs/IPs but from which they traditionally had access to for their subsistence and traditional activities, particularly the
home ranges of ICCs/IPs who are still nomadic and/or shifting cultivators.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; “Ancestral Lands,” Explained.—Ancestral lands are lands held by the ICCs/IPs
under the same conditions as ancestral domains except that these are limited to lands and that these lands are not merely
occupied and possessed but are also utilized by the ICCs/IPs under claims of individual or traditional group ownership.
These lands include but are not limited to residential lots, rice terraces or paddies, private forests, swidden farms and tree
lots.
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Same; Same; Same; Same; Land Titles; Customary Laws; The National Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP)
issues a Certificate of Ancestral Domain Title (CADT) in the name of the community concerned, leaving the allocation of
lands within the ancestral domain to any individual or indigenous corporate (family or clan) claimants to the ICCs/IPs
concerned to decide in accordance with customs and traditions while with respect to ancestral lands outside the ancestral
domains, the NICP issues a Certificate of Ancestral Land Title (CALT).—Upon due application and compliance with the
procedure provided under the law and upon finding by the NCIP that the application is meritorious, the NCIP shall issue a
Certificate of Ancestral Domain Title (CADT) in the name of the community concerned. The allocation of lands within the
ancestral domain to any individual or indigenous corporate (family or clan) claimants is left to the ICCs/IPs concerned to
decide in accordance with customs and traditions. With respect to ancestral lands outside the ancestral domain, the NCIP
issues a Certificate of Ancestral Land Title (CALT). CADTs and CALTs issued under the IPRA shall be registered by the
NCIP before the Register of Deeds in the place where the property is situated.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The IPRA categorically declares ancestral lands and domains held by native title as
never to have been public land—domains and lands held under native title are, therefore, indisputably presumed to have
never been public lands and are private.—Native title refers to ICCs/IPs’ preconquest rights to lands and domains held
under a claim of private ownership as far back as memory reaches. These lands are deemed never to have been public
lands and are indisputably presumed to have been held that way since before the Spanish Conquest. The rights of
ICCs/IPs to their ancestral domains(which also include ancestral lands) by virtue of native title shall be recognized and
respected. Formal recognition, when solicited by ICCs/IPs concerned, shall be embodied in a Certificate of Ancestral
Domain Title (CADT), which shall recognize the title of the concerned ICCs/IPs over the territories identified and
delineated. Like a Torrens title, a CADT is evidence of private ownership of land by native title. Native title, however, is a
right of private ownership peculiarly granted to ICCs/IPs over their ancestral lands and domains. The IPRA categorically
declares ancestral lands and domains held by native title as never to have been public land. Domains and lands held under
native title are, therefore, indisputably presumed to have never been public lands andare private.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The concept of native title first upheld in Cariño v. Insular Government, 41 Phil 935
(1909), 212 US. 449, 53 L.Ed. 594, and enshrined in the IPRA grants ownership, albeit in limited
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form, of the land to the ICCs/IPs.—In the Philippines, the concept of native title first upheld in Cariño and enshrined
in the IPRA grants ownership, albeit in limited form, of the land to the ICCs/IPs. Native title presumes that the land is
private and was never public. Cariño is the only case that specifically and categorically recognizes native title. The long
line of cases citing Cariño did not touch on native title and the private character of ancestral domains and
lands. Cariño was cited by the succeeding cases to support the concept of acquisitive prescription under the Public Land
Act which is a different matter altogether. Under the Public Land Act, land sought to be registered must be public
agricultural land. When the conditions specified in Section 48 [b] of the Public Land Act are complied with, the possessor of
the land is deemed to have acquired, by operation of law, a right to a grant of the land. The land ceases to be part of the
public domain, ipso jure, and is converted to private property by the mere lapse or completion of the prescribed statutory
period.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Ancestral lands and ancestral domains are not part of the lands of the public
domain; they are private and belong to the ICCs/IPs.—Thus, ancestral lands and ancestral domains are not part of the
lands of the public domain. They are private and belong to the ICCs/IPs. Section 3 of Article XII on National Economy and
Patrimony of the 1987 Constitution classifies lands of the public domain into four categories: (a) agricultural, (b) forest or
timber, (c) mineral lands, and (d) national parks. Section 5 of the same Article XII mentions ancestral lands and ancestral
domains but it does not classify them under any of the said four categories. To classify them as public lands under any one
of the four classes will render the entire IPRA law a nullity. The spirit of the IPRA lies in the distinct concept of ancestral
domains and ancestral lands. The IPRA addresses the major problem of the ICCs/IPs which is loss of land. Land and space
are of vital concern in terms of sheer survival of the ICCs/IPs. The 1987 Constitution mandates the State to “protect the
rights of indigenous cultural communities to their ancestral lands” and that “Congress provide for the applicability of
customary laws x x x in determining the ownership and extent of ancestral domain.” It is the recognition of the ICCs/IPs
distinct rights of ownership over their ancestral domains and lands that breathes life into this constitutional mandate.
Same; Same; Same; Same; The right of ownership and possession of the ICCs/IPs to their ancestral domains is held
under the indigenous concept of ownership which maintains the view that ancestral domains are the ICCs/IPs private but
community property.—The right of ownership and possession of the ICCs/IPs to their ancestral domains is held under the
indigenous concept of ownership. This concept maintains the view that
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ancestral domains are the ICCs/IPs private but community property. It is private simply because it is not part of the
public domain. But its private character ends there. The ancestral domain is owned in common by the ICCs/IPs and not by
one particular person. The IPRA itself provides that areas within the ancestral domains, whether delineated or not, are
presumed to be communally held. These communal rights, however, are not exactly the same as co-ownership rights under
the Civil Code. Co-ownership gives any co-owner the right to demand partition of the property held in common. The Civil
Code expressly provides that “[n]o co-owner shall be obliged to remain in the co-ownership.” Each co-owner may demand at
any time the partition of the thing in common, insofar as his share is concerned. To allow such a right over ancestral
domains may be destructive not only of customary law of the community but of the very community itself.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Customary Laws; The IPRA, by legislative fiat, introduces a new concept of ownership, a
concept that has long existed under customary law.—Following the constitutional mandate that “customary law govern
property rights or relations in determining the ownership and extent of ancestral domains,” the IPRA, by legislative flat,
introduces a new concept of ownership. This is a concept that has long existed under customary law.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Customary law is a primary, not secondary, source of rights under the IPRA and
uniquely applies to ICCs/IPs, and its recognition does not depend on the absence of a specific provision in the civil law.—
Custom, from which customary law is derived, is also recognized under the Civil Code as a source of law. Some articles of
the Civil Code expressly provide that custom should be applied in cases where no codal provision is applicable. In other
words, in the absence of any applicable provision in the Civil Code, custom, when duly proven, can define rights and
liabilities. Customary law is a primary, not secondary, source of rights under the IPRA and uniquely applies to ICCs/IPs.
Its recognition does not depend on the absence of a specific provision in the civil law. The indigenous concept of ownership
under customary law is specifically acknowledged and recognized, and coexists with the civil law concept and the laws on
land titling and land registration.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Natural Resources; There is nothing in IPRA that grants to the ICCs/IPs ownership over
the natural resources within their ancestral domains.—Examining the IPRA, there is nothing in the law that grants to the
ICCs/IPs ownership over the natural resources within their ancestral domains. The right of ICCs/IPs in their ancestral
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domains includes ownership, but this “ownership” is expressly defined and limited in Section 7 (a) as: “Sec. 7. a) Right
of ownership—The right to claim ownership over lands, bodies of water traditionally and actually occupied by ICCs/IPs,
sacred places, traditional hunting and fishing grounds, and all improvements made by them at any time within the
domains;” The ICCs/IPs are given the right to claim ownership over “lands, bodies of water traditionally and actually
occupied by ICCs/IPs, sacred places, traditional hunting and fishing grounds, and all improvements made by them at any
time within the domains.” It will be noted that this enumeration does not mention bodies of water not occupied by the
ICCs/IPs, minerals, coal, wildlife, floraand fauna in the traditional hunting grounds, fish in the traditional fishing
grounds, forests or timber in the sacred places, etc. and all other natural resources found within the ancestral domains.
Indeed, the right of ownership under Section 7 (a) does not cover “waters, minerals, coal, petroleum and other mineral oils,
all forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna and all other natural
resources”enumerated in Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution as belonging to the State.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The inclusion of “natural resources” in Section 1, Part II, Rule III of the
Implementing Rules goes beyond the parameters of Section 7 (b) of the law and is contrary to Section 2, Article XII of the
1987 Constitution.—The constitutionality of Section 1, Part II, Rule III of the Implementing Rules was not specifically and
categorically challenged by petitioners. Petitioners actually assail the constitutionality of the Implementing Rules in
general. Nevertheless, to avoid any confusion in the implementation of the law, it is necessary to declare that the inclusion
of “natural resources” in Section 1, Part II, Rule III of the Implementing Rules goes beyond the parameters of Section 7 (b)
of the law and is contrary to Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The right to negotiate the terms and conditions over the natural resources covers only
their exploration which must be for the purpose of ensuring ecological and environmental protection of, and conservation
measures in the ancestral domain—it does not extend to the exploitation and development of natural resources.—Ownership
over the natural resources in the ancestral domains remains with the State and the ICCs/IPs are merely granted the right
to “manage and conserve” them for future generations, “benefit and share” the profits from their allocation and utilization,
and “negotiate the terms and conditions for their exploration” for the purpose of “ensuring ecological and environmental
protection and conservation measures.” It must be noted that the right to negotiate the terms and conditions over the
natural re-
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sources covers only their exploration which must be for the purpose of ensuring ecological and environmental
protection of, and conservation measures in the ancestral domain. It does not extend to the exploitation and development
of natural resources. Simply stated, the ICCs/IPs’ rights over the natural resources take the form of management or
stewardship. For the ICCs/IPs may use these resources and share in the profits of their utilization or negotiate the terms
for their exploration. At the same time, however, the ICCs/IPs must ensure that the natural resources within their
ancestral domains are conserved for future generations and that the “utilization” of these resources must not harm the
ecology and environment pursuant to national and customary laws.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The limited rights of “management and use” in Section 7 (b) of the IPRA must be
taken to contemplate small-scale utilization of natural resources as distinguished from large-scale utilization.—The limited
rights of “management and use” in Section 7 (b) must be taken to contemplate small-scale utilization of natural resources
as distinguished from large-scale. Small-scale utilization of natural resources is expressly allowed in the third paragraph
of Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution “in recognition of the plight of forest dwellers, gold panners, marginal
fishermen and others similarly situated who exploit our natural resources for their daily sustenance and survival.” Section
7 (b) also expressly mandates the ICCs/IPs to manage and conserve these resources and ensure environmental and
ecological protection within the domains, which duties, by their very nature, necessarily reject utilization in a large-scale.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The rights granted by the IPRA to the ICCs/IPs over the natural resources in their
ancestral domains merely gives the ICCs/IPs, as owners and occupants of the land on which the resources are found, the
right to the small-scale utilization of these resources, and at the same time, a priority in their large-scale development and
exploitation.—The rights granted by the IPRA to the ICCs/IPs over the natural resources in their ancestral domains
merely gives the ICCs/IPs, as owners and occupants of the land on which the resources are found, the right to the small-
scale utilization of these resources, and at the same time, a priority in their large-scale development and exploitation.
Section 57 does not mandate the State to automatically give priority to the ICCs/IPs. The State has several options and it
is within its discretion to choose which option to pursue. Moreover, there is nothing in the law that gives the ICCs/IPs the
right to solely undertake the large-scale development of the natural resources within their domains. The ICCs/IPs must
undertake such endeavour always under State supervision or control. This
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indicates that the State does not lose control and ownership over the resources even in their exploitation. Sections 7
(b) and 57 of the law simply give due respect to the ICCs/IPs who, as actual occupants of the land where the natural
resources lie, have traditionally utilized these resources for their subsistence and survival.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Ecology and Environment; Indigenous rights came as a result of both human rights and
environmental protection, and have become a part of today’s priorities for the international agenda.—Presently, there is a
growing concern for indigenous rights in the international scene. This came as a result of the increased publicity focused
on the continuing disrespect for indigenous human rights and the destruction of the indigenous peoples’ environment,
together with the national governments’ inability to deal with the situation. Indigenous rights came as a result of both
human rights and environmental protection, and have become a part of today’s priorities for the international agenda.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Customary Laws; If the evolution of the Filipino people into a democratic society is to truly
proceed democratically, i.e., if the Filipinos as a whole are to participate fully in the task of continuing democratization, it is
the Supreme Court’s duty to acknowledge the presence of indigenous and customary laws in the country and affirm their co-
existence with the land laws in our national legal system.—The struggle of the Filipinos throughout colonial history had
been plagued by ethnic and religious differences. These differences were carried over and magnified by the Philippine
government through the imposition of a national legal order that is mostly foreign in origin or derivation. Largely
unpopulist, the present legal system has resulted in the alienation of a large sector of society, specifically, the indigenous
peoples. The histories and cultures of the indigenes are relevant to the evolution of Philippine culture and are vital to the
understanding of contemporary problems. It is through the IPRA that an attempt was made by our legislators to
understand Filipino society not in terms of myths and biases but through common experiences in the course of history. The
Philippines became a democracy a centennial ago and the decolonization process still continues. If the evolution of the
Filipino people into a democratic society is to truly proceed democratically, i.e., if the Filipinos as a whole are to participate
fully in the task of continuing democratization, it is this Court’s duty to acknowledge the presence of indigenous and
customary laws in the country and affirm their co-existence with the land laws in our national legal system.
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VITUG, J., Separate Opinion:
Supreme Court; Judicial Review; Procedural Rules and Technicalities; Until an exact balance is struck, the Court must
accept an eclectic notion that can free itself from the bondage of legal nicety and hold trenchant technicalities subordinate to
what may be considered to be of overriding concern.—Nevertheless, where a most compelling reason exists, such as when
the matter is of transcendental importance and paramount interest to the nation, the Court must take the liberal approach
that recognizes the legal standing of nontraditional plaintiffs, such as citizens and taxpayers, to raise constitutional issues
that affect them. This Court thus did so in a case that involves the conservation of our forests for ecological needs. Until an
exact balance is struck, the Court must accept an eclectic notion that can free Itself from the bondage of legal nicety and
hold trenchant technicalities subordinate to what may be considered to be of overriding concern.
National Patrimony; Regalian Doctrine; Natural Resources; Indigenous Peoples Rights Act (IPRA); The provisions
Sections 7 and 57 of the IPRA, in their totality, are, in my view, beyond the context of the fundamental law and virtually
amount to an undue delegation, if not an unacceptable abdication, of State authority over a significant area of the country
and its patrimony.—IPRA effectively withdraws from the public domain the so-called ancestral domains covering literally
millions of hectares. The notion of community property would comprehend not only matters of proprietary interest but also
some forms of self-governance over the carved-out territory. This concept is elaborated in Section 7 of the law which states
that the “rights of ownership and possession of ICCs/IPs to their ancestral domains shall be recognized and protected,”
subsumed under which would encompass the right of ownership (paragraph a); the right to develop, control and use lands
and natural resources, including “the right to negotiate the terms and conditions for the exploration of natural resources in
the areas for the purpose of ensuring ecological, environmental protection and the conservation measures, pursuant to
national and customary laws;” (par. b); the right to stay in the territories (par. c); the right to return to their abandoned
lands. In case of displacement (par. d); the right to regulate entry of migrants (par. e); the right to claim parts of ancestral
domains previously reserved (par. g); and the right to resolve land conflicts. In accordance primarily with customary law
(par. h). Concurrently, Section 57 states that ICCs/IPs shall be given “priority rights in the harvesting, extraction,
development or exploitation of any natural resources within the ancestral domains.” These provisions of IPRA, in their
totality, are, in my view, beyond the context of the fun-
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damental law and virtually amount to an undue delegation, if not an unacceptable abdication, of State authority over
a significant area of the country and its patrimony.
Same; Same; Same; The decision of the United States Supreme Court in Cariño v. Insular Government, 41 Phil 935
(1910), holding that a parcel of land held since time immemorial by individuals under a claim of private ownership is
presumed never to have been public land and cited to downgrade the application of the regalian doctrine, cannot override
the collective will of the people expressed in the Constitution.—The decision of the United States Supreme Court in Cariño
vs. InsularGovernment, holding that a parcel of land held since time immemorial by individuals under a claim of private
ownership is presumed never to have been public land and cited to downgrade the application of the regalian doctrine,
cannot override the collective will of the people expressed in the Constitution. It is in them that sovereignty resides and
from them that all government authority emanates. It is not then for a court ruling or any piece of legislation to be
conformed to by the fundamental law, but it is for the former to adapt to the latter, and it is the sovereign act that must,
between them, stand inviolate.
Customary Laws; I do not see the statement in Section 5 of Article XII of the Constitution allowing Congress to provide
“for the applicability of customary laws governing property rights or relations in determining the ownership and extent of
ancestral domains” as saying that Congress may enact a law that would simply express that “customary laws shall govern”
and end it there.—The second paragraph of Section 5 of Article XII of the Constitution allows Congress to provide “for the
applicability of customary laws governing property rights or relations in determining the ownership and extent of
ancestral domains.” I do not see this statement as saying that Congress may enact a law that would simply express that
“customary laws shall govern” and end it there. Had it been so, the Constitution could have itself easily provided without
having to still commission Congress to do it.
Same; Customary laws, when specifically enacted to become part of statutory law, must first undergo that publication
to render them correspondingly binding and effective as such.—The constitutional aim, it seems to me, is to get Congress to
look closely into the customary laws and, with specificity and by proper recitals, to hew them to, and make them part of,
the stream of laws. The “due process clause,” as I so understand it in Tañada vs. Tuvera would require an apt publication
of a legislative enactment before it is permitted to take force and effect. So, also
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customary laws, when specifically enacted to become part of statutory law, must first undergo that publication to
render them correspondingly binding and effective as such.
KAPUNAN, J., Separate Opinion:
Indigenous Peoples Rights Act (IPRA); Words and Phrases; International Law; In international law, the definition of
what constitutes “indigenous peoples” attains some degree of controversy.—The term “indigenous” traces its origin to the
Old Latin word indu, meaning “within.” In the sense the term has come to be used, it is nearer in meaning to the Latin
word indigenus, which means “native.” “Indigenous” refers to that which originated or has been produced naturally in a
particular land, and has not been introduced from the outside. In international law, the definition of what constitutes
“indigenous peoples” attains some degree of controversy. No definition of the term “indigenous peoples” has been adopted
by the United Nations (UN), although UN practice has been guided by a working definition in the 1986 Report of UN
Special Rapporteur Martinez Cobo.
Same; Same; In Philippine constitutional law, the term “indigenous peoples” pertains to those groups of Filipinos who
have retained a high degree of continuity from pre-Conquest culture.—In Philippine constitutional law, the term
“indigenous peoples” pertains to those groups of Fili-pinos who have retained a high degree of continuity from pre-
Conquest culture. Philippine legal history, however, has not been kind to the indigenous peoples, characterized them as
“uncivilized,” “backward people,” with “barbarous practices” and “a low order of intelligence.”
Same; Same; The extant Philippine national culture is the culture of the majority, its indigenous roots were replaced by
foreign cultural elements that are decidedly pronounced, if not dominant.—Though Filipinos today are essentially of the
same stock as the indigenous peoples, our national culture exhibits only the last vestiges of this native culture. Centuries
of colonial rule and neocolonial domination have created a discernible distinction between the cultural majority and the
group of cultural minorities. The extant Philippine national culture is the culture of the majority; its indigenous roots were
replaced by foreign cultural elements that are decidedly pronounced, if not dominant. While the culture of the majority
reoriented itself to Western influence, the culture of the minorities has retained its essentially native character.
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Supreme Court; Judicial Review; When the State machinery is set into motion to implement an alleged unconstitutional
statute, the Supreme Court possesses sufficient authority to resolve and prevent imminent injury and violation of the
constitutional process.—In the case at bar, there exists a live controversy involving a clash of legal rights. A law has been
enacted, and the Implementing Rules and Regulations approved. Money has been appropriated and the government
agencies concerned have been directed to implement the statute. It cannot be successfully maintained that we should
await the adverse consequences of the law in order to consider the controversy actual and ripe for judicial resolution. It is
precisely the contention of the petitioners that the law, on its face, constitutes an unconstitutional abdication of State
ownership over lands of the public domain and other natural resources. Moreover, when the State machinery is set into
motion to implement an alleged unconstitutional statute, this Court possesses sufficient authority to resolve and prevent
imminent injury and violation of the constitutional process.
Same; Same; Parties; Locus Standi; Taxpayer’s Suits; Citizen’s Suits; In a sense, all citizen’s and taxpayer’s suits are
efforts to air generalized grievances about the conduct of government and the allocation of power.—In addition to the
existence of an actual case or controversy, a person who assails the validity of a statute must have a personal and
substantial interest in the case, such that, he has sustained, or will sustain, a direct injury as a result of its enforcement.
Evidently, the rights asserted by petitioners as citizens and taxpayers are held in common by all the citizens, the violation
of which may result only in a “generalized grievance.” Yet, in a sense, all citizen’s and taxpayer’s suits are efforts to air
generalized grievances about the conduct of government and the allocation of power.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; National Patrimony; The preservation of the integrity and inviolability of the
national patrimony is a proper subject of a citizen’s suit.—Petitioners, as citizens, possess the “public right” to ensure that
the national patrimony is not alienated and diminished in violation of the Constitution. Since the government, as the
guardian of the national patrimony, holds it for the benefit of all Filipinos without distinction as to ethnicity, it follows
that a citizen has sufficient interest to maintain a suit to ensure that any grant of concessions covering the national
economy and patrimony strictly complies with constitutional requirements. Thus, the preservation of the integrity and
inviolability of the national patrimony is a proper subject of a citizen’s suit.
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National Patrimony; Regalian Doctrine; The theory of jura regalia was nothing more than a natural fruit of conquest;
The Regalian theory does not negate native title to lands held in private ownership since time immemorial.—Generally,
under the concept of jura regalia, private title to land must be traced to some grant, express or implied, from the Spanish
Crown or its successors, the American Colonial government, and thereafter, the Philippine Republic. The belief that the
Spanish Crown is the origin of all land titles in the Philippines has persisted because title to land must emanate from
some source for it cannot issue forth from nowhere. In its broad sense, the term “jura regalia” refers to royal rights, or
those rights which the King has by virtue of his prerogatives. In Spanish law, it refers to a right which the sovereign has
over anything in which a subject has a right of property or propriedad. These were rights enjoyed during feudal times by
the king as the sovereign. The theory of the feudal system was that title to all lands was originally held by the King, and
while the use of lands was granted out to others who were permitted to hold them under certain conditions, the King
theoretically retained the title. By fiction of law, the King was regarded as the original proprietor of all lands, and the true
and only source of title, and from him all lands were held. The theory of jura regalia was therefore nothing more than a
natural fruit of conquest. The Regalian theory, however, does not negate native title to lands held in private ownership
since time immemorial.
Same; Same; Natural Resources; The mere fact that Section 3(a) of IPRA defines ancestral domains to include the
natural resources, found therein does not ipso facto convert the character of such natural resources as private property of the
indigenous people.—Section 3(a) merely defines the coverage of ancestral domains, and describes the extent, limit and
composition of ancestral domains by setting forth the standards and guidelines in determining whether a particular area is
to be considered as part of and within the ancestral domains. In other words, Section 3(a) serves only as a yardstick which
points out what properties are within the ancestral domains. It does not confer or recognize any right of ownership over
the natural resources to the indigenous peoples. Its purpose is definitional and not declarative of a right or title. The
specification of what areas belong to the ancestral domains is, to our mind, important to ensure that no unnecessary
encroachment on private properties outside the ancestral domains will result during the delineation process. The mere fact
that Section 3(a) defines ancestral domains to include the natural resources found therein does not ipso facto convert the
character of such natural resources as private property of the indigenous peoples. Similarly, Section 5 in relation to Section
3(a) cannot be construed as a source of ownership rights of indigenous people over the natural resources simply
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because it recognizes ancestral domains as their “private but community property.”

Same; Same; Same; Words and Phrases; The phrase “private but community property” is merely descriptive of the
indigenous peoples’ concept of ownership as distinguished from that provided in the Civil Code.—The phrase “private but
community property” is merely descriptive of the indigenous peoples’ concept of ownership as distinguished from that
provided in the Civil Code. In Civil Law, “ownership” is the “independent and general power of a person over a thing for
purposes recognized by law and within the limits established thereby.” The civil law concept of ownership has the following
attributes: jus utendi or the right to receive from the thing that which it produces, jus abutendi or the right to consume the
thing by its use, jus disponendi or the power to alienate, encumber, transform and even destroy that which is owned,
and jus vindicandi or the right to exclude other persons from the possession the thing owned. In contrast, the indigenous
peoples’ concept of ownership emphasizes the importance of communal or group ownership. By virtue of the communal
character of ownership, the property held in common “cannot be sold, disposed or destroyed” because it was meant to
benefit the whole indigenous community and not merelythe individual member.
Same; Same; Same; The concept of native title to natural resources, unlike native title to land, has not been recognized
in the Philippines.—Finally, the concept of native title to natural resources, unlike native title to land, has not been
recognized in the Philippines. NCIP and Flavier, et al. invoke the case of Reavies v. Fianza in support of their thesis that
native title to natural resources has been upheld in this jurisdiction. They insist that “it is possible for rights over natural
resources to vest on a private (as opposed to a public) holder if these were held prior to the 1935 Constitution.” However, a
judicious examination of Reavies reveals that, contrary to the position of NCIP and Flavier, et al., the Court did not
recognize native title to natural resources. Rather, it merely upheld the right of the indigenous peoples to claim ownership
of minerals under the Philippine Bill of 1902.
Same; Same; Same; Upon the certification of certain areas as ancestral domain following the procedure outlined in
Sections 51 to 53 of the IPRA, jurisdiction of the government agency or agencies concerned over lands forming part thereof
ceases but the jurisdiction of government agencies over the natural resources within the ancestral domains does not
terminate by such certification because said agencies are mandated under existing laws to administer the natural resources
for the State, which is the
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owner thereof.—Undoubtedly, certain areas that are claimed as ancestral domains may still be under the
administration of other agencies of the Government, such as the Department of Agrarian Reform, with respect to
agricultural lands, and the Department of Environment and Natural Resources with respect to timber, forest and mineral
lands. Upon the certification of these areas as ancestral domain following the procedure outlined in Sections 51 to 53 of the
IPRA, jurisdiction of the government agency or agencies concerned over lands forming part thereof ceases. Nevertheless,
the jurisdiction of government agencies over the natural resources within the ancestral domains does not terminate by
such certification because said agencies are mandated under existing laws to administer the natural resources for the
State, which is the owner thereof. To construe Section 52[i] as divesting the State, through the government agencies
concerned, of jurisdiction over the natural resources within the ancestral domains would be inconsistent with the
established doctrine that all natural resources are owned by the State.
Same; Same; Same; Clearly, Section 2, Article XII, when interpreted in view of the pro-Filipino, pro-poor philosophy of
our fundamental law, and in harmony with the other provisions of the Constitution rather as a sequestered pronouncement,
cannot be construed as a prohibition against any and all forms of utilization of natural resources without the State’s direct
participation.—In addition to the means of exploration, development and utilization of the country’s natural resources
stated in paragraph 1, Section 2 of Article XII, the Constitution itself states in the third paragraph of the same section that
Congress may, by law, allow small-scale utilization of natural resources by its citizens. Further, Section 6, Article XIII,
directs the State, in the disposition and utilization of natural resources, to apply the principles of agrarian reform or
stewardship. Similarly, Section 7, Article XIII mandates the State to protect the rights of subsistence fishermen to
the preferential use of marine and fishing resources. Clearly, Section 2, Article XII, when interpreted in view of the pro-
Filipino, pro-poor philosophy of our fundamental law, and in harmony with the other provisions of the Constitution rather
as a sequestered pronouncement, cannot be construed as a prohibition against any and all forms of utilization of natural
resources without the State’s direct participation.
Same; Same; Same; Land Titles; By the enactment of IPRA, Congress did not purport to annul any and all Torrens
titles within areas claimed as ancestral lands or ancestral domains.—Further, by the enactment of IPRA, Congress did not
purport to annul any and all Torrens titles within areas claimed as ancestral lands or ancestral domains. The statute im-
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poses strict procedural requirements for the proper delineation of ancestral lands and ancestral domains as safeguards
against the fraudulent deprivation of any landowner of his land, whether or not he is member of an indigenous cultural
community. In all proceedings for delineation of ancestral lands and ancestral domains, the Director of Lands shall appear
to represent the interest of the Republic of the Philippines. With regard to ancestral domains, the following procedure is
mandatory: first,petition by an indigenous cultural community, or motu proprio by the NCIP; second, investigation and
census by the Ancestral domains Office (“ADO”) of the NCIP; third, preliminary report by the ADO; fourth, posting and
publication; and lastly, evaluation by the NCIP upon submission of the final report of the ADO. With regard to ancestral
lands, unless such lands are within an ancestral domain, the statute imposes the following procedural
requirements: first, application; second, posting and publication; third, investigation and inspection by the
ADO; fourth,delineation; lastly, evaluation by the NCIP upon submission of a report by the ADO. Hence, we cannot sustain
the arguments of the petitioners that the law affords no protection to those who are not indigenous peoples.
Indigenous Peoples; Due Process; The fact that the NCIP is composed of members of the indigenous peoples does not
mean that it (the NCIP) is incapable, or will appear to be so incapable, of delivering justice to the non-indigenous peoples.—
The fact that the NCIP is composed of members of the indigenous peoples does not mean that it (the NCIP) is incapable, or
will appear to be so incapable, of delivering justice to the non-indigenous peoples. A person’s possession of the trait of
impartiality desirable of a judge has nothing to do with his or her ethnic roots. In this wise, the indigenous peoples are as
capable of rendering justice as the non-indigenous peoples for, certainly, the latter have no monopoly of the concept of
justice.
Same; Customary Laws; The use of customary laws under the IPRA is not absolute, for the law speaks merely of
primacy of use.—Anent the use of customary laws in determining the ownership and extent of ancestral domains, suffice it
to say that such is allowed under paragraph 2, Section 5 of Article XII of the Constitution. Said provision states, “The
Congress may provide for the applicability of customary laws governing property rights and relations in determining the
ownership and extent of the ancestral domains.” Notably, the use of customary laws under IPRA is not absolute, for the
law speaks merely of primacy of use.The IPRA prescribes the application of such customary laws where these present a
workable solution acceptable to the parties, who are members of the same indige-
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nous group. This interpretation is supported by Section 1, Rule IX of the Implementing Rules.
Same; Same; When one of the parties to a dispute is a non-member of an indigenous group, or when the indigenous
peoples involved belong to different groups, the application of customary law is not required.—The application of customary
law is limited to disputes concerning property rights or relations in determining the ownership and extent of the ancestral
domains, where all the parties involved are members of indigenous peoples, specifically, of the same indigenous group. It
therefore follows that when one of the parties to a dispute is a non-member of an indigenous group, or when the indigenous
peoples involved belong to different groups, the application of customary law is not required.
Administrative Law; Presidency; Power of Control; Words and Phrases; An “independent agency” is an administrative
body independent of the executive branch or one not subject to a superior head of department, as distinguished from a
“subordinate agency” or an administrative body whose action is subject to administrative review or revision.—The NCIP
has been designated under IPRA as the primary government agency responsible for the formulation and implementation of
policies, plans and programs to promote and protect the rights and well being of the indigenous peoples and the recognition
of their ancestral domain as well as their rights thereto. It has been granted administrative, quasi-legislative and quasi-
judicial powers to carry out its mandate. The diverse nature of the NCIP’s functions renders it impossible to place said
agency entirely under the control of only one branch of government and this, apparently, is the reason for its
characterization by Congress as an independent agency. An “independent agency” is defined as an administrative body
independent of the executive branch or one not subject to a superior head of department, as distinguished from a
“subordinate agency” or an administrative body whose action is subject to administrative review or revision.
Same; Same; Same; The NCIP, although independent to a certain degree, was placed by Congress “under the office of
the President” and, as such, is still subject to the President’s power to control and supervision with respect to its performance
of administrative functions.—That Congress did not intend to place the NCIP under the control of the President in all
instances is evident in the IPRA itself, which provides that the decisions of the NCIP in the exercise of its quasi-judicial
functions shall be appealable to the Court of Appeals, like those of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) and
the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). Nevertheless, the NCIP, although independent to a certain degree, was
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placed by Congress “under the office of the President” and, as such, is still subject to the President’s power of control
and supervision granted under Section 17, Article VII of the Constitution with respect to its performance of administrative
functions, such as the following: (1) the NCIP must secure the President’s approval in obtaining loans to finance its
projects; (2) it must obtain the President’s approval for any negotiation for funds and for the acceptance of gifts and/or
properties in whatever form and from whatever source; (3) the NCIP shall submit annual reports of its operations and
achievements to the President, and advise the latter on all matters relating to the indigenous peoples; and (4) it shall
exercise such other powers as may be directed by the President. The President is also given the power to appoint the
Commissioners of the NCIP as well as to remove them from office for cause motu proprio or upon the recommendation of
any indigenous community.
MENDOZA, J., Separate Opinion:
Courts; Judicial Review; The judicial power vested in the Supreme Court by Art. VIII, §1 extends only to cases and
controversies for the determination of such proceedings as are established by law for the protection or enforcement of rights,
or the prevention, redress or punishment of wrongs.—The judicial power vested in this Court by Art. VIII, §1 extends only
to cases and controversies for the determination of such proceedings as are established by law for the protection or
enforcement of rights, or the prevention, redress or punishment of wrongs. In this case, the purpose of the suit is not to
enforce a property right of petitioners against the government and other respondents or to demand compensation for
injuries suffered by them as a result of the enforcement of the law, but only to settle what they believe to be the doubtful
character of the law in question. Any judgment that we render in this case will thus not conclude or bind real parties in the
future, when actual litigation will bring to the Court the question of the constitutionality of such legislation. Such
judgment cannot be executed as it amounts to no more than an expression of opinion upon the validity of the provisions of
the law in question.
Same; Same; The statement that the judicial power includes the duty to determine whether there has been a grave abuse
of discretion was inserted in Art. VIII, §1 not really to give the judiciary a roving commission to right any wrong it perceives
but to preclude courts from invoking the political question doctrine in order to evade the decision of certain cases even where
violations of civil liberties are alleged.—I do not conceive it to be the function of this Court under Art. VIII, §1 of the
Constitution to determine in the abstract whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
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discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the legislative and executive departments in
enacting the IPRA. Our jurisdiction is confined to cases or controversies. No one reading Art. VIII, §5 can fail to note that,
in enumerating the matters placed in the keeping of this Court, it uniformly begins with the phrase “all cases . . .” The
statement that the judicial power includes the duty to determine whether there has been a grave abuse of discretion was
inserted in Art. VIII, §1 not really to give the judiciary a roving commission to right any wrong it perceives but to preclude
courts from invoking the political question doctrine in order to evade the decision of certain cases even where violations of
civil liberties are alleged.
Same; Same; The judicial power cannot be extended to matters which do not involve actual cases or controversies
without upsetting the balance of power among the three branches of the government and erecting, as it were, the judiciary,
particularly the Supreme Court, as a third branch of Congress, with power not only to invalidate statutes but even to rewrite
them.—Indeed, the judicial power cannot be extended to matters which do not involve actual cases or controversies without
upsetting the balance of power among the three branches of the government and erecting, as it were, the judiciary,
particularly the Supreme Court, as a third branch of Congress, with power not only to invalidate statutes but even to
rewrite them. Yet that is exactly what we would be permitting in this case were we to assume jurisdiction and decide
wholesale the constitutional validity of the IPRA contrary to the established rule that a party can question the validity of a
statute only if, as applied to him, it is unconstitutional. Here the IPRA is sought to be declared void on its face.
Same; Same; Freedom of Expression; “Chilling Effect” Syndrome; The only instance where a facial challenge to a
statute is allowed is when it operates in the area of freedom of expression—invalidation of the statute “on its face” rather
than “as applied” is permitted in the interest of preventing a “chilling” effect on freedom of expression.—The only instance
where a facial challenge to a statute is allowed is when it operates in the area of freedom of expression. In such instance,
the overbreadth doctrine permits a party to challenge the validity of a statute even though as applied to him it is not
unconstitutional but it might be if applied to others not before the Court whose activities are constitutionally protected.
Invalidation of the statute “on its face” rather than “as applied” is permitted in the interest of preventing a “chilling” effect
on freedom of expression. But in other cases, even if it is found that a provision of a statute is unconstitutional, courts will
decree only partial invalidity unless the invalid portion is so far in-
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separable from the rest of the statute that a declaration of partial invalidity is not possible.
Same; Same; To decline the exercise of jurisdiction where there is no genuine controversy is not to show timidity but
respect for the judgment of a coequal department of government whose acts, unless shown to be clearly repugnant to the
fundamental law, are presumed to be valid.—To decline, therefore, the exercise of jurisdiction where there is no genuine
controversy is not to show timidity but respect for the judgment of a coequal department of government whose acts, unless
shown to be clearly repugnant to the fundamental law, are presumed to be valid. The polestar of constitutional
adjudication was set forth by Justice Laurel in the Angara case when he said that “this power of judicial review is limited
to actual cases and controversies to be exercised after full opportunity of argument by the parties, and limited further to
the constitutional question raised or the very lis mota, presented.” For the exercise of this power is legitimate only in the
last resort; and as a necessity in the determination of real, earnest, and vital controversy between individuals. Until,
therefore, an actual case is brought to test the constitutionality of the IPRA, the presumption of constitutionality, which
inheres in every statute, must be accorded to it.
PANGANIBAN, J., Separate Opinion (Concurring and Dissenting):
National Patrimony; Ancestral Domains; Ancestral Lands; I respectfully reject the contention that “ancestral lands and
ancestral domains are not public lands and have never been owned by the State.”—It recognizes or, worse, grants rights of
ownership over lands of the public domain, waters, x x x and other natural resources” which, under Section 2, Article XII of
the Constitution, “are owned by the State” and “shall not be alien-ated.” I respectfully reject the contention that “ancestral
lands and ancestral domains are not public lands and have never been owned by the State.” Such sweeping statement
places substantial portions of Philippine territory outside the scope of the Philippine Constitution and beyond the collective
reach of the Filipino people. As will be discussed later, these real properties constitute a third of the entire Philippine
territory; and the resources, 80 percent of the nation’s natural wealth.
Same; Same; Same; I cannot agree to legitimize perpetual inequality of access to the nation’s wealth or to stamp the
Court’s imprimatur on a law that offends and degrades the repository of the very authority of the Supreme Court—the
Constitution of the Philippines.—Consistent with the social justice principle of giving more in law to those who have less in
life,
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Congress in its wisdom may grant preferences and prerogatives to our marginalized brothers and sisters, subject to
the irreducible caveat that the Constitution must be respected. I personally believe in according every benefit to the poor,
the oppressed and the disadvantaged, in order to empower them to equally enjoy the blessings of nationhood. I cannot,
however, agree to legitimize perpetual inequality of access to the nation’s wealth or to stamp the Court’s imprimatur on a
law that offends and degrades the repository of the very authority of this Court—the Constitution of the Philippines.
Same; Same; Same; Though laudable and well-meaning, IPRA, however, has provisions that run directly afoul of our
fundamental law from which it claims origin and authority.—RA 8371, which defines the rights of indigenous cultural
communities and indigenous peoples, admittedly professes a laudable intent. It was primarily enacted pursuant to the
state policy enshrined in our Constitution to “recognize and promote the rights of indigenous cultural communities within
the framework of national unity and development.” Though laudable and well-meaning, this statute, however, has
provisions that run directly afoul of our fundamental law from which it claims origin and authority. More specifically,
Sections 3(a) and (b), 5, 6, 7(a) and (b), 8 and other related provisions contravene the Regalian Doctrine—the basic
foundation of the State’s property regime.
Vested Rights; Property; Ownership; Because of the State’s implementation of policies considered to be for the common
good, all those concerned have to give up, under certain conditions, even vested rights of ownership.—I submit, however,
that all Filipinos, whether indigenous or not, are subject to the Constitution. Indeed, no one is exempt from its
allencompassing provisions. Unlike the 1935 Charter, which was subject to “any existing right, grant, lease or concession,”
the 1973 and the 1987 Constitutions spoke in absolute terms. Because of the State’s implementation of policies considered
to be for the common good, all those concerned have to give up, under certain conditions, even vested rights of ownership.
National Patrimony; Ancestral Domains; Ancestral Lands; Four hundred years of Philippine political history cannot be
set aside or ignored by IPRA, however well-intentioned it may be.—Verily, as petitioners undauntedly point out, four
hundred years of Philippine political history cannot be set aside or ignored by IPRA, however well-intentioned it may be.
The perceived lack of understanding of the cultural minorities cannot be remedied by conceding the nation’s resources to
their exclusive advantage. They cannot be more privileged simply because they have chosen to ignore state laws. For
having chosen not to be enfolded by statutes on
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perfecting land titles, ICCs/IPs cannot now maintain their ownership of lands and domains by insisting on their
concept of “native title” thereto. It would be plain injustice to the majority of Filipinos who have abided by the law and,
consequently, deserve equal opportunity to enjoy the country’s resources.
Same; Same; Same; Regalian Doctrine; The concerted effort to malign the Regalian Doctrine as a vestige of the colonial
past must fail—our Constitution vests the ownership of natural resources, not in colonial masters, but in all the Filipino
people.—The concerted effort to malign the Regalian Doctrine as a vestige of the colonial past must fail. Our Constitution
vests the ownership of natural resources, not in colonial masters, but in all the Filipino people. As the protector of the
Constitution, this Court has the sworn duty to uphold the tenets of that Constitution—not to dilute, circumvent or create
exceptions to them.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Since RA 8371 defines ancestral domains as including the natural resources found therein
and further states that ICCs/IPs own these ancestral domains, then it means that ICCs/IPs can own natural resources.—
Respondents insist, and the ponencia agrees, that paragraphs (a) and (b) of Sections 3 are merely definitions and should
not be construed independently of the other provisions of the law. But, precisely, a definition is “a statement of the
meaning of a word or word group.” It determines or settles the nature of the thing or person defined. Thus, after defining a
term as encompassing several items, one cannot thereafter say that the same term should be interpreted as excluding one
or more of the enumerated items in its definition. For that would be misleading the people who would be bound by the law.
In other words, since RA 8371 defines ancestral domains as including the natural resources found therein and further
states that ICCs/IPs own these ancestral domains, then it means that ICCs/IPs can own natural resources.
Same; Same; Same; Congress, through IPRA, has in effect abdicated in favor of a minority group the State’s power of
ownership and full control over a substantial part of the national patrimony, in contravention of our most fundamental law.
—But again, RA 8371 relinquishes this constitutional power of full control in favor of ICCs/IPs, insofar as natural
resources found within their territories are concerned. Pursuant to their rights of ownership and possession, they may
develop and manage the natural resources, benefit from and share in the profits from the allocation and the utilization
thereof. And they may exercise such right without any time limit, unlike non-ICCs/IPs who may do so only for a period not
exceeding 25 years, renewable for a like period. Consistent with the Consti-
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tution, the rights of ICCs/IPs to exploit, develop and utilize natural resources must also be limited to such period. In
addition, ICCs/IPs are given the right to negotiate directly the terms and conditions for the exploration of natural
resources, a right vested by the Constitution only in the State. Congress, through IPRA, has in effect abdicated in favor of
a minority group the State’s power of ownership and full control over a substantial part of the national patrimony, in
contravention of our most fundamental law.
Same; Same; Same; In giving ICCs/IPs rights in derogation of our fundamental law, Congress is effectively mandating
“reverse discrimination.”—Indigenous peoples may have long been marginalized in Philippine politics and society. This
does not, however, give Congress any license to accord them rights that the Constitution withholds from the rest of the
Filipino people. I would concede giving them priority in the use, the enjoyment and the preservation of their ancestral
lands and domains. But to grant perpetual ownership and control of the nation’s substantial wealth to them, to the
exclusion of other Filipino citizens who have chosen to live and abide by our previous and present Constitutions, would be
not only unjust but also subversive of the rule of law. In giving ICCs/IPs rights in derogation of our fundamental law,
Congress is effectively mandating “reverse discrimination.” In seeking to improve their lot, it would be doing so at the
expense of the majority of the Filipino people. Such short-sighted and misplaced generosity will spread the roots of
discontent and, in the long term, fan the fires of turmoil to a conflagration of national proportions.
Social Justice; The law must help the powerless by enabling them to take advantage of opportunities and privileges that
are open to all and by preventing the powerful from exploiting and oppressing them.—Peace cannot be attained by brazenly
and permanently depriving the many in order to coddle the few, however disadvantaged they may have been. Neither can
a just society be approximated by maiming the healthy to place them at par with the injured. Nor can the nation survive
by enclaving its wealth for the exclusive benefit of favored minorities. Rather, the law must help the powerless by enabling
them to take advantage of opportunities and privileges that are open to all and by preventing the powerful from exploiting
and oppressing them. This is the essence of social justice—empowering and enabling the poor to he able to compete with the
rich and, thus, equally enjoy the blessings of prosperity, freedom and dignity.
SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION in the Supreme Court. Certiorari and Prohibition.
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Cruz vs.Secretaryof Environmentand Natural
Resources
The facts are stated in the resolution of the Court.

Barbara Anne C. Migallos & Troy A. Luna, Raymond Parsifal A. Fortun & Bienvenido O. Bulatao for
petitioners.
The Solicitor General for respondents.
Luna, Bonpin,Perez & Associates for intervenors.
Rodolfo C. Rapista for intervenors-oppositors.
Leilene Carantes-San Juan for Sioco-Cariño Family.
R E S O L U TI O N
PER CURIAM:
Petitioners Isagani Cruz and Cesar Europa brought this suit for prohibition and mandamus as citizens and
taxpayers, assailing the constitutionality of certain provisions of Republic Act No. 8371 (R.A. 8371), otherwise
known as the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997 (IPRA), and its Implementing Rules and Regulations
(Implementing Rules). 1
In its resolution of September 29, 1998, the Court required respondents to comment. In compliance,
respondents Chairperson and Commissioners of the National Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP), the
government agency created under the IPRA to implement its provisions, filed on October 13, 1998 their
Comment to the Petition, in which they defend the constitutionality of the IPRA andpray that
thepetitionbedismissed for lack of merit.
On October 19, 1998, respondents Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources
(DENR) and Secretary of the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) filed through the Solicitor
General a consolidated Comment. The Solicitor General is of the view that the IPRA is partly unconstitutional
on the ground that it grants ownership over natural resources to indigenouspeoples and prays that thepetition
begranted in part.
On November 10, 1998, a group of intervenors, composed of Sen. Juan Flavier, one of the authors of the
IPRA, Mr. Ponciano Benna-
_______________
1 Rollo, p. 114.
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gen, a member of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, and the leaders and members of 112 groups of
indigenous peoples (Flavier, et al.), filed their Motion for Leave to Intervene. They join the NCIP in defending
the constitutionality of IPRA and praying for the dismissal of the petition.
On March 22, 1999, the Commission on Human Rights (CHR) likewise filed a Motion to Intervene and/or to
Appear as Amicus Curiae. The CHR asserts that IPRA is an expression of the principle of parens patriae and
that the State has the responsibility to protect and guarantee the rights of those who are at a serious
disadvantage like indigenous peoples. For this reason it prays that the petition be dismissed.
On March 23, 1999, another group, composed of the Ikalahan Indigenous People and the Haribon
Foundation for the Conservation of Natural Resources, Inc. (Haribon, et al.), filed a Motion to Intervene with
attached Comment-in-Intervention. They agree with the NCIP and Flavier, et al. that IPRA is consistent with
the Constitution and pray that the petition for prohibition and mandamus be dismissed.
The motions for intervention of the aforesaid groups and organizations were granted.
Oral arguments were heard on April 13, 1999. Thereafter, the parties and intervenors filed their respective
memoranda in which they reiterate the arguments adduced in their earlier pleadings and during the hearing.
Petitioners assail the constitutionality of the following provisions of the IPRA and its Implementing Rules
on the ground that they amount to an unlawful deprivation of the State’s ownership over lands of the public
domain as well as minerals and other natural resources therein, in violation of the regalian doctrine embodied
in Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution:
“(1) Section 3(a) which defines the extent and coverage of ancestral domains, and Section 3(b) which, in turn, defines
ancestral lands;
“(2) Section 5, in relation to section 3(a), which provides that ancestral domains including inalienable public lands,
bodies of water, mineral and other resources found within ancestral domains are private but community property
of the indigenous peoples;
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“(3) Section 6 in relation to Section 3(a) and 3(b) which defines the composition of ancestral domains and ancestral
lands;
“(4) Section 7 which recognizes and enumerates the rights of the indigenous peoples over theancestral domains;
“(5) Section 8 which recognizes and enumerates the rights of the indigenous peoples over theancestrallands;
“(6) Section 57 which provides for priority rights of the indigenous peoples in the harvesting, extraction, development or
exploration of minerals and other natural resources within the areas claimed to be their ancestral domains, and
the right to enter into agreements with non-indigenous peoples for the development and utilization of natural
resources therein for a period not exceeding 25 years, renewable for not more than 25 years;and
“(7) Section 58 which gives the indigenous peoples the responsibility to maintain, develop, protect and conserve the
ancestral domains and portions thereof which are found to be necessary 2
for critical watersheds, mangroves, wildlife
sanctuaries, wilderness, protected areas, forest cover or reforestation.”
Petitioners also contend that, by providing for an allencompassing definition of “ancestral domains” and
“ancestral lands” which might even include3
private lands found within said areas, Sections 3(a) and 3(b)
violate the rights of private landowners.
In addition, petitioners question the provisions of the IPRA defining the powers and jurisdiction of the
NCIP and making customary law applicable to the settlement of disputes involving ancestral domains 4
and
ancestral lands on the ground that these provisions violate the due process clause of the Constitution. These
provisions are:
“(1) Sections 51 to 53 and 59 which detail the process of delineation and recognition of ancestral domains
and which vest on the NCIP the sole authority todelineate ancestraldomainsand ancestral lands;
_______________
2 Petition, Rollo, pp. 16-23.
3 Id.at 23-25.
4 Section 1, Article III of the Constitution states: “No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law, nor
shall any person be deniedthe equal protection of the laws.”
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“(2) Section 52[i] which provides that upon certification by the NCIP that a particular area is an ancestral
domain and upon notification to the following officials, namely, the Secretary of Environment and
Natural Resources, Secretary of Interior and Local Governments, Secretary of Justice and
Commissioner of the National Development Corporation, the jurisdiction of said officials oversaid area
terminates;
“(3) Section 63 which provides the customary law, traditions and practices of indigenous peoples shall be
applied first with respect to property rights, claims of ownership, hereditary succession and settlement
of land disputes, and that any doubt or ambiguity in the interpretation thereof shall be resolvedin
favorof the indigenous peoples;
“(4) Section 65 which states that customary laws and practices shall be used to resolve disputes involving
indigenous peoples; and
“(5) Section 66 which vests 5 on the NCIP the jurisdiction over all claims and disputes involving rights of
theindigenous peoples.”
Finally, petitioners assail the validity of Rule VII, Part II, Section 1 of the NCIP Administrative Order No. 1,
series of 1998, which provides that “the administrative relationship of the NCIP to the Office of the President
is characterized as a lateral but autonomous relationship for purposes of policy and program coordination.”
They contend that said Rule infringes upon 6
the President’s power of control over executive departments under
Section 17,Article VII of the Constitution.
Petitionerspray for the following:
“(1) A declaration that Sections 3, 5, 6, 7, 8, 52[i], 57, 58, 59, 63, 65 and 66 and other related provisions of
R.A. 8371 are unconstitutional and invalid;
“(2) The issuance of a writ of prohibition directing the Chairperson and Commissioners of the NCIP to
cease and desist from implementing theassailed provisions of R.A.8371 and its Implementing Rules;
“(3) The issuance of a writ of prohibition directing the Secretary of the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources to cease and desist from implementing Department of Environment and Natural
Resources CircularNo. 2, series of 1998;
_______________
5 Rollo, pp. 25-27.
6 Id.at 27-28.
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“(4) The issuance of a writ of prohibition directing the Secretary of Budget and Management to cease and
desist from disbursing public funds for the implementation of the assailed provisions of R.A. 8371; and
“(5) The issuance of a writ of mandamus commanding the Secretary of Environment and Natural
Resources to comply with his duty of carrying out the State’s constitutional mandate to control and 7
supervise the exploration, development, utilization and conservation of Philippine natural resources.”
After due deliberation on the petition, the members of the Court voted as follows:
Seven (7) voted to dismiss the petition. Justice Kapunan filed an opinion, which the Chief Justice and
Justices Bellosillo, Quisumbing, and Santiago join, sustaining the validity of the challenged provisions of R.A.
8371. Justice Puno also filed a separate opinion sustaining all challenged provisions of the law with the
exception of Section 1, Part II, Rule III of NCIP Administrative Order No. 1, series of 1998, the Rules and
Regulations Implementing the IPRA, and Section 57 of the IPRA which he contends should be interpreted as
dealing with the large-scale exploitation of natural resources and should be read in conjunction with Section 2,
Article XII of the 1987 Constitution. On the other hand, Justice Mendoza voted to dismiss the petition solely
on the ground that it does not raise a justiciable controversy and petitioners do not have standing toquestion
the constitutionality of R.A. 8371.
Seven (7) other members of the Court voted to grant the petition. Justice Panganiban filed a separate
opinion expressing the view that Sections 3 (a)(b), 5, 6, 7 (a)(b), 8, and related provisions of R.A. 8371 are
unconstitutional. He reserves judgment on the constitutionality of Sections 58, 59, 65, and 66 of the law, which
he believes must await the filing of specific cases by those whose rights may have been violated by the IPRA.
Justice Vitug also filed a separate opinion expressing the view that Sections 3(a), 7, and 57 of R.A. 8371 are
unconstitutional. Justices Melo, Pardo, Buena,
_______________
7 Transcript of Stenographic Notes of the hearing held on April 13, 1999, pp. 5-6.
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Gonzaga-Reyes, and De Leon join in the separate opinions of Justices Panganiban and Vitug.
As the votes were equally divided (7 to 7) and the necessary majority was not obtained, the case was
redeliberated upon. However, after redeliberation, the voting remained the same. Accordingly, pursuant to
Rule 56, Section 7 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, thepetition is DISMISSED.
Attached hereto and made integral parts thereof are the separate opinions of Justices Puno, Vitug,
Kapunan, Mendoza, and Panganiban.
SO ORDERED.
Davide,
Jr. (C.J.), Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Pardo, Buena, Gonzaga-
Reyes, Ynares-Santiago and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.
SEPARATE OPINION
PUNO, J:
PRECIS
A classic essay on the utility of history was written in 1874 by Friedrich Nietzsche entitled1 “On the
2
Uses and
Disadvantages of History for Life.” Expounding on Nietzsche’s essay, Judge Richard Posner wrote:
“Law is the most historically oriented, or if you like the most backward-looking, the most ‘past-dependent,’ of the
professions. It venerates tradition, precedent, pedigree, ritual, custom, ancient practices, ancient texts, archaic
terminology, maturity, wisdom, seniority, gerontocracy, and interpretation conceived of as a method of recovering history.
It is suspicious of innovation, discontinuities, ‘paradigm shifts,’ and the energy and brashness of youth. These ingrained
attitudes are obstacles to anyone who
_______________
1 Chief Judge, US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit; Senior Lecturer, University of ChicagoLaw School.
2 The University of Chicago Law Review, Vol. 67, Summer 2000, No. 3, p. 573.
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wants to re-orient law in a more pragmatic direction. But, by the same token, pragmatic jurisprudence must come to terms
with history.”
When Congress enacted the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act(IPRA), it introduced radical concepts into the
Philippine legal system which appear to collide with settled constitutional and jural precepts on state
ownership of land and other natural resources. The sense and subtleties of this law cannot be appreciated
without considering its distinct sociology and the labyrinths of its history. This Opinion attempts to interpret
IPRA by discovering its soul shrouded by the mist of our history. After all, the IPRA was enacted by Congress
not only to fulfill the constitutional mandate of protecting the indigenous cultural communities’ right to their
ancestral land but more importantly, to correct a grave historical injustice to our indigenous people.
This Opinion discusses the following:
I. The Development of the Regalian Doctrine in the Philippine Legal System.
A. The Laws of the Indies

B. Valenton v. Murciano
C. The Public Land Acts and the Torrens System
D. The Philippine Constitutions
II. The Indigenous Peoples Rights Act (IPRA).
A. Indigenous Peoples
1. Indigenous Peoples: Their History

2. Their Concept of Land
III. The IPRA is a Novel Piece of Legislation.
A. Legislative History
IV. The Provisions of the IPRA Do Not Contravene the Constitution.
A. Ancestral domains and ancestral lands are the private property of indigenous peoples and do not constitute part of
the land of the public domain.
1. The right to ancestral domains and ancestral lands: how acquired

2. The concept of native title
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(a) Cariño v. Insular Government

(b) Indian Title to land
(c) Why the Cariño doctrine is unique
3. The option of securing a Torrens title to the ancestral land

B. The right of ownership and possession by the ICCs/IPs to their ancestral domains is a limited form of ownership
and does not include the right to alienate the same.
1. The indigenous concept of ownership and customary law
C. Sections 7 (a), 7 (b) and 57 of the IPRA do not violate the Regalian Doctrine enshrined in Section 2, Article XII of
the 1987 Constitution.
1. The rights of ICCs/IPs over their ancestral domains and lands

2. The right of ICCs/IPs to develop lands and natural resources within the ancestral domains does not deprive the
State of ownership over the natural resources, control and supervision in their development and exploitation.
(a) Section 1, Part II, Rule III of the Implementing Rules goes beyond the parameters of Section 7(a) of the law on
ownership of ancestral domains and is ultra vires.
(b) The small-scale utilization of natural resources in Section 7 (b) of the IPRA is allowed under Paragraph 3, Section
2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution.
(c) The large-scale utilization of natural resources in Section 57 of the IPRA may be harmonized with Paragraphs 1
and 4, Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution.
V. The IPRA is a Recognition of Our Active Participation in the International Indigenous Movement.
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DISCUSSION
I. THE DEVELOPMENTOF THE REGALIAN DOCTRINE IN THEPHILIPPINE LEGAL SYSTEM.

3
The capacity of the State to own or acquire property is the state’s power of dominium. This was the
foundation for the early Spanish decrees embracing the feudal theory of jura regalia. The “Regalian Doctrine”
or jura regalia is a Western legal concept that was first introduced by the Spaniards into the country through
the Laws of the Indies and the Royal Cedulas. The Laws of the Indies, i.e., more specifically, Law 14, Title 12,
Book 4 of the Novisima Recopilacion de Leyes de las Indias, set the policy of the Spanish Crown with respect to
the Philippine Islands in the following manner:
“We, having acquired full sovereignty over the Indies, and all lands, territories, and possessions not heretofore ceded away
by our royal predecessors, or by us, or in our name, still pertaining to the royal crown and patrimony, it is our will that all
lands which are held without proper and true deeds of grant be restored to us as they belong to us, in order that after
reserving before all what to us or to our viceroys, audiencias, and governors may seem necessary for public squares, ways,
pastures, and commons in those places which are peopled, taking into consideration not only their present condition, but
also their future and their probable increase, and after distributing to the natives what may be necessary for tillage and
pasturage, confirming them in what they now have and giving them more if necessary, all the rest of said lands may
remain free and unencumbered for us to disposeof as we may wish.
We therefore order and command that all viceroys and presidents of pretorial courts designate at such time as shall to
them seem most expedient, a suitable period within which all possessors of tracts, farms, plantations, and estates shall
exhibit to them and to the court officers appointed by them for this purpose, their title deeds thereto. And those who are in
possession by virtue of proper deeds and receipts, or by virtue of just
_______________
3 Dominium is distinguished from imperium which is the government authority possessed by the state expressed in the concept of sovereignty—Lee
Hong Hok v. David, 48 SCRA 372, 377 [1972].
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4
prescriptive right shall be protected, and all the rest shall be restored to us tobedisposedof at our will.”
The Philippines passed to Spain by virtue of “discovery” and conquest. Consequently, all lands became the
exclusive patrimony and dominion of the Spanish Crown. The Spanish Government took charge 5
of distributing
the lands by issuing royal grants and concessions to Spaniards, both military and civilian. Private land titles
could only
6
be acquired from the government either by purchase or by thevariousmodes of landgrant from the
Crown.
The Laws of the Indies were followed by the Ley Hipotecaria, or the Mortgage Law of 1893.7 The Spanish
Mortgage Law provided for the systematic registration of titles and deeds as well as possessory claims. The
law sought to register and tax lands pursuant to the Royal Decree of 1880. The Royal Decree of 1894, or the
“Maura Law,” was partly an amendment8 of the Mortgage Law as well as the Laws of the Indies, as already
amended by previous orders and decrees. This was the last Spanish land law promulgated in the Philippines.
It required the “adjustment” or registration of all agricultural lands,otherwise the lands shall revert to the
state.
Four years later, by the Treaty of Paris of December 10, 1898, Spain ceded to the government of the United
States all rights, interests and claims over the national territory of the Philippine Islands. In 1903, the United
States colonial government, through
_______________
4 Valenton v. Murciano, 3 Phil. 537, 543 [1904]; See also Florencio D.R. Ponce, The PhilippineTorrens System, p. 13 [1964].
5 Antonio H. Noblejas, Land Titles and Deeds, p. 5 [1986]; These grants were better known as repartimientos and encomiendas.
Repartimientos were handouts to the military as fitting reward for their services to the Spanish crown. The encomiendas were given to
Spaniards to administer and develop with the right to receive and enjoy for themselves the tributes of the natives assigned to them.—
Ponce, supra, p. 12, citing Benitez, Historyof the Philippines, pp. 125-126.
6 Narciso Pena, Registration ofLandTitlesandDeeds, p. 2 [1994].
7 The Mortgage Law is a misnomer because it is primarily a law on registration of property and secondarily a mortgage law—
Ponce, supra, at 16.
8 Ponce, supra,at 15.
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the Philippine Commission, passed Act No. 926, the first Public Land Act. 9
In 1904, under the American regime, this Court decided the case of Valenton v. Murciano.
Valenton resolved the question of which is the better basis for ownership of land: long-time occupation or
paper title. Plaintiffs had entered into peaceful occupation of the subject land in 1860. Defendant’s
predecessor-in-interest, on the other hand, purchased the land from the provincial treasurer of Tarlac in 1892.
The lower court ruled against the plaintiffs on the ground that they had lost all rights to the land by not
objecting to the administrative sale. Plaintiffs appealed the judgment, asserting that their 30-year adverse
possession, as an extraordinary period of prescription in the Partidas and the Civil Code, had given them title
to the land as against everyone, including the State; and that the State, not owning the land, couldnot validly
transmit it.
The Court, speaking through Justice Willard, decided the case on the basis of “those10
special laws which
from earliest time have regulated the disposition of the public lands in the colonies.” The question posed by
the Court was: “Did these special laws recognize any right of prescription as against the State as to these
lands; and if so, to what extentwas it recognized?”
Prior to 1880, the Court said, there were no laws specifically providing for the disposition of land in the
Philippines. However, it was understood that in the absence of any special law to govern a specific colony, the
Laws of the Indies would be followed. Indeed, in the Royal Order of July 5, 1862, it was decreed that until
regulations on the subject could be prepared, the authorities of the Phil-ippine Islands should11follow strictly
the Laws of the Indies, the Ordenanza of the Intendentes of 1786, and the Royal Cedula of 1754.
_______________
9 3 Phil. 537 [1904].
10 Id.at 540.
11 Id.at 548.
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Quoting the preamble of Law 14, Title 12, Book 4 of the Recopilacion de Leyes de lasIndias,the court
interpreted it as follows:
“In the preamble of this law there is, as is seen, a distinct statement that all those lands belong to the Crown which have
not been granted by Philip, or in his name, or by the kings who preceded him. This statement excludes the idea that there
might be lands not so granted, that did not belong to the king. It excludes the idea that the king was not still the owner of all
ungranted lands, because some private person had been in the adverse occupation of them. By the mandatory part of the
law all the occupants of the public lands are required to produce before the authorities named, and within a time to be
fixed by them, their title papers. And those who had good title or showed prescription were to be protected in their
holdings. It is apparent that it was not the intention of the law that mere possession for a length of time
12
should make the
possessors the owners of the land possessed by them without any action on the part of the authorities.”
The preamble stated that all those lands which

13
had not been granted by Philip, or in his name, or by the kings
who preceded him, belonged to the Crown. For those lands granted by the king, the decree provided for a
system of assignment of such lands. It also ordered that all possessors
14
of agricultural land should exhibit their
title deed, otherwise, the land would be restored to the Crown.
The Royal Cedula of October 15, 1754 reinforced the Recopilacion when it ordered the Crown’s principal
subdelegate to issue a generalorder directing thepublicationof the Crown’s instructions:
“xxx to the end that any and all persons who, since the year 1700, and up to the date of the promulgation and publication
of said order, shall have occupied royal lands, whether or not x xx cultivated or tenanted, may xxx appear and exhibit to
said subdelegates the titles and patents by
_______________
12 Id.at 543-544.
13 Id.at 543.
14 Id. at 542-543. These comments by the court are clear expressions of the concept that Crown holdings embraced
both imperium and dominium—Ma. Lourdes Aranal-Sereno and Roan Libarios, The Interface Between National Land Law and Kalinga
Land Law, 58 P.L.J. 420, 423 [1983].
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virtue of which said lands are occupied, x xx. Said subdelegates will at the same time warn the parties
interested that in case of their failure to present their title deeds within the term designated, without a just
and valid
15
reason therefor, they will be deprived of and evicted from their lands, and they will begranted to
others.”
On June 25, 1880, the Crown adopted regulations for the adjustment of lands “wrongfully occupied” by
private individuals in the Philippine Islands. Valenton construed these regulations together with
contemporaneous legislative and executive interpretations of the law, and concluded that plaintiffs’ case fared
no better under the 1880 decree and other laws which followed it, than it did under the earlier ones. Thus as a
general doctrine, the Court stated:
“While the State has always recognized the right of the occupant to a deed if he proves a possession for a sufficient length
of time, yet it has always insisted that he must make that proof before the proper
16
administrative officers, and obtain from
them his deed, and until he did that the State remained the absolute owner.”
In conclusion, the Court ruled: “We hold that from 1860 to 1892 there was no law in force in these Islands by
which 17the plaintiffs could obtain the ownership of these lands by prescription, without any action by the
State.” Valenton had no rights other than those which accrued to mere possession. Murciano, on the other
hand, was deemed to be the owner of the land by virtue of the grant by the provincial secretary. In effect,
Valenton upheld the Spanish conceptof state ownershipof public land.
As a fitting observation, the Court added that “[t]he policy pursued by the Spanish Government from earliest
times, requiring settlers on the public lands
18
to obtain title deeds therefor from the State, has been continued by
the American Government in Act No. 926”
_______________
15 Id.at 545-546.
16 Id.at 543.
17 Id.at 557.
18 Id. at 553-554; Valenton was applied in Cansino v. Valdez, 6 Phil. 320 [1906]; Tiglao v. Insular Government, 7 Phil. 80 [1906]; and
Cariño v.
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Act No. 926, the first Public Land Act, was passed in pursuance of the provisions of the Philippine Bill of 1902.
The law governed the disposition of lands of the public domain. It prescribed rules and regulations for the
homesteading, selling, and leasing of portions of the public domain of the Philippine Islands, and prescribed
the terms and conditions to enable persons to perfect their titles to public lands in the Islands. It also provided
for the “issuance of patents to certain native settlers upon public lands,” for the establishment of town sites
and sale of lots therein, for the completion of imperfect titles, and for the cancellation or confirmation of
Spanish concessions and grants in the Islands.” In short, the Public Land Act 19
operated on the assumption that
title to public lands in the Philippine Islands remained in the government; and that the government’s title to
public 20land sprung from the Treaty of Paris and other subsequent treaties between Spain and the United
States. The term “public land” referred to all lands of the public domain whose21
title still remained in the
government and are thrown open to private appropriation
22
and settlement, and excluded the patrimonial
property of the government and the friar lands.
Act No. 926 was superseded in 1919 by Act 2874, the second Public Land Act. This new law was passed
under the Jones Law. It was more comprehensive in scope but limited the exploitation of agricultural 23
lands to
Filipinos and Americans and citizens of other countries which gave Filipinos the same privileges. After the
passage of the 1935 Constitution, Act 2874 was amended in 1936 by Commonwealth Act No.
141. Commonwealth Act No. 141 remains the present Public Land Law and it is essentially the same Insular
Government, 7 Phil. 132 [1906]; all decided by the Philippine Supreme Court.
_______________
19 Pleasesee Section 70, Act 926.
20 Ponce, supra,at33.
21 Montano v. Insular Government, 12 Phil. 572 [1909]; also cited in Ponce,supra,at 32.
22 Archbishop of Manila v. Director of Lands, 27 Phil. 245 [1914]; also cited in Ponce, supra,at 32.
23 Antonio H. Noblejas, LandTitles and Deeds, p. 250 [1961].
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as Act 2874. The main difference between the two relates to the transitory provisions on the rights of
American citizens
24
and corporations during the Commonwealth period at par with Filipino citizens and
corporations.
Grants of public land were brought under the operation of the Torrens system under Act 496, or the Land
Registration Law of 1903. Enacted by the Philippine Commission, Act 496 placed all public and private lands
in the Philippines under the Torrens system. 25
The law is said to be almost a verbatim copy of the
Massachussetts Land Registration Act of 1898, which, in turn, followed the principles and procedure of the
Torrens system of registration formulated by Sir Robert Torrens who patterned it after the Merchant Shipping
Acts in South Australia. The Torrens system requires that the government issue an official certificate of title
attesting to the fact that the person named is the owner of the property26described therein, subject to such liens
and encumbrances as thereon noted or the law warrants or reserves. The certificate of title is indefeasible
and imprescriptible and all claims to the parcel of land 27are quieted upon issuance of said certificate. This
system highly facilitates land conveyance and negotiation.
The Regalian doctrine was enshrined in the 1935 Constitution. One of the fixed and dominating objectives of
the 193528 Constitutional Convention was the nationalization and conservation of the natural resources of the
country. There was an overwhelming sentiment in the Convention29
in favor of the principle of state ownership
of natural resources and the adoption of the Regalian doctrine. State ownership of natural resources was seen
as a neces-
_______________
24 Ponce, supra,at 32.
25 Peña, Registration of Land Titles and Deeds, p. 26 [1982]; Noblejas, supra,at 32.
26 Noblejas, supra,at 32.
27 Ponce, supra,at 123-124; Noblejas, supra,at 33.
28 2 Aruego, The Framing of the Philippine Constitution, p. 592 [1937].
29 Id.at 600.
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sary starting point to secure

30
recognition of the state’s power to control their disposition, exploitation,
development, or utilization. The delegates to the Constitutional Convention very well knew that the concept
of State ownership of land and natural resources was introduced by the Spaniards, however, they were not
certain whether it was continued and applied by the Americans. To remove 31
all doubts, the Convention
approved the provision in the Constitution affirming the Regaliandoctrine.
Thus, the 1935 Constitution, in Section 1 of Article XIII on “Conservation andUtilization of Natural
Resources,” reads as follows:
“Sec. 1. All agricultural, timber, and mineral lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other
mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, and other natural resources of the Philippines belong to the State, and their
disposition, exploitation, development, or utilization shall be limited to citizens of the Philippines, or to corporations or
associations at least sixty per centum of the capital of which is owned by such citizens, subject to any existing right, grant,
lease, or concession at the time of the inauguration of the Government established under this Constitution. Natural
resources, with the exception of public agricultural land, shall not be alienated, and no license, concession, or lease for the
exploitation, development, or utilization of any of the natural resources shall be granted for a period exceeding twenty-five
years, except as to water rights for irrigation, water supply, fisheries, or industrial uses other than the development of
water power, in which cases beneficial use may be the measure and thelimit of the grant.”
The 1973 Constitution reiterated the Regalian doctrine in Section 8, Article XIV on the “National Economy
and the Patrimony of the Nation,” to wit:
“Sec. 8. All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum and other mineral oils, all forces of potential
energy, fisheries, wildlife, and other natural resources of the Philippines belong to the State. With the exception of
agricultural, industrial or commercial, residential, and resettlement lands of the public domain, natural resources shall not
be alienated, and no license, concession, or lease for the exploration, development, exploitation, or utilization of any of the
natural resources shall be
_______________
30 Id.at 600-601.
31 Ibid.
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granted for a period exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for not more than twenty-five years, except as to water rights for
irrigation, water supply, fisheries, or industrial uses other than the development of water power, in which cases beneficial
use may be the measure and the limit of the grant.”
The 1987 Constitution reaffirmed the Regalian doctrine in Section 2 of Article XII on “National Economy and
Patrimony,” to wit:
“Sec. 2. All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential
energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural resources are owned by the State. With the
exception of agricultural lands, all other natural resources shall not be alienated. The exploration, development and
utilization of natural resources shall be under the full control and supervision of the State. The State may directly
undertake such activities or it may enter into co-production, joint venture, or production-sharing agreements with Filipino
citizens, or corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of whose capital is owned by such citizens. Such
agreements may be for a period not exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for not more than twenty-five years, and under
such terms and conditions as may be provided by law. In cases of water rights for irrigation, water supply, fisheries, or
industrial uses other than the development of water power, beneficial use may be the measure and limit of the grant.
x x x.”
Simply stated, all lands of the public domain as well as all natural resources enumerated therein, whether on
public or private land, belong to the State. It is this concept of State ownership that petitioners claim is being
violated by the IPRA.
II. THE INDIGENOUS PEOPLES RIGHTS ACT.

Republic Act No. 8371 is entitled “An Act to Recognize, Protect and Promote the Rights of Indigenous Cultural
Communities/Indigenous Peoples, Creating a National Commission on Indigenous Peoples, Establishing
Implementing Mechanisms, Appropriating Funds Therefor, and for Other Purposes.” It is simply known as
“The Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997” or the IPRA.
The IPRA recognizes the existence of the indigenous cultural communities or indigenous peoples (ICCs/IPs)
as a distinct sector in
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Philippine society. It grants these people the ownership and possession of their ancestral domains and ancestral
lands, and defines the extent of these lands and domains. The ownership given is the indigenous concept of
ownership under customary law which traces its origin to native title.
Other rights are also granted theICCs/IPs, and these are:
- the right to developlandsand natural

resources;
- the right to stayinthe territories;
- the right in case of displacement;
- the right to safe and clean airand water;
- the right to claim parts of reservations;
32
- the right to resolveconflict;
- the right to ancestral lands which
include
a. the right to transfer land/property to/among members of the same ICCs/IPs, subject to customary laws
and traditions of the community concerned;
b. the right to redemption for a period not exceeding 15 years from date of transfer, if the transfer is to a
non-member of the ICC/IP and 33
is tainted by vitiated consent of the ICC/IP, or if the transferis for an
unconscionable consideration.
Within their ancestral

34
domains and ancestral lands,
35
the ICCs/IPs are given the right to self-governance and
empowerment, social justice and human rights, the right to preserve and protect their culture, traditions, 36
institutions and community intellectual rights, and the right to develop their own sciences and technologies.
To carry out the policies of the Act, the law created the National Commission on Indigenous Peoples
(NCIP). The NCIP is an independent agency under the Office of the President and is composed of seven (7)
Commissioners belonging to ICCs/IPs from each of the ethnographic areas—Region I and the Cordilleras;
Region II; the
_______________
32 Section 7.
33 Section 8.
34 Sections 13 to20.
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rest of Luzon; Island groups including Mindoro, Palawan, Romblon, Panay and the rest37 of the Visayas;
Northern and Western Mindanao; Southern and Eastern Mindanao; and Central Mindanao. The NCIP took
over the functions of the Office for Northern Cultural Communities and the Office for Southern Cultural 38
Communities created by former President Corazon Aquino which were merged under a revitalized structure.
Disputes involving ICCs/IPs are to be resolved under customary laws and practices. When
39
still unresolved,
the matter may be brought to the NCIP, which is granted quasi-judicial powers. The NCIP’s decisions may be
appealed to the Court of Appeals by a petition for review.
Any person who violates any of the provisions of the Act such as, but not limited to, unauthorized and/or
unlawful intrusion upon ancestral lands and domains shall be punished in accordance with customary laws or
imprisoned
40
from 9 months to 12 years and/or fined from P100,000.00 to P500,000.00 and obliged to pay
damages.
The IPRA is a law dealing with a specific group of people, i.e., the Indigenous Cultural Communities (ICCs) or
the Indigenous Peoples (IPs). The term “ICCs” is used in the 1987 Constitution while that of “IPs” 41
is the
contemporary international language in the International Labor Organization 42
(ILO) Convention 169 and the
United Nations (UN) Draft Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples.
_______________
37 Sections 38 and 40.
39 Section 69.
40 Section 73.
41 Convention Concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries, June 27, 1989.
42 Guide to R.A. 8371, published by the Coalition for IPs Rights and Ancestral Domains in cooperation with the ILO and Bilance-Asia
Department, p. 4 [1999]—hereinafter referred to asGuide to RA. 8371.
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ICCs/IPs are defined by the IPRA as:

“Sec. 3 [h]. Indigenous Cultural Communities/Indigenous Peoples.—Refer to a group of people or homogeneous societies
identified by self-ascription and ascription by others, who have continuously lived as organized community on communally
bounded and defined territory, and who have, under claims of ownership since time immemorial, occupied, possessed and
utilized such territories, sharing common bonds of language, customs, traditions and other distinctive cultural traits, or
who have, through resistance to political, social and cultural inroads of colonization, non-indigenous religions and cultures,
became historically differentiated from the majority of Filipinos. ICCs/IPs shall likewise include peoples who are regarded
as indigenous on account of their descent from the populations which inhabited the country, at the time of conquest or
colonization, or at the time of inroads of non-indigenous religions and cultures, or the establishment of present state
boundaries, who retain some or all of their own social, economic, cultural and political institutions, but who may have been
displaced from their traditional domains or who may have resettled outside their ancestral domains.”
Indigenous Cultural Communities or Indigenous Peoples refer to a group of people or homogeneous societies
who have continuously lived as an organized community on communally bounded and defined territory. These
groups of people have actually occupied, possessed and utilized their territories under claim of ownership since
time immemorial. They share common bonds of language, customs, traditions and other distinctive cultural
traits, or, they, by their resistance to political, social and cultural inroads of colonization, non-indigenous
religions and cultures, became historically differentiated from the Filipino majority. ICCs/IPs also include
descendants of ICCs/IPs who inhabited the country at the time of conquest or colonization, who retain some or
all of their own social, economic, cultural and political institutions but who may have been displaced from
their traditional territories or who may have resettled outside their ancestral domains.
1. Indigenous Peoples: Their History
Presently, Philippine indigenous peoples inhabit the interiors and mountains of Luzon, Mindanao, Mindoro,
Negros, Samar,
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Leyte, and the Palawan and Sulu group of islands. They are composed of 110 tribes and are as follows:
1. In the Cordillera Autonomous Region—Kankaney, Ibaloi, Bontoc, Tinggian or Itneg, Ifugao, Kalinga,
Yapayao, Aeta or Agta or Pugot, and Bago of Ilocos Norte and Pangasinan; Ibanag of Isabela, Cagayan;
Ilongot of Quirino and Nueva Vizcaya; Gaddang of Quirino, Nueva Vizcaya, Itawis of Cagayan; Ivatan
of Batanes, Aeta of Cagayan, Quirino and Isabela.
2. In Region III—Aetas.
3. In Region IV—Dumagats of Aurora, Rizal; Remontado of Aurora, Rizal, Quezon; Alangan or Mangyan,
Batangan, Buid or Buhid, Hanunuo and Iraya of Oriental and Occidental Mindoro; Tadyawan of
Occidental Mindoro; Cuyonon, Palawanon, Tagbanua and Tao’t bato of Palawan.
4. In Region V—Aeta of Camarines Norte and Camarines Sur; Aeta-Abiyan, Isarog, and Kabihug of
Camarines Norte; Agta, and Mayon of Camarines Sur; Itom of Albay; Cimaron of Sorsogon; and the
Pullon of Masbate and Camarines Sur.
5. In Region VI—Ati of Negros Occidental, Iloilo and Antique, Capiz; the Magahat of Negros Occidental;
the Corolano and Sulod.
6. In Region VII—Magahat of Negros Oriental and Eskaya of Bohol.
7. In Region IX—the Badjao numbering about 192,000 in Tawi-Tawi, Zamboanga del Sur; the Kalibugan
of Basilan, the Samal, Subanon and Yakat.
8. Region X—Numbering 1.6 million in Region X alone, the IPs are: the Banwaon, Bukidnon, Matigsalog,
Talaanding of Bukidnon; the Camiguin of Camiguin Island; the Higa-unon of Agusan del Norte,
Agusan del Sur, Bukidnon and Misamis Occidental; the Tigwahanon of Agusan del Sur, Misamis
Oriental and and Misamis Occidental, the Manobo of the Agusan provinces, and the Umayamnon of
Agusan and Bukidnon.
9. In Region XI—There are about 1,774,065 IPs in Region XI. They are tribes of the Dibabaon, Mansaka
of Davao del Norte; Blaan, Kalagan, Langilad, Tboli and Talaingod of Davao del Sur; Mamamanua of
Surigao del Sur; Mandaya of the Surigao provinces and Davao Oriental; Manobo Blit of South
Cotabato; the Mangguangon of Davao and South Cotabato; Matigsalog of Davao del Norte and Del Sur,
Tagakaolo, Tasaday and Ubo of South Cotabato; and Bagobo of Davao del Sur and South Cotabato.
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43
10. In Region XII—Ilianen, Tiruray, Maguindanao, Maranao, Tausug, Yakan/Samal, and Iranon.
How these indigenous peoples came to live in the Philippines goes back toas early as 25,000 to30,000 B.C.
Before the time

44
of Western contact, the Philippine archipelago was peopled largely by the Negritos, Indonesians
and Malays. The strains from these groups eventually gave rise to common cultural features which became
the dominant influence in ethnic reformula-
_______________
43 Taken from the list of IPs submitted by Rep. Andolana to the House of Representatives during the deliberations on H.B. No. 9125—
Interpellations of Aug. 20, 1997, pp. 00086-00095. “Lost tribes” such as the Lutangan andTatanghave not been included.
44 How these people came to the Philippines may be explained by two theories. One view, generally linked to Professor Otley H. Beyer,
suggests the “wave theory”—a series of arrivals in the archipelago bringing in different types and levels of culture. The Negritos, dark-
skinned pygmies, came between 25,000 to 30,000 B.C. Their cultural remains are preserved by the Negrito-type Filipinos found in Luzon,
Visayas and Mindanao. Their relatively inferior culture did not enable them to overcome the pressures from the second wave of people,
the Indonesians A and B who came in 5,000 and 3,500 B.C. They are represented today by the Kalinga, Gaddang, Isneg, Mangyan,
Tagbanua, Manobo, Mandaya, Subanon, and Sama. The first group was pushed inland as the second occupied the coastal and downriver
settlements. The last wave involved Malay migrations between 500 B.C. and 1,500 A.D. They had a more advanced culture based on metal
age technology. They are represented by the Christianized and Islamized Filipinos who pushed the Indonesian groups inland and occupied
muchof the coastal,lowland and downstream areas. A second view is postulated by Robert Fox, F. Landa Jocano, Alfredo Evangelista, and
Jesus Peralta. Jocano maintains that the Negritos, Indonesians and Malays stand co-equal as ethnic groups without any one being
dominant, racially or culturally. The geographic distribution of the ethno-linguistic groups, which shows overlapping of otherwise similar
racial strains in both upland and lowland cultures or coastal and inland communities, suggests a random and unstructured advent of
different kinds of groups in the archipelago—Samuel K. Tan, A History of the Philippines, published by the Manila Studies Association,
Inc. and the Philippine National Historical Society, Inc., pp. 33-34 [1997]; Teodoro A. Agoncillo,Historyof the Filipino People,p. 21 [1990].
179
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Cruz vs. Secretary of Environmentand Natural
Resources
tion in the archipelago. Influences from the Chinese and Indian civilizations in the third or fourth millennium
B.C. augmented these ethnic strains. Chinese economic and socio-cultural influences came by way of Chinese
porcelain,
45
silk and traders. Indian influence found their way into the religious-cultural aspect of precolonial
society.
The ancient Filipinos settled beside bodies of water. Hunting and food gathering 46became supplementary
activities as reliance on them was reduced by fishing and the cultivation of the soil. From the hinterland,
coastal, and riverine communities, our ancestors evolved an essentially homogeneous culture, a basically
common way of life where nature was a primary factor. Community life throughout the archipelago was
influenced by, and responded to, common ecology. The generally47
benign tropical climate and the largely 48
uniform flora and fauna favored similarities, not differences. Life was essentiallysubsistence but not harsh.
The early Filipinos had a culture that was basically Malayan in structure and form. They had languages
that traced their origin to the Austronesian parent-stock and used them 49not only as media of daily
communication but also as vehicles for the expression of their literary moods. They fashioned 50
concepts and
beliefs about the world that they could not see, but which they sensed to be part of their lives. They had their
own religion and religious beliefs. They believed in the immortality of the soul and life after death. Their
rituals were based on beliefs in a ranking deity whom they called Bathalang Maykapal, and a host of other
deities, in the environmental spirits and in soul spirits. The early Filipinos adored the sun, the moon, the
animals and birds, for they seemed to consider the objects of Nature as something to be respected. They
venerated
_______________
45 Tan,supra,at 35-36.
46 Onofre D. Corpuz, The Roots of the Filipino Nation, Philippine Centennial (1898-1998) Edition, vol. 1, p. 13, Aklahi Foundation, Inc.
[1989]. It was in 800-1,000 A.D. that the Ifugaos of Northern Luzon built the rice terraces—Id.at 37.
47 Id. at 5-6.
48 Id.at 13.
49 Teodoro A. Agoncillo,History of the FilipinoPeople,p. 54 [1990].
50 Corpuz,supra,at 5.
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almost any object that was51

close to their daily life, indicating the importance of the relationship between man
and the object of nature.
The unit of government was the “barangay,” a term that derived 52
its meaning from the Malay word
“balangay,” meaning, a boat, which transported them to these shores. The barangay was basically a family-
based community and consisted of thirty to one hundred families. Each barangay was different and ruled by a
chieftain called a “dato.” It was the chieftain’s duty to rule and govern his subjects and promote their welfare
and interests. A chieftain had wide powers for he exercised all the functions 53
of government. He was the
executive, legislator and judge and was the supreme commander in time of war.
Laws were either customary or written. Customary laws were handed down orally from generation to
generation and constituted the bulk of the laws of the barangay. They
54
were preserved in songs and chants and
in the memory of the elder persons in the community. The written 55
laws were those that the chieftain and his
elders promulgated from time to time as the necessity arose. The oldest known written body of laws was the
Maragtas Code by Datu Sumakwel 56
at about 1250 A.D. Other old codes are the Muslim Code of Luwaran and
the Principal Code of Sulu. Whether customary or written, the laws dealt with various subjects, such as
inheritance, divorce, usury, loans, partnership, crime and punishment, property
_______________
51 Id.at 44-45.
52 Agoncillo,supra,at 40.
53 Id.at 40-41.
54 Rafael Iriarte, History of the Judicial System, the Philippine Indigenous Era Prior to 1565, unpublished work submitted as entry to
the Centennial Essay-Writing Contest sponsored by the National Centennial Commission and the Supreme Court in 1997, p. 103, citing
Perfecto V. Fernandez, Custom Laws in Pre-Conquest Philippines, UP Law Center, p. 10 [1976].
55 Agoncillo,supra,at 41.
56 Amelia Alonzo, The History of the Judicial System in the Philippines, Indigenous Era Prior to 1565, unpublished work submitted as
entry to the Centennial Essay-Writing Contest sponsored by the National Centennial Commission and the Supreme Court in 1997.
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rights, family relations and adoption. Whenever disputes arose, these were decided peacefully through a court
composed by the chieftain as “judge” and the barangay elders as “jury.” Conflicts arising between subjects of
different barangays
57
were resolved by arbitration in which a board composed of elders from neutral barangays
acted as arbiters.
Baranganic society had a distinguishing feature: the absence of private property in land. The chiefs merely
administered the lands in the name of the barangay. The social order was an extension of the family with
chiefs embodying the higher unity of the community. Each individual, therefore, participated in 58
the
community ownership of the soil and the instruments of production as a member of the barangay. This
ancient communalism was practiced in accordance with the concept of mutual sharing of resources so that no
individual, regardless of status, was without sustenance. Ownership of59 land was non-existent or unimportant
and the right of usufruct was what regulated the development of lands. Marine resources and fishing grounds
were likewise free to all. Coastal communities depended 60
for their economic welfare on the kind of fishing
sharing concept similar to those in land communities. Recognized leaders, such as the chieftains and elders,
by virtue of their positions of importance, enjoyed some economic privileges and benefits. But their rights,
related to either land and sea, were subject to their responsibility
61
to protect the communities from danger and
to provide them with the leadership and means of survival.
Sometime in the 13th century, Islam was introduced to the archipelago in Maguindanao. The Sultanate of
Sulu was established and claimed jurisdiction over territorial areas represented today by Tawi-tawi, Sulu,
Palawan, Basilan and Zamboanga. Four ethnic
_______________
57 Agoncillo, supra,at42.
58 Renato Constantino, A Past Revisited,p. 38 [1975].
59 Samuel K. Tan, A History of the Philippines, published by the Manila Studies Ass’n., Inc. and the Phil. National Historical Society,
Inc., p. 43 [1997].
60 Id.
61 Id.at 43-44.
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62
groups were within this jurisdiction: Sama, Tausug, Yakan and Subanon. The Sultanate 63of Maguindanao
spread out from Cotabato toward Maranao territory, now Lanao del Norte and Lanao del Sur.
The Muslim societies evolved an Asiatic form of feudalism where land was still held in common but was
private in use. This is clearly indicated in the Muslim Code of Luwaran. The Code contains a provision on 64
the
lease of cultivated lands. It, however, has no provisionfor the acquisition, transfer, cession or sale ofland.
The societies encountered by Magellan and Legaspitherefore were primitive economies where most
production was geared to the use of the producers
65
and to the fulfillment of kinship obligations. They were not
economies geared to exchange and profit. Moreover, the family basis of barangay membership as well as of
leadership and 66
governance worked to splinter the population of the islands into numerous small and separate
communities.
When the Spaniards settled permanently in the Philippines in 1565, they found the Filipinos living in
barangay settlements scattered along water routes and river banks. One of the first tasks imposed67
on the
missionaries and the encomenderos was to collect all scattered Filipinos together in a reduccion.
68
As early as
1551, the Spanish government assumed an unvarying solicitous attitude towards the natives. The Spaniards
regarded it a sacred “duty to conscience and humanity to civilize these less fortunate people
_______________
62 Tan, supra,at 47-48.
63 Id.at 48-49.
64 Cacho v. Government of the P.I., 28 Phil. 616, 625-627 11914]; see also Ponce, The Philippine Torrens System, pp. 11-12 [1964]. In
Philippine pre-colonial history, there was only one recorded transaction on the purchase of land. The Maragtas Code tells us of the
purchase of Panay Island by ten Bornean datus led by Datu Puti from the Atis under Marikudo in the 13th century. The purchase price
for the Island was a gold salakot and a long gold necklace—Agoncillo, supra,at 25.
65 Constantino, supra,at 38.
66 Corpuz, supra,at 39.
67 Resettlement—“bajo el son de la campana” (under the sound of the bell) or “bajo el toque dela campana”(under the peal of the bell).
68 People v. Cayat, 68 Phil. 12, 17 [1939].
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living in the obscurity of ignorance” and to accord them the “moral 69

and material advantages” of community life
and the “protection and vigilance afforded them by the same laws.”
The Spanish missionaries were ordered to establish pueblos where the church and convent would be
constructed. All the new Christian converts
70
were required to construct their houses around the church and the
unbaptized were invited to do the same. With the reduccion, the Spaniards attempted to “tame” the reluctant
Filipinos through Christian indoctrination using the convento/casa real/plaza complex as focal point.
The reduccion, to the Spaniards, was a “civilizing” device to make the Filipinos law-abiding citizens 71
of the
Spanish Crown, and in the long run, to make them ultimately adoptHispanic culture and civilization.
All lands lost by the old barangays in the process of pueblo organization as well as all lands not assigned to
them and the pueblos, were now declared to be crown lands or realengas,
72
belonging to the Spanish king. It was
from the realengas that land grants were made tonon-Filipinos.
The abrogation of the Filipinos’ ancestral rights in land and the introduction of the concept
73
of public domain
were the most immediate fundamental results of Spanish colonial theory and law. The concept that the
Spanish king was the owner of everything of value in74the Indies or colonies was imposed on the natives, and the
natives were stripped of theirancestral rights to land.
_______________
69 Id. at 17, citing the Decree of the Governor-General of the Philippines, Jan. 14, 1887.
70 Agoncillo, supra,at 80.
71 Id.at 80.
72 Corpuz, supra,at 277-278.
73 Id. at 277.
74 Id.; N.B. But see discussion in Cariño v. Insular Government, infra,where the United States Supreme Court found that the Spanish
decrees in the Philippines appeared to recognize that the natives owned some land. Whether in the implementation of these decrees the
natives’ ancestral rights to land were actually respected was not discussed by the U.S. Supreme Court; see also Note 131,infra.
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Increasing their foothold in the Philippines, the Spanish colonialists, civil and religious, classified the Filipinos
according to their religious practices and beliefs, and divided them into three types. First were the Indios, the
Christianized Filipinos, who generally came from the lowland populations. Second, 75
were the Moros or the
Muslim communities, and third, were the infieles or the indigenous communities.
The Indio was a product of the advent of Spanish culture. This class was favored by the Spaniards and was
allowed76certain status although below the Spaniards. The Moros and infieles were regarded as the lowest
classes.
The Moros and infieles resisted Spanish rule and Christianity. The Moros were driven from Manila and the
Visayas to Mindanao; while the infieles, to the hinterlands.The Spaniards did not pursue them into the deep
interior. The upland societies were naturally outside the immediate concern of Spanish interest, and the cliffs
and forests
77
of the hinterlands were difficult and inaccessible, allowing the infieles, in effect, relative
security. Thus, the infieles,which were peripheral to colonial administration, were not only able to preserve
their own culture but also thwarted
78
the Christianization process, separating themselves from the newly
evolved Christian community. Their own political, economic and social systems were kept constantly alive
and vibrant.
The pro-Christian or pro-Indio attitude of colonialism brought about a generally mutual feeling of suspicion,
fear, and hostility between the Christians on the one hand and the non-Christians on the other. Colonialism
tended to divide and rule an otherwise culturally and historically
79
related populace through a colonial system
that exploitedboth the virtues and vicesof the Filipinos.
President McKinley, in his instructions to the Philippine Commission of April 7,1900, addressed the
existenceof the infieles:
_______________
75 Tan, supra, at 49-50.
76 Id.at 67.
77 Id.at 52-53.
78 Id.at 53.
79 Id.at 55.
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“In dealing with the uncivilized tribes of the Islands, the Commission should adopt the same course followed by Congress in
permitting the tribes of our North American Indians to maintain their tribal organization and government, and under
which many of those tribes are now living in peace and contentment, surrounded by civilization to which they are unable
or unwilling to conform. Such tribal government should, however, be subjected to wise and firm regulation; and, without
undue or petty interference,
80
constant and active effort should be exercised to prevent barbarous practicesand introduce
civilized customs.”
Placed in an alternative of either letting the natives alone or guiding them in the path of civilization, the
American government 81
chose “‘to adopt the latter measure as one more in accord with humanity andwith the
national conscience.”
The Americans classified the Filipinos into two: the Christian Filipinos and the non-Christian
Filipinos. The term “non-Christian” referred not to religious belief, but to a geographical area, and more
directly, “to natives of the Philippine
82
Islands of a low grade of civilization, usually living in tribal relationship
apart from settled communities.”
Like the Spaniards, the Americans pursued a policy of assimilation. In 1903, they passed Act No. 253
creating the Bureau of Non-Christian Tribes (BNCT). Under the Department of the Interior, the BNCTs
primary task was to conduct ethnographic research among unhispanized Filipinos, including those in Muslim
Mindanao, with a “special view to determining the most practicable means for bringing about their
advancement in civilization and prosperity.” The BNCT was modeled after the bureau dealing with American
Indians. The agency took a keen anthropological
83
interest in Philippine cultural minorities and produced a
wealth of valuable materials about them.
_______________
80 People v. Cayat, 68 Phil. 12, 17 [1939].
81 Memorandum of the Secretary of the Interior, quoted in Rubi v. Provincial Board of Mindoro, 39 Phil. 660, 714 [1919]; also cited
in People v. Cayat, supra, at 17-18.
82 Rubi v. Provincial Board of Mindoro, supra, at 693.
83 Charles MacDonald, Indigenous Peoples of the Philippines: Between Segregation and Integration, Indigenous Peoples of Asia, p. 348,
ed.
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The 1935 Constitution did not carry any policy on the non-Christian Filipinos. The raging issue then was the
conservation of the national patrimony for the Filipinos.
In 1957, the Philippine Congress passed RA. No. 1888,an “Act to effectuate in a more rapid and complete
manner the economic, social, moral and political advancement of the non-Christian Filipinos or national
cultural minorities and to render real, complete, and permanent the integration of all said national cultural
minorities into the body politic, creating the Commission on National Integration charged with said functions.”
The law called for a policy of integration of indigenous peoples 84into the Philippine mainstream and for this
purpose created the Commission on National Integration (CNI). The CNI was given, more or less, the same
task as the BNCT during the American regime. The post-independence policy of integration 85
was like the
colonial policy of assimilation understood in the context ofaguardian-ward relationship.
The policy of assimilation and integration did not yield the desired result. Like the Spaniards and
Americans, government attempts at integration met with fierce resistance. Since World War II, a tidal wave of
Christian settlers
86
from the lowlands of Luzon and the Visayas swamped the highlands and wide open spaces
in Mindanao. Knowledge by the settlers of the Public Land Acts and the Torrens system resulted in the titling
of several ancestral lands in the settlers’ names. With government initiative and participation, this titling
displaced several indigenous peoples from their lands. Worse, these peoples87were also displaced by projects
undertaken by the nationalgovernment in the name of nationaldevelopment. by R.H. Barnes, A. Gray and B.
Kingsbury, pub. by Association for Asian Studies [1995]. The BNCT made a Bontok and Subanon
ethnography, a history of Sulu genealogy, and a compilation on unhispanized peoples in northern Luzon.—
Owen J. Lynch, Jr., The Philippine Colonial Dichotomy: Attraction and Disenfranchisement, 63 P.L.J. 139-140
[1988].
_______________
84 R.A. No. 1888 of 1957.
85 See People v. Cayat, supra, at 21; See also Rubi v. Provincial Board of Mindoro, 39 Phil. 660, 694 [1919].
86 MacDonald,Indigenous Peoples of the Philippines,supra, at 351.
87 The construction of the Ambuklao and Binga dams in the 1950’s resulted in the eviction of hundreds of Ibaloi families—Cerilo Rico S.
187
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It was in the 1973 Constitution that the State adopted the following provision:

“The State shall consider the customs,88traditions, beliefs, and interests of national cultural communities in the formulation
and implementation of State policies.”
For the first time in Philippine history, the “non-Christian tribes” or the “cultural minorities” were addressed by
the highest law of the Republic, and they were referred to as “cultural communities.” More importantly this
time, their “uncivilized” culture was given some recognition and their “customs, traditions, beliefs and
interests” were to be considered by the State in the formulation and implementation of State policies.
President Marcos abolished the CNI and transferred its functions to the Presidential Adviser on National
Minorities (PANAMIN).The PANAMIN was tasked to integrate the ethnic groups that sought full integration
into the larger community, and at the same 89time “protect the rights of those who wish to preserve their
original lifeways beside the larger community.” In short, while still 90
adopting the integration policy, the decree
recognized the right of tribal Filipinos to preserve their way of life.
In 1974, President Marcos promulgated P.D. No. 410,otherwise known as the Ancestral Lands Decree. The
decree provided for the issuance of land occupancy certificates 91
to members of the national cultural
communities who were given up to 1984 to register their claims. In 1979, the Commission on the Settlement
of Land Prob-Abelardo, Ancestral Domain Rights: Issues, Responses, and Recommendations, Ateneo Law
Journal, vol. 38, No. 1, p. 92 [1993].
_______________
88 Section 11, Art. XV, 1973 Constitution.
89 Presidential Decrees Nos. 1017 and 1414.
90 The PANAMIN, however, concentrated funds and resources on image-building, publicity, and impact projects. In Mindanao, the
agency resorted to a policy of forced resettlement on reservations, militarization and intimidation—MacDonald, Indigenous Peoples of the
Philippines, supra,at 349-350.
91 No occupancy certificates were issued, however, because the government failed to release the decree’s implementing rules and
regulations—Abelardo, supra, at 120-121.
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lems was created under E.O. No. 561 which provided a mechanism 92
for the expeditious resolution of land
problems involving small settlers, landowners, and tribal Filipinos.
Despite the promulgation of these laws, from 1974 to the early 1980’s, some 100,000 Kalingas and Bontoks
of the Cordillera region were displaced by the Chico River dam project of the National Power Corporation
(NPC). The Manobos of Bukidnon saw their land bulldozed by the Bukidnon Sugar Industries Company
(BUSCO). In Agusan del Sur, the National Development Company was authorized by law in 1979 to take
approximately 40,550 hectares of land that later became
93
the NDC-Guthrie plantation in Agusan del Sur. Most
of the land was possessed by the Agusan natives. Timber concessions, water projects, plantations, mining,
and cattle ranching and other projects of the national government led not only to the eviction of94 the indigenous
peoples from their land but also to the reduction and destruction of their natural environment.
The Aquino government signified a total shift from the policy of integration to one of preservation. Invoking
her powers under the Freedom Constitution, President Aquino created the Office of Muslim Affairs, Office for
Northern Cultural
95
Communities and the Office for Southern Cultural Communities all under the Office of the
President.
The 1987 Constitution
96
carries at least six (6) provisions which insure the right of tribal Filipinos to preserve
their way of life.
_______________
92 Id., Note 177.
93 Id.,at 93-94.
94 MacDonald, Indigenous Peoples of the Philippines, supra, at 351.
95 E.O. Nos. 122-A, 122-B and 122-C. The preamble of E.O. No. 122-B states: “Believing that the new government is committed to
formulate more vigorous policies, plans, programs, and projects for tribal Filipinos, otherwise known as Indigenous Cultural
Communities, taking into consideration their communal aspirations, customs, traditions, beliefs, and interests, in order to promote and
preserve their rich cultural heritage and insure their participation in the country’s development for national unity; x x x”
96 Article II, sec. 22; Article VI, sec. 5, par. 2; Article XII, sec. 5; Article XIII, sec. 6; Article XIV, sec. 17; and Article XVI, sec. 12.
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This Constitution goes further than the 1973 Constitution by expressly guaranteeing the rights of tribal
Filipinos to their ancestral domains and ancestral lands. By recognizing their right to their ancestral lands and
domains, the State has effectively upheld their right to live ina culturedistinctly their own.
2. Their Concept of Land
Indigenous peoples share distinctive traits that set them apart from the Filipino mainstream. They are non-
Christians. They live in less accessible, marginal, mostly upland areas. They have a system of self-government
not dependent upon the laws of the central administration of the Republic of the Philippines. They 97
follow ways
of life and customs that are perceived as different from those of the rest of the population. The kind of
response the indigenous peoples chose to deal with colonial threat worked well to their advantage by making it
difficult for Western concepts and religion to erode their customs and traditions. The “infieles societies” which
had become peripheral to colonial administration, represented, from a cultural perspective, a much older base
of archi-pelagic culture. The political systems were still structured on the patriarchal and kinship oriented
arrangement of power and authority. The economic activities were governed by the concepts of an ancient
communalism and mutual help. The social structure which emphasized division of labor and distinction of
functions, not status, was maintained. The cultural styles and forms 98
of life portraying the varieties of social
courtesies and ecological adjustments were kept constantly vibrant.
Land is the central element of the indigenous peoples’ existence. There is no traditional concept of
permanent, individual, land ownership. Among the Igorots, ownership of land more accurately applies to the
tribal right to use the land or to territorial control. The people are the secondary owners or stewards of the
land and that if a member of the tribe ceases to work, he loses his claim of ownership, and the land reverts to
the beings of the spirit world who are its true and primary owners. Under the concept of “trusteeship,”
_______________
97 MacDonald, Indigenous Peoples of the Philippines, supra, at 345.
98 Samuel K. Tan, A Historyofthe Philippines, p. 54 [1997].
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99
the right to possess the land does not only belong to the present generation but the future onesas well.
Customary law on land rests on the traditional belief that no100one owns the land except the gods and spirits,
and that those who work the land are its mere stewards. Customary law has a strong preference for
communal ownership, which
101
could either be ownership by a group of individuals or families who are related by
blood or by marriage, or ownership by residents of the same locality who may not be related by blood or
marriage. The system of communal ownership under customary laws draws its meaning from the subsistence
and highly collectivized mode of economic production. The Kalingas, for instance, who are engaged in team
occupation like hunting, foraging for forest products, and swidden farming found it natural102
that forest areas,
swidden farms, orchards, pasture and burial grounds should be communally-owned. For the Kalingas,
everybody has a common right to a common economic base. Thus, as a rule, rights and obligations to the land
are shared in common.
Although highly bent on communal ownership, customary law on land also sanctions individual ownership.
The residential lots and terrace rice farms are governed by a limited system of individual ownership. It is
limited because while the individual owner has the right to use and dispose of the property, 103
he does not
possess all the rights of an exclusive and full owner as defined under our Civil Code. Under Kalinga
customary law, the alienation of individu-
_______________
99 Cordillera Studies Program, Land Use and Ownership and Public Policy in the Cordillera, 29-30 [n.d.]; also cited in Dante B.
Gatmaytan, Ancestral Domain Recognition in the Philippines: Trends in Jurisprudence and Legislation,5 Phil. Nat. Res.L.J. No. 1, pp. 47-
48 [1992].
100 Abelardo, Ancestral Domain Rights, supra, at 98-99, citing Ponciano L. Bennagen, Indigenous Attitudes Toward Land and Natural
Resources of Tribal Filipinos, 31 National Council of Churches in the Philippines Newsletter, Oct.-Dec. 1991, at 4-9.
101 Id. at 99, citing June Prill-Brett, Bontok Land Tenure (UP Law library, mimeographed).
102 Ma. Lourdes Aranal-Sereno and Roan Libarios, The Interface of National Land Law and Kalinga Law, 58 P.L.J. 420, 440-441
[1983].
103 Ibid.
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ally-owned land is strongly discouraged except in marriage and 104

succession and except to meet sudden financial
needs due to sickness, death in the family, or loss of crops. Moreover, land to be alienated should first be
offered to a clan-member
105
before any village-member can purchase it, and in no case may land be sold to a non-
member of the ili.
Land titles do not exist in the indigenous peoples’ economic and social system. The concept of individual land
ownership under the civil law is alien to them. Inherently colonial in origin, our national land laws and
governmental policies frown106upon indigenous claims to ancestral lands. Communal ownership is looked upon
as inferior, if not inexistent.
III. THE IPRA IS A NOVEL PIECE OF LEGISLATION.

It was to address the centuries-old neglect of the Philippine indigenous peoples that the Tenth Congress of the
Philippines, by their joint efforts, passed and approved R.A. No. 8371, the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act
(IPRA) of 1997. The law was a consolidation of two Bills—Senate
107
Bill No. 1728 and House Bill No. 9125.
Principally sponsored by Senator Juan M. Flavier, Senate Bill No. 1728 was a consolidation of four
proposed measures referred to the Committees on Cultural Communities, Environment and Natu-
_______________
104 Ibid.
105 Ibid.
106 Ma. Lourdes Aranal-Sereno and Roan Libarios, The Interface, supra,at 420.
107 Senate Bill No. 1728 was co-sponsored by Senator Macapagal-Arroyo and co-authored by Senators Alvarez, Magsaysay, Revilla,
Mercado, Enrile, Honasan,Tatad, Maceda, Shahani,Osmena and Romulo. The Eighth Congress, through Senators Rasul, Estrada and
Romulo filed a bill to operationalize the mandate of the 1987 Constitution on indigenous peoples. The bill was reported out, sponsored and
interpellated but never enacted into law. In the Ninth Congress, the bill filed by Senators Rasul and Macapagal-Arroyo was never
sponsored and deliberated upon in the floor.
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ral Resources, Ways and Means, as well as Finance. It adopted almost en toto the comprehensive version of
Senate Bill Nos. 1476 and 1486 which108
was a result of six regional consultations and one national consultation
with indigenous peoples nationwide. At the Second Regular Session of the Tenth Congress, Senator Flavier,
in his sponsorship speech, gave a background on the situation of indigenous peoples in the Philippines, to wit:
“The Indigenous Cultural Communities, including the Bangsa Moro, have long suffered from the dominance and neglect of
government controlled by the majority. Massive migration of their Christian brothers to their homeland shrunk their
territory and many of the tribal Filipinos were pushed to the hinterlands. Resisting the intrusion, dispossessed of their
ancestral land and with the massive exploitation of their natural resources by the elite among the migrant population,
they became marginalized. And the government has been an indispensable party to this insidious conspiracy against the
Indigenous Cultural Communities (ICCs). It organized and supported the resettlement of people to their ancestral land,
which was massive during the Commonwealth and early years of the Philippine Republic. Pursuant to the Regalian
Doctrine first introduced to our system by Spain through the Royal Decree of 13 February 1894 or the Maura Law, the
government passed laws to legitimize the wholesale landgrabbing
109
and provide for easy titling or grant of lands to migrant
homesteaders within thetraditionalareas of the ICCs.”
Senator Flavier further declared:

The IPs are the offsprings and heirs of the peoples who have first inhabited and cared for the land long before any central
government was established. Their ancestors had territories over which they ruled themselves and related with other
tribes. These territories—the land—include people, their dwelling, the mountains, the water, the air, plants, forest and the
animals. This is their environment in its totality. Their existence as indigenous peoples is manifested in their own lives
through political, economic, socio-cultural and spiritual practices. The IPs culture is the living and irrefutableproof to this.
_______________
108 Sponsorship Speech of Senator Flavier, Legislative History of SBN 1728, Tenth Congress, Second Regular Session, Senate, Oct 16,
1996, pp. 15-16.

109 Id. at 12.
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Their survival depends on securing or acquiring

110
land rights; asserting their rights to it; and depending on it. Otherwise,
IPs shall cease to exist asdistinct peoples.”
To recognize the rights of the indigenous peoples effectively, Senator Flavier proposed a bill based on two
postulates: (1) the concept of native title; and (2) theprincipleofparens patriae.
According to Senator Flavier, “[w]hile our legal tradition subscribes to the Regalian Doctrine reinstated in
Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution,” our “decisional laws” and jurisprudence passed by the State
have “made exception to the doctrine.” This exception was first laid down in the case of Cariño v. Insular
Government where:
“xxx the court has recognized long occupancy of land by an indigenous member of the cultural communities as one of
private ownership, which, in 111
legal concept, is termed “native title.” This ruling has not been overturned. In fact, it was
affirmed insubsequent cases.”
Following Cariño, the State passed Act No. 926, Act No. 2874, CA. No. 141, P.D. 705, P.D. 410, P.D. 1529, R.A.
6734 (the Organic Act for the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao). These laws, explicitly or implicitly,
and liberally or restrictively, recognized “native title” or “private right” and the existence of ancestral lands
and domains. Despite the passage of these laws, however, Senator Flavier continued:
“xxx the executive department of government since the American occupation has not implemented the policy. In fact, it
was more honored in its breach than in its observance, its wanton disregard shown during the period unto the
Commonwealth and the early years of the Philippine Republic when government organized and supported massive
resettlement of the peopletothe land of the ICCs.”
Senate Bill No. 1728 seeks to genuinely recognize the IPs right to own and possess their ancestral land. The
bill was prepared also under the principle of parens patriaeinherent in the supreme
_______________
110 Id. at 17-18.
111 Id.at 13.
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power of the State and deeply embedded in Philippine legal tradition. This principle mandates that persons
suffering from serious disadvantage or handicap, which places them in a position of actual inequality in their
relation or transaction with others, are entitled to the protection of the State.
Senate Bill No. 1728 was 112
passed on Third Reading by twenty-one (21) Senators voting in favor and none
against, with no abstention.
House Bill No. 9125 was sponsored by Rep. Zapata, Chairman of the Committee on Cultural Communities.
It was originally authored and subsequently 113presented and defended on the floor by
Rep. GregorioAndolanaof North Cotabato.
Rep.Andolana’s sponsorshipspeech reads as follows:
‘This Representation, as early as in the 8th Congress, filed a bill of similar implications that would promote, recognize the
rights of indigenous cultural communities within the framework of national unity and development.
Apart from this, Mr. Speaker, is our obligation, the government’s obligation to assure and ascertain that these rights
shall be well-preserved and the cultural traditions as well as the indigenous laws that remained long before this Republic
was established shall be preserved and promoted. There is a need, Mr. Speaker, to look into these matters seriously and
early approval of the substitute bill shall bring into reality the aspirations, the hope and the dreams of more than 114
12
million Filipinos that they be considered in the mainstream of the Philippine society as we fashion for the year 2000.”
Rep. Andolana stressed that H.B. No. 9125 is based on the policy of preservation as mandated in the
Constitution. He also empha-
_______________
112 Journal of the Tenth Congress of the Philippines, Senate, Session No. 5, Aug. 5-6,1997, pp. 86-87.
113 Co-authors of the bill were Reps. Ermita, Teves, Plaza, Calalay, Recto, Fua, Luciano, Abad, Cosalan, Aumentado, de la Cruz,
Bautista, Singson, Damasing, Romualdo, Montilla, Germino, Verceles—Proceedings of Sept. 4, 1997, pp. 00107-00108.
114 Sponsorship speech of Rep. Andolana of House Bill No 9125 March 20, 1997.
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sized that the rights of IPs to their land was enunciated in Cariño v. Insular Government which recognized
115
the
fact that they had vested rights prior to the establishment of the Spanish and American regimes.
After exhaustive interpellation, House Bill No. 9125, and its corresponding amendments, was approved on
Second Reading with no objections.
IV. THE PROVISIONS OF THE IPRA

DO NOT CONTRAVENE THE CONSTITUTION.
The IPRA grants to ICCs/IPs a distinct kind of ownership over ancestral domains and ancestral
lands. Ancestral lands are not the same as ancestral domains. These are defined in Section 3 [a] and [b] ofthe
IndigenousPeoples Right Act,viz.:
“Sec. 3 a) Ancestral Domains.—Subject to Section 56 hereof, refer to all areas generally belonging to ICCs/IPs comprising
lands, inland waters, coastal areas, and natural resources therein, held under a claim of ownership, occupied or possessed
by ICCs/IPs by themselves or through their ancestors, communally or individually since time immemorial, continuously to
the present except when interrupted by war, force majeure or displacement by force, deceit, stealth or as a consequence of
government projects or any other voluntary dealings entered into by government and private individuals/corporations, and
which are necessary to ensure their economic, social and cultural welfare. It shall include ancestral lands, forests, pasture,
residential, agricultural, and other lands individually owned whether alienable and disposable or otherwise, hunting
grounds, burial grounds, worship areas, bodies of water, mineral and other natural resources, and lands which may no
longer be exclusively occupied by ICCs/IPs but from which they traditionally had access to for their subsistence and
traditional activities, particularly the home ranges of ICCs/IPs who are still nomadic and/or shifting cultivators;
_______________
115 Interpellationof Aug. 20, 1997, 6:16 p.m., p. 00061.
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b) Ancestral Lands.—Subject to Section 56 hereof, refers to land occupied, possessed and utilized by individuals,
families and clans who are members of the ICCs/IPs since time immemorial, by themselves or through their
predecessors-in-interest, under claims of individual or traditional group ownership, continuously, to the present
except when interrupted by war, force majeure or displacement by force, deceit, stealth, or as a consequence of
government projects and other voluntary dealings entered into by government and private
individuals/corporations, including, but not limited to, residential lots, rice terraces or paddies, private forests,
swiddenfarms and tree lots.”
Ancestral domains are all areas belonging to ICCs/IPs held under a claim of ownership, occupied or possessed
by ICCs/IPs by themselves or through their ancestors, communally or individually since time immemorial,
continuously until the present, except when interrupted by war, force majeure or displacement by force, deceit,
stealth or as a consequence of government projects or any other voluntary dealings with government and/or
private individuals or corporations. Ancestral domains comprise lands, inland waters, coastal areas, and
natural resources therein and includes ancestral lands, forests, pasture, residential, agricultural, and other
lands individually owned whether alienable or not, hunting grounds, burial grounds, worship areas, bodies of
water, mineral and other natural resources. They also include lands which may no longer be exclusively
occupied by ICCs/IPs but from which they traditionally had access to for their subsistence and traditional116
activities, particularly the home ranges of ICCs/IPs who are still nomadic and/or shifting cultivators.
Ancestral lands are lands held by the ICCs/IPs under the same conditions as ancestral domains except that
these are limited to lands and that these lands are not merely occupied and possessed but are also utilized by
the ICCs/IPs under claims of individual or traditional group ownership. These lands include 117
but are not
limited to residential lots, rice terraces or paddies, private forests, swidden farms and tree lots.
_______________
116 Section 3 [a],IPRA.
117 Section 3 [b], IPRA.
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The procedures for claiming ancestral domains and lands are similar to the procedures embodied in
Department Administrative Order (DAO) No. 2, series of 1993, 118
signed by then Secretary of the Department of
Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) Angel Alcala. DAO No. 2 allowed the delineation of ancestral
domains by special task forces and ensured the issuance of Certificates of Ancestral Land Claims (CALC’s)
and Certificates of Ancestral Domain Claims (CADC’s) toIPs.
The identification and delineation of these ancestral domains 119
and lands is a power conferred by the IPRA
on the National Commission on 120
Indigenous Peoples (NCIP). The guiding principle in identification and
delineation is self-delineation. This means that the ICCs/IPs have 121
a decisive role in determining the
boundaries of theirdomainsand in all the activities pertinent thereto.
The procedure for the delineation and recognition of ancestral domains is set forth in Sections 51 and 52 of
the IPRA. The identification, delineation and certification of ancestral lands is in Section53 of saidlaw.
Upon due application and compliance with the procedure provided under the law and upon finding by the
NCIP that the application is meritorious, the NCIP shall issue a Certificate of Ancestral Domain Title (CADT)
122
122
in the name of the community concerned. The allocation of lands within the ancestral domain to any
individual or indigenous corporate (family
123
or clan) claimants is left to the ICCs/IPs concerned to decide in
accordance with customs and traditions. With respect to ancestral lands outside the ances-
_______________
118 Guide to R.A. 8371, p. 14.
119 Section 44 [e], IPRA.
120 Section 51, IPRA.
121 Guide to R.A. 8371, p. 15.
122 A CADT refers to a title formally recognizing the right of possession and ownership of ICCs/IPs over their ancestral domains
identified and delineated in accordance with the IPRA—Rule II [c], Rules & Regulations Implementing the IPRA, NCIP Admin. Order No.
1.
123 Section 53 [a], IPRA.
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124
tral domain, the NCIP issues a Certificate of Ancestral Land Title (CALT).
CADT’s and CALT’s issued under the125IPRA shall be registered by the NCIP before the Register of Deeds in
the place where the property is situated.
(1) Right to Ancestral Domains and Ancestral Lands: How Acquired
The rights of the ICCs/IPs to their ancestral domains and ancestral lands may be acquired in two modes:
(1) by native title over both ancestral lands and domains; or (2) by Torrens title under the Public Land Act and
the Land Registration Act with respect to ancestral lands only.
(2) The Concept of Native Title
Native title is defined as:

“Sec. 3 [1]. Native Title—refers to pre-conquest rights to lands and domains which, as far back as memory reaches, have
been held under a claim of private ownership by ICCs/IPs, have never 126
been public lands and are thus indisputably
presumed to have been held that way since before the Spanish Conquest.”
Native title refers to ICCs/IPs’ preconquest rights to lands and domains held under a claim of private
ownership as far back as memory reaches. These lands are deemed never to have been public lands and are
indisputably presumed to have been held that way since before the Spanish Conquest. The rights of ICCs/IPs
to their ancestral domains (which
127
also include ancestral lands) by virtue of native title shall be recognized and
respected. Formal recognition, when solicited by ICCs/IPs concerned, shall be embodied in a Certificate of
Ancestral Domain Title (CADT), which
_______________
124 A CALT refers to a title formally recognizing the rights of the ICCs/IPs over their ancestral lands—Rule II [d], Implementing Rules
NCIPA.O. No. 1.
125 Section 52 [k], IPRA.
126 Section 3 [1], IPRA.
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128
128
shall recognize the title of the concerned ICCs/IPs over the territories identified and delineated.
Like a Torrens title, a CADT is evidence of private ownership of land by native title. Native title, however,
is a right of private ownership peculiarly granted to ICCs/IPs over their ancestral lands and domains. The
IPRA categorically declares ancestral lands and domains held by native title as never to have been public land.
Domains and lands held under native title are, therefore, indisputably presumed to have never been public
lands and are private.
129
(a) Cariño v. Insular Government
The concept130 of native title in the IPRA was taken from the 1909 case of Cariño v. Insular
Government. Cariño firmly established a concept of private land title that existed irrespective of any royal
grant from the State.
In 1903, Don Mateo Cariño, an Ibaloi, sought to register with the land registration court 146 hectares of
land in Baguio Municipality, Benguet Province. He claimed that this land had been possessed and occupied by
his ancestors since time immemorial; that his grandfather built fences around the property for the holding of
cattle and that his father cultivated some parts of the land. Cariño inherited the land in accordance with
Igorot custom. He tried
131
to have the land adjusted under the Spanish land laws, but no document issued from
the Spanish
132
Crown. In 1901, Cariño obtained a possessory title to the land under the Spanish Mortgage
Law. The North American colonial government, however, ignored his possessory title and built a public road
on the land prompting him
_______________
128 Ibid.
129 41 Phil. 935 (1909), 212 U.S. 449, 53 L.Ed. 594.
130 Sponsorship Speech of Senator Juan Flavier, Leg. History of SBN 1728, Tenth Congress, Second Regular Session, Oct. 16, 1996, p.
13.
131 It was the practice of the Spanish colonial government not to issue titles to Igorots—Owen J. Lynch, Jr., Invisible Peoples and a
Hidden Agenda: The Origins of Contemporary Philippine Land Laws (1900-1913), 63 P.L.J. 249, 288 [1988], citing the testimony of
Benguet Provincial Governor William F. Pack, Records at 47,Cariño.
132 Maura Law or the Royal Decree of Feb. 13, 1894.
200
200 SUPREME COURT REPORTSANNOTATED

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to seek a Torrens title

133
to his property in the land registration court. While his petition was pending, a U.S.
military reservation was proclaimed over his land and, shortly thereafter, a military detachment 134
was
detailed on the property with orders to keep cattle and trespassers, including Cariño, off the land.
In 1904, the land registration court granted Cariño’s application for absolute ownership to the land. Both
the Government of the Philippine Islands and the U.S. Government appealed to the C.F.I. of Benguet which
reversed
135
the land registration court and dismissed Cariño’s application. The Philippine Supreme
Court 136 affirmed the C.F.I, by applying the Valenton ruling. Cariño took the case to the U.S. Supreme
Court. On one hand, the Philippine government invoked the Regalian doctrine and contended that Cariño
failed to comply with the provisions of the Royal Decree of June 25, 1880, which required registration of land
claims within a limited period of time. Cariño, on the other, asserted that he was the absolute owner of the
land jure gentium, and that the land neverformed part of the public domain.
In a unanimous decision written by Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, theU.S.Supreme Court held:
“It is true that Spain, in its earlier decrees, embodied the universal feudal theory that all lands were held from the Crown,
and perhaps the general attitude of conquering nations toward people not recognized as entitled to the treatment accorded
to those in the same zone of civilization with themselves. It is true, also, that in legal theory, sovereignty is absolute, and
that, as against foreign nations, the United States may assert, as Spain asserted, absolute power. But it does not follow
that, as against the inhabitants of the Philippines, the United States asserts that Spain
_______________
133 Later namedCamp John Hay.
134 Lynch,Invisible Peoples, supra, at 288-289.
135 7 Phil. 132 [1906].
136 In 1901, Cariño had entered into a promissory agreement with a U.S. merchant in Manila.The note obliged Cariño to sell the land at issue “as soon
as he obtains from the Government of the United States, or its representatives in the Philippines, real and definitivetitle.”See Lynch, Invisible Peoples,
supra,at290, citing Government’s Exhibit G, Records, at 137-138,Cariño.
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had such power. When theory is left on one side, sovereignty is a question of strength, and may vary in degree. How far a
new sovereign shall insist upon the theoretical 137 relation of the subjects to the head in the past, and how far it shall
recognize actual facts, are mattersfor it to decide.”
The U.S. Supreme Court noted that it need not accept Spanish doctrines. The choice was with the new
colonizer. Ultimately, the matter had tobe decidedunder U.S. law.
The Cariño decision largely rested on the North American 138
constitutionalist’s concept of “due process” as
well as the pronounced policy “‘to do justice to the natives.” It was based on the strong mandate extended to
the Islands via the Philippine Bill of 1902 that “No law shall be enacted in said islands which shall deprive
any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, or deny to any person therein the equal
protection of the laws.” The court declared:
“The acquisition of the Philippines was not like the settlement of the white race in the United States. Whatever
consideration may have been shown to the North American Indians, the dominant purpose of the whites in America was to
occupy land. It is obvious that, however stated, the reason for our taking over the Philippines was different. No one, we
suppose, would deny that, so far as consistent with paramount necessities, our first object in the internal administration of
the islands is to do justice to the natives, not to exploit their country for private gain. By the Organic Act of July 1, 1902,
chapter 1369, section 12 (32 Statutes at Large, 691), all the property and rights acquired there by the United States are to
be administered ‘for the benefit of the inhabitants thereof.’ It is reasonable to suppose that the attitude thus assumed by
the United States with regard to what was unquestionably its own is also its attitude in deciding what it will claim for its
own. The same statute made a bill of rights, embodying the safeguards of the Constitution, and, like the Constitution,
extends those safeguards to all. It provides that ‘no law shall be enacted in said islands which shall deprive any person of
life, liberty, or property without due process of law, or deny to any person therein the equal protection of the laws.’ In the
light of the declaration that we have quoted from section 12, it is hard to believe that the United States was ready to
declare in the next breath that “any person” did not embrace the inhabitants of Benguet,
_______________
137 Cariño v. Insular Government, supra, at 939.
138 Ibid.
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or that it meant by “property” only that which had become such by ceremonies of which presumably a large part of the
inhabitants never had heard, and that it proposed to treat as public land what139they, by native custom and by long
association,—of the profoundest factors in human thought,—regarded as their own.”
The Courtwent further:

“[E]very presumption is and ought to be against the government in a case like the present. It might, perhaps, be proper
and sufficient to say that when, as far back as testimony or memory goes, the land has been held by individuals under a
claim of private ownership, it will be presumed to have been held in the same way from before the Spanish conquest, and
never to have been public land. Certainly in140a case like this, if there is doubt or ambiguity in the Spanish law, we ought to
give the applicant the benefit of the doubt.”
The court thus laid down the presumption of a certain title held (1) as far back as testimony or memory went,
and (2) under a claim of private ownership. Land held by this title is presumed to “never have beenpublic
land.”
Against this presumption, the U.S. Supreme Court analyzed the Spanish decrees upheld in the 1904
decision of Valenton v. Murciano. The U.S. Supreme Court found noproof that the Spanish decrees
did not honor native title. On the contrary, the decrees discussed in Valentonappeared to recognize that the
natives owned some land, irrespective of any royal grant. The Regalian doctrine declared in the preamble of
the Recopilacion was all “theory and discourse” and it was observed that titles were admitted to existbeyond
thepowers of the Crown,viz.:
“If the applicant’s case is to be tried by the law of Spain, we do not discover such clear proof that it was bad by that law as to
satisfy us that he does not own the land. To begin with, the older decrees and laws cited by the counsel for the plaintiff in
error seem to indicate pretty clearly that the natives were recognized as owning some lands, irrespective of any royal grant.
In other words, Spain did not assume to convert all the native in-
_______________
139 Id.at 940.
140 Id.at 941.
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habitants of the Philippines into trespassers or even into tenants at will. For instance, Book 4, title 12, Law 14 of
the Recopilacion de Leyes de las Indias, cited for a contrary conclusion in Valenton v. Murciano, 3 Philippine 537, while it
commands viceroys and others, when it seems proper, to call for the exhibition of grants, directs them to confirm those who
hold by good grants or justa prescripcion. It is true that it begins by the characteristic assertion of feudal overlordship and
the origin of all titles in the King or his predecessors. That was theory and discourse. The fact was that titles 141
were admitted
to exist that owed nothing to the powers of Spain beyond this recognition in their books” (Emphasis supplied).
The court further stated that the Spanish “adjustment” proceedings never held sway over unconquered
territories. The wording of the Spanish laws were not framed in a manner as to convey to the natives that
failure to register what to them has always been their own would mean loss of such land. The registration
requirement was “not to confer title, but simply to establish it”; it was “not calculated to convey to the mind of
an Igorot chief the notion that ancient family possessions were in danger, if he had read every word of it.”
By recognizing this kind of title, the court clearly repudiated the doctrine of Valenton. It was frank enough,
however, to admit the possibility that the applicant might have been deprived of his land under Spanish law
because of the inherent ambiguity of the decrees and concomitantly, the various interpretations which may be
given them. But precisely because of the142ambiguity and of the strong “due process mandate” of the Constitution,
the court validated this kind of title. This title was sufficient, even without government administrative
action, and entitled the holder to a Torrens certificate. Justice Holmes explained:
“It will be perceived that the rights of the applicant under the Spanish law present a problem not without difficulties for
courts of a legal tradition. We have deemed it proper on that account to notice the possible
_______________
141 Id.at941-942.
142 Aranal-Sereno and Libarios, The Interface Between Kalinga Land Law, supra at 428—This article was one of those circulated among the
Constitutional Commissioners in the formulation of Sec. 5, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution (4 Record of the Constitutional Commission 33).
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effect of the change of sovereignty and the act of Congress establishing the fundamental principles now to be observed.
Upon a consideration of the whole case we are of the opinion that law and justice require that the applicant should be
granted what he seeks, and should not be deprived of what, by the practice and belief
143
of those among whom he lived, was
his property, through a refined interpretation of an almost forgotten law of Spain.”
Thus, the144court ruled in favor of Cariño and ordered the registrationof the148hectares inBaguio Municipality in
hisname.
Examining Cariño closer, the U.S. Supreme Court did not categorically refer to the title it upheld as “native
title.” It simply said:
“The Province of Benguet was inhabited by a tribe that the Solicitor-General, in his argument, characterized as a savage
tribe that never was brought under the civil or military government of the Spanish Crown. It seems probable, if not certain,
that the Spanish officials would not have granted to anyone in that province the registration to which formerly the plaintiff
was entitled by the Spanish Laws, and which would have made his title beyond question good. Whatever may have been
the technical position of Spain it does not follow that, in the view of the United States, he had lost all rights and was a
mere trespasser when the present government seized his land. The argument to that effect seems to amount to a denial of
native titles through an important part of the Island of Luzon,
145
at least, for the want of ceremonies which the Spaniards
would not have permitted and had not the power to enforce.”
This is the only instance when Justice Holmes used the term “native title” in the entire length of
the Cariñodecision. It is observed that the widespread use of the term “native title” may be traced to Professor
Owen James Lynch, Jr., a Visiting Professor at
______________
143 Id.at 944.
144 Certificate of Title No. 2 covering the 148 hectares of Baguio Municipality was issued not in the name of Cariño who died on June 6,
1908, but to his lawyers John Hausserman and Charles Cohn and his attorney-in-fact Metcalf Clarke. Hausserman, Cohn and Clarke sold
the land to the U.S. Government in a Deed of Quitclaim—Richel B. Langit, Igorot Descendants Claim Rights to Camp John Hay, Manila
Times, p. 1, Jan. 12, 1998.
145 Id.at 939.
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the University of the Philippines College of Law from the Yale University Law School. In 1982, Prof. Lynch
published
146
an article in the Philippine Law Journal entitled Native Title, Private Right and Tribal Land
Law. This article was made after Professor Lynch visited over thirty tribal 147
communities throughout the
country and studied the origin and development of Philippine land laws. He discussed Cariño extensively
and used the term “native title” to refer to Cariño’s title as discussed and upheld by the U.S. Supreme Court in
said case.
(b) Indian Title
In a footnote in the same article, Professor Lynch stated that the concept of “native title” as defined
148
by Justice
Holmes in Cariño “is conceptually similar to “aboriginal title” of the American Indians. This is not
surprising, according to Prof. Lynch, considering that during the American
149
regime, government policy towards
ICCs/IPs was consistently made in reference
150
to native Americans. This was clearly demonstrated in the case
of Rubi v. Provincial Board of Mindoro.
In Rubi, the Provincial Board of Mindoro adopted a Resolution authorizing the provincial governor to
remove the Mangyans from
________________
146 57 P.L.J. 268, 293-296 [1982].
147 Prom 1987 to 1988, Prof. Lynch allowed the P.L.J. to publish parts of his doctoral dissertation at the Yale Law School entitled
“Invisible Peoples: A History of Philippine Land Law.” Please see The Legal Bases of Philippine Colonial Sovereignty: An Inquiry, 62
P.L.J. 279 [1987]; Land Rights, Land Laws and Land Usurpation: The Spanish Era (15681898),63 P.L.J. 82 [1988]; The Colonial
Dichotomy: Attraction and Disenfranchisement, 63 P.L.J. 112; Invisible Peoples and a Hidden Agenda: The Origins of Contemporary
Philippine Land Laws (1900-1913),63 P.L.J. 249.
148 “Native title” is a common law recognition of pre-existing aboriginal land interests in Australia—Maureen Tehan, Customary Title,
Heritage Protection, and Property Rights in Australia: Emerging Patterns of Land Use in the Post-Mabo Era, 7 Pacific Rim Law & Policy
Journal, No. 3, p. 765 [June 1998].
149 Lynch,Native Titles, supra, Note 164, p. 293.
150 39 Phil. 660 [1919].
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their domains and place them in a permanent reservation in Sitio Tigbao, Lake Naujan. Any Mangyan who
refused to comply was to be imprisoned. Rubi and some Mangyans, including one who was imprisoned for
trying to escape from the reservation, filed for habeas corpus claiming deprivation of liberty under the Board
Resolution. This Court denied the petition on the ground of police power. It upheld government policy
promoting the idea that a permanent settlement was the only successful method for educating the Mangyans,
introducing civilized
151
customs, improving their health and morals, and protecting the public forests in which
they roamed. Speaking throughJustice Malcolm, the court said:
“Reference was made in the President’s instructions to the Commission to the policy adopted by the United States for the
Indian Tribes. The methods followed by the Government of the Philippine Islands in its dealings with the so-called non-
Christian people is said, on argument, to be practically identical with that followed by the United States Government in its
dealings with the Indian tribes. Valuable lessons, it is insisted, can be derived byaninvestigation of the American-Indian
policy. From the beginning of the United States, and even before, the Indians have been treated as “in a state of pupilage.”
The recognized relation between the Government of the United States and the Indians may be described as that of
guardian and ward. It is for the Congress to determine when and 152
how the guardianship shall be terminated. The Indians
are alwayssubject to theplenary authority ofthe United States.
x x x.
As to the second point, the facts in the Standing Bear case and the Rubi case are not exactly identical. But even
admitting similarity of facts, yet it is known to all that Indian reservations do exist in the United States, that Indians have
been taken from different parts of the country and placed on these reservations, without any previous consultation as to
their own wishes, and that, when once so located, they have been made to remain on the reservation for their own good
and for the general good of the country. If any lesson can be drawn from the Indian policy of the United States, it is that
the determination of this policy is for the legislative and executive branches of the government and that when once so
decided upon, the courts should not interfere to upset a carefully planned
_______________
151 Id.at 712-713.
152 Id.at 694.
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governmental system. Perhaps, just as many forceful reasons exist for the segregation
153
of the Manguianes in Mindoro as
existed for the segregation of the different Indiantribes in the United States.”
Rubi applied the concept of Indian land grants or reservations in the Philippines. An Indian reservation is a
part of the
154
public domain set apart by proper authority for the use and occupation of a tribe or tribes of
Indians. It may be set apart by an 155 act of Congress, by treaty, or by executive order, but it cannot be
established by custom and prescription.
Indian title to land, however,
156
is not limited to land grants or reservations. It also covers the “aboriginal right
of possession or occupancy.” The aboriginal right of possession depends on the actual occupancy of the lands
in question by the tribe or nation as their ancestral home, in157the sense that such lands constitute definable
territory occupied exclusively by the particular tribe or nation. It
________________
153 Id.at 700.
154 42 C.J.S., Indians,Sec. 29 [1944 ed.].
155 There are 3 kinds of Indian reservations: (a) those created by treaties prior to 1871; (b) those created by acts of Congress since 1871;
and (c) those made by Executive Orders where the President has set apart public lands for the use of the Indians in order to keep them
within a certain territory—42 C.J.S., Indians, Sec. 29 citing Sioux Tribe of Indians v. U.S., 94 Ct. Cl. 150, 170, certiorari granted 62 S. Ct.
631, 315 U. S. 790, 86 L. Ed. 1194, affirmed 62 S. Ct. 1095, 316 U.S. 317, 86 L.Ed. 1501. It is observed that the first two kinds may include
lands possessed by aboriginal title. The last kind covers Indian reservations proper. Until 1871, Indian tribes were recognized by the
United States as possessing the attributes of nations to the extent that treaties were made with them. In that year, however, Congress, by
statute, declared its intention thereafter to make the Indian tribes amenable directly to the power and authority of the United States by
the immediate exercise of its legislative power over them, instead of by treaty. Since then, Indian affairs have been regulated by acts of
Congress and by contracts with the Indian tribes practically amounting to treaties—41 Am Jur 2d, Indians, Sec. 55 [1995 ed.].
156 42 C.J.S. Indians,Sec. 28 [1944 ed.].
157 Ibid; see also U.S. v. Santa Fe Pac. R. Co., Ariz., 62 S. Ct. 248, 314 U.S. 339, 86 L. Ed. 260 [1941].
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is a right which exists apart from any treaty, statute, or other governmental action, although in numerous
instances treaties have been negotiated with Indian tribes, recognizing158 their aboriginal possession and
delimiting their occupancy rights or settling and adjusting theirboundaries.
American jurisprudence recognizes the Indians’ or native Americans’ rights to land they have held and
occupied before the “discovery” of the Americas by the Europeans. The earliest definitive statement by the U.S.
Supreme 159Court on the nature of aboriginal title was made in 1823 in Johnson & Graham’s Lessee v.
M'Intosh.
In Johnson, the plaintiffs claimed the land in question under two (2) grants made by the chiefs of two (2)
Indian tribes. The U.S. Supreme Court refused to recognize this conveyance, the plaintiffs being private
persons. The only conveyance that was recognized was that made by the Indians to the government of the
European discoverer. Speaking for the court, Chief Justice Marshall pointed out that the potentates of the old
world believed that they had made ample compensation to the inhabitants of the new world by bestowing
civilization and Christianity upon them; but in addition, said the court, they found it necessary, in order to
avoid conflicting settlements and consequent war, to establish the principle that discovery gives title to the
government by whose subjects, or by whose authority, the discovery
160
was made, against all other European
governments, which title might be consummated by possession. The exclusion of all other Europeans gave to
the nation making the discovery the sole right of acquiring the soil from the natives and establishing
settlements upon it. As regards the natives, the court further stated that:
“Those relations which were to exist between the discoverer and the natives were to be regulated by themselves. The rights
thus acquired being exclusive, no otherpowercould interpose between them.
In the establishment of these relations, the rights of the original inhabitants were, in no instance, entirely disregarded;
but were necessarily,
________________
158 Ibid.
159 8 Wheat 543, 5 L. Ed. 681 [1823].
160 Id.at 680.
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to a considerable extent, impaired. They were admitted to be the rightful occupants of the soil, with a legal as well as just
claim to retain possession of it, and to use it according to their own discretion; but their rights to complete sovereignty, as
independent nations, were necessarily diminished, and their power to dispose of the soil at their own will, to whomsoever
they pleased, was denied by the fundamental principle that discovery gave exclusive titleto those who made it.
While the different nations of Europe respected the right of the natives as occupants, they asserted the ultimate dominion
to be in themselves; and claimed and exercised, as a consequence of this ultimate dominion, a power to grant the soil, while
yet in possession of the natives.
161
These grants have been understood by all to convey a title to the grantees, subject only to the
Indian right of occupancy.”
Thus, the discoverer of new territory was deemed to have obtained the exclusive right to acquire Indian land
and extinguish Indian titles. Only to the discoverer—whether to England, France, Spain or Holland—did this
right belong and not to any other nation or private person. The mere acquisition of the right nonetheless did
not extinguish Indian claims to land. Rather, until the discoverer, by purchase or conquest, exercised its right,
the concerned Indians were recognized as the “rightful occupants of the soil, with a legal as well as just claim
to retain possession of it.” Grants made by the discoverer to her subjects of lands occupied by the Indians were
held to convey a title to the grantees, subject only to the Indian right of occupancy. Once the discoverer
purchased the land from the Indians or conquered them, it was only then that the discoverer gained an
absolute title unrestricted by Indian rights.
The court concluded, in essence, that a grant of Indian lands by Indians could not convey a title paramount
to the title of the United States itself tootherparties, saying:
It has never been contended that the Indian title amounted to nothing. Their right of possession has never been questioned.
The claim of government extends162
to the complete ultimate title, charged with this right of possession, and to the exclusive
power of acquiring that right.”
_______________
161 Id.at 689.
162 Id. at 696; see also 41 ALR Fed 425, Annotation: Proof and Extinguishment of Aboriginal Title to Indian Lands, Sec. 2 [a] [1979].
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It has been said that the history

163
of America, from its discovery to the present day, proves the universal
recognition of this principle.
The Johnson doctrine was a compromise. It protected Indian rights and 164
their native lands without having
to invalidate conveyances made by the government to many U.S. 165
citizens.
Johnson was reiterated in the case of Worcester v. Georgia. In this case, the State of Georgia enacted a
law requiring all white persons residing within the Cherokee nation to obtain a license or permit from the
Governor of Georgia; and any violation of the law was deemed a high misdemeanor. The plaintiffs, who were
white missionaries, did not obtain said license and were thus charged with a violation ofthe Act.
The U.S. Supreme Court declared the Act as unconstitutional for interfering with the treaties established
between the United States and the Cherokee nation as well as the Acts of Congress regulating intercourse
with them. It characterized the relationship between the United States government and the Indians as:
“The Indian nations were, from their situation, necessarily dependent on some foreign potentate for the supply of their
essential wants, and for their protection from lawless and injurious intrusions into their country. That power was
naturally termed their protector. They had been arranged under the protection of Great Britain; but the extinguishment of
the British power in their neighborhood, and the establishment of that of the United States in its place, led naturally to
the declaration, on the part of the Cherokees, that they were under the protection of the United States, and of no other
power. They assumed the relation with the United States which had before subsisted with Great Britain.
This relation was that of a nation claiming and receiving the protection of one more
166
powerful, not that of individuals
abandoning their national character,and submitting as subjects tothelaws of a master.”
_______________
163 Buttz v. Northern Pac. R. Co., Dak., 7 S. Ct. 100, 119 U.S. 55, 30 L.Ed. 330, 335 [1886].
164 Lynch, Native Title, supra, at 293-294; Cohen, Original Indian Title,32 Minn. L.R. 48-49 [1947].
165 6 Pet 515, 8 L.Ed. 483 [1832].
166 Id.at 499.
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It was the policy of the U.S. government to treat the Indians as nations with distinct territorial boundaries
and recognize their right of occupancy over all the landswithin theirdomains. Thus:
“From the commencement of our government Congress has passed acts to regulate trade and intercourse with the Indians;
which treat them as nations, respect their rights, and manifest a firm purpose to afford that protection which treaties
stipulate. All these acts, and especially that of 1802, which is still in force, manifestly consider the several Indian nations
as distinct political communities, having territorial boundaries, within which their authority is exclusive, and having a
right to all the lands within those boundaries, which is not only acknowledged, but guaranteed by the United States.
x x x.
“The Indian nations had always been considered as distinct, independent political communities, retaining their original
natural rights, as the undisputed possessors of the soil from time immemorial, with the single exception of that imposed by
irresistible power, which excluded them from intercourse with any other European potentate than the first discoverer of
the coast of the particular region claimed: and this was a restriction which those European potentates imposed on
themselves, as 167
well as on the Indians. The very term “nation,” so generally applied to them, means “a people distinct from
others.” x xx.
The Cherokee nation, then, is a distinct community, occupying its own territory, with boundaries accurately described,
in which the laws of Georgia can have no force, and which the citizens of Georgia have no right to enter but with the assent
of the Cherokees themselves or in conformity with treaties and with the acts of Congress. The whole intercourse 168 between
the United States and this nation is, by our Constitution and laws, vestedin the government of the United States.”
The discovery of the American continent gave title to

169
the government of the discoverer as against all other
European governments. Designated as the naked fee, this title was to be consum-
_______________
167 Id.at 500.
168 Id. at 501.
169 The title of the government to Indian lands, the naked fee, is a sovereign title, government having no landlord from whom it holds
the fee—Shoshone Tribe of Indians of Wind River Reservation in Wyoming v.
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mated by possession and was subject to the Indian title of occupancy. The discoverer acknowledged the
Indians’ legal and just claim to retain possession of the land, the Indians being the original inhabitants of the
land. The discoverer nonetheless asserted the exclusive right to acquire the Indians’ land—either by purchase,
“defensive” conquest, or cession—and in so doing, extinguish the Indian title. Only the discoverer could
extinguish Indian title because it alone asserted ultimate dominion in itself. Thus, while the different nations
of Europe respected
170
the rights of the natives as occupants, they all asserted the ultimate dominion and title to
be in themselves.
As early as the 19th century, it became accepted doctrine that although fee title to the lands occupied by the
Indians when the colonists arrived became vested in the sovereign—first the discovering European nation and
later the original 13 States and the United States—a right of occupancy in the Indian tribes was nevertheless
recognized. The Federal Government continued the policy of respecting the Indian171 right of occupancy,
sometimes called Indian title, which it accorded the protection of complete ownership. But this aboriginal
Indian interest simply constitutes “permission” from the whites to occupy the land, and means mere
172
172
possession not specifically recognized as ownership by173Congress. It is clear that this right of occupancy based
upon aboriginal possession is not a property right. It is vulnerable to affirmative action by the federal
government who, as sovereign, possessed exclusive power to
_______________
U.S., 85 Ct. Cl. 331, certiorari granted U.S. v. Shoshone Tribe of Indians, 58 S. Ct. 609, 303 U.S. 629, 82 L. Ed. 1090, affirmed 58 S. Ct.
794, 304 U.S. 111, 82 L.Ed. 1213, 1218-1219 [1938].
170 Buttz v. Northern Pac. R. Co., Dak., at 30 L. Ed. 330, 335; Beecher v. Wetherby, Wis., 95 U.S. 517, 24 L. Ed. 440, 441 [1877]; see
also 42 C.J.S.,Indians,Sec. 28 [1944 ed.].

171 Annotation, Proof and Extinguishment of Aboriginal Title to Indian Lands, 41 ALR Fed 425, Sec. 2 [b] [1979]—hereinafter cited as
Aboriginal Title to IndianLands.

172 Ibid.; see also Tee Hit Ton Indians v. U.S., 348 U.S. 272, 99 L. Ed. 314, 320, 75 S. Ct. 313 [1955], reh den 348 U.S. 965, 99 L. Ed.
753, 75 S. Ct. 521.

173 Ibid.;Tee Hit Ton Indians v.U.S.,at 99 L. Ed. 320.
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174
extinguish the right of occupancy at will. Thus, aboriginal title is not the same175
as legal title. Aboriginal title
rests on actual, exclusive and continuous use and occupancy for a long time. It entails that land owned by
Indian title must be used within the tribe,176
subject to its laws and customs, and cannot be sold to another
sovereign government nor to any citizen. Such title as Indians have to possess and occupy land is in the
tribe, and not in the individual Indian; the right of individual Indians to share in the tribal property usually
177
depends upon tribal membership, the property of the tribe generally beingheld in communal ownership.
As a rule, Indian lands are not included in the term “public lands,” which 178
is ordinarily used to designate
such lands as are subject to sale or other disposal under general laws. Indian land which has been
abandoned is deemed to fall into the public do-
_______________
174 Oneida Indian Nation v. County of Oneida, 414 U.S. 661, 39 L. Ed. 2d 73, 94 S Ct. 772 [1974]; U.S. v. Alcea Bank of Tillamooks, 329
U.S. 40, 91 L. Ed. 29. 67 S. Ct. 167 [1946].

175 For compensation under the Indian Claims Commission Act, the proof of aboriginal title rests on actual, exclusive and continuous
use and occupancy for a long time prior to the loss of the property. (The Indian Claims Commission Act awards compensation to Indians
whose aboriginal titles were extinguished by the government through military conquest, creation of a reservation, forced confinement of
Indians and removal of Indians from certain portions of the land and the designation of Indian land into forest preserve, grazing district,
etc.)—Aboriginal Title to Indian Lands, supra, atSecs. 2[a], 3[a],pp. 431, 433, 437.
176 Aboriginal Title to Indian Lands, supra, at Sec. 2[b], p. 435.
177 41 Am Jr 2d, Indians,Sec. 59[1995 ed.].
178 An allotment of Indian land contains restrictions on alienation of the land. These restrictions extend to a devise of the land by will—
Missouri, K. & T R. Co. v. U.S., 235 U.S. 37, 59 L. Ed. 116, 35 S. Ct. 6 [1914]; A railroad land grant that falls within Indian land is null
and void—Northern P. R. Co. v. U.S., 227 U.S. 355, 57 L. Ed. 544, 33 S. Ct. 368 [1913]; Portions of Indian land necessary for a railroad
right of way were, by the terms of the treaty, declared “public land,” implying that land beyond the right of way was private—Kindred v.
Union P.R. Co., 225 U.S. 582, 56 L. Ed. 1216, 32 S. Ct. 780 [1912]; see also 41 Am Jur 2d, Indians,Sec. 58 [1995 ed.].
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179
main. On the other hand, an180Indian reservation is a part of the public domain set apart for the use and
occupation of a tribe of Indians. Once set apart by proper authority, the reservation ceases to be public land,
and until the Indian title is extinguished,
181
no one but Congress can initiate any preferential right on, or restrict
the nation’s power to dispose of,them.
The American
182
judiciary struggled for more than 200 years with the ancestral land claims of indigenous
Americans. And two things are clear. First, aboriginal title is recognized. Second, indigenous property
systems are also recognized. From a legal
183
point of view, certain benefits can be drawn from a comparison of
Philippine IPs to native Americans. Despite the similarities between native title and aboriginal title,
however, there are at present some misgivings on whether jurisprudence on American Indians may be cited
authoritatively in the Philippines. The U.S. recognizes the possessory rights of the Indians over their land;
title to the land, however, is deemed to have passed to the U.S. as successor of the discoverer. The aboriginal
184
title of ownership is not specifically recognized as ownership by action authorized by Congress. The
protection of aboriginal title merely guards against encroachment
_______________
179 Aboriginal Title to Indian Lands, supra, at Sec. 2[a], p. 433.
180 42 C.J.S. Indians,Sec. 29 [1944 ed.]
181 Ibid.
182 North American Indians have made much progress in establishing a relationship with the national government and developing
their own laws. Some have their own government-recognized constitutions. Usually the recognition of Indian tribes depends on whether
the tribe has a reservation. North American tribes have reached such an advanced stage that the main issues today evolve around
complex jurisdictional and litigation matters. Tribes have acquired the status of sovereign nations within another nation, possessing the
right to change and grow—Jose Paulo Kastrup, The Internationalization of Indigenous Rights from the Environmental and Human Rights
Perspective, Texas International Law Journal, vol. 32:97, 104[1997].
183 Lynch, Native Title, supra, at 293.
184 Dante Gatmaytan, Ancestral Domain Recognition in the Philippines: Trends in Jurisprudence and Legislation, 5 Phil. Nat. Res. L.J.
No. 1, pp. 43, 40 [Aug. 1992]; see also Tee Hit Ton Indians v. U.S., supra, at 320.
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185
by persons other than the Federal Government. Although 186
there are criticisms against the refusal to
recognize the native Americans’187ownership of these lands, the power of the State to extinguish these titles
has remainedfirmly entrenched.
Under the IPRA, 188
the Philippine State is not barred form asserting sovereignty over the ancestral domains
and ancestral lands. The IPRA, however, is still in its infancy and any similarities between its application in
the Philippines vis-à-vis American Jurisprudence on aboriginal title will depend on the peculiar facts of each
case.
(c) Why theCariño doctrine is unique
In the Philippines, the concept of native title first upheld in Cariño and enshrined in the IPRA grants
ownership, albeit in limited form, of the land to the ICCs/IPs. Native title presumes that the land is private
and was never public. Cariño is the only case that specifically and categorically recognizes native title. The long
line of cases citing Cariño did not touch on native title and the private character of ancestral domains and
lands. Cariño was cited by the succeeding cases to support the concept of acquisitive prescription under the
Public Land Act which is a different matter
_______________
185 Ibid.
186 D. Gatmaytan, supra, citing Churchill, The Earth is Our Mother-Struggles for American Indian Land and Liberation in the
Contemporary United States, The State of Native America: Genocide, Colonization and Resistance 139 (M. Jaimes 1992); and Indian Law
Resource Center, United States Denial of Indian Property Rights: A Study in Lawless Power and Racial Discrimination, Rethinking
Indian Law 15 (National Lawyers Guild, Committee on Native American Struggles 1982).
187 Id., Note 28, stating that some earlier decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court have held that Congress is subject to the strictures of the
Constitution in dealing with Indians. When Indian property is taken for non-Indian use, the U.S. government is liable for payment of
compensation, and an uncompensated taking may be enjoined. F. Cohen, Handbook of Federal Indian Law 217 [1982], citing Shoshone
Tribe v. U.S.299 U.S. 476 [1937]; Choate v. Trapp, 224 U.S. 665 [1912]; and Lane v. Pueblo of Santa Rosa, 249 U.S. 110 [1919].
188 See Discussion,infra,Part IV (c) (2).
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altogether. Under the Public Land Act, land sought to be registered must be public agricultural land. When
the conditions specified in Section 48 [b] of the Public Land Act are complied 189
with, the possessor of the land is
deemed to have 190 acquired, by191operation of law, a right to a grant of the land. The land ceases to be part of the
public domain, ipso jure, and is converted to private property by the mere lapseor completionof
theprescribed statutoryperiod. 192
It was only in the case of Oh Cho v. Director of Lands that the court declared that the rule that all lands
that were not acquired from the government, either by purchase or grant, belong to the public domain has an
exception. This exception would be any land that should have been in the possession of an occupant and of his
predecessors-in-interest since time immemorial. It is this kind of possession that would justify the
presumption that the land had 193
never been part of the public domain or that it had been private property even
before the Spanish conquest. Oh Cho,however, was decided under the provisions of the Public Land Act
and Cariño was cited to support the applicant’s claim of acquisitive prescription under the said Act.
All these years, Cariño had been quoted out of context simply to justify long, continuous, open and adverse
possession in the concept of owner of public agricultural land. It is this long, 194
continuous, open and adverse
possession in the concept
195
of owner of thirty years both for ordinary citizens and members of the national
cultural minorities that converts the land from public into private and entitles the registrant to a Torrens
certificate of title.
_______________
189 Susi v. Razon, 48 Phil. 424 [1925]; Herico v. Dar, 95 SCRA 437[1980].
190 Ibid.
191 Director of Lands v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 146 SCRA 509[1986]; Director of Lands v. Buyco, 216 SCRA 78 [1992]; Republic
v. Court of Appeals and 235 SCRA 567 [1994].
192 75 Phil. 890 [1946].
193 Id.at 892.
194 Sec. 48 [b], CA 141.
195 Sec. 48 [c], CA. 141, as amended. This provision was added in 1964 by R.A. 3872.
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(3) The Option of Securing a Torrens Title to the Ancestral Land Indicates that the Land is Private.
The private character of ancestral lands and domains as laid down in the IPRA is further strengthened by the
option given to individual ICCs/IPs over their individually-owned ancestral lands. For purposes of registration
under the Public Land Act and the Land Registration Act, the IPRA expressly converts ancestral land into
public agricultural land which may be disposed of by the State. The necessary implication is that ancestral
land is private. It, however, has to be first converted to public agricultural land simply for registration
purposes. To wit:
“Sec. 12. Option to Secure Certificate of Title Under Commonwealth Act 141, as amended, or the Land Registration Act 496.
—Individual members of cultural communities, with respect to their individually-owned ancestral lands who, by
themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest, have been in continuous possession and occupation of the same in the
concept of owner since time immemorial or for a period of not less than thirty (30) years immediately preceding the
approval of this Act and uncontested by the members of the same ICCs/IPs shall have the option to secure title to their
ancestral lands under the provisions of CommonwealthAct 141, as amended,or theLand Registration Act 496.
For this purpose, said individually-owned ancestral lands, which are agricultural in character and actually used for
agricultural, residential, pasture, and tree farming purposes, including those with a slope of eighteen percent (18%) or
more, are hereby classified as alienable and disposable agriculturallands. 196
The option granted under this section shall be exercised within twenty (20)years from the approval of this Act.”
ICCs/IPs are given the option to secure a Torrens certificate of title over their individually-owned ancestral
lands. This option is limited to ancestral lands only, not domains, and such lands must be individually,not
communally, owned.
Ancestral lands that are owned by individual members of ICCs/IPs who, by themselves or through their
predecessors-in-interest, have been in continuous possession and occupation of the
_______________
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197
same in the concept of owner since time immemorial or for a period of not less than 30 years, which claims
are uncontested by the members of the same ICCs/IPs, may be registered under CA. 141, otherwise known as
the Public Land Act, or Act 496, the Land Registration Act. For purposes of registration, the
individuallyowned ancestral lands are classified as alienable and disposable agricultural lands of the public
domain, provided, they are agricultural in character and are actually used for agricultural, residential,
pasture and tree farming purposes. These lands shall be classified as public agricultural lands regardless of
whether they have a slopeof 18% or more.
The classification of ancestral land as public agricultural land is in compliance with the requirements of the
Public Land Act and 198
the Land Registration Act. CA. 141, the Public Land Act, deals specifically with lands of
the public domain. Its provisions apply to those lands “declared open to disposition or concession” xxx “which
have not been reserved for public or quasi-public purposes, nor appropriated by the Government, nor in any
manner become private property, nor those on which a private right authorized and recognized199by this Act or
any other valid law x xx or which having been reserved or appropriated, have ceased to be so.” Act 496, the
Land Registration Act, allows registration only of private lands and public agricultural lands. Since ancestral
domains and lands are private, if the ICC/IP wants to avail of the benefits of CA. 141 and Act 496, the IPRA
itself200converts his ancestral land, regardless of whether the land has a slope of eighteen per cent (18%) or
over, fromprivate to publicagricultural land forproperdisposition.
_______________
197 “Time immemorial” refers “to a period of time when as far back as memory can go, certain ICCs/IPs are known to have occupied,
possessed in the concept of owner, and utilized a defined territory devolved to them, by operation of customary law or inherited from their
ancestors, in accordance with their customs and traditions.” (Sec. 3 [p], IPRA).
198 Section 2, CA. 141.
199 Section 8, CA. 141.
200 The classification of ancestral lands 18% in slope or over as alienable in the IPRA is an exception to Section 15, P.D. 705, the
Revised Forestry Code.
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The option to register land under the Public Land Act and the Land Registration Act has nonetheless a limited
period. This option must be exercised within twenty (20) years from October 29, 1997, the dateof approvalof
theIPRA.
Thus, ancestral lands and ancestral domains are not part of the lands of the public domain. They are private
and belong to the ICCs/IPs. Section 3 of Article XII on National Economy and Patrimony of the 1987
Constitution classifies lands of the public domain into four categories: (a) agricultural, (b) forest or timber, (c)
mineral lands, and (d) national parks. Section 5 of the same Article XII mentions ancestral lands and ancestral
domains but it does not classify them under any of the said four categories. To classify them as public lands
under any one of the four classes will render the entire IPRA law a nullity. The spirit of the IPRA lies in the
distinct concept of ancestral domains and ancestral lands. The IPRA addresses the major problem of the 201
ICCs/IPs which is loss of land. Land and space are of vital concern in terms of sheer survival of theICCs/IPs.
The 1987 Constitution mandates the State to “protect the rights of indigenous cultural communities to their
ancestral lands” and that “Congress provide 202
for the applicability of customary laws x x x in determining the
ownership and extent of ancestral domain.” It is the recognition of the ICCs/IPs distinct rights of ownership
over their ancestral domains and lands that breathes life into this constitutional mandate.
Registration under the Public Land Act and Land Registration Act recognizes the concept of ownership under
the civil law. This ownership is based on adverse possession for a specified period, and harkens to Section 44
of the Public Land Act on administrative
_______________
201 Charles MacDonald, Indigenous Peoples of the Philippines: Between Segregation and Integration, Indigenous Peoples of Asia, supra,
at pp. 345, 350.

202 Section 5, ArticleXII, 1987 Constitution.
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legalization (free patent) of imperfect or incomplete titles and Section 48 (b) and (c) of the same Act on the
judicial confirmation of imperfector incomplete titles. Thus:
“Sec. 44. Any natural-born citizen of the Philippines who is not the owner of more than twenty-four hectares and who since
July fourth, 1926 or prior thereto, has continuously occupied and cultivated, either by himself or through his predecessors-
in-interest, a tract or tracts of agricultural public lands subject to disposition, or who shall have paid the real estate tax
thereon while the same has not been occupied by any person shall be entitled, under the provisions of this chapter, to have
a free patent issued to him for such tract or tracts of such land not to exceed twenty-four hectares.
A member of the national cultural minorities who has continuously occupied and cultivated, either by himself or through
his predecessors-in-interest, a tract or tracts of land, whether disposable or not since July 4, 1955, shall be entitled to the
right granted in the preceding paragraph of this section: Provided, That at the time he files his free patent
203
application he is
not the owner of any real property secured or disposable under the provision of the Public Land Law.
x x x.
“Sec. 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines, occupying lands of the public domain or claiming to own
any such lands or an interest therein, but whose titles have not been perfected or completed, may apply to the Court of
First Instance of the province where the land is located for confirmation of their claims and the issuance of a certificate of
titletherefor, under theLand Registration Act,to wit:
(a) [perfectionofSpanish titles] x x x.

(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and
notorious possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona fide claim of
acquisition or ownership, for at least thirty years immediately preceding the filing of the application for
confirmation of title except when prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be conclusively presumed to have
performed all the conditions essential to a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the
provisions of this Chapter.
_______________
203 Words in italics were amendments introduced by R.A. 3872 in 1964.
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(c) Members of the national cultural minorities who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in
open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of lands of the public domain suitable to
agriculture, whether disposable or not, under 204
a bona fide claim of ownership for at least 30 years shall be entitled to
the rights granted in sub-section (b) hereof.”
Registration under the foregoing provisions presumes that the land was originally public agricultural land but
because of adverse possession since July 4, 1955 (free patent) or at least thirty years (judicial confirmation),
the land has become private. Open, adverse, public and continuous possession is sufficient, provided, the
possessor makes proper application therefor. The possession has to be confirmed judicially or administratively
after which a Torrens title is issued.
A Torrens title recognizes the owner whose name appears in the certificate as entitled to all the rights of
ownership under the civil law. The Civil Code of the Philippines defines ownership in Articles 427, 428 and
429. This concept is based on Roman Law which the Spaniards introduced to the Philippines through the Civil
Code of 1889. Ownership, under Roman Law, may be exercised over things or rights. It primarily includes the
right of the owner to enjoy and dispose of the thing owned.205And the right to enjoy and dispose of the 206 thing
includes the right to receive from the thing what it produces, the right to207consume the thing by its use, the
right to alienate, encumber, transform or even destroy the thing owned, and the right to exclude from 208
the
possession of the thing owned by any other person to whom the owner has not transmitted such thing.
_______________
204 Words in italics were amendments introduced by R.A. 3872 on June 18, 1964. On January 25, 1977, however, Sec. 48 [b] and 48 [c]
were further amended by P.D. 1073 stating that these provisions on cultural minorities apply only to alienable and disposable lands of the
public domain—Please seeRepublic v. CA and Paran, 201 SCRA 1, 10-11 [1991].
205 Jus utendi, jus fruendi.
206 Jus abutendi.
207 Jus disponendi.
208 Jus vindicandi. Please see Tolentino, Civil Code, vol. II, pp. 45-46 [1992]; see also Tolentino, vol. I, pp. 12-14.
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1. The indigenous Conceptof Ownershipand Customary Law.
Ownership of ancestral domains by native title does not entitle the ICC/IP to a torrens title but to a Certificate
of Ancestral Domain Title (CADT). The CADT formally recognizes the indigenous concept of ownership of the
ICCs/IPs over their ancestral domain. Thus:
“Sec. 5. Indigenous concept of ownership:—Indigenous concept of ownership sustains the view that ancestral domains and
all resources found therein shall serve as the material bases of their cultural integrity. The indigenous concept of
ownership generally holds that ancestral domains are the ICCs/IPs private but community property which belongs to all
generations and therefore cannot be sold, disposed or destroyed. It likewise covers sustainable traditional resource rights.”
The right of ownership and possession of the ICCs/IPs to their ancestral domains is held under the indigenous
concept of ownership. This concept maintains the view that ancestral domains are the ICCs/IPs private but
community property. It is private simply because it is not part of the public domain. But its private character
ends there. The ancestral domain is owned in common by the ICCs/IPs and not by one particular person. The
IPRA itself provides209
that areas within the ancestral domains, whether delineated or not, are presumed to be
communally 210
held. These communal rights, however, are not exactly the same as co-ownership rights under the
Civil Code. Co-ownership gives any co-owner the right to demand partition of the property held in common.
The Civil Code expressly provides that “[n]o co-owner shall be obliged to remain in the co-ownership.” Each 211
co-
owner may demand at any time the partition of the thing in common, insofar as his share is concerned. To
allow such a right over ancestral domains may be
_______________
209 Sec. 55, IPRA provides: “Sec. 55. Communal rights.—Subject to Section 56 hereof, areas within the ancestral domains, whether
delineated or not, shall be presumed to be communally held: Provided, That communal rights under this Act shall not be construed as co-
ownership as provided in Republic Act No. 386, otherwise knownas the New Civil Code “
210 Ibid.
211 Article 494,Civil Code.
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212
destructive not only of customary law of the community but of the very community itself.
Communal rights over land are not the same as corporate rights over real property, much less corporate
condominium rights. A corporation can exist 213
only for a maximum of fifty (50) years subject to an extension of
another fifty214years in any single instance. Every stockholder has the right to disassociate215himself from the
corporation. Moreover, the corporation itself may be dissolved voluntarily or involuntarily.
Communal rights to the land are held not only by the present possessors of the land but extends to all
generations of the ICCs/IPs, past, present and future, to the domain. This is the reason why the ancestral
domain must be kept within the ICCs/IPs themselves. The domain cannot be transferred, sold or conveyed to
other persons.It belongs to the ICCs/IPs as a community.
Ancestral lands are also held under the indigenous concept of ownership. The lands are communal. These
lands, however, may be transferred subject to the following limitations: (a) only to the members of the same
ICCs/IPs; (b) in accord with customary laws and traditions; and (c) subject to the right of redemption of the
ICCs/IPs for a period of 15 years if the land was transferred to a non-member of the ICCs/IPs.
Following the constitutional mandate that “customary 216law govern property rights or relations in
determining the ownership and extent of ancestral domains,” the IPRA, by legislative
217
fiat, introduces a new
concept of ownership. This is a concept that has long existed under customary law.
_______________
212 Antonio M. La Vina, Arguments for Communal Title, Part II, 2
Phil. Nat. Res. L. J. 23 [Dec. 1989].

213 Section 11, Corporation Code.
214 Sections 60-72, Corporation Code.
215 Section 117, Corporation Code. Please see also La Vina, Arguments for Communal Title, Part II, supra, at 23.
216 Section 5, par. 2, Article XII, 1987 Constitution.
217 Customary law is recognized by the Local Government Code of 1991 in solving disputes among members of the indigenous
communities, viz.:
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Custom,
218
from which customary law is derived, is also recognized under the Civil Code as a source of
law. Some articles of 219
the Civil Code expressly provide that custom should be applied in cases where no codal
provision is applicable. In other words, in the absence
220
of any applicable provision in the Civil Code, custom,
when dulyproven, candefine rights and liabilities.
Customary law is a primary, not secondary, source of rights under the IPRA and uniquely applies to
ICCs/IPs. Its recognition does not depend on the absence of a specific provision in the civil law. The indigenous
concept of ownership under customary law is specifically acknowledged
221
and recognized, and coexists with the
civil law concept and the laws on land titling andland registration.
_______________
“Sec. 412 (c). Conciliation among members of indigenous cultural communities.—The customs and traditions of indigenous cultural
communities shall be applied in settling disputes between members of theculturalcommunities.”
218 Law writes custom into contract—Hongkong & Shanghai Bank v. Peters, 16 Phil. 284 [1910].
The Civil Code provides:

“Art. 11. Customs which are contrary to law, public order or public policy shall not becountenanced.”
“Art. 12 A custom must be proved as a fact, according to the rules of evidence.”
219 Article 78 on marriages between Mohammedans or pagans who live in the non-Christian provinces—this is now Art. 33 of the
Family Code; Art. 118, now Art. 74 of the Family Code on property relations between spouses; Art. 577 on the usufructuary of woodland;
Art. 657 on easement of right of way for passage of livestock; Arts. 678, 1315, 1376, 1522, 1564 and 1577.Please seeAquino, Civil Code, vol.
1, p. 25.
220 Castle Bros. v. Gutierrez Hermanos, 11 Phil. 629 [1908]; In Re: Firm Name of Ozaeta Romulo, 92 SCRA 1 [1979]; Yao Kee v. Sy-
Gonzales, 167 SCRA 736 [1988]; Please see Aquino, Civil Code, vol. 1, p. 26 for a list of other cases.
221 This situation is analogous to the Muslim Code or the Code of Muslim Personal Laws (P.D. 1083) which took effect on February 4,
1977 despite the effectivity of the Civil Code and the Family Code. P.D. 1083 governs persons, family relations and succession among
Muslims, the adjudication and settlement of disputes, the organization of the Shari’a courts, etc.
225
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To be sure, the indigenous concept of ownership exists even without a paper title. The CADT is merely a “formal
recognition” of native title. This is clear from Section11of theIPRA, to wit:
“Sec. 11. Recognition of Ancestral Domain Rights.—The rights of ICCs/IPs to their ancestral domains by virtue of Native
Title shall be recognized and respected. Formal recognition, when solicited by ICCs/IPs concerned shall be embodied in a
Certificate of Ancestral Domain Title, which shall recognize the title of the concerned ICCs/IPs over the territories
identified and delineated.”
The moral import of ancestral domain, native land or being native is “belongingness” to the land, being people
of the land—by sheer force of having sprung from the land since time beyond recall, and the faithful nurture of
the land by the sweat of one’s brow. This is fidelity of usufructuary relation to the land—the possession of
stewardship through perduring, intimate tillage, and222the mutuality of blessings between man and land; from
man, care for land; fromthe land, sustenance for man.
1. The Rights of ICCs/IPs Over Their Ancestral Domains and Lands
The IPRA grants the ICCs/IPs several rights over their ancestral domains and ancestral lands. Section 7
provides for the rights over ancestraldomains:
“Sec. 7. Rights to Ancestral Domains.—The rights of ownership and possession of ICCs/IPs to their ancestral domains shall
be recognized and protected. Such rights include:
_______________
222 Mariflor P. Pagusara, The Kalinga Ili: Cultural-Ecological Reflections on Indigenous Theora and Praxis of Man-Nature
Relationship,Dakami Ya Nan Dagami, p. 36, Papers and Proceedings of the 1st Cordillera Multi-Sectoral Land Congress, 11-14 March
1983, Cordillera Consultative Committee [1984].
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a) Right of Ownership.—The right to claim ownership over lands, bodies of water traditionally and
actually occupied by ICCs/IPs, sacred places, traditional hunting and fishing grounds, and all
improvements made by them at any time within the domains;
b) Right to Develop Lands and Natural Resources.—Subject to Section 56 hereof, the right to develop,
control and use lands and territories traditionally occupied, owned, or used; to manage and conserve
natural resources within the territories and uphold the responsibilities for future generations; to benefit
and share the profits from allocation and utilization of the natural resources found therein; the right to
negotiate the terms and conditions for the exploration of natural resources in the areas for the purpose of
ensuring ecological, environmental protection and the conservation measures, pursuant to national and
customary laws; the right to an informed and intelligent participation in the formulation and
implementation of any project, government or private, that will affect or impact upon the ancestral
domains and to receive just and fair compensation for any damages which they may sustain as a result
of the project; and the right to effective measures by the government to prevent any interference with,
alienation and encroachment upon these rights;
c) Right to Stay in the Territories.—The right to stay in the territory and not to be removed therefrom. No
ICCs/IPs will be relocated without their free and prior informed consent, nor through any means other
than eminent domain, x x x;
d) Right in Case of Displacement.—In case displacement occurs as a result of natural catastrophes, the
State shall endeavor to resettle the displaced ICCs/IPs in suitable areas where they can have
temporary life support systems: x x x;
e) Right to Regulate the Entry of Migrants.—Right to regulate the entry of migrant settlers and
organizations into their domains;
f) Right to Safe and Clean Air and Water.—For this purpose, the ICCs/IPs shall have access to integrated
systems for the management of their inland waters and air space;
g) Right to Claim Parts of Reservations.—The right to claim parts of the ancestral domains which have
been reserved for various purposes, except those reserved and intended for common and public welfare
and service;
h) Right to Resolve Conflict.—Right to resolve land conflicts in accordance with customary laws of the
area where the land is located, and only in default thereof shall the complaints be submitted to
amicable settlement and to the Courts of Justice whenever necessary.”
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Section 8 provides for the rights over ancestral lands:

“Sec. 8. Rights to Ancestral Lands.—The right of ownership and possession of the ICCs/IPs to their ancestral lands shall he
recognized and protected.
a) Right to transfer land/property.—Such right shall include the right to transfer land or property rights to/among
members of the same ICCs/IPs, subject to customary laws and traditions of the community concerned.
b) Right to Redemption.—In cases where it is shown that the transfer of land/property rights by virtue of any
agreement or devise, to a non-member of the concerned ICCs/IPs is tainted by the vitiated consent of the ICCs/IPs,
or is transferred for an unconscionable consideration or price, the transferor ICC/IP shall have the right to redeem
the same within a period not exceeding fifteen (15) years from the date of transfer.”
Section 7 (a) defines the ICCs/IPs right of ownership over their ancestral domains which covers (a) lands, (b)
bodies of water traditionally and actually occupied by the ICCs/IPs, (c) sacred places, (d) traditional hunting
and fishing grounds, and (e) all improvements made by them at any time within the domains. The right of
ownership includes the following rights: (a) the right to develop lands and natural resources; (b) the right to
stay in the territories; (c) the right to resettlement in case of displacement; (d) the right to regulate the entry
of migrants; (e) the right to safe and clean air and water; (f) the right to claim parts of the ancestral domains
as reservations; and (g) the right to resolve conflict in accordance with customary laws.
Section 8 governs their rights to ancestral lands. Unlike ownership over the ancestral domains, Section 8
gives the ICCs/IPs also the right to transfer the land or property rights to members of the same ICCs/IPs or
non-members thereof. This is in keeping with the option given to ICCs/IPs to secure a Torrens title over the
ancestral lands,but notto domains.
2. The Right of ICCs/IPs to Develop Lands and Natural Resources Within the Ancestral Domains Does
Not Deprive the State of Ownership Over the Natural Resources and Control and Supervision in their
Development and Exploitation.
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The Regalian doctrine on the ownership, management and utilization of natural resources is declared in
Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution, viz.:
“Sec. 2. All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential
exception of agricultural lands, all other natural resources shall not be alienated. The exploration, development, and
undertake such activities, or, it may enter into coproduction, joint venture, or production-sharing agreements with Filipino
industrial uses other than the development of water power, beneficial use maybe themeasure and limit of the grant.
The State shall protect the nation’s marine wealth in its archipelagic waters, territorial sea, and exclusive economic
zone, and reserve its use and enjoymentexclusivelyto Filipino citizens.
The Congress may, by law, allow small-scale utilization of natural resources by Filipino citizens, as well as cooperative
fish farming, with priority to subsistence fishermen and fishworkers in rivers, lakes, bays, and lagoons.
The President may enter into agreements with foreign-owned corporations involving either technical or financial
assistance for large-scale exploration, development, and utilization of minerals, petroleum, and other mineral oils according
to the general terms and conditions provided by law, based on real contributions to the economic growth and general
welfare of the country. In such agreements, the state shall promote the development and useof local scientific and
technical resources.
The President shall notify
223
the Congress of every contract entered into in accordance with this provision, within thirty
days from its execution.”
_______________
223 Section 2, Article XII.
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All lands of the public domain and all natural resources—waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral
oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural
resources—are owned by the State. The Constitution provides that in the exploration, development and
utilization of these natural resources, the State exercises full control and supervision, and may undertake the
same in four (4) modes:
1. The State maydirectlyundertake such activities; or
2. The State may enter into co-production, joint venture or production-sharing agreements with Filipinocitizensor
qualified corporations;
3. Congress may, by law, allow small-scale utilization of natural resources by Filipino citizens;
4. For the large-scale exploration, development and utilization of minerals, petroleum and other mineral oils, the
President may enter into agreements with foreign-owned corporations involving technical or financial assistance.
As owner of the natural resources, the State is accorded primary power and responsibility in the exploration,
development and utilization of these natural resources. The State may directly undertake the exploitation
224
and
development
225
by itself, or, it may allow participation
226
by the private sector through coproduction, joint
venture, or production-sharing agreements. These agreements may be for a period of 25 years, renewable
for another 25 years. The
_______________
224 A “co-production agreement” is defined as one wherein the government provides input to the mining operation other than the
mineral resource—Section 26 (b), R.A. 7942, the Philippine Mining Act of 1995.
225 A “joint venture agreement” is one where a joint-venture company is organized by the government and the contractor with both
parties having equity shares, and the government entitled to a share in the gross output—Section26 (c), R.A. 7942.
226 A mineral “production-sharing agreement” is one where the government grants to the contractor the exclusive right to conduct
mining operations within a contract area and shares in the gross output. The contractor provides the financing, technology, management
and personnel necessary for the implementation of the agreementr-Section 26 (a), R.A. 7942.
230

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State, through Congress, may allow the small-scale utilization of natural resources by Filipino citizens. For
the large-scale exploration of these resources, specifically minerals, petroleum and other mineral oils, the
State, through the President, may enter into technical and financial assistance agreements with foreign-
owned corporations.
Under the Philippine Mining Act of 1995, (R.A. 7942) and the People’s Small-Scale Mining Act of 1991 (R.A.
7076) the three
227
types of agreements, i.e., coproduction,
228
joint venture or production-sharing, may apply to both
large-scale and small-scale mining. “Small-scale mining” refers to “mining activities which rely heavily229on
manual labor using simple implements and methods and do not use explosivesor heavy mining equipment.”
Examining the IPRA, there is nothing in the law that grants to the ICCs/IPs ownership over the natural
resources within their ancestral domains. The right of ICCs/IPs in their ancestral domains includes ownership,
but this “ownership” is expressly defined and limited in Section 7 (a)as:
“Sec. 7. (a) Right of ownership—The right to claim ownership over lands, bodies of water traditionally and actually
occupied by ICCs/IPs, sacred places, traditional hunting and fishing grounds, and all improvements made bythem at
anytimewithin the domains”;
The ICCs/IPs are given the right to claim ownership over “lands, bodies of water traditionally and actually
occupied by ICCs/IPs, sacred places, traditional hunting and fishing grounds, and all improvements made by
them at any time within the domains.” It will be noted that this enumeration does not mention bodies of water
not occupied by the ICCs/IPs, minerals, coal, wildlife, flora
_______________
227 Section 26, R.A. 7942.
228 Section 3 [d], People’s Small-Scale Mining Act of 1991 (R.A. 7076) provides:
“Sec. 3 [d] ‘Small-scale mining contract’ refers to coproduction, joint venture or mineral production sharing agreement between the
State and a small-scale mining contractor for the small-scale utilization of a plot of mineral land.”
229 Section 3 [b], R.A. 7076.
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and fauna in the traditional hunting grounds, fish in the traditional fishing grounds, forests or timber in the
sacred places, etc. and all other natural resources found within the ancestral domains. Indeed, the right of
ownership under Section 7 (a) does not cover “waters, minerals, coal, petroleum and other mineral oils, all
forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna and all other natural resources”
enumerated in Section 2,Article XII of the 1987 Constitution asbelonging to the State.
The non-inclusion of ownership by the ICCs/IPs over the natural resources in Section7(a) complies with
theRegaliandoctrine.
(a) Section 1, Part II, Rule III of the Implementing Rules Goes Beyond the Parameters of Sec. 7 (a) of the
IPRA And is Unconstitutional.
230
The Rules Implementing the IPRA in Section 1, Part II, Rule III reads:
“Section 1. Rights of Ownership.—ICCs/IPs have rights of ownership over lands, waters, and natural resources and all
improvements made by them at any time within the ancestral domains/lands. These rights shall include, but not limited
to, the right over the fruits, the right to possess, the right to use, right to consume, right to exclude and right to recover
ownership, and the rights or interests over land and natural resources. The right to recover shall be particularly applied to
lands lost through fraud or any form or vitiated consent or transferred for an unconscionable price.”
Section 1 of the Implementing Rules gives the ICCs/IPs rights of ownership over “lands, waters and natural resources.”
The term “natural resources” is not one of those expressly mentioned in Section 7 (a) of the law. Our Constitution and
jurisprudence clearly declare that the right to claim ownership 231 over land does not necessarily include the right to claim
ownership over the natural resources found on or under the land. The IPRA itself makes a
_______________
230 NCIP Administrative Order No. 1, Series of 1998.
231 In Republicv. Court of Appeals, 160 SCRA 228, 239 [1988], Cruz, J., ponente,it was declared that if a person is the owner of a piece of agricultural
land on which minerals are discovered, his ownership of such land does not give him the right to extract or utilize the said minerals
232

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distinction between land and natural resources. Section 7 (a) speaks of the right of ownership only over the land within the
ancestral domain. It is Sections 7 (b) and 57 of the law that speak of natural resources, and these provisions, as shall be
discussed later, do not give the ICCs/IPs the rightof ownership over these resources.
The constitutionality of Section 1, Part II, Rule III of the Implementing Rules was not specifically and
categorically challenged
232
by petitioners. Petitioners actually assail the constitutionality of the Implementing
Rules in general. Nevertheless, to avoid any confusion in the implementation of the law, it is necessary to
declare that the inclusion of “natural resources” in Section 1, Part II, Rule III of the Implementing Rules goes
beyond the parameters of Section 7 (b) of the law and is contrary to Section 2, Article XII of the 1987
Constitution.
(a) The Small-Scale Utilization of Natural Resources In Sec. 7 (b) of the IPRA Is Allowed Under Paragraph
3, Section 2 of Article XII of the Constitution.
Ownership over natural resources remain with the State and the IPRA in Section 7 (b) merely grants the
ICCs/IPs the right to manage them, viz.:
“Sec. 7 (b) Right to Develop Lands and Natural Resources.—Subject to Section 56 hereof, right to develop, control and use
lands and territories traditionally occupied, owned, or used; to manage and conserve natural resources within the
territories and uphold the responsibilities for future generations; to benefit and share the profits from allocation and
utilization of the natural resources found therein; the right to negotiate the terms and conditions for the exploration of
natural resources in the areas for the purpose of ensuring ecological, environmental protection and the conservation
measures, pursuant to national and customary laws; the right to an informed and intelligent participation in the
formulation and implementation of any project, government or private, that will affect or impact upon the ancestral
domains and to receive just and fair compensa-without the permission of the State to which such minerals belong—also
cited in H. de Leon, Phil. Constitutional Law, Principles and Cases, vol. 2, pp. 800-801 [1999].
_______________
232 See Ground I, Grounds to Issue Writ of Prohibition, Petition, p. 14.
233
VOL. 347, DECEMBER 6, 2000 233

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tion for any damages which they may sustain as a result of the project; and the right to effective measures by the
government to prevent any interference with, alienation and encroachment upon these rights”;
The right to develop lands and natural resources under Section 7 (b) ofthe IPRA enumerates the following
rights:
a) the right to develop, control and use lands and territoriestraditionally occupied;
b) the right to manage and conserve natural resources within the territoriesand uphold the responsibilities for future
generations;
c) the right to benefit and share the profits from the allocation and utilization of thenatural resources found therein;
d) the right to negotiate the terms and conditions for the exploration of natural resources for the purpose of ensuring
ecological, environmental protection and the conservation measures, pursuant to national and customarylaws;
e) the right to an informed and intelligent participation in the formulation and implementation of any project,
government or private, that will affect or impact upon the ancestral domains and to receive just and fair
compensation for any damages which they may sustain as a result of the project;
f) the right to effective
233
measures by the government to prevent any interference with, alienation andencroachment
upon these rights.
Ownership over the natural resources in the ancestral domains remains with the State and the ICCs/IPs are
merely granted the right to “manage and conserve” them for future generations, “benefit and share” the profits
from their allocation and utilization, and “negotiate the terms and conditions for their exploration” for the
purpose of “ensuring ecological and environmental protection and
_______________
233 Section 7 (b) is subject to Section 56 of the same law which provides:
“Sec. 56. Existing Property Rights Regimes.—Property rights within the ancestral domains already existing and/or vested upon
effectivity of this Act, shallbe recognized and respected.”
The law took effect 15 days upon publication in the O.G. or in any 2 newspapers of general circulation (Sec. 84, IPRA). The IPRA was
published in the Chronicle and Malaya on Nov. 7, 1997.
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conservation measures.” It must be noted that the right to negotiate the terms and conditions over the natural
resources covers only their exploration which must be for the purpose of ensuring ecological and
environmental protection of, and conservation measures in the ancestral domain. It does not extend to the
exploitation and development ofnatural resources.
Simply stated, the ICCs/IPs’ rights over the natural resources take the form of management or
stewardship. For the ICCs/IPs may use these resources and share in the profits of their utilization or negotiate
the terms for their exploration. At the same time, however, the ICCs/IPs must ensure that the natural
resources within their ancestral domains are conserved for future generations and that the “utilization” 234
of
these resources must not harm the ecology and environment pursuant tonationaland customary laws.
The limited rights of “management and use” in Section 7 (b) must be taken to contemplate small-scale
utilization of natural resources as distinguished from large-scale. Small-scale utilization of natural resources is
expressly allowed in the third paragraph of Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution “in recognition of the
plight of forest dwellers, gold panners, marginal fishermen and others similarly
_______________
234 Section 9 of the IPRA also gives the ICCs/IPs the ff. responsibilities overtheir ancestral domains:
a) “ Maintain Ecological Balance.—To preserve, restore, and maintain a balanced ecology in the ancestral domain by protecting the
flora and fauna, watershed areas, and other reserves;
b) Restore Denuded Areas.—To actively initiate, undertake and participate in the reforestation of denuded areas and other
development programs and projects subject tojust and reasonable remuneration;
c) Observe Laws.—To observe and comply with the provisions of this Act and therules and regulations for its
effectiveimplementation.”Section 58 of the same law also mandates that ancestral domains or portions thereof, which are found to
be necessary for critical watersheds, mangroves, wildlife sanctuaries, wilderness, protected areas, forest cover, or reforestation as
determined by appropriate agencies with the full participation of the ICCs/IPs concerned shall be maintained, managed and
developed for such purposes. The ICCs/IPs concerned shall be given the responsibility to maintain, develop, protect and conserve
such areas with thefull and effective assistance of government agencies.
235
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235
situated who exploit our natural resources for their daily sustenance and survival” Section 7 (b) also
expressly mandates the ICCs/IPs to manage and conserve these resources and ensure environmental and
ecological protection within the domains, which duties, by their very nature, necessarily reject utilization in a
large-scale.
(c) The Large-Scale Utilization of Natural Resources In Section 57 of the IPRA Is Allowed Under
Paragraphs 1 and 4, Section 2, Article XII of the1987 Constitution.
Section 57 of the IPRA provides:
“Sec. 57. Natural Resources within Ancestral Domains.—The ICCs/IPs shall have priority rights in the harvesting,
extraction, development or exploitation of any natural resources within the ancestral domains. A non-member of the
ICCs/IPs concerned may be allowed to take part in the development and utilization of the natural resources for a period of
not exceeding twenty-five (25) years renewable for not more than twenty-five (25) years: Provided, That a formal and
written agreement is entered into with the ICCs/IPs concerned or that the community, pursuant to its own decision-
making process, has agreed to allow such operation: Provided finally, That the NCIP may exercise visitorial powers and
take appropriate action to safeguard the rights of the ICCs/IPs under the same contract.”
Section 57 speaks of the “harvesting, extraction, development or exploitation of natural resources within
ancestral domains” and “gives the ICCs/IPs ‘priority rights’ therein.” The terms “harvesting, extraction,
development or exploitation” of any natural resources within the ancestral domains obviously refer to large-
scale utilization. It is utilization not merely236 for subsistence but for commercial or other extensive use that
require technology other than manual labor. The law recognizes the probability of requir-
_______________
235 Hector S. de Leon, Textbook on the New Philippine Constitution pp. 473-474 [1987] citing the 1986 UP Law Constitution Project,
The National Economy and Patrimony, p. 11.

236 Under the Small-Scale Mining Act of 1991, “small-scale mining” refers to “mining activities which rely heavily on manual labor
using
236

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ing a non-member of the ICCs/IPs to participate in the development and utilization of the natural resources
and thereby allows such participation for a period of not more than 25 years, renewable for another 25 years.
This may be done on condition that a formal written agreement be entered into by the non-member and
members of the ICCs/IPs.
Section 57 of the IPRA does not give the ICCs/IPs the right to “manage and conserve” the natural resources.
Instead, the law only grants the ICCs/IPs “priority rights” in the development or exploitation thereof. Priority
means giving preference. Having priority rights over the natural resources does not necessarily mean
ownership rights. The grant of priority rights implies that there is a superior entity that owns these resources
and this entity has the power to grant preferential rights over the resources to whosoever itself chooses.
Section 57 is not a repudiation of the Regalian doctrine. Rather, it is an affirmation of the said doctrine that
all natural resources found within the ancestral domains belong to the State. It incorporates by implication
the Regalian doctrine, hence, requires that the provision be read in the light of 237
Section 2, Article XII of the
1987 Constitution. Interpreting Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution in relation to Section 57 of
IPRA, the State, as owner of these natural resources, may directly undertake the development and exploitation
of the natural resources by itself, or in the alternative, it may recognize the priority rights of the ICCs/IPs as
owners of the land on which the natural resources are found by entering into a co-production, joint venture, or
production-sharing agreement with them. The State may likewise enter into any of said agreements with a non-
member of the ICCs/IPs, whether natural or juridical, or enter into agreements with foreign-owned
corporations involving either technical or financial assistance for the large-scale exploration, development and
utilization of minerals, petroleum, and other mineral oils, or allow such non-member to participate in its
agreement with the ICCs/IPs. If the State decides to enter into an agreement with a non-ICC/IP member, the
National Commis-
_______________
simple implements and methods and do not use explosives or heavy mining equipment”—Section 3 [b],R.A. 7076.
237 See infra.,pp. 77-79.
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sion on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP) shall ensure that the rights of the ICCs/IPs under the agreement shall be
protected. The agreement shall be for a period of 25 years, renewable for another 25 years.
To reiterate, in the large-scale utilization of natural resources within the ancestral domains, the State, as
owner of these resources, has four (4) options: (1) it may, of and by itself, directly undertake the development
and exploitation of the natural resources; or (2) it may recognize the priority rights of the ICCs/IPs by entering
into an agreement with them for such development and exploitation; or (3) it may enter into an agreement with
a non-member of the ICCs/IPs, whether natural or juridical, local or foreign; or (4) it may allow such non-
member to participate in the agreement with the ICCs/IPs.
The rights granted by the IPRA to the ICCs/IPs over the natural resources in their ancestral domains merely
gives the ICCs/IPs, as owners and occupants of the land on which the resources are found, the right to the
small-scale utilization of these resources, and at the same time, a priority in their large-scale development and
exploitation. Section 57 does not mandate the State to automatically give priority to the ICCs/IPs. The State
has several options and it is within its discretion to choose which option to pursue.Moreover, there is nothing in
the law that gives the ICCs/IPs the right to solely undertake the large-scale development of the natural
resources within their domains. The ICCs/IPs must undertake such endeavour always under State supervision
or control. This indicates that the State does not lose control and ownership over the resources even in their
exploitation. Sections 7 (b) and 57 of the law simply give due respect to the ICCs/IPs who, as actual occupants
of the land where the natural resources lie, have traditionally utilized these resources for their subsistence
and survival.
Neither is the State stripped of ownership and control of the natural resources by the following provision:
“Section 59. Certification Precondition.—All departments and other governmental agencies shall henceforth be strictly
enjoined from issuing, renewing or granting any concession, license or lease, or entering into any production-sharing
agreement, without prior certification from the NCIP that the area affected does not overlap with any ancestral domain.
Such certification shall only be issued after a field-based investiga-
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tion is conducted by the Ancestral Domains Office of the area concerned: Provided, That no certification shall be issued by
the NCIP without the free and prior informed and written consent of the ICCs/IPs concerned: Provided, further, That no
department, government agency or government-owned or -controlled corporation may issue new concession, license, lease,
or production sharing agreement while there is a pending application for a CADT: Provided, finally, That the ICCs/IPs
shall have the right to stop or suspend, in accordance with this Act, any project that has not satisfied the requirement of
this consultation process.”
Concessions, licenses, lease or production-sharing agreements for the exploitation of natural resources shall
not be issued, renewed or granted by all departments and government agencies without prior certification
from the NCIP that the area subject of the agreement does not overlap with any ancestral domain. The NCIP
certification shall be issued only after a field-based investigation shall have been conducted and the free and
prior informed written consent of the ICCs/IPs obtained. Non-compliance with the consultation requirement
gives the ICCs/IPs the right to stop or suspend any project granted by any department or government agency.
As its subtitle suggests, this provision requires as a precondition for the issuance of any concession, license
or agreement over natural resources, that a certification be issued by the NCIP that the area subject of the
agreement does not lie within any ancestral domain. The provision does not vest the NCIP with power over
the other agencies of the State as to determine whether to grant or deny any concession or license or
agreement. It merely gives the NCIP the authority to ensure that the ICCs/IPs have been informed of the
agreement and that their consent thereto has been obtained. Note that the certification applies to agreements
over natural resources that do not necessarily lie within the ancestral domains. For those that are found
within the said domains, Sections 7(b) and 57 of the IPRA apply.
V. THE IPRA IS A RECOGNITION OF OUR ACTIVE PARTICIPATION IN THE INDIGENOUS

INTERNATIONAL MOVEMENT.
The indigenous movement can be seen as the heir to a history of anti-imperialism stretching back to
prehistoric times. The move-
239
VOL. 347, DECEMBER 6, 2000 239

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ment received a massive impetus during the 1960’s from two sources. First, the decolonization of Asia and
Africa brought into the limelight the possibility of peoples controlling their own238destinies. Second, the right of
self-determination was enshrined in the UN Declaration on Human Rights. The rise of the civil rights
movement and anti-racism brought to the attention of North American Indians, Aborigines in Australia, and
Maori in New Zealand the possibility of fighting for fundamental rights and freedoms. 239
In 1974 and 1975, international indigenous organizations were founded, and during the 1980’s,
indigenous affairs were on the international agenda. The people of the Philippine Cordillera were the first
Asians to take part in the international indigenous movement. It was the Cordillera People’s Alliance that
carried out successful campaigns against the building of the Chico240
River Dam in 1981-82 and they have since
become one of the best-organized indigenousbodies in the world.
Presently, there is a growing concern for indigenous rights in the international scene. This came as a result
of the increased publicity focused on the continuing disrespect for indigenous human rights and the
destruction of the indigenous
241
peoples’ environment, together with the national governments’ inability to deal
with the situation. Indigenous rights came as a result of both human 242
rights and environmental protection,
and have become a partof today’spriorities for the internationalagenda.
_______________
238 Andrew Gray, The Indigenous Movement in Asia, Indigenous Peoples of Asia, ed. By Barnes, Gray and Kingsbury, pub. By Ass’n, for
Asian Studies,at 35, 42 [1995].

239 E.g. International Indian TreatyCouncil, World Council of IPs.
240 Gray, The Indigenous Movement in Asia, supra, at 44, citing the International Work Group for Indigenous Affairs,1988.
241 Jose Paulo Kastrup, The Internationalization of Indigenous Rights from the Environmental and Human Rights Perspective, 32 Texas
International Law Journal 97, 102 [1997].

242 Benedict Kingsbury, “Indigenous Peoples” in International Law: A Constructivist Approach to the Asian Controversy, The American
Journal of InternationalLaw, vol. 92:414, 429 [1998].
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International institutions and bodies have realized the necessity of applying policies, programs and specific
rules concerning IPs in some nations. The World Bank,
243
for example, first adopted a policy on IPs as a result of
the dismal experience of projects in Latin America. The World Bank now seeks to apply its current policy on
IPs to some of its projects244in Asia. This policy has provided an influential model for the projects of
theAsianDevelopment Bank.
The 1987 Philippine Constitution formally recognizes the existence of ICCs/IPs and declares 245
as a State
policy the promotion of their rights within the framework of national unity and development. 246
The IPRA
amalgamates the Philippine category of ICCs with the international category of IPs, and is heavily
influenced by both the International Labor Organization247
(ILO) Convention 169 and the United Nations (UN)
Draft Declaration on the Rights of IndigenousPeoples.
ILO Convention No.248169 is entitled the “Convention Concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in
Independent Countries” and was adopted on June 27, 1989. It is based on the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the International
Covenant on Civil
249
and Political Rights, and many other international instruments on the prevention of
discrimination. ILO Convention No. 169 revised
_______________
243 The World Bank supported the Chico Dam project. Due to the Kalingas’ opposition, the WB pulled out of the project but the conflict
between the Philippine government and the natives endured long after—Marcus Colchester, Indigenous Peoples’ Rights and Sustainable
Resource Use in South and Southeast Asia, Indigenous Peoples of Asia, supra, pp. 59, 71-72.
244 Kingsbury, supra,at 417.
245 Section 22, Article II, 1987 Constitution.
246 Interpellation of Senator Flavier on S.B. No. 1728, Deliberation on Second Reading, November 20, 1996, p. 20.
247 Guide to R.A. 8371, Coalition for IPs Rights and Ancestral Domains, the International Labor Organization, and the ILO-Bilance-
Asia Dep’t, p. 3 [1999].

248 Also referred to as the “Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention, 1989.”
249 SeeIntroduction to ILO Convention No. 169, par. 4.
241
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the “Convention Concerning the Protection and Integration of Indigenous and Other Tribal and Semi-Tribal
Populations in Independent Countries” (ILO No. 107) passed on June 26, 1957. Developments in international
law made it appropriate to adopt new international standards on indigenous peoples “with a view to removing
the assimilationist orientation of the earlier standards,” and recognizing the aspirations
250
of these peoples to
exercise control over theirown institutions,waysof life and economic development.”
CONCLUSION
The struggle of the Filipinos throughout colonial history had been plagued by ethnic and religious differences.
These differences were carried over and magnified by the Philippine 251 government through the imposition of a
national legal order that is mostly foreign in origin or derivation. Largely unpopulist, the present legal
system has resulted in the alienation of a large sector of society, specifically, the indigenous peoples. The
histories and cultures of the indigenes are relevant
252
to the evolution of Philippine culture and are vital to the
understanding of contemporary problems. It is through the IPRA that an attempt was made by our
legislators to understand Filipino society not in terms of myths and biases but through common experiences in
the course of history. The Philippines became a democracy a centennial ago and the decolonization process still
continues. If the evolution of the Filipino people into a democratic society is to truly proceed
democratically, 253
i.e., if the Filipinos as a whole are to participate fully in the task of continuing
democratization, it is this Court’s duty to acknowledge the presence of indigenous and customary laws in the
country and affirm their co-existence with the land laws in our national legal system.
_______________
250 Id., pars.5 and 6.
251 Perfecto V. Fernandez, Towards a Definition of National Policy on Recognition of Ethnic Law within the Philippine Legal Order,
55 P.L.J. 383, 385 [1980].
252 Samuel K Tan, A History of the Philippines, Manila Studies Association, Inc. andthe Phil. National Historical Society,Inc., p. 6
[1997].
253 Fernandez, supra, at 385, 391.
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With the foregoing disquisitions, I vote to uphold the constitutionality of theIndigenous Peoples Rights Act of
1997.
SEPARATE OPINION
VITUG, J.:
An issue of grave national interest indeed deserves a proper place in any forum and, when it shows itself in a
given judicial controversy, the rules of procedure, like locus standi, the propriety of the specific remedy invoked,
or the principle of hierarchy of courts, that may ordinarily be raised by party-litigants, should not be so
perceived as good and inevitable justifications for advocating timidity, let alone isolationism,by theCourt.
A cardinal requirement, to which I agree, is that 1
one who invokes the Court’s adjudication must have a
personal and substantial interest in the dispute; indeed, the developing trend would require a logical
nexus between the status asserted and the claim sought2 to be adjudicated in order to ensure that one is the
proper and appropriate party to invoke judicial power. The rule requires a party to aptly show a personal
stake in the outcome of the case or an injury to himself that can be redressed by a favorable decision so as to
warrant his invocation of the Court’s jurisdiction and to render legally feasible the exercise of the Court’s
remedial powers in his behalf. If it were otherwise, the exercise of that power can easily become too unwieldy
by its sheer magnitude and scope to a point that may, in no small measure, adversely affect its intended
essentiality, stability and consequentially.
Nevertheless, where a most compelling reason 3
exists, such as when the matter is of transcendental
importance and paramount interest to the nation, the Court must take the liberal approach that recognizes
the legal standing of nontraditional plaintiffs, such
_______________
1 Peoplevs. Vera, 65 Phil. 56, 89; Macasiano vs. National Housing Authority, 224 SCRA 236, 244 (1993).
2 Am Jur § 189, p. 591, S. v. D., 410 US 841, 35 L Ed 2d 536, 93 S Ct 1146.
3 Legaspi vs. Civil Service Commission, 150 SCRA 530, 540 (1987); Tanada vs. Tuvera, 136 SCRA 27, 36, 37 (1985).
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4 5
as citizens and taxpayers, to raise constitutional issues that affect them. This Court thus did so in a case that
involves the conservation of our forests for ecological needs. Until an exact balance is struck, the Court must
accept an eclectic notion that can free itself from the bondage of legal nicety and hold trenchant technicalities
subordinate towhatmaybe considered to be ofoverriding concern.
The petition seeks a declaration by the Court of unconstitutionally of certain provisions of Republic Act No.
8371, a law that obviously is yet incapable of exact equation in its significance to the nation and its people now
and in the generations yet to come. Republic Act No. 8371, otherwise also known as the Indigenous Peoples
Rights Act of 1997 CIPRA”), enacted into law in 1997 and made effective on 22 November 1997, is apparently
intended to be a legislative response to the 1987 Constitution which recognizes the 6rights of indigenous
cultural communities “within the framework of national unity and development” and commands the
State, “subject to the provisions of this Constitution and national development policies and programs,” to
protect the rights of indigenous cultural 7
communities to their ancestral lands in order to ensure their
economic, social, and cultural well-being.
Among the assailed provisions in IPRA is its Section 3(a) which defines “ancestral domains” to embrace “all
areas generally belonging to ICCs/IPs comprising lands, inland waters, coastal areas, and natural resources”
including “ancestral lands, forests, pasture, residential, agricultural, and other lands individually owned
whether alienable and disposable or otherwise,” over which indigenous cultural communities/indigenous
peoples (“ICCs/IPs”) could exercise virtual ownership and control.
IPRA effectively withdraws from the public domain the so-called ancestral domains covering literally
millions of hectares. The notion of community property would comprehend not only matters of
_______________
4 Defensor Santiago, Miriam, Constitutional Law, First Edition, 1994, p. 11; see also Rev. Fr. Joaquin Bernas, S.J., on the 1987
Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines, 1996 Ed.,pp. 336-337.
5 Oposa vs. Factoran, Jr., 224 SCRA 792 (1993).
6 Art. 11, Sec. 22.
7 Art. XII, Sec. 5.
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proprietary interest but also some forms of self governance over the curved-out territory. This concept is
elaborated in Section 7 of the law which states that the “rights of ownership and possession of ICCs/IPs to
their ancestral domains shall be recognized and protected,” subsumed under which would encompass the right
of ownership(paragraph a); the right to develop, control and use lands and natural resources, including
“the right to negotiate the terms and conditions for the exploration of natural resources in the areas for the
purpose of ensuring ecological, environmental protection and the conservation measures, pursuant to national
and customary laws”; (par. b); the right to stay in the territories (par. c); the right to return to their abandoned
lands in case of displacement (par. d); the right to regulate entry of migrants (par. e); the right to claim parts of
ancestral domains previously reserved (par. g); and the right to resolve land conflicts in accordance primarily
with customary law (par. h).Concurrently, Section 57 states that ICCs/IPs shall be given “priority rights in the
harvesting, extraction, development or exploitation of any natural resources within the ancestral
domains.” These provisions of IPRA, in their totality, are, in my view, beyond the context of the fundamental
law and virtually amount to an undue delegation, if not an unacceptable abdication, of State authority over a
significant area of the country and its patrimony.
Article XII of the 1987 Constitution expresses that all “lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal,
petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber, wildlife, flora and
fauna, and other natural resources are owned by the State,” and, with the exception of agricultural lands, “shall
not be alienated.” It ordains that the “exploration,8
development, and utilization of natural resources shall be
under the full controland supervisionof the State.”
These provisions had roots in the 1935 Constitution which, along with some other specific mandates in the
1935 Constitution, forming Article XII under the title “Conservation and Utilization of Natural Resources,”
were derived largely from the report of the Committee on Nationalization and Preservation of Lands and other
_______________
8 Sec. 2.
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9
Natural Resources. According to the Committee report, among the principles upon which these provisions
were based, was “that the land, minerals, forests and other natural resources constitute the exclusive heritage
of the Filipino Nation,” and
10
should thereby “be preserved for those under the sovereign authority of the Nation
and for their posterity.” The delegates to the 1934 Constitutional Convention were of the unanimous view
that the “policy on natural resources, 11being fundamental to the nation’s survival should not be left to the
changing mood of the lawmakingbody.”
The 1987 Constitution, like the precursor provisions in the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions, thus expresses
this regalian doctrine of the old, and the domainial doctrine of the new, that all lands and natural resources
belong to the state other than those which it recognizes to be of private ownership. Except for agricultural
lands of the public domain which alone may be alienated, forest or timber, and mineral lands, as well as all
other natural resources, of the country must remain with the state, the exploration, development and utilization
of which shall be subject to its full control and supervision albeit allowing it to enter into coproduction, joint
venture or production-sharing agreements, or into agreements with foreign-owned 12corporations involving
technical or financial assistance for large-scale exploration,development andutilization. 13
The decision of the United States Supreme Court in Cariño vs. Insular Government, holding that a parcel
of land held since time immemorial by individuals under a claim of private ownership is presumed never to
have been public land and cited to downgrade the application of the regalian doctrine, cannot override
the collective will of the people expressed in the
14
Constitution. It is in them that sovereignty resides and from
them that all government authority emanates. It is not then for a court ruling or any piece
_______________
9 II Aruego, The Framing of the Philippine Constitution, p. 594.
10 Ibid., p. 595.
11 Ibid., p. 600.
12 CONST., Art. XII, Sec. 2; Miners Association of the Philippines, Inc. vs. Factoran, J[r., 240 SCRA 100 (1995).
13 41 Phil. 935.
14 CONST., Art. II, Sec. I.
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of legislation to be conformed to by the fundamental law, but it is for the former to adapt to the latter, and it is
the sovereign act that must, between them, stand inviolate.
The second paragraph of Section 5 of Article XII of the Constitution allows Congress to provide "for the
applicability of customary laws governing property rights or relations in determining the ownership and
extent of ancestral domains.” I do not see this statement as saying that Congress may enact a law that would
simply express that “customary laws shall govern” and end it there. Had it been so, the Constitution could
have itself easily provided it without having to still commission Congress to do it. Mr. Chief Justice Davide
has explained this authority of Congress, during the deliberations of the 1986 Constitutional Convention,
thus:
“Mr. Davide. xxx Insofar as the application of the customary laws governing property rights or relations in determining the
ownership and extent of the ancestral domain is concerned, it is respectfully submitted that the particular matter must be
submitted to Congress. I understand that the idea of Comm. Bennagen is for the possibility of the codification of these
customary laws. So before these are codified, we cannot now mandate that the same must immediately be applicable. We
leave it to Congress to determine the extent of the ancestral domain and the ownership 15
thereof in relation to whatever
may have been codified earlier. So, in short, let us not put thecart ahead of the horse.”
The constitutional aim, it seems to me, is to get Congress to look closely into the customary laws and, with
specificity and by proper recitals, to hew them to, and make
16
them part of, the stream of laws. The “due process
clause,” as I so understand it in Tañada vs. Tuvera would require an apt publication of a legislative
enactment before it is permitted to take force and effect. So, also, customary laws, when specifically enacted to
become part of statutory law, must first undergo that publication to render them correspondingly binding and
effective as such.
Undoubtedly, IPRA has several good points, and I would respectfully urge Congress to re-examine the law.
Indeed, the State is ex-
_______________
15 4 Record of the ConstitutionalCommission 32.
16 146 SCRA 446 (1986).
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horted to protect the rights of indigenous cultural communities to their ancestral lands, a task that would entail
a balancing of interest between their specific needs and the imperatives of national interest.
WHEREFORE, I vote to grant thepetition.
SEPARATE OPINION
KAPUNAN, J.:
You ask if we own the land . .. How can you own that which will outlive you? Only the race own the land because only the
race lives forever. To claim a piece of land is a birthright of every man. The lowly animals claim their place; how much
more man? Man is born to live. Apu Kabunian, lord of us all, gave us life and placed us in the world to live human lives.
And where shall we obtain life? From the land. To work (the land) is an obligation, not merely a right. In tilling the land,
you possess it. And so land is a grace that must be nurtured. To enrich it and make it fructify is the eternal exhortation of
Apu Kabunian to all his children. Land is sacred. Land is beloved.From its womb springs . .. life.
—Macli-ing Dulag, Chieftain of the Kalinga

Tribe (quoted in Ponciano L. Bennagen,
“Tribal Filipinos” in Indigenous View of
Land and the Environment, ed. Shelton H.
Davis, the World Bank Discussion Papers,
No. 188, pp. 71-72.)
It is established doctrine that a statute
1
should be construed whenever possible in harmony with, rather than
in violation of, the Constitution. The presumption is that the legislature intended to enact a valid, sensible
and 2just law and one which operates no further than may be necessary to effectuate the specific purpose of the
law.
_______________
1 Teehankee vs. Rovira, 75 Phil. 634 (1945); San Miguel Corporation vs. Avelino, 89 SCRA 69 (1979); Phil. Long Distance Telephone Co.
w. Collector of Internal Revenue, 90 Phil 674 (1952).

2 In re Guarina, 24 Phil, 37 (1913).
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The challenged provisions of the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act (IPRA) must be construed in view of such
presumption of constitutionality. Further, the interpretation of these provisions should take into account the
purpose of the law, which is to give life to the constitutional mandate that the rights of the indigenous peoples
be recognized and protected.
The struggle of our indigenous peoples to reclaim their ancestral lands and domains and therefore, their
heritage, is not unique. It is one that they share with the red-skinned “Indians” of the United States, with the
aborigines of Australia, the Maori of New Zealand and the Sazmi of Sweden, to name a few. Happily, the
nations in which these indigenous peoples live all have enacted measures in an attempt to heal an oppressive
past by the promise of a progressive future. Thus has the international community realized the injustices that
have been perpetrated upon the indigenous peoples. This sentiment among the family of nations is expressed
in a number of documents, the most recent and most comprehensive of which is the Draft United Nations
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples which was adopted by the UN Sub-Commission on Prevention
of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities by its resolution on August 26, 1994. Among the rights
recognized by the UN Draft is the restitution of lands, territories and even the resources which the indigenous
peoples have traditionally owned or otherwise occupied or used, and which have been confiscated, occupied,
used or damaged without the free and informed consent of the indigenouspeoples.
A Historical Backdrop on the Indigenous Peoples

The term “indigenous” traces its origin to the Old Latin word indu, meaning “within.” In the sense
3
the term
has come to be used, it is nearer in meaning to the Latin word indigenus, which means “native.” “Indigenous”
refers to that which originated or has been
_______________
3 In Philippine Colonial history, the term indio applied to indigenous throughout the vast Spanish empire. India was a synonym for all
of Asia east of the Indus River. Even after it became apparent that the explorer Christopher Columbus was not able to reach territories
lying off the east
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4
produced naturally in a particular land, and has not been introduced from the outside. In international law,
the definition of what constitutes “indigenous peoples” attains some degree of controversy. No definition of the
term “indigenous peoples” has been adopted by the United Nations (UN), although UN 5practice has been
guided by a working definition in the 1986 Report of UN Special Rapporteur Martinez Cobo:
Indigenous communities, peoples and nations are those which, having a historical continuity with pre-invasion and pre-
colonial societies that developed on their territories, consider themselves distinct from other sections of the societies now
prevailing in those territories, or parts of them. They form at present non-dominant sections of society and are determined
to preserve, develop and transmit to future generations their ancestral territories, and their ethnic identity, as the basis of
their continued existence as peoples, in accordance with their own cultural patterns, social institutionsand legal systems.
This historical continuity may consist of the continuation, for an extended period reaching into the present, of one or
more of the following factors:
(a) Occupation of ancestral lands, or atleast ofpart of them;

(b) Common ancestry with the original occupants of these lands;
(c) Culture in general, or in specific manifestations (such as religion, living under a tribal system, membership of an
indigenous community, dress, means of livelihood, life-style,etc.);
_______________
coast of Asia, the Spanish persisted in referring to all natives within their empire as los Indios. (Owen J. Lynch. Jr., THE PHILIPPINE
COLONIAL DICHOTOMY: Attraction and Disenfranchisement, 63 PL J 112 [1988] citing R. BERKHOFER, THE WHITE MAN’S
INDIAN: IMAGES OF THE AMERICAN INDIAN FROM COLUMBUS TO THE PRESIDENT 5 [1979].
4 WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (1976), p. 1151.
5 Benedict Kingsbury, “Indigenous Peoples” in International Law: A Constructivist Approach to the Asian Controversy, 92 The
American Journal of International Law 414, 419 (1998) citing Jose Martinez Cobo, Study of the Problem of Discrimination against
indigenous population, UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub. 2/1986/7/ Add. 4, paras. 379-80.
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(d) Language (whether used as the only language, as mother-tongue, as the habitual means of communication at home
or in the family, or as the main, preferred, habitual, general or normal language);
(e) Residence in certain parts of the country; or in certain regions of the world;
6
(f) Other relevant facts.
In Philippine constitutional law, the term “indigenous peoples” pertains

7
to those groups of Filipinos who have
retained a high degree of continuity from pre-Conquest culture. Philippine8
legal history, however,
9
has not
been kind10to the indigenous peoples, characterized
11
them as “uncivilized,” “backward people,” with “barbarous
practices” and “a low orderofintelligence.”
Drawing inspiration from both our fundamental law and international law, IPRA now employs the
politically-correct conjunctive term “indigenous peoples/indigenous cultural communities” as follows:
Sec. 3. Definition of Terms.—For purposes of this Act, the following terms shall mean:
xxx
(h) Indigenous peoples/Indigenous cultural communities.—refer to a group of people or homogenous societies identified by self-
ascription and ascription by others, who have continuously lived as organized community on communally bounded and defined
territory,
_______________
6 Ibid. This definition is criticized for taking the potentially limited, and controversial view of indigenous peoples by requiring “historical continuity
with pre-invasion and pre-colonial societies that developed on their territories.”
7 4 RECORD OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION 34.
8 Rubi v. Provincial Board of Mindoro, 39 Phil. 660, 680 (1919).
9 Hearing before the Committee on the Philippines, United States Senate, Sixty-Third Congress, Third Session on HR 18459, pp. 346, 351. Quoted
inRubiat 686.
10 United States President McKinleys’ Instruction to the Philippine Commission, April 7, 1900, quoted In Rubiat 680.
11 US v. Tubban, 29 Phil. 434, 436 (1915).
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and who have, under claims of ownership since time immemorial, occupied, possessed and utilized such territories, sharing common
bonds of language, customs, traditions, and other distinctive cultural traits, or who have, through resistance to political, social and
cultural inroads of colonization, non-indigenous religions and cultures, became historically differentiated from the majority of Filipinos.
Indigenous peoples shall likewise include peoples who are regarded as indigenous on account of their descent from the populations
which inhabited the country at the time of conquest or colonization, or at the time of inroads of non-indigenous religions and cultures, or
the establishment of present State boundaries, who retain some or all of their own social, economic, cultural and political institutions,
but who may have been displaced from their traditional domains or who may have resettled outside theirancestral domains x x x.
Long before the Spaniards set foot in these islands, the indigenous peoples were already plowing our soil and
hunting in our forests. The Filipinos of Aeta and Malay stock, who were the original inhabitants of our
archipelago, were, at that time, practicing
12
a native culture. From the time the Spaniards arrived up to the
early part of the American regime, these native inhabitants resisted foreign invasion, relentlessly fighting for
their lands. Today, from the remote uplands of Northern Luzon, to Palawan, Mindoro and Mindanao, the
indigenous peoples continue to live on and cultivate their ancestrallands, the lands of their forefathers.
Though Filipinos today are essentially of the same stock as the indigenous peoples, our national culture
exhibits only the last vestiges of this native culture. Centuries of colonial rule and neocolonial domination
13
have created a discernible distinction between the cultural majority and the group of cultural minorities. The
extant Philippine national culture is the culture of the majority; its in-
_______________
12 See Owen J. Lynch, Jr., INVISIBLE PEOPLES AND A HIDDEN AGENDA: The Origins of Contemporary Philippine Land Laws
(1900-1913), 63 PLJ 249 (1988).

13 For an introduction to the chasm that exists between Philippine Law and Indigenous Custom Law, see Owen J. Lynch, Jr., Native
Title, Private Right and Tribal Land Law: An Introductory Survey 52 PLJ 268 (1982); and the Philippine Indigenous Law Collection: An
Introduction and PreliminaryBibliography, 58 PLJ 457 (1983), by the same author.
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digenous 14roots were replaced by foreign cultural elements that are decidedly pronounced, if not
dominant. While the culture of the majority reoriented itself to Western influence, the culture of the
minorities hasretained its essentially nativecharacter. One of every six Filipinos is a member of an indigenous
cultural community. Around
15
twelve million Filipinos are members of the one hundred and ten or so indigenous
cultural 16communities, accounting for more than seventeen per centum of the estimated seventy million
Filipinos in our country. Sadly, the indigenous peoples are one of the poorest sectors of Philippine society.
The incidence of poverty and malnutrition among themes significantly higher than the national average. The
indigenous peoples are also among the most powerless. Perhaps because of their inability to speak the
language of law and power, they have been relegated to the fringes of society. They have little, if any, voice in
national politics and enjoy the least protection from economic exploitation.
The Constitutional Policies on Indigenous Peoples
The framers of the 1987 Constitution, looking back to the long destitution of our less fortunate brothers,
fittingly saw the historic opportunity to actualize the ideals of people empowerment and social justice, and to
reach out particularly to the marginalized sectors of society, including the indigenous peoples. They
incorporated in the fundamental law several provisions recognizing and protecting the rights and interests of
the indigenous peoples, to wit:
_______________
14 See RENATO CONSTANTINO, THE PHILIPPINES: A PAST REVISITED (1975), pp. 26-41; TEODORO AGONCILLO, A HISTORY
OF THE FILIPINO PEOPLE, 8th ed., pp. 5, 74-75.

15 Response of Rep. Gregorio A. Andolana to the interpellation of Rep. John Henry R. Osmena on House Bill No. 9125, Journal of
August 20 and 21, 1997 of the House of Representatives, p. 20.

16 Philippines Yearbook (1998 ed.), p. 366.
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Sec. 22. The 17State recognizes and promotes the rights of indigenous peoples within the frameworkof national unityand
development.
Sec. 5. The State, subject to the provisions of this Constitution and national development policies and programs, shall
protect the rights of indigenous cultural communities to their ancestral lands to ensure their economic, social, andcultural
well-being.
The Congress may provide for the applicability of customary 18
laws governing property rights and relations in
determining the ownership and extent of ancestral domains.
Sec. 1. The Congress shall give the highest priority to the enactment of measures that protect and enhance the right of
all the people to human dignity, reduce social, economic and political inequalities, and remove cultural inequities by
equitably diffusing wealth and political power for the common good. 19
To this end, the State shall regulate the acquisition, ownership, use and disposition of propertyand its increments. Sec.
6. The State shall apply the principles of agrarian reform or stewardship, whenever applicable in accordance with law, in
the disposition and utilization of other natural resources, including lands of the public domain under lease or concession,
subject20 to prior rights, homestead rights of small settlers, and the rights of indigenous communities to their ancestral
lands.
Sec. 17. The State shall recognize, respect, and protect the rights of indigenous cultural communities to preserve and
develop 21their cultures, traditions, and institutions. It shall consider these rights in the formulation of national plans and
policies.
_______________
17 Article II of the Constitution, entitled State Principles and Policies.
18 Article XII of the Constitution, entitled National Economy and Patrimony.
19 Article XIII of the Constitution, entitled Social Justice and Human Rights.
20 Ibid.
21 Article XIV of the Constitution, entitled Education, Science, Technology, Arts, Culture,and Sports.
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Sec. 12. The Congress may create a consultative body to advise the President on policies
22
affecting indigenous cultural
communities, the ma-jorityof the members of which shallcome fromsuch communities.
IPRA was enacted precisely to implement the foregoing constitutional provisions. It provides, among others,
that the State shall recognize and promote the rights of indigenous peoples within the framework of national
unity and development, protect their rights over the ancestral lands and ancestral domains and recognize the
applicability of customary laws23 governing property rights or relations in determining the ownership and
extent of the ancestral domains. Moreover, IPRA enumerates the civil and political rights
_______________
22 Article XVI of the Constitution, entitled General Provisions.
23 SECTION 2. Declaration of State Policies.—The State shall recognize and promote all the rights of Indigenous Cultural Communi-
ties/Indigenous Peoples (ICCs/IPs) hereunder enumerated within the framework of the Constitution:
a) The State shall recognize and promote the rights of ICCs/IPs within the framework of national unity and development;
b) The State shall protect the rights of ICCs/IPs to their ancestral domains to ensure their economic, social and cultural well being
and shall recognize the applicability of customary laws governing property rights or relations in determining the ownership and
extent of ancestral domain;
c) The State shall recognize, respect and protect the rights of ICCs/IPs to preserve and develop their cultures, traditions and
institutions. It shall consider these rights in the formulation of national laws and policies;
d) The State shall guarantee that members of the ICCs/IPs regardless of sex, shall equally enjoy the full measure of human rights
and freedoms without distinction or discrimination;
e) The State shall take measures, with the participation of the ICCs/IPs concerned, to protect their rights and guarantee respect for
their cultural integrity, and to ensure that members of the ICCs/IPs benefit on an equal footing from the rights and opportunities
which national laws and regulations grant to other members of the population; and
f) The State recognizes its obligations to respond to the strong expression of the ICCs/IPs for cultural integrity by assuring
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24 25
of the indigenous peoples; spells out their social and 26
cultural rights; acknowledges a general concept of
indigenous property right 27and recognizes title thereto; and creates the NCIP as an independent agency under
theOffice of the President.
Preliminary Issues
A.The petition presentsan actual controversy.

The time-tested standards for the exercise of judicial review are: (1) the existence of an appropriate case; (2)
an interest personal and substantial by the party raising the constitutional question; (3) the plea that the
function be exercised at the earliest opportunity;
28
and (4) the necessity that the constitutional question be
passed upon in order todecide the case. 29
Courts can only decide actual controversies, not hypothetical questions or cases. The threshold issue,
therefore, is whether an “appropriate case” exists for the exercise of judicial review in the present case.
An “actual case or controversy” means an existing case or controversy which is both ripe 30
for resolution and
susceptible of judicial determination, and that which is not conjectural or anticipatory, maximum ICC/IP
participation in the direction of education, health, as well as other services of ICCs/Ips, in order to render such
services more responsive to the needs and desires of thesecommunities. Towards these ends, the State shall
institute and establish the necessary mechanisms to enforce and guarantee the realization of these rights,
taking into consideration their customs, traditions, values, beliefs, interests and institutions, and to adopt and
implement measures to protect their rights to their ancestral domains.
_______________
24 See Sections 13-20, R.A. 8371.
25 See Sections 21-37, R.A. 8371.
26 See Sections 4-12, R.A. 8371.
27 See Sections 38-50, R.A. 8371.
28 Dumlao v. COMELEC, 95 SCRA 392, 400 (1980), citing People vs. Vera, 65 Phil. 56 (1937).
29 Subic Bay Metropolitan Authority v. COMELEC, 262 SCRA 492, 513 (1996).
30 Board of Optometry v. Colet, 260 SCRA 88, 104 (1996).
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31
or that which seeks to resolve hypothetical or feigned constitutional problems. A petition raising a
constitutional question does not present an “actual controversy,” unless it alleges a legal right or power.
Moreover, it must show that a conflict of rights exists, for inherent in the term “controversy” is the presence of
32
32
opposing views or contentions. Otherwise, the Court will be forced to resolve issues which remain unfocused
because they lack such concreteness provided when a question emerges precisely framed from a clash of
adversary33 arguments exploring every aspect of a multifaceted situation embracing conflicting and demanding 34
interests. The controversy must also be justiciable; that is, it must be susceptible of judicial determination.
In the case at bar, there exists a live controversy involving a clash of legal rights. A law has been enacted,
and the Implementing Rules and Regulations approved. Money has been appropriated and the government
agencies concerned have been directed to implement the statute. It cannot be successfully maintained that we
should await the adverse consequences of the law in order to consider the controversy actual and ripe for
judicial resolution. It is precisely the contention of the petitioners that the law, on its face, constitutes an
unconstitutional abdication of State ownership over lands of the public domain and other natural resources.
Moreover, when the State machinery is set into motion to implement an alleged unconstitutional statute, this
Court possesses sufficient authority to resolve and prevent imminent injury and violation of the constitutional
process.
B. Petitioners, as citizensand taxpayers, have the requisite standing to raise the constitutional questions herein.
In addition to the existence of an actual case or controversy, a person who assails the validity of a statute must
have a personal
_______________
31 Muskrat v. United States, 219 US 346, 362 (1913).
32 WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY, 1976, p. 497.
33 UnitedStates v. Freuhauf, 365 US 146 (1961).
34 Association of Small Landowners v. Secretary of Agrarian Reform,175 SCRA 343, 364 (1989); Joya v. PCGG, 225 SCRA 568 (1993).
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and substantial 35interest in the case, such that, he has sustained, or will sustain, a direct injury as a result of
its enforcement. Evidently, the rights asserted by petitioners as citizens and taxpayers36are held in common
by all the citizens, the violation of which may result only in a “generalized grievance.” Yet, in a sense, all
citizen’s and taxpayer’s
37
suits are efforts to air generalized grievances about the conduct of government and the
allocation of power. 38
In several cases, the Court has adopted a liberal 39
attitude with regard to standing. The proper party
40
requirement is considered as merely procedural, and the Court has41ample discretion with regard thereto. As
early as 1910, the Court in the case of Severino vs. GovernorGeneral held:
xxx [W]hen the relief is sought merely for the protection of private rights, the relator must show some personal or special
interest in the subject matter, since he is regarded as the real party in interest and his right must clearly appear. Upon the
other hand, when the question is one of public right and the object of the mandamus is to procure the enforce-
_______________
35 People v.Vera, 65 Phil. 56, 89 (1937).
36 Lozada v. COMELEC, 120 SCRA 337, 342 (1983).
37 US v. Richardson, 418 US 166, 194 S Ct 2940, 41 L Ed 2d 678 (1974).
38 Kilosbayan v. Guingona, 232 SCRA 110, 135 (1994), citing, among others, Philconsa v. Gimenez, 15 SCRA 479 (1965); CLU v. Executive
Secretary, 194 SCRA 317 (1991); Guingona v. Carague, 196 SCRA 221 (1991); Osmena. v. COMELEC,199 SCRA 750 (1991); Basco v. PAGCOR, 197
SCRA 52 (1991); Carpio v. Executive Secretary, 206 SCRA 290 (1992).
In Kilosbayan v. Morato (250 SCRA 130 [1995]) the Court discoursed on the rule on standing as follows: taxpayers may sue on the claim of illegal
disbursement of funds, or to assail the constitutionality of a tax measure; voters may question the validity of election laws; citizens may raise
constitutional questions of transcendental importance which must be settled early; and, legislators may question the validity of official acts which
infringe their prerogatives.
39 Araneta v. Dinglasan, 84 Phil. 368, 373 (1949).
40 Assn. of Small Landowners in the Philippines v. Secretary of Agrarian Reform, 175 SCRA 343, 364-365 (1989).
41 16 Phil. 365 (1910), citing HIGH, EXTRAORDINARY LEGAL REMEDIES.
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ment of a public duty, the people are regarded as the real party in interest, and the relator at whose instigation the
proceedings are instituted need not show that he has any legal or special42
interest in the result, it being sufficient to show
that he is a citizen and as such interested in the execution of the laws.
This Court has recognized that a “public right,” or that which belongs to the people at large, may also be the
subject of an actual case or controversy. In Severino, we ruled that a private citizen may enforce a “public
right” in behalf of other citizens. We opined therein that:
... [T]he right which [petitioner] seeks to enforce is not greater or different from that of any other qualified elector in the
municipality of Silay. It is also true that the injury which he would suffer in case he fails to obtain the relief sought would
not be greater or different from that of the other electors; but he is seeking to enforce a public right as distinguished from a
private right. The real party in interest is the public, or the qualified electors of the town of Silay. Each elector has the same
right and would suffer the same injury. Each elector stands on the43 same basis with reference to maintaining a
petition whether or not the relief sought by the relator should be granted.
44
In Tañada v. Tuvera, the Court enforced the “public right” to due process and to be informedof matters
ofpublic concern. 45
In Garcia vs. Board of Investments, the Court upheld the “public right” to be heard or consulted on matters
of national concern.
In Oposa v. Factoran,46 the Court recognized the “public right” of citizens to “a balanced and healthful
ecology which, for47 the first time in our nation’s constitutional history, is solemnly incorporated in the
fundamental law.” Mr. Justice (now Chief Justice) Hilario G. Davide, Jr., delivering the opinion ofthe Court,
stated that:
_______________
42 Id.,at 371.
43 Id.,at 374-375
44 136 SCRA 27, 37 (1985).
45 177 SCRA 374, 383 (1989).
46 224 SCRA 792 (1993).
47 Id.,at 805.
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Such a right belongs to a different category of rights altogether for it concerns nothing less than self-preservation and self-
perpetuation—aptly and fittingly stressed by petitioners—the advancement of which may even be said to predate all
governments and constitutions. As a matter of fact, these
48
basic rights need not even be written in the Constitution for they
are assumed to existfrom theinception of humankind.
Petitioners, as citizens, possess the “public right” to ensure that the national patrimony is not alienated and
diminished in violation of the Constitution. Since the government, as the guardian of the national patrimony,
holds it for the benefit of all Filipinos without distinction as to ethnicity, it follows that a citizen has sufficient
interest to maintain a suit to ensure that any grant of concessions covering the national economy and
patrimony strictly complies with constitutional requirements. Thus, the preservation of the integrity and
inviolability of the national patrimony is a proper subjectof a citizen’s suit.
In addition, petitioners, as taxpayers, possess the right to restrain officials from wasting public funds
through the enforcement of an unconstitutional statute. It is well-settled that a taxpayer has the right to
enjoin public
49
officials from wasting public funds through the implementation of an unconstitutional 50
statute, and by necessity, he may assail the validity of a statute appropriating public funds. The taxpayer
has paid his taxes and contributed to the public coffers and, thus, may inquire into the manner by which the
proceeds of his taxes are spent. The expenditure by an51 official of the State for the purpose of administering an
invalid law constitutes a misapplication of suchfunds.
The IPRA appropriates funds as indicated in its title: “An Act to Recognize, Protect and Promote the Rights
of Indigenous Cultural Communities/Indigenous Peoples, Creating the National Commis-
_______________
48 Ibid.
49 Philconsav. Mathay, 18 SCRA 300, 306 (1966).
50 Philconsav. Gimenez, 15 SCRA 479, 487 (1965), citing 11 AM JUR 761.
51 Sanidad v. COMELEC, 73 SCRA 333, 358-359 (1976); Pascual v. Secretary of Public Works, 110 Phil. 331 (1960); Tan v.
Macapagal, 43 SCRA 677, 680 (1972).
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sion on Indigenous Peoples, Establishing Implementing Mechanisms, Appropriating Funds Therefor, and for
Other Purposes.” In the same manner, Section 79 authorizes for the expenditure of public funds by providing
that “the amount necessary to finance [its] initial implementation shall be charged against the current year’s
appropriation for the Office for Northern
52
Cultural Communities (the “ONCC”) and the53Office for Southern
Cultural Communities (the “OSCC”),” which were merged as organic offices of the NCIP. Thus,the IPRA is a
valid subject of a taxpayer’s suit.
C. The petition for prohibition and mandamusis not an improper remedy.

Prohibition is an extraordinary writ directed against any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person,
whether exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions, ordering said entity or person to desist
from further proceedings when said proceedings are without or in excess of said entity’s or person’s
jurisdiction, or are accompanied with grave abuse of discretion, 54and there is no appeal or any other plain,
speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. Mandamus, on the other hand, is an
extraordinary writ commanding a tribunal, corporation, board, officer or person, immediately or at some other
specified time, to do the act required to be done, when said entity or person unlawfully neglects the
performance of an act which the law specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust or station, or
when said entity or person unlawfully excludes another from the use and
_______________
52 Section 79. Appropriations.—The amount necessary to finance the initial implementation of this Act shall be charged against the
current year’s appropriation of the ONCC and the OSCC. Thereafter, such sums as may be necessary for its continued implementation
shall be included in theannual General Appropriations Act.
53 Section 74. Merger of ONCC/OSCC—The Office for Northern Cultural Communities (ONCC) and the Office for Southern Cultural
Communities (OSCC), created under Executive Order Nos. 122-B and 122-C respectively, are hereby merged as organic offices of the
NCIP and shall continue to function under a revitalized and strengthened structure to achieve the objectives of the NCIP x x x.
54 Section 2, Rule 65, 1997 RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE.
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enjoyment of a right or office to which

55
such other is entitled, and there is no other plain, speedy and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course oflaw.
In this case, the petitioners pray that respondents be restrained from implementing the challenged
provisions of the IPRA and its Implementing Rules and the assailed DENR Circular No. 2, series of 1998, and
that the same officials be enjoined from disbursing public funds for the implementation of the said law and
rules. They further ask that the Secretary of the DENR be compelled to perform his duty to control and
supervise the activities pertaining to natural resources.
Prohibition will lie to restrain the public officials concerned from implementing the questioned provisions of
the IPRA and from disbursing funds in connection therewith if the law is found to be unconstitutional.
Likewise, mandamus will lie to compel the Secretary of the DENR to perform his duty to control and supervise
the exploration, development, utilization and conservation of the country’s natural resources. Consequently,
the petition for prohibition and mandamusis not an improperremedy for the relief sought.
D. Notwithstanding the failure of petitioners to observe the hierarchy of courts, the Court assumes jurisdiction
over the petition in view of the importanceof the issues raised therein.
Between two courts of concurrent original jurisdiction, it is the lower court that should initially pass upon the
issues of a case. That way, as a particular case goes through the hierarchy of courts, it is shorn of all but the
important legal issues or those of first impression, which are the proper subject of attention of the appellate
court. This is a procedural rule borne of experience and adopted to improve the administration of justice.
This Court has consistently enjoined litigants to respect the hierarchy of courts. Although this Court has
concurrent jurisdiction with the Regional Trial Courts and the Court of Appeals to issue writs
of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas
_______________
55 Section 3, Rule 65, 1997 RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE.
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56
corpus and injunction, such concurrence does not give a party unrestricted freedom of choice of court forum.
The resort to this Court’s primary jurisdiction to issue said writs shall be allowed only where the redress
desired cannot be obtained
57
in the appropriate courts 58or where exceptional and compelling circumstances
justify such invocation. We held in People v. Cuaresma that:
A becoming regard for judicial hierarchy most certainly indicates that petitions for the issuance of extraordinary writs
against first level (“inferior”) courts should be filed with the Regional Trial Court, and those against the latter, with the
Court of Appeals. A direct invocation of the Supreme Court’s original jurisdiction to issue these writs should be allowed only
where there are special and important reasons therefor, clearly and specifically set out in the petition. This is established
policy. It is a policy necessary to prevent inordinate demands upon the Court’s time and attention which are better devoted
to those matters within its exclusive juris-
_______________
56 ArticleVIII of the Constitution states:
Sec. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
(1) Exercise original jurisdiction over cases affecting ambassadors, other public ministers and consuls, and over petitions
for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas corpus.
xxx
Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 (B.P. 129), as amended, provides:
Sec. 9. Jurisdiction.—The Court of Appeals shallexercise:
(1) Original jurisdiction to issue writs of mandamus, prohibition, certiorari, habeas corpus, and quo warranto, and auxiliary writs or processes,
whether or not in aid of its appellate jurisdiction;
x x x.
Sec. 21. Original jurisdiction in other cases.—Regional Trial Courts shall exercise originaljurisdiction:
(1) In the issuance of writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus and injunction which may be enforcedinany part of
their respective regions;and
(2) In actions affecting ambassadors and other public ministers and consuls.
57 Tano vs. Socrates, 278 SCRA 154, 173-174 (1997).

58 172 SCRA 415 (1989).
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59
diction, and to prevent further over-crowding of the Court’s docket x xx. (Emphasis supplied.)
IPRA aims to rectify the historical injustice inflicted upon indigenous peoples. Its impact upon the lives not
only of the indigenous peoples but also upon the lives of all Filipinos cannot be denied. The resolution of this
case by the Court at the earliest opportunity is necessary if the aims of the law are to be achieved. This reason
is compelling enough to allow petitioners’ invocation of this Court’sjurisdiction in the first instance.
Substantive Issues
Primary Issue
The issue of prime concern raised by petitioners and the Solicitor General revolves around the
constitutionality of certain provisions of IPRA, specifically Sections 3(a), 3(b), 5, 6, 7, 8, 57, 58 and 59. These
provisions allegedly violate Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution, which states:
Sec. 2. All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential
undertake such activities, or it may enter into co-production, joint venture, or production-sharing agreements with Filipino
industrial uses other than the development of water power, beneficial use maybe themeasure and limit of the grant.
The State shall protect the nation’s marine wealth in its archipelagic waters, territorial sea, and exclusive economic
zone, and reserve its use and enjoymentexclusivelyto Filipino citizens.
_______________
59 Id.,424.
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The Congress, may, by law, allow small-scale utilization of natural resources by Filipino citizens, as well as cooperative
fish farming, with priority to subsistence fishermen and fishworkers in rivers, lakes, bays and lagoons.
The President may enter into agreements with foreign-owned corporations involving either technical or financial
assistance for large-scale exploration, development and utilization of minerals, petroleum, and other mineral oils according
to the general terms and conditions provided by law, based on real contributions to the economic growth and general
welfare of the country. In such agreements, the State shall promote the development and use of local scientific and
technicalresources.
The President shall notify the Congress of every contract entered into in accordance with this provision, within thirty
days from its execution.
60
Under IPRA, indigenous peoples may obtain the recognition
61
of their right of ownership over ancestral lands
and ancestral domains by virtue of native title. The term “ancestral lands” under the statute refers
to landsoccupied by individuals, families and clans who are members of indigenous cultural communities, in-
_______________
60 Section 7. Rights to Ancestral Domains.—The rights of ownership and possession of ICCs/IPs to their ancestral domains shall be
recognized and protected. Such rightsshallinclude:
(a) Right of Ownership.—The right to claim ownership over lands, bodies of water traditionally and actually occupied by ICCs/IPs,
sacred places, traditional
(b) hunting and fishing grounds, and all improvements made bythem at any timewithin thedomains;
xxx
61 Section 3(1) Native Title—refers to pre-conquest rights to lands and domains which, as far back as memory reaches, have been held
under a claim of private ownership by ICCs/IPs, have never been public lands and are thus indisputably presumed to have been held that
way since beforethe Spanish Conquest; x x x
Section 3(p) Time Immemorial—refers to a period of time when as far back as memory can go, certain ICCs/IPs are known to have
occupied, possessed in the concept of owners, and utilized a defined territory devolved to them, by operation of customary law or inherited
from their ancestors, in accordance with their customs and traditions.
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eluding residential lots, rice terraces or paddies, private forests, swidden farms and tree lots. These lands are
required to have been “occupied, possessed and 62
utilized” by them or through their ancestors “since time
immemorial, continuously to the present.” On the other hand, “ancestral domains” is defined
as areas generally belonging to indigenous cultural communities, including ancestral lands, forests, pasture,
residential and agricultural lands, hunting grounds, worship areas, and lands no longer occupied exclusively
by indigenous cultural communities but to which they had traditional access, particularly the home ranges of
indigenous cultural communities who are still nomadic or shifting
63
cultivators. Ancestral domains also include
inland waters, coastal areas and natural resources therein. Again, the same are required to have been
_______________
62 Section 3(b) Ancestral Lands-—Subject to Section 56 hereof, refers to land occupied, possessed and utilized by individuals, families
and clans who are members of the ICCs/IPs since time immemorial, by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest, under claims
of individual or traditional group ownership, continuously to the present except when interrupted by war, force majeure or displacement
by force, deceit, stealth, or as a consequence of government projects or any other voluntary dealings entered into by the government and
private individuals/corporations, including, but not limited to, residential lots, rice terraces or paddies, private forests, swidden farms and
tree lots;
63 Section 3(a) Ancestral Domains—Subject to Section 56 hereof, refer to all areas generally belonging to ICCs/IPs comprising lands,
inland waters, coastal areas and natural resources therein, held under a claim of ownership, occupied or possessed by Indigenous peoples,
by themselves or through their ancestors, communally or individually since time immemorial, continuously to the present except when
interrupted by war, force majeure or displacement by force, deceit, stealth or as a consequence of government projects or any other
voluntary dealings entered into by the government and private individuals/corporations, and which are necessary to ensure their
economic, social and cultural welfare. It shall include ancestral lands, forests, pasture, residential, agricultural, and other lands
individually owned whether alienable and disposable or otherwise, hunting grounds, burial grounds, worship areas, bodies of water,
mineral and other resources, and lands which may no longer be exclusively be occupied by Indigenous peoples but from which they
traditionally had access to for their subsistence and traditional activities, particularly the home ranges of ICCs/IPs who are still nomadic
and/or shiftingcultivators.
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“held under a claim of ownership, occupied or possessed by ICCs/IPs, by themselves or64 through their
ancestors, communally or individually since time immemorial, continuously to the present.” Under Section
56, property rights within the ancestral domains already existing and/or vested upon effectivity of said law
“shall be recognized and respected.”
Ownership is the crux of the issue of whether the provisions of IPRA pertaining to ancestral lands,
ancestral domains, and natural resources are unconstitutional. The fundamental question is, who, between
the State and the indigenous peoples, are the rightful ownersof these properties?
It bears stressing
65
that a statute should be construed in harmony with, and not in violation, of the
fundamental law. The reason is that the legislature, in enacting a statute, is assumed to have acted within
its authority and adhered to the constitutional limitations. Accordingly, courts should presume that it was the
intention of the legislature to enact a valid, sensible, and66just law and one which operates no further than may
be necessary to effectuate the specific purpose of thelaw.
A. The provisions of IPRA recognizing the ownership of indigenous peoples over the ancestral lands and
ancestral domains are not unconstitutional.
In support of their theory that ancestral lands and ancestral domains are part of the public domain and, thus,
owned by the State, pursuant to Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution, petitioners and theSolicitorGeneral
advance thefollowing arguments:
First, according to petitioners, the King of Spain under international law acquired exclusive dominion over the Philippines
by virtue of discovery and conquest. They contend that the Spanish King under the theory of jura regalia, which was
introduced into Philippine law upon Spanish conquestin 1521, acquired title toall thelandsin the archipelago.
_______________
64 Ibid.
65 Hebron v. Reyes, 104 Phil. 175 (1958); San Miguel Corporation v. Avelino, 89 SCRA 69 (1979).
66 In re Guarina, 24 Phil. 37 (1913).
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Second, petitioners and the Solicitor General submit that ancestral lands and ancestral domains are owned by the State.
They invoke the theory of jura regalia which imputes to the State the ownership of all lands and makes the State the
original source of all private titles. They argue that the Philippine State, as successor to Spain and the United States, is
the source of anyasserted right of ownership in land.
Third, petitioners and the Solicitor General concede that the Cariño doctrine exists. However, petitioners maintain that
the doctrine merely states that title to lands of the public domain may be acquired by prescription. The Solicitor General,
for his part, argues that the doctrine applies only to alienable lands of the public domain and, thus, cannot be extended to
other lands of the public domain such as forest or timber, mineral lands,and national parks.
Fourth, the Solicitor General asserts that even assuming that native title over ancestral lands and ancestral domains
existed by virtue of the Cariño doctrine, such native title was extinguished upon the ratification of the 1935 Constitution.
Fifth, petitioners admit that Congress is mandated under Section 5, Article XII of the Constitution to protect that rights
of indigenous peoples to their ancestral lands and ancestral domains. However, they contend that the mandate is subject to
Section 2, Article XII and the theory of jura regalia embodied therein. According to petitioners, the recognition and
protection under R.A. 8371 of the right of ownership over ancestral lands and ancestral domains is far in excess of the
legislative power and constitutional mandate of Congress.
Finally, on the premise that ancestral lands and ancestral domains are owned by the State, petitioners posit that R.A.
8371 violates Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution which prohibits the alienation of non-agricultural lands of the
public domain and othernatural resources.
I am notpersuaded by these contentions.

Undue reliance by petitioners and the Solicitor General on the theory of jura regalia is understandable. Not
only is the theory well recognized in our legal system; it has been regarded, almost with reverence, as the
immutable postulate of Philippine
67
land law. It has been incorporated into our fundamental law and has been
recognized by the Court.
_______________
67 SeeLee Hong Hok vs. David, 48 SCRA 372 (1972).
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Generally, under the concept of jura regalia, private title to land must be traced to some grant, express or
implied, from the Spanish Crown or its successors, the American Colonial government, and thereafter, the
Philippine Republic. The belief that the Spanish Crown is the origin of all land titles in the Philippines 68
has
persisted because title to land must emanate from some source for it cannot
69
issue forth fromnowhere.
In its broad sense, the70term “jura regalia” refers to royal rights, or those rights which the King has by
virtue of his prerogatives. In Spanish law, it refers
71
to a right which the sovereign has over anything in which
a subject has a right of property or propriedad. These were rights enjoyed during feudal times by the king as
the sovereign.
The theory of the feudal system was that title to all lands was originally held by the King, and while the
use of lands was granted out to 72
others who were permitted to hold them under certain conditions, the King
theoretically retained the title. By fiction of law, the King was regarded 73
as the original proprietor of all lands,
and the true and only source of title, and from him all lands were held. 74
The theory of jura regalia was therefore nothing more than a natural fruitof conquest.
The Regalian theory, however, does not negate native title to lands 75
held in private ownership since time
immemorial. In the landmark case of Cariño vs. Insular Government the United
_______________
68 PEÑA, REGISTRATION OF LAND TITLES AND DEEDS, 1994 rev.ed., p. 15.
69 1 BOUVIER’S LAW DICTIONARY, 3rd revision, p. 1759.
70 BLACKS LAW DICTIONARY, 6th ed., p. 1282.
71 76 CORPUS JURIS SECUNDUM, citing Hart v. Burnett, 15 Cal. 530, 566.
72 WASHBURN, p. 44; see also WILLIAMS, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW ON REAL PROPERTY, 6th ed. (1886),R. 2; BIGELOW, p. 2.
73 WARVELLE, ABSTRACTS AND EXAMINATION OF TITLE TO REAL PROPERTY (1907), p. 18.
74 1 DICTIONARY OF ENGLISH LAW (Jowitt, ed.), p. 797.
75 41 Phil. 935, 212 U.S. 449, 53L Ed. 594 (1909).
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76
States Supreme Court, reversing the decision of the pre-war Philippine Supreme Court, made the following
pronouncement:
xxx Every presumption is and ought to be taken against the Government in a case like the present. It might, perhaps, be
proper and sufficient to say that when, as far back as testimony or memory goes, the land has been held by individuals
under a claim of private ownership, it will
77
be presumed to have been held in the same way from before the Spanish conquest,
and never to have been public land, x x x (Emphasis supplied.)
The above ruling institutionalized the recognition of the existence of native title to land, or ownership of land
by Filipinos by virtue of possession under a claim of ownership since time immemorial and independent of any
grant from the Spanish Crown, as an exception to the theory of jura regalia.
In Cariño, an Igorot by the name of Mateo Cariño applied for registration in his name of an ancestral land
located in Benguet. The applicant established that he and his ancestors had lived on the land, had cultivated
it, and had used it as far they could remember. He also proved that they had all been recognized as owners,
the land having been passed on by inheritance according to native custom. However, neither he nor his
ancestors had any document of title from the Spanish Crown. The government opposed the application for
registration, invoking the theory of jura regalia. On appeal, the United States Supreme Court held that the
applicant was entitled to the registration of his native title to their ancestral land.
Cariño was decided by the U.S. Supreme 78
Court in 1909, at a time when decisions of the U.S. Court were
binding as precedent
79
in our jurisdiction. We applied the Cariñodoctrine in the 1946 case of Oh Cho vs.
79
Director of Lands, where we stated that “[a]ll lands
_______________
76 Cariño vs. Insular Government, 7 Phil. 132 (1906). The Philippine Supreme Court in this case held that in the Philippines, there is
no conclusive presumption of a grant of title to land from the Government founded merelyupon long possession of the same bythe
applicant.
77 Cariño vs. Insular Government, supra note 75,at 941.
78 Section 10, Philippine Bill of 1902.
79 75 Phil. 890 (1946).
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that were not acquired from the Government either by purchase or by grant, belong to the public domain, but
[a]n exception to the rule would be any land that should have been in the possession of an occupant and of his
predecessors in interest since time immemorial, for such possession would justify the presumption that the
land had never
80
been part of the public domain or that it had been private property even before the Spanish
conquest.”
Petitioners however aver that the U.S. Supreme Court’s ruling in Cariño was premised on the fact that the
applicant had complied with the requisites of acquisitive prescription, having established that he and his
predecessors-in-interest had been in possession of the property since time immemorial. In effect, petitioners
suggest that title to the ancestral land applied for by Cariño was transferred from the State, as original owner,
to Cariño by virtue of prescription. They conclude that the doctrine cannot be the basis for decreeing “by mere
legislative fiat81 . .. that ownership of vast tracts of land belongs to [indigenous peoples] without judicial
confirmation.”
The Solicitor General, for his part, claims that the Cariño doctrine applies only to alienable lands of the
public domain and, as such, cannot be extended to other lands of the public domain such as forestor timber,
mineral lands, andnational parks.
There is no merit in these contentions.
A proper reading of Cariño would show that the doctrine enunciated therein applies only to lands which
have always been considered as private, and not to lands of the public domain, whether alienable or otherwise.
A distinction must be made between ownership of land under native title and ownership by acquisitive
prescription against the State. Ownership by virtue of native title presupposes that the land has been held by
its possessor and his predecessors-in-interest in the concept of an owner since time immemorial. The land is
not acquired from the State, that is, Spain or its successors-in-interest, the United States and the Philippine
Government. There has been no transfer of title from the State as
_______________
80 Id.,at 892.
81 Memorandum of Petitioners, Rollo,p. 861.
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the land has been regarded as private in character as far back as memory goes. In contrast, ownership of land
by acquisitive prescription against the State involves a conversion of the character of the property from
alienable public land to private land, which presupposes a transfer of title from the State to a private person.
Since native title assumes that the property covered by it is private land and is deemed never to have been
part of the public domain, the Solicitor General’s thesis that native title under Cariñoapplies only to lands of
the public domain is erroneous. Consequently, the classification of lands of the82
public domain into agricultural,
forest or timber, mineral lands, and national parks under the Constitution is irrelevant to the application of
the Cariño doctrine because the Regalian doctrine which vests in the State ownership of lands of the public
domain does not cover ancestral lands and ancestral domains.
Legal history supports the Cariño doctrine.
When Spain acquired sovereignty over the Philippines by virtue of its discovery and occupation
83
thereof in
the 16th century and the Treaty of Tordesillas of 1494 which it entered into with Portugal, the continents of
Asia, the84
Americas and Africa were considered as terra nulliusalthough already populated by other
peoples. The discovery and occupation by the European States, who were then considered as the only
members of the international community of civilized85
nations, of lands in the said continents were deemed
sufficient to create title under international law.
Although Spain was deemed to have acquired sovereignty over the Philippines, this did not mean that it
acquired title to all lands in the archipelago. By virtue of the colonial laws of Spain, the
_______________
82 Section3, Article XII, CONSTITUTION.
83 Under the Treaty of Tordesillas, the world was divided between Spain and Portugal, with the former having exclusive power to claim
all lands and territories west of the Atlantic Ocean demarcation line (Lynch, The Legal Bases of Philippine Colonial Sovereignty, 62 Phil L
J 279, 283 [1987]).
84 See AKEHURST, A MODERN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW, 5th ed., 142-143.
85 See CRUZ, INTERNATIONAL LAW, 1996 ed., pp. 106-107.
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Spanish Crown 86
was considered to have acquired dominiononly over theunoccupied and unclaimed portions
ofour islands.
In sending the first expedition to the Philippines, Spain did not intend to deprive the natives of their
property. Miguel Lopez de Legazpi was under instruction of the Spanish King to do no harm to the natives and
to their property. In this regard, an authority on the early Spanish colonial period in the Philippineswrote:
The government of [the King of Spain] Philip II regarded the Philippines as a challenging opportunity to avoid a repetition
of the sanguinary conquests of Mexico and Peru. In his written instructions for the Adelantado Legazpi, who commanded
the expedition, Philip II envisaged a bloodless pacification of the archipelago. This extraordinary document could have
been lifted almost verbatim from the lectures of the Dominican theologian, Francisco de Vitoria, delivered in the
University of Salamanca. The King instructed Legazpi to inform the natives that the Spaniards had come to do no harm to
their persons or to their property. The Spaniards intended to live among them in peace and in friendship and ‘‘to explain to
them the law of Jesus Christ by which they will be saved.” Although the Spanish expedition could defend themselves if
attacked, the royal instruc-
_______________
86 Cariño v. Insular Government, supra note 75, at 939.
This point finds significance in light of the distinction between sovereignty and dominion. Sovereignty is the right to exercise the functions of a State to
the exclusion of any other State (Case Concerning the Island of Las Palmas [1928], UNRIAA II 829, 838). It is often referred to as the power
of imperium, which is defined as the government authority possessed by the State (BERNAS, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES: A COMMENTARY VOL. 2, p. 419). On the other hand, dominion, or dominium, is the capacity of the State to own or acquire property
such as lands and natural resources.
Dominium was the basis for the early Spanish decrees embracing the theory of jura regalia. The declaration in Section 2, Article XII of the 1987
Constitution that all lands of the public domain are owned by the State is likewise founded on dominium (Ibid.). If dominium, not impeHum, is the basis
of the theory of jura regalia, then the lands which Spain acquired in the 16th century were limited to non-private lands, because it could only acquire
lands which were not yet privately-owned or occupied by the Filipinos. Hence, Spain acquired title only over lands which were unoccupied and
unclaimed, i.e.,public lands.
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87
tions admonished the commander to commit no aggressive act which might arouse native hostility.
88
Spanish colonial laws recognized and respected Filipino landholdings including native land occupancy. Thus,
the Recopilación
89
de Leyes de las Indias expressly conferred ownership of lands already held by the
natives. The royal decrees of 1880 and 1894 did not extinguish native title to land in the Philippines. The
earlier royal decree, dated June 25, 1880, provided that all those in
_______________
87 PHELAN, THE HISPANIZATION OF THE PHILIPPINES: SPANISH AIMS AND FILIPINOS RESPONSES, 1565-1700 (1959), pp.
8-9.
88 Cariño vs. Insular Government, supra note 75,at 943.
89 Book 4, Title 12, Law 9, decreed by Philip II, 1 June 1594. We order that grants of farms and lands to Spaniards be without injury to
the Indians and that those which have been granted to their loss and injury, be returned to the lawful owners.
Book 4, Title 12, Law 14. We having acquired full sovereignty over the Indies, and all lands, territories, and possessions not heretofore
ceded away by our royal predecessors, or by us, or in our name, still pertaining the royal crown and patrimony, it is our will that all lands
which are held without proper and true deeds of grant be restored to us according as they belong to us, in order that xxx after distributing
to the natives what may be necessary for tillage and pasteurage, confirming them in what they now have and giving them more if
necessary, all the rest of said lands may remain free and unencumbered for us to dispose of as we wish. [Quoted in Valenton v.
Murciano, 3 Phil. 537, 542-543 (1904).] (Emphasis supplied.)
Book 6, Title 1, Law 15, decreed by King Philip II, at Madrid, 7 November 1574. We command that in the Philippine Islands the
Indians not be removed from one to another settlement by forceandagainst their will.
Book 6, Title 1, Law 23, otherwise known as Ordinance 10 of 1609 decreed by Philip III. It is right that time should be allowed the
Indians to work their own individual lands and thoseof the community.
Book 6, Title 1, Law 32, decreed by Philip II, 16 April 1580. We command the Viceroys, Presidents, and Audiencias that they see to it
that the Indians havecomplete libertyin their dispositions.
Royal Cedula of October 15, 1754. Where such possessors shall not be able to produce title deeds it shall be sufficient if they shall show
that ancient possession, as a valid title by prescription: x x x. [Quoted in Valenton v. Murciano, supra, at 546.] (Emphasis supplied.)
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90
“unlawful possession of royal lands” must legalize their possession by means of adjustment proceedings, and
within the period specified. The later royal decree, dated February 13, 1894, otherwise known as the Maura
Law, declared that titles that were capable of adjustment under the royal decree of 1880, but for which
adjustment was not sought, were forfeited. Despite the harsh wording of the Maura Law, it was held in the
case of Cariño that the royal decree of 1894 should not91
be construed as confiscation of title, but merely as
thewithdrawal of theprivilege of registering such title.
Neither was native title disturbed by the Spanish cession of the Philippines to the United States, contrary
to petitioners’ assertion that
92
the US merely succeeded to the rights of Spain, including the latter’s rights over
lands of the public domain. Under the Treaty of Paris93
of December 10, 1898, the cession of the Philippines did
not impair any right to property existing at the time. During the
_______________
90 Article 6 of the royal decree of June 25, 1880, quoted in Valenton v. Murciano, supra note 89 at 549.
91 Cariño v. Insular Government, supra note 75, at 944.
92 Memorandum of Petitioners, par. 3.4,Rollo,pp. 845-846.
93 TheTreaty of Paris reads in part:
Article III. Spain cedes to the United States the archipelago known as the Philippine Islands,x x x.
The United States will pay to Spain the sum of twenty million dollars, within three months after the exchange of the ratifications of the
presenttreaty.
xxx
Article VIII. In conformity with the provisions of Articles One, Two, and Three of this treaty, Spain relinquishes in Cuba, and cedes in
Porto Rico and other islands of the West Indies, in the Island of Guam, and in the Philippine Archipelago, all the buildings, wharves,
barracks, forts, structures, public highways, and other immovable property which, in conformity with law, belong to the public domain
and as such belong to the Crown of Spain.
And it is hereby declared that the relinquishment or cession, as the case may be, to which the preceding paragraph refers, can not in
any respect impair the property or rights which by law belong to the peaceful possession of property of all kinds, of provinces,
municipalities, public or private establishments, ecclesiastical or civic bod-
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American colonial regime, native title to land was respected, even protected. The Philippine Bill of 1902
provided that property and94rights acquired by the US through cession from Spain were to be administered for
the benefit of the Filipinos. In obvious adherence to libertarian principles, McKinley’s Instructions, as well as
the Philippine Bill of 1902, contained a bill of rights embodying the safeguards of the US Constitution. One of
these rights, which served as 95an inviolable rule upon every division and branch of the American colonial
government in the 96
Philippines, was that “no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due
process of law.” These vested rights safeguarded by the Philippine Bill of 1902 were in turn expressly
protected by the due process clause of the 1935 Constitution. Resultantly, property rights of the indigenous
peoples over their ancestral lands and ancestral domains were firmly established in law.
Nonetheless, the Solicitor General takes the view that the vested rights of indigenous peoples to their
ancestral lands and97 domains were “abated by the direct act by the sovereign Filipino people of ratifying the
1935 Constitution.” He advances the following arguments:
_______________
ies, or any other associations having legal capacity to acquire and possess property in the aforesaid territories renounced or ceded, or of
private individuals, of whatsoever nationality such individuals may be.
94 The statute reads in part:
Section 12. That all the property and rights which may have been acquired in the Philippine Islands under the treaty of peace with
Spain,signed December tenth, eighteen hundred and ninety-eight, except such land or other property as shall be designated by the
President of the United States for military and other reservations of the Government of the United States, are hereby placed under the
control of the Government of said Islands, to be administered for the benefit of theinhabitants thereof,exceptas provided bythis Act.
95 McKinley’s Instructions to the Second Philippine Commission, in MENDOZA, FROM MCKINLEY’S INSTRUCTIONS TO THE NEW
CONSTITUTION: DOCUMENTS ON THE PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTIONAL SYSTEM (1978) p. 71.

96 Id.,at 65-75; Section 5, Philippine Bill of 1902.
97 Solicitor General’s Memorandum, Rollo,pp. 668-669.
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The Sovereign, which is the source of all rights including ownership, has the power to restructure the consolidation of
rights inherent in ownership in the State. Through the mandate of the Constitutions that have been adopted, the State has
wrested control of those portions of the natural resources it deems absolutely necessary for social welfare and existence. It
has been held that the State may impair vested rights through a legitimate exercise of police power.
Vested rights do not prohibit the Sovereign from performing acts not only essential to but determinative of social
welfare and existence. To allow otherwiseis to invite havoc in the established social system, x x x
Time-immemorial possession does not create private ownership in cases of natural resources that have been found from
generation to generation to be critical to the survival of the Sovereign and its agent, the State.98
Stated simply, the Solicitor General’s argument is that the State, as the source of all titles to land, had the
power to re-vest in itself, through the 1935 Constitution, title to all lands, including ancestral lands and
ancestral domains. While the Solicitor General admits that such a theory would necessarily impair vested
rights, he reasons out that even vested rights of ownership over ancestral lands and ancestral domains are not
absolute and may be impaired by the legitimate exercise of police power.
I cannot agree. The text of the provision of the 1935 Constitution invoked by the Solicitor General, while
embodying the theory of jura regalia, is too clear for any misunderstanding. It simply declares that “all
agricultural, timber, and mineral lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other
mineral99 oils, all forces of potential energy, and other natural resources of the Philippines belong to the
State.” Nowhere does it state that cer-
_______________
98 Id.at 668.
99 Section 1, Article XII, 1935 Constitution reads:
All agricultural, timber, and mineral lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of
potential energy, and other natural resources of the Philippines belong to the State, and their disposition, exploitation, development, or
utilization shall be limited to citizens of the Philippines, or to corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of the
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tain lands which are “absolutely necessary for social welfare and existence,” including those which are not part
of the public domain, shall thereafter be owned by the State. If there is any room for constitutional
construction, the provision should be interpreted in favor of the preservation, rather than impairment or
extinguishment, of vested rights. Stated otherwise, Section 1, Article XII of the 1935 Constitution cannot be
construed to mean that vested right which had existed then were extinguished and that the landowners were
divested of their lands, all in the guise of “wrest[ing] control of those portions of the natural resources [which
the State] deems absolutely necessary for social welfare and existence.” On the contrary, said Section restated
the fundamental rule against the diminution of existing rights by expressly providing that the ownership of
lands of the public domain and other natural resources by the State is “subject to any existing right, grant,
lease, or concessions.” The “existing rights” that were intended to be protected must, perforce, include
the right of ownership by indigenous peoples over 100their ancestral lands and domains. The words of the law
should be given their ordinary or usual meaning, and the term “existing rights” cannot be assigned an
unduly restrictive definition. 101
Petitioners concede that Congress is mandated under Section 5, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution to
protect the rights of in-
_______________
capital of which is owned by such citizens, subject to any existing right, grant, lease, or concession at the time of the inauguration of the
Government established under this Constitution. Natural resources, with the exception of public agricultural land, shall not be alienated,
and no license, concession, or lease for the exploitation, development, or utilization of any of the natural resources shall be granted for a
period exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for another twenty five years, except as to water rights for irrigation, water supply,
fisheries or industrial uses other than the development of water power, in which cases beneficial use may be the measure and limit of the
grant.
100 Central Azucarera Don Pedro v. Central Bank, 104 Phil. 598 (1954).
101 Sec. 5, Article XII. The State, subject to the provisions of this Constitution and national development policies and programs, shall
protect
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digenous peoples to their ancestral lands and ancestral domains. Nonetheless, they contend that the
recognition and protection under IPRA of the right of ownership of indigenous peoples over ancestral lands
and ancestral domains are far in excess of the legislative power and constitutional mandate of the
102
102
Congress, since such recognition and protection amount to the alienation of lands of the public domain,
which is proscribed under Section 2, Article XIIn of the Constitution.
Section 5, Article XII of the Constitution expresses the sovereign intent to “protect the rights of indigenous
peoples to their ancestral
103
lands.” In its general and ordinary sense, the term “right” refers to any legally
enforceable
104
claim. It is a power, privilege, faculty or demand inherent in one person and incident upon
another. When used in relation to property, 105
“right” includes any interest in or title to an object, or any just
and legal claim to hold, use and enjoy it. Said provision in the Constitution cannot, by any reasonable
construction, be interpreted to exclude the protection of the right of ownership over such ancestral lands. For
this reason, Congress cannot be said to have exceeded its constitutional mandate and power in enacting the
provisions of IPRA, specifically Sections 7(a) and 8, which recognize the right of ownership of the indigenous
peoplesover ancestral lands.
The second paragraph of Section 5, Article XII also grants Congress the power to “provide for the
applicability of customary laws governing property rights or relations in determining the ownership and
extent of ancestral domains.” In light of this provision, does Congress have the power to decide whether
ancestral domains shall be private property or part of the public domain? Also, does Congress have the power
to determine whether the “extent” of
_______________
the rights of indigenous cultural communities to their ancestral lands to ensure their economic, social,and cultural well-being.
The Congress may provide for the applicability of customary laws governing property rights and relations in determining the
ownership and extent of ancestral domains.
102 See Memorandum of Petitioners, Rollo, pp. 863-864.
103 SIBAL, PHILIPPINE LEGAL ENCYCLOPEDIA, p. 893
104 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, 5th ed., p. 1189.
105 Ibid.
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ancestral domains shall include the natural resources found therein?

It is readily apparent from the constitutional records that the framers of the Constitution did not intend
Congress to decide whether ancestral domains shall be public or private property. Rather, they acknowledged
that ancestral domains shall be treated as private property, and that customary laws shall merely determine
whether such private ownership is by the entire indigenous cultural community, or by individuals, families, or
clans within the community. The discussion below between Messrs. Regalado and Bennagen and Mr. Chief
Justice Davide, then members of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, is instructive:
MR. REGALADO. Thank you, Madame President. May I seek some clarifications from either Commissioner Bennagen or
Commissioner Davide regarding this phrase “CONGRESS SHALL PROVIDE FOR THE APPLICABILITY OF
CUSTOMARY LAWS GOVERNING PROPERTY RIGHTS OR RELATIONS in determining the ownership and extent of
the ancestral domain,” because ordinarily it is the law on ownership and the extent thereof which determine the property
rights or relations arising therefrom. On the other hand, in this proposed amendment the phraseology is that it is the
property rights or relations which shall be used as the basis in determining the ownership and extent of the ancestral
domain. I assume there must be a certain difference in the customary laws and our regular civil laws on property.
MR. DAVIDE. That is exactly the reason, Madam President, why we will leave it to Congress to make the necessary
exception to the general law on property relations.
MR. REGALADO. I was thinking if Commissioner Bennagen could give us an example of such a customary law wherein
it is the property rights and relations that determine the ownership and the extent of that ownership, unlike the basic
fundamental rule that it is the ownership and the extent of ownership which determine the property rights and relations
arising therefrom and consequent thereto. Perhaps, these customary laws may have a different provision or thrust so that
we could make the corresponding suggestions also by way of an amendment.
MR. DAVIDE. That is exactly my own perception.
MR. BENNAGEN. Let me put it this way.
There is a range of customary laws governing certain types of ownership. There would be ownership based on
individuals, on clan or lineage,
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or on community. And the thinking expressed in the consultation 106 is that this should be codified and should be recognized
in relation to existing national laws. That is essentiallytheconcept. (Emphasis supplied.)
The intention to treat ancestral domains as private property is also apparent from the following exchange
between Messrs. Suarez and Bennagen:
MR. SUAREZ. When we speak of customary laws governing property rights or relations in determining the
ownership and extent of the ancestral domain, are we thinking in terms of the tribal ownership or
community ownership or of private ownership within the ancestral lands or ancestral domain?
MR. BENNAGEN. The concept of customary laws is that it is considered as ownership by
privateindividuals,clans and even communities.
MR. SUAREZ. So, there will be two aspects to this situation. This means that the State will set aside the
ancestral domain and there is a separate law for that. Within the ancestral domain it could accept more
specific ownership in terms of individualswithin the ancestrallands.
MR. BENNAGEN. Individuals and groups within the ancestral domain.107 (Emphasis supplied.)
It cannot be correctly argued that, because the framers of the Constitution never expressly
mentioned Cariño in their deliberations, they did not intend to adopt the concept of native
108
title to land, or that
they were unaware of native title as an exception to the theory of jura regalia. The framers of the
Constitution, as well as the people adopting it, were presumed to be aware of the prevailing judicial doctrines
concerning the subject of constitutional
109
provisions, and courts should take these doctrines into consideration
in construing theConstitution.
Having thus recognized that ancestral domains under the Constitution are considered as private property
of indigenous peoples,
_______________
106 4RECORD OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION 32.
107 Id., at37.
108 Solicitor General’s Memorandum, Rollo, p. 665.
109 Torres v. Tan Chim, 69 Phil 518 (1940); CIR v. Guerrero, 21 SCRA 180 (1967).
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the IPRA, by affirming or acknowledging such ownership through its various provisions, merely abides by the
constitutional mandate and does not suffer any vice of unconstitutionality.
Petitioners interpret the phrase “subject to the provisions of this Constitution and national development
policies and programs” in Section 5, Article XII of the Constitution to mean “as subject to the provision of
Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution,” which vests in the State ownership of all lands of the public domain,
mineral lands and other natural resources. Following this interpretation, petitioners maintain that ancestral
lands and ancestral domains are the property of the State.
This proposition is untenable. Indeed, Section 2, Article XII reiterates the declarations made in the 1935
and 1973 Constitutions on the state policy of conservation and nationalization of lands of the public domain
and natural resources, and is of paramount importance to our national economy and patrimony. A close
perusal of the records of the 1986 Constitutional Commission reveals that the framers of the Constitution
inserted the phrase “subject to the provisions of this Constitution” mainly to prevent the impairment of
Torrens titles and other prior rights in the determination of what constitutes ancestral lands and ancestral
domains, to wit:
MR. NATIVIDAD. Just one question. I want to clear this section protecting ancestral lands. How does this
affect the Torrens title and other prior rights?
MR. BENNAGEN. I think that was also discussed in the committee hearings and we did say that in cases
where due process is clearly established in terms of prior rights, these two have to be respected.
MR. NATIVIDAD. The other point is: How vast is this ancestral land? Is it true that parts of Baguio City are
considered as ancestral lands?
MR. BENNAGEN. They could be regarded as such. If the Commissioner still recalls, in one of the publications
that I provided the Commissioners, the parts could be considered as ancestral domain in relation to the
whole population of Cordillera but not in relation to certain individuals or certain groups.
MR. NATIVIDAD. The Commissioner means that the whole Baguio City is considered as ancestral land?
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MR. BENNAGEN. Yes, in the sense that it belongs to Cordillera or in the same manner that Filipinos can
speak of the Philippine archipelago as ancestral land, but not in terms of the right of a particular person or
particular group to exploit, utilize, or sell it.
MR. NATIVIDAD. But is clear110that the prior rights will be respected.
MR. BENNAGEN. Definitely.
Thus, the phrase “subject to the provisions of this Constitution” was intended by the framers of the
Constitution as a reiteration of the constitutional guarantee that no person shall be deprived of property
without dueprocessof law.
There is another reason why Section 5 of Article XII mandating the protection of rights of the indigenous
peoples to their ancestral lands cannot be construed as subject to Section 2 of the same Article ascribing
ownership of all public lands to the State. The Constitution must be construed as a whole. It is a rule that
when construction is proper, the whole Constitution is examined in order to determine the 111
meaning of any
provision. That construction should beusedwhichwould give effect to the entire instrument.
Thus, the provisions of the Constitution on State ownership of public lands, mineral lands and other
natural resources should be read together with the other provisions
112
thereof which firmly recognize the rights
of the indigenous peoples. These, as set forth herein before, include: Section 22, Article II, providing that the
State recognizes and promotes the rights of indigenous peoples within the framework of national unify and
development; Section 5, Article XII, calling for the protection of the rights of indigenous cultural communities
to their ancestral lands to ensure their economic, social, and cultural well-being, and for the applicability of
customary laws governing property rights and relations in determining the ownership and extent of ancestral
domains; Section 1, Article XIII,directing the removal or reduction of social, economic,
_______________
111 See ICOOLEY, CONST., LIMITATIONS, 8TH ED., pp. 127-129.
112 See pp. 8-9 of this Opinion for the full text of the constitutional provisions mentioned.
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political and cultural inequities and inequalities by equitably diffusing wealth and political power for the
common good; Section 6, Article XIII, directing the application of the principles of agrarian reform or
stewardship in the disposition and utilization of other natural resources, subject to prior rights, homestead
rights of small settlers, and the rights of indigenous communities to their ancestral lands; Section 17, Article
XIV, decreeing that the State shall recognize, respect, and protect the rights of indigenous cultural
communities to preserve and develop their cultures, traditions, and institutions; and Section 12, Article
XVI, authorizing the Congress to create a consultative body to advise the President on policies affecting
indigenous culturalcommunities.
Again, as articulated in the Constitution, the first
113
goal of the national economy is the more equitable
distribution of opportunities, income,
114
and wealth. Equity is given prominence as the first objective of
national economic development. The framers of the Constitution did not, by the phrase “subject to the
provisions of this Constitution and national development policies and programs,”
_______________
113 Section 1, Article XII provides:
The goals of the national economy are a more equitable distribution of opportunities, income, and wealth’, a sustained increase in the
amount of goods and services produced by the nation for the benefit of the people; and an expanding productivity as the key to raisingthe
qualityof life for all, especially theunderprivileged.
The State shall promote industrialization and full employment based on sound agricultural development and agrarian reform, through
industries that make full and efficient use of human and natural resources, and which are competitive in both domestic and foreign
markets. However, the State shall protect Filipino enterprises against unfair foreigncompetition and tradepractices.
In the pursuit of these goals, all sectors of the economy and all regions of the country shall be given optimum opportunity to develop.
Private enterprises, including corporations, cooperatives and similar collective organizations, shall be encouraged to broaden the base of
their ownership. (Emphasis supplied.)
114 BERNAS, THE INTENT OF THE 1986 CONSTITUTION WRITERS, p. 800, citing the sponsorship speech of Dr. Bernardo Villegas,
Chairman of the Committee on NationalEconomy and Patrimony.
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intend to establish a hierarchy of constitutional norms. As explained by then Commissioner (now Chief
Justice) Hilario G. Davide, Jr., it was not their objective to make certain interests primary or paramount, or to
create absolute limitations or outright prohibitions;rather, the idea is towards the balancing of interests:
BISHOP BACANI. In Commissioner Davide’s formulation of the first sentence, he says: “The State, SUBJECT TO THE
provisions of this Constitution AND NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT POLICIES AND PROGRAMS shall guarantee the
rights of cultural or tribal communities to their ancestral lands to insure their economic, social and cultural wellbeing. “
There are at least two concepts here which receive different weights very often. They are the concepts of national
development policies and programs, and the rights of cultural or tribal communities to their ancestral lands, et cetera. I
would like to ask: When the Commissioner proposed this amendment, which was the controlling concept? I ask this
because sometimes the rights of cultural minorities are precisely transgressed in the interest of national development
policies and programs. Hence, I would like to know which is the controlling concept here. Is it the rights of indigenous
peoples to their ancestral lands or is it national development policies and programs.
MR. DAVIDE. It is not really a question, of which is primary or which is more paramount. The concept introduced here
is really the balancing of interests. That is what we seek to attain. We have to balance the interests taking into account
the specific needs and115
the specific interests also of these cultural communities in like manner that we did so in the
autonomous regions. (Emphasis supplied.)
B. The provisions of RA. 8371 do not infringe upon the State’s ownership over thenatural resources withinthe
ancestral domains.
Petitioners posit that IPRA
116
deprives the State of its ownership over mineral lands of the public domain and
other natural resources, as well as117the State’s full control and supervision over the exploration, development
and utilization of natural resources. Specifically, petitioners and the Solicitor General assail Sections 3
_______________
115 4 RECORD OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL COMMISSION 34.
116 Petition, Rollo,
pp. 18-19.
117 Id.,at 20
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118 119 120
(a), 5, and 7 of IPRA as violative of Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution which states, in part, that
“[a] 11 lands of the public
_______________
118 Section 3. Definition of Terms.—For Purposes of this Act, the followingterms shall mean:
a) Ancestral Domains.—Subject to Section 56 hereof, refer to all areas generally belonging to ICCs/IPs comprising lands, inland
waters, coastal areas, and natural resources therein, held under a claim of ownership, occupied or possessed by ICCs/IPs, by
themselves or through their ancestors, communally or individually since time immemorial, continuously to the present except
when interrupted by war, force majeure or displacement by force, deceit, stealth or as a consequence of government projects or any
other voluntary dealings entered into by government and private individuals/corporations, and which are necessary to ensure their
economic, social and cultural welfare. It shall include ancestral lands, forests, pasture, residential, agricultural, and other lands,
individually owned whether alienable and disposable or otherwise, hunting grounds, burial grounds, worship areas, bodies of
water, mineral and other natural resources, and lands which may no longer be exclusively occupied by ICCs/IPs but from which
they traditionally had access to for their subsistence and traditional activities, particularly the home ranges of ICCs/IPs who are
still nomadicand/or shifting cultivators.
119 Section 5. Indigenous Concept of Ownership.—Indigenous concept of ownership sustains the view that ancestral domains and all
resources found therein shall serve as the material bases of their cultural integrity. The indigenous concept of ownership generally holds
that ancestral domains are the ICCs/IPs private but community property which belongs to all generations and therefore cannot be sold,
disposed or destroyed. Itlikewise covers sustainable traditional resourcerights.
120 Section 7. Rights to Ancestral Domains.—The rights of ownershipand possession of ICCs/IPs to their ancestral domains shall be
(a) Right of Ownership.—The right to claim ownership over lands, bodies of water traditionally and actually occupied by ICCs/IPs,
sacred places, traditional hunting and fishing grounds, and all improvements made by them at any time within the domains;
(b) Right to Develop Lands and Natural Resources.—Subject to Section 56 hereof, right to develop, control and use lands and
territories traditionally occupied, owned, or used; to manage and con-
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domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy,121
fisheries,
forests or timber, wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural resources are owned by the State.” They would
have the Court declare as unconstitutional Section 3(a) of IPRA because the inclusion of natural resources in
the definition of ancestral domains purportedly results in the abdication ofState ownership over
theseresources.
I am not convinced.
Section 3(a) merely defines the coverage of ancestral domains, and describes the extent, limit and
composition of ancestral domains by setting forth the standards and guidelines in determining whether a
particular area is to be considered as part of and within the ancestral domains. In other words, Section 3(a)
serves only as a yardstick which points out what properties are within the ancestral domains. It does not
confer or recognize any right of ownership over the natural resources to the indigenous peoples. Its purpose is
definitional and not declarative ofa right or title.
The specification of what areas belong to the ancestral domains is, to our mind, important to ensure that no
unnecessary encroachment on private properties outside the ancestral domains will result during the
delineation process. The mere fact that Section 3(a) defines ancestral domains to include the natural resources
_______________
serve natural resources within the territories and uphold the responsibilities for future generations; to benefit and share the profits
from allocation and utilization of the natural resources found therein; the right to negotiate the terms and conditions for the exploration of
natural resources in the areas for the purpose of ensuring ecological, environmental protection and the conservation measures, pursuant
to national and customary laws; the right to an informed and intelligent participation in the formulation and implementation of any
project, government or private, that will affect or impact upon the ancestral domains and to receive just and fair compensation for any
damages which they may sustain as a result of the project; and the right to effective measures by the government to prevent any
interference with, alienation and encroachment upon these rights; x x x (Emphasis supplied.)
121 Section 2, Article XII, CONSTITUTION.
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found therein does not ipso facto convert the character of such natural resources as private property of the
indigenous peoples. Similarly, Section 5 in relation to Section 3(a) cannot be construed as a source of
ownership rights of indigenous people over the natural resources simply because it recognizes ancestral
domains as their “private but community property.”
The phrase “private but community property” is merely descriptive of the indigenous peoples’ concept of
ownership as distinguished from that provided in the Civil Code. In Civil Law, “ownership” is the
“independent and general
122
power of a person over a thing for purposes recognized by law and within the limits
established thereby.” The civil law concept of ownership has the following attributes: jus utendi or the right
to receive from the thing that which it produces, jus abutendi or the right to consume the thing by its use, jus
disponendi or the power to alienate, encumber, transform and even destroy that which123is owned and jus
vindicandi or the right to exclude other persons from the possession the thing owned. In contrast, the
indigenous peoples’ concept of ownership emphasizes the importance of communal or group ownership. By
virtue of the
124
communal character of ownership, the property held in common “cannot be sold, disposed or
destroyed” because
125
it was meant to benefit the whole indigenous community and not merely the
individualmember.
That IPRA is not intended to bestow ownership over natural resources to the indigenous peoples is also
clear from the deliberations of the bicameral conference committee on Section 7 which recites the rights of
indigenous peoples over their ancestral domains, to wit:
_______________
122 TOLENTINO, COMMENTARIES AND JURISPRUDENCE ON THE CIVIL CODE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Vol. II, p. 42 (1983); see
alsoArticles 427 and 428, Civil Code.

123 Id.,at 43.
124 Section 5, R.A. 8371.
125 Ibid.
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126
CHAIRMAN FLAVIER. Accepted. Section 8 rights to ancestral domain, this iswhere we transferredthe other provision
but here itself—
HON. DOMINGUEZ. Mr. Chairman, if I may be allowed to make a very short Statement. Earlier, Mr. Chairman, we
have decided to remove the provisions on natural resources because we all agree that that belongs to the State. Now, the
plight or the rights of those indigenous communities living in forest and areas where it could be exploited by mining, by
dams, so can we not also provide a provision to give little protection or either rights for them to be consulted before any
mining areas should be done in their areas, any logging done in their areas or any dam construction because this has been
disturbing our people especially in the Cordilleras. So, if there could be, if our lawyers or the secretariat could just propose
a provision for incorporation here so that maybe the right to consultation and the right to be compensated when there are
damages within their ancestral lands.
CHAIRMAN FLAVIER. Yes, very well taken but to the best of my recollection both are already considered in
subsequent sections which we are now lookingfor.
HON. DOMINGUEZ. Thank you.
CHAIRMAN FLAVIER. First of all there is a line that gives priority use for the indigenous people where they are.
Number two, in terms of the mines there is a need for prior consultation of source which is here already. So, anyway it is
on the record that you want to make sure that the secretariat takes note of those two issues and my assurance is that it is
alreadythereand I will make sure that theycross check.
HON. ADAMAT. I second that, Mr. Chairman.
CHAIRMAN FLAVIER. Okay, 127
thank you. So we now move to Section 8, there is a Senate version you do not have and if
you agree we will adopt that. (Emphasis supplied.)
Further, Section 7 makes no mention of any right of ownership of the indigenous peoples over the natural
resources. In fact, Sec-
_______________
126 Should be Section 7. The Transcript of Session Proceedings of the deliberations of the Bicameral Conference Committee on National
Cultural Communities regarding House Bill No. 9125 refers to Section 8 but the Committee was actually discussing Section 7 on Rights to
Ancestral Domains.
127 Transcript of Session Proceedings, Bicameral Conference Committee on National Cultural Communities, October 9, 1997, XTV-2.
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tion 7(a) merely recognizes the “right to claim ownership over lands, bodies of water traditionally and actually
occupied by indigenous peoples, sacred places, traditional hunting and fishing grounds, and all improvements
made by them at any time within the domains.” Neither does Section 7(b), which enumerates certain rights of
the indigenous peoples over the natural resources found within their ancestral domains, contain any
recognition of ownership vis-a-vis the natural resources.
What is evident is that the IPRA protects the indigenous
128
peoples’ rights and welfare in relation to the
natural resources found within their ancestral domains, including the preservation of the ecological balance
therein and the need to ensure that the indigenous peoples will not be unduly displaced when State-approved
activities involving the natural resources located therein are undertaken.
Finally, the concept of native title to natural resources,unlike native title to land, has
129
not been recognized
in the Philippines. NCIP and Flavier, et al. invoke the case of Reavies v. 130
Fianza in support of their thesis
that native title to natural resources has been upheld in this jurisdiction. They insist that “it is possible for
_______________
128 Sections 7 (b) and Section 57,R.A. 8371.
129 40 Phil. 1017 (1909), 215 US 16, 54 L Ed 72.
130 Ibid. The facts of the case were discussed in Fianza vs. Reavies, (7 Phil. 610 [1909]) thus: Jose Fianza, et al., members of the Igorot
tribe, claimed that he and his predecessors had, for more than fifty years prior to 1901, possessed a certain parcel of mineral land on
which were found two gold mines. The same parcel of land was also claimed by an American, J.F. Reavies, who entered the land in 1901
and proceeded to locate mining claims according to the mining laws of the United States. The Philippine Supreme Court held that
Fianza, et al. were the rightful owners of the mineral lands pursuant to Section 45 of the Philippine Bill of 1902 which in sum states that
where a person has held or worked on his mining claims for a period equivalent to ten years, evidence of such possession and working of
the claims for such period shall be sufficient to establish a right to a patent thereto. On appeal, the United States Supreme Court affirmed
the decision of the Philippine Supreme Court and held that the indigenous peoples were the rightful owners of the contested parcel of
land, stating that the possession and working by Fianza, et al. of the
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rights over natural 131
resources to vest on a private (as opposed to a public) holder if these were held prior to the
1935 Constitution.” However, a judicious examination of Reavies reveals that, contrary to the position of
NCIP and Flavier, et al., the Court did not recognize native title to natural resources. Rather, it merely upheld
the right of the indigenous peoples to claim ownership of minerals under the Philippine Bill of1902.
While as previously discussed, native title to land or private ownership by Filipinos of land by virtue of
time immemorial possession in the concept of an owner was acknowledged and recognized as far back during
the Spanish colonization of the Philippines, there was no similar favorable treatment as regards natural
resources. The unique value of natural resources has been acknowledged by the State and is the underlying
reason for its consistent132assertion of ownership and control over said natural resources from the Spanish
regime up to the present. Natural re-
_______________
mining claim in the Philippine Islands for the time required under the Section 45 of the Philippine Bill of 1902 to establish the right to
a patent, need not have been under a claim of title.
131 Memorandum of Intervenors Flavier, et al., Rollo,p. 918.
132 Article I of the Decree of Superior Civil Government of January 29, 1864 provided that The supreme ownership of mines throughout
the kingdom belong to the crown and the king. They shall not be exploited except by persons who obtained special grant from this superior
government and by those who may secure it thereafter, subject to this regulation.” (FRANCISCO, PHILIPPINE LAWS ON NATURAL
RESOURCES, 2nd ed. [1956], p. 14, citing the unpublished case of Lawrence v. Garduno G.R. No. 19042.)
Article 2 of the Royal Decree of May 14, 1867 (the Spanish Mining Law), the law in force at the time of the cession of the Philippines to the United States
contained a similar declaration, thus:
The ownership of the substances enumerated in the preceding article (among them those of inflammable nature) belongs to the state, and they
cannot be disposed of without an authorization issued by the Superior Civil Governor.
The Spanish Civil Code contained the following analogous provisions affirming the State’s ownership overminerals:
Art. 339. Property of public dominium is—
x x x
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sources, especially minerals, were considered by Spain as an abundant source of revenue to finance its battles
in wars against other
_______________
2. That belonging exclusively to the State which, without being of general public use, is employed in some public service, or in the development of the
national wealth, such as walls, fortresses, and other works for the defense of the territory, and mines,until granted to private individuals.
Art. 350. The proprietor of land is the owner of the surface and of everything under it and may build, plant or excavate thereon, as he may see fit,
subject to any existing easements and to the provisions of the Laws on Mines and Watersand to police regulations.
After the Philippines was ceded to Spain, the Americans continued to adhere to the concept of State-ownership of natural resources.
However, the open and free exploration, occupation and purchase of mineral deposits and the land where they may be found were allowed
under the Philippine Bill of 1902. Section 21 thereof stated:
Sec. 21. That all valuable mineral deposits in public lands in the Philippine Islands, both surveyed and unsurveyed, are hereby declared to be free and
open to exploration, occupation and purchase, and the land in which they are found, to occupation and purchase, by citizens of the United States, or of
said Islands: Provided, That when on any lands in said Islands entered and occupied as agricultural lands under the provisions of this Act, but not
patented, mineral deposits have been found, the working of such mineral deposits is hereby forbidden until the person, association, or corporation who or
which has entered and is occupying such lands shall have paid to the Government of said Islands such additional sum or sums as will make the total
amount paid for the mineral claim or claims in which said deposits are located equal to the amount charged by the Government for the same as mineral
claims.
Other natural resources such as water and forests were similarly regarded as belonging to the State during both the Spanish and
American rule in the Philippines,viz:
Article 33 of the Law of Waters of August 3, 1866 defined waters of public ownership as (1) the waters springing continuously or
intermittently from lands of the public domain; (2) the waters of rivers; and (3) the continuous or intermittent waters of springs and
creeks running through their natural channels.
Article 1 of the same law states:
The following arealso part of the national domain open to public use:
1. The coasts or maritime frontiers of the Philippine territory with their coves, inlets, creeks, roadsteads, bays and ports
2. The coast of the sea, that is, the maritime zone encircling the coasts, to the full width recognized by international law. The state provides for and
regulates the police supervision and the uses of this zone as well as
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nations. Hence, Spain, by asserting its ownership over minerals wherever these may be found, whether in
public or private133 lands, recognized the separability of title over lands and that over minerals which may
befound therein.
_______________
the right of refuge and immunity therein, in accordance with law and international treaties.
With respect to forests, there are references made regarding State-ownership of forest lands in Supreme Court decisions (See Director
of Forestry vs. Munoz, 23 SCRA 1183, 1198-1199 [1968]; Director of Lands vs. Abanzado, 65 SCRA 5, 11 [1975]; Mapa vs. Insular
Government, 10 Phil. 175, 184 [1908]; Montano vs. Insular Government, 12 Phil. 572, 584 [1909]).
The State’s ownership over natural resources was embodied in the 1935, 1973 and 1987 Constitutions. Section 1, Article XII of the 1935
Constitution declared:
All agricultural, timber and mineral lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy,
and other natural resources of the Philippines belong to the State, and their disposition, exploitation, development, or utilization shall be limited to
citizens of the Philippines, or to corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of the capital of which is owned by such citizens, subject to any
existing right, grant, lease or concession at the time of the inauguration of the Government established under this Constitution. Natural resources, with
the exception of public agricultural land, shall not be alienated, and no license, concession, or lease for the exploitation, or utilization of any of the natural
resources shall be granted for a period exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for another twenty-five years, except as to water rights for irrigation,
water supply, fisheries, or industrial uses other than the development of water power, in which cases beneficial use may be the measure and the limit of
the grant.
Section 8, ArticleXIV of the 1973 Constitution provided:
All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, wildlife, and other
natural resources of the, Philippines belong to the State. With the exception of agricultural, industrial or commercial, residential, and resettlement lands
of the public domain, natural resources shall not be alienated, and no license, concession, or lease for the exploration, development, exploitation, or
utilization of any of the natural resources shall be granted for a period exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for not more than twenty-five years. except
as to water rights for irrigation water supply, fisheries, or industrial uses other than the development of water power, in which cases, beneficial usemay
be the measure and limit of the grant.
133 NOBLEJAS, PHILIPPINE LAW ON NATURAL RESOURCES 1961 Revised Ed., p. 6.
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On the other hand, the United States viewed natural resources as a source of wealth for its nationals. As the
owner of natural resources over the Philippines after the latter’s cession from Spain, the United States saw it
fit to allow both Filipino and American citizens to explore and exploit minerals in public lands, and to grant
patents to private mineral lands. A person who acquired ownership over a parcel of private mineral land
pursuant to the laws 134
then prevailing could exclude other persons, even the State, from exploiting minerals
within his property. Although the United States made a distinction between minerals found in public lands
and those found in private lands, title in these minerals was in all cases sourced from the State. The framers
of the 1935 Constitution found it necessary to maintain the State’s ownership over natural resources to insure
their conservation for future generations of Filipinos, to prevent foreign control of the country through
economic domination; and to avoid situations whereby “the Philippines would 135
become a source of international
conflicts, thereby posingdangerto its internal security and independence.
The declaration of State ownership and 136control over minerals and 137
other natural resources in the 1935
Constitution was reiterated in both the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions.
_______________
134 See LAUREL (ED.), PROCEEDINGS OF THE PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION, VOL. VI, pp. 494-495.
135 Explanatory Note of the Committee on Nationalization of Lands and Natural Resources, September 14, 1934, reproduced in
LAUREL (ED.), PROCEEDINGS OF THE PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION, VOL. VII, pp. 464-468; see also DE LEON
AND DE LEON, JR., PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND CASES, VOL. 2, pp. 801-802.
136 Section 8, Article XIV, see note 139 for the full text of the provision.
137 Paragraph 1, Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution provides:
All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other minerals oils, all forces of potential energy, fisheries, forests or timber,
wildlife, flora and fauna, and other natural resources are owned by the State. With the exception of agricultural lands, all other natural resources shall
not be alienated. The explo-
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Having ruled that the natural resources which may be found within the ancestral domains belong to the State,
the Court deems it necessary to clarify that the jurisdiction of the NCIP with respect to ancestral domains
under Section 52 [i] of IPRA extends only to thelands and not to thenatural resourcestherein.
Section 52[i] provides:
Turnover of Areas Within Ancestral Domains Managed by Other Government Agencies.—The Chairperson of the NCIP
shall certify that the area covered is an ancestral domain. The secretaries of the Department of Agrarian Reform,
Department of Environment and Natural Resources, Department of Interior and Local Government, and Department of
Justice, the Commissioner of the National Development Corporation, and any other government agency claiming
jurisdiction over the area shall be notified thereof. Such notification shall terminate any legal basis for the jurisdiction
previously claimed.
Undoubtedly, certain areas that are claimed as ancestral domains may still be under the administration of
other agencies of the Government, such as the Department of Agrarian Reform, with respect to agricultural
lands, and the Department of Environment and Natural Resources with respect to timber, forest and
mineral lands. Upon the certification of these areas as ancestral domain following the procedure outlined in
Sections 51 to 53 of the IPRA, jurisdiction of the government agency or agencies concerned over lands forming
part thereof ceases. Nevertheless, the jurisdiction of government agencies over the natural resources within
the ancestral domains does not terminate by such certification because said agencies are mandated under
existing laws to administer the natu-
_______________
ration, development, and utilization of natural resources shall be under the full control and supervision of the State. The State may
directly undertake such activities, or it may enter into co-production, joint venture, or production-sharing agreements with Filipino
citizens, or corporations and associations at least sixty per centum of whose capital is owned by such citizens. Such agreements may be for
a period not exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for not more than twenty-five years, and under such rights for irrigation, water
supply, fisheries, or industrial uses other than the development of water power, beneficial use may be the measure and limit of the grant.
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ral resources for the State, which is the owner thereof. To construe Section 52[i] as divesting the State,
through the government agencies concerned, of jurisdiction over the natural resources within the ancestral
domains would be inconsistent with the established doctrine that all natural resourcesareownedby the State.
C. The provisions of IPRA pertaining to the utilization of natural resourcesare notunconstitutional.

The IPRA provides that indigenous peoples shall have the right to manage and conserve the natural resources
found on the ancestral domains, to benefit from and share in the profits from the allocation and utilization
138
of
these resources, and to negotiate the terms and conditions for the exploration of such natural resources. The
statute also grants them priority rights in the139 harvesting, extraction, development or exploitation of any
natural resources within the ancestral domains. Before the NCIP can
_______________
138 Section 7. Rights to Ancestral Domains.—The rights of ownership and possession of ICCs/IPs to their ancestral domains shall be

xxx
b) Right to Develop Lands and Natural Resources.—Subject to Section 56 hereof, right to develop, control and use lands and territories traditionally
occupied, owned, or used; to manage and conserve natural resources within the territories and uphold the responsibilities for future generations; to benefit
and share the profits from allocation and utilization of the natural resources found therein; the right to negotiate the terms and conditions for the
exploration of natural resources in the areas for the purpose of ensuring ecological, environmental protection and the conservation measures, pursuant to
national and customary laws; the right to an informed and intelligent participation in the formulation and implementation of any project, government or
private, that will affect or impact upon the ancestral domains and to receive just and fair compensation for any damages which they may sustain as a
result of the project; and the right to effective measures by the government to prevent any interference with, alienation and encroachment upon these
rights;
139 Section 57. Natural Resources within Ancestral Domains.—TheICCs/IPs shall have priority rights in the harvesting, extraction,
develop-
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issue a certification for the renewal, or grant of any concession, license or lease, or for the perfection of any
production-sharing
140
agreement the prior informed written consent of the indigenous peoples concerned must be
obtained. In return, the indigenous peoples are given the responsibility to maintain, develop, protect and
conserve the ancestral domains or portions thereof which are found to be necessary for 141 critical watersheds,
mangroves, wildlife sanctuaries, wilderness, protected areas, forest cover, or reforestation.
_______________
ment or exploitation of any natural resources within the ancestral domains. A non-member of the ICCs/IPs concerned may be allowed
to take part in the development and utilization of the natural resources for a period of not exceeding twenty-five (25) years renewable for
not more than twenty-five (25) years: Provided, That a formal and written agreement is entered into with the ICCs/IPs concerned or that
the community, pursuant to its own decision making process, has agreed to allow such operation: Provided, finally, That the NCIP may
exercise visitorial powers and take appropriate action to safeguard the rights of the ICCs/IPs under the same contract.
140 Section 59. Certification Precondition.—All departments and other governmental agencies shall henceforth be strictly enjoined from
issuing, renewing, or granting any concession, license or lease, or entering into any production-sharing agreement, without prior
certification from the NCIP that the area affected does not overlap with any ancestral domain. Such certification shall only be issued after
a field-based investigation is conducted by the Ancestral Domains Office of the area concerned: Provided, That no certification shall be
issued by the NCIP without the free and prior informed and written consent of Indigenous peoples concerned: Provided, further, That no
department, government agency or govern-ment-owned or controlled corporation may issue new concession, license, lease, or production
sharing agreement while there, is a pending application for a CADT: Provided, finally, That the ICCs/IPs shall have the right to stop or
suspend, in accordance with this Act, any project that has not satisfied the requirement of thisconsultation process.
141 Section 58. Environmental Considerations.—Ancestral domains or portions thereof, which are found to be necessary for critical
watersheds, mangroves, wildlife sanctuaries, wilderness, protected areas, forest cover, or reforestation as determined by appropriate
agencies with the full participation of the Indigenous peoples concerned shall be maintained, managed and developed for such
purposes: The indigenous peoples con-
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The Solicitor General argues that these provisions deny the State an active and dominant role in the
utilization of our country’s natural resources. Petitioners, on the other hand, allege that under the
Constitution the exploration, development and utilization of natural resources may only be undertaken by the
State, either directly or indirectly through co-production, joint venture, or production-sharing
142
142
agreements. To petitioners, no other method is allowed by the Constitution. They likewise submit that by
vesting ownership of ancestral lands and ancestral domains in the indigenous peoples, IPRA necessarily
143
gives
them control over the use and enjoyment of such natural resources, to the prejudice of the State.
Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution provides in paragraph 1 thereof that the exploration, development
and utilization of natural resources must be under the full control and supervision of the State, which may
directly undertake such activities or enter into co-production, joint venture, or production-sharing agreements.
This provision, however, should not be read in isolation to avoid a mistaken interpretation that any and all
forms of utilization of natural resources other144than the foregoing are prohibited. The Constitution must be
regarded as consistent with itself throughout. No constitutional provision is to be separated from all the
others, or to be considered alone, all provisions bearing upon a
_______________
cerned shall be given the responsibility to maintain, develop, protect and conserve such areas with the full and effective assistance of
government agencies. Should the Indigenous peoples decide to transfer the responsibility over the areas, said decision must be made in
writing. The consent of the Indigenous peoples should be arrived at in accordance with its customary laws without prejudice to the basic
requirements of existing laws on free and prior Informed consent: Provided, That the transfer shall be temporary and will ultimately
revert to the Indigenous peoples in accordance with the program for technology transfer; Provided, further, That no Indigenous peoples
shall be displaced or relocated for the purpose enumerated under this section without the written consent of the specific persons
authorized to give consent.
142 Citing Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution.
143 Memorandum of Petitioners, Id.,at 840-841.
144 State v. Lathrop, 93 Ohio St 79, 112 NE 209, cited in 16 AM JUR 2d, ConstitutionalLaw, § 100.
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particular subject145
are to be brought into view and to be so interpreted as to effectuate the great purposes of the
fundamental law.
In addition to the means of exploration, development and utilization of the country’s natural resources
stated in paragraph 1, Section 2 of Article XII, the Constitution itself states in the third paragraph of
146
the same
section that Congress may, by law, allow small-scale utilization of natural resources by its citizens. Further,
Section 6, Article XIII, directs the State, in the
147
disposition and utilization of natural resources, to apply the
principles of agrarian reform or stewardship. Similarly, Section 7, Article XIII mandates148the State to protect
the rights of subsistence fishermen to the preferential use of marine and fishing resources. Clearly,
_______________
145 Old Wayne Mutual Life Assn. v. McDonough, 204 US 6, 51 L Ed 345, cited in 16 AM JUR 2d Constitutional Law,§ 100.
146 Third paragraph, Section 2, Article XII, Constitution—
The Congress may, by law, allow small scale-utilization of natural resources by Filipino citizens, as well as cooperative fish farming, with priority to
subsistence fishermen and fishworkers in rivers,lakes, bays, and lagoons.
147 Section 6, Article XIII, Constitution—
The State shall apply the principles of agrarian reform or stewardship, whenever applicable in accordance with law, in the disposition and utilization of
other natural resources, including lands of the public domain under lease or concession suitable to agriculture, subject to prior rights, homestead rights of
small settlers, and the rights of the indigenous communities to their ancestral lands.
The State may resettle landless farmers and farmworkers in its own agricultural estates which shall be distributed to them in the manner provided by
law.
148 Section 7, Article XIII, Constitution—
The State shall protect the rights of subsistence fishermen, especially of local communities, to the preferential use of the communal marine and fishing
resources, both inland and offshore. It shall provide support to such fishermen through appropriate technology and research, adequate financial,
production, and marketing assistance, and other services. The State shall also protect, develop, and conserve such resources. The protection shall extend
to offshore
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Section 2, Article XII, when interpreted in view of the pro-Filipino, pro-poor philosophy of our fundamental
law, and in 149 harmony with the other provisions of the Constitution rather as a sequestered
pronouncement, cannot be construed as a prohibition against any and all forms of utilization of natural
resources without the State’s direct participation.
Through the imposition of certain requirements and 150
conditions for the exploration, development and
utilization of the natural resources
151
under existing laws, the State retains full control over such activities,
whetherdoneon small-scale basis or otherwise.
The rights given to the indigenous peoples regarding the exploitation of natural resources under Sections
7(b) and 57 of IPRA amplify what has been granted to them under existing laws, such as the Small-Scale
Mining Act of 1991 (R.A. 7076) and the Philippine Mining Act of 1995 (R.A. 7942). R.A. 7076 expressly
provides that should an ancestral land be declared as a people’s small-scale mining area, the members of the
indigenous152
peoples living within said area shall be given priority in the awarding of small-scale mining
contracts. R.A. 7942 declares that no ancestral land shall be opened for mining operations without the prior
consent of the
_______________
fishing grounds of subsistence fishermen against foreign intrusion. Fishworkers shall receive a just share from their labor in the
utilization of marine and fishing resources.
149 Bower v. Big Horn Canal Assn. (Wyo) 307 P2d 593, cited in 16 AM JUR 2d Constitutional Law, § 100.
150 Republic Act No. 7076 (the Small-Scale Mining Act of 1991), Republic Act No. 7942 (the Philippine Mining Act of 1995).
151 Section 3(b) of R.A. 7076 defines “small-scale mining” as referring to mining activities which rely heavily on manual labor using
simple implements and methods and do not use explosives or heavy mining equipment.
152 Section 7, R.A. 7076 provides:
Ancestral lands.—No ancestral land may be declared as a people’s smallscale mining area without the prior consent of the cultural communities
concerned: Provided, That, if ancestral lands are declared as people’s small-scale mining areas, the members of the cultural communities therein shall be
given priority for the awarding of a people’s small-scale mining contract.
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153
indigenous cultural community concerned and in the event that the members of such indigenous cultural
community give their consent to mining
154
operations within their ancestral land, royalties shall be paid to them
by theparties to themining contract.
In any case, a careful reading of Section 7(b) would reveal that the rights given to the indigenous peoples
are duly circumscribed. These rights are limited only to the following: to manage and conserve natural
resources within territories and uphold it for future generations; to benefit and share the profits from
allocation and utilization of the natural resources found therein; to negotiate the terms and conditions for the
exploration of natural resources in the areas for the purpose of ensuring ecological, environmental protection
and the conservation measures, pursuant to national and customary laws; to an informed and intelligent
participation in the formulation and implementation of any project, government or private, that will affect or
impact upon the ancestral domains and to receive just and fair compensation for any damages which they may
sustain as a result of the project, and the right to effective measures by the government to prevent any
interference with, alienation andencroachment of theserights.
It must be noted that the right to negotiate terms and conditions granted under Section 7(b) pertains only
to the exploration of natural resources. The term “exploration” refers only to the search or prospecting of
mineral resources, or any155
other means for the purpose of determining the existence and the feasibility of
mining them for profit. The exploration, which is merely a preliminary activity, cannot be equated with the
entire process of “exploration, development and utilization” of natural resources which under the
Constitutionbelong to theState.
Section 57, on the other hand, grants the indigenous peoples “priority rights” in the utilization of natural
resources and not absolute ownership thereof. Priority rights does not mean exclusive rights. What is granted
is merely the right of preference or first
_______________
153 Section 16, R.A. 7942.
154 Section 17, R.A. 794?.
155 Sec. 3(q), Chapter 1, Republic Act No. 7942 (the Philippine Mining Act of 1995).
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consideration in the award of privileges provided by existing laws and regulations, with due regard to the
needs and welfare of indigenous peoples living in the area.
There is nothing in the assailed law which implies an automatic or mechanical character in the grant of
concessions. Nor does the law negate the exercise of sound discretion by government entities. Several factors
still have to be considered. For example, the extent and nature of utilization and the consequent impact on the
environment and on the indigenous peoples’ way of life are important considerations. Moreover, the
indigenous peoples must show that they live in the area and that they are in the best position to undertake the
required utilization.
It must be emphasized that the grant of said priority rights to indigenous peoples is not a blanket authority
to disregard pertinent laws and regulations. The utilization of said natural resources is always subject to
compliance by the indigenous peoples with existing laws, such as R.A. 7076 and R.A. 7942 since it is not they
but the State, which owns these resources.
It also bears stressing that the grant of priority rights does not preclude the State from undertaking
activities, or entering into coproduction, joint venture or production-sharing agreements with private entities,
to utilize the natural resources which may be located within the ancestral domains. There is no intention, as
between the State and the indigenous peoples, to create a hierarchy of values; rather, the object is to balance
the interests of the State for national development and those of the indigenous peoples.
Neither does the grant of priority rights to the indigenous peoples exclude non-indigenous peoples from
undertaking the same activities within the ancestral domains upon authority granted by the proper
governmental agency. To do so would unduly limit the ownership rights of the State over the natural
resources.
To be sure, the act of the State of giving preferential right to a particular sector in the utilization of natural
resources is nothing new. As previously mentioned, Section 7, Article XIII of the Constitution mandates the
protection by the State of “the rights of subsistence fishermen, especially of local communities, to the
preferential
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use of communal marine and fishing resources, both inland and offshore.”
Section 57 further recognizes the possibility that the exploration and exploitation of natural resources
within the ancestral domains may disrupt the natural environment as well as the traditional activities of the
indigenous peoples therein. Hence, the need for the prior informed consent of the indigenous peoples before
any search for or utilization of the natural resources within their ancestral domains is undertaken.
In a situation where the State intends to directly or indirectly undertake such activities, IPRA requires that
the prior informed consent of the indigenous peoples be obtained. The State must, as a matter of policy and
law, consult the indigenous peoples in accordance with the intent of the framers of the Constitution that
national development policies and programs should involve a systematic consultation to balance local needs as
well as national plans. As may be gathered from the discussion of the framers of the Constitution on this
point, the national
156
plan presumably takes into account the requirements of the region after thorough
consultation. To this end, IPRA grants to the indigenous peoples the right to an informed and intelligent
participation in the formulation and implementation of any project, government
157
or private, and the right not
to be removed therefrom without their free and prior informed consent. As to non-members, the prior
informed consent takes the form of a formal and written agreement between the indigenous peoples and non-
members under the proviso in Section 57 in case the State enters into a co-production, joint venture, or
production-sharing agreement with Filipino citizens, or corporations. This requirement 158
is not peculiar to
IPRA. Existing159laws and regulations, such 160
as the Philippine Environmental Policy, the Environmental
Impact System, the Local Government Code
_______________
157 Sections7(a)and (b), R.A. 8371.
158 Presidential Decree No. 1151 (1971).
159 Presidential Decree No. 1586 (1978) and DENR Administrative Order No. 37 (1996).
160 Republic Act No. 7160 (1991).
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161
and the Philippine Mining Act of 1995 already require increased consultation and participation of
stakeholders, such as indigenous peoples, in the planning of activities with significant environment impact.
The requirement in Section 59 that prior written informed consent of the indigenous peoples must be
procured before the NCIP can issue a certification for the “issuance, renewal, or grant of any concession,
license or lease, or to the perfection of any production-sharing agreement,” must be interpreted, not as a grant
of the power to control the exploration, development and utilization of natural resources, but merely the
imposition of an additional requirement for such concession or agreement. The clear intent of the law is to
protect the rights and interests of the indigenous peoples which may be adversely affected by the operation of
such entities or licensees.
Corollary Issues
A. IPRA does not violate the Due Process clause.

The first corollary issue raised by petitioners is whether IPRA violates Section 1, Article III of the
Constitution, which provides that “no person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process
of law, nor shall any person be deprived the equal protection of the laws.”
Petitioners maintain that the broad definition of ancestral lands and ancestral domains under Section 3(a)
and 3(b) of IPRA includes private lands. They argue that162
the inclusion of private lands in the ancestral lands
and ancestral domains violates the due process clause. Petitioners’ contention is erroneous.
Sections 3(a) and 3(b) expressly provide that the definition of ancestral lands and ancestral domains are
“subject to Section 56,” which reads:
_______________
161 Republic Act No. 7942.
162 Petition, Rollo,pp. 23-25.
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Sec. 56. Existing Property Rights Regimes.—Property rights within the ancestral domains already existing and/or vested
upon effectivity of this Act, shall be recognizedandprotected.
Petitioners, however, contend that Section 56 aims to protect only the vested rights of indigenous peoples, but
not those who are not members of such communities. Following their interpretation, IPRA, under Section 56,
recognizes the rights of indigenous peoples to their ancestral lands and ancestral domains, subject to the vested
rights of the same communities to such ancestral lands and ancestral domains.Such interpretation is obviously
incorrect.
The “property rights” referred to in Section 56 belong to those acquired by individuals, whether indigenous
or non-indigenous peoples. Said provision makes no distinction as to the ethnic origins of the ownership of
these “property rights.” The IPRA thus recognizes and respects “vested rights” regardless of whether they
pertain to indigenous
163
or non-indigenous peoples. Where the law does not distinguish, the courts should not
distinguish. What IPRA only requires is that these “property rights” already exist and/or vestedupon its
effectivity.
Further, by the enactment of IPRA, Congress did not purport to annul any and all Torrens titles within
areas claimed as ancestral lands or ancestral domains. The statute imposes strict procedural requirements for
the proper delineation of ancestral lands and ancestral domains as safeguards against the fraudulent
deprivation of any landowner of his land, whether or not he is member of an indigenous cultural community.
In all proceedings for delineation of ancestral lands and ancestral
164
domains, the Director of Lands shall appear
to represent the interest of the Republic of the Philippines. With regard to ancestral domains, the following
procedure is mandatory: first,petition by an indigenous cultural community, or motu proprio by the
NCIP; second, investigation and census by the Ancestral domains Office (“ADO”) of the
NCIP; third,preliminary report by the ADO; fourth, posting and publication; and lastly, evaluation by the
NCIP upon submission of the final
_______________
163 Ramirez v. CA 248 SCRA 590, 596 (1995).
164 Section 53 (f), R.A. 8371.
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165
report of the ADO. With regard to ancestral lands, unless such lands are within an ancestral domain, the
statute imposes the following procedural requirements: first,application; second, posting and
publication; third,investigation and inspection
166
by the ADO; fourth,delineation; lastly, evaluation by the NCIP
upon submission of a report by the ADO. Hence, we cannot sustain the arguments of the petitioners that the
law affords no protection to those who arenot indigenous peoples.
Neither
167
do the questioned sections of IPRA168
on the composition and powers and jurisdiction of the
NCIP and the application of customary law, violate thedue process clauseof the Constitution.
Petitioners point169out that IPRA provides that the NCIP shall be composed exclusively of members of
indigenous peoples,170 and that the NCIP shall have jurisdiction over all claims and disputes involving
indigenous peoples, including even disputes between a
_______________
165 Section 52, R.A. 8371.
166 Section 53, R.A. 8371.
167 Sections 40, 51, 52, 53, 54, 62and 66, R.A. No. 8371.
168 Sections 63 and 65, R.A. No. 8371.
169 Section 40. Composition.—The NCIP shall be an independent agency under the Office of the President and shall be composed of
seven (7) Commissioners belonging to the ICCs/IPs, one (1) of whom shall be the Chairperson. The Commissioners shall be appointed by
the President of the Philippines from a list of recommendees submitted by authentic ICCs/IPs: Provided, That the seven (7)
Commissioners shall be appointed specifically from each of the following ethnographic areas, Region I and the Cordilleras; Region II, the
rest of Luzon; Island Groups including Mindoro, Palawan, Romblon, Panay and the rest of the Visayas; Northern and Western Mindanao;
Southern and Eastern Mindanao; and Central Mindanao: Provided, That at least two (2) of the seven (7) Commissioners shall be women.
170 Section 66. Jurisdiction of the NCIP.—The NCIP, through its regional offices, shall have jurisdiction over all claims and disputes
involving rights of ICCs/IPs. Provided, however, That no such dispute shall be brought to the NCIP unless the parties have exhausted all
remedies provided under their customary laws. For this purpose, a certification shall be issued by the Council of Elders/Leaders who
participated in the attempt to settle the dispute that the same has not been resolved, which
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member of such communities

171
and one who is not a member, as well as over disputes in the delineation of
ancestral domains. Petitioners clarify that they do not claim that the members of the NCIP are incapable of
being fair and impartial judges. They merely contend that the NCIP will not appear to be impartial, because a
party who is not a member of an indigenous cultural community “who must defend his case against [one who
is] before judges who are all members of [indigenous
172
peoples] cannot but harbor a suspicion that they do not
have thecoldneutrality of an impartial judge.” In addition, petitioners claim that IPRA 173
prescribes that
customary laws shall be applied first in disputes involving property, succession and land, and that such laws
shall likewise be used in
_______________
certification shall be a condition precedent to the filing of a petition with the NCIP.
171 Section 62. Resolution of Conflicts.—In cases of conflicting interest, where there are adverse claims within the ancestral domains as
delineated in the survey plan, and which can not be resolved, the NCIP shall hear and decide, after notice to the proper parties, the
disputes arising from the delineation of such ancestral domains: Provided, That if the dispute is between and/or among ICCs/IPs
regarding the traditional boundaries of their respective ancestral domains, customary process shall be followed. The NCIP shall
promulgate the necessary rules and regulations to carry out its adjudicatory functions: Provided, further, That any decision, order, award
or ruling of the NCIP on any ancestral domain dispute or on any matter pertaining to the application, implementation, enforcement and
interpretation of this Act may be brought by Petition for Review to the Court of Appeals within fifteen (15) days from receipt of a copy
thereof.
172 Memorandum of Petitioners, Rollo,pp. 873-874.
173 Section 3 (f). Customary Laws.—refer to a body of written and/or unwritten rules, usages, customs and practices traditionally and
continuallyrecognized,accepted and observed by respective ICCs/IPs;

xxx
Sec. 63. Applicable Laws.—Customary laws, traditions and practices of the ICCs/IPs of the land where the conflict arises shall be
applied first with respect to property rights, claims and ownerships, hereditary succession and settlement of land disputes. Any doubt or
ambiguity in the application and interpretation of laws shall be resolved in favor of the ICCs/IPs.
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174
disputes involving indigenous peoples. They assert that “[w]hen the dispute involves a member of an
[indigenous cultural community and another who is not], a resolution of such a dispute based on customary
laws. . . would clearly be a denial of due
175
process . . . [because those who are not indigenous peoples] do not
know what these customary laws are.”
Petitioners’ concerns are unfounded. The fact that the NCIP is composed of members of the indigenous
peoples does not mean that it (the NCIP) is incapable, or will appear to be so incapable, of delivering justice to
the non-indigenous peoples. A person’s possession of the trait of impartiality desirable of a judge has nothing
to do with his or her ethnic roots. In this wise, the indigenous peoples are as capable of rendering justice as the
non-indigenous peoples for, certainly, the latter have no monopoly of the conceptofjustice.
In any case, there are sufficient checks in the law against any abuse by the NCIP of its quasi-judicial
powers. Section 67 states that the decision of the NCIP shall be appealable to the Court of Appeals by petition
for review. The regular remedies under our rules of procedure are likewise available to any party aggrieved by
the decision of the NCIP.
Anent the use of customary laws in determining the ownership and extent of ancestral domains, suffice it to
say that such is allowed under paragraph 2, Section 5 of Article XII of the Constitution. Said provision states,
“The Congress may provide for the applicability of customary laws governing property rights and relations in
determining the ownership and extent of the ancestral domains.” Notably,
176
the use of customary laws under
IPRA is not absolute, for the law speaks merely of primacy of use. The IPRA prescribes the application of
such customary laws where these
_______________
174 Sec.65. Primacy of Customary Laws and Practices.—When disputes involve ICCs/IPs, customary laws and practices shall bemused
to resolve thedispute.
175 Memorandum of Petitioners, Rollo, pp. 875-876.
176 R.A. 8371 states:
Sec. 65. Primacy of Customary Laws and Practices.—When disputes involve ICCs/IPs, customary laws and practices shall be used to resolve the dispute.
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present a workable solution acceptable to the parties, who are members of the same indigenous group. This
interpretation is supported by Section 1, Rule IX of the Implementing Rules which states:
RULE IX. JURISDICTION AND PROCEDURES FOR
ENFORCEMENT OF RIGHTS
Section 1. Primacy of Customary Law.—All conflicts related to ancestral domains and lands, involving ICCs/IPs, such as
but not limited to conflicting claims and boundary disputes, shall be resolved by the concerned parties through the
application of customary laws in the area where the disputed ancestral domain or land is located.
All conflicts related to the ancestral domains or lands where one of the parties is a non-ICC/IP or where the dispute
could not be resolved through customary law shall be heard and adjudicated in accordance with the Rules on Pleadings,
Practice and Procedures before the NCIP to be adopted hereafter. (Emphasis supplied.)
The application of customary law is limited to disputes

177
concerning property rights or relations in determining
the ownership
178
and extent of the ancestral domains, where all the parties involved are members of indigenous
peoples, specifically, of the same indigenous group. It therefore follows that when one of the parties to a
dispute is a non-member of an indigenous group, or when the indigenous peoples involved belong to different
groups, the applicationof customary law isnot required.
Like any other law, the objective of IPRA in prescribing the primacy of customary law in disputes
concerning ancestral lands and domains where all parties involved are indigenous peoples is justice. The
utilization of customary laws is in line with the constitutional policy of recognizing the application thereof
through legislation passed by Congress.
Furthermore, the recognition and use of customary law is not a novel idea in this jurisdiction. Under the
Civil Code, use of customary law is sanctioned, as long as it is proved as a fact according to
_______________
177 See Secs. 62and 63, R.A. 8371.
178 Sec. 65, R.A.8371.
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179 180
the rules of evidence, and it is not contrary to law, public order or public policy. Moreover, the Local
Government Code of 1991 calls for the recognition and application of customary laws to the resolution of issues
involving members of indigenous peoples. This law admits the operation of customary laws in the settling of
disputes if such are
181
ordinarily used in barangays where majority of the inhabitants are membersof
indigenouspeoples.
B. Section 1, Part II, Rule VII of the Implementing Rules of IPRA does not infringe upon the President’s power
of control over the Executive Department
The second corollary issue is whether the Implementing Rules of IPRA violate Section 17, Article VII of the
Constitution, which provides that:
The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus, and offices. He shallensure that the laws be
faithfully executed.
The assailedprovision of the ImplementingRules provides:
Rule VII. The National Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP)

xxx
Part II: NCIP as an Independent Agency Under the Office of the President
_______________
179 The Civil Code provides:
Article 12. A custom must be proved as a fact, according to the rules of evidence.
180 The Civil Code provides:
Article 11. Customs which are contrary to law, public order or public policyshall not be countenanced.
181 R.A. No. 7160 reads:
Sec. 399. Lupong Tagapamayapa.—

xxx
(f) In barangays where majority of the inhabitants are members of indigenous peoples, local systems of settling disputes of indigenous peoples, local
systems of settling disputes through their councils of datus or elders shall be recognized without prejudice to theapplicable provisions of this Code.
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Section 1. The NCIP is the primary agency of government for the formulation and implementation of policies, plans and
programs to recognize, promote and protect the rights and well-being of indigenous peoples. It shall be an independent
agency under the Office of the President. As such, the administrative relationship of the NCIP to the Office of the President
is characterized as a lateral but autonomous relationship for purposes of policy and program coordination. This
relationship shall be carried out through a system of periodic reporting. Matters of day-to-day administration or all those
pertaining to internal operations shall be left to the discretion of the Chairperson of the Commission, as the Chief
Executive Officer.
Petitioners asseverate that the aforecited rule infringes upon the power of control of the President over the
NCIP by characterizing the relationship of the NCIP to the Office of the President as “lateral but autonomous .
. . for purposes of policy and program coordination.”
Although both Section 40 of the IPRA and Section 1, Part II, Rule VII of the Implementing Rules
characterize the NCIP as an independent agency under the Office of the President, such characterization does
not remove said body from the President’s control and supervision.
The NCIP has been designated under IPRA as the primary government agency responsible for the
formulation and implementation of policies, plans and programs to promote and protect the rights and well
being of182 the indigenous peoples and the recognition
183
of their184ancestral domain as well185 as their rights
thereto. It has been granted administrative, quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial powers to carry out its
mandate. The diverse nature of the NCIP’s functions renders it impossible to place said agency entirely under
the control of only one branch of government and this, apparently, is the reason for its characterization by
Congress as an independent agency. An “independent agency” is defined as
_______________
182 Sec. 38, R.A.8371.
183 Sec. 44 (a), (b), (c), (d), (f), (g), (h), (i), (j), (k), (1), (m), (n), (p), (q), R.A. 8371.
184 Sec. 44 (o), R.A. 8371.
185 Secs. 44 (e),51-54, 62, R.A.8371.
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an administrative body independent of the executive branch or one not subject to a superior head of
department, as distinguished from186a “subordinate agency” or an administrative body whose action is subjectto
administrative review or revision.
That Congress did not intend to place the NCIP under the control of the President in all instances is
evident in the IPRA itself, which provides that the decisions
187
of the NCIP in the exercise of its quasi-judicial
functions shall be appealable to the Court of Appeals, like those of the National Labor Relations Commission
(NLRC) and the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). Nevertheless, the NCIP, although independent
to a certain degree, was placed by Congress “under the office of the President” and, as such, is still subject to
the President’s
188
power of control and supervision granted under Section 17, Article VII of the
Constitution with respect to its performance of administrative functions, such as the 189
following: (1) the NCIP
must secure the President’s approval in obtaining loans to finance its projects; (2) it must obtain the
President’s approval for any negotiation
190
for funds and for the acceptance of gifts and/or properties in whatever
form and from whatever source; (3) the NCIP shall submit annual reports of its operations 191 and achievements
to the President, and advise the latter on all matters relating to 192
the indigenous peoples; and (4) it shall
exercise such other powers as may be directed
193
by the President. The President is also given the power to
appoint the Commissioners of the NCIP as well as194to remove them from office for cause motu proprio or upon
the recommendation of any indigenous community.
_______________
186 1 AM JUR 2D, Administrative Law, § 55.
187 Sec. 62, R.A.8371.
188 Sec. 17. The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus, and offices. He shall ensure that the laws be
faithfully executed.
189 Sec. 44 (f), R.A. 8371.
190 Sec. 44 (g), R.A. 8371.
191 Sec. 44 (j), RA. 8371.
192 Sec. 44 (p), R.A. 8371.
193 Sec. 40, R.A.8371.
194 Sec. 42, R.A.8371.
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To recapitulate:
(1) The provisions of the IPRA (specifically Sections 3, paragraphs [a] and [b], 5, 6, 7, and 8) affirming the
ownership by the indigenous peoples of their ancestral lands and domains by virtue of native title do
not diminish the State’s ownership of lands of the public domain, because said ancestral lands and
domains are considered as private land, and never to have 195
been part of the public domain, following
the doctrine laid down in Cariño vs. Insular Government;
(2) The constitutional provision vesting ownership over minerals, mineral lands and other natural
resources in the State is not violated by Sections 3, 5, 7, 56, 57, 58 and 59 of the IPRA which grant
certain rights to the indigenous peoples over the natural resources found within the ancestral
domains, e.g., to benefit from and share in the profits from the allocation and utilization of the same,
as well as priority rights in the harvesting, extraction, development or exploitation thereof. The State
retains full control over the exploration, development and utilization of natural resources even with
the grant of said rights to the indigenous peoples, through the imposition of requirements and
conditions for
196
the utilization of natural resources under197existing laws, such as the Small-Scale Mining
Act of 1991 and the Philippine Mining Act of 1995. Moreover, the rights granted to indigenous
peoples for the utilization of natural resources within their ancestral domains merely amplify what has
been earlier granted to them under the aforesaid laws;
(3) While the IPRA recognizes the rights of indigenous peoples with regard to their ancestral lands and
domains, it also protects the vested rights of persons, whether indigenous or non-indigenous peoples,
who may have acquired rights of ownership 198
lands or rights to explore and exploit natural resources
within the ancestral lands and domains;
_______________
195 Supranote 75.
196 R.A. 7076.
197 R.A. 7942.
198 Section 56, R.A. 8371.
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(4) The Due Process Clause of the Constitution is not violated by the provisions (Sections 40, 51-54, 62, 63,
65 and 66) of the IPRA which, among others, establish the composition of the NCIP, and prescribe the
application of customary law in certain disputes involving indigenous peoples. The fact the NCIP is
composed wholly of indigenous peoples does not mean that it is incapable of being impartial. Moreover,
the use of customary laws is sanctioned by paragraph 2, Section 5 ofArticle XII ofthe Constitution;and
(5) The provision of the Implementing Rules characterizing the NCIP as an independent agency under the
Office of the President does not infringe upon the President’s power of control under Section 17, Article
VII of the Constitution, since said provision as well as Section 40 of the IPRA expressly places the
NCIP under the Office of the President, and therefore under the President’s control and supervision
with respect to its administrative functions. However, insofar as the decisions of the NCIP in the
exercise of its quasi-judicial powers are concerned, the same are reviewable by the CourtofAppeals, like
those of the NLRC and the SEC.
In viewof theforegoing, I vote to DISMISS thepetition.
SEPARATE OPINION
MENDOZA, J.:
This suit was instituted to determine the constitutionality of certain provisions of R.A. No. 8371, otherwise
known as the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act. Petitioners do not complain of any injury as a result of the
application of the statute to them. They assert a right to seek an adjudication of constitutional questions as
citizens and taxpayers, upon the plea that the questions raised are of “transcendental importance.”
The judicial power vested in this Court by Art. VIII, §1 extends only to cases and controversies for the
determination of such proceedings as are established
1
by law for the protection or enforcement of rights, or the
prevention, redress or punishment of wrongs. In this case, the purpose of the suit is not to enforce a
_______________
1 Lopez v. Roxas, 17 SCRA 756, 761 (1966).
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property right of petitioners against the government and other respondents or to demand compensation for
injuries suffered by them as a result of the enforcement of the law, but only to settle what they believe to be
the doubtful character of the law in question. Any judgment that we render in this case will thus not conclude
or bind real parties in the future, when actual litigation will bring to the Court the question of the
constitutionality of such legislation. Such judgment cannot be executed as it 2
amounts to no more than an
expression of opinion upon the validity of the provisions of the law in question.
I do not conceive it to be the function of this Court under Art. VIII, §1 of the Constitution to determine in
the abstract whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of the legislative and executive departments in enacting the IPRA. Our jurisdiction is
confined to cases or controversies. No one reading Art. VIII, §5 can fail to note that, in enumerating the
matters placed in the keeping of this Court, it uniformly beginswith the phrase “all cases . . .”
The statement that the judicial power includes the duty to determine whether there has been a grave abuse
of discretion was inserted in Art. VIII, §1 not really to give the judiciary a roving commission to right any
wrong it perceives but to preclude courts from invoking the political question doctrine in order to evade the
decision of certain cases even where violations of civil liberties are alleged. 3
The statement is based on the ruling of the Court in Lansang v. Garcia, in which this Court, adopting the
submission of the Solicitor General, formulated the following test of its jurisdiction in such cases:
[J]udicial inquiry into the basis of the questioned proclamation can go no further than to satisfy the Court not that the
President’s decision is correct and that public safety was endangered by the rebellion and justified the suspension of the
writ, but that in suspending the writ, the President did not act arbitrarily.
_______________
2 Muskrat v. United States, 279 U.S. 346, 55 L.Ed. 246 (1911).
3 42 SCRA 448, 481 (1971) (emphasis on the original).
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That is why Art. VII, §18 now confers on any citizen standing to question the proclamation of martial law or
the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. It is noteworthy that Chief Justice Roberto
Concepcion, who chaired the Committee on the Judiciary of the Constitutional Commission, was the author of
the opinions of the Court in Lopez v. Roxas and Lansang v. Garcia.
Indeed, the judicial power cannot be extended to matters which do not involve actual cases or controversies
without upsetting the balance of power among the three branches of the government and erecting, as it were,
the judiciary, particularly the Supreme Court, as a third branch of Congress, with power not only to invalidate
statutes but even to rewrite them. Yet that is exactly what we would be permitting in this case were we to
assume jurisdiction and decide wholesale the constitutional validity of the IPRA contrary to the established
rule that a party can question the validity of a statute only if, as applied to him, it is unconstitutional. Here
the IPRA is sought to be declared void on its face.
The only instance where a facial challenge to a statute is allowed is when it operates in the area of freedom
of expression. In such instance, the overbreadth doctrine permits a party to challenge the validity of a statute
even though as applied to him it is not unconstitutional but it might be if applied to others not before the
Court whose activities are constitutionally protected. Invalidation of the statute “on its face” rather than “as
applied” is permitted in the interest of preventing a “chilling” effect on freedom of expression. But in other
cases, even if it is found that a provision of a statute is unconstitutional, courts will decree only partial
invalidity unless the invalid portion is so far inseparable from the rest of the statute that a declaration of
partial invalidity is not possible.
For the Court to exercise its power of review when there is no case or controversy is not only to act without
jurisdiction but also to run the risk that, in adjudicating abstract or hypothetical questions, its decision will be
based on speculation rather than experience. Deprived of the opportunity to observe the impact of the law, the
Court is likely to equate questions of constitutionality with questions of wisdom and is thus likely to intrude
into the domain of legislation. Constitutional adjudication, it cannot be too often repeated, cannot take place in
a vacuum.
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Some of 4the brethren contend that not deciding the constitutional

5
issues raised by petitioners will be a “galling
cop out” or an “advocacy of timidity, let alone isolationism.” To decline the exercise of jurisdiction in this case
6
is no more a “cop out” or a sign of “timidity” than it was for Chief Justice Marshall in Marbury v. Madison to
hold that petitioner had the right to the issuance of his commission as justice of the peace of the District of
Columbia only to declare in the end that after all mandamus did not lie, because §13 of the Judiciary Act of
1789, which conferred original jurisdiction on the United States Supreme Court to issue the writ of
mandamus, was unconstitutional as the court’s jurisdiction is mainly appellate.
Today Marbury v. Madison is remembered for the institution of the power of judicial review, and so that
there can be no doubt of this power of our Court, we in this country have enshrined its principle in Art. VIII,
§1. Now, the exercise of judicial review can result either in the invalidation of an act of Congress or in
upholding it.7
Hence, the checking and legitimating functions of judicial review so well mentioned in
thedecisions of this Court.
To decline, therefore, the exercise of jurisdiction where there is no genuine controversy is not to show
timidity but respect for the judgment of a coequal department of government whose acts, unless shown to be
clearly repugnant to the fundamental law, are presumed to be valid. The polestar of constitutional
adjudication was set forth by Justice Laurel in the Angara case when he said that “this power of judicial
review is limited to actual cases and controversies to be exercised after full opportunity of argument 8
by the
parties, and limited further to the constitutional question raised or the very lis mota,presented.” For the
exercise of this power is legitimate only in the last resort, and as a necessity in the
_______________
4 Panganiban, J., Separate Opinion, p. 2.
5 Vitug,J., Separate Opinion, p. 1.
6 1 Cranch 137, 2 L.Ed. 60 (1803).
7 Occena v. Commission on Elections; Gonzales v. The National Treasurer, 104 SCRA 1 (1981); Mitra v. Commission on Elections, 104
SCRA 59 (1981).
8 Angara v. Electoral Commission, 63 Phil. 139, 158 (1936).
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9
determination of real, earnest, and vital controversy between individuals. Until, therefore, an actual case is
brought to test the constitutionality of the IPRA, the presumption of constitutionality, which inheres in every
statute, must be accorded to it. 10
Justice Kapunan, 11on the other hand, cites the statement in Severino v. Governor General, reiterated
in Tañada v. Tuvera, that “when the question is one of public right and the object of mandamus to procure
the enforcement of a public duty, the people are regarded as the real party in interest, and the relator at
whose instigation the proceedings are instituted need not show that he has any legal or special interest in the
result, it being sufficient that he is a citizen and as such is interested in the execution of12
the laws.” On the
basis of this statement, he argues that
13
petitioners have standing tobring theseproceedings.
In Severino v. Governor General, the question was whether mandamus lay to compel the Governor General
to call a special election on the ground that it was his duty to do so. The ruling was that he did not have such a
duty. On the other hand, although mandamus was issued in Tañada v. Tuvera, it was clear that petitioners
had standing to bring the suit, because the public has a right to know and the failure of respondents to publish
all decrees and other presidential issuances in the Official Gazette placed petitioners in danger of violating
those decrees and issuances. But, in this case, what public right is there for petitioners to enforce when the
IPRA does not apply to them except in general and in common withother citizens?
For the foregoing reasons I vote to dismiss the petition in this case.
_______________
9 PhilippineAssociation of Colleges and Universities v. Secretary of Education, 97 Phil. 806 (1955).
10 16Phil. 366 (1913).
11 136 SCRA 27 (1985).
12 Kapunan, J., Separate Opinion, pp. 21-23.
13 Supranote 10.
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SEPARATE OPINION
(CONCURRING AND DISSENTING)
PANGANIBAN, J.:
I concur with the draft ponencia of Mr. Justice Santiago M. Kapunan in its well-crafted handling of the
procedural or preliminary issues. In particular, I agree that petitioners have shown an 1actual case or
controversy involving at least two constitutional questions of transcendental 2
importance, which deserve
judicious disposition on the merits directly by the highest court of the land. Further, I am satisfied that the
various aspects of this controversy have been fully presented 3
and impressively argued by the parties.
Moreover, prohibition and mandamus are proper legal remedies to address the problems raised by petitioners.
In any event, this Court has given due course to the Petition, heard oral arguments and required the
submission of memoranda. Indeed, it would then be a galling copout for us to dismiss it on mere technical or
procedural grounds.
Protectionof Indigenous Peoples’ Rights Must Be Within the Constitutional Framework

With due respect, however, I dissent from the ponencia’sresolution of the two main substantive issues, which
constitute the core of this case. Specifically, I submit that Republic Act (RA) No. 8371, otherwise known as the
Indigenous Peoples’ Rights Act (IPRA) of 1997, violates and contravenes the Constitution of the Philippines
insofar as—
_______________
1 Kilosbayan v. Morato, 250 SCRA 130, 140, November 16, 1995; Association of Small Landowners v. Secretary of Agrarian Reform, 175
SCRA 343, 365, July 14, 1989; Antonio v. Dinglasan, 84 Phil. 368 (1949).

2 Tañada v. Angara, 272 SCRA 18, 46, May 2, 1997; Santiago v. Comelec, 270 SCRA 106, 123-124, March 19, 1997; Basco v.
PAGCOR, 197 SCRA 52, 60, May 14, 1991.

3 Tañada v. Angara, ibid.
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1. It recognizes or, worse, grants rights of ownership over lands of the public domain, waters, xxx and
other natural resources” which, under Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution, “are owned by the
State” and “shall not be alienated.” I respectfully reject the contention that “ancestral lands and
ancestral domains are not public lands and have never been owned by the State.” Such sweeping
statement places substantial portions of Philippine territory outside the scope of the Philippine
Constitution and beyond the collective reach of the Filipino people. As will be discussed later, these real
properties constitute a third of the entire Philippine territory; and the resources, 80 percent of the
nation’s natural wealth.
2. It defeats, dilutes or lessens the authority of the State to oversee the “exploration, development, and
utilization of natural resources,” which the Constitution expressly requires to “be under the fullcontrol
and supervisionof the State.”
True, our fundamental law mandates the protection of the indigenous cultural communities’ right to their
ancestral lands, but such mandate is “subject to the provisions of this Constitution.”4 I concede that
indigenous cultural communities and indigenous peoples (ICCs/IPs) may be accorded preferential rights to the
beneficial use of public domains, as well as priority in the exploration, development and utilization of natural
resources. Such privileges, however, must be subject to the fundamental law.
Consistent with the social justice principle of giving more in law to those who have less in life, Congress in
its wisdom may grant preferences and prerogatives to our marginalized brothers and sisters, subject to the
irreducible caveat that the Constitution must be respected. I personally believe in according every benefit to
the poor, the oppressed and the disadvantaged, in order to empower them to equally enjoy the blessings of
nationhood. I cannot, however, agree to legitimize perpetual inequality of access to the nation’s wealth or to
stamp the Court’s imprimatur on a law that offends and degrades the repository of the very authority of this
Court—the Constitution of the Philippines.
_______________
4 §5, Art. XII, 1987 Constitution.
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The Constitution Is a Compact

My basic5 premise is that the Constitution is the fundamental law of the land, to which all other laws must
conform. It is the people’s quintessential
6
act of sovereignty, embodying the principles upon which the State
and the government are founded. Having the status of a supreme and all-encompassing law, it speaks for all
the people all the time, not just for the majority or for the minority at intermittent times. Every constitution
7
is
a compact made by and among the citizens of a State to govern themselves in a certain manner. Truly, the
Philippine Constitution is a solemn covenant made by all the Filipinos to govern themselves. No group,
however blessed, and no sector, however distressed, is exempt from its compass.
RA 8371, which defines the rights of indigenous cultural communities and indigenous peoples, admittedly
professes a laudable intent. It was primarily enacted pursuant to the state policy enshrined in our
Constitution to “recognize and promote
8
the rights of indigenous cultural communities within the framework of
national unity and development.” Though laudable and well-meaning, this statute, however, has provisions
that run directly afoul of our fundamental law from which it claims origin and authority. More specifically,
Sections 3(a) and (b), 5, 6, 7(a) and (b), 8 and other related provisions contravene the Regalian Doctrine—the
basic foundationof the State’s property regime.
Public Domains and NaturalResources Are Ownedbythe State and Cannot Be Alienatedor Ceded
Jura regalia was introduced into our political system upon the “discovery” and the “conquest” of our country in
the sixteenth century. Under this concept, the entire earthly territory known as the
_______________
5 16 CJS §3.
6 16 Am Jur 2d §2.
7 Ibid.
8 §22, Art. II of the Constitution.
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Philippine Islands was acquired and held by the Crown of Spain. The King, as then head of State, had the
supreme power or exclusive dominion over all our lands, waters, minerals and other natural resources. By
royal decrees, though, private ownership of real property was recognized upon the showing of (1) a title deed;
or (2) ancient 9
possession in the concept of owner, according to which a title could be obtained by
prescription. Refusal to abide by the system and its implementing laws meant the abandonment or waiver of
ownership claims.
By virtue of the 1898 Treaty of Paris, the Philippine archipelago was ceded to the United States. The latter
assumed administration of the Philippines and succeeded to the property rights of the Spanish Crown. But
under the Philippine Bill of 1902, the US Government allowed and granted patents to Filipino and US citizens
for the 10“free and open xxx exploration, occupation and purchase [of mines] and the land in which they are
found.” To a certain extent, private individuals were entitled to own, exploit and dispose of mineral resources
and other rights arising from mining patents.
This US policy was, however, rejected by the Philippine Commonwealth in 1935 when it crafted and ratified
our first Constitution. Instead, the said Constitution embodied the Regalian Doctrine, which more definitively
declared as 11
belonging to the State all lands of the public domain, waters, minerals and other natural
resources. Although respecting mining patentees under the Philippine Bill of 1902, it restricted the further
exploration, development and utilization of natural resources, both as to who might be entitled to undertake
such activities and for how long. The pertinent provision reads:
_______________
9 Abaoag v. Director of Lands, 45 Phil. 518 (1923), cited in petitioners’ Memorandum.
10 Soledad M. Cagampang-de Castro, The Economic Policies on Natural Resources Under the 1987 Constitution Revisited,” Journal of
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines,Vol. XXV, Nos. 3 & 4 (1999), p. 51.
11 In a republican system of government, the concept of jura regalia is stripped of royal overtones; ownership is vested in the State,
instead. (Joaquin G. Bernas, SJ, The Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines: A Commentary, 1996 ed.,pp. 1009-1010.)
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“SECTION 1. [Art. XIII]. All agricultural, timber, and mineral lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal,
petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential energy, and other natural resources of the Philippines belong to
the State, and their disposition, exploitation, development, or utilization shall be limited to citizens of the Philippines, or
to corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of the capital of which is owned by such citizens, subject to any
existing right, grant, lease, or concession at the time of the inauguration of the Government established under this
Constitution. Natural resources, with the exception of public agricultural land, shall not be alienated, and license,
concession, or lease for the exploitation, development, or utilization of any of the natural resources shall be granted for a
period exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for another twenty-five years, except as to water rights for irrigation, water
supply, fisheries, or industrial uses other than the development of water power, in which cases beneficial use may be the
measure and the limit of the grant.”
The concept was carried over in the 1973 and the 1987 Constitutions. Hence, Sections 8 and 9, Article XIV of
the 1973 Constitution, state:
“SEC. 8. All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum and other mineral oils, all forces of potential
energy, fisheries, wildlife, and other natural resources of the Philippines belong to the State. With the exception of
agricultural, industrial or commercial, residential, and resettlement lands of the public domain, natural resources shall
not be alienated and no license, concession, or lease for the exploration, development, exploitation, utilization of any of the
natural resources shall be granted for a period exceeding twenty-five years, renewable for not more than twenty-five years,
except as to water rights for irrigation, water supply, fisheries, or industrial uses other than the development of water
power, in which cases beneficial use may be the measure and the limit of the grant.
SEC. 9. The disposition, exploration, development, exploitation, or utilization of any of the natural resources of the
Philippines shall be limited to citizens of the Philippines, or to corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of the
capital of which is owned by such citizens. The National Assembly, in the national interest, may allow such citizens,
corporations, or associations to enter into service contracts for financial, technical, management, or other forms of
assistance with any foreign person or entity for the exploration, development, exploitation, or utilization of any of the
natural resources. Existing valid and binding service
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contracts for financial, technical, management, or other forms of assistance are hereby recognized as such.”
Similarly, Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution, provides:

“SEC. 2. All lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, coal, petroleum, and other mineral oils, all forces of potential
undertake such activities, or it may enter into co-production, joint venture, or production-sharing agreements with Filipino
citizen, or corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of whose capital is owned by such citizens. Such
industrial uses other than the development of water power, beneficial use may be the measure and limit of the grant.
“The State shall protect the nation’s marine wealth in its archipelagic waters, territorial sea, and exclusive economic
zone, and reserve its use and enjoyment exclusively to Filipino citizens.
“The Congress may, by law, allow small-scale utilization of natural resources by Filipino citizens, as well as cooperative
fish farming, with priority to subsistence fishermen and fish workers in rivers, lakes, bays and lagoons.
“The President may enter into agreements with foreign-owned corporations involving either technical or financial
assistance for large-scale exploration, development, and utilization of minerals, petroleum, and other mineral oils
according to the general terms and conditions provided by law, based on real contributions to the economic growth and
general welfare of the country. In such agreements, the State shall promote the development and use of local scientific and
technical resources.
‘The President shall notify the Congress of every contract entered into in accordance with this provision, within thirty
days from its execution.”
The adoption of the Regalian Doctrine by the Philippine Commonwealth was initially impelled by the desire to
preserve the
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nation’s wealth in the hands of the Filipinos themselves. Nationalism was fervent at the time, and our
constitutional framers decided to embody the doctrine in our fundamental law. Charging the State with the
conservation of the national patrimony was deemed necessary for Filipino posterity. The arguments in support
of the provision are encapsulated by Aruego as follows: “[T]he natural resources, particularly the mineral
resources which constituted a great source of wealth, belonged not only12 to the generation then but also to the
succeeding generation and consequently should be conserved for them.”
Thus, after expressly declaring that all lands of the public domain, waters, minerals, all forces of energy
and other natural resources belonged to the Philippine State, the Commonwealth absolutely prohibited the
alienation of these natural resources. Their disposition, exploitation, development and utilization were further
restricted only to Filipino citizens and entities that were 60 percent Filipino-owned. The present Constitution
even goes further by declaring that such activities “shall be under the full control and supervision of the
State.” Additionally, it enumerates land classifications and expressly states
13
that only agricultural lands of the
public domain shall be alienable. We quote below the relevant provision:
“SEC. 3. Lands of the public domain are classified into agricultural, forest or timber, mineral lands, and national parks.
Agricultural lands of the public domain may be further classified by law according to the uses to which they may be
devoted. Alienable lands of the public domain shall be limited to agricultural lands. Private corporations or associations
may not hold such alienable lands of the public domain except by lease, for a period not exceeding twenty-five years,
renewable for not more than twenty-five years, and not to exceed one thousand hectares in area. x x x.”
Mr. Justice Kapunan upholds private respondents and intervenors in their claim that all ancestral domains
and lands are outside
_______________
12 II Aruego, The Framing of the Philippine Constitution 603, quoted in Bernas,supra,p. 1010.
13 §3, Art. XII, 1987 Constitution.
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the coverage of public domain; and that these properties—including forests, bodies of water, minerals and
parks found therein—are private and have never been part of the public domain, because they have belonged
to the indigenous people’s ancestors since time immemorial.
I submit, however, that all Filipinos, whether indigenous or not, are subject to the Constitution. Indeed, no
one is exempt from its all-encompassing provisions. Unlike the 1935 Charter, which was subject to “any
existing right, grant, lease or concession,” the 1973 and the 1987 Constitutions spoke in absolute terms.
Because of the State’s implementation of policies considered to be for the common good, all those concerned
have to give up, under certain conditions,
14
evenvested rights of ownership.
In Republic v. Court of Appeals, this Court said that once minerals are found even in private land, the
State may intervene to enable it to extract the minerals in the exercise of its sovereign prerogative. The land is
converted into mineral land and may not be used by any private person, including the registered owner, for
any other purpose that would impede the mining operations. Such owner would be entitled to just
compensation for the loss sustained. 15
In Atok Big-Wedge Mining Company v. IAC, the Court clarified that while mining claim holders and
patentees have the exclusive right to the possession and enjoyment of the located claim, their rights are not
absolute or strictly one of ownership. Thus, failure to comply with the requirements of pertinent mining laws
was deemed an abandonment or awaiverof the claim.
Verily, as petitioners undauntedly point out, four hundred years of Philippine political history cannot be set
aside or ignored by IPRA, however well-intentioned it may be. The perceived lack of understanding of the
cultural minorities cannot be remedied by conceding the nation’s resources to their exclusive advantage. They
cannot be more privileged simply because they have chosen to ignore state laws. For having chosen not to be
enfolded by statutes
_______________
14 160 SCRA 228, 239, April 15, 1988.
15 261 SCRA 528, September 9,1996.
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on perfecting land titles, ICCs/IPs cannot now maintain their ownership of lands and domains by insisting on
their concept of “native title” thereto. It would be plain injustice to the majority of Filipinos who have abided
by the law and, consequently, deserve equal opportunity to enjoy the country’s resources.
Respondent NCIP claims that IPRA does not violate the Constitution, because it does not grant ownership
of public domains and natural resources to ICCs/IPs. “Rather, it recognizes and mandates respect for the
rights of 16indigenous peoples over their ancestral lands and domains that had never been lands of the public
domain.” I say, however, that such claim finds no legal support. Nowhere in the Constitution is there a
provision that exempts such lands and domains from its coverage. Quite the contrary, it declares that all lands
of the public domain and natural resources “are owned by the State”; and “with the exception of agricultural
lands, all other natural resources shallnotbe 17
alienated.”
As early as Oh Cho v. Director of Lands, the Court declared as belonging to the public domain all lands not
acquired from the government, either by purchase or by grant under laws, orders or decrees promulgated by
the Spanish government; or by possessory information 18
under Act 496 (MortgageLaw).
On the other hand, Intervenors Flavier, et al. differentiate the concept of ownership of ICCs/IPs from that
which is defined in Articles 427 and 428 of the Civil Code. They maintain that “[t]here are variations among
ethnolinguistic groups in the Cordillera, but a fair synthesis of these refers to 'xxx the tribal right to use the
land or to territorial control xxx, a collective right to freely use the particular territory x x x [in]the concept
oftrusteeship.’”
In other words, the “owner” is not an individual. Rather, it is a tribal community that preserves the
property for the common but nonetheless exclusive and perpetual benefit of its members, without the
attributes of alienation or disposition. This concept, however, still perpetually withdraws such property from
the control of
_______________
16 NCIP’s Memorandum, p. 24.
17 75 Phil. 890, 892, August 31, 1946.
18 Intervenors’Memorandum, pp; 33 et seq.
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the State and from its enjoyment by other citizens of the Republic. The perpetual and exclusive character of
private respondents’ claims simplymakes them repugnant to basic fairness andequality.
Private respondents and intervenors trace their “ownership” of ancestral domains and lands to the pre-
Spanish conquest. I should say that, at the time, their claims to such lands and domains was limited to the
surfaces thereof since their ancestors were agriculture-based. This must be the continuing scope of the
indigenous groups’ ownership claims: limited to land, excluding the natural resources found within.
In any event, if all that the ICCs/IPs demand is preferential use—not ownership—of 19ancestral domains,
then I have no disagreement. Indeed, consistent with the Constitution is IPRA’s Section 57 —without the too-
broad definitions under Section 3 (a) and (b)—insofar as it grants them priority rights in harvesting,
extracting, developing or exploiting natural resources within ancestral domains.
The concerted effort to malign the Regalian Doctrine as a vestige of the colonial past must fail. Our
Constitution vests the ownership of natural resources, not in colonial masters, but in all the Filipino people. As
the protector of the Constitution, this Court has the sworn duty to uphold the tenets of that Constitution—not to
dilute, circumventorcreate exceptions to them.
Cariño v. InsularGovernment Was Modified by the Constitution

20
In this connection, I submit that Cariño v. Insular Government has been modified or superseded by our 1935,
1973 and 1987 Constitutions. Its ratio should be understood as referring only to a means by which public
agricultural land may be acquired by citizens. I must also stress that the claim of Petitioner Cariño refers to
_______________
19 “SEC. 57. Natural Resources within Ancestral Domains.—The ICCs/IPs shall have priority rights in the harvesting, extraction,
development or exploitation of any natural resources within the ancestral domains, x x x.
20 41 Phil. 935, February 23, 1909.
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land ownership only, not to the natural resources underneath or to the 21

aerial and cosmic space above.
Significantly, in Director of Land Management v. Court of Appeals, a Decision handed down after our three
Constitutions had taken
22
effect, the Court rejected a cultural minority member’s registration of land under CA
141, Section 48 (c). The reason was that the property fell within the Central Cordillera Forest Reserve. This
Court quoted with favor the solicitor general’s following statements:
“3. The construction given by respondent Court of Appeals to the particular provision of law involved, as to include even
forest reserves as susceptible to private appropriation, is to unconstitutionally apply such provision. For, both the 1973
and present Constitutions do not include timber or forest lands as alienable. Thus, Section 8, Article XIV of 1973
Constitution states that Svith the exception of agricultural, industrial or commercial, residential and resettlement lands of
the public domain, natural resources shall not be alienated.’ The new Constitution, in its Article XII, Section 2, also
expressly states that “with the exception of agricultural lands, all other natural resources shall not be alienated.’”
23
Just recently, in Gordula v. Court of Appeals, the Court also stated that “forest land is incapable of
registration, and its inclusion in a title nullifies that title. To be sure, the defense of indefeasibility of a
certificate of title issued pursuant to a free patent does not lie against the state in an action for reversion of
the land covered thereby when such land is a part of a public forest or of a forest reservation, the patent
covering forest land being void ab initio.”
_______________
21 172 SCRA 455, 463, April 18, 1989, per Gutierrez, Jr., J.
22 (c)Members of the national cultural minorities who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest have been in open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of lands of the public domain suitable to agriculture, whether disposable or
not, under a bona fide claim of ownership for at least 30 years shall be entitled to the rights granted in subsection (b) hereof. (As amended
by R.A. No. 3872, section 1, approved June 18, 1964).”
23 284 SCRA 617, 633, January22, 1998, per Puno,J.
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RA 8371 Violates the Inalienability ofNatural Resources and of Public Domains

The ponencia theorizes that RA 8371 does not grant to ICCs/IPs ownership of the natural resources found
within ancestral24domains. However, a simple reading of the very wordings of the law belies this statement.
Section 3 (a) defines and delineates ancestral domains as “all areas generally belonging to ICCs/IPs
comprising lands, inland waters, coastal areas, and natural resourcestherein, held under a claim of ownership,
occupied or possessed by ICCs/IPs, by themselves or through their ancestors, communally or individually since
time immemorial, continuously to the present except when interrupted by war, force majeure or displacement
x xx. It shall include ancestral lands, forests, pasture, residential, agricultural, and other lands individually
owned whether alienable and disposable or otherwise, hunting grounds x x x bodies of water, mineral and
other natural resources x x x.” (Emphasis ours.)
Clearly, under the above-quoted provision of IPRA, ancestral domains of ICCs/IPs encompass the natural
resources found
_______________
24 “a) Ancestral Domains—Subject to Section 56 hereof, refers to all areas generally belonging to ICCs/IPs comprising lands, inland
waters, coastal areas, and natural resources therein, held under a claim of ownership, occupied or possessed by ICCs/IPs, by themselves or
through their ancestors, communally or individually since time immemorial, continuously to the present except when interrupted by
war, force majeureor displacement by force, deceit, stealth or as a consequence of government projects or any other voluntary dealings
entered into by government and private individuals/corporations, and which are necessary to ensure their economic, social and cultural
welfare. It shall include ancestral lands individually owned whether alienable and disposable or otherwise, hunting grounds, burial
grounds, worship areas, bodies of water, mineral and other natural resources, and lands which may no longer be exclusively occupied by
ICCs/IPs but from which they traditionally had access to for their subsistence and traditional activities, particularly the home ranges of
ICCs/IPs who are still nomadic and/or shiftingcultivators.”
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therein. And Section 7 guarantees recognition and protection of their rightsofownership andpossessionover
such domains.
The indigenous concept of ownership, as defined under Section 5 of the law, “holds that ancestral domains
are the ICC’s/IP’s private but community property which belongs to all generations and therefore cannot be
sold, disposed or destroyed.” Simply put, the law declares that ancestral domains, including the natural
resources found therein, are owned by ICCs/IPs and cannot be sold, disposed or destroyed. Not only does it
vest ownership, as understood under the Civil Code; it adds perpetual exclusivity. This means that while
ICCs/IPs could own vast ancestral domains, the majority of Filipinos who are not indigenous can never own
any part thereof. 25
On the other hand, Section 3 (b) of IPRA defines ancestral lands as referring to ‘lands occupied, possessed
and utilized by individuals, families and clans of the ICCs/IPs since time immemorial x x x, under claims of
individual or traditional group ownership, x x x including, but not limited to, residential lots, rice terraces or
paddies, private forests, swidden farms and tree lots.” Section 8 recognizes and protects “the right of
ownership and possession of ICCs/IPs to their ancestral lands.” Such ownership need not be by virtue of a
certificate of title, but simply by possession since time immemorial.
I believe these statutory provisions directly contravene Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution, more
specifically the declaration that the State owns all lands of the public domain, minerals and natural resources
—none of which, except agricultural lands, can be
_______________
25 “b) Ancestral Lands—Subject to Section 56 hereof, refers to lands occupied, possessed and utilized by individuals, families and clans
who are members of the ICCs/IPs since time immemorial, by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest, under claims of
individual or traditional group ownership, continuously, to the present except when interrupted by war, force majeure or displacement by
force, deceit, stealth, or as a consequence of government projects and other voluntary dealings entered into by government and private
individuals/corporations, including, but not limited to, residential lots, rice terraces or paddies, private forests, swiddenfarms and tree
lots.”
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alienated. In several cases, this Court has consistently held that non-agricultural land must first be
reclassified and
26
converted into alienable or disposable land for agricultural purposes by a positive act of the
government. Mere27 possession or utilization thereof, however long, does not automatically convert them into
private properties. The presumption is that “all lands not appearing to be clearly within private ownership
are presumed to belong to the State. Hence, x xx all applicants in land registration proceedings have the
burden of overcoming the presumption that the land thus sought to be registered forms part of the public
domain. Unless the applicant succeeds in showing by clear and convincing evidence that the property involved
was acquired by him or his ancestors either by composition title from the Spanish Government or by
possessory information title, or any other means for the proper acquisition of public lands, the property must
be held to be part of the public domain. The applicant must present competent and persuasive proof to
substantiate his claim; he may 28 not rely on general statements, or mere conclusions of law other than factual
evidenceof possession and title.”
Respondents insist, and the ponencia agrees, that paragraphs (a) and (b) of Section 3 are merely definitions
and should not be construed independently of the other29
provisions of the law. But, precisely, a definition is “a
statement30
of the meaning of a word or word group.” It determines or settles the nature of the thing or person
defined. Thus, after defining a term as encompassing several items, one cannot thereafter say that the same
term should be interpreted as excluding one or more of the enumerated items in its
_______________
26 Director of Lands and Director of Forest Development v. Intermediate Appellate Court, March 2, 1993, 219 SCRA 339; Director of
Lands v. Aquino, 192 SCRA 296, December 17, 1990; Sunbeam Convenience Foods, Inc.v. Court of Appeals, January29, 1990, 181 SCRA
443.
27 Ibid.; Margolles v. Court of Appeals, February 14, 1994, 230 SCRA 97; Gordula v. Court of Appeals, supra.
28 Republic v. Sayo, October 31, 1990, 191 SCRA 71, per Narvasa, J.(laterCJ). See also Republic v. Court of Appeals, supra.
29 Webster’s Third New International Dictionary; Petitioners’ Memorandum, p. 41.
30 Ibid.
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bound by the law. In other words, since RA 8371 defines ancestral domains as including the natural resources
found therein and further states that ICCs/IPs own these ancestral domains, then it means that ICCs/IPs
canownnatural resources.
In fact, Intervenors Flavier, et al. submit that everything above and below these ancestral domains, with no
specific limits, likewise belongs to ICCs/IPs. I say that this theory directly contravenes the Constitution. Such
outlandish contention further31
disregards international law which, by constitutional fiat, has been adopted as
part of the law of the land.
No Land Area Limits Are Specified by RA 8371

Under Section 3, Article XII of the Constitution, Filipino citizens may acquire no more than 12 hectares of
alienable public land, whether by purchase, homestead or grant. More than that, but not exceeding 500
hectares, they may hold by lease only.
RA 8371, however, speaks of no area or term limits to ancestral lands and domains. In fact, by their mere
definitions, they could cover vast tracts of the nation’s territory. The properties under the assailed law cover
everything held, occupied or possessed “by themselves or through their ancestors, communally or individually
since time immemorial.” It also includes all “lands which may no longer be exclusively occupied by [them] but
from which they traditionally had access to for their subsistence and traditional activities, particularly the
home ranges of ICCs/IPs who are still nomadic and/or shifting cultivators.”
Nomadic groups have no fixed area within which they hunt or forage for food. As soon as they have used up
the resources of a certain area, they move to another place or go back to one they used to occupy. From year to
year, a growing tribe could occupy and use enormous areas, to which they could claim to have had “traditional
access.” If nomadic ICCs/IPs succeed in acquiring title to their enlarging ancestral domain or land, several
thousands of
_______________
31 §2, Art. II of the Constitution.
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VOL. 347, DECEMBER 6, 2000 333

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hectares of land may yet be additionally delineated as their private property.

Similarly, the Bangsa Moro people’s claim to their ancestral land is not based on compounded or
consolidated title, but “on a collective
32
stake to the right to claim what their forefathers secured for them when
they first set foot on our country.” They trace their right to occupy what they deem to be their ancestral land
way back to their ancient sultans and datus, who had settled in many islands that have 33
become part of
Mindanao. This long history of occupation is the basisof their claim to their ancestral lands.
Already, as of June 1998, over 2.5 million hectares have been 34
claimed by various ICCs/IPs as ancestral
domains; and over 10 thousand hectares, as ancestral lands. Based on ethnographic surveys, the solicitor
general estimates that ancestral domains cover 80 percent 35
of our mineral resources and between 8 and 10
million of the 30 million hectares of land in the country. This means that four fifths of its natural resources
and one
36
third of the country’s land will be concentrated among 12 million Filipinos constituting 110
ICCs, while over 60 million other Filipinos constituting the overwhelming majority will have to share the
remaining. These figures indicate a violation of the constitutional principle of a “more equitable distribution of
opportunities, income, and wealth” among Filipinos.
_______________
32 Cecilio R. Laurente, ‘The King’s Hand: The Regalian Doctrine as a Contributing Factor in the Mindanao Conflict,” Human Rights
Agenda,Vol. 5, Issue No. 7, July & August 2000, pp. 6-7.

33 Ibid.
34 Solicitor General’s Memorandum, p. 3; rollo, p. 651.
35 Ibid., pp. 4-5.
36 Ibid. See also Datu Vic Saway, indigenous Peoples and the Uplands: A Situatfoner,” Proceedings of the 6th Upland NGO Consultative
Conference, 23-27 August 1998, p. 30.
334

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RA 8371 Abdicates the StateDuty to Take Full Control and Supervision ofNatural Resources
Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution, further provides that “[t]he exploration, development, and utilization
of natural resources shall be under the full control and supervision of the State.” The State may (1) directly
undertake such activities; or (2) enter into co-production, joint yenture or production-sharing
37
agreements with
Filipino citizens or entities, 60 percent of whose capital is owned by Filipinos. Such agreements, however,
shall not exceed 25 years, renewable for the same period and under terms and conditionsas may be providedby
law.
But again, RA 8371 relinquishes this constitutional power of full control in favor of ICCs/IPs, insofar as
natural resources found within their territories are concerned. Pursuant to their rights of ownership and
possession, they may develop and manage 38
the natural resources, benefit from and share in the profits from the
allocation and the utilization thereof. And they may exercise such right without any time limit,
39
unlike non-
ICCs/IPs who may do so only for a period not exceeding 25 years, renewable for a like period. Consistent with
the Constitution, the rights of ICCs/IPs to exploit, develop and utilize natural resources must also be limited
to such period.
In addition, ICCs/IPs
40
are given the right to negotiate directly the terms and conditions for the exploration
of natural resources, a right vested by the Constitution only in the State. Congress, through IPRA, has in
effect abdicated in favor of a minority group the State’s power of ownership and full control over a substantial
_______________
37 Or (3) in case of large-scale exploration, development and utilization of minerals, enter—through the President—into “agreements
with foreign-owned corporations involving either technical or financial assistance.” (Miners Association of the Philippines v. Factoran,
Jr., 240 SCRA 100, January 16, 1995.)
38 §7(b), RA 7381.
39 §57, ibid.
40 §7(b), ibid.
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part of the national patrimony, in contravention of our most fundamental law.

I make clear, however, that to the extent that ICCs/IPs may undertake small-scale utilization of natural
resources and cooperative fish farming, I absolutely have no objection. These undertakings are certainly
allowed under the third paragraph of Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution.
Having already disposed of the two major constitutional dilemmas wrought by RA 8371—(1) ownership of
ancestral lands and domains and the natural resources therein; and (2) the ICCs/IPs’ control of the
exploration, development and utilization of such resources—I believe I should no longer tackle the following
collateral issues petitioners have brought up:
1. Whether the inclusion of private lands within the coverage of ancestral domains amounts to undue
deprivation of private property
2. Whether ICCs/IPs may regulate the entry/exit of migrants
3. Whether ancestral domains are exempt from real property taxes, special levies and other forms of
exaction
4. Whether customary laws and traditions of ICCs/IPs should first be applied in the settlements of
disputes over their rights and claims
5. Whether the composition and the jurisdiction of the National Commission of Indigenous Peoples
(NCIP) violate the due process and equal protection clauses
6. Whether members of the ICCs/IPs may be recruited into the armed forces against their will
I believe that the first three of the above collateral issues have been rendered academic or, at least, no longer
of “transcendental importance,” in view of my contention that the two major IPRA propositions are based on
unconstitutional premises. On the other hand, I think that in the case of the last three, it is best to await
specific cases filed by those whose rights may have been injured by specific provisions of RA 8371.
336
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Epilogue
Section 5,Article XII ofthe Constitution, provides:

“SEC. 5. The State, subject to the provisions of this Constitution and national development policies and programs, shall
protect the rights of indigenous cultural communities to their ancestral lands to ensure their economic, social, andcultural
well being.
“The Congress may provide for the applicability of customary laws governing properly rights and relations in
determining the ownership and extent of ancestral domain.”
Clearly, there are two parameters that must be observed in the protection of the rights of ICCs/IPs: (1) the
provisions of the 1987 Constitution and(2)national development policies andprograms.
Indigenous peoples may have long been marginalized in Philippine politics and society. This does not,
however, give Congress any license to accord them rights that the Constitution withholds from the rest of the
Filipino people. I would concede
41
giving them priority in the use, the enjoyment and the preservation of their
ancestral lands and domains. But to grant perpetual ownership and control of the nation’s substantial wealth
to them, to the exclusion of other Filipino citizens who have chosen to live and abide by our previous and
present Constitutions, would be not only unjust but also subversive of therule of law.
In giving ICCs/IPs rights in derogation of our fundamental law, Congress is effectively mandating “reverse
discrimination.” In seeking to improve their lot, it would be doing so at the expense of the majority of the
Filipino people. Such short-sighted and misplaced generosity will spread the roots of discontent and, in the
long term, fan the fires of turmoil to a conflagration of national proportions.
Peace cannot be attained by brazenly and permanently depriving the many in order to coddle the few,
however disadvantaged they may have been. Neither can a just society be approximated by maiming the
healthy to place them at par with the injured. Nor can
_______________
41As stated earlier, Sec. 57 of IPRA, insofar as it grants them such priority, is constitutional.
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the nation survive by enclaving its wealth for the exclusive benefit of favored minorities.
Rather, the law must help the powerless by enabling them to take advantage of opportunities and privileges
that are open to all and by preventing the powerful from exploiting and oppressing them. This is the essence of
social justice—empowering and enabling the poor to be able to compete with the rich and, thus, equally enjoy
the blessings of prosperity, freedom and dignity.
WHEREFORE, I vote to partially GRANT the Petition and to DECLARE as UNCONSTITUTIONAL
Sections 3(a) and (b), 5, 6, 7(a) and (b), 8 and related provisions of RA 8371.
Petition dismissed.
Notes.—Unlike the 1935 Constitution, the 1973 Constitution did not expressly qualify the application of
the regalian doctrine as being subject to any right granted before the effectivity of the 1935 Constitution or the
1973 Constitution for that matter but the conditional application of the regalian doctrine could be found in
Presidential Decree No. 463 (1974). (Atok Big-Wedge Mining Company vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 261
SCRA 528 [1996])
Before the Treaty of Paris on April 11, 1899, our lands, whether agricultural, mineral or forest were under
the exclusive patrimony and dominion of the Spanish Crown—private ownership of land could only be
acquired through royal concessions. (Palomo vs. Court of Appeals, 266 SCRA 392 [1997])
A province may not invoke the Regalian doctrine to extend the coverage of its ordinance to quarry resources
extracted from private lands, for taxes, being burdens, are not to be presumed beyond what the applicable
statute expressly and clearly declares, tax statutes being construed strictissimi juris against the government.
(Province of Bulacan vs. Court of Appeals, 299 SCRA 442 [1998])
——o0o——
338

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128 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Cruz vs. Secretaryof Environmentand Natural

VOL. 347, DECEMBER 6, 2000 129

VIRGILIO CAYETANO, CONCHITA G. DESCAGA, LEVY ESTEVES, ODETTE G. ESTEVEZ, RODOLFO C.

130 SUPREME COURT REPORTS

Cruz vs. Secretary of Environment and Natural

National Patrimony; Regalian Doctrine; Natural Resources; Public Lands; The “Regalian Doctrine” or jura regalia is a

VOL. 347, DECEMBER 6, 2000 131

Cruz vs. Secretary of Environment and Natural

132 SUPREME COURT REPORTS

Cruz vs. Secretary of Environment and Natural

Cruz vs. Secretary of Environment and Natural

13 SUPREME COURT REPORTS

Cruz vs. Secretary of Environment and Natural

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Cruz vs. Secretary of Environment and Natural

136 SUPREME COURT REPORTS

Cruz vs. Secretary of Environment and Natural

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Cruz vs. Secretary of Environment and Natural

138 SUPREME COURT REPORTS

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Cruz vs. Secretary of Environment and Natural

140 SUPREME COURT REPORTS

Cruz vs. Secretary of Environment and Natural

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Cruz vs. Secretary of Environment and Natural

142 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

VITUG, J., Separate Opinion:

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Cruz vs. Secretary of Environment and Natural

144 SUPREME COURT REPORTS

Cruz vs. Secretary of Environment and Natural

KAPUNAN, J., Separate Opinion:

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Cruz vs. Secretary of Environment and Natural

146 SUPREME COURT REPORTS

Cruz vs. Secretary of Environment and Natural

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Cruz vs. Secretary of Environment and Natural

because it recognizes ancestral domains as their “private but community property.”

148 SUPREME COURT REPORTS

Cruz vs. Secretary of Environment and Natural

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Cruz vs. Secretary of Environment and Natural

150 SUPREME COURT REPORTS

Cruz vs. Secretary of Environment and Natural

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Cruz vs. Secretary of Environment and Natural

MENDOZA, J., Separate Opinion:

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Cruz vs. Secretary of Environment and Natural

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Cruz vs. Secretary of Environment and Natural

PANGANIBAN, J., Separate Opinion (Concurring and Dissenting):

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Cruz vs. Secretary of Environment and Natural

Cruz vs. Secretary of Environment and Natural