157 ARANGONTE Vs SPS MAGLUNOB

ARANGONTE vs. SPS.
MAGLUNOB
G.R. 178906
February 18, 2009
By: Ellaine M. Quimson
PONENTE: CHICO-NAZARIO, J.
FACTS:
Elvira Arangote acquired the subject parcel of land from Esperanza Maglunob, who is
grand aunt of respondents Martin Maglunob and Romeo Salido.
In June 1986, Esperenza executed an affidavit in which she renounced her rights, share
and participation in the land in favor of Elvira and her husband. It appears that the lot was not
exclusive property of Esperanza but also of the other heirs of Martin I whom she represented in
the partition agreement.
Elvira and her husband, Ray constructed a house on the land in 1989 and in 1993, OCT
was issued in her name by the DAR. However, respondents with the help of hired persons
entered the property and built a wall behind and in front of Elvira’s house. Elvira and Ray sued
respondents for quieting of title and declaration of ownership. Respondents averred that they
were co-owners of the land with Esperanza who allegedly inherited the land from Martin 1
together with Tomas and Inocencia (Martin II’s and Romeo’s predecessor in interest). They
argued that Esperanza could not have validly waived her rights in favor of Elvira and Ray.
MCTC ruled for Elvira. RTC reversed MCTC and declared respondents lawful owners of
the land together with the other heirs of Martin I. Elvira went to the CA but the CA affirmed the
RTC decision. Before SC, Elvira argued that both RTC and CA erred in declaring the affidavit of
Esperanza void because it is a valid and binding proof of transfer of ownership of the subject
property as it was coupled with actual delivery.
ISSUE: Whether or not the donation to Elvira and her husband is valid.
RULING:
Supreme Court affirmed the decision of CA. SC ruled that the affidavit executed by Esperanza
wherein she renounced, relinquished and waived all her rights, share, interest and participation
in the subject property in favor of Elvira and Ray is in fact a donation.
It is clear from the records that the subject property was not Esperanza’s exclusive share,
but also that of the other heirs of her father, Martin I. Esperanza expressly affixed her
thumbmark to the Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement of July 1981 not only for herself, but also on
behalf of the other heirs of Martin I. Though in the Partition Agreement dated 29 April 1985
Esperanza affixed her thumbmark without stating that she was doing so not only for herself, but
also on behalf of the other heirs of Martin I, this does not mean that Esperanza was already the
exclusive owner thereof. The evidence shows that the subject property is the share of the heirs of
Martin I. This is clear from the sketch attached to the Partition Agreement dated 29 April 1985,
which reveals the proportionate areas given to the heirs of the two siblings, Pantaleon and
Placida, who were the original owners of the whole parcel of land from which the subject
property was taken.
In this case, the petitioner derived her title to the subject property from the notarized
Affidavit executed by Esperanza, wherein the latter relinquished her rights, share, interest and
participation over the same in favor of the petitioner and her husband.
A careful perusal of the said Affidavit reveals that it is not what it purports to be.
Esperanza’s Affidavit is, in fact, a Donation. Esperanza’s real intent in executing the said
Affidavit was to donate her share in the subject property to petitioner and her husband.
As no onerous undertaking is required of petitioner and her husband under the said
Affidavit, the donation is regarded as a pure donation of an interest in a real property covered by
Article 749 of the Civil Code. Article 749 of the Civil Code provides:
Art. 749. In order that the donation of an immovable may be valid, it must be made in a
public document, specifying therein the property donated and the value of the charges which the
donee must satisfy.
The acceptance may be made in the same deed of donation or in a separate public
document, but it shall not take effect unless it is done during the lifetime of the donor.
If the acceptance is made in a separate instrument, the donor shall be notified thereof in
an authentic form, and this step shall be noted in both instruments.
From the aforesaid provision, there are three requisites for the validity of a simple donation of a
real property, to wit: (1) it must be made in a public instrument; (2) it must be accepted, which
acceptance may be made either in the same Deed of Donation or in a separate public instrument;
and (3) if the acceptance is made in a separate instrument, the donor must be notified in an
authentic form, and the same must be noted in both instruments.
This Court agrees with the RTC and the Court of Appeals that the Affidavit executed by
Esperanza relinquishing her rights, share, interest and participation over the subject property in
favor of the petitioner and her husband suffered from legal infirmities, as it failed to comply with
the aforesaid requisites of the law.
In the present case, the said Affidavit, which is tantamount to a Deed of Donation, met
the first requisite, as it was notarized; thus, it became a public instrument. Nevertheless, it failed
to meet the aforesaid second and third requisites. The acceptance of the said donation was not
made by the petitioner and her husband either in the same Affidavit or in a separate public
instrument. As there was no acceptance made of the said donation, there was also no notice of
the said acceptance given to the donor, Esperanza. Therefore, the Affidavit executed by
Esperanza in favor of petitioner and her husband is null and void.
The subsequent notarized Deed of Acceptance dated 23 September 2000, as well as the
notice of such acceptance, executed by the petitioner did not cure the defect. Moreover, it was
only made by the petitioner several years after the Complaint was filed in court, or when the
RTC had already rendered its Decision dated 12 September 2000, although it was still during
Esperanza’s lifetime. Evidently, its execution was a mere afterthought, a belated attempt to cure
what was a defective donation.
It is true that the acceptance of a donation may be made at any time during the lifetime of
the donor. And granting arguendo that such acceptance may still be admitted in evidence on
appeal, there is still need for proof that a formal notice of such acceptance was received by the
donor and noted in both the Deed of Donation and the separate instrument embodying the
acceptance. At the very least, this last legal requisite of annotation in both instruments of
donation and acceptance was not fulfilled by the petitioner. Neither the Affidavit nor the Deed of
Acceptance bears the fact that Esperanza received notice of the acceptance of the donation by
petitioner. For this reason, even Esperanza’s one-third share in the subject property cannot be
adjudicated to the petitioner.
With the foregoing, this Court holds that the RTC and the Court of Appeals did not err in
declaring null and void Esperanza’s Affidavit

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ARANGONTE vs. SPS.

By: Ellaine M. Quimson

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