Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

A.M. No. RTJ-05-1962               October 17, 2013

ATTY. JESSIE TULDAGUE and ATTY. ALFREDO BALAJO JR., Complainants, 

vs.
JUDGE MOISES PARDO and JAIME CALPATURA Legal Researcher and Officer-In-Charge Regional Trial
Court Branch 32 Cabarroguis Quirino, Respondents.

x-----------------------x

A.M. OCA IPI No. 05-2243

ATTY. JESSIE TULDAGUE and ATTY. ALFREDO BALAJO JR., Complainants, 

vs.
JAIME CALPATURA Legal Researcher and Officer-In-Charge Branch Clerk of Court Regional Trial Court
Branch 32 Cabarroguis Quirino, Respondent.

x-----------------------x

A.M. No. 05-10-661-RTC

RE: REPORT ON THE JUDICIAL AUDIT AND INVESTIGATION CONDUCTED IN THE REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT CABARROGUIS QUIRINO.

DECISION

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

Before this Court are: (1) the Administrative Complaint 1 dated 10 June 2005 filed by Atty. Jessie Tuldague
(Tuldague), Clerk of Court VI, Office of the Clerk of Court, Regional Trial Court, Cabarroguis, Quirino (RTC), and
Atty. Alfredo Balajo, Jr. (Balajo ), 2nd Assistant Provincial Prosecutor, Office of the Provincial Prosecutor,
Cabarroguis, Quirino, against now retired Judge Moises Pardo (Judge Pardo), Presiding Judge of RTC, Branch 31,
for Corruption and Violation of the New Code of Judicial Conduct; (2) the Administrative Complaint 2 dated 5 July
2005 filed by Tuldague and Balajo against Jaime Calpatura (Calpatura), Legal Researcher and Officer-In-Charge,
Branch Clerk of Court of RTC, Branch 32, for Corruption; and (3) the Report on the Judicial Audit and
Investigation3 conducted in the same court.

The Facts

The antecedent facts of these cases, as culled from the records, are as follows:

A.M. No. RTJ-05-1962

Tuldague and Balajo allege that Judge Pardo committed corruption and violations of the New Code of Judicial
Conduct, to wit:

1. In Criminal Case No. 1427, entitled People v. Rosendo Discipulo, Judge Pardo allegedly asked and
received P6,000.00 from Rosendo Discipulo (Rosendo), in exchange for a favorable decision on his
application for probation.

On 28 February 2005, Rosendo was convicted for violation of Republic Act No. 6425. Balajo alleged that
after the promulgation of the decision, Rosendo’s counsel immediately filed a written application for
probation accurately quoting the penalty imposed. 4 Rosendo testified that Calpatura sent an emissary to
ask P10,000.00 from him, in order for Judge Pardo to act favorably on his application for probation.

On 28 March 2005, Calpatura and Judge Pardo allegedly sent text messages to Rosendo. Calpatura
allegedly instructed him to give P3,000.00 to Dominador Pascua (Dominador) while Judge Pardo asked him
to go to his house in the evening. Thereafter, Rosendo allegedly gave P3,000.00 to Dominador. At 7:30 p.m.
of the same day, Rosendo, together with Fr. Teodoro Lazo (Fr. Lazo) and spouses Palmer and Irene
Natividad, went to Judge Pardo’s house. They had a "drinking congress" until 10:00 p.m. Before leaving,
Rosendo allegedly gave P6,000.00 to Judge Pardo in the presence of his driver, Ramil S. Alonzo (Alonzo).
 2. In Land Registration Case No. 223-2002, Judge Pardo allegedly obtained P1,000.00 from petitioner John
F. Toribio (Toribio) for a speedy release of a copy of the granted petition, sometime in December 2002.

3. In Criminal Case No. 1581, entitled People v. Johny Kimayong, Judge Pardo allegedly asked and
received one deer from accused Johny Kimayong (Kimayong) in exchange for a favorable decision. Balajo
testified that on 21 February 2003, the jail guard mistakenly gave him a letter, containing the information that
"Judge Pardo demanded and was given a live deer in exchange for a court favor to Johny Kimayong." 5

4. Judge Pardo allegedly received P10,000.00 from Richard Calpito (Calpito), in exchange for endorsing him
to the position of Process Server of RTC, Branch 31. Judge Pardo also allegedly received a cow from
Michael T. Garingan (Garingan), in exchange for endorsing him as Utility in the Office of the Clerk of Court.

5. On 29 June 2002, Judge Pardo allegedly ordered Lugeorge N. Discipulo (Lugeorge), Electrician II of the
Maintenance Section of the RTC, to take out two (2) cans of coat master paint from the Hall of Justice.
Lugeorge testified that on 30 June 2002, he brought and used the two cans of paint in Judge Pardo’s house.
Judge Pardo allegedly ordered him to get another paint, but he no longer complied. According to him,
Tuldague already discovered the missing cans of paint and had it noted in the security guard’s logbook.

In his Comment/Answer dated 9 August 2005, 6 Judge Pardo vehemently denied the allegations of Tuldague, Balajo,
Lugeorge and Rosendo.

Judge Pardo denied that Rosendo gave him money for his probation. Judge Pardo presented Fr. Lazo, who testified
that Rosendo went with him to Judge Pardo’s house to thank the judge. Fr. Lazo stated that he did not see Rosendo
hand anything to Judge Pardo during their stay. Judge Pardo also narrated that on 4 July 2005, he visited Fr. Lazo
in his convent. Fr. Lazo then confronted Rosendo, who admitted that he was forced by his cousin Lugeorge to sign
the Affidavit. On Balajo’s accusation, Judge Pardo stated that he immediately called the attention of Rosendo’s
counsel in open court when he quoted the penalty imposed.

Judge Pardo denied the charges that he obtained P1,000.00 from Toribio and a live deer from Kimayong. He also
denied receiving P10,000.00 and a cow from Calpito and Garingan in exchange for endorsing them to vacant
positions in the RTC. Judge Pardo claimed that these allegations were unsupported by concrete evidence. He
further argued that the letter allegedly given to Balajo was obtained illegally and in violation of the privacy of
communication.

Judge Pardo likewise denied ordering Lugeorge to take two cans of paint for use in his house. He narrated that
during the wake of Lugeorge’s mother-in-law, Lugeorge confessed that he took the cans of paint and gave one to
Alonzo.

Finally, he alleged that Tuldague filed this complaint to get even because: (a) he enjoined Tuldague from signing
applications for leave of absence of employees, which he used to do; (b) he recalled Process Servers Calpito and
Levi Prestoza (Prestoza), who used to be under Tuldague’s disposal; (c) he issued a memorandum prohibiting
Tuldague from serving summons before the raffle of cases; (d) he stopped the practice of filing all pleadings with the
Office of the Clerk of Court and limited it to initiatory pleadings only; and (e) he stopped sharing the conduct of raffle
of foreclosure proceedings with Tuldague. Judge Pardo claimed that Balajo detested him for noticing that Balajo
would refuse to submit object evidence when he rested his case.

A.M. OCA IPI No. 05-2243-P

In this case, Tuldague and Balajo accuse Calpatura of corruption, in cahoots with Judge Pardo, to wit:

1.Calpatura allegedly approached litigants and offered them assistance provided they would give him money or
animals.

In the same criminal case against Rosendo, Calpatura allegedly sent an emissary to ask for P10,000.00 so that
Judge Pardo would decide favorably Rosendo’s probation. On 28 March 2005, Calpatura allegedly sent Rosendo a
text message, stating to give him P3,000.00, through Dominador.

In Civil Case No. 292, the plaintiff Alberto Gorospe (Gorospe) testified that his friend Jose Cabañero (Cabañero)
introduced him to Calpatura while they were following up this case in the RTC. Sometime in July 2004, Gorospe,
together with Cabañero, allegedly met Calpatura in the Cabarroguis public market. Calpatura allegedly urged him to
buy hard drinks and pulutan. Gorospe agreed because he was seeking help with his case. Then, sometime in
November 2004, Calpatura allegedly asked him to prepare a goat for Judge Pardo’s birthday. Judge Pardo allegedly
instructed Gorospe to give him the goat through Calpatura. Thereafter, Calpatura allegedly asked him again for
money.

Juanito Pascua (Juanito) likewise testified that Calpatura visited him in jail to ask for two goats. Judge Pardo
allegedly instructed Calpatura to ask for the goats in order to expedite his release from jail. Thus, Juanito gave the
two goats for Judge Pardo to Calpatura. Calpatura allegedly asked Juanito again for another goat. After Juanito’s
acquittal, Calpatura allegedly ordered him to repair a bed without payment.
2. Calpatura allegedly acted as "fixer" and "bagman" for Judge Pardo in cases where the accused deposited cash
bonds. Both Calpatura and Judge Pardo allegedly shared with the released cash bonds thereafter.

In Criminal Case No. 1468, Aurelia Diaz (Diaz) testified that Calpatura and Prestoza asked for her released cash
bond amounting to P16,000.00, so that the estafa case against her would be dismissed. Diaz narrated that on 14
October 2002, Judge Pardo asked her if she would give him the released cash bond amounting to P16,000.00. Diaz
agreed but asked Judge Pardo to acknowledge its receipt. Then, Judge Pardo allegedly called her lawyer, Atty.
Edwin Betguen (Betguen). Betguen came and asked Diaz to go with him to the comfort room. Calpatura and
Prestoza thereafter appeared. Then, Betguen allegedly received the P16,000.00 from Diaz.

On the other hand, Tuldague and Naty Fernando (Fernando) narrated that in the afternoon of 12 February 2003,
Diaz, Cezar Diaz and Procopio Castro approached Tuldague to inquire about their rice thresher, which was
executed upon Diaz’s conviction of estafa. Diaz then complained to Tuldague that she was misled into believing that
her case would be dismissed if she gave P10,000.00, or part of her cash bond, to Betguen and Calpatura. Fernando
testified that he heard Diaz complain to Tuldague.

3.Calpatura allegedly bragged to court litigants about drafting decisions and his closeness to Judge Pardo.

4.Finally, Calpatura allegedly projected himself as a lawyer even though he did not pass the bar.

In his Comment/Answer dated 30 August 2005,7 Calpatura essentially denied the allegations against him. He denied
that he offered assistance to litigants in exchange for money or animals and that he was a "fixer" and "bagman" of
Judge Pardo.

Calpatura denied receiving P3,000.00 from Rosendo through Dominador. He presented Dominador, who testified
that Rosendo did not give him money on 28 March 2005. However, Calpatura admitted that Lugeorge requested
him to offer Rosendo’s cash bond to Judge Pardo for his acquittal. He turned down the offer since he knew Judge
Pardo’s strictness and non-acceptance of bribes.

Calpatura alleged that Gorospe’s accusations were purely concocted and fabricated. Calpatura presented
Cabañero, who testified that he never introduced Gorospe to Calpatura and neither did they meet Calpatura in the
Cabarroguis public market. Cabañero instead insisted that it was a certain Ramiterre, whom he introduced to
Calpatura and who was with them in the Cabarroguis public market. 8

Calpatura likewise refuted Juanito’s accusations and offered the Certification issued by Benjamin Galapon,
Provincial Warden, Cabarroguis, Quirino. The Certification states: "Jaime Calpatura did not visit the Provincial
Warden Office since he was transferred from PENRE Office to the [RTC], Cabarroguis, Quirino." 9

Calpatura denied obtaining money from Diaz regarding her estafa case. He alleged that Diaz’s Affidavit was self-
serving and executed upon the instance of Tuldague and Balajo. He likewise insisted that Fernando’s testimony was
purely fabricated and concocted.

Finally, he claimed that the allegations against him were products of instigations with ill-motive brought about by
complainants’ illegitimate and capricious ambitions. He alleged that Tuldague sought to be free from constructive
suggestions and corrections on his wrong office actions, i.e. issuance of summons before the raffle of cases. He
likewise claimed that Balajo harbored ill-feelings against him since he questioned his issuance of commitment
orders.

A.M. No. 05-10-661-RTC

On 15 August to 19 August 2005, a judicial audit was conducted in the RTC of Cabarroguis, Quirino, based on the
directive of the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) and Chief Justice Hilario Davide, Jr. to investigate Judge
Pardo. On 19 September 2005, the audit team submitted their initial report providing, among others, that in
Branches 31 and 32 of the RTC, Judge Pardo, as presiding and pairing judge, accumulated a total of: (a) forty-four
(44) cases without further action or settings for a considerable length of time; (b) seven (7) cases submitted for
decision or resolution but already beyond the reglementary period to decide or resolve; and (c) one (1) case not yet
set for hearing.10

In a Resolution dated 18 October 2005, 11 the Court En Banc, upon recommendation by the OCA, resolved to: (a)
consolidate the instant judicial audit and investigation report with the complaints against Judge Pardo; (b) include
Calpatura as respondent in the charge of corruption; and (c) refer the consolidated cases to Justice Alfredo M.
Marigomen (Justice Marigomen), Consultant, OCA, for investigation, report and recommendation within 60 days
from the termination of the formal hearing.

In a Resolution dated 4 April 2006, 12 the Court En Banc, resolved to redocket the complaint, amend the earlier
resolution and limit the charges against Judge Pardo to: (a) corruption through, among others, sharing of cash
bonds; (b) demanding money or live animals in exchange for endorsing applicants for vacant positions; and (c)
taking of court property specifically two big cans of coat master paint allocated for the painting of the Hall of Justice.
On 27 April 2006, 25 May 2006, and 29 June 2006, Justice Marigomen conducted an investigation at the Hall of
Justice, Cabarroguis, Quirino. Complainants presented eight (8) witnesses, namely: Rosendo, Lugeorge, Gorospe,
Diaz, Fernando, Juanito, Tuldague, and Balajo. On the other hand, respondents presented seven (7) witnesses,
namely: Fr. Lazo, Dominador, Cabañero, Madarang, Galapon, Calpatura, and Judge Pardo.

Meanwhile, based on the initial report on the judicial audit, which was adopted by the OCA in its Memorandum
Report dated 28 April 2006, 13 this Court issued a Resolution dated 20 June 2006, 14 to wit:

(a) DIRECT Judge Moises M. Pardo, RTC, Branch 31, Cabarroguis, Quirino, to SUBMIT certified true copies of the
following, within five (5) days from notice hereof:

(i) Criminal Case No. 1891 – order showing the latest status of the case;

(ii) Criminal Case No. 1655 – formal offer of exhibits for the prosecution allegedly attached to the
case records; court order resolving the same; and court order and/or pleading filed by the parties to
show the latest status of the case;

(iii) Criminal Case No. 1395 – Supreme Court Resolution allegedly designating Judge Menrado
Corpuz, RTC, Branch 38, Maddela, Quirino, to hear and decide the case;

(iv) Criminal Case No. 1716-2002 – order dismissing the case;

(v) Criminal Case Nos. 1626 and 1376 – decisions (submit only after the promulgation of the
decisions); and (vi) Criminal Case No. 1608 and Civil Case No. 332 – decisions;

(b) DIRECT Judge Pardo to

(i) DECIDE WITH DISPATCH Criminal Case No. 1708 which has already been submitted for
decision per his letter of January 16, 2005;

(ii) COMPLY with the previous directive of the Office of the Court Administrator to (1) decide with
dispatch Criminal Case No. 1609; and (2) immediately take appropriate action on Civil Case No.
292, which remains unacted upon despite the lapse of the period given to the parties to reconstitute
the records of the case; and

(iii)

SUBMIT, within five (5) days from promulgation, a compliance report relative to the foregoing
directives, with certified true copies of the order issued in Civil Case No. 292 and the decisions in
Criminal Case Nos. 1609 and 1708;

xxxx

(j) DIRECT Judge Pardo, in his capacity as Acting Presiding Judge of RTC, Branch 32, Cabarroguis, Quirino, to:

(i) EXPLAIN why no administrative sanction shall be imposed on him for his failure, as of audit date, to (1) take
appropriate action on the following cases: Criminal Cases Nos. 1887, 1888, 1889, 1890, 1922, 1903, 1909, 1904,
1915, 1919, 1726 with respect to accused Jose Tubera (with Warrants of Arrest/ Alias Warrants of Arrest); Civil
Cases Nos. 603 and 609 (with Summons); Civil Case No. 537 (No further setting of trial); Criminal Case No. 1454
(No further setting of the hearing on the Motion for Declaration of the Penalty Imposed against the Accused);
Criminal Case Nos. 1414 and 1916-05 and Civil Cases Nos. 384, 522, 535 and 560 (where the parties and
concerned court employees failed to comply with the directives of the court for a considerable length of time); and
(2) resolve, within the reglementary period, the following cases: Criminal Case Nos. 1422, 1509, 1514 and 1615;

(ii) SUBMIT, within five (5) days from notice hereof, certified true copies of the decisions/resolutions in the following
cases: Criminal Case Nos. 1422, 1509 and 1615;

(iii) COMPLY with the previous directive of the OCA to (1) resolve with dispatch Criminal Case No. 1514; and (2)
immediately take appropriate action on Criminal Case No. 1916-05, where no further action was taken by the court
despite the lapse of the period given to the prosecution to submit the report on the reinvestigation of the case, and
Criminal Case No. 1726 which has not yet been archived with respect to accused Jose Tubera, who has not yet
been arraigned and who has jumped bail since March 2004;

(iv) SUBMIT within ten (10) days from notice hereof a compliance report relative to the foregoing directives, with
certified true copies of the orders issued in Criminal Cases Nos. 1916-05 and 1726 and the resolution/order in
Criminal Case No. 1514; and
(v) IMMEDIATELY TAKE APPROPRIATE ACTION on the following cases: Civil Case Nos. 384, where no further
action was taken by the court despite the lapse of the period given to the parties to submit their pleading or
addendum to the Compromise Agreement; and Civil Case No. 522 where no further action was taken by the court
despite the lapse of the period given to the DENR to comply with its Order of July 8, 2002; 15

xxxx

In his Letter-Compliance dated 8 August 2006,16 Judge Pardo submitted the certified true copies of Orders and
Decisions he rendered in RTC, Branch 31. In his Letter-Compliance dated 9 August 2006, 17 Judge Pardo likewise
attached copies of his Medical Certificate, Orders, Resolutions and Decisions for Branch 32. Judge Pardo explained
in his letter that he had been suffering from chronic hypertensive cardio vascular disease with temporary rheumatoid
arthritis since 1 March 2005.

In a Resolution dated 18 October 2006, 18 this Court, through the Second Division, resolved to consolidate A.M. OCA
IPI No. 05-2243-P with A.M. No. RTJ-05-1962.

In a Resolution dated 14 December 2009, this Court, through the First Division, approved Judge Pardo’s application
for optional retirement effective 1 July 2009. However, we held in abeyance the payment of his retirement benefits
until the final resolution of this case.

The Report and Recommendations of the OCA

In its Report dated 3 June 2010, 19 the OCA found Judge Pardo liable for violating Section 1, Canon 4 of the New
Code of Judicial Conduct.20 The OCA found that Judge Pardo did not deny he had a drinking spree with Rosendo,
for more than two hours in the evening of 28 March 2005. Thus, the OCA found this act disturbing and improper
since Rosendo had a pending application for probation with Judge Pardo at that time.

As for the charges of (1) corruption against both Judge Pardo and Calpatura, (2) taking of court property, and (3)
endorsing of applicants in exchange for money or animals against Judge Pardo only, the OCA noted that the
complainants failed to substantiate their charges. The complainants did not have direct knowledge of their charges
and the witnesses they presented were not credible to substantiate their claims.

Accordingly, the OCA recommended that:

1.the charge of corruption against respondents Judge Moises M. Pardo (now retired), formerly of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 31, Cabarroguis, Quirino, and Jaime B. Calpatura, Legal Researcher of the
said court, as well as the charges of demanding money or live animals in exchange for indorsing applicants
for vacant positions and taking of court property against respondent Judge Pardo, be DISMISSED for
insufficiency of evidence;

2.Judge Pardo be FINED in the amount of P20,000.00 for violation of the New Code of Judicial Conduct,
which shall be deducted from his retirement benefits; and

3.the matter regarding the judicial audit conducted in Branches 31 and 32 of the Regional Trial Court,
Cabarroguis, Quirino be now considered CLOSED and TERMINATED, insofar as Judge Pardo is
concerned.21

The Ruling of the Court

The Court agrees with the recommendations of the OCA but modifies the amount of the recommended fine.

In administrative proceedings, the complainants bear the burden of proving, by substantial evidence, the allegations
in the complaint.22 Substantial evidence means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to support a conclusion. In the absence of evidence to the contrary, bare allegations of misconduct cannot
prevail over the presumption of regularity in the performance of judicial duty. 23

In A.M. No. RTJ-05-1962, complainants Tuldague and Balajo bear the burden of proving their allegations against
Judge Pardo, which we limited to three acts: (a) corruption through, among others, sharing of cash bonds; (b)
demanding money or live animals in exchange for endorsing applicants for vacant positions; and (c) taking of court
property specifically two big cans of coat master paint allocated for the painting of the Hall of Justice. Since the
charges hurled against Judge Pardo are grave in nature, the evidence against him should be competent and
derived from direct knowledge. 24

However, as the OCA observed, complainants did not have direct knowledge of their charges and merely relied on
their witnesses to testify on the alleged wrongful acts of Judge Pardo. To determine the credibility and probative
weight of the testimony of a witness, such testimony must be considered in its entirety and not in truncated
parts.25 To determine which contradicting statements of a witness are to prevail as to the truth, the other evidence
received must be considered.26
On the charge of corruption, complainants only presented Rosendo to testify that he gave P6,000.00 to Judge
Pardo in the latter’s house. He alleged that he likewise gave P3,000.00 to Calpatura, through Dominador. However,
Rosendo’s statements remain uncorroborated as he did not present Alonzo, who allegedly saw him give the money
to Judge Pardo. On the other hand, Judge Pardo presented Fr. Lazo, who testified that he did not see Rosendo give
money to Judge Pardo in his house. Calpatura likewise presented Dominador, who testified that Rosendo never
gave him money.

Rosendo’s testimony also contains material inconsistencies, which gravely affected his credibility. Contrary to
Rosendo’s statement in his Affidavit 27 that Calpatura sent an emissary to ask for P10,000.00, Rosendo testified on
cross-examination that Calpatura sent him a text message, while Judge Pardo called him to ask for the money. 28 In
his Affidavit, Rosendo claimed that Calpatura only sent a text message on 28 March 2005, but on cross-
examination, he stated that Calpatura also sent a text message on 28 February 2005. 29 It is well to note that when a
serious and inexplicable discrepancy is present between a previously executed sworn statement of a witness and
his testimonial declarations with respect to one’s participation in a serious imputation such as bribery, such
discrepancy raises grave doubt on the veracity of the witness’ account. 30

On the charge that Judge Pardo demanded money or live animals to endorse applicants for vacant positions,
Tuldague’s allegation remains unsubstantiated. Toribio, Kimayong, Calpito, and Garingan, from whom Judge Pardo
allegedly asked for money and animals, were not presented. In Aldecoa-Delorino v. Abellanosa, 31 the charges of
abuse of authority, harassment and oppression were dismissed by the Court when the concerned employees did
not submit their Affidavits or appear during the investigation of the administrative case. The Court cannot give
credence to charges based on mere suspicion and speculation. 32

Finally, on the charge that Judge Pardo ordered Lugeorge to bring court property, specifically two cans of paints, to
his house, we likewise find the evidence presented to be insufficient. Only Lugeorge’s testimony was presented. The
security guards who allegedly saw the taking were not presented. On the other hand, the veracity of Lugeorge’s
testimony is doubtful due to these circumstances: (1) Lugeorge only mentioned the alleged order of Judge Pardo to
deliver the cans of paint to his house when Tuldague confronted him about the missing cans of paint; 33 (2) Tuldague
thereafter ordered that "NOTE: TWO (2) BIG CAN (sic) OF COAT MASTER TAKEN OUT BY L. N.
DISCIPULO"34 be entered in the security logbook, but did not mention Judge Pardo in the entry; (3) Tuldague
prepared Lugeorge’s affidavit on 6 June 2006, or four years from the alleged order of Judge Pardo to Lugeorge in
2002; and (4) during his cross-examination, Tuldague admitted that Lugeorge had been his subordinate since he
was appointed as Clerk of Court.35

A material inconsistency is likewise present in Lugeorge’s testimony when in his Affidavit, he stated that Judge
Pardo ordered him to bring out two cans of paint from the RTC on 29 June 2002. 36 On his cross-examination,
however, Lugeorge testified that Judge Pardo’s order happened "before 29 June 2002." 37 In Jabon v. Judge
Usman,38 we held that the complainant’s glaring discrepancy in the date of the commission of the alleged corrupt act
and his failure to correct the discrepancy despite given a chance, negatively affected his credibility.

With the failure of complainants to substantiate their charges, the complaint against Judge Pardo should be
dismissed for lack of merit. However, we find Judge Pardo liable for gross misconduct constituting violations of the
Code of Judicial Conduct.

Rosendo testified that he went to Judge Pardo’s house to give him P6,000.00.  Although the alleged giving of
1âwphi1

money was not proved, Judge Pardo did not deny that Rosendo, a litigant who had a pending application for
probation in his sala, went to his house, had a "drinking spree" with him and stayed there for more than two hours.

Section 1, Canon 2 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary states that " Judges shall
ensure that not only is their conduct above reproach, but that it is perceived to be so in the view of a reasonable
observer." Section 2, Canon 2 of the Code states that "The behavior and conduct of judges must reaffirm the
people’s faith in the integrity of the judiciary." Section 1, Canon 4 of the Code states that "Judges shall avoid
impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all of their activities."

In Tan v. Rosete,39 we ruled that the respondent judge’s acts of meeting with litigants outside the office premises
beyond office hours and sending a member of his staff to talk with complainant constitute gross misconduct. In J.
King & Sons Company v. Hontanosas,40 we likewise held respondent judge liable for misconduct when he
entertained a litigant in his home and received benefits given by the litigant.

Section 8, Rule 140 of the Rules of Court classifies gross misconduct constituting violations of the Code of Judicial
Conduct as a serious offense. It is punishable by: (1) dismissal from the service, forfeiture of benefits, and
disqualification from reinstatement to any public office; (2) suspension from office without salary and other benefits
for more than three months but not exceeding six months; or (3) a fine of more than P20,000 but not
exceeding P40,000.41

The Court notes that this is not the first offense of Judge Pardo. In Magpali v. Judge Pardo, 42 the Court fined
himP10,000.00 for gross ignorance of the law and warned him that a repetition of similar acts would be dealt with
more severely. In A.M. OCA IPI No. 05-2316-RTJ, we dismissed the charges of grave misconduct, gross ignorance
of the law and violation of the New Code of Judicial Conduct against Judge Pardo but reminded him to be more
circumspect in the performance of his administrative functions, with a warning as well. 43 In light of these
circumstances, we find it proper to impose upon him the maximum fine of P40,000.00.

In A.M. OCA IPI No. 05-2243-P, the complainants presented three witnesses to testify on separate instances when
Calpatura allegedly committed corruption in cahoots with Judge Pardo. First, Gorospe testified that Calpatura was
introduced to him by Cabañero to help him with the lost records of his case. Calpatura allegedly urged Gorospe to
buy liquor and pulutan, and then they drank in the public market. Gorospe likewise accused Calpatura of asking
goats for Judge Pardo’s birthday and for him. However, we find Gorospe’s accusations insufficient due to the
following: (1) Calpatura presented Cabañero, who refuted Gorospe’s allegations and categorically stated that he
never introduced Calpatura to Gorospe and neither did Calpatura join them to drink in the public market; (2) on
cross-examination, Gorospe admitted that Judge Pardo never celebrated his birthday during his stint as a
judge;44 and (3) Gorospe’s testimony likewise suffered from inconsistencies, such that, in his Affidavit, 45 he stated
that Judge Pardo instructed him to give him a goat through Calpatura, but on cross-examination he testified that it
was Calpatura who asked him for a goat to be given to Judge Pardo. 46

Second, Juanito stated in his Salaysay47 that Calpatura asked for two goats from him while he was in jail. However,
Juanito’s statement fails to convince us. Juanito did not specify the circumstances as to when exactly Calpatura
asked for the goats and how he was able to send the goats while he was in prison. On the other hand, Calpatura
presented the Certification of the Provincial Warden to prove that he never visited the jail for any purpose. Juanito
further admitted during his cross-examination that: (1) he is only familiar with a little Tagalog while his Salaysay was
written in Tagalog and prepared by Tuldague; (2) when he was asked to identify his Salaysay , he could only "see a
little," or could see his signature only, because his vision was blurred; (3) he has little education and he could only
recall what he stated in his Salaysay if it would be read to him; and (4) finally, he signed his Salaysay in Tuldague’s
house since they were neighbors.48

Third, Tuldague alleged that Diaz complained to him about giving P10,000.00 or part of her cash bond to Betguen
and Calpatura after being assured that it would settle her case.49 Again, we cannot accept Tuldague’s allegation,
even though corroborated by Fernando. Both Tuldague and Fernando lacked direct and personal knowledge of
whether Diaz indeed gave her cash bond to Betguen and Calpatura. Diaz, on the other hand, consistently and
categorically testified that it was Betguen only who received her released cash bond amounting to P16,000.00.50

While the law does not tolerate misconduct by a civil servant, suspension, replacement or dismissal must not be
resorted to unless there is substantial evidence to merit such penalties. 51 In the absence of substantial evidence to
the contrary, Calpatura cannot be held accountable for the charges against him.

As for A.M. No. 05-10-661-RTC, we adopt the finding of the OCA that the same should be considered closed and
terminated, insofar as Judge Pardo is concerned. In any case, Judge Pardo has already complied with this Court’s
Resolution. In Office of the Court Administrator v. Judge Mantua, 52 where respondent judge was charged with gross
inefficiency for undue delay in deciding cases, we considered the said judge s earnest efforts in attending to the
pending cases in his docket sufficient to negate his liability.

WHEREFORE, we find respondent Judge Moises Pardo, retired Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court,
Cabarroguis, Quirino, Branch 31, GUILTY of gross misconduct and FINE him 140,000.00 to be deducted from his
retirement benefits. The Office of the Court Administrator is DIRECTED to release the retirement pay and other
benefits due Judge Pardo unless he is charged in some other administrative complaint or the same is otherwise
withheld for some other lawful cause.

We DISMISS the complaint against Jaime Calpatura, Legal Researcher and Officer-In-Charge, Branch Clerk of
Court, Regional Trial Court, Cabarroguis, Quirino, Branch 32, for lack of merit. SO ORDERED.

ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO

Chief Justice

(no part due to relationship of party)

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice
Associate Justice

ARTURO D. BRION DIOSDADO M. PERALTA

Associate Justice Associate Justice

LUCAS P. BERSAMIN (On official leave)

Associate Justice MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO*
 Associate Justice

(On official leave)

MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.
ROBERTO A. ABAD**
Associate Justice
Associate Justice

JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ JOSE C. MENDOZA

Associate Justice Associate Justice

BIENVENIDO L. REYES ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE

Associate Justice Associate Justice

(On official leave)

MARVIC MARIO VICTOR F. LEONEN***
Associate Justice
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

A.M. No. MTJ-08-1706               April 16, 2009

(Formerly OCA IPI No. 08-1984-MTJ)

MUTYA B. VICTORIO, Complainant, 
vs.
Judge MAXWELL S. ROSETE, PRESIDING JUDGE, MUNICIPAL Trial Court IN CITIES, BRANCH 2,
SANTIAGO CITY, Respondent.

RESOLUTION

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

The instant administrative complaint 1 was filed before this Court by Mutya B. Victorio (Victorio) charging Judge
Maxwell S. Rosete (Judge Rosete) of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Branch 2, Santiago City, with
Conduct Unbecoming a Judge, in relation to Civil Cases No. 11-551 and No. 556-557, entitled, Mutya Victorio v.
Leonardo Chua, et al.

The antecedent facts giving rise to the instant administrative case, as judicially determined in Chua v. Victorio,2are
recounted below:

Sometime in September of 1994, [Victorio] (through her attorney-in-fact) made a rental survey of other commercial
establishments along Panganiban Street. On the basis of the survey, a 25% rental increase was demanded from
[Leonardo Chua and Heirs of Yong Tian].

[Leonardo Chua and Heirs of Yong Tian] refused to pay the increased rentals which compelled [Victorio] to file
unlawful detainer cases against both lessees, docketed as Civil Cases Nos. II-370 and II-371. However, both
complaints were dismissed by the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Branch II, Santiago City. The dismissal
was affirmed by the Regional Trial Court (RTC), but reversed by the Court of Appeals, which ordered [Leonardo
Chua and Heirs of Yong Tian] to vacate the leased premises.

The decision of the Court of Appeals became final and executory, and, upon motion filed by [Victorio], the MTCC
issued writs of execution ordering the ejectment of [Leonardo Chua and Heirs of Yong Tian] from respondent’s
property.

[Leonardo Chua and Heirs of Yong Tian] filed motions to quash the writs of execution, contending that there were
supervening events which rendered the execution unjust or impossible. Specifically, [Leonardo Chua and Heirs of
Yong Tian] claimed that they had acceded to the request for an increase in rentals, and had paid [Victorio] the
amount demanded.

The MTCC found that [Leonardo Chua and Heirs of Yong Tian] had indeed paid to [Victorio] the increased monthly
rental even before the Court of Appeals decision attained finality. In fact, [Leonardo Chua and Heirs of Yong Tian]
offered to pay the increased rentals as early as January 1996, while the cases were still pending with the RTC. The
increased monthly rentals were accepted by [Victorio] without reservation, and monthly payment of the rentals at the
increased rate continued throughout the pendency of the suits. Accordingly, the MTCC quashed the writs of
execution that it earlier issued.
1awphi1

[Victorio] assailed the quashal of the writ of execution directly to the Supreme Court via a petition for review on
certiorari. This petition was dismissed by the Supreme Court on procedural grounds. [Leonardo Chua and Heirs of
Yong Tian] thus remained in possession of [Victorio’s] properties.

Subsequently, on October 10, 1998, [Victorio] wrote a letter to [Leonardo Chua and Heirs of Yong Tian] informing
them of her intention to increase the monthly rentals effective November 1, 1998, from P6,551.25 per unit to a sum
more than double that, namely, P15,000.00 per unit. [Leonardo Chua and Heirs of Yong Tian] refused to pay this
amount, contending that it was beyond the allowable rental increase embodied in the compromise agreement.

[Victorio] thus instituted Civil Cases Nos. [II-556 and 557] seeking the ejectment of [Leonardo Chua and Heirs of
Yong Tian]. In a joint decision dated May 10, 1999, the MTCC, Branch II, Santiago City dismissed these complaints
for lack of merit. On appeal [in Civil Cases Nos. 21-2761 and 21-2762], the RTC initially reversed the MTCC, but
later reversed its earlier decision. On March 9, 2000, the RTC issued an order affirming the MTCC’s dismissal of the
complaints.
[Victorio] filed a petition for review with the Court of Appeals, which was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. [59482]. On
May 31, 2001, the Court of Appeals reversed the March 9, 2000 Order of the RTC affirming the MTCC’s dismissal of
the complaints. The Court of Appeals ruled that the compromise agreement, which set a definite period of four years
for the lease contract, had been abrogated by [Leonardo Chua and Heirs of Yong Tian’s] refusal to pay the
increased rentals in 1994. Accordingly, in 1994, the juridical relation between the parties severed. When [Victorio]
accepted payment of the increased monthly amount, an entirely new contract of lease was entered into between the
parties. Since payment of rent was made on a monthly basis, and pursuant to Article 1687 of the Civil Code, the
period of this lease contract was monthly. Upon expiration of every month, the lessor could increase the rents and
demand that the lessee vacate the premises upon noncompliance with increased terms. In exercise of equity,
however, the Court of Appeals granted [Leonardo Chua and Heirs of Yong Tian] an extension of one year from
finality of the decision within which to vacate the premises. A motion for reconsideration [was filed but the same was
denied] on 11 March 2003.3

Aggrieved by the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 59482, Leonardo Chua and Heirs of Yong
Tian filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari before this Court, docketed as G.R. No. 157568, bearing the complete
title Leonardo Chua and Heirs of Yong Tian v. Mutya B. Victorio.

The Court rendered a Decision4 in Chua v. Victorio on 18 May 2004, with the following fallo:

Wherefore, in view of the foregoing, the instant petition for review is DENIED. The decision of the Court of Appeals
dated May 31, 2001 in CA-G.R. SP No. 59482, is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that [Leonardo Chua and
Heirs of Yong Tian] are ordered to vacate the leased premises one month after the finality of this decision. Petitioner
Leonardo Chua is also ORDERED to pay [Victorio] the sum of P15,000.00 a month as reasonable compensation for
the use of the premises from November 1, 1998 until he finally vacates the premises. Petitioners, Heirs of Yong
Tian, are ORDERED to pay [Victorio] the monthly sum of P15,000.00 per unit, or P30,000.00 per month from
November 1, 1998 until they finally vacate the premises.

Costs against [Leonardo Chua and Heirs of Yong Tian]. 5

The aforementioned Decision in Chua v. Victorio became final and executory on 6 August 2004, per Entry of
Judgment6 issued by this Court.

A Motion for Execution was filed on 28 December 2004 by Victorio before the MTCC in Civil Cases No. 11-551 and
No. 556-557, but Judge Rosete denied the same.

On 25 January 2005, Victorio filed another Motion7 for the Issuance of a Writ of Execution before the MTCC, but her
Motion was again denied by Judge Rosete in a Resolution 8 dated 28 March 2006, which decreed:

PREMISES CONSIDERED, the court resolves and so holds that [Victorio] may no longer be entitled to a writ of
execution. Accordingly, the motion for issuance of a writ of execution should be as it is hereby DENIED. 9

Victorio appealed the 28 March 2006 Resolution of the MTCC, but the appeal was withdrawn 10 upon verbal
instruction of Victorio’s Attorney-in-Fact. Thereafter, Judge Rosete issued an Order on 3 August 2006, which
declared that the case was considered "Finally Closed and Terminated." 11

On 13 November 2006, Victorio file a third Motion12 for Execution to have Leonardo Chua and Heirs of Yong Tian
vacate the leased premises. However, in a Resolution dated 6 December 2006, Judge Rosete only granted the
issuance of a partial Writ of Execution for the enforcement of the rental obligations of Leonardo Chua and Heirs of
Yong Tian. The dispositive portion of said Resolution reads:

WHEREFORE, in the light pf the foregoing, and finding [Victorio’s] motion dated November 13, 2006 partially
meritorious, let a writ of execution issue but only for the payment of rental arrearages by the [Leonardo Chua and
Heirs of Yong Tian].13

Consequently, Victorio filed on 28 March 2007 the present administrative complaint 14 against Judge Rosete for
Conduct Unbecoming a Judge. Victorio pointed out that Judge Rosete, in his Resolutions dated 28 March 2006 and
6 December 2006, in Civil Cases No. 11-551 and No. 556-557, refused to execute the judgment ordering Leonardo
Chua and Heirs of Yong Tian to vacate the leased premises. Victorio argued that Judge Rosete erred in ruling that
Victorio’s continuous acceptance of rental payment from Leonardo Chua and Heirs of Yong Tian gave birth to new
contracts of lease, since:

a. All the receipts issued by [Victorio] to [Leonardo Chua and Heirs of Yong Tian] contained a reservation
which reads "It is understood that the deposit and endorsement of the above check(s) will not prejudice the
cases now in court, Municipal Trial Court Branch II," among others.

b. It is clearly stated on page 7 of the Supreme Court Decision the dispositive portion of which read "No
amount of subsequent payment by the lessees could automatically restore the parties to what they once
were "and" the lessor’s acceptance of the increased rentals did not have the effect of reviving the earlier
contract of lease.
Victorio also informed the Court that on 14 December 2006, Leonardo Chua and Heirs of Yong Tian filed with the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 35, Santiago City, a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with Prayer for Temporary
Restraining Order (TRO) and/or Preliminary Injunction, against Victorio and Judge Rosete challenging the issuance
of the partial Writ of Execution in Civil Cases No. 11-551 and No. 556-557. The RTC issued a TRO and the Petition
therein is now submitted for resolution.

In his Comment15 on Victorio’s administrative complaint against him, Judge Rosete explained that he considered the
collection and acceptance by Victorio’s representative from Leonardo Chua and Heirs of Yong Tian of advance
monthly rentals as having created a new lease contract between said parties. For this reason, Victorio may no
longer press for the ejectment of Leonardo Chua and Heirs of Yong Tian from the leased premises. Leonardo Chua
and Heirs of Yong Tian, however, remained bound and obligated to pay Victorio whatever balance they may have
had on the monthly rentals as decreed by this Court in its Decision of 18 May 2004 inChua v. Victorio. So Judge
Rosete averred that it was not true that he denied the execution of the judgment inChua v. Victorio, for he issued a
Writ of Execution on 8 December 2006 for the same, particularly with regard to the payment by Leonardo Chua and
Heirs of Yong Tian of their rental obligations.

On 3 March 2008, the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) submitted its Report, 16 recommending that –

We respectfully submit for the consideration of the Honorable Court our recommendation:

1. That the instant administrative complaint be RE-DOCKETED as a regular administrative matter;

2. That respondent Judge Maxwell S. Rosete be found GUILTY of Gross Ignorance of the Law and
accordingly be meted with a penalty of FINE in the amount of P40,000.00 to be deducted from his accrued
leave credits;

3. That the Fiscal Management Office be DIRECTED to compute the monetary value of Judge Rosete’s
leave credits to be applied in satisfaction of the penalty to be imposed. 17

On 2 June 2008, the Court required 18 the parties to manifest within 10 days from notice if they were willing to submit
the matter for resolution based on the pleadings filed. Both parties failed to file any manifestation despite notice sent
to and received by them. Resultantly, the Court deemed the parties to have waived their right to submit such
manifestations and considered the case submitted for decision based on the pleadings filed.

The Court agrees in the recommendation of the OCA except for the penalty imposed.

As the OCA found, Judge Rosete is indeed guilty of gross ignorance of the law for issuing the Resolutions dated 28
March 2006 and 8 December 2006, denying Victorio’s motions for the issuance of a writ of execution in Civil Cases
No. 11-551 and No. 556-557. There is no dispute that judgment in said cases, appealed to this Court inChua v.
Victorio, has already become final and executory, an entry of judgment having been made in Chua v. Victorio on 6
August 2004. With a final and executory decision, rendered by no less than this Court, execution should issue as a
matter of right on motion by Victorio, in accordance with Section 1, Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Procedure, which
provides:

Section 1. Execution upon judgments or final orders. - Execution shall issue as a matter of right, on motion, upon a
judgment or order that disposes of the action or proceeding upon the expiration of the period to appeal therefrom if
no appeal has been duly perfected.

Judge Rosete's excuses for his refusal to enforce the Decision dated 18 May 2004 of this Court in Chua v. Victorio,
which categorically ordered Leonardo Chua and Heirs of Yong Tian to vacate the leased premises, are
unsatisfactory for the following reasons:

First, the 18 May 2004 Decision of this Court in Chua v. Victorio was already final and executory, having
been recorded in the Book of Entries of Judgment on 6 August 2004. Hence, Judge Rosete’s insistence to
the contrary constituted a contumacious disregard of a final and executory judgment of this Court.

Second, Judge Rosete’s exposition – that he deemed the collection and acceptance of advance monthly
rentals by Victorio’s representative from Leonardo Chua and Heirs of Yong Tian as acts that had created
new lease contracts between said parties and prevented the ejectment of the lessees from the leased
premises – unacceptable.

The Court, in Chua v. Victorio, clearly ordered (1) Leonardo Chua and Heirs of Yong Tian to vacate the leased
premises one month after the finality of the said Deicsion; (2) Leonardo Chua to pay Victorio P15,000.00 a month as
reasonable compensation for the use of the leased premises from 1 November 1998 until he finally vacates the
same; (2) Heirs of Yong Tian to pay Victorio P15,000.00 per month per unit, or a total of P30,000.00 per month, as
reasonable compensation for the leased premises from 1 November 1998 until they finally vacate the same; and (4)
Leonardo Chua and Heirs of Yong Tian to pay the costs of the suit.
By refusing to issue the necessary writ for the ejectment of Leonardo Chua and Heirs of Yong Tian from the leased
premises, and considering the establishment of alleged new lease contracts arising from Victorio’s acceptance of
advance rental payments from Leonardo Chua and Heirs of Yong Tian, Judge Rosete effectively altered or modified
the final and executory Decision dated 18 May 2004 of this Court in Chua v. Victorio, which ordered Leonardo Chua
and Heirs of Yong Tian to already vacate the leased premises.

Once a judgment becomes final and executory, the prevailing party can have it executed as a matter of right, and
the issuance of a Writ of Execution becomes a ministerial duty of the court. 19 A decision that has attained finality
becomes the law of the case regardless of any claim that it is erroneous. The writ of execution must therefore
conform to the judgment to be executed and adhere strictly to the very essential particulars. 20

A final judgment of the Supreme Court cannot be altered or modified, except for clerical errors, misprisions or
omissions. No "inferior" court has authority to revoke a resolution of a superior court, much less a final and
executory resolution of the Supreme Court, the latter itself having no power to revoke the same after it has become
final. Any amendment or alteration which substantially affects a final and executory judgment is null and void for lack
of jurisdiction, including the entire proceedings held for that purpose. An order of execution which varies the tenor of
the judgment or exceeds the terms thereof is a nullity. 21

In disregarding the rules and settled jurisprudence, Judge Rosete showed gross ignorance of the law, amounting to
bad faith.

Judges, being the visible representations of law and justice22 are expected to be circumspect in the performance of
their tasks,23 for it is their duty to administer justice in a way that inspires confidence in the integrity of the justice
system.

For this reason, the Code of Judicial Conduct requires high standards of competence, integrity and
independence.24 It mandates judges to be faithful to the law and to maintain professional competence. 25 Indeed, it
has been held that the failure to consider and apply a basic and elementary rule, law or principle is not only
inexcusable, but also renders magistrates susceptible to administrative sanctions for incompetence and gross
ignorance of the law.26

In this case, it is very clear that Judge Rosete disregarded a basic, unequivocal rule that execution shall issue as a
matter of right when the order becomes final and executory.27 It is moreover hornbook doctrine that when this point
is reached, the trial court has the ministerial duty to issue a writ of execution to enforce the order. 28 The rule admits
of exceptions,29 but none obtains in this case. Hence, it is mandatory for Judge Rosete to issue the writ prayed for.

As can be seen, the law involved is simple and elementary; lack of conversance therewith constitutes gross
ignorance of the law. Judges are expected to exhibit more than just cursory acquaintance with statutes and
procedural laws. They must know the laws and apply them properly in all good faith. Judicial competence requires
no less.30

A judge owes it to himself and to his office to know by heart basic legal principles and to harness his legal know-how
correctly and justly. When a judge displays utter unfamiliarity with the law and the rules, he erodes the confidence of
the public in the courts. Ignorance of the law by a judge can easily be the mainspring of injustice. As an advocate of
justice and a visible representation of the law, a judge is expected to be proficient in the interpretation of our laws.
When the law is so elementary, not to know it constitutes gross ignorance of the law. Ignorance of the law, which
everyone is bound to know, excuses no one – most especially judges. Ignorantia juris quod quisque scire tenetur
non excusat.31 As the Court held in Spouses Monterola v. Judge Caoibes, Jr.32 :

Observance of the law, which respondent ought to know, is required of every judge. When the law is sufficiently
basic, a judge owes it to his office to simply apply it; anything less than that is either deliberate disregard thereof or
gross ignorance of the law. It is a continuing pressing responsibility of judges to keep abreast with the law and
changes therein. Ignorance of the law, which everyone is bound to know, excuses no one — not even judges —
from compliance therewith. x x x. Canon 4 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics requires that the judge should be
studious in the principles of law. Canon 18 mandates that he should administer his office with due regard to the
integrity of the system of the law itself, remembering that he is not a depository of arbitrary power, but a judge under
the sanction of law. Indeed, it has been said that when the inefficiency springs from a failure to consider a basic and
elementary rule, a law or principle in the discharge of his duties, a judge is either too incompetent and undeserving
of the position and the title he holds or is too vicious that the oversight or omission was deliberately done in bad faith
and in grave abuse of judicial authority.33

Competence is a mark of a good judge. When a judge displays an utter lack of familiarity with the rules, he erodes
the public's confidence in the competence of our courts.34 It is highly imperative that judges be conversant with the
law and basic legal principles.35 Basic legal procedures must be at the palm of a judge's hands. 36

Gross ignorance of the law or procedure is classified as a serious charge under Rule 140, Section 8 of the Rules of
Court, as amended by A.M. No. 01-8-10 SC; and penalized under Section 11 of the same Rule as follows:
SEC. 11. Sanctions. - A. If the respondent is guilty of a serious charge, any of the following sanctions may be
imposed:

1. Dismissal from the service, forfeiture of all or part of the benefits as the Court may determine, and
disqualification from reinstatement or appointment to any public office, including government-owned or
controlled corporations: Provided, however, that the forfeiture of benefits shall in no case include accrued
leave credits;

2. Suspension from office without salary and other benefits for more than three (3) but not exceeding six (6)
months; or

3. A fine of more than P20,000.00 but not exceeding P40,000.00.

Guided by the previous rulings of this Court in Gamas v. Oco37 and Sule v. Biteng,38 a fine of P20,000.00 is justified
in the case at bar.

However, the Court notes that Judge Rosete filed a Certificate of Candidacy as mayor of Cordon, Isabela, on 29
March 2007. Pursuant to Section 66 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881, otherwise known as the Omnibus Election Code
of the Philippines, Judge Rosete is considered ipso facto resigned from his office. Moreover, on 15 April 2008, this
Court en banc, in A.M. MTJ-08-1702,39 dismissed Judge Rosete from service with forfeiture of all benefits,
except accrued leave credits, with prejudice to reinstatement or appointment to any public office, for Dishonesty
and Gross Misconduct. Thus, the P20,000.00 fine imposed against Judge Rosete shall be deducted from his
accrued leave credits, if sufficient.

WHEREFORE, Judge Maxwell Rosette is found LIABLE for Gross Ignorance of the Law in issuing the Resolutions
dated 28 March 2006 and 8 December 2006, denying complainant Mutya B. Victorio’s motions for issuance of a writ
of execution, and is hereby ordered to pay a FINE of Twenty Thousand (P20,000.00) PESOS, to be deducted from
his retirement benefits. But since he was already dismissed from office with forfeiture of all benefits, the fine shall be
deducted from his accrued leave credits, if sufficient; if not, then he should pay the said amount directly to this
Court. The Fiscal Management and Budget Office is DIRECTED to compute the monetary value of Judge Rosete’s
leave credits to be applied in satisfaction of the fine imposed.

SO ORDERED.

MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice 
Chairperson

MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA

Associate Justice Associate Justice

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice
 EN BANC

[A.M. No. RTJ-99-1517. February 26, 2002]

PURITA T. LIM, complainant, vs. JUDGE DEMETRIO D. CALIMAG, JR., Regional

Trial Court, Branch 35, Santiago City, respondent.

RESOLUTION
Per Curiam:

In a complaint dated 18 April 1999 supported by her affidavit, complainant Purita T.

Lim charges respondent Judge Demetrio D. Calimag, Jr., Presiding Judge of Branch 35 of
the Regional Trial Court of Santiago City, Isabela, with conduct unbecoming a judge,
maltreatment and failure to pay his obligation.
Complainant, a businesswoman doing business under the name Standard Lumber and
Hardware, alleged in her affidavit that on or about 13 November 1996, Nieves Santiago,
Civil Cases Docket Clerk in the office of the respondent Judge, called her and told her that
respondent would like to talk with her. Over the telephone respondent asked her to see
him in his office. The next day, when she went to see respondent in his chambers, the
latter told her that he needed about P30,000 for his business. He then gave her a receipt
signed by him (Annex A of Affidavit) acknowledging receipt from her of a check in the
amount P30,000. The following day Noel Tomas, Officer-in-Charge of the Office of the
Clerk of Court, picked up from her office the amount of P30,000. On the third week of
January 1997, the complainant called up respondents office to remind him of his obligation
to pay; however, she was informed by one of his staff members that respondent had left
for the United States. Upon respondents return from the United States, she kept on calling
Tomas and Santiago at his office to remind them about the obligation of the Judge, but
both informed her that the respondent told them ako ang bahala ron. When she
personally went to see respondent at his office, he shouted very loudly at her in this
wise: Ginugulomo ang mga tauhan ko, namatayan lang kami at wala pa akong pera,
and babayaran din kita huwag kang mag-alala. Despite repeated demands by her,
respondent refused and failed to pay his obligation. She believed that because of her
persistent attempts to collect from him, respondent Judge refused to inhibit himself from
hearing Special Civil Action No. 35-0117 for injunction that Zenaida Agcaoili filed against
her and Judge Maxwel Rosete and Ruben Plata.
In compliance with the 1  Indorsement dated 25 June 1999 of then Deputy Court
st

Administrator Bernardo T. Ponferrada, respondent Judge submitted his comment dated 4

October 1999, to which he attached receipts issued by complainants Standard Lumber
and the affidavit of Noel Tomas, among other things. Respondent denied having
instructed Nieves Santiago to call complainant by phone and having seen complainant in
his office. It was he who went to complainants business establishment in Santiago City to
order hardware materials worth P30,000 for the repair of his old house, for which he
executed a promissory note for the payment of the materials on 15 January 1997.
Although he was still in the United States on 16 December 1996 he managed to make a
partial payment ofP6,000 to complainant. On 26 February 1997, when complainant came
to his office, he made a partial payment to her in the amount of P6,028.72, thereby leaving
an unpaid balance in the amount of P19,768.28. He was willing to pay such little amount.
However, in December 1997, complainants employee accidentally bumped the rear
portion of his Isuzu pick-up vehicle. He spent P20,000, more or less, for the repair of his
vehicle. Complainant assured him that she would shoulder the expenses for the repair of
his vehicle upon submission of the documents required by the insurer. Upon his
instruction, Noel Tomas submitted the required documents to complainant. Since then
complainant never made any personal demand for the payment of the unpaid portion of
his obligation to her. Nonetheless, he would have paid his obligation to her had she been
true to her promise to shoulder the expenses for the repair of his vehicle. Hence, he
presumed the offsetting of their mutual obligations.
As to Special Civil Action No. 0117, respondent alleged that the same was filed on 15
October 1997 and raffled to his branch on 16 October 1997, or a year after he contracted
the loan for hardware materials. His refusal to inhibit himself was based on paragraph 2,
Section 1, Rule 137 of the Revised Rules of Court, which provides that a Judge may, in
the exercise of his sound discretion, disqualify himself from sitting in a case, for just or
valid reasons other than those mentioned above. Complainant never attended the hearing
of said case and filed the petition for inhibition only after he had decided the case.
Finally, respondent asserted that the administrative case is baseless in fact and in law.
It was filed by a disgruntled litigant whose ill-motive is to harass and intimidate him.
This Court, in its resolution of 15 December 1999, ordered the docketing of the case
as a regular administrative matter and referred the case to retired Justice Pedro Ramirez,
a consultant of the Office of the Court Administrator, for investigation report and
recommendation.
After weighing the evidence adduced by the parties, Justice Ramirez found that
respondent Judge indeed owed complainant two different amounts in November 1996:
one was for the construction materials he bought from her hardware store on credit; and
the other, which was covered by the acknowledgement receipt dated 14 November 1996,
was a cash loan in the amount of P30,000. The first has almost been paid already, but the
second has not yet been paid at all. He considered respondent Judges
excuse,Namatayan daw sila; kagagaling ko lang sa States, wala akong pambayad; kaya 
ako nakikiusap sa iyo namatayan kami, wala pa akong pambayad, as indicative of his
lack of intention to pay his just and valid obligation. He also held that respondent Judges
claim of compensation for his damaged vehicle is unavailing; the amount he owed from
complainant was due on 15 January 1997 and he must not have waited for the alleged
vehicular accident in December 1997 to offset his obligation to complainant.
Anent respondent Judges failure to inhibit himself from Special Civil Action No. 35-
0117, which had been elevated to the Court of Appeals where it is still pending, Justice
Ramirez deemed it best to leave the matter to said court for its determination.
Justice Ramirez took into account respondent Judges past misconduct in office, to wit:

In A.M. No. RTJ-99-1441, Romulo F. Manuel, by Horacio M. Pascual, complainant -versus-

Judge Demetrio D. Calimag, respondent, May 28, 1999, the Second Division of this Honorable
Court admonished herein respondent Judge to conduct himself accordingly in all his activities at all
times as to avoid any impropriety or even the appearance of impropriety.

In A.M. No. RTJ-99-1493, Jaime L. Co, petitioner, vs. Judge Demetrio D. Calimag, Jr.,

respondent, June 20, 2000, the Third Division of this Honorable Court imposed upon respondent
Judge a fine of P1,000 for inefficiency in office, with the warning that a repetition of the same or
similar acts in the future will be dealt with more severely.

In A.M. No. RTJ-00-1537, Evelyn Tranquilino, complainant, vs. Judge Demetrio D. Calimag, Jr.,

respondent, March 26, 2001, the Second Division of this Honorable Court, for Disgraceful and
Immoral Conduct and Conduct Unbecoming... a Judge, suspended respondent Judge for six (6)
months without pay to commence immediately upon service to him of this Resolution plus a fine
of P20,000.00 which he is required to pay within thirty (30) days from service hereof, with warning
that a repetition of the same or similar misconduct will be dealt with more severely.
 In view of his findings and conclusion, Justice Ramirez recommends that respondent
Judge be held guilty of willful failure to pay his just debt to complainant Purita T. Lim; and
that, considering his past misconduct in office he be dismissed from the service, with
forfeiture of benefits (except accrued leaves) and disqualification from reinstatement or
appointment to any public office including government-owned or -controlled corporations.
We agree on the finding of facts and conclusions of Mr. Justice Pedro Ramirez.
Indeed, complainants version is more credible and convincing.
Respondents contrariant account is not only flimsy but also incredulous. Undoubtedly, he
took advantage of his position to extract a loan from the complainant by requiring her to
come to his office and making it difficult for the latter to refuse. That he had no intention at
all to pay the obligation became all the more evident when he tried to justify it by an
unfounded claim of compensation arising out of the cost of repair for the damage to his
vehicle caused by complainants employee. He unilaterally adjudged that complainant was
civilly liable for either the civil aspect of a criminal case or for a quasi-delict.
Needless to state, if the damage to respondents vehicle constituted a violation of the
Revised Penal Code, complainants civil liability would only be subsidiary pursuant to
Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code. If the act amounted to a quasi-delict (Article 2176
of the Civil Code), complainant would be liable for the damage caused only upon proof
that the employee acted within the scope of his assigned task; besides, complainant may
not be liable at all upon proof that she observed all the diligence of a good father of a
family to prevent damage (Article 2184, in relation to Article 2180, Civil Code).
Significantly, there is no evidence at all that respondent initiated a complaint against
complainant and her employee or either of them to enforce his claim for the damages
caused to his vehicle.
We do not, therefore, hesitate to rule that respondent deliberately and willfully failed to
pay a just and lawful debt in favor of complainant. In so doing, he diminished the honor
and integrity of his office and stained the image of the Judiciary. He thus violated (1)
Canon 3 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics, which mandates that [a] judges official conduct
should be free from the appearance of impropriety, and his personal behavior, not only
upon the bench and in the performance of official duties, but also in his everyday life,
should be beyond reproach; and (2) Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, which
provides that [a] judge should avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all
activities. Indeed, it has been said that a magistrate of the law must comport himself at all
times in such a manner that his conduct, official or otherwise, can bear the most searching
scrutiny of the public that looks up to him as an epitome of integrity and justice. The
ethical principles and sense of propriety of a judge are essential to the preservation of the
faith of the people in the Judiciary. (Alfonso vs. Juanson, 228 SCRA 239, 254-255 [1993],
citing Dia-Aonuevo vs. Bercacio, 68 SCRA 81 [1975]). Public confidence in the Judiciary
is eroded by irresponsible or improper conduct of judges (In re: Judge Benjamin H.Viray,
202 SCRA 628, 634 [1991]).
Respondents conduct eloquently manifests that he is beyond transformation despite
the disciplinary sanctions previously taken against him in the cases mentioned in the
report of Justice Pedro Ramirez. The totality of his attitude, conduct and sense of values
renders him unfit to stay a minute longer in the Judiciary.
And now on the penalty to be imposed on respondent in this case. Under Section 8,
paragraph 6 of Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, [w]illful failure to pay a just debt is
classified as a serious charge. Section 11 thereof authorizes the imposition of the penalty
of dismissal from the service with forfeiture of all or part of the benefits as this Court may
determine except accrued leave credits, as well as disqualification from reinstatement or
appointment to any public office, including government-owned or -controlled corporations.
Dismissal of respondent from the service is therefore in order. He should likewise be
ordered to pay his indebtedness to the complainant. (Garciano vs. Oyao, 102 SCRA 195
[1981]; Manalo Demaala, 104 SCRA 330 [1981]; Fabrigas vs. Nemeno, 146 SCRA 61
[1986]).
*

WHEREFORE, for willful failure to pay a just and lawful debt, gross misconduct and
violation of Canon 3 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics and Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial
Conduct, respondent Judge Demetrio D. Calimag, Jr., Presiding Judge of Branch 35,
Regional Trial Court, Santiago City, is hereby ordered DISMISSED from the service with
forfeiture of all his benefits, except accrued leave credits, as well as disqualification from
reinstatement or appointment to any public office, including government-owned or
-controlled corporations.
Respondent is further ordered to pay complainant the sum of P30,000, representing
his indebtedness, with interest at 6% per annum from the filing of the complaint in this
case and until the promulgation of this Resolution, and 12% per annum from the date of
such promulgation until the indebtedness is fully paid.
This Resolution is immediately executory. The Court Administrator and the Clerk of
Court shall see to it that service of a copy thereof be immediately served on respondent.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan,
Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Buena, Ynares-Santiago, De Leon, Jr., Sandoval-
Gutierrez, and Carpio, JJ., concur.
 Republic of the Philippines
Supreme Court
Baguio City
 
              

                SECOND DIVISION

 
 
FLORENCE EBERSOLE DEL MAR- A.M. No. RTJ-11-2279
SCHUCHMAN, (Formerly OCA IPI No. 08-3041-RTJ )
Complainant,  
  Present:
   
  CARPIO, J., Chairperson,
- versus - PERALTA,
  ABAD,
  MENDOZA, and
  SERENO,* JJ.
JUDGE EFREN M. CACATIAN,  
Regional Trial Court, Branch 35, Promulgated:
Santiago City, Isabela,  
Respondent. April 6, 2011
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x
 
 
               DECISION

 
PERALTA, J.:
 
The instant case before us now is an offshoot of A.M. OCA IPI No. 08-3041-RTJ wherein the
Third Division, in a Resolution[1] dated September 16, 2009, resolved to adopt and approve the
recommendation of the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA), which dismissed the charges
of Florence Ebersole Del Mar-Schuchman (complainant) against Judge Efren Cacatian (Judge
Cacatian) for lack of merit and for being judicial in nature.
To recapitulate, the antecedent facts of the case are as follows:
Complainant Schuchman is one of the children of Norma Ebersole Del Mar who is the party-
plaintiff in Civil Case No. 35-2373, entitled Norma Ebersole Del Mar v. Robert Del Mar for
reconveyance of ownership and possession of disputed properties.
 
On October 21, 1997, the Regional Trial Court of Santiago City, Branch 35, then presided by
Judge Demetrio Calimag, Jr., rendered a decision[2] in favor of plaintiff.
 
Defendant Robert Del Mar appealed to the Court of Appeals. However, in a Resolution [3] dated
January 13, 1999, the appeal was dismissed due to appellant's failure to file an appellant's brief,
in violation of Section 1 (e), Rule 50 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
 
Defendant Robert Del Mar then filed a petition for certiorari before this Court, but was,
likewise, dismissed in a Resolution[4] dated March 13, 2002 on the ground that certiorari was
not a substitute for a lost appeal.
 
On September 7, 2005, upon motion of plaintiff-appellee, Judge Efren Cacatian issued a Writ of
Execution[5] to implement the October 21, 1997 Decision of the trial court.
 
Meanwhile, before the full implementation of the writ of execution, complainant alleged that
they were called to the chamber of Judge Cacatian for a conference. Complainant narrated that
during the conference, Judge Cacatian proposed a package deal for the issuance of the titles of
the subject properties in the names of the three (3) heirs of judgment-plaintiff, including herself.
In exchange, complainant was asked to provide the amount of P350,000.00 as fee for real estate
research fixing.
Complainant alleged that she immediately asked her niece, witness Helen Grace Ebersole
Alamar (Alamar), to go to Roger Colobong, who was working at the Philippine National Bank,
Santiago City Branch, to obtain P50,000.00. On the same day, complainant alleged that she
gave P50,000.00 to Judge Cacatian and promised to give the remaining P300,000.00 as soon as
she returned from her trip to the United States of America.
 
However, upon inquiry from the Bureau of Internal Revenue, complainant discovered that the
settlement of the estate tax would only cost P125,000.00. Complainant then opted to settle the
amount immediately, thus, new certificates of titles were eventually issued in their names.
 
Subsequently, defendant Robert Del Mar filed: (1) a Manifestation with Motion to Recall All
Orders Issued by this Court for the Enforcement of the Judgment dated April 4, 2007; (2)
Motion for Reconsideration dated April 12, 2007; and (3) Motion to Suspend Further and/or
Full Implementation of the Writ of Execution dated May 10, 2007.
 
On July 17, 2007, respondent judge granted said motions,[6] the dispositive portion of which
reads:
WHEREFORE, the motions are granted. Consequently, the following Orders are
hereby reversed, recalled, revoked and/or cancelled, to wit:
 
a.) Order of September 7, 2005, granting the motion for execution;
b.) Writ of Execution also dated September 7, 2005; and
c.) Resolution dated March 19, 2007, ordering the full execution of the
decision.
Accordingly, the Register of Deeds is hereby ordered: (1) to reinstate the following
certificates of titles, namely: T-82257, T-82260, T-82261, T-82258, T-82264, T-
82263, T-82259 and T-134664 back in favor of defendant Robert Del Mar; and 2) to
cause the cancellation of these titles, namely: TSC-9463, TSC-9464, TSC-9465, TSC-
9466, TSC-9467, TSC-9468, TSC-9469 and TSC-9470 in the name of deceased
plaintiff Norma Ebersole Del Mar, and all derivative titles therefrom.
 
Finally, the executing sheriff is ordered to defer the execution of the decision of
this case.
 
SO ORDERED.
 
Feeling aggrieved, complainant filed the instant administrative complaint against Judge
Cacatian. Complainant asserted that respondent judge exercised grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction in issuing the Orders dated July 17, 2007 and November 21,
2007. She maintained that in issuing said Orders, respondent judge, in effect, reversed and set
aside the trial court's Decision dated October 21, 1997 which was already rendered final by the
Supreme Court in its Decision dated March 13, 2002.
 
Complainant further averred that respondent judge violated the Code of Judicial Conduct when
he personally brokered the settlement of the estate of the plaintiff and the issuance of new
certificates of titles, and solicited by way of research fee, the amount of P350,000.00 of which
respondent judge received the amount of P50,000.00.
 
On November 18, 2008, the OCA directed respondent judge to comment on the charges of
Violation of Code of Judicial Ethics, Extortion, Grave Abuse of Judicial Discretion and
Rendering an Unjust Interlocutory Order against him.[7]
 
In his Comment[8] dated December 19, 2008, Judge Cacatian denied having extorted money
much less received the amount of P50,000.00 from complainant as downpayment for the
supposed fixing of the titles of the properties. He further alleged that he could not have
transacted with complainant since he did not know her personally. He claimed that he
prohibited litigants from entering his chambers, thus, he could not have met complainant for
purposes of carrying out the transaction being complained of. Atty. Norberto Obedoza, Branch
Clerk of Court of the same court, corroborated Judge Cacatian's claim that it is the latter's
policy to prohibit litigants from entering his chamber.
 
On August 3, 2009, the OCA recommended that the instant complaint against Judge Cacatian
be dismissed for lack of merit and for being judicial in nature.[9]
 
On August 19, 2009, complainant submitted additional documentary evidence in support of the
instant complaint against respondent judge, to wit: (1) Affidavit[10] of Roger P. Colobong; and
(2) Affidavit[11] of Helen Grace E. Alamar. Both witnesses corroborated complainant's
allegation that Judge Cacatian received P50,000.00 from her.
 
In a Resolution dated September 16, 2009, the Court adopted and approved the findings and
recommendation of the OCA and dismissed the complaint against Judge Cacatian for lack of
merit and for being judicial in nature.
 
However, in a letter dated November 23, 2009, complainant alleged that there were
irregularitites in the handling of the complaint she filed against Judge Cacatian. She manifested
that the additional affidavits she submitted were not considered by the Court in their Decision
dated September 16, 2009.
 
In a Resolution[12] dated January 11, 2010, the Court resolved to treat complainant's letter dated
November 23, 2009 as a motion for reconsideration of the Resolution dated September 16,
2009, and referred said motion to the OCA for evaluation, report and recommendation.
 
Subsequently, in a Memorandum[13] to Chief Justice Renato C. Corona dated April 26, 2010, the
OCA, in the interest of substantial justice, recommended that complainant's motion for
reconsideration of the Resolution dated September 16, 2009 be given due course, and be
referred to an Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals for investigation, report and
recommendation.
 
In the same Memorandum, the OCA likewise explained that the additional documents filed by
complainant were actually received on time by the Court on August 24, 2009.
 
Thus, on July 26, 2010, the Court resolved to give due course to the motion for reconsideration
of the Resolution dated September 16, 2009 and referred the same to an Associate Justice of the
Court of Appeals for investigation, report and recommendation.
 
In his Report dated November 10, 2010, Associate Justice Michael P. Elbinias [14] found Judge
Cacatian guilty of violating Rule 5.02 of the Code of Judicial Conduct and thus recommended
that he be fined in the amount of P11,000.00.
 
In the report, the allegations of extortion and knowingly rendering an unjust order or judgment
were recommended to be dismissed due to insufficient evidence. However, for proposing or
brokering to facilitate the transfer of titles of the properties of complainant's mother to
complainant and her siblings, Judge Cacatian was found to be engaged in a commercial
transaction that affected his appearance of impartiality, thus, violated Rule 5.02 of the Code of
Judicial Conduct.
 
Likewise, the Investigating Justice observed during the hearing that, in contrast with Judge
Cacatian's bare denial that he had a conference with complainant, complainant and her witness,
Alamar, appeared candid and sincere in asserting that they have met Judge Cacatian. Atty.
Obedoza also could not testify with certainty whether such conference took place, because he
was manning two separate offices. Judge Cacatian also failed to present his wife to refute the
allegation that she was also present during the alleged conference. Thus, the Investigating
Justice surmised that it was possible that the alleged conference indeed took place.
 
We agree with the findings and recommendation of the Investigating Justice.
 
In this case, the allegation of extortion or unjust exaction of money was found to be baseless.
Complainant failed to prove that Judge Cacatian demanded money from her in exchange for a
favorable decision. In fact, the judgment in the subject case had long been final at the time
when the alleged act of extortion transpired. There was no allegation or finding that respondent
judge actually threatened to reverse the writ of execution if she cannot provide the subject
money. As testified to by complainant, she and Judge Cacatian merely discussed and negotiated
the transaction where Judge Cacatian through his wife, will facilitate the processing and
transferring of the titles of the subject properties from complainant's mother to complainant and
her siblings.
Indeed, an accusation of extortion is very easy to concoct and difficult to disprove.
The proceedings in charges of this character are in their nature highly penal in character and are
to be governed by the rules of law applicable to criminal cases. Thus, as in this case, it must,
therefore, be proven beyond reasonable doubt inasmuch as what is imputed against respondent
judge connotes a misconduct so grave that, if proven, would entail dismissal from the bench.
The quantum of proof required should be more than substantial. It will take more than mere
pleadings and affidavits to lend an aura of respectability and credibility to complainant's
accusation. A finding of guilt should come from the strength of the complainant's evidence and
not from the weakness of the respondent judge's defense.[15] Complainant failed to satisfy this
requirement.
 
Corollarily, the charge of knowingly rendering unjust judgment or order must also fail. To hold
a judge liable for knowingly rendering an unjust judgment or order, it must be shown beyond
reasonable doubt that the judgment or order is unjust and it was made with a conscious and
deliberate effort to do an injustice.
 
If complainant felt prejudiced by the orders issued by respondent judge, the proper recourse is
through judicial remedies, i.e., to elevate the assailed decision or order to the higher court for
review and correction. Disciplinary proceedings and criminal actions against magistrates do not
complement, supplement or substitute judicial remedies, whether ordinary or extraordinary.
Only judicial errors tainted with fraud, dishonesty, gross ignorance, bad faith, or deliberate
intent to do an injustice will be administratively sanctioned. [16] This, again, complainant failed
to prove.
 
We reiterate that the ground for the removal of a judicial officer should be established beyond
reasonable doubt. Such is the rule where the charges on which the removal is sought is
misconduct in office, willful neglect, corruption, incompetency, etc. The general rule in regard
to admissibility in evidence in criminal trials apply.[17]
However, while respondent cannot be made liable for extortion, we nevertheless share the
Investigating Justice's view that respondent judge is guilty of violating Canon 5, Rule 5.02 of
the Code of Judicial Conduct for his act of transacting with complainant in facilitating the
transfer of the titles of the properties from complainant's mother to complainant and her siblings
during the conference in respondent judge's chamber.
 
Canon 5, Rule 5.02 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, provides:
 
A judge shall refrain from financial or business dealings that tend to reflect
adversely on the court's partiality, interfere with the proper performance of judicial
activities, or increase involvement with lawyers or persons likely to come before the
court. A judge should so manage investments and other financial interests as to
minimize the number of cases giving ground for disqualification.
 
In the instant case, Judge Cacatian, in proposing to facilitate the transfer of titles of the
properties, in effect engaged in a commercial transaction that gave him an appearance of
impropriety. In Agustin v. Mercado,[18] We declared that employees of the court should have no
business meeting with litigants or their representatives under any circumstance. This prohibition
is more compelling when it involves a judge who, because of his position, must strictly adhere
to the highest tenets of judicial conduct; a judge must be the embodiment of competence,
integrity and independence. As we explained in Yu-Asensi v. Judge Villanueva:[19]
x x x.[W]ithin the hierarchy of courts, trial courts stand as an important and visible
symbol of government especially considering that as opposed to appellate courts, trial
judges are those directly in contact with the parties, their counsel and the communities
which the Judiciary is bound to serve. Occupying as he does an exalted position in the
administration of justice, a judge must pay a high price for the honor bestowed upon him.
Thus, a judge must comport himself at all times in such manner that his conduct, official
or otherwise, can bear the most searching scrutiny of the public that looks up to him as
the epitome of integrity and justice. x x x it is essential that judges, like  Caesar's wife,
should be above suspicion. [20]

 
The Code does not qualify the prohibition. The intent of the rule is to limit a judge's
involvement in the affairs and interests of private individuals to minimize the risk of conflict
with his judicial duties and to allow him to devote his undivided attention to the performance of
his official functions.[21]
Needless to say, the Code of Judicial Conduct has the force and effect of law. The Code itself
provides that judges are enjoined to strictly comply with its provisions. Otherwise, a judge may
arrogate upon himself the discretion of determining when he may or may not act in a fiduciary
capacity.[22]
Under Section 11 (B), in relation to Section 9 (4) of Rule 140 of the Rules of Court, as amended
by A.M. No. 01-8-10-SC, violation of Supreme Court rules constitutes a less serious charge
punishable by any of the following sanctions:
 
1. Suspension from office without salary and other benefits for not less than
one (1) nor more than three (3) months; or
2. A fine of more than P10,000.00, but not exceeding P20,000.00.
 
 
WHEREFORE, JUDGE EFREN M. CACATIAN, Presiding Judge, Branch 35, Regional
Trial Court, Santiago City, Isabela, is found GUILTY of violation of Canon 5.02 of the Code
of Judicial Conduct and, considering this to be his first offense, is hereby FINED in the amount
of P11,000.00, with a stern WARNING that a repetition of a similar infraction will be
sanctioned more severely.
 
SO ORDERED.
 
 
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice
 
 
WE CONCUR:
 
 
 
ANTONIO T. CARPIO
Associate Justice
Chairperson
 
 
 
 
ROBERTO A. ABAD JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA
Associate Justice Associate Justice
 
 
 
 
MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO
Associate Justice
 
 EN BANC

 
ESTER F. BARBERO, A.M. No. MTJ-07-1682

Complainant,

Present:

PUNO, C.J.,

QUISUMBING,

YNARES-SANTIAGO,
CARPIO,

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,

CORONA,

CARPIO MORALES,

- versus - AZCUNA,

TINGA,

CHICO-NAZARIO,
VELASCO, JR.,

NACHURA,

REYES,

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, and

BRION, JJ.

 
JUDGE CESAR M. DUMLAO,

Municipal Trial Court, Promulgated:

San Mateo, Isabela,

Respondent. June 19, 2008

x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x

DECISION
 

PER CURIAM:

This is a complaint for gross ignorance of the law filed by Ester F. Barbero (Barbero) against
Judge Cesar M. Dumlao (Judge Dumlao), Presiding Judge of the Municipal Trial Court, San
Mateo, Isabela.

Barbero filed a criminal case[1] for estafa against a certain Herman A. Medina (Medina). The

case was raffled to Judge Anastacio D. Anghad (Judge Anghad), Presiding Judge of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC), Judicial Region II, Branch 36, SantiagoCity, Isabela. On 19 February 2003,
Judge Anghad issued a warrant of arrest[2] commanding the proper officer to arrest Medina.

Medina was arrested by virtue of the warrant of arrest. However,

[3]
Judge Dumlao approved Medinas bail and, on 9 May 2003, issued an order  commanding the
Bureau of Jail Management and Penology and the Philippine National Police to
releaseMedina. Barbero alleged that Judge Dumlaos approval of Medinas bail and his order to
release Medina were unlawful.

On 15 July 2003, the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) received an affidavit-
complaint[4] from Barbero charging Judge Dumlao with gross ignorance of the law. In its
1st Indorsement[5] dated 7 August 2003, the OCA directed Judge Dumlao to comment on the
affidavit-complaint. Judge Dumlao ignored the 1st Indorsement. In its 1st Tracer[6] dated 11
November 2003, the OCA directed Judge Dumlao to comment on the affidavit-
complaint. Judge Dumlao ignored the 1st Tracer. In its 2ndTracer[7] dated 10 March 2004, the
OCA directed Judge Dumlao to comment on the affidavit-complaint. Judge Dumlao ignored the
2nd Tracer. In a Resolution[8] dated 6 April 2005, the Court directed Judge Dumlao to comment
on the affidavit-complaint and to show cause why he should not be administratively dealt with
for ignoring the OCAs directives. Judge Dumlao ignored the 6 April 2005 Resolution.

In a Resolution[9] dated 17 August 2005, the Court reiterated its 6 April

2005 Resolution. Judge Dumlao ignored the 17 August 2005 Resolution. In a Resolution
dated 6 February 2006, the Court fined Judge Dumlao P500 for ignoring its directives and
directed Judge Dumlao to comply with the 17 August 2005 Resolution. Judge Dumlao ignored
the 6 February 2006 Resolution. In Resolutions dated 18 September 2006 and 19 February
2007, the Court considered Judge Dumlao to have waived his right to comment on the
affidavit-complaint and resolved to proceed with the administrative case based on the
pleadings already filed.

The Court finds Judge Dumlao liable for gross ignorance of the law and for violation of Court
directives.

 
Section 17(a), Rule 114 of the Rules of Court provides:

SEC. 17. Bail, where filed. (a) Bail in the amount fixed may be filed with the court
where the case is pending, or in the absence or unavailability of the judge thereof,
with any regional trial judge, metropolitan trial judge, municipal trial judge, or
municipal circuit trial judge in the province, city, or municipality. If the accused is
arrested in a province, city, or municipality other than where the case is pending, bail
may also be filed with any regional trial court of said place, or if no judge thereof is
available, with any metropolitan trial judge, municipal trial judge, or municipal circuit
trial judge therein.

In Cruz v. Judge Yaneza,[10] the Court held that:

There are prerequisites to be complied with. First, the application for bail must be
filed in the court where the case is pending. In the absence or unavailability of the
judge thereof, the application for bail must be filed with another branch of the same
court within the province or city. Second, if the accused is arrested in a province,
city or municipality other than where the case is pending, bail may be filed with
any regional trial court of the place. (Emphasis ours)

The criminal case Barbero filed against Medina was pending before

the RTC of Santiago City. Judge Anghad of the RTC issued the warrant of arrest,
and Medina was arrested by virtue of that warrant.

Section 3, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court provides that no person under detention by legal
process shall be released except when he is admitted to bail. Section 19 provides that the
accused must be discharged upon approval of the bail by the judge with whom it was filed in
accordance with Section 17. Section 17 provides that the bail may be filed with the court
where the case is pending, unless (1) the judge in that court is absent or unavailable, or (2) the
accused is arrested in a province, city, or municipality other than where the case is pending. If
the judge is absent or unavailable, the bail should be filed with another branch of the same
court. If the accused is arrested in a province, city, or municipality other than where the case is
pending, the bail should be filed with  any  RTC  of the place.

In the present case, there was no showing that Judge Anghad was absent or unavailable or
that Medina was arrested outside Santiago City. Thus, Medinas bail should have been filed
with Judge Anghad. Even if Judge Anghad were absent or unavailable or even if Medina were
arrested in San Mateo, Judge Dumlao would still be liable because the bail should have been
filed with another branch of the RTC in Santiago City or with the RTC of San Mateo,
respectively.[11]

Since the criminal case was pending before the RTC of Santiago City and there was no showing
that Judge Anghad of the RTC was absent or unavailable, Judge Dumlao lacked authority to
approve the bail and order Medinas release.

Barbero alleged that Judge Dumlaos acts of approving Medinas bail and ordering Medinas

release were not in accordance with law:

[N]apag-alaman ko x x x na [si Medina] ay basta na lang pinakawalan ni x x x Judge

Cesar M. Dumlao ng Municipal Trial Court ng San Mateo, Isabela x x x;

[A]ng ginawa ni Judge Cesar M. Dumlao ay hindi naaayon sa batas sapagkat wala

siyang kapangyarihang pakawalan x x x [si Medina];

[N]apag-alaman ko rin na ang pagrerelease na ginawa ni Judge Dumlao ay base

sa [bail] na ipinakita sa kanya;

[S]a akin pong pagkakaalam, lahat po ng [bail] sa criminal
cases ay dapat aksyunan at aprubahan ng hukom o judge na siyang may hawak n
g asunto;

x x x x

[K]ung maaari po sana, dahil sa kawalang respeto [ni Judge] Cesar
M. Dumlao sa ating batas x x x, ipinakikiusap [ko] na sana ay imbestigahan ang nas
abing pagmamalabis at kawalan ng respeto[.]

The Court directed Judge Dumlao several times to comment

on Barberos allegations. Judge Dumlao opted to ignore all of the Courts directives. By his
silence, Judge Dumlao admitted the truth of the allegations. In Palon, Jr. v. Vallarta,[12] the
Court held that silence is admission of the truth of the charges:
 

Respondent judge failed to comment on the complaint or file any responsive

pleading or manifestation despite receipt of notice to do so. x x x The natural instinct
of man impels him to resist an unfounded claim or imputation and defend himself. It
is against human nature to just remain reticent and say nothing in the face of false
accusations. Hence, silence x x x is an admission of the truth of the
charges. Respondent judge is deemed to have admitted the charges against
him. (Emphasis ours)

This is the second time Judge Dumlao unlawfully approved the bail and ordered the release
of Medina. The instant case has exactly the same set of facts as Lim v.  Dumlao.[13] In that case
(1) complainant filed two criminal cases for carnapping and theft against Medina; (2) the
criminal cases were filed with the RTC, Judicial Region II, Branch 35, Santiago City, Isabela; (3)
Judge Fe Albano Madrid of the RTC issued a warrant of arrest against Medina; (4) Medina was
arrested by virtue of the warrant of arrest; (5) Judge Dumlao approved the bail of Medina; and
(6) Judge Dumlao ordered the release of Medina.

In Lim,[14] the Court held that:

It is not disputed that the criminal cases filed by complainant against Herman
Medina were pending before the Regional Trial Court of Santiago City, Isabela,
Branch 35. In fact, the warrant of arrest was issued by Judge Fe Albano Madrid,
presiding judge of the said court. The order of release therefore, on account of the
posting of the bail, should have been issued by that court, or in the absence or
unavailability of Judge Madrid, by another branch of an RTC in Santiago City. In this
case, however, there is no proof that Judge Madrid was absent or unavailable at the
time of the posting of the bail bond. In fact, complainant Lim avers that on the day
[Judge Dumlao] ordered the release of Medina, Judge Madrid and all the judges of
the RTC of Santiago City, Isabela were at their respective posts.

It is elementary that a municipal trial court judge has no authority to grant bail to
an accused arrested outside of his territorial jurisdiction. The requirements of
Section 17(a), Rule 114 x x x must be complied with before a judge may grant
bail. The Court recognizes that not every judicial error bespeaks ignorance of the
law and that, if committed in good faith, does not warrant administrative sanction,
but only in cases within the parameters of tolerable misjudgment. Where x x x the
 law is straightforward and the facts so evident, not to know it or to act as if one
does not know it constitutes gross ignorance of the law.

[Judge Dumlao] undeniably erred in approving the bail and issuing the order of

release. He is expected to know that certain requirements ought to be complied
with before he can approve Medinas bail and issue an order for his release. The
law involved is rudimentary that it leaves little room for error. (Emphasis ours)

The acts of approving bail and ordering the release of accused whose cases are pending before
other courts constitute gross ignorance of the law.[15] Gross ignorance of the law is a serious
offense[16] punishable by (1) dismissal from the service, forfeiture of all or part of the benefits,
except accrued leave credits, and disqualification from reinstatement or appointment to
any public office, including government-owned or controlled corporations; (2) suspension from
office without salary and other benefits for more than three but not exceeding six months; or
(3) a fine of more than P20,000 but not exceeding P40,000.[17]

Aside from Lim, the Court also found Judge Dumlao grossly ignorant of the law in Pascual v.
Judge Dumlao.[18] In that case, Judge Dumlao (1) hastily ordered the issuance of a temporary
restraining order (TRO) without notice and hearing; (2) ordered the issuance of the TRO even
though there was no showing of any grave or irreparable injury; (3) hastily granted a motion to
deposit harvest without notice and hearing; and (4) failed to order the sheriff to render an
accounting of the harvest.

Canon 6 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary provides that
competence is a prerequisite to the due performance of judicial office. Judge Dumlao lacks this
prerequisite.

Judge Dumlao disrespected the Court by repeatedly refusing to comment on the affidavit-

complaint. In its 1st Indorsement dated 7 August 2003, 1st Tracer dated 11 November 2003, and
2nd Tracer dated 10 March 2004, the OCA directed Judge Dumlaoto comment on the affidavit-
complaint. In its Resolutions dated 6 April 2005, 17 August 2005, and 6 February 2006, the
Court fined Judge Dumlao P500, directed him to comment on the affidavit-complaint, and
directed him to show cause why he should not be administratively dealt with for refusing to
comment. Judge Dumlao unjustifiably ignored all six directives.

Court resolutions directing judges to comment on administrative complaints are not mere
requests. Judges are duty-bound to obey them fully and promptly.[19] In refusing to comment
on the affidavit-complaint for almost five years and despite several directives from the Court,
Judge Dumlao blatantly demonstrated gross misconduct, outright disrespect, indifference, and
a recalcitrant streak in his character.[20]
 

This is the third time Judge Dumlao disrespected the Court. In Office of the Court

Administrator v.  Dumlao,[21] the Court found him liable for ignoring its directives. In that case,
the Court held that:

It appears that Judge Dumlao ignored and continued to ignore this Courts directive

requiring him to file his comment on complainant Sinaon, Jr.s administrative
complaint. He had been afforded more than ample time within which to file the
required pleading. x x x[S]everal Resolutions had been issued by the OCA and this
Court requiring Judge Dumlao to comment on the complaint against him. The first
Resolution was issued as early as 2 August 2002 and the last was issued almost three
years later, or 5 July 2005, by which time, the Court already deemed waived
Judge Dumlaos right to file his comment and considered the case submitted for
decision based on the pleadings filed. Subsequently, Judge Dumlao again failed to
comply with the order of this Court to file his manifestation in the re-docketed
administrative complaint (concerning his non-filing of the comment) despite due
notice.

Judge Dumlao had been given more than ample time to abide with the orders of
this Court, yet he persistently failed to do so. Judge Dumlao neither offered any
reason nor raised any defense for his failure to comply with the mandates of this
Court. Nothing was heard from Judge Dumlao as to what had prevented him from
complying with the Courts directives. Such insolence should not go
unpunished. (Emphasis ours)

In Lim,[22] the Court also found Judge Dumlao liable for ignoring its directives. In that case, the
Court held that, We agree with the OCA that [Judge Dumlao] must be held administratively
liable for his unjustified failure to comment on an administrative complaint. This constitutes
gross misconduct and insubordination.

Violation of Supreme Court directives is a less serious offense[23] punishable by (1) suspension

from office without salary and other benefits for not less than one nor more than three
months, or (2) a fine of more than P10,000 but not exceedingP20,000.[24]

Aside from Lim, Pascual, and Office of the Court Administrator, Judge Dumlao has another

administrative case decided against him. In Morales, Sr. v. Judge Dumlao,[25] the Court found
him liable for violating SC Administrative Circular No. 1-90. In that case, the Court held that:

 
 [Judge Dumlaos] claim that he did not know how he inadvertently signed the
notarized revocation of power of attorney in this case betrays a deficiency of that
degree of circumspection demanded of all those who don the judicial robe. It is, in
fact, an open admission of his negligence and lack of care in attending to the
incidents brought before him for adjudication. This kind of judicial carelessness runs
contrary to Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, which states that:

A judge should perform official duties honestly, and with impartiality

and diligence. [(Emphasis ours)]

While we do not expect judges to have an encyclopedic recollection of applicable

laws, jurisprudence or administrative circulars we issue periodically in the discharge
of their responsibilities, they nevertheless have the bounden duty to keep abreast
with the law and the changes therein as well as the decisions of this Court. As a trial
judge, [Judge Dumlao] is the visible representation of law and justice. Under Canon
1.01 of the Code of Judicial Conduct he is expected to be the embodiment of
competence, integrity and independence to maintain public confidence in the legal
system.

Inefficient judges are equally impermissible in the judiciary as the incompetent and
dishonest ones. Any of them tarnishes the image of the judiciary and brings it to
public contempt, dishonor or disrespect and must then be administratively dealt
with and punished accordingly.

Judge Dumlao has amply demonstrated his incorrigibility and unfitness to be a judge. He is

undeterred by the several penalties and stern warnings the Court has given him. The Court will
not hesitate to impose the ultimate penalty for it cannot tolerate any conduct that diminishes
the faith of the people in the judicial system.[26]

WHEREFORE, the Court finds Judge Cesar M. Dumlao, Municipal Trial Court, San
Mateo, Isabela, GUILTY of GROSS IGNORANCE OF THE LAW and VIOLATION OF SUPREME
COURT DIRECTIVES. Accordingly, the CourtDISMISSES him from the service, with forfeiture of
all benefits except accrued leave credits, and with prejudice to reinstatement or appointment
to any public office including government-owned or controlled corporations.

 
SO ORDERED.

 
REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice

LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO

Associate Justice Associate Justice

   

   

   

   

   

 
ANTONIO T. CARPIO MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ
Associate Justice Associate Justice

   

 
RENATO C. CORONA CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES
Associate Justice Associate Justice

   

   
  

 
ADOLFO S. AZCUNA DANTE O. TINGA
Associate Justice
  Associate Justice

   

   

   

   

MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice Associate Justice

   

 
ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA RUBEN T. REYES

Associate Justice Associate Justice

   

   

   

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO ARTURO D. BRION

Associate Justice Associate Justice

 
 
SECOND DIVISION

[A.M. No. MTJ-03-1501.  March 14, 2005]

JAIME LIM CO, complainant, vs. JUDGE RUBEN R. PLATA, MTCC, BRANCH 1,

SANTIAGO CITY, respondent.

DECISION
CHICO-NAZARIO,  J.:

Jaime Lim Co filed before this Court a Complaint,[1] dated 13 May 2002, against Hon.
Ruben R. Plata, the Presiding Judge of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Branch
1 of Santiago City, Isabela, for gross partiality, serious misconduct, and inefficiency in
office.  Respondent Judge filed his Comment[2] and Additional Comment[3] on the said
Complaint, dated 11 September 2002 and 2 April 2003, respectively.
On 09 July 2003, this Court resolved to re-docket the case as a regular administrative
matter[4] and to refer the administrative matter to Executive Judge Fe Albano Madrid of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Santiago City, Isabela, for investigation, report, and
recommendation.[5] Counsel for the respondent Judge, Atty. Emerito Agcaoili, however,
moved for the inhibition of Executive Judge Madrid from hearing the administrative matter
since she was supposedly a bosom friend of Eva T. Co, the wife of complainant Co.
[6]
Executive Judge Madrid decided to grant the motion and inhibit herself because she
believed that it would be hard to dispel the suspicion that she might be prejudiced against
the respondent Judge just because his counsel, Atty. Agcaoili, filed a previous
administrative case against her.[7] Thus, this Court designated Executive Judge Bonifacio
T. Ong of RTC, Branch 24 of Echague, Isabela, to investigate the administrative matter in
place of Executive Judge Madrid.[8]
In his Report,[9] dated 19 May 2004, the investigating Judge made the following
findings and recommendations on the administrative matter: (1) respondent Judge was
guilty of negligence rather than partiality, and should be meted a fine of P1,000; (2)
respondent Judge was culpable of simple misconduct, instead of gross misconduct, and
should pay a fine of P1,000; and (3) the charge of inefficiency against respondent Judge
should be dismissed for lack of merit.
After reviewing the Report of the investigating Judge, dated 19 May 2004, the Office of
the Court Administrator (OCA) made its own findings and recommendations in its
Memorandum,[10] dated 12 October 2004, summarized as follows:  (1) adopting the
recommendation of the investigating Judge that respondent Judge was not guilty of
partiality, but of simple negligence, and imposing the penalty of censure; (2) finding that
although respondent Judge was not guilty of gross misconduct, he still failed to avoid the
appearance of impropriety, for which he should be reprimanded with a warning that a
repetition of the same shall be dealt with more severely; and (3) dismissing the charge of
inefficiency in office for lack of merit.
I

The Charge of Gross Partiality

 Complainant Co was the private offended party in Criminal Cases No. 1-4210 and No.
1-4211, filed against spouses Milagros and Jose Villaceran, respectively, for violation of
Batas Pambansa Blg. 22, otherwise known as the Bouncing Checks Law.  The accused
Villacerans, in the said criminal cases, allegedly issued separately two postdated checks,
each for the amount of P1,000,000, payable to complainant Co, which were subsequently
dishonored by the drawee banks.
The two criminal cases were raffled to Santiago City, MTCC, Br. I, presided over by
the respondent Judge.  Respondent Judge issued a Warrant of Arrest for the accused
Villacerans and fixed their bail at P100,000 each, as recommended by the Office of the
City Prosecutor.
Before the warrant of arrest could be served upon them, the accused Villacerans
voluntarily appeared before the respondent Judge and separately filed Applications for
Bail.  Respondent Judge granted bail to the accused Villacerans in the reduced amount
ofP50,000 each.  By virtue of the property bonds posted by the accused Villacerans,
respondent Judge recalled the Warrant of Arrest issued against them.
Complainant Co charged respondent Judge with gross partiality by pointing out the
following irregularities in the Applications for Bail filed by the accused Villacerans, and the
grant thereof by the respondent Judge, which allegedly demonstrated respondent Judges
gross partiality for the said accused:

1.   The Applications for Bail failed to state the amount of bail applied for and the exact date
of application.

2.   A duplicate of the Application for Bail of accused Milagros Villaceran was signed by
respondent Judge himself.

3.   The Applications for Bail were not properly received by the Santiago City MTCC Br. I.

4.   Respondent Judge signed an undated Order, reducing the amount of bail from the original
amount of P100,000 each to P50,000 each, even though the accused Villacerans did not file
any Application to Reduce Bail.

5.   The Order signed by the respondent Judge for the recall of the Warrant of Arrest for the
accused Villacerans again failed to state important information such as the values of the
property bonds posted, and the time and date of approval of the said property bonds.

According to complainant Co, respondent Judge purposely left blank the values of the property
bonds in the above-mentioned documents because he was aware of the insufficiency of the property
bonds posted by the accused Villacerans.  The property bonds posted by the accused Villacerans,
covered by Transfer Certificates of Title (TCTs) No. 263647 and No. 264847, had assessed values
of only P6,200 and P6,900, respectively.  The values of the said property bonds failed to comply
even with the reduced amount of bail, fixed by respondent Judge himself, at P50,000 for each of the
accused.

6.   Only upon the insistence of complainant Co did respondent Judge order the accused
Villacerans to post additional bail bonds.  The accused Villacerans complied with the order
by posting Surety Bonds No. 25746 and No. 25747, dated 20 June 2000, in the amount
of P40,000 each, and issued by Wellington Insurance Company, Inc. (WICI).  Said surety
bonds, however, were good for only one year.  During the joint hearing conducted on 06
December 2001 of Criminal Cases No. 1-4210 and No. 1-4211, the private prosecutor,
Atty. Dionisio E. Bala, Jr., informed the respondent Judge that the said surety bonds had
already expired.  He also questioned the present standing of WICI as a bonding company
duly accredited by the Supreme Court, considering that the certification submitted before
the Santiago City MTCC Br. I was dated 1999.  Atty. Bala thus requested the respondent
 Judge to order the arrest of the accused Villacerans until they were able to post new bonds. 
Respondent Judge refused to order the arrest of the accused Villacerans and merely said
that, [t]he Court will look into that.

7.   Complainant Co observed that accused Milagros Villaceran would often go in and out of
the respondent Judges chambers before and after court hearing.

Convinced that the respondent Judge was biased and sympathetic to the accused
Villacerans, complainant Co filed a motion[11] for the respondent Judge to inhibit himself
from Criminal Cases No. 1-4210 and No. 1-4211.  In his Order,[12] dated 21 February 2002,
the respondent Judge granted complainant Cos Motion to Inhibit [s]o as not to erode the
publics faith in the capability of the Court to render fair and impartial justice without the
element of suspicion or bias.
Despite having inhibited himself from Criminal Cases No. 1-4210 and No. 1-4211,
respondent Judge maintained that he had not been partial and biased in favor of the
accused Villacerans to the detriment of complainant Co, who was the private offended
party in the said criminal cases.
According to the respondent Judge, the accused Villacerans appeared at the Santiago
City, MTCC, Br. I, before the Warrant of Arrest could be served upon them.  The accused
Villacerans manifested that they came to learn about the criminal cases filed against them
and they wanted to post bail. 
The accused Villacerans pleaded with the respondent Judge for the reduction of the
amount of bail bond, which respondent Judge approved.  The bail bond for each of the
accused was originally fixed at P100,000.  Respondent Judge agreed to reduce the bail
bond to P50,000 each.  Since the accused Villacerans did not have enough cash, they
instead offered two pieces of their real property, located in the Municipality of Echague,
Isabela, as property bonds.
Respondent Judge asked the accused Villacerans to file Applications for Bail so that
he could act on them officially.  When the accused Villacerans informed him that they did
not yet have a lawyer, respondent Judge instructed them to request for the usual form of
an Application for Bail from his own staff.  The accused Villacerans, however, prevailed
upon respondent Judges staff to do more than just provide the required form, but also to
help the accused Villacerans prepare their Applications for Bail, the Property Bond Form,
and other supporting documents.  The respondent Judges staff immediately submitted the
prepared documents to respondent Judge for his signature.
Addressing the alleged irregularities in the Applications for Bail of the accused
Villacerans and his grant thereof, respondent Judge explained in his Comment, dated 11
September 2002, that:

1.10.  Upon verifying that the accused have accomplished all the necessary documents in relation to
their property bond and have submitted the originals of the Transfer Certificate of Title to their
properties, Judge Plata approved the bail for property bond at P50,000.00 each.

a.            Judge Plata then signed the order for the recall of their warrant of arrest and accordingly
returned the papers to his staff for further processing and promulgation, as it is the usual job of the
clerical staff.

b.            Judge Plata was not aware that one of the papers that he had signed was one of the
applications for bail of Milagros Villaceran until he received a copy of the complaint of Mr. Jaime
Lim Co.

c.            Judge Plata was likewise not aware that his staff failed to completely fill up all the
necessary data in the forms in accordance with his instructions prior to filing them.
d.            Judge Plata had to contend with the volume of work as presiding/executive judge of
MTCC Br. 1 and Br. 2 of Santiago City and that of the MTC Cordon, Isabela. [13]

This Court upholds the findings of both the investigating Judge and the OCA that the
above-stated facts demonstrated the negligence of the respondent Judge rather than his
gross partiality.
As stated in the OCA Memorandum, dated 12 October 2004:

We find that respondent Judge was remiss in scrutinizing the documents which he signed.  We
agree with the investigating Judges observation that respondent was negligent in this aspect.  That
his signature above the printed name of the accused was made inadvertently is credible as it would
be the height of folly if he deliberately signed the bail for and in behalf of the accused. [14]

Given that the documents herein had been prepared by his staff, respondent Judge
had the responsibility of reviewing the said documents when submitted to him, before
affixing his signature thereon.  Respondent Judges signature carried a lot of weight and
could turn an ordinary piece of paper into an official act of the court, thus, he should have
checked, and if necessary, double-checked, whether the forms were properly filled-out
and the information therein were correct, in order to avoid similar controversies in the
future.
Respondent Judge defended his decision to reduce the bail bond from P100,000
to P50,000 for each of the accused Villacerans as a legitimate exercise of his judicial
discretion.  According to respondent Judge, Section 9, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court,
allowed the reduction of the amount of bail upon certain overriding considerations, i.e., (a)
financial ability of the accused to give bail; (b) nature and circumstance of the offense; (c)
penalty of the offense charged; and (d) character and reputation of the accused.
Respondent Judge also invoked paragraph 2(o) of the Department of Justice (DOJ)
Circular No. 89, dated 29 August 2000, otherwise known as The 2000 Bail Bond Guide,
which stated that:

For violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22, bail shall be P2,000.00 for the first P40,000.00 face value
of the check and an additional P1,000.00 for every P10,000.00 in excess of P40,000.00, but bail
shall not exceed P30,000.00.

The two checks involved in Criminal Cases No. 1-4210 and No. 1-4211, allegedly
issued by the accused Villacerans, each had a face value of P1,000,000.  Respondent
Judge argued that the reduced amount of bail bond, amounting to P50,000 for each of the
accused Villacerans, was still substantial, considering that he could have further reduced
the said amount to P30,000, as provided under The 2000 Bail Bond Guide.
Worth reiterating herein is the finding of the OCA, in its Memorandum, dated 12
October 2004, which reads as follows

As reported by the Investigating Judge, respondent was negligent in reducing motu proprio the bail
recommended by the public prosecutor not because the accused are not entitled to it but because
respondent failed to comply with the time tested safeguard against arbitrariness.  As held in AM
No. MTJ-00-1286 (21 January 2002), [I]n all cases, whether bail is a matter of right or discretion,
notify the prosecutor of the hearing of the application for bail or require him to submit his
recommendation.

Respondents infraction is procedural in nature, that is, reducing the bail without the benefit of
hearing.  The court in AM No. RTJ-03-1767, 3-28-03 enunciated that under the present rules, a
hearing is required in granting bail whether it is a matter of right or discretion [15]
 The rights of the accused Villacerans to bail and to the reduction thereof to a
reasonable amount were not questioned herein; rather, at issue was the manner the
reduction of the bail was granted.  In the cases of Te v. Perez[16] and Docena-Caspe v.
Bugtas,[17]referred to by the OCA in its Memorandum, dated 12 October 2004, this Court
held that there should be a hearing before granting bail, whether bail was a matter of right
or discretion; and the Judge should notify the prosecutor of the date of the hearing or
require the prosecutor to submit his recommendation.
Such procedural requirements were laid down by jurisprudence precisely to avoid
accusations of arbitrariness against the Judges in fixing the amount of the bail for the
accused, as what happened herein.  Respondent Judge was negligent for failing to
comply with a very elementary rule of criminal procedure, and this Court believes that
such negligence actually merits a stiffer penalty than those recommended by the
investigating Judge (a fine of P1,000) and OCA (censure). This Court therefore imposes
upon respondent Judge a fine of P2,000.
Respondent Judge approved the provisional release of the accused Villacerans upon
acceptance of their property bonds because respondent Judge believed that,
notwithstanding the assessed values stated in their respective Tax Declarations, the two
pieces of agricultural lands covered by TCTs No. 263647 and No. 264847 had an area of
1.0014 and 1.0127 hectares, respectively, which were actually worth more than
the P100,000 bail bond for both of the accused Villacerans.  At any rate, respondent
Judge, upon the insistence of complainant Co, required the accused Villacerans to post
additional bail bonds.  The accused Villacerans complied with the said order by posting
the WICI surety bonds.
As for the respondent Judges refusal to order the arrest of the accused Villacerans
after the expiration of the WICI surety bonds, respondent Judge was of the opinion that
once a surety bond was posted by an accused, the same remained effective until it was
ordered released by the court.  He further maintained that in case of nonpayment of the
premium on the surety bond, it was up to the bondsmen to complain and to request for the
release of the bond upon surrendering the body of the accused.  Nonetheless, in order to
address the concerns of the private prosecutor, Atty. Bala, respondent Judge issued an
Order,[18] dated 20 December 2001, directing WICI, the bonding company, to submit an
updated certification of good standing from the Supreme Court.
However, even before WICI could comply with the said Order, dated 20 December
2001, complainant Co already filed a Motion to Inhibit Presiding Judge [19] on 21 January
2002.  Respondent Judge, in his Order,[20] dated 21 February 2002, granted the said
Motion.  Respondent Judge, therefore, had no more opportunity to resolve the issue
concerning the expiration of the WICI surety bonds.  In the words used by the
investigating Judge and the OCA, the said issue was overtaken by the filing of the Motion
to Inhibit.  Respondent Judge cannot be held accountable when his failure to fully resolve
the matter was impeded by subsequent events in the criminal cases, instigated by
complainant Co himself.
II

The Charge of Grave Misconduct

Complainant Co also accused respondent Judge of grave misconduct because the

respondent Judge had allegedly demanded tikoy from complainant Co in consideration for
respondent Judges voluntary inhibition from Criminal Cases No. 1-4210 and No. 1-4211;
and when complainant Co was unable to give tikoy, respondent Judge asked for P500
instead.
 According to complainant Co, he never received a copy of the respondent Judges
Order, dated 21 February 2002, granting his Motion to Inhibit, so on 07 March 2002, he
went to see the respondent Judge at Santiago City, MTCC, Br. I, to personally follow-up
on the status of the said Motion.  He did not find respondent Judge at the office of
Santiago City, MTCC, Br. I, but instead, saw him at the adjoining office of Santiago City,
MTCC, Br. II.[21]
Respondent Judge informed him that the Motion had already been approved. 
Thereafter, respondent Judge allegedly told complainant Co, Magkaibigan pa tayo And to
prove that you still love me, give me tikoy. When complainant Co replied that he did not
know where to buy tikoy, respondent Judge supposedly said, Magbigay ka ng pera, kami
na ang bibili. Complainant Co then handed P500 to respondent Judge.[22]
Respondent Judge disputed the charge of gross misconduct against him. According to
the respondent Judge, he had already issued the Order inhibiting himself from hearing
Criminal Cases No. 1-4210 and No. 1-4211 on 21 February 2002, or almost two weeks
before he saw complainant Co on 07 March 2002; hence, he did not need to demand for
anything from complainant Co in exchange for granting the latters Motion to Inhibit. 
Records of Criminal Cases No. 1-4210 and No. 1-4211 were transferred to Santiago City,
MTCC, Br. II, the very same day.
Respondent Judge submitted affidavits and oral testimonies of several witnesses,
including court officers and staff members of Santiago City, MTCC, Br. I and Br. II, to
support his version of the events that transpired on 07 March 2002, during complainant
Cos visit.
Among respondent Judges witnesses was Mr. Roger Ruma, the former Branch Clerk
of Court of Santiago City, MTCC, Br. II.  On 07 March 2002, respondent Judge was at
Santiago City, MTCC, Br. II, talking to Mr. Ruma, when complainant Co intruded to inquire
about his Motion to Inhibit.  Mr. Ruma recounted the exchange between respondent Judge
and complainant Co as follows:

Jaime Co                           Judge, anong nangyari sa Motion ko?

Judge Plata           :           Nandon na sa Branch 2, napirmahan ko na, matagal

na.

Jaime Co               :           Nandon na pala, sige.  He looks glad.

Judge Plata           :           Oh Jaime trabaho lang yan; Magkaibigan pa ba tayo?

Jaime Co               :           Oo naman!

Judge Plata           :           Papaano ko malaman kung mahal mo kami?

Jaime Co               :           Eh di magpabili ako ng tikoy!

Judge Plata           :           Huwag!  Bawal, nagbibiro lang ako.[23]

The conversation was interrupted at this point by a court staff member who informed
the respondent Judge that there was a telephone call for him.  After respondent Judge left
the room to answer the telephone call, complainant Co gave P500 to another court staff
member who used the money to buy pizza when he could not find any tikoy.  The court
staff and student trainees shared the pizza among themselves.
Respondent Judge also discredited the two witnesses presented by complainant Co,
namely Eugenio Taguba and Maripi A. Apolonio, both employees of Santiago City, MTCC,
Br. II.  Respondent Judge alleged that Mr. Taguba and Ms. Apolonio had an ax to grind
against him.  Respondent Judge complained to the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI)
that staff members of Santiago City, MTCC, Br. II, were gambling in the court premises
during office hours, instigating the NBI to conduct a raid of Santiago City, MTCC, Br. II.  In
the raid, which happened at around 3:00 p.m., the NBI actually caught several staff
members, including Mr. Taguba and Ms. Apolonio, in the act of gambling.  An
administrative case was filed against the staff members caught in the raid, wherein they
were subsequently found guilty by this Court of simple misconduct, and were meted the
penalty of suspension for one month and one day, without pay.[24]
Respondent Judge, in addition, presented evidence that during the time he was talking
to complainant Co, there was an on-going session at Santiago City, MTCC, Br. II, and Mr.
Taguba and Ms. Apolonio were in the courtroom attending to their duties.  Thus, they
could not have been present in the office of Mr. Ruma where complainant Co and
respondent Judge were talking.
Furthermore, it could be expected that Ms. Apolonio would support complainant Co
because he was her Ninong or godfather at her wedding.[25]
Evidence on the issue of gross misconduct weighs heavily in favor of the innocence of
the respondent Judge.  The respondent Judges version of the events that transpired on 07
March 2002 was corroborated by a greater number of witnesses whose characters were
not put into question.  They generally appeared to be disinterested parties to the case with
no reason or motive to protect respondent Judge.  Respondent Judge was also able to
present documentary evidence to further support the affidavits and oral testimonies of his
witnesses.
Moreover, this Court agrees in the findings of the OCA in its Memorandum dated 12
October 2004, that:

It is hard to believe that respondent would risk his reputation and position as a judge by
asking tikoy in front of other people.  Besides, the case had already ceased to be in his sala and had
already been transferred to the other branch long before complainant had a talk with respondent.

Also, it must be considered that said conversation was cut short when respondent was called to
answer a phone call, that ceased him to control (sic) the events that later on ensued.[26]

This Court, however, also agrees with the OCA that respondent Judge committed an
indiscretion when he commented to complainant Co, Papaano ko malaman kung mahal
mo kami?  Although respondent Judge made the comment jokingly, it was also very
understandable how complainant Co had construed it as an insinuation to do some act or
to give something to prove that he had no hard feelings towards respondent Judge.
For making such a comment, respondent Judge violated Canon 2 of the then Code of
Judicial Ethics, which provided that, A Judge should avoid impropriety and the
appearance of impropriety in all activities.[27] Since respondent Judge occupied an exalted
position in the administration of justice, he should pay a high price for the honor bestowed
upon him; and his private, as well as his official, conduct must at all times be free from the
appearance of impropriety.[28]
Although respondent Judge cannot be enjoined from sharing jokes, he must be more
prudent in this regard.  As a Judge, respondent herein is the subject of constant scrutiny. 
He must freely and willingly impose upon himself certain restrictions, which might be
viewed as burdensome on an ordinary citizen, because he must conduct himself in a way
that is consistent with the dignity of his judicial office.[29]
III

The Charge of Inefficiency in Office

 As to his charge of inefficiency in office, complainant Co alleged that Criminal Cases
No. 1-4210 and No. 1-4211 had been pending for a long time before Santiago City,
MTCC, Br. I.  Respondent Judge did not assert his authority to try and resolve these
cases as soon as possible.  The cases were often called at 11:30 a.m., just to be reset for
lack of material time to hear the cases.
This Court finds no basis for this charge of inefficiency against respondent Judge. 
Respondent Judge had satisfactorily explained in his Memorandum, [30] dated 04 May
2004, that the delay in the resolution of Criminal Cases No. 1-4210 and No. 1-4211 were
attributable to reasons other than respondent Judges alleged inefficiency.
Respondent Judge was present during all the scheduled hearings of the said criminal
cases.  The records of the criminal cases supported respondent Judges claim that
hearings of the cases were reset three times because of the absence of the private
prosecutor; five times because of the absence of the public prosecutor; and two times
because of the absence of the counsel for the accused.[31]
At other times, respondent Judge was unable to hear the said criminal cases since
there were at least 30 criminal cases set for hearing on every hearing date.  Due to the
sheer number of cases, there was barely enough time to call all the cases in the calendar,
much less, to hear the testimony of the witnesses in all of the cases scheduled.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, this Court finds that: (1) the respondent Judge is
guilty of simple negligence for his failure to scrutinize the documents he had signed and to
follow the proper procedure for fixing the amount of bail, for which he is meted a fine
ofP2,000.00; (2) the respondent Judge is guilty of violating Canon 2 of the Code of
Judicial Ethics for his failure to avoid the appearance of impropriety, for which he is
reprimanded with a warning that a repetition of the same shall be dealt with more
severely; and (3) the charge of inefficiency in office against respondent Judge to be
without basis and is hereby dismissed.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, (Chairman), Austria-Martinez, Callejo, Sr., and Tinga, JJ., concur.
 [A.M. No. RTJ-00-1537.March 26, 2001]

TRANQUILINO vs. JUDGE CALIMAG

SECOND DIVISION

Gentlemen:

Quoted hereunder, for your information, is a resolution of this Court dated MAR 26 2001.

A.M No. RTJ-00-1537(Evelyn Tranquilino vs. Judge Dernetrio D. Calimag, Jr., Presiding Judge, RTC-Br.35, Santiago City.)

Complainant Evelyn Tranquilino charges respondent Demetrio D. Calimag, Jr., RTC-Br. 35, Santiago City, of Sexual
Harassment, Gross Misbehavior, Conduct Unbecoming of a Judge and Gross Immorality, in a Complaint dated 21 July 1999
and filed with this Court on 30 August 1999.

Specifically, complainant alleges that in July 1998 she accompanied a barangay mate at the latter's request to the sala of
respondent judge; that as soon as her barangay mate left the chambers of respondent the latter immediately locked the
door, stood behind the chair from where she was seated, gripped her forearms and whispered: "You know, I like you."

Not appreciating respondent's actuations, complainant turned to leave but was prevailed upon respondent to accept a ride
home as he was then also about to leave the court. Complainant accepted the invitation confident that respondent would not
attempt to do anything more since his driver and bodyguard would also be in the car.

Once inside the car, however, respondent repeatedly touched complainant's chest and kissed her on the lips. Respondent
only stopped when they reached Northeastern College where he was supposed to alight. Complainant took advantage of the
opportunity to rush home but was followed by respondent who barged inside her house without invitation and left only when
she pushed him outside.

Respondent repeatedly went to her house in the months of August 1998 and July 1999, and during those visits respondent
would either stand or sit very close to her and touch her hands, thighs and knees against her will. Also, respondent
repeatedly called her in the months of September, October and November 1998 but she refused to answer his calls.
Sometime thereafter, she confronted respondent in his chambers upon hearing that he was spreading rumors that she was
his mistress but respondent crudely suggested that they instead give truth to the rumor. Complainant, in utter dismay,
moved to leave but respondent angrily hit his desk and uttered: "Putang ina! Ang dami namang babae diyan na puedeng
bayaran kahit isang libo! Ikaw pa na tatlo na ang anak aug magpapakipot!"

When complainant subsequently went to court to follow up her complaint for annulment of marriage which she had given to
respondent himself, the latter repeated his sexual advances by again touching her chest and kissing her on the nape, cheeks
and lips. As regards her complaint for annulment, respondent had previously assured her that he would have it raffled to his
sala and that he would take care of it if complainant would only give herself to him.

Respondent Judge in his Comment dated 16 November 1999 denies the charges. Instead he alleges that he first met
complainant in a caravan rally in Isabela in March 1998. On that occasion complainant asked his help in annulling her
marriage so that she could marry an American. He advised her to engage the services of a lawyer to assist her in preparing
her petition. In the following months of April, May and June 1998 complainant and Barangay Kagawad  Lydia Makiling
regularly visited him in court to seek his advice regarding the possibility of filing complainants petition for annulment of
marriage in his sala but he bluntly told her that her petition would not prosper because she was the one suffering from
psychological incapacity for having abandoned her husband and left their conjugal dwelling in Jones, Isabela. Sometime in
July 1998 she and Lydia Makiling indeed visited him in his sala but they left together at 4:30 in the afternoon at the same
time that his other visitors did. If it were really true that he made sexual advances against complainant in his chambers why
then did the latter still accept his offer of a ride home? Also, if it were really true that he again made sexual advances inside
his car, why then did complainant not react and even allowed him inside her home? A woman of good repute will not allow
more than a year to lapse from the time the alleged sexual advances were made before filing a complaint to vindicate her
honor. If indeed it is true that complainant was afraid of him because of his previous behavior, why then did complainant
allow him, allegedly, inside her home during the months of August 1998 and July 1999?

Respondent further argues that, contrary to complainants claim that he repeatedly called on her in her house, the truth is
that it was really complainant who repeatedly called him pleading to have her case filed in his court but that he always told
her that it would not prosper. Being a married man and a member of the Judiciary, respondent claims that he is not stupid
enough to spread rumors that she was his mistress. Moreover, he countered, if it is true that he made sexual overtures to
her, why then would she always go to his chambers to follow up her complaint for annulment of marriage when no case had
yet been filed and he was not even her lawyer as to do the filing for her? Respondent concluded that complainant was merely
paid by disgruntled litigants to file a complaint against him.

On 2 February 2000 we referred this case to Mme. Justice Mercedes Gozo-Dadole of the Court of Appeals for investigation,
report and recommendation. Subsequently, hearings were conducted on 16 May, 9 June and 30 June 2000. In her Report
dated 19 December 2000 the Investigating Justice stated -

Evidence on hand shows that on several occasions, respondent has committed those (acts) complained (of), to wit:

(1) Sometime last July 1998 at about 4:30 p.m. while complainant was inside the chamber of respondent
judge at the Hall of Justice and while her companion Lydia Makiling has (sic) left the respondents chamber,
respondent suddenly stood up, went to the door, locked it and when the complainant was about to stand up to
leave the respondents chamber, the latter placed his hands on both her shoulders by holding her back,
 stooped his face so close to her face, that he was reeling with alcohol breath (sic) and whispered: "I like you
and I love you, touching simultaneously her breast several times;

(2) That after leaving the chamber of the respondent, the latter also followed her, told her to ride with him in his car in the
presence of his bodyguard Gary Domingo and his driver at the same time pushing her at the backseat of his car directly
behind his driver while he seated himself at the right side. While inside the car, placed his left hand around her neck and
pulled her towards him then touched her breast, placed his right hand inside her buttoned blouse, and mashed her breast
despite parrying his advances who continued to do these acts and then, later on, he unzipped her zipped pants in order to
finger her private parts but was unsuccessful because they already reached the Northeastern College where respondent
disembarked.

(3) That when she made a follow-up of her annulment case with the respondent who assured her that the
annulment case will (sic) be raffled to his sala, respondent, while she was inside his chamber, rained kisses on
her hands, cheek and lips then mashed her breast and had it not been for somebody who knocked on (sic) the
door his carnal/sexual desires could not have been prevented x x x x although the incident as stated in
paragraph 2 was accordingly done in the presence of respondent's driver and bodyguard, yet, they were not
presented to collaborate the denial of the respondent judge x x x x

As the records now stand, it is the undersigneds assessment that respondent has failed to live up to the high standard
required of members of the bench x x x x [h]e grossly violated his duty to uphold the dignity of the judiciary and to avoid
impropriety, not only in the performance of his judicial duties but also to (sic) his behavior outside his sala and as a private
individual x x x x

On the basis of the foregoing evaluation on the evidence presented by both the complainant and the respondent,
undersigned Investigating Justice recommends, for gross misbehavior, gross immorality and acts unbecoming of a judge
committed by herein respondent judge and with the presence of the mitigating circumstance due to (sic) the actuation,
conduct and consent on the part of the complainant, a fine of Twenty Thousand (P20,000.00) Pesos would be sufficient
penalty x x x x

The issue boils down to one of credibility and the propriety of the penalty recommended. Due to the private nature of the
acts charged against respondent judge, it is not at all surprising that this case will have to be decided principally on the basis
of the testimonies of complainant and respondent. Just as in criminal cases where the trial court's factual conclusions and
assessment of the credibility of witnesses carry great weight having had the opportunity to observe the demeanor of the
witnesses, and can therefore discern if they are telling the truth or not, 1 Peopte v. Solares, G.R. No. 82363, 5 May 1989, 173
SCRA 203. so too do we accord the same degree of respect to the findings of the Investigating Justice in this case.

The Court has always laid down exacting standards of morality and decency from those who serve in the Judiciary. 2 Junio v.
Rivera, Jr., A.M. No. MTJ-91-565, 30 August 1993, 225 SCRA 688. In fact we said that no position is more demanding as
regards moral righteousness and uprightness of any individual than a seat in the Judiciary 3 Yu-Asensi v. Villanueva, A.M. No.
MTJ-00-1245, 19 January 2000, 322 SCRA 255; Legaspi vs. Garrete, Adm. Matter No. MTJ-92-713, 27 March 1995, 242
SCRA 679. considering that a judge, being the visible representation of the law and of justice, 4 Gil v. Son, AM. No. MTJ-93-
741, 21 February 1995, 241 SCRA 467. is naturally expected to be the epitome of integrity and should be beyond reproach.

Respondent Judge, a married man, failed to live up to this standard when he made sexual advances, no less in his chambers,
against complainant, herself married though separated. Although, as observed by the Investigating Justice, indications exist
that complainant somehow tolerated those advances, perhaps in the hope of obtaining a favor from respondent judge with
respect to her complaint for annulment of marriage, this fact however does not, and cannot, mitigate respondents liability.
Independently and regardless of complainant's behavior, respondent Judge was expected to maintain, if not his own personal
code, the code of honor befitting a member of the Judiciary.

Thus, we find no reason not to adopt the factual findings and conclusion of Mme. Justice Mercedes Gozo-Dadole as regards
the administrative liability of respondent. However, as regards the penalty imposed, we find the recommendation
of P20,000,00 too lenient considering that under Resolution No. 89-106 dated 20 July 1989 of the Civil Service Commission
the penalty for disgraceful and immoral conduct is suspension for six (6) months and one (1) day for the first offense, and
dismissal from the service for the second.

Respondent Judge had already been previously admonished to "conduct himself accordingly in all his activities at all times as
to avoid any impropriety or even the appearance of impropriety" in order to promote and protect the image of the Judiciary
to which he is privileged to belong.5 Manuel v. Calimag, Jr., AM. No. RTJ-99-1441, 28 May 1999, 307 SCRA 657. Considering
the foregoing, we find the penalty of suspension for six (6) months without pay plus a fine of P20,000.00 adequate and
reasonable.

WHEREFORE, for Disgraceful and Immoral Conduct, and Conduct Unbecoming of a Judge, respondent JUDGE DEMETRIO D,
CALIMAG, JR., of RTC-Br. 35, Santiago City, is SUSPENDED for six (6) months without pay to commence immediately upon
service to him of this Resolution plus a fine of P20,000.00 which he is required to pay within thirty (30) days from service
hereof. Respondent Judge is WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar misconduct will be dealt with more severely.

SO ORDERED.

Very truly yours,

(Sgd.) TOMASITA M. DRIS

Clerk of Court