Sales Case Assignment GR Num and Sylabi

SALES CASE ASSIGNMENT
DEL CASTILLO
1. Coronel vs. CA 263 SCRA 15
Case Title : ROMULO A. CORONEL, ALARICO A. CORONEL, ANNETTE A.

CORONEL, ANNABELLE C. GONZALES (for herself and on behalf of Floraida
C. Tupper, as attorney-in-fact), CIELITO A. CORONEL, FLORAIDA A.
ALMONTE, and CATALINA BALAIS MABANAG, petitioners, vs. THE COURT OF
APPEALS, CONCEPCION D. ALCARAZ and RAMONA PATRICIA ALCARAZ,
assisted by GLORIA F. NOEL as attorney-in-fact, respondents.Case Nature :
PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals.
Syllabi Class : Sale
Syllabi:
1. Contracts; Sales; Essential Elements of a Contract of Sale.-
—Sale, by its very nature, is a consensual contract because it is perfected by
mere consent. The essential elements of a contract of sale are the following:
a) Consent or meeting of the minds, that is, consent to transfer ownership in
exchange for the price; b) Determinate subject matter; and c) Price certain
in money or its equivalent.
2. Same; In case of double sale, what finds relevance and materiality is not
whether or not the second buyer was a buyer in good faith but whether or
not said second buyer registers such second sale in good faith, that is,
without knowledge of any defect in the title of the property sold.-
—In a case of double sale, what finds relevance and materiality is not
whether or not the second buyer was a buyer in good faith but whether or
not said second buyer registers such second sale in good faith, that is,
without knowledge of any defect in the title of the property sold. As clearly
borne out by the evidence in this case, petitioner Mabanag could not have in
good faith, registered the sale entered into on February 18, 1985 because as
early as February 22, 1985, a notice of lis pendens had been annotated on
the transfer certificate of title in the names of petitioners, whereas petitioner
Mabanag registered the said sale sometime in April, 1985. At the time of
registration, therefore, petitioner Mabanag knew that the same property had
already been previously sold to private respondents, or, at least, she was
charged with knowledge that a previous buyer is claiming title to the same
property. Petitioner Mabanag cannot close her eyes to the defect in
petitioners’ title to the property at the time of the registration of the
property.
3. Same; Same; A seller cannot unilaterally and extrajudicially rescind a
contract of sale where there is no express stipulation authorizing him to
extrajudicially rescind.-
—Even assuming arguendo that Ramona P. Alcaraz was in the United States
of America on February 6, 1985, we cannot justify petitioners-sellers’ act of
unilaterally and extrajudicially rescinding the contract of sale, there being no
express stipulation authorizing the sellers to extrajudicially rescind the
contract of sale. (cf. Dignos vs. CA, 158 SCRA 375 [1988]; Taguba vs. Vda.
de De Leon, 132 SCRA 722 [1984])
4. Same; Rescission; Pleadings and Practice; Evidence; Allegations
must be proven by sufficient evidence-
— mere allegation is not an evidence.—We do not agree with petitioners
that there was a valid rescission of the contract of sale in the instant case.
We note that these supposed grounds for petitioners’ rescission, are mere
allegations found only in their responsive pleadings, which by express
provision of the rules, are deemed controverted even if no reply is filed by
the plaintiffs (Sec. 11, Rule 6, Revised Rules of Court). The records are
absolutely bereft of any supporting evidence to substantiate petitioners’
allegations. We have stressed time and again that allegations must be
proven by sufficient evidence (Ng Cho Cio vs. Ng Diong, 110 Phil. 882
[1961]; Recaro vs. Embisan, 2 SCRA 598 [1961]). Mere allegation is not an
evidence (Lagasca vs. De Vera, 79 Phil. 376 [1947]).
5. Same; Same; Estoppel; Having represented themselves as the true
owners of the subject property at the time of sale, the sellers cannot claim
later that they were not yet the absolute owners thereof at that time.-
—Aside from this, petitioners are precluded from raising their supposed lack
of capacity to enter into an agreement at that time and they cannot be
allowed to now take a posture contrary to that which they took when they
entered into the agreement with private respondent Ramona P. Alcaraz. The
Civil Code expressly states that: Art. 1431. Through estoppel an admission
or representation is rendered conclusive upon the person making it, and
cannot be denied or disproved as against the person relying thereon. Having
represented themselves as the true owners of the subject property at the
time of sale, petitioners cannot claim now that they were not yet the
absolute owners thereof at that time.
6. Sale; Ownership; Succession; Rights to the succession are transmitted
from the moment of death of the decedent.-
—Article 774 of the Civil Code defines Succession as a mode of transferring
ownership as follows: Art. 774. Succession is a mode of acquisition by virtue
of which the property, rights and obligations to the extent and value of the
inheritance of a person are transmitted through his death to another or
others by his will or by operation of law. Petitioners-sellers in the case at bar
being the sons and daughters of the decedent Constancio P. Coronel are
compulsory heirs who were called to succession by operation of law. Thus,
at the point their father drew his last breath, petitioners stepped into his
shoes insofar as the subject property is concerned, such that any rights or
obligations pertaining thereto became binding and enforceable upon them. It
is expressly provided that rights to the succession are transmitted from the
moment of death of the decedent (Article 777, Civil Code; Cuison vs.
Villanueva, 90 Phil. 850 [1952]).
7. Same; Same; Same; Same; When the sellers declared in the “Receipt
of Down Payment” that they received an amount as purchase price for their
house and lot without any reservation of title until full payment of the entire
purchase price, the natural and ordinary idea conveyed is that they sold
their property.-
—It is a canon in the interpretation of contracts that the words used therein
should be given their natural and ordinary meaning unless a technical
meaning was intended (Tan vs. Court of Appeals, 212 SCRA 586 [1992]).
Thus, when petitioners declared in the said “Receipt of Down Payment” that
they — Received from Miss Ramona Patricia Alcaraz of 146 Timog, Quezon
City, the sum of Fifty Thousand Pesos purchase price of our inherited house
and lot, covered by TCT No. 1199627 of the Registry of Deeds of Quezon
City, in the total amount of P1,240,000.00. Without any reservation of title
until full payment of the entire purchase price, the natural and ordinary idea
conveyed is that they sold their property.
8. Same; Same; Same; Same; In a conditional contract of sale, upon the
fulfillment of the suspensive condition, the sale becomes absolute and this
will definitely affect the seller’s title thereto.-
—In a conditional contract of sale, however, upon the fulfillment of the
suspensive condition, the sale becomes absolute and this will definitely
affect the seller’s title thereto. In fact, if there had been previous delivery of
the subject property, the seller’s ownership or title to the property is
automatically transferred to the buyer such that, the seller will no longer
have any title to transfer to any third person. Applying Article 1544 of the
Civil Code, such second buyer of the property who may have had actual or
constructive knowledge of such defect in the seller’s title, or at least was
charged with the obligation to discover such defect, cannot be a registrant in
good faith. Such second buyer cannot defeat the first buyer’s title. In case a
title is issued to the second buyer, the first buyer may seek reconveyance of
the property subject of the sale.
9. Same; Same; Same; Same; In a contract to sell, there being no
previous sale of the property, a third person buying such property despite
the fulfillment of the suspensive condition such as the full payment of the
purchase price cannot be deemed a buyer in bad faith and the prospective
buyer cannot seek the relief of reconveyance of the property-
— there is no double sale in such case.—It is essential to distinguish
between a contract to sell and a conditional contract of sale specially in
cases where the subject property is sold by the owner not to the party the
seller contracted with, but to a third person, as in the case at bench. In a
contract to sell, there being no previous sale of the property, a third person
buying such property despite the fulfillment of the suspensive condition such
as the full payment of the purchase price, for instance, cannot be deemed a
buyer in bad faith and the prospective buyer cannot seek the relief of
reconveyance of the property. There is no double sale in such case. Title to
the property will transfer to the buyer after registration because there is no
defect in the owner-seller’s title per se, but the latter, of course, may be
sued for damages by the intending buyer.
10. Same; Same; Same; Same; In a contract to sell, upon the fulfillment
of the suspensive condition, ownership will not automatically transfer to the
buyer-
— the prospective seller still has to convey title to the prospective buyer by
entering into a contract of absolute sale.—In a contract to sell, upon the
fulfillment of the suspensive condition which is the full payment of the
purchase price, ownership will not automatically transfer to the buyer
although the property may have been previously delivered to him. The
prospective seller still has to convey title to the prospective buyer by
entering into a contract of absolute sale.
11. Same; Same; Same; Same; A contract to sell may not even be
considered as a conditional contract of sale because in a conditional contract
of sale, the first element of consent is present, although it is conditioned
upon the happening of a contingent event which may or may not occur.-
—A contract to sell as defined hereinabove, may not even be considered as
a conditional contract of sale where the seller may likewise reserve title to
the property subject of the sale until the fulfillment of a suspensive
condition, because in a conditional contract of sale, the first element of
consent is present, although it is conditioned upon the happening of a
contingent event which may or may not occur. If the suspensive condition is
not fulfilled, the perfection of the contract of sale is completely abated (cf.
Homesite and Housing Corp. vs. Court of Appeals, 133 SCRA 777 [1984]).
However, if the suspensive condition is fulfilled, the contract of sale is
thereby perfected, such that if there had already been previous delivery of
the property subject of the sale to the buyer, ownership thereto
automatically transfers to the buyer by operation of law without any further
act having to be performed by the seller.
12. Same; Same; Same; Same; “Contract to Sell,” Defined.-
—A contract to sell may thus be defined as a bilateral contract whereby the
prospective seller, while expressly reserving the ownership of the subject
property despite delivery thereof to the prospective buyer, binds himself to
sell the said property exclusively to the prospective buyer upon fulfillment of
the condition agreed upon, that is, full payment of the purchase price.
13. Same; Same; Words and Phrases; “Contract to Sell” and
“Contract of Sale,” Distinguished; In a contract to sell, the prospective
seller explicitly reserves the transfer of title to the prospective buyer,
meaning, the prospective seller does not as yet agree or consent to transfer
ownership of the property subject of the contract to sell until the happening
of an event.-
—Under this definition, a Contract to Sell may not be considered as a
Contract of Sale because the first essential element is lacking. In a contract
to sell, the prospective seller explicitly reserves the transfer of title to the
prospective buyer, meaning, the prospective seller does not as yet agree or
consent to transfer ownership of the property subject of the contract to sell
until the happening of an event, which for present purposes we shall take as
the full payment of the purchase price. What the seller agrees or obliges
himself to do is to fulfill his promise to sell the subject property when the
entire amount of the purchase price is delivered to him. In other words the
full payment of the purchase price partakes of a suspensive condition, the
non-fulfillment of which prevents the obligation to sell from arising and thus,
ownership is retained by the prospective seller without further remedies by
the prospective buyer.
Division: THIRD DIVISION
Docket Number: G.R. No. 103577
Counsel: Leven S. Puno
Ponente: MELO
Dispositive Portion:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED
and the appealed judgment AFFIRMED.
2. Katipunan vs. Katipunan 375 SCRA 199
Case Title : MIGUEL KATIPUNAN, INOCENCIO VALDEZ, EDGARDO

BALGUMA and LEOPOLDO BALGUMA, JR., petitioners, vs. BRAULIO
KATIPUNAN, JR., respondent.Case Nature : PETITION for review on
certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals.
Syllabi Class : Remedial Law|Civil Law|Appeals|Contracts
Syllabi:
1. Remedial Law; Appeals; Rule that findings of a trial court given its
peculiar vantage point to assess the credibility of witnesses are entitled to
full faith and credit and may not be disturbed on appeal is not infallible for it
admits of certain exceptions.-
While it may be true that findings of a trial court, given its peculiar vantage
point to assess the credibility of witnesses, are entitled to full faith and]
credit and may not be disturbed on appeal, this rule is not infallible, for it
admits of certain exceptions. One of these exceptions is when there is a
showing that the trial court had overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied
some fact or circumstance of weight and substance, which, if considered,
could materially affect the result of the case. Also, when the factual findings
of the trial court contradict those of the appellate court, this Court is
constrained to make a factual review of the records and make its own
assessment of the case. The instant case falls within the said exception.
2. Civil Law; Contracts; A contract of sale is born from the moment there
is a meeting of minds upon the thing which is the object of the contract and
upon the price; Instances where consent may be vitiated.-
A contract of sale is born from the moment there is a meeting of minds upon
the thing which is the object of the contract and upon the price. This
meeting of the minds speaks of the intent of the parties in entering into the
contract respecting the subject matter and the consideration thereof. Thus,
the elements of a contract of sale are consent, object, and price in money or
its equivalent. Under Article 1330 of the Civil Code, consent may be vitiated
by any of the following: (1) mistake, (2) violence, (3) intimidation, (4)
undue influence, and (5) fraud. The presence of any of these vices renders
the contract voidable.
3. Civil Law; Contracts; A contract where one of the parties is incapable of
giving consent or where consent is vitiated by mistake, fraud, or intimidation
is not void ab initio but only voidable and is binding upon the parties unless
annulled by proper court action.-
A contract where one of the parties is incapable of giving consent or where
consent is vitiated by mistake, fraud, or intimidation is not void ab initio
but only voidable and is binding upon the parties unless annulled by proper
court action. The effect of annulment is to restore the parties to the status
quo ante insofar as legally and equitably possible—this much is dictated by
Article 1398 of the Civil Code. As an exception however to the principle of
mutual restitution, Article 1399 provides that when the defect of the
contract consists in the incapacity of one of the parties, the incapacitated
person is not obliged to make any restitution, except when he has been
benefited by the things or price received by him.
Counsel: Nelson A. Loyola, Anatolio S. Tuazon, Jr.

Ponente: SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision of the Court of
Appeals dated July 3, 1997 in CA-G.R. CV No. 45928 is AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION in the sense that petitioners Edgardo Balguma and Leopoldo
Balguma, Jr., are ordered to turn over to respondent Braulio Katipunan, Jr.
the rentals they received for the five-door apartment corresponding to the
period from January, 1986 up to the time the property shall have been
returned to him, with interest at the legal rate. Costs against petitioners.
3. Mapalo vs. Mapalo 17 SCRA 114
Case Title : MIGUEL MAPALO, ET AL., petitioners, vs. MAXIMO MAPALO, ET

AL., respondents.Case Nature : PETITION for review by certiorari of a
decision of the Court of Appeals.
Syllabi Class : Contracts|Purchase and sale|Attorney’s fees.|Contract
without consideration
Docket Number: Nos. L-21489 and L-21628
Counsel: Pedro P. Tuason, Primicias & Del Castillo
Ponente: BENGZON
Wherefore, the decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby reversed and set
aside, and another one is hereby rendered affirming in toto the judgment of
the Court of First Instance a quo, with attorney’s fees on appeal in favor of
appellants in the amount of P1,000.00, plus the costs, both against the
private appellees. So ordered.
4. Toyota Shaw, Inc. vs. CA 244 SCRA 523
Case Title : NESTORIO MEMITA, petitioner, vs. RICARDO MASONGSONG,

respondent.Case Nature : PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision
and resolution of the Court of Appeals.
Syllabi Class : Constitutional Law|Remedial Law|Civil Law|Due Process|Civil
Procedure|Motions for Postponement|Contracts|Fraud
Division: SECOND DIVISION
Counsel: Allan L. Zamora, Vicente A. Sabornay

Ponente: CARPIO
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated 9 August 2001 and
the Resolution dated 22 October 2001 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV
No. 60555 are AFFIRMED.
FLORES
1. Jovan Land, Inc. vs. CA 268 SCRA 160
Case Title : JOVAN LAND, INC., petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and
EUGENIO QUESADA, respondents.Case Nature : PETITION for review on
Syllabi Class : Civil Law|Contracts|Sales|Statute of Frauds
Syllabi:
1. Civil Law; Contracts; Sales; A contract undergoes various stages that
include its negotiation or preparation, its perfection and finally its
consummation.-
In the case of Ang Yu Asuncion v. Court of Appeals, we held that: “x x x [A]
contract (Art. 1157, Civil Code), x x x is a meeting of minds between two
persons whereby one binds himself, with respect to the other, to give
something or to render some service x x x. A contract undergoes various
stages that include its negotiation or preparation, its perfection and, finally,
its consummation. Negotiation covers the period from the time the
prospective contracting parties indicate interest in the contract to the time
the contract is concluded x x x. The perfection of the contract takes place
upon the concurrence of the essential elements thereof.”
2. Civil Law; Contracts; Sales; Elements before a contract of sale can be
valid.-
Moreover, it is a fundamental principle that before a contract of sale can be
valid, the following elements must be present, viz: (a) consent or meeting of
the minds; (b) determinate subject matter; (3) price certain in money or its
equivalent. Until the contract of sale is perfected, it cannot, as an
independent source of obligation, serve as a binding juridical relation
between the parties.
3. Civil Law; Contracts; Sales; The requisites of a valid contract of sale
are lacking in the receipt and therefore the sale is neither valid nor
enforceable.-
Clearly then, a punctilious examination of the receipt reveals that the same
can neither be regarded as a contract of sale nor a promise to sell. Such an
annotation by Conrado Quesada amounts to neither a written nor an implied
acceptance of the offer of Joseph Sy. It is merely a memorandum of the
receipt by the former of the latter’s offer. The requisites of a valid contract
of sale are lacking in said receipt and therefore the “sale” is neither valid nor
enforceable.
4. Civil Law; Contracts; Sales; Statute of Frauds; Under the Statute of
Frauds an agreement for the sale of real property or of an interest therein to
be enforceable must be in writing and subscribed by the party charged or by
an agent thereof.-
Although there was a series of communications through letter-offers and
rejections as evident from the facts of this case, still it is undeniable that no
written agreement was reached between petitioner and private respondent
with regard to the sale of the realty. Hence, the alleged transaction is
unenforceable as the requirements under the Statute of Frauds have not
been complied with. Under the said provision, an agreement for the sale of
real property or of an interest therein, to be enforceable, must be in writing
and subscribed by the party charged or by an agent thereof.
Division: FIRST DIVISION
Counsel: Escobido & Pulgar Law Offices, Eduardo B. Tampoc
Ponente: HERMOSISIMA, JR.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this petition is DENIED.
2. Jimenez vs. Jordana 444 SCRA 250
Case Title : RAMON R. JIMENEZ, JR. and ANNABELLE L. JIMENEZ,

petitioners, vs. JUAN JOSE JORDANA, respondent.Case Nature : PETITION
for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals.
Syllabi Class : Remedial Law|Civil Law|Actions|Test to determine whether
the sufficiency of the facts alleged in the complaint constitutes a cause of
action|Sales
Syllabi:
1. Remedial Law; Actions; Definition and Elements of a Cause of Action;
The nature of action is determined by the material averments in the
complaint and the character of the relief sought not by the defenses
asserted in the answer or motion to dismiss.-
Cause of action is defined as “the act or omission by which a party violates a
right of another.” It has the following elements: 1) the legal right of the
plaintiff; 2) the correlative obligation of the defendant to respect that legal
right; and 3) an act or omission of the defendant that violates such right.
The nature of an action is determined by the material averments in the
complaint and the character of the relief sought, not by the defenses
asserted in the answer or motion to dismiss. Thus, the complaint must
contain a concise statement of the ultimate or essential facts constituting
the plaintiff’s cause of action.
2. Remedial Law; Actions; Test to determine whether the sufficiency
of the facts alleged in the complaint constitutes a cause of
action; Hypothetical admission extends to the relevant and material facts
pleaded in, and the inferences fairly deducible from, the complaint.-
In a motion to dismiss, a defendant hypothetically admits the truth of the
material allegations of the plaintiff’s complaint. This hypothetical admission
extends to the relevant and material facts pleaded in, and the inferences
fairly deducible from, the complaint. Hence, to determine whether the
sufficiency of the facts alleged in the complaint constitutes a cause of action,
the test is as follows: admitting the truth of the facts alleged, can the court
render a valid judgment in accordance with the prayer?
3. Remedial Law; Actions; Where a party makes a claim contrary to
ownership, and the relief prayed for cannot be granted without the court
deciding on who has a better right to the property, the suit is a real action.-
We agree with the appellate court. Indeed, what respondent instituted
against petitioners was a real action for the recovery of property. It has
been held that where a party makes a claim contrary to ownership, and the
relief prayed for cannot be granted without the court deciding on who has a
better right to the property, the suit is a real action.
4. Remedial Law; Actions; Participation in a contract is not necessarily an
element that determines the existence of a cause of action.-
Respondent is not suing petitioners for contractual breach but for a recovery
of property. It is not relevant, therefore, even to argue that the parties have
no privity of contract. We stress that participation in a contract is not
necessarily an element that determines the existence of a cause of action.
5. Civil Law; Sales; Elements of a valid contract of sale.-
The elements of a valid contract of sale under Article 1458 of the Civil Code
are the following: (1) the parties’ consent or meeting of minds, (2) a
determinate subject matter, and (3) a price certain in money or its
equivalent. Being consensual, a contract of sale is perfected upon the
meeting of the minds of the buyer and the seller as to the object of the sale
and the cause or consideration. From that moment on, the parties may
reciprocally demand performance; that is, the vendee may compel the
transfer of the ownership of the object of the sale, and the vendor may
require the vendee to pay the price of the thing sold.

Counsel: Padilla, Jimenez, Kintanar & Asuncion, Ruscius G. Zaragoza
Ponente: PANGANIBAN
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED and the assailed Decision AFFIRMED.
Costs against petitioners.
3. Cabotaje vs. Pudunan 436 SCRA 423
Case Title : MARIA CABOTAJE, AGUSTIN CABOTAJE, AMELIA TOMAS and

DANIEL PUGAYAN, petitioners, vs. SPOUSES SOTERO PUDUNAN and MARIA
RIVERA, respondents.Case Nature : PETITION for review on certiorari of a
Syllabi Class : Remedial Law|Civil Law|Certiorari|Contracts|Sales|
Prescription
Syllabi:
1. Remedial Law; Certiorari; The general rule is that in a petition for
review on certiorari, only questions of law may be raised, exceptions.-
The general rule is that in a petition for review on certiorari, only questions
of law may be raised. However, the rule is not without exceptions, which the
Court enumerated in Fuentes v. Court of Appeals as follows: (a) when the
factual findings of the trial court and the Court of Appeals are contradictory;
(b) when the inference made by the Court of Appeals is manifestly mistaken
or absurd; (c) when the judgment of the Court of Appeals is premised on its
misapprehension of the facts; and, (d) when the Court of Appeals failed to
resolve relevant facts which, if properly considered, would justify a
modification or reversal of the decision of the appellate court.
2. Civil Law; Contracts; Sales; One of the essential requirements of a
valid contract, including a contract of sale, is the consent of the owner of the
property; Absent such consent, the contract is null and void ab initio.-
All told then, we find and so hold that the petitioners did not consent to the
sale of Lot 1 to the respondents. One of the essential requirements of a valid
contract, including a contract of sale, is the consent of the owner of the
property. Absent such consent, the contract is null and void ab initio. A void
contract is absolutely wanting in civil effects; it is equivalent to nothing. It
produces no effects whatsoever either against or in favor of anyone; hence,
it does not create, modify, or extinguish the judicial relation to which it
refers. In fine, the petitioners, not the respondents, are the rightful owners
of Lot 1.
3. Civil Law; Contracts; Sales; Prescription; The action for the
declaration of the non-existence of a contract does not prescribe.-
Under Article 1410 of the New Civil Code, the action for the declaration of
the non-existence of a contract does not prescribe. Thus, the action of the
petitioners for the declaration of the non-existence of the assailed deed is
imprescriptible.
Counsel: Rogelio P. Corpuz, Edgar A. Talingdan
Ponente: CALLEJO, SR.
IN LIGHT OF THE FOREGOING, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the
Court of Appeals is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The decision of the Regional
Trial Court in Civil Case No. 207 is REINSTATED. No costs.
4. Acap vs. Court of Appeals 251 SCRA
Case Title : TEODORO ACAP, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and EDY

DE LOS REYES, respondents.Case Nature : PETITION for review on
Syllabi Class : Property|Ownership|Sales|Succession|Land Titles|Adverse
Claims|Words and Phrases
Syllabi:
1. Property; Ownership; An asserted right or claim to ownership or a real
right over a thing arising from a juridical act, however justified, is not per se
sufficient to give rise to ownership over the res—that right or title must be
completed by fulfilling certain conditions imposed by law; While title is the
juridical justification, mode is the actual process of acquisition or transfer of
ownership over a thing in question.-
In the first place, an asserted right or claim to ownership or a real right over
a thing arising from a juridical act, however justified, is not per se sufficient
to give rise to ownership over the res. That right or title must be completed
by fulfilling certain conditions imposed by law. Hence, ownership and real
rights are acquired only pursuant to a legal mode or process. While title is
the juridical justification, mode is the actual process of acquisition or
transfer of ownership over a thing in question.
2. Property; Ownership; Under Article 712 of the Civil Code, the modes of
acquiring ownership are generally classified into two (2) classes, namely, the
original mode and the derivative mode.-
Under Article 712 of the Civil Code, the modes of acquiring ownership are
generally classified into two (2) classes, namely, the original mode (i.e.,
through occupation, acquisitive prescription, law or intellectual creation) and
the derivative mode (i.e., through succession mortis causa or tradition as a
result of certain contracts, such as sale, barter, donation, assignment or
mutuum).
3. Property; Ownership; Sales; Succession; “Contract of Sale” and
“Declara-tion of Heirship and Waiver of Rights,” Distinguished.-
In the case at bench, the trial court was obviously confused as to the nature
and effect of the Declaration of Heirship and Waiver of Rights, equating the
same with a contract (deed) of sale. They are not the same. In a Contract of
Sale, one of the contracting parties obligates himself to transfer the
ownership of and to deliver a determinate thing, and the other party to pay
a price certain in money or its equivalent. Upon the other hand, a
declaration of heirship and waiver of rights operates as a public instrument
when filed with the Registry of Deeds whereby the intestate heirs adjudicate
and divide the estate left by the decedent among themselves as they see fit.
It is in effect an extrajudicial settlement between the heirs under Rule 74 of
the Rules of Court.
4. Property; Ownership; Sales; Succession; There is a marked
difference between a sale of hereditary rights and a waiver of hereditary
rights; A stranger to succession cannot conclusively claim ownership over a
lot on the sole basis of a waiver document which does not recite the
elements of either a sale, or a donation, or any other derivative mode of
acquiring ownership.-
Hence, there is a marked difference between a sale of hereditary rights and
a waiver of hereditary rights. The first presumes the existence of a contract
or deed of sale between the parties. The second is, technically speaking, a
mode of extinction of ownership where there is an abdication or intentional
relinquishment of a known right with knowledge of its existence and
intention to relinquish it, in favor of other persons who are co-heirs in the
succession. Private respondent, being then a stranger to the succession of
Cosme Pido, cannot conclusively claim ownership over the subject lot on the
sole basis of the waiver document which neither recites the elements of
either a sale, or a donation, or any other derivative mode of acquiring
ownership.
5. Property; Ownership; Land Titles; Adverse Claims; Words and
Phrases; A notice of adverse claim is nothing but a notice of a claim
adverse to the registered owner, the validity of which is yet to be
established in court at some future date.-
A notice of adverse claim, by its nature, does not however prove private
respondent’s ownership over the tenanted lot. “A notice of adverse claim is
nothing but a notice of a claim adverse to the registered owner, the validity
of which is yet to be established in court at some future date, and is no
better than a notice of lis pendens which is a notice of a case already
pending in court.”
6. Property; Ownership; Land Titles; Adverse Claims; Where a
person’s right or interest in a lot in question remains an adverse claim, the
same cannot by itself be sufficient to cancel the OCT to the land.-
It is to be noted that while the existence of said adverse claim was duly
proven, there is no evidence whatsoever that a deed of sale was executed
between Cosme Pido’s heirs and private respondent transferring the rights of
Pido’s heirs to the land in favor of private respondent. Private respondent’s
right or interest therefore in the tenanted lot remains an adverse claim
which cannot by itself be sufficient to cancel the OCT to the land and title
the same in private respondent’s name.
Counsel: Francisco B. Cruz, Cerewarlito V. Quebrar
Ponente: PADILLA
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court hereby GRANTS the petition
and the decision of the Court of Appeals dated 1 May 1994 which affirmed
the decision of the RTC of Himamaylan, Negros Occidental dated 20 August
1991 is hereby SET ASIDE. The private respondent’s complaint for recovery
of possession and damages against petitioner Acap is hereby DISMISSED for
failure to properly state a cause of action, without prejudice to private
respondent taking the proper legal steps to establish the legal mode by
which he claims to have acquired ownership of the land in question.
MOREN
1. Quijada vs. CA 299 SCRA 695
Case Title : ALFONSO QUIJADA, CRESENTE QUIJADA, REYNELDA QUIJADA,

DEMETRIO QUIJADA, ELIUTERIA QUIJADA, EULALIO QUIJADA, and WARLITO
QUIJADA, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS, REGALADO MONDEJAR,
RODULFO GOLORAN, ALBERTO ASIS, SEGUNDINO RAS, ERNESTO
GOLORAN, CELSO ABISO, FERNANDO BAUTISTA, ANTONIO MACASERO, and
NESTOR MAGUINSAY, respondents.Case Nature : PETITION for review on
Syllabi Class : Civil Law|Property|Donation|Sale|Laches|Damages
Counsel: Generoso S. Sansaet, Public Defender’s Office
Ponente: MARTINEZ
WHEREFORE, by virtue of the foregoing, the assailed decision of the Court of
Appeals is AFFIRMED.
2. Dantis vs. Maghinang 695 SCRA 599
Case Title : ROGELIO DANTIS, petitioner, vs. JULIO MAGHINANG, JR.,

respondent.Case Nature : PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision
Syllabi Class : Civil Law|Contracts|Contract of Sale
Counsel: Vicente D. Millora
Ponente: MENDOZA, J.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed January 25, 2010
Decision and the March 23, 2010 Resolution of the Court Appeals, in CA-G.R.
CV No. 85258, are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The March 2, 2005 Decision
of the Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan, Branch 18, in Civil Case No.
280-M-2002, is REINSTATED.
3. Bagnas vs. CA 176 SCRA 159
Case Title : ISAAC BAGNAS, ENCARNACION BAGNAS, SILVESTRE BAGNAS,

MAXIMINA BAGNAS, SIXTO BAGNAS, and AGATONA ENCARNACION,
petitioners, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, ROSA L. RETONIL, TEOFILO
ENCARNACION, and JOSE B. NAMBAYAN, respondents.Case Nature :
PETITION for certiorari to review the decision of the Court of Appeals.
Syllabi Class : Civil Law|Sales|Consideration|Succession|Intestate Heirs
Syllabi:
1. Civil Law; Sales; Consideration; The apparent gross disproportion
between the stipulated price and the undisputably valuable real estate
allegedly sold, demonstrates that the deeds of sale in question state a false
consideration, thereby making them not merely voidable, but void ab initio.-
Without necessarily according all these assertions its full concurrence, but
upon the consideration alone that the apparent gross, not to say enormous,
disproportion between the stipulated price (in each deed) of P1.00 plus
unspecified and unquantified services and the undisputably valuable real
estate allegedly sold—worth at least P10,500.00 going only by assessments
for tax purposes which, it is well-known, are notoriously low indicators of
actual value—plainly and unquestionably demonstrates that they state a
false and fictitious consideration, and no other true and lawful cause having
been shown, the Court finds both said deeds, insofar as they purport to be
sales, not merely voidable, but void ab initio.
2. Civil Law; Sales; Consideration; Succession; Intestate Heirs; The
transfers in question being void, the properties covered thereby remain part
of the estate of the deceased, and are therefore recoverable by the intestate
heirs of the latter.-
The transfers in question being void, it follows as a necessary consequence
and conformably to the concurring opinion in Armentia, with which the Court
fully agrees, that the properties purportedly conveyed remained part of the
estate of Hilario Mateum, said transfers notwithstanding, recoverable by his
intestate heirs, the petitioners herein, whose status as such is not
challenged.
Counsel: Beltran, Beltran & Beltran, Jose M. Legaspi
Ponente: NARVASA
WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed. The
questioned transfers are declared void and of no force or effect. Such
certificates of title as the private respondents may have obtained over the
properties subject of said transfers are hereby annulled, and said
respondents are ordered to return to the petitioners possession of all the
properties involved in this action, to account to the petitioners for the fruits
thereof during the period of their possession, and to pay the costs. No
damages, attorney’s fees or litigation expenses are awarded, there being no
evidence thereof before the Court.
4. Alcantara-Daus vs. de Leon 404 SCRA 74
Case Title : AURORA ALCANTARA-DAUS, petitioner, vs. Spouses HERMOSO

and SOCORRO DE LEON, respondents.Case Nature : PETITION for review
on certiorari of the decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals.
Syllabi Class : Civil Law|Contracts|Sales|Perfection|Transfer of ownership|
Evidence|Appeals|Prescription|Actions|Laches
Syllabi:
1. Civil Law; Contracts; Sales; Perfection; A contract of sale is
perfected by mere consent.-
A contract of sale is consensual. It is perfected by mere consent, upon a
meeting of the minds on the offer and the acceptance thereof based on
subject matter, price and terms of payment. At this stage, the seller’s
ownership of the thing sold is not an element in the perfection of the
contract of sale.
2. Civil Law; Contracts; Sales; Perfection; Transfer of ownership; It
is during the delivery that the law requires the seller to have the right to
transfer ownership of the thing sold.-
The contract, however, creates an obligation on the part of the seller to
transfer ownership and to deliver the subject matter of the contract. It is
during the delivery that the law requires the seller to have the right to
transfer ownership of the thing sold. In general, a perfected contract of sale
cannot be challenged on the ground of the seller’s non-ownership of the
thing sold at the time of the perfection of the contract.
3. Civil Law; Contracts; Sales; Perfection; Transfer of ownership; It
is through tradition or delivery that the buyer acquires the real right of
ownership over the thing sold.-
Further, even after the contract of sale has been perfected between the
parties, its consummation by delivery is yet another matter. It is through
tradition or delivery that the buyer acquires the real right of ownership over
the thing sold.
4. Civil Law; Contracts; Sales; Evidence; Notarial Documents; As a
general rule, the due execution and authenticity of a document must be
reasonably established before it may be admitted in evidence.-
As a general rule, the due execution and authenticity of a document must be
reasonably established before it may be admitted in evidence. Notarial
documents, however, may be presented in evidence without further proof of
their authenticity, since the certificate of acknowledgment is prima facie
evidence of the execution of the instrument or document involved. To
contradict facts in a notarial document and the presumption of regularity in
its favor, the evidence must be clear, convincing and more than merely
preponderant.
5. Civil Law; Contracts; Sales; Evidence; Appeals; The Supreme Court
reviews factual issues when there is conflict between the findings of CA and
the trial court.-
While normally this Court does not review factual issues, this rule does not
apply when there is a conflict between the holdings of the CA and those of
the trial court, as in the present case.
6. Civil Law; Contracts; Sales; Prescription; It is well-settled that no
title to registered land in derogation of that of the registered owner shall be
acquired by prescription or adverse possession.-
It is well-settled that no title to registered land in derogation of that of the
registered owner shall be acquired by prescription or adverse possession.
Neither can prescription be allowed against the hereditary successors of the
registered owner, because they merely step into the shoes of the decedent
and are merely the continuation of the personality of their predecessor in
interest. Consequently, since a certificate of registration covers it, the
disputed land cannot be acquired by prescription regardless of petitioner’s
good faith.
7. Civil Law; Contracts; Sales; Prescription; Actions; The civil code
provides that real actions over immovable properties prescribe after thirty
years.-
Article 1141 of the New Civil Code provides that real actions over immovable
properties prescribe after thirty years. This period for filing an action is
interrupted when a complaint is filed in court.
8. Civil Law; Contracts; Sales; Laches; Laches is based upon equity and
the public policy of discouraging stale claims.-
Laches is based upon equity and the public policy of discouraging stale
claims. Since laches is an equitable doctrine, its application is controlled by
equitable considerations. It cannot be used to defeat justice or to perpetuate
fraud and injustice.
Counsel: Simplicio M. Sevilleja, Villamor A. Tolete
Ponente: PANGANIBAN
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED and the assailed Decision AFFIRMED.
Costs against petitioner.
MANGILIMAN
1. Heirs of San Andres vs. Rodriguez 332 SCRA 769
Case Title : HEIRS OF JUAN SAN ANDRES (VICTOR S. ZIGA) and

SALVACION S. TRIA, petitioners, vs. VICENTE RODRIGUEZ,
respondent.Case Nature : PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of
the Court of Appeals.
Syllabi Class : Sales|Consignation|Contracts|Sales|Prescription and Laches
Counsel: Antonio S. Tria, Simando, Villanueva
Ponente: MENDOZA
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED with the
modification that respondent is ORDERED to reimburse petitioners for the
expenses of the survey.
2. Monongsong vs. Estimo 404 SCRA 683
Case Title : MILAGROS MANONGSONG, joined by her husband, CARLITO

MANONGSONG, petitioners, vs. FELOMENA JUMAQUIO ESTIMO, EMILIANA
JUMAQUIO, NARCISO ORTIZ, CELESTINO ORTIZ, RODOLFO ORTIZ, ERLINDA
O. OCAMPO, PASTOR ORTIZ, JR., ROMEO ORTIZ, BENJAMIN DELA CRUZ,
SR., BENJAMIN DELA CRUZ, JR., AURORA NICOLAS, GLORIA RACADIO,
ROBERTO DELA CRUZ, JOSELITO DELA CRUZ and LEONCIA S. LOPEZ,
respondents.Case Nature : PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision
Syllabi Class : Civil Procedure|Evidence|Civil Law|Pleadings and Practice|
Appeals|Civil Cases|Preponderance of Evidence|Property|Co-Ownership|
Marriage|Contracts|Sale|Elements
Syllabi:
1. Civil Procedure; Pleadings and Practice; Appeals; In general, only
questions of law are appealable to the court under Rule 45.-
In general, only questions of law are appealable to this Court under Rule 45.
However, where the factual findings of the trial court and Court of Appeals
conflict, this Court has the authority to review and, if necessary, reverse the
findings of fact of the lower courts. This is precisely the situation in this
case.
2. Evidence; Civil Cases; Preponderance of Evidence; In civil cases,
the party having the burden of proof must produce a preponderance of
evidence thereon.-
x x x Simply put, he who alleges the affirmative of the issue has the burden
of proof, and upon the plaintiff in a civil case, the burden of proof never
parts. However, in the course of trial in a civil case, once plaintiff makes out
a prima facie case in his favor, the duty or the burden of evidence shifts to
defendant to controvert plaintiff ’s prima facie case, otherwise, a verdict
must be returned in favor of plaintiff. Moreover, in civil cases, the party
having the burden of proof must produce a preponderance of evidence
thereon, with plaintiff having to rely on the strength of his own evidence and
not upon the weakness of the defendant’s. The concept of “preponderance of
evidence” refers to evidence which is of greater weight, or more convincing,
that which is offered in opposition to it; at bottom, it means probability of
truth.
3. Civil Law; Property; Co-Ownership; Marriage; The presumption
under Article 160 of the Civil Code applies only when there is proof that the
property was acquired during the marriage.-
The presumption under Article 160 of the Civil Code applies only when there
is proof that the property was acquired during the marriage. Proof of
acquisition during the marriage is an essential condition for the operation of
the presumption in favor of the conjugal partnership.
4. Civil Law; Contracts; Sale; Elements; Article 1458 of the Civil Code
enumerates the elements of a valid contract of sale.-
Under Article 1458 of the Civil Code, the elements of a valid contract of sale
are: (1) consent or meeting of the minds; (2) determinate subject matter
and (3) price certain in money or its equivalent.
5. Civil Procedure; Pleadings and Practice; Appeals; When a party
adopts a certain theory in the court below, he cannot change his theory on
appeal.-
When a party adopts a certain theory in the court below, he cannot change
his theory on appeal. To allow him to do so is not only unfair to the other
party, it is also offensive to the basic rules of fair play, justice and due
process.
Counsel: Vicente Tagoc, Jr., Roque, Butuyan & Gangoso
Ponente: CARPIO
WHEREFORE, the Decision of 26 June 1998 of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CV No. 51643, dismissing the complaint of petitioners against Felomena
Jumaquio Estimo and Emiliana Jumaquio, is AFFIRMED.
3. San Miguel Properties Philippines vs. Huang 336 SCRA 737
Case Title : SAN MIGUEL PROPERTIES PHILIPPINES, INC., petitioner, vs.

SPOUSES ALFREDO HUANG and GRACE HUANG, respondents.Case Nature :
PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals.
Syllabi Class : Civil Law|Property|Sales|Option secured by respondents
from petitioner was fatally defective
Syllabi:
1. Civil Law; Property; Sales; Amount given not as a part of the purchase
price and as proof of the perfection of the contract of sale but only as a
guarantee that respondents would not back out of the sale.-
With regard to the alleged payment and acceptance of earnest money, the
Court holds that respondents did not give the P1 million as “earnest money”
as provided by Art. 1482 of the Civil Code. They presented the amount
merely as a deposit of what would eventually become the earnest money or
downpayment should a contract of sale be made by them. The amount was
thus given not as a part of the purchase price and as proof of the perfection
of the contract of sale but only as a guarantee that respondents would not
back out of the sale. Respondents in fact described the amount as an
“earnest-deposit.”
2. Civil Law; Property; Sales; Option giving respondents the exclusive
right to buy the properties within the period agreed upon is separate and
distinct from the contract of sale which the parties may enter.-
The first condition for an option period of 30 days sufficiently shows that a
sale was never perfected. As petitioner correctly points out, acceptance of
this condition did not give rise to a perfected sale but merely to an option or
an accepted unilateral promise on the part of respondents to buy the subject
properties within 30 days from the date of acceptance of the offer. Such
option giving respondents the exclusive right to buy the properties within
the period agreed upon is separate and distinct from the contract of sale
which the parties may enter. All that respondents had was just the option to
buy the properties which privilege was not, however, exercised by them
because there was a failure to agree on the terms of payment. No contract
of sale may thus be enforced by respondents.
3. Civil Law; Property; Sales; Option secured by respondents from
petitioner was fatally defective; Consideration in an option contract may
be anything of value, unlike in sale where it must be the price certain in
money or its equivalent.-
Even the option secured by respondents from petitioner was fatally
defective. Under the second paragraph of Art. 1479, an accepted unilateral
promise to buy or sell a determinate thing for a price certain is binding upon
the promisor only if the promise is supported by a distinct consideration.
Consideration in an option contract may be anything of value, unlike in sale
where it must be the price certain in money or its equivalent. There is no
showing here of any consideration for the option. Lacking any proof of such
consideration, the option is unenforceable.
4. Civil Law; Property; Sales; The manner of payment of the purchase
price is an essential element before a valid and binding contract of sale can
exist.-
The appellate court opined that the failure to agree on the terms of payment
was no bar to the perfection of the sale because Art. 1475 only requires
agreement by the parties as to the price of the object. This is error. In
Navarro v. Sugar Producers Cooperative Marketing Association, Inc., we laid
down the rule that the manner of payment of the purchase price is an
essential element before a valid and binding contract of sale can exist.
Although the Civil Code does not expressly state that the minds of the
parties must also meet on the terms or manner of payment of the price, the
same is needed, otherwise there is no sale. As held in Toyota Shaw, Inc. v.
Court of Appeals, agreement on the manner of payment goes into the price
such that a disagreement on the manner of payment is tantamount to a
failure to agree on the price.
5. Civil Law; Property; Sales; It is not the giving of earnest money, but
the proof of the concurrence of all the essential elements of the contract of
sale which establishes the existence of a perfected sale.-
It is not the giving of earnest money, but the proof of the concurrence of all
the essential elements of the contract of sale which establishes the existence
of a perfected sale.
Counsel: Abello, Concepcion, Regala & Cruz, Malaya, Sanchez, Francisco,

Anover & Anover
Ponente: MENDOZA
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED and
respondents’ complaint is DISMISSED.
RENTOY
1. Pealosa vs. Santos 363 SCRA 545
ase Title : HERNANDO R. PEÑALOSA alias “HENRY PEÑALOSA,” petitioner,

vs. SEVERINO C. SANTOS (deceased), Substituted by his heirs: OLIVER
SANTOS and ADYLL M. SANTOS, and ADELA DURAN MENDEZ SANTOS,
respondents.Case Nature : PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision
of the Court of Appeals.
Syllabi Class : Appeals|Contracts|Evidence|Simulated Contracts|Requisites|
Words and Phrases|Notarial Law
Syllabi:
1. Appeals; Evidence; Findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are binding
and conclusive upon the Supreme Court, subject to certain exceptions, one
of which is when the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts.-
At any rate, in Baricuatro, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals, 325 SCRA 137, 145
(2000), we reiterated the doctrine that findings of fact of the Court of
Appeals are binding and conclusive upon this Court, subject to certain
exceptions, one of which is when the judgment is based on a
misapprehension of facts. In this case, after carefully poring over the
records, we are convinced that the lower courts misappreciated the evidence
presented by the parties and that, indeed, a reversal of the assailed
judgment is in order.
2. Contracts; Simulated Contracts; Requisites; Words and
Phrases; Simulation is a declaration of a fictitious will, deliberately made by
agreement of the parties, in order to produce, for the purposes of deception,
the appearance of a juridical act which does not exist or is different from
that which was really executed.-
It should have been readily apparent to the trial court that the
circumstances it cited in its decision are not proper grounds for holding that
the second deed is simulated. Simulation is a declaration of a fictitious will,
deliberately made by agreement of the parties, in order to produce, for
purposes of deception, the appearance of a juridical act which does not exist
or is different from that which was really executed. Its requisites are: a) an
outward declaration of will different from the will of the parties; b) the false
appearance must have been intended by mutual agreement; and c) the
purpose is to deceive third persons. None of these requisites is present in
this case.
3. Contracts; Simulated Contracts; The basic characteristic of an
absolutely simulated or fictitious contract is that the apparent contract is not
really desired or intended to produce legal effects or alter the juridical
situation of the parties in any way.-
The basic characteristic of an absolutely simulated or fictitious contract is
that the apparent contract is not really desired or intended to produce legal
effects or alter the juridical situation of the parties in any way. However, in
this case, the parties already undertook certain acts which were directed
towards fulfillment of their respective covenants under the second deed,
indicating that they intended to give effect to their agreement.
4. Contracts; Simulated Contracts; Evidence; Where the genuineness
and due execution of a deed was not seriously put in issue, it should be
upheld as the best evidence of the intent and true agreement of the parties
—oral testimony, depending as it does exclusively on human memory, is not
as reliable as written or documentary evidence.-
Our attention is also drawn to the fact that the genuineness and due
execution of the second deed was not denied by Severino. Except to allege
that he was not physically present when the second deed was notarized
before the notary public, Severino did not assail the truth of its contents nor
deny that he ever signed the same. As a matter of fact, he even admitted
that he affixed his signature on the second deed to help petitioner acquire a
loan. This can only signify that he consented to the manner proposed by
petitioner for payment of the balance and that he accepted the stipulated
price of P2,000,000.00 as consideration for the sale. Since the genuineness
and due execution of the second deed was not seriously put in issue, it
should be upheld as the best evidence of the intent and true agreement of
the parties. Oral testimony, depending as it does exclusively on human
memory, is not as reliable as written or documentary evidence.
5. Contracts; Notarial Law; Non-appearance of the parties before the
notary public who notarized the deed does not necessarily nullify nor render
the parties’ transaction void ab initio.-
It should be emphasized that the non-appearance of the parties before the
notary public who notarized the deed does not necessarily nullify nor render
the parties’ transaction void ab initio. We have held previously that the
provision of Article 1358 of the New Civil Code on the necessity of a public
document is only for convenience, not for validity or enforceability. Failure to
follow the proper form does not invalidate a contract. Where a contract is
not in the form prescribed by law, the parties can merely compel each other
to observe that form, once the contract has been perfected. This is
consistent with the basic principle that contracts are obligatory in whatever
form they may have been entered into, provided all essential requisites are
present. Same; Sales; Elements.—The elements of a valid contract of sale
under Art. 1458 of the Civil Code are: (1) consent or meeting of the minds;
(2) determinate subject matter; and (3) price certain in money or its
equivalent. In the instant case, the second deed reflects the presence of all
these elements and as such, there is already a perfected contract of sale.
6. Contracts; Notarial Law; Non-payment of the purchase price is not
among the instances where the law declares a contract to be null and void.-
However, it is well-settled that non-payment of the purchase price is not
among the instances where the law declares a contract to be null and void.
It should be pointed out that the second deed specifically provides: That for
and in consideration of the sum of TWO MILLION PESOS (P2,000,000.00),
Philippine Currency paid in full by HENRY R. PEÑALOSA, receipt of which is
hereby acknowledged by me to my full satisfaction, I hereby by these
presents, sells (sic), cede, convey and otherwise dispose of the above
described parcel of land, unto HENRY R. PEÑALOSA, his heirs, successors
and assigns, free from all liens and encumbrances, x x x (SGD.) SEVERINO
C. SANTOS VENDOR x x x As can be seen from above, the contract in this
case is absolute in nature and is devoid of any proviso that title to the
property is reserved in the seller until full payment of the purchase price.
Neither does the second deed give Severino a unilateral right to resolve the
contract the moment the buyer fails to pay within a fixed period. At most,
the non-payment of the contract price merely results in a breach of contract
for non-performance and warrants an action for rescission or specific
performance under Article 1191 of the Civil Code.
Counsel: Kho, Bustos, Malcontento, Basay Law Offices, Octavio A. Del Callar
Ponente: QUISUMBING
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the Court of Appeals
dated December 29, 1997 and its resolution dated April 15, 1998 in CA-G.R.
CV No. 45206 which had affirmed the judgment of the Regional Trial Court
of Quezon City, Branch 78, are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. A new judgment
is hereby rendered UPHOLDING the validity of Exhibit B, the Deed of
Absolute Sale dated September 12, 1988, entered into between the parties.
The Landbank of the Philippines is further ordered to RELEASE to
respondents the amount of P1,700,000.00 held in escrow, representing the
balance of the purchase price agreed upon by the parties under the deed of
absolute sale. Finally, the respondents are ordered to DELIVER to petitioner
the owner’s duplicate copy of TCT No. PT-23458 after said release, with the
corresponding payment of taxes due. Costs against respondents.
2. Yason vs. Arciaga 449 SCRA 458
Case Title : DR. JOSE and AIDA YASON, petitioners, vs. FAUSTINO
ARCIAGA, FELIPE NERI ARCIAGA, DOMINGO ARCIAGA AND ROGELIO
ARCIAGA, respondents.Case Nature : PETITION for review on certiorari of a
Syllabi Class : Civil Law|Contracts
Syllabi:
1. Civil Law; Contracts; A person is not incapacitated to enter into a
contract merely because of advanced years or by reason of physical
infirmities, unless such age and infirmities impair his mental faculties to the
extent that he is unable to properly, intelligently and fairly understand the
provisions of the contract.-
Mere weakness of mind alone, without imposition of fraud, is not a ground
for vacating a contract. Only if there is unfairness in the transaction, such as
gross inadequacy of consideration, the low degree of intellectual capacity of
the party, may be taken into consideration for the purpose of showing such
fraud as will afford a ground for annulling a contract. Hence, a person is not
incapacitated to enter into a contract merely because of advanced years or
by reason of physical infirmities, unless such age and infirmities impair his
mental faculties to the extent that he is unable to properly, intelligently and
fairly understand the provisions of said contract. Respondents failed to show
that Claudia was deprived of reason or that her condition hindered her from
freely exercising her own will at the time of the execution of the Deed of
Conditional Sale.
2. Civil Law; Contracts; The signature may be made by a person’s cross
or mark even though he is able to read and write and is valid if the deed is
in all other respects a valid one.-
It is of no moment that Claudia merely affixed her thumbmark on the
document. The signature may be made by a person’s cross or mark even
though he is able to read and write and is valid if the deed is in all other
respects a valid one.
3. Civil Law; Contracts; A notarized Deed of Absolute Sale has in its favor
the presumption of regularity and it carries the evidentiary weight conferred
upon it with respect to its execution.-
In Chilianchin vs. Coquinco, this Court held that a notarial document must
be sustained in full force and effect so long as he who impugns it does not
present strong, complete, and conclusive proof of its falsity or nullity on
account of some flaws or defects provided by law. Here, respondents failed
to present such proof. It bears emphasis that a notarized Deed of Absolute
Sale has in its favor the presumption of regularity, and it carries the
evidentiary weight conferred upon it with respect to its execution.
Counsel: Generoso Q. Molera, Arturo S. Santos

Ponente: SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ
WHEREFORE, the challenged Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV
No. 55668 is REVERSED. The Decision of the RTC, Branch 62, Makati City
dismissing respondents’ complaint is AFFIRMED.
3. Manila Metal Container Corp. vs. PNB 511 SCRA 444
Case Title : MANILA METAL CONTAINER CORPORATION, petitioner,

REYNALDO C. TOLENTINO, intervenor, vs. PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK,
respondent, DMCI-PROJECT DEVELOPERS, INC., intervenor.Case Nature :
PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution of the Court
of Appeals.
Syllabi Class : Contracts|Requisites|Sales|Corporation Law|Board of
Directors|Earnest Money
Counsel: Calleja, Saulog Law Offices, The Legal Department, John R.

Sadullo, Francis Allan A. Rubio
Ponente: CALLEJO, SR.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is DENIED. The assailed
decision is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner Manila Metal Container
Corporation.
SAN PEDRO
1. PUP vs. CA 368 SCRA 545
Case Title : POLYTECHNIC UNIVERSITY OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs.

COURT OF APPEALS and FIRESTONE CERAMICS, INC., respondents.,
NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, petitioner, vs. FIRESTONE
CERAMICS, INC., respondents.
Case Nature : PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court
of Appeals.
Syllabi Class :Obligations and Contracts|Courts|Right of First Refusal|
Education|Sales|Words and Phrases|Government-Owned and Controlled
Corporations|Lease|Prejudicial Publicity
Syllabi:
1. Obligations and Contracts; Right of First Refusal; It is elementary
that a party to a contract cannot unilaterally withdraw a right of first refusal
that stands upon valuable consideration.-
We do not see it the way PUP and NDC did. It is elementary that a party to a
contract cannot unilaterally withdraw a right of first refusal that stands upon
valuable consideration. That principle was clearly upheld by the Court of
Appeals when it denied on 6 June 2000 the twin motions for reconsideration
filed by PUP and NDC on the ground that the appellants failed to advance
new arguments substantial enough to warrant a reversal of the Decision
sought to be reconsidered.
2. Obligations and Contracts; Education; Our paramount interest in
education does not license us, or any party for that matter, to destroy the
sanctity of binding obligations—education may be prioritized for legislative
or budgetary purposes, but we doubt if such importance can be used to
confiscate private property such as the right of first refusal.-
Petitioner posited that if we were to place our imprimatur on the decisions of
the courts a quo, “public welfare or specifically the constitutional priority
accorded to education” would greatly be prejudiced. Paradoxically, our
paramount interest in education does not license us, or any party for that
matter, to destroy the sanctity of binding obligations. Education may be
prioritized for legislative or budgetary purposes, but we doubt if such
importance can be used to confiscate private property such as FIRESTONE’s
right of first refusal.
3. Obligations and Contracts; Education; Sales; Words and
Phrases; A contract of sale, as defined in the Civil Code, is a contract where
one of the parties obligates himself to transfer the ownership of and to
deliver a determinate thing to the other or others who shall pay therefore a
sum certain in money or its equivalent; The Civil Code provision on sale is,
in effect, a “catch-all” provision which effectively brings within its grasp a
whole gamut of transfers whereby ownership of a thing is ceded for a
consideration.-
A contract of sale, as defined in the Civil Code, is a contract where one of
the parties obligates himself to transfer the ownership of and to deliver a
determinate thing to the other or others who shall pay therefore a sum
certain in money or its equivalent. It is therefore a general requisite for the
existence of a valid and enforceable contract of sale that it be mutually
obligatory, i.e., there should be a concurrence of the promise of the vendor
to sell a determinate thing and the promise of the vendee to receive and pay
for the property so delivered and transferred. The Civil Code provision is, in
effect, a “catchall” provision which effectively brings within its grasp a whole
gamut of transfers whereby ownership of a thing is ceded for a
consideration.
4. Obligations and Contracts; Education; Sales; Government-Owned
and Controlled Corporations; The National Development Corporation and
the Polytechnic University of the Philippines have their respective charters
and therefore each possesses a separate and distinct individual personality;
Beyond cavil, a government owned and controlled corporation has a
personality of its own distinct and separate from that of the government.-
Contrary to what petitioners PUP and NDC propose, there is not just one
party involved in the questioned transaction. Petitioners NDC and PUP have
their respective charters and therefore each possesses a separate and
distinct individual personality. The inherent weakness of NDC’s proposition
that there was no sale as it was only the government which was involved in
the transaction thus reveals itself. Tersely put, it is not necessary to write an
extended dissertation on government owned and controlled corporations and
their legal personalities. Beyond cavil, a government owned and controlled
corporation has a personality of its own, distinct and separate from that of
the government. The intervention in the transaction of the Office of the
President through the Executive Secretary did not change the independent
existence of these entities. The involvement of the Office of the President
was limited to brokering the consequent relationship between NDC and PUP.
But the withdrawal of the appeal by the Executive Secretary is considered
significant as he knew, after a review of the records, that the transaction
was subject to existing liens and encumbrances, particularly the priority to
purchase the leased premises in favor of FIRESTONE.
5. Obligations and Contracts; Education; Since the conduct of the
parties to a contract may be sufficient to establish the existence of an
agreement and the terms thereof, it becomes necessary for the courts to
examine the contemporaneous behavior of the parties in establishing the
existence of their contract.-
True that there may be instances when a particular deed does not disclose
the real intentions of the parties, but their action may nevertheless indicate
that a binding obligation has been undertaken. Since the conduct of the
parties to a contract may be sufficient to establish the existence of an
agreement and the terms thereof, it becomes necessary for the courts to
examine the contemporaneous behavior of the parties in establishing the
existence of their contract.
6. Obligations and Contracts; Education; Lease; Where the stipulation
for a right of first refusal is part and parcel of the contract of lease, the
consideration for the lease is the same as that for the option.-
In the instant case, the right of first refusal is an integral and indivisible part
of the contract of lease and is inseparable from the whole contract. The
consideration for the right is built into the reciprocal obligations of the
parties. Thus, it is not correct for petitioners to insist that there was no
consideration paid by FIRESTONE to entitle it to the exercise of the right,
inasmuch as the stipulation is part and parcel of the contract of lease
making the consideration for the lease the same as that for the option.
7. Obligations and Contracts; Education; Lease; When a lease contract
contains a right of first refusal, the lessor is under a legal duty to the lessee
not to sell to anybody at any price until after he has made an offer to sell to
the latter at a certain price and the lessee has failed to accept it.-
It is a settled principle in civil law that when a lease contract contains a right
of first refusal, the lessor is under a legal duty to the lessee not to sell to
anybody at any price until after he has made an offer to sell to the latter at
a certain price and the lessee has failed to accept it. The lessee has a right
that the lessor’s first offer shall be in his favor.
8. Obligations and Contracts; Education; Sales; In contracts of sale,
the basis of the right of first refusal must be the current offer of the seller to
sell or the offer to purchase of the prospective buyer.-
It now becomes apropos to ask whether the courts a quo were correct in
fixing the proper consideration of the sale at P1,500.00 per square meter. In
contracts of sale, the basis of the right of first refusal must be the current
offer of the seller to sell or the offer to purchase of the prospective buyer.
Only after the lessee-grantee fails to exercise its right under the same terms
and within the period contemplated can the owner validly offer to sell the
property to a third person, again, under the same terms as offered to the
grantee. It appearing that the whole NDC compound was sold to PUP for
P554.74 per square meter, it would have been more proper for the courts
below to have ordered the sale of the property also at the same price.
However, since FIRESTONE never raised this as an issue, while on the other
hand it admitted that the value of the property stood at P1,500.00 per
square meter, then we see no compelling reason to modify the holdings of
the courts a quo that the leased premises be sold at that price.
9. Obligations and Contracts; Education; Sales; A right of first refusal
is neither “amorphous nor merely preparatory” and can be enforced and
executed according to its terms.-
The contention has no merit. At the heels of Ang Yu came Equatorial Realty
Development, Inc, v. Mayfair Theater, Inc., where after much deliberation
we declared, and so we hold, that a right of first refusal is neither
“amorphous nor merely preparatory” and can be enforced and executed
according to its terms. Thus, in Equatorial we ordered the rescission of the
sale which was made in violation of the lessee’s right of first refusal and
further ordered the sale of the leased property in favor of Mayfair Theater,
as grantee of the right. Emphatically, we held that “(a right of first priority)
should be enforced according to the law on contracts instead of the
panoramic and indefinite rule on human relations.” We then concluded that
the execution of the right of first refusal consists in directing the grantor to
comply with his obligation according to the terms at which he should have
offered the property in favor of the grantee and at that price when the offer
should have been made.
10. Courts; Prejudicial Publicity; Petitioner PUP should be cautioned
against bidding for public sympathy by bewailing the dismissal of its petition
before the press—such advocacy is not likely to elicit the compassion of this
Court or of any court for that matter.-
One final word. Petitioner PUP should be cautioned against bidding for public
sympathy by bewailing the dismissal of its petition before the press. Such
advocacy is not likely to elicit the compassion of this Court or of any court
for that matter. An entreaty for a favorable disposition of a case not made
directly through pleadings and oral arguments before the courts do not
persuade us, for as judges, we are ruled only by our forsworn duty to give
justice where justice is due.
Docket Number: G.R. No. 143513, G.R. No. 143590
Counsel: Francisco SB. Acejas III, Government Corporate Counsel, Arturo

S. Santos
Ponente: BELLOSILLO
WHEREFORE, the petitions in G.R. No. 143513 and G.R. No. 143590 are
DENIED. Inasmuch as the first contract of lease fixed the area of the leased
premises at 2.90118 hectares while the second contract placed it at 2.60
hectares, let a ground survey of the leased premises be immediately
conducted by a duly licensed, registered surveyor at the expense of private
respondent FIRESTONE CERAMICS, INC., within two (2) months from finality
of the judgment in this case. Thereafter, private respondent FIRESTONE
CERAMICS, INC., shall have six (6) months from receipt of the approved
survey within which to exercise its right to purchase the leased property at
P1,500.00 per square meter, and petitioner Polytechnic University of the
Philippines is ordered to reconvey the property to FIRESTONE CERAMICS,
INC., in the exercise of its right of first refusal upon payment of the
purchase price thereof.
2. Republic vs. Florendo 549 SCRA 527
Case Title : REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the PHILIPPINE

ECONOMIC ZONE AUTHORITY (PEZA) through its Director General, Lilia B.
de Lima, petitioner, vs. ANTONIO and LILI FLORENDO, respondentsCase
Nature : PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of
Appeals.
Syllabi Class : Compromise Agreements ; Judgments ; Judgments ;
Execution of Judgments ;
Division: FIRST DIVISION.
Counsel: The Solicitor General
Ponente: CORONA
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The February 7, 2005
decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 86718 is SET ASIDE. The
following orders of the Regional Trial Court, Lapu-Lapu City, Cebu, Branch
27 are hereby declared NULL AND VOID: (1) order of the RTC, Lapu-Lapu
City, Branch 27 dated March 21, 2003 granting respondents’ motion for
execution; (2) order of the RTC dated May 21, 2004 denying petitioner’s
motion to quash writ of execution and motion to lift garnishment; (3) order
of the RTC dated September 15, 2004 denying petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration of the order dated May 21, 2004; (4) writ of execution dated
April 24, 2003 and (5) notices of garnishment dated May 14, 2003, June 22,
2004, and September 23, 2004, and all other orders and notices pursuant to
the writ of execution. The status quo order issued by this Court on February
21, 2005 is LIFTED.
3. Ang Yu Asuncion vs. CA 238 SCRA 602
Case Title : ANG YU ASUNCION, ARTHUR GO AND KEH TIONG, petitioners,

vs. THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS and BUEN REALTY DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION, respondents.Case Nature : PETITION for review of a
Syllabi Class : Obligations|Due Process|Contracts|Sales|Options|Words and
Phrases|“Right of First Refusal|” Explained|Actions
Syllabi:
1. Obligations; Essential elements of an obligation.-
An obligation is a juridical necessity to give, to do or not to do (Art. 1156,
Civil Code). The obligation is constituted upon the concurrence of the
essential elements thereof, viz: (a) The vinculum juris or juridical tie which
is the efficient cause established by the various sources of obligations (law,
contracts, quasi-contracts, delicts and quasi-delicts); (b) the object which is
the prestation or conduct, required to be observed (to give, to do or not to
do); and (c) the subject-persons who, viewed from the demandability of the
obligation, are the active (obligee) and the passive (obligor) subjects.
2. Obligations; Contracts; Various stages of a contract.-
Among the sources of an obligation is a contract (Art. 1157, Civil Code),
which is a meeting of minds between two persons whereby one binds
himself, with respect to the other, to give something or to render some
service (Art. 1305, Civil Code). A contract undergoes various stages that
include its negotiation or preparation, its perfection and, finally, its
consummation. Negotiation covers the period from the time the prospective
contracting parties indicate interest in the contract to the time the contract
is concluded (perfected). The perfection of the contract takes place upon the
concurrence of the essential elements thereof. A contract which is
consensual as to perfection is so established upon a mere meeting of minds,
i.e., the concurrence of offer and acceptance, on the object and on the
cause thereof. A contract which requires, in addition to the above, the
delivery of the object of the agreement, as in a pledge or commodatum, is
commonly referred to as a real contract. In a solemn contract, compliance
with certain formalities prescribed by law, such as in a donation of real
property, is essential in order to make the act valid, the prescribed form
being thereby an essential element thereof. The stage of consummation
begins when the parties perform their respective undertakings under the
contract culminating in the extinguishment thereof.
3. Obligations; Contracts; Sales; In sales, the contract is perfected when
the seller obligates himself, for a price certain, to deliver and to transfer
ownership of a thing or right to the buyer, over which the latter agrees.-
Until the contract is perfected, it cannot, as an independent source of
obligation, serve as a binding juridical relation. In sales, particularly, to
which the topic for discussion about the case at bench belongs, the contract
is perfected when a person, called the seller, obligates himself, for a price
certain, to deliver and to transfer ownership of a thing or right to another,
called the buyer, over which the latter agrees.
4. Obligations; Contracts; Sales; When the sale is not absolute but
conditional, the breach of the condition will prevent the obligation to convey
title from acquiring an obligatory force.-
When the sale is not absolute but conditional, such as in a “Contract to Sell”
where invariably the ownership of the thing sold is retained until the
fulfillment of a positive suspensive condition (normally, the full payment of
the purchase price), the breach of the condition will prevent the obligation to
convey title from acquiring an obligatory force. In Dignos vs. Court of
Appeals (158 SCRA 375), we have said that, although denominated a “Deed
of Conditional Sale,” a sale is still absolute where the contract is devoid of
any proviso that title is reserved or the right to unilaterally rescind is
stipulated, e.g., until or unless the price is paid. Ownership will then be
transferred to the buyer upon actual or constructive delivery (e.g., by the
execution of a public document) of the property sold. Where the condition is
imposed upon the perfection of the contract itself, the failure of the
condition would prevent such perfection. If the condition is imposed on the
obligation of a party which is not fulfilled, the other party may either waive
the condition or refuse to proceed with the sale (Art. 1545, Civil Code).
5. Obligations; Contracts; Sales; An unconditional mutual promise to buy
and sell, with an object that is determinate and the price fixed, can be
obligatory on the parties.-
An unconditional mutual promise to buy and sell, as long as the object is
made determinate and the price is fixed, can be obligatory on the parties,
and compliance therewith may accordingly be exacted.
6. Obligations; Contracts; Sales; Options; An accepted unilateral
promise which specifies the thing to be sold and the price to be paid, when
coupled with a valuable consideration distinct and separate from the price,
may be termed a perfected contract of option.-
An accepted unilateral promise which specifies the thing to be sold and the
price to be paid, when coupled with a valuable consideration distinct and
separate from the price, is what may properly be termed a perfected
contract of option. This contract is legally binding, and in sales, it conforms
with the second paragraph of Article 1479 of the Civil Code. Observe,
however, that the option is not the contract of sale itself. The optionee has
the right, but not the obligation, to buy. Once the option is exercised timely,
i.e., the offer is accepted before a breach of the option, a bilateral promise
to sell and to buy ensues and both parties are then reciprocally bound to
comply with their respective undertakings.
7. Obligations; Contracts; Sales; Options; Rules applicable where a
period is given to the offeree within which to accept the offer.-
Where a period is given to the offeree within which to accept the offer, the
following rules generally govern: (1) If the period is not itself founded upon
or supported by a consideration, the offeror is still free and has the right to
withdraw the offer before its acceptance, or, if an acceptance has been
made, before the offeror’s coming to know of such fact, by communicating
that withdrawal to the offeree. The right to withdraw, however, must not be
exercised whimsically or arbitrarily; otherwise, it could give rise to a damage
claim under Article 19 of the Civil Code; (2) If the period has a separate
consideration, a contract of “option” is deemed perfected, and it would be a
breach of that contract to withdraw the offer during the agreed period. The
option, however, is an independent contract by itself, and it is to be
distinguished from the projected main agreement (subject matter of the
option) which is obviously yet to be concluded. If, in fact, the optioner-
offeror withdraws the offer before its acceptance (exercise of the option) by
the optionee-offeree, the latter may not sue for specific performance on the
proposed contract (“object” of the option) since it has failed to reach its own
stage of perfection. The optionee-offeror, however, renders himself liable for
damages for breach of the option. In these cases, care should be taken on
the real nature of the consideration given, for if, in fact, it has been intended
to be part of the consideration for the main contract with a right of
withdrawal on the part of the optionee, the main contract could be deemed
perfected; a similar instance would be an “earnest money” in a contract of
sale that can evidence its perfection (Art. 1482, Civil Code).
8. Obligations; Contracts; Sales; Options; Words and
Phrases; “Right of First Refusal,” Explained; In the law on sales, the
so-called “right of first refusal” is an innovative juridical relation, but it
cannot be deemed a perfected contract of sale under Article 1458 of the Civil
Code.-
In the law on sales, the so-called “right of first refusal” is an innovative
juridical relation. Needless to point out, it cannot be deemed a perfected
contract of sale under Article 1458 of the Civil Code, Neither can the right of
first refusal, understood in its normal concept, per se be brought within the
purview of an option under the second paragraph of Article 1479,
aforequoted, or possibly of an offer under Article 1319 of the same Code. An
option or an offer would require, among other things, a clear certainty on
both the object and the cause or consideration of the envisioned contract. In
a right of first refusal, while the object might be made determinate, the
exercise of the right, however, would be dependent not only on the grantor’s
eventual intention to enter into a binding juridical relation with another but
also on terms, including the price, that obviously are yet to be later firmed
up. Prior thereto, it can at best be so described as merely belonging to a
class of preparatory juridical relations governed not by contracts (since the
essential elements to establish the vinculum juris would still be indefinite
and inconclusive) but by, among other laws of general application, the
pertinent scattered provisions of the Civil Code on human conduct.
9. Obligations; Contracts; Sales; Options; Words and
Phrases; “Right of First Refusal,” Explained; Breach of a right of first
refusal decreed under a final judgment does not entitle the aggrieved party
to a writ of execution of the judgment but to an action for damages.-
Even on the premise that such right of first refusal has been decreed under
a final judgment, like here, its breach cannot justify correspondingly an
issuance of a writ of execution under a judgment that merely recognizes its
existence, nor would it sanction an action for specific performance without
thereby negating the indispensable element of consensuality in the
perfection of contracts. It is not to say, however, that the right of first
refusal would be inconsequential for, such as already intimated above, an
unjustified disregard thereof, given, for instance, the circumstances
expressed in Article 19 of the Civil Code, can warrant a recovery for
damages. The final judgment in Civil Case No. 87-41058, it must be
stressed, has merely accorded a “right of first refusal” in favor of petitioners.
The consequence of such a declaration entails no more than what has
heretofore been said. In fine, if, as it is here so conveyed to us, petitioners
are aggrieved by the failure of private respondents to honor the right of first
refusal, the remedy is not a writ of execution on the judgment, since there is
none to execute, but an action for damages in a proper forum for the
purpose.
10. Due Process; Actions; A party not impleaded in an action cannot be
held subject to the writ of execution issued therein.-
Furthermore, whether private respondent Buen Realty Development
Corporation, the allegedpurchaser of the property, has acted in good faith or
bad faith and whether or not it should, in any case, be considered bound to
respect the registration of the lis pendens in Civil Case No. 87-41058 are
matters that must be independently addressed in appropriate proceedings.
Buen Realty, not having been impleaded in Civil Case No. 87-41058, cannot
be held subject to the writ of execution issued by respondent Judge, let
alone ousted from the ownership and possession of the property, without
first being duly afforded its day in court.
Division: EN BANC
Counsel: Antonio M. Albano, Umali, Soriano & Associates
Ponente: VITUG
WHEREFORE, we UPHOLD the Court of Appeals in ultimately setting aside
the questioned Orders, dated 30 August 1991 and 27 September 1991, of
the court a quo. Costs against petitioners.

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SALES CASE ASSIGNMENT

Case Title : ROMULO A. CORONEL, ALARICO A. CORONEL, ANNETTE A.

Division: THIRD DIVISION

Docket Number: G.R. No. 103577

Counsel: Leven S. Puno

Case Title : MIGUEL KATIPUNAN, INOCENCIO VALDEZ, EDGARDO

Division: THIRD DIVISION

Docket Number: G.R. No. 132415

Counsel: Nelson A. Loyola, Anatolio S. Tuazon, Jr.

Case Title : MIGUEL MAPALO, ET AL., petitioners, vs. MAXIMO MAPALO, ET

Counsel: Pedro P. Tuason, Primicias & Del Castillo

Case Title : NESTORIO MEMITA, petitioner, vs. RICARDO MASONGSONG,

Docket Number: G.R. No. 150912

Counsel: Allan L. Zamora, Vicente A. Sabornay

Division: FIRST DIVISION

Docket Number: G.R. No. 125531

Counsel: Escobido & Pulgar Law Offices, Eduardo B. Tampoc

Ponente: HERMOSISIMA, JR.

Case Title : RAMON R. JIMENEZ, JR. and ANNABELLE L. JIMENEZ,

Division: THIRD DIVISION

Counsel: Padilla, Jimenez, Kintanar & Asuncion, Ruscius G. Zaragoza

Case Title : MARIA CABOTAJE, AGUSTIN CABOTAJE, AMELIA TOMAS and

Division: SECOND DIVISION

Docket Number: G.R. No. 134712

Counsel: Rogelio P. Corpuz, Edgar A. Talingdan

Ponente: CALLEJO, SR.

Case Title : TEODORO ACAP, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and EDY

Division: FIRST DIVISION

Docket Number: G.R. No. 118114

Counsel: Francisco B. Cruz, Cerewarlito V. Quebrar

Case Title : ALFONSO QUIJADA, CRESENTE QUIJADA, REYNELDA QUIJADA,

Docket Number: G.R. No. 126444

Counsel: Generoso S. Sansaet, Public Defender’s Office

Case Title : ROGELIO DANTIS, petitioner, vs. JULIO MAGHINANG, JR.,

Docket Number: G.R. No. 191696

Counsel: Vicente D. Millora

Case Title : ISAAC BAGNAS, ENCARNACION BAGNAS, SILVESTRE BAGNAS,

Division: FIRST DIVISION

Docket Number: G.R. No. 38498

Counsel: Beltran, Beltran & Beltran, Jose M. Legaspi

Case Title : AURORA ALCANTARA-DAUS, petitioner, vs. Spouses HERMOSO

Division: THIRD DIVISION

Docket Number: G.R. No. 149750

Counsel: Simplicio M. Sevilleja, Villamor A. Tolete

Case Title : HEIRS OF JUAN SAN ANDRES (VICTOR S. ZIGA) and

Docket Number: G.R. No. 135634

Counsel: Antonio S. Tria, Simando, Villanueva

2. Monongsong vs. Estimo 404 SCRA 683

Case Title : MILAGROS MANONGSONG, joined by her husband, CARLITO

Division: FIRST DIVISION

Docket Number: G.R. No. 136773

Counsel: Vicente Tagoc, Jr., Roque, Butuyan & Gangoso

3. San Miguel Properties Philippines vs. Huang 336 SCRA 737

Case Title : SAN MIGUEL PROPERTIES PHILIPPINES, INC., petitioner, vs.

Division: SECOND DIVISION

Docket Number: G.R. No. 137290

Counsel: Abello, Concepcion, Regala & Cruz, Malaya, Sanchez, Francisco,

ase Title : HERNANDO R. PEÑALOSA alias “HENRY PEÑALOSA,” petitioner,

Division: SECOND DIVISION