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One of the nation's most eminent biologists, Keith Stewart Thompson, has stated:

"Perhaps the most obvious challenge is to demonstrate evolution empirically. There are,
arguably, some two to ten million species on Earth. The fossil record shows that most species
survive somewhere between three and five million years. In that case, we ought to be seeing small
but significant numbers of originations and extinctions every decade." But, of course, we do not
see that. (From the article "Natural Selection and Evolution's Gun," American Scientist, Vol. 85,
Nov/Dec 1997, p. 516)

Science
First Definition
Here is a dictionary definition. Many people assume that when we use the word "science," we are talking about this
definition. In my opinion, it's a pretty good definition, and it would be good if we all meant this definition when we
used the word "science." In general, when you see the word "science" in these pages, this is the definition.

"Systematized knowledge derived from observation, study, and experimentation carried on in

order to determine the nature or principles of what is being studied." (Webster's New World
Dictionary of the American Language)

Implied in this definition is the idea that conclusions are made on the basis of empirical evidence (i.e., evidence that
comes from experimentation and observation). Thus, a true "scientist" is someone who studies a part of the world
around him for evidence that he then uses to draw conclusions about the world he lives in.

Few people should have trouble with this definition of science.

Second Definition
However, there are many who use the term "science" to refer to a way of looking at the world. To them, the word
"science" refers to a philosophical mindset. Their definition of science might be something like this.

"An understanding that matter is the only true reality in the world and that everything in the world
can be explained only in terms of this matter. An understanding that the natural world contains
everything that is real and of value."

Now it should be easy to see that if someone who adheres to this second definition of "science" hears me refer to the
fact that the empirical evidence points to the fact that this world must have had a Creator, they will cry, "That is not
science! That is religion!"

They are using a definition of science that, by definition, excludes the concept of a Creator. They believe, in essence,
that their philosophy of life (or religion) of materialism and naturalism is "science" and that the Christian philosophy
of life (or religion) is "religion." In fact, both materialism and Christianity can be thought of as philosophies of life.
One must examine the evidence closely to ascertain which "philosophy" most closely fits the evidence that exists in
the world around us. (And, in fact, one can do "good science" [first definition!] and still adhere to either
"philosophy"--or some other philosophy--of life.)

I can argue all day that "science" (first definition) points to a Creator, but they will have none of it
because they claim that "science" (second definition) allows no room for the concept of a
Supernatural Creator!

This is the very reason you hear so many people on television "nature programs" and in high
school biology textbooks talk as though the natural world is all that there is. They believe that to
imply that a Creator might be involved in all this would be to deny "science" (second definition,
of course).
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I would suggest that we need to do our little part to insist that the first definition of science
(above) is the only valid definition. And I would suggest that those who use the word "science" to
mean the second definition should be required to use a different word--a word that shows that they
are really talking about their philosophy or their religion. They are talking about the philosophy
(or "religion" if you please!) of materialism or naturalism.

We must not let them get away with taking a good word ("science") and redefining it to mean
"materialism" or "naturalism!" (And then claim that anyone who disagrees with them is trying to
replace "science" [second definition] with religion!).

The philosophy of Naturalism is a world-view that is built on an unverifiable assumption. Strictly speaking, neither
evolution nor creation are empirical science, nor can they be. This is evident in that they both seek to address the
question of life's origin, something that cannot be repeated nor put into a test tube. Neither theory is subject to
repeatable experimentation or observable processes. However, both can be described as forensic science, in that
they seek to reconstruct a theory about a past event based on empirical data presently observed. Origin science,
whether evolutionism or creationism, is analogous to what forensic specialists do at a crime scene and what
archaeologists do on a dig. Most importantly, both theories are first and foremost a philosophical framework for
interpreting the data.

One of the primary flaws with evolutionists is their stubborn propensity to confuse the data itself with data-
interpretation. The very same data is viewed by both evolutionists and non-evolutionists, but because each is
working within a different paradigm the interpretive conclusions are very different. Yet evolutionists call their own
(naturalist) interpretation "science" and the non-evolutionist interpretation "faith."

If naturalism is assumed, then any notion of Intelligent Design is automatically excluded by very definition. But if
evolution is actually bad philosophy, we are left with a nagging question. If science excludes Design, and yet there
is in fact a Designer, then how will anyone ever know? If our idea of science excludes God outright, and He in
fact exists, then our "science" is forever damned to be riddled with error. This is a simple logical conclusion, and I
am amazed that it is so rarely considered.

Currently, the situation with the debate is rather ironic. We have come full circle, back to Inherit the Wind. Yet the
characterization of the creationists as closed-minded with a "don't confuse me with the facts" attitude is now the
position occupied by the evolutionists. The situation has entirely reversed. Furthermore, the evolutionists are every
bit as interested in maintaining the popular philosophy of materialistic naturalism as the early creationists were in
defending the Bible.

quote:
From a theistic perspective, Darwinism as a general theory is not empirical at all. It is a child of
naturalistic or positivistic philosophy, which defines science as the attempt to explain the world
without allowing any role to theological or providential activity. Positivism in this sense requires
science to have at least a vague theory about everything really important. To produce the required
theory, scientists are allowed, if necessary, to make simplifying assumptions or even to overlook
difficult aspects of the problem. Even a particularly frustrating problem, such as the origin of life
on earth, is considered to be solved in principle once scientists think they have some plausible
general notion about how the thing might have happened. The spirit of positivistic science is
illustrated by James Trefil's summary of the evolution of life in his recent book, 1000 Things
Everyone Should Know About Science:

Evolution of life on earth proceeded in two stages: chemical and

biological. Life on earth must have developed from inorganic materials-
what else was there for it to come from? The first stage in the
development of life, therefore, was the production of a reproducing cell
from materials at hand on the early earth. This process is called
chemical evolution.... Once a living, reproducing system was present,
the process of natural selection took over to produce the wide variety of
life that exists today.
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That sort of reasoning seems unimpeachable to metaphysical naturalists; fully naturalistic

chemical and biological evolution happened because nothing else could have happened. A theist,
on the other hand, has no reason to accept the plausibility of either chemical evolution or creative
natural selection in the absence of a convincing empirical demonstration.

Because Darwinism has its roots in metaphysical naturalism, it is not consistent to accept
Darwinism and then to give it a theistic interpretation. Theistic evolutionists are continually
confused on this point because they think that Darwinism is an empirical doctrine-i.e., that it rests
fundamentally on observation. If that were the case, it is hard to see how any observations of
evolution or natural selection in action could rule out the possibility that Darwinian evolution is
God's way of creating. Nothing about the observed variations in the beaks of finches in the
Galapagos Islands, or in the increased survival rate of dark melanic moths during periods when
the background trees were darkened by industrial smoke, discredits a theistic interpretation of
evolution. If one assumes that confidence in the ability of Darwinian selection to create entirely
new kinds of animals is based on observations like those, then obviously atheism or metaphysical
naturalism is not a necessary implication of Darwinism. This mistaken premise leads theistic
evolutionists to the conclusion that they can accept George Gaylord Simpson's "scientific"
statement-i.e., that mutation and selection did the work of creation-and reject his "philosophical"
conclusion that the universe is purposeless.

The flaw in that logic is that the purportedly scientific statement was inferred from the
philosophical conclusion rather than the other way around. The empirical evidence in itself is
inadequate to prove the necessary creative power of natural selection without a decisive boost
from the philosophical assumption that only unintelligent and purposeless processes operated in
nature before the evolution of intelligence. Darwinists know that natural selection created the
animal groups that sprang suddenly to life in the Cambrian rocks (to pick a single example) not
because observation supports this conclusion but because naturalistic philosophy permits no
alternative. What else was available to do the job? Certainly not God-because the whole point of
positivistic science is to explain the history of life without giving God a place in it.

In short, the reason that Darwinism and theism are incompatible is not that God could not have
used evolution by natural selection to create. Darwinian evolution might seem unbiblical to some,
or an unlikely method for God to use, but it is always possible that God might do something that
confounds our expectations. The contradiction between Darwinism and theism is at a deeper level.
To know that Darwinism is true (as a general explanation for the history of life), one has to know
that no alternative to naturalistic evolution is possible. To know that is to know that God does not
exist, or at least that God cannot create. To infer that Darwinism is true because there is no creator
God, and then to interpret Darwinism as God's method of creating, is to engage in self-
contradiction.

I have two concluding points. First, the contradiction between Darwinism and theism is not
necessarily evident to people who have only a superficial acquaintance with Darwinism. That
explains why 40 percent of the American public believes in a God-guided evolution and thinks, no
doubt, that this position satisfactorily reconciles science and religion. The contradiction sinks in
when a person assimilates Darwinist ways of thinking and sees how antithetical they are to theism.
That is why Darwin in his own time and his successors today have generally felt that theistic
evolutionists were missing the point. Theistic evolutionists protest (correctly) that a creative role
for natural selection does not rule out the possibility of God, but they fail to understand that the
entire outlook of positivistic science is profoundly incompatible with the existence of a
supernatural creator who takes an active role in the natural world.

My second concluding point is that it is risky for Darwinists to be candid about the implications
of their theory for theistic religion. I don't mean simply that the anti-theistic bluster put about by
people like William Provine and Carl Sagan arouses opposition, although that is an important
consideration. I am thinking of an intellectual problem. The all-purpose defense that Darwinists
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invoke when their theory is under attack is to invoke what I called in my earlier address
"Dobzhansky's rules," the rules of positivistic science. That is, they say that "science" is defined
as the search for naturalistic explanations for all phenomena and that any other activity is "not
science." This position is sustainable only on the assumption that "science" is just one knowledge
game among many, and theists suffer no great loss if they have to go and play in another game
called "religion." The problem is that the games do not have equivalent status. The science game
has government support and control of the public educational establishment. Everybody's
children, theists and non-theists alike, are to be taught that "evolution is a fact." This implies that
everything contrary to "evolution,'' specifically the existence of a God who takes a role in
creation, is false. If "evolution" has strong anti-theistic implications, the theists in the political
community are entitled to ask whether what Darwinists promulgate as "evolution," is really true.
The answer, "That's the way we think in Science," is not an adequate response.

Over 40 years ago, C.S. Lewis noted the tendency of scientists to rally around naturalism, not because of the
evidence, but because they fear the alternative:

"The Bergsonian critique of orthodox Darwinism is not easy to answer. More disquieting still is
D.M.S. Watson's defense. ‘Evolution itself,’ he wrote, ‘is accepted by zoologists not because it has
been observed to occur or... can be proved by logically coherent evidence to be true, but because
the only alternative, special creation, is clearly incredible.’ Has it come to that? Does the whole
cast structure of modern naturalism depend not on positive evidence but simply on an a priori
metaphysical prejudice? Was it devised not to get in facts but keep out God?” ~ C.S. Lewis, The
Weight of Glory

In an article entitled, “Naturalism Is An Essential Part of Science and Critical Inquiry,” what I’ve been saying is
quite bluntly stated: “Naturalism is, ironically, a controversial philosophy. Our modern civilization depends totally
for its existence and future survival on the methods and fruits of science, naturalism is the philosophy that science
created and that science now follows with such success, yet the great majority of humans (at least 90% of the U.S.
population) believe in the antithesis of naturalism--supernaturalism. Our culture persistently indulges and
celebrates supernaturalism, and most people, including some scientists, refuse to systematically understand
naturalism and its consequences.”

And I posit, that when the majority defines what they think science is, it is by no means religiously neutral. As the
immediately above quote shows. The below is an excellent article, I will give just one example of the three
mentioned.

quote:

Is Science Religiously Neutral? Three Examples

Simon and Altruism

First, then, some examples that suggest that science is not religiously neutral. I begin with Herbert
Simon's article, "A Mechanism for Social Selection and Successful Altruism." This article is
concerned with the problem of altruism: Why, asks Simon, do people like Mother Teresa do the
things that they do? Why do they devote their time and energy and indeed their entire lives to the
welfare of other people? Of course it isn't only the great saints of the world that display this
impulse; most of us do so to one degree or another.

How, says Simon, can we account for this kind of behavior? The rational way to behave, he says,
is to act or try to act in such a way as to increase one's personal fitness; i.e., to act so as to increase
the probability that one's genes will be widely disseminated in the next and subsequent generation,
thus doing well in the evolutionary derby. A paradigm of rational behavior, so conceived, was
reported in the South Bend Tribune of December 21, l991 (dateline Alexandria (Va.)). "Cecil B.
Jacobson, an infertility specialist, was accused of using his own sperm to impregnate his patients;
he may have fathered as many as 75 children, a prosecutor said Friday." Unlike Jacobson,
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however, such people as Mother Teresa and Thomas Aquinas cheerfully ignore the short- or long-
term fate of their genes. What is the explanation of this behavior?

The answer, says Simon, is two mechanisms: "docility" and "bounded rationality":

Docile persons tend to learn and believe what they perceive others in the society
want them to learn and believe. Thus the content of what is learned will not be
fully screened for its contribution to personal fitness (p. 1666).

Because of bounded rationality, the docile individual will often be unable to

distinguish socially prescribed behavior that contributes to fitness from altruistic
behavior [i. e., socially prescribed behavior that does not contribute to fitness--
AP]. In fact, docility will reduce the inclination to evaluate independently the
contributions of behavior to fitness. .... By virtue of bounded rationality, the
docile person cannot acquire the personally advantageous learning that provides
the increment, d, of fitness without acquiring also the altruistic behaviors that
cost the decrement, c. (p. 1667).

The idea is that a Mother Teresa or a Thomas Aquinas displays bounded rationality; they are
unable to distinguish socially prescribed behavior that contributes to fitness from altruistic
behavior (socially prescribed behavior which does not). As a result, they fail to acquire the
personally advantageous learning that provides that increment d of fitness without, sadly enough,
suffering that decrement c exacted by altruistic behavior. They acquiesce unthinkingly in what
society tells them is the right way to behave; and they aren't quite up to making their own
independent evaluation of the likely bearing of such behavior on the fate of their genes. If they did
make such an independent evaluation (and were rational enough to avoid silly mistakes) they
would presumably see that this sort of behavior does not contribute to personal fitness, drop it like
a hot potato, and get right to work on their expected number of progeny.

No Christian could accept this account as even a beginning of a viable explanation of the altruistic
behavior of the Mother Teresas of this world. From a Christian perspective, this doesn't even miss
the mark; it isn't close enough to be a miss. Behaving as Mother Teresa does is not a display of
bounded rationality--as if, if she thought through the matter with greater clarity and penetration,
she would cease this kind of behavior and instead turn her attention to her expected number of
progeny. Her behavior displays a Christ-like spirit; she is reflecting in her limited human way the
magnificent splendor of Christ's sacrificial action in the Atonement. (No doubt she is also laying
up treasure in heaven). Indeed, is there anything a human being can do that is more rational than
what she does? From a Christian perspective, the idea that her behavior is irrational (and so
irrational that it needs to be explained in terms of such mechanisms as unusual docility and limited
rationality!) is hard to take seriously. For from that perspective, behavior of the sort engaged in by
Mother Teresa is anything but a manifestation of 'limited rationality'. On the contrary: her
behavior is vastly more rational than that of someone who, like Cecil Jacobson, devotes his best
efforts to seeing to it that his genes are represented in excelsis in the next and subsequent
generations.

Simon suggests or assumes that the rational course for a human being to follow is to try to
increase her fitness. Rationality, however, is a deeply normative notion; the rational course is the
right course, the one to be recommended, the one you ought to pursue. Simon, therefore, seems to
be making a normative claim, or perhaps a normative assumption; it is a vital and intrinsic part of
what he means to put forward. If so, however, can it really be part of science? Science is supposed
to be non-evaluative, non-normative, non-prescriptive: it is supposed to give us facts, not values.
Can this claim that the rational course is to pursue fitness then be part of science, of a scientific
explanation, or a scientific enterprise?

But perhaps there is a reply. What, exactly, does Simon mean here by such terms as “rational”
and “rationality”? At least two things; for when he says that the rational course, for a human
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being, is to try to increase her fitness, he isn't using the term in the same way as when he says
Mother Teresa and people like her suffer from bounded rationality. The latter means simply that
people like this aren't quite up to snuff when it comes to intelligence, perspicacity, and the like;
they are at least slightly defective with respect to acuteness. It is because of the lack of acuity that
they fail to see that the socially prescribed behavior in question is really in conflict with their own
best interests or the achievement of their own goals. This limited rationality is a matter of running
a quart low, of playing with less than a full deck, of being such that the elevator doesn't go all the
way to the top floor.

When he says that the rational course for a human being is to strive to promote fitness, he
presumably means something different by the term “rational”, namely, that a properly
functioning human being, one not subject to malfunction (one that isn't insane, or retarded, or
reacting to undue stress, or in the grip of some other malfunction or dysfunctional state) will as a
matter of fact have certain goals, try to attain certain conditions, aim to bring about certain states
of affairs. Presumably survival would be one of these goals; but another one, says Simon, is
promoting or maximizing fitness.

And there are two things to say about this claim. In the first place, we might ask what the evidence
is that, as a matter of fact, properly functioning human beings do indeed all or nearly all display
this goal. It isn't easy to see precisely how to answer this question. One suspects that a study done
by way of the usual polling and questionnaire techniques wouldn't yield this result; most of the
properly functioning people I know, anyway, wouldn't give as one of their main goals that of
increasing their fitness. (Perhaps you will retort that this is because most of the people I know are
past childbearing age, so that directly increasing their genetic representation in the next
generations is no longer a live option. Of course they could do their best to see that they have a lot
of grandchildren--judiciously distributed bribes, perhaps, or arranging circumstances so that their
daughters will become pregnant, or encouraging their younger relatives to drop out of school and
have children). But obviously there is always another option: we can say that the goals or aims in
question aren't conscious, are not available to conscious inspection. They are rather to be
determined by behavior. It is your behavior that reveals and demonstrates your goals, no matter
what you say (and, indeed, no matter what you think).

Well, perhaps so. It would still remain to be shown or argued that properly functioning human
persons do as a matter of fact display in their behavior this goal of increasing their fitness--where,
of course, we couldn't sensibly take their displaying this goal as a criterion of normality or proper
function. As a matter of fact, Simon doesn't proceed in this way; his procedure, with respect to
this question, is a priori rather than a posteriori. He doesn't tell us what it is that leads him to
think that properly functioning human beings will have this goal, but one suspects his answer
would be that human beings acquire this goal somehow by virtue of our evolutionary history. I
suspect he thinks it would follow from any proper evolutionary account of human beings (and for
many other species as well) that they have maximizing fitness as a goal. How exactly this story
would go is perhaps not entirely clear; but for the moment we can ignore the difficulties.

The second thing to say about this claim is that the same question arises with respect to it: isn't the
idea of proper function itself a normative notion? There is a connected circle of notions here:
proper function, health, normality (in the normative, not the descriptive sense) dysfunction,
damage, design (a properly functioning lung is working the way lungs are designed to work),
purpose, and the like. Perhaps none of these notions can be analyzed in terms of notions outside
the charmed circle (so that this circle would resemble that involving the notions of necessity,
possibility, entailment, possible worlds, and so on). And aren't these notions normative? Indeed,
there is a use of 'ought' to go with them. When the starter button is pressed, the engine ought to
turn over--i.e., if the relevant parts are functioning properly, the engine will turn over when the
starter button is pressed. When you suffer a smallish laceration, a scab ought to form over the
wound; that is, if the relevant parts of your body are functioning properly, a scab will form over
the wound. A six-month-old baby ought to be able to raise its head and kick its feet
simultaneously; that is, a healthy, normal (in the normative, not the statistical sense) six-month-
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old baby can do these things. Must we not concede, therefore, that this notion of proper function is
itself a normative notion, so that if Simon uses 'rationality' in a way explicable only in terms of
proper function, then what he says is indeed normative and thus not properly a part of science?

Perhaps; but if the employment of the notion of normality or proper function is sufficient to
disqualify a discourse from the title of science, then a lot more than Simon's account of altruism
will turn out not to be science. Consider functional generalizations--the sorts of generalizations to
be found in biological and psychological descriptions of the way in which human beings or other
organic creatures work. As John Pollock points out, such generalizations seem to involve an
implicit presupposition:

when we formulate similar generalizations about machines, the generalizations

we formulate are really about how machines work when they work properly; or
when they are not broken. Similarly it seems that generalizations about
organisms should be understood as being about the way they work when they are
“working normally.”

Here “working normally” and “not being broken” mean something like “subject to no
dysfunction” or “working properly” or “not malfunctioning”. Functional generalizations about
organisms, therefore, say how they work when they are functioning properly. But of course
biological and social science is full of functional generalizations. Thus, if Simon is appealing to
the notion of proper function in his idea of rationality, he may be appealing to a kind of
normativity; but that kind of normativity is widely found in science. Or, at any rate, it is widely
found in what is called science. Some will maintain that the notion of proper function doesn't
belong in science unless it can be explained, somehow, in other terms--finally, perhaps, in terms
of the regularities studied in physics and chemistry. We need not enter that disputatious territory
here; it is sufficient to note that if Simon is appealing to the notion of proper function, then what
he does appeal to is in fact to be found over the length and breadth of the social and biological
sciences. Therefore, we should not deny the title 'science' to what Simon does unless we are
prepared to raise the same strictures with respect to most of the rest of what we think of as social
and biological science. And even if we do say that Simonian science isn't really science, nothing
substantive changes; my point will then be, not that religious considerations bear on science
properly so-called, but rather that they bear on what is in fact called science, which is a very
important, indeed, dominant part of our intellectual and cultural life.

I shall therefore assume that Simonian science is science. So in Simon's account of altruism we
have an example of a scientific theory that is clearly not neutral with respect to Christian
commitment; indeed, it is inconsistent with it. Simon's theory also illustrates another and quite
different way in which religious considerations are relevant to science; they bear on what we take
it needs explanation. From Simon's perspective, it is altruism that needs explanation; from a
Christian or theistic perspective, on the other hand, it is only to be expected that humans beings
would sometimes act altruistically. Perhaps what needs explanation is the way in which human
beings savage and destroy each other.

Naturalism, materialism, whether metaphysical or otherwise, is dead in the water. It is a theory that has no
explanatory power whatsoever. And when it presumes to have explanatory power, it is entirely anti-thetical to the
Christian faith and worldview. A great quote by the senior paleontologist of the British Natural History Museum
makes the point that I believe is the root of the problem, “Darwin’s evolutionary explanation of man has been
transformed into a modern myth, to the detriment of science and social progress…. The secular myths of evolution
have had a damaging effect on scientific research, leading to distortion, to needless controversy, and to the gross
misuse of science…. I mean the stories, the narratives about change over time. How the dinosaurs became extinct,
how the mammals evolved, where man came from. These seem to me to be little more than story-telling.”

A myth, says my dictionary, is a real or fictional story that embodies the cultural ideals of a people or express deep,
commonly felt emotions. By this definition, myths are generally good things – and the origin stories that
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paleontologists tell are necessarily myths (“Four Legs Good, Two Legs Bad,” Natural History [1983]). I will end
with this, when I say that the hypothesis of evolutionary origins has no explanatory power, what do I mean?…

Why then does the scientific theory of evolution hold on to a concept of chance to the degree it
does? I suspect it is the fact that there is no alternative whatsoever that could explain the fact of
universal evolution at least in principle, and be formulated within the framework of natural
science [philosophical naturalism]. If no alternative should be forthcoming, if chance remains
overtaxed, then the conclusion seems inevitable that evolution and therefore living beings cannot
be grasped by natural science to the same extent as non-living things – not because organisms are
so complex, but because the explaining mechanism is fundamentally inadequate.

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