Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 162419             July 10, 2007

PAUL V. SANTIAGO, petitioner, 
vs.
CF SHARP CREW MANAGEMENT, INC., respondent.

DECISION

TINGA, J.:

At the heart of this case involving a contract between a seafarer, on one hand, and the manning
agent and the foreign principal, on the other, is this erstwhile unsettled legal quandary: whether the
seafarer, who was prevented from leaving the port of Manila and refused deployment without valid
reason but whose POEA-approved employment contract provides that the employer-employee
relationship shall commence only upon the seafarer’s actual departure from the port in the point of
hire, is entitled to relief?

This treats of the petition for review filed by Paul V. Santiago (petitioner) assailing the Decision and
Resolution of the Court of Appeals dated 16 October 2003 and 19 February 2004, respectively, in
CA-G.R. SP No. 68404.1

Petitioner had been working as a seafarer for Smith Bell Management, Inc. (respondent) for about
five (5) years.2On 3 February 1998, petitioner signed a new contract of employment with respondent,
with the duration of nine (9) months. He was assured of a monthly salary of US$515.00, overtime
pay and other benefits. The following day or on 4 February 1998, the contract was approved by the
Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA). Petitioner was to be deployed on board
the "MSV Seaspread" which was scheduled to leave the port of Manila for Canada on 13 February
1998.

A week before the scheduled date of departure, Capt. Pacifico Fernandez, respondent’s Vice
President, sent a facsimile message to the captain of "MSV Seaspread," which reads:

I received a phone call today from the wife of Paul Santiago in Masbate asking me not to
send her husband to MSV Seaspread anymore. Other callers who did not reveal their identity
gave me some feedbacks that Paul Santiago this time if allowed to depart will jump ship in
Canada like his brother Christopher Santiago, O/S who jumped ship from the C.S. Nexus in
Kita-kyushu, Japan last December, 1997.

We do not want this to happen again and have the vessel penalized like the C.S. Nexus in
Japan.

Forewarned is forearmed like his brother when his brother when he was applying he
behaved like a Saint but in his heart he was a serpent. If you agree with me then we will
send his replacement.
 Kindly advise.3

To this message the captain of "MSV Seaspread" replied:

Many thanks for your advice concerning P. Santiago, A/B. Please cancel plans for him to
return to Seaspread.4

On 9 February 1998, petitioner was thus told that he would not be leaving for Canada anymore, but
he was reassured that he might be considered for deployment at some future date.

Petitioner filed a complaint for illegal dismissal, damages, and attorney's fees against respondent
and its foreign principal, Cable and Wireless (Marine) Ltd. 5 The case was raffled to Labor Arbiter
Teresita Castillon-Lora, who ruled that the employment contract remained valid but had not
commenced since petitioner was not deployed. According to her, respondent violated the rules and
regulations governing overseas employment when it did not deploy petitioner, causing petitioner to
suffer actual damages representing lost salary income for nine (9) months and fixed overtime fee, all
amounting to US$7, 209.00.

The labor arbiter held respondent liable. The dispositive portion of her Decision dated 29 January
1999 reads:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, respondent is hereby Ordered to pay complainant

All the other claims are hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.6

On appeal by respondent, the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) ruled that there is no
employer-employee relationship between petitioner and respondent because under the Standard
Terms and Conditions Governing the Employment of Filipino Seafarers on Board Ocean Going
Vessels (POEA Standard Contract), the employment contract shall commence upon actual
departure of the seafarer from the airport or seaport at the point of hire and with a POEA-approved
contract. In the absence of an employer-employee relationship between the parties, the claims for
illegal dismissal, actual damages, and attorney’s fees should be dismissed. 7 On the other hand, the
NLRC found respondent’s decision not to deploy petitioner to be a valid exercise of its management
prerogative.8 The NLRC disposed of the appeal in this wise:

WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, the assailed Decision dated January 29, 1999 is
hereby AFFIRMED in so far as other claims are concerned and with MODIFICATION by
VACATING the award of actual damages and attorney’s fees as well as excluding Pacifico
Fernandez as party respondent.

SO ORDERED.9

Petitioner moved for the reconsideration of the NLRC’s Decision but his motion was denied for lack
of merit.10 He elevated the case to the Court of Appeals through a petition for certiorari.

In its Decision11 dated 16 October 2003, the Court of Appeals noted that there is an ambiguity in the
NLRC’s Decision when it affirmed with modification the labor arbiter’s Decision, because by the very
modification introduced by the Commission (vacating the award of actual damages and attorney’s
fees), there is nothing more left in the labor arbiter’s Decision to affirm. 12

According to the appellate court, petitioner is not entitled to actual damages because damages are
not recoverable by a worker who was not deployed by his agency within the period prescribed in

the POEA Rules.13 It agreed with the NLRC’s finding that petitioner’s non-deployment was a valid
exercise of respondent’s management prerogative. 14 It added that since petitioner had not departed
from the Port of Manila, no employer-employee relationship between the parties arose and any claim
for damages against the so-called employer could have no leg to stand on. 15

Petitioner’s subsequent motion for reconsideration was denied on 19 February 2004. 16

The present petition is anchored on two grounds, to wit:

A. The Honorable Court of Appeals committed a serious error of law when it ignored
[S]ection 10 of Republic Act [R.A.] No. 8042 otherwise known as the Migrant Worker’s Act of
1995 as well as Section 29 of the Standard Terms and Conditions Governing the
Employment of Filipino Seafarers On-Board Ocean-Going Vessels (which is deemed
incorporated under the petitioner’s POEA approved Employment Contract) that the claims or
disputes of the Overseas Filipino Worker by virtue of a contract fall within the jurisdiction of
the Labor Arbiter of the NLRC.

B. The Honorable Court of Appeals committed a serious error when it disregarded the
required quantum of proof in labor cases, which is substantial evidence, thus a total
departure from established jurisprudence on the matter. 17

Petitioner maintains that respondent violated the Migrant Workers Act and the POEA Rules when it
failed to deploy him within thirty (30) calendar days without a valid reason. In doing so, it had
unilaterally and arbitrarily prevented the consummation of the POEA- approved contract. Since it
prevented his deployment without valid basis, said deployment being a condition to the
consummation of the POEA contract, the contract is deemed consummated, and therefore he should
be awarded actual damages, consisting of the stipulated salary and fixed overtime pay. 18Petitioner
adds that since the contract is deemed consummated, he should be considered an employee for all
intents and purposes, and thus the labor arbiter and/or the NLRC has jurisdiction to take cognizance
of his claims.19

Petitioner additionally claims that he should be considered a regular employee, having worked for
five (5) years on board the same vessel owned by the same principal and manned by the same local
agent. He argues that respondent’s act of not deploying him was a scheme designed to prevent him
from attaining the status of a regular employee.20

Petitioner submits that respondent had no valid and sufficient cause to abandon the employment
contract, as it merely relied upon alleged phone calls from his wife and other unnamed callers in
arriving at the conclusion that he would jump ship like his brother. He points out that his wife had
executed an affidavit21 strongly denying having called respondent, and that the other alleged callers
did not even disclose their identities to respondent. 22 Thus, it was error for the Court of Appeals to
adopt the unfounded conclusion of the NLRC, as the same was not based on substantial evidence. 23

On the other hand, respondent argues that the Labor Arbiter has no jurisdiction to award petitioner’s
monetary claims. His employment with respondent did not commence because his deployment was
withheld for a valid reason. Consequently, the labor arbiter and/or the NLRC cannot entertain
adjudication of petitioner’s case much less award damages to him. The controversy involves a
breach of contractual obligations and as such is cognizable by civil courts. 24 On another matter,
respondent claims that the second issue posed by petitioner involves a recalibration of facts which is
outside the jurisdiction of this Court.25

There is some merit in the petition.

There is no question that the parties entered into an employment contract on 3 February 1998,
whereby petitioner was contracted by respondent to render services on board "MSV Seaspread" for
the consideration of US$515.00 per month for nine (9) months, plus overtime pay. However,
respondent failed to deploy petitioner from the port of Manila to Canada. Considering that petitioner
was not able to depart from the airport or seaport in the point of hire, the employment contract did
not commence, and no employer-employee relationship was created between the parties. 26

However, a distinction must be made between the perfection of the employment contract and the
commencement of the employer-employee relationship. The perfection of the contract, which in this
case coincided with the date of execution thereof, occurred when petitioner and respondent agreed
on the object and the cause, as well as the rest of the terms and conditions therein. The
commencement of the employer-employee relationship, as earlier discussed, would have taken
place had petitioner been actually deployed from the point of hire. Thus, even before the start of any
employer-employee relationship, contemporaneous with the perfection of the employment contract
was the birth of certain rights and obligations, the breach of which may give rise to a cause of action
against the erring party. Thus, if the reverse had happened, that is the seafarer failed or refused to
be deployed as agreed upon, he would be liable for damages.

Moreover, while the POEA Standard Contract must be recognized and respected, neither the
manning agent nor the employer can simply prevent a seafarer from being deployed without a valid
reason.

Respondent’s act of preventing petitioner from departing the port of Manila and boarding "MSV
Seaspread" constitutes a breach of contract, giving rise to petitioner’s cause of action. Respondent
unilaterally and unreasonably reneged on its obligation to deploy petitioner and must therefore
answer for the actual damages he suffered.

We take exception to the Court of Appeals’ conclusion that damages are not recoverable by a
worker who was not deployed by his agency. The fact that the POEA Rules 27 are silent as to the
payment of damages to the affected seafarer does not mean that the seafarer is precluded from
claiming the same. The sanctions provided for non-deployment do not end with the suspension or
cancellation of license or fine and the return of all documents at no cost to the worker. They do not
forfend a seafarer from instituting an action for damages against the employer or agency which has
failed to deploy him.

The POEA Rules only provide sanctions which the POEA can impose on erring agencies. It does not
provide for damages and money claims recoverable by aggrieved employees because it is not the
POEA, but the NLRC, which has jurisdiction over such matters.

Despite the absence of an employer-employee relationship between petitioner and respondent, the
Court rules that the NLRC has jurisdiction over petitioner’s complaint. The jurisdiction of labor
arbiters is not limited to claims arising from employer-employee relationships. Section 10 of R.A. No.
8042 (Migrant Workers Act), provides that:
 Sec. 10. Money Claims. – Notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary, the Labor
Arbiters of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) shall have the original and
exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide, within ninety (90) calendar days after the filing of
the complaint, the claims arising out of an employer-employee relationship or by virtue of any
law or contract involving Filipino workers for overseas deployment including claims for actual,
moral, exemplary and other forms of damages. x x x [Emphasis supplied]

Since the present petition involves the employment contract entered into by petitioner for overseas
employment, his claims are cognizable by the labor arbiters of the NLRC.

Article 2199 of the Civil Code provides that one is entitled to an adequate compensation only for
such pecuniary loss suffered by him as he has duly proved. Respondent is thus liable to pay
petitioner actual damages in the form of the loss of nine (9) months’ worth of salary as provided in
the contract. He is not, however, entitled to overtime pay. While the contract indicated a fixed
overtime pay, it is not a guarantee that he would receive said amount regardless of whether or not
he rendered overtime work. Even though petitioner was "prevented without valid reason from
rendering regular much less overtime service,"28 the fact remains that there is no certainty that
petitioner will perform overtime work had he been allowed to board the vessel. The amount of
US$286.00 stipulated in the contract will be paid only if and when the employee rendered overtime
work. This has been the tenor of our rulings in the case of Stolt-Nielsen Marine Services (Phils.), Inc.
v. National Labor Relations Commission29 where we discussed the matter in this light:

The contract provision means that the fixed overtime pay of 30% would be the basis for
computing the overtime pay if and when overtime work would be rendered. Simply stated,
the rendition of overtime work and the submission of sufficient proof that said work was
actually performed are conditions to be satisfied before a seaman could be entitled to
overtime pay which should be computed on the basis of 30% of the basic monthly salary. In
short, the contract provision guarantees the right to overtime pay but the entitlement to such
benefit must first be established. Realistically speaking, a seaman, by the very nature of his
job, stays on board a ship or vessel beyond the regular eight-hour work schedule. For the
employer to give him overtime pay for the extra hours when he might be sleeping or
attending to his personal chores or even just lulling away his time would be extremely unfair
and unreasonable.30

The Court also holds that petitioner is entitled to attorney’s fees in the concept of damages and
expenses of litigation. Attorney's fees are recoverable when the defendant's act or omission has
compelled the plaintiff to incur expenses to protect his interest. 31 We note that respondent’s basis for
not deploying petitioner is the belief that he will jump ship just like his brother, a mere suspicion that
is based on alleged phone calls of several persons whose identities were not even confirmed. Time
and again, this Court has upheld management prerogatives so long as they are exercised in good
faith for the advancement of the employer’s interest and not for the purpose of defeating or
circumventing the rights of the employees under special laws or under valid
agreements.32 Respondent’s failure to deploy petitioner is unfounded and unreasonable, forcing
petitioner to institute the suit below. The award of attorney’s fees is thus warranted.

However, moral damages cannot be awarded in this case. While respondent’s failure to deploy
petitioner seems baseless and unreasonable, we cannot qualify such action as being tainted with
bad faith, or done deliberately to defeat petitioner’s rights, as to justify the award of moral damages.
At most, respondent was being overzealous in protecting its interest when it became too hasty in
making its conclusion that petitioner will jump ship like his brother.
We likewise do not see respondent’s failure to deploy petitioner as an act designed to prevent the
latter from attaining the status of a regular employee. Even if petitioner was able to depart the port of
Manila, he still cannot be considered a regular employee, regardless of his previous contracts of
employment with respondent. In Millares v. National Labor Relations Commission,33 the Court ruled
that seafarers are considered contractual employees and cannot be considered as regular
employees under the Labor Code. Their employment is governed by the contracts they sign every
time they are rehired and their employment is terminated when the contract expires. The exigencies
of their work necessitates that they be employed on a contractual basis. 34

WHEREFORE, petition is GRANTED IN PART. The Decision dated 16 October 2003 and the
Resolution dated 19 February 2004 of the Court of Appeals are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
Decision of Labor Arbiter Teresita D. Castillon-Lora dated 29 January 1999 is REINSTATED with the
MODIFICATION that respondent CF Sharp Crew Management, Inc. is ordered to pay actual or
compensatory damages in the amount of US$4,635.00

representing salary for nine (9) months as stated in the contract, and attorney’s fees at the
reasonable rate of 10% of the recoverable amount.

SO ORDERED.

Carpio, Carpio-Morales, Velasco, Jr., JJ., concur.