FIRST DIVISION (b) Original Certificate of Title No.

(b) Original Certificate of Title No. O-12665, and Transfer Certificates of over the disputed land in the name of petitioners, the same was
G.R. No. 129682      March 21, 2002 Title Nos. T-84439, T-93857 and T-117618 deriving therefrom, as well timberland and formed part of the public domain, as per certification
NESTOR PAGKATIPUNAN and ROSALINA MAÑAGAS- as any other derivative titles, are declared null and void; issued by the Bureau of Forest Development on April 1, 1985, thus:
PAGKATIPUNAN, petitioners,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS and REPUBLIC OF THE (c) The respondent Register of Deeds for Quezon Province is ordered to TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:
PHILIPPINES, respondents. cancel said titles; and
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
This is to certify that the tract of land situated in Vigo Cantidang, San
(d) The parcels of land covered thereby are ordered reverted to the Narciso, Quezon, containing an area of 3,804.261 square meters as
This is a petition for review of the decision  of the Court of Appeals
1 State. described in Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-117618 x x x registered in
nullifying the decision of the Court of First Instance of Gumaca, the name of Spouses Nestor E. Pagkatipunan and Rosalina Mañgas is
Quezon2 which confirmed petitioners’ title over the lots subject of the verified to be within the Timberland Block -B, Project No. 15-B of San
Without pronouncement as to costs."9 Narciso, Quezon, certified and declared as such on August 25, 1955 per
instant petition. Petitioners further seek to annul and set aside the
resolutions3 of the Court of Appeals denying their urgent motion to recall BFD Map LC-1880. The land is, therefore, within the administrative
the judgment entered4 in the land registration case. jurisdiction and control of the Bureau of Forest Development, and not
On July 16, 1986, petitioners moved for the reconsideration of the afore-
subject to disposition under the Public Land Law.
cited decision10 reiterating that the land in question was agricultural
because it was possessed and cultivated as such long before its
The antecedent facts are as follows:
classification as timberland by the Bureau of Forestry in 1955. [Sgd.]ARMANDO CRUZ
Petitioners and their predecessors-in-interest have been in open, Supervising Cartographer22
Sometime in November 1960, petitioners’ predecessors-in-interest, continuous, exclusive, notorious possession and occupation of said land
spouses Getulio Pagkatipunan and Lucrecia Esquires, filed with the for agricultural and cattle raising purposes as far back as the Spanish
Court of First Instance of Gumaca, Quezon an application for judicial regime. Following the doctrine in Oracoy v. Director of Lands, 11 private This fact was even admitted by petitioners during the proceedings
confirmation and registration of their title to Lots 1 and 2 of Plan Psu- interest had intervened and petitioners acquired vested rights which can before the court a quo  on March 10, 1986, when they confirmed that the
174406 and Lots 1 and 2 of Plan Psu-112066, all located in San no longer be impaired by the subsequent classification of the land as land has been classified as forming part of forest land, albeit  only on
Narciso, Quezon.5 timberland by the Director of Forestry. August 25, 1955.23 Since no imperfect title can be confirmed over lands
not yet classified as disposable or alienable, the title issued to herein
petitioners is considered void ab initio.24
On May 4, 1961, the Court of First Instance entered an order of default On August 20, 1986, the appellate court denied the motion for
against the whole world, except spouses Felicisimo Almace and Teodulo reconsideration for lack of merit. 12 On December 12, 1986, the decision
Medenilla who were given ten (10) days to file their written opposition as of June 27, 1986 attained finality and judgment was entered in the book Under the Regalian doctrine, all lands of the public domain belong to the
regards Lot No. 2 of Plan Psu-174406. Upon motion of petitioner’s of entries of judgments.13 State, and the State is the source of any asserted right to ownership in
predecessors, Lot No. 2 of Plan Psu-174406 was removed from the land and charged with the conservation of such patrimony. This same
coverage of the application. The remaining parcel of land covered by Lot doctrine also states that all lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly
On April 2, 1987, petitioners filed an urgent motion to set aside entry of within private ownership are presumed to belong to the State. 25 To
No. 1 has an area of 3,804.261 square meters.
judgment on the ground that Atty. Cirilo E. Doronila, petitioners’ counsel overcome such presumption, incontrovertible evidence must be shown
of record, was not furnished a copy of the resolution denying the motion by the applicant that the land subject of the application is alienable or
On June 15, 1967, the Court of First Instance promulgated a decision for reconsideration.14 In the absence of such notice, the decision of the disposable.26
confirming petitioners’ title to the property. On October 23, 1967, OCT appellate court did not become final and executory.
No. O-12665 was issued in the name of petitioners. 1âwphi1.nêt
In the case at bar, there was no evidence showing that the land has
On October 22, 1987, the Court of Appeals set aside and lifted the entry been reclassified as disposable or alienable. Before any land may be
Almost eighteen (18) years later, or on September 12, 1985, the of judgment in CA-G. R. SP No. 07115 and directed the clerk of court to declassified from the forest group and converted into alienable or
Republic of the Philippines filed with the Intermediate Appellate Court an furnish petitioners’ counsel a copy of the August 20, 1986 resolution. 15 disposable land for agricultural or other purposes, there must be a
action to declare the proceedings in LRC Case No. 91-G, LRC Record positive act from the government. Even rules on the confirmation of
No. N-19930 before the Court of First Instance of Gumaca, Quezon null imperfect titles do not apply unless and until the land classified as forest
For petitioners’ inaction despite service of the August 20, 1986
and void, and to cancel Original Certificate of Title No. 0-12665 and titles land is released in an official proclamation to that effect so that it may
resolution, the June 27, 1986 decision became final and executory. On
derived therefrom as null and void, to direct the register of deeds to form part of the disposable agricultural lands of the public
March 2, 1988, entry of judgment was again made in the land
annul said certificates of title, and to confirm the subject land as part of domain.27 Declassification of forest land is an express and positive act of
registration case.
the public domain.6 Government.28 It cannot be presumed. Neither should it be ignored nor
deemed waived.29 It calls for proof.30
On September 4, 1995, Atty. Doronila withdrew his appearance as
The Republic claimed that at the time of filing of the land registration
counsel for petitioners.16
case and of rendition of the decision on June 15, 1967, the subject land The court a quo found registrable title in favor of petitioners based on
was classified as timberland under LC Project No. 15-B of San Narciso, the Republic’s failure to show that the land is more valuable as forest
Quezon, as shown in BF Map No. LC-1180; hence inalienable and not On April 1, 1996, petitioners, through their new counsel, Atty. George I. land than for agricultural purposes, a finding which is based on a wrong
subject to registration. Moreover, petitioners’ title thereto can not be Howard, filed with the Court of Appeals an urgent motion to recall the concept of what is forest land.
confirmed for lack of showing of possession and occupation of the land entry of judgment, 17 which was denied by the appellate court on
in the manner and for the length of time required by Section 48(b), December 16, 1996.18
Commonwealth Act No. 141, as amended. Neither did petitioners have There is a big difference between "forest" as defined in the dictionary
any fee simple title which may be registered under Act No. 496, as and "forest or timber land" as a classification of land of the public domain
amended. Consequently, the Court of First Instance did not acquire The motion for reconsideration was likewise denied on the ground that it in the Constitution. One is descriptive of what appears on the land while
jurisdiction over the res and any proceedings had therein were null and raised arguments already discussed and resolved in the urgent motion the other is a legal status, a classification for legal purposes. The "forest
void.7 to recall entry of judgment.19 land" started out as a "forest" or vast tracts of wooded land with dense
growths of trees and underbrush. However, the cutting down of trees
and the disappearance of virgin forest do not automatically convert the
On the other hand, petitioners raised the special defenses of Hence, the instant petition for review.20 land of the public domain from forest or timber land to alienable
indefeasibility of title and res judicata.  They argued that due to the lapse agricultural land.31
of a considerable length of time, the judgment of the Court of First
Instance of Quezon in the land registration case has become final and Petitioners claim that their title to the land became incontrovertible and
conclusive against the Republic. Moreover, the action for reversion of indefeasible one (1) year after issuance of the decree of registration. The classification of forest land, or any land for that matter, is descriptive
the land to the public domain is barred by prior judgment. 8 Hence, the Republic’s cause of action was barred by prescription of its legal nature or status, and does not have to be descriptive of what
and res judicata, proceedings having been initiated only after about 18 the land actually looks like. 32 A person cannot enter into forest land and
years from the time the decree of registration was made. Contrary to the by the simple act of cultivating a portion of that land, earn credits
In a decision promulgated on June 27, 1986, the Intermediate Appellate appellate court’s findings, the land is agricultural and the inclusion and towards an eventual confirmation of imperfect title. The Government
Court held that the land in question was forestral land; hence not classification thereof by the Bureau of Forestry in 1955 as timberland must first declare the forest land to be alienable and disposable
registrable. There was no evidence on record to show that the land was can not impair the vested rights acquired by petitioners’ predecessors- agricultural land before the year of entry, cultivation, and exclusive and
actually and officially delimited and classified as alienable or disposable in-interest who have been in open, continuous, adverse and public adverse possession can be counted for purposes of an imperfect title. 33
land of the public domain. Therefore, the Court of First Instance did not possession of the land in question since time immemorial and for more
acquire jurisdiction to take cognizance of the application for registration than thirty (30) years prior to the filing of the application for registration in
and to decide the same. Consequently, the action to declare null and 1960. Hence, the Court of Appeals committed grave error when it denied As ruled in the case of Heirs of Jose Amunategui v. Director of
void the June 15, 1967 decision for lack of jurisdiction did not prescribe. their motion to set aside entry of judgment in the land registration case. Forestry:34
The dispositive portion of the appellate court’s decision reads:
The petition lacks merit. A forested area classified as forest land of the public domain does not
WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered in favor of petitioner and against lose such classification simply because loggers or settlers may have
respondents, and as prayed for: stripped it of its forest cover. Parcels of land classified as forest land
Unless public land is shown to have been reclassified or alienated to a may actually be covered with grass or planted to crops by kaingin
private person by the State, it remains part of the inalienable public cultivators or other farmers. "Forest lands" do not have to be on
(a) The Decision dated June 15, 1967 in LRC Case No. 91-G, LRC domain. Occupation thereof in the concept of owner, no matter how mountains or in out of the way places. Swampy areas covered by
Record No. N-19930 is hereby declared null and void, and accordingly long, cannot ripen into ownership and be registered as a title. 21 mangrove trees, nipa palms, and other trees growing in brackish or sea
set aside; water may also be classified as forest land. The classification is
descriptive of its legal nature or status and does not have to be
Evidence extant on record showed that at the time of filing of the descriptive of what the land actually looks like. Unless and until the land
application for land registration and issuance of the certificate of title
classified as "forest" is released in an official proclamation to that effect
so that it may form part of the disposable agricultural lands of the public
domain, the rules on confirmation of imperfect title do not apply.

Moreover, the original text of Section 48 (b), Chapter VIII of the Public
Land Act, which took effect on December 1, 1936, expressly provided
that only agricultural land of the public domain are subject to acquisitive
prescription, to wit:

Section 48. x x x

(a) x x x

(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest

have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and
occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain, under a bona
fide claim of acquisition of ownership, except as against the
Government, since July twenty-six, eighteen hundred and ninety-four,
except when prevented by war or force majeure.  These shall be
conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to
a Government grant and shall be entitled to a certificate of title under the
provisions of this Chapter. (Emphasis supplied)

Thus, it is clear that the applicant must prove not only his open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and occupation of the
land either since time immemorial or for the period prescribed therein,
but most importantly, he must prove that the land is alienable public
land.35 In the case at bar, petitioners failed to do so.

Petitioners’ contention that the Republic is now barred from questioning

the validity of the certificate of title issued to them considering that it took
the government almost eighteen (18) years to assail the same is
erroneous. It is a basic precept that prescription does not run against the
State.36 The lengthy occupation of the disputed land by petitioners
cannot be counted in their favor, as it remained part of the patrimonial
property of the State, which property, as stated earlier, is inalienable and
indisposable.37

In light of the foregoing, the Court of Appeals did not err when it set
aside the June 15, 1967 decision of the court a quo and ordered that the
subject lot be reverted back to the public domain. Since the land in
question is unregistrable, the land registration court did not acquire
jurisdiction over the same. Any proceedings had or judgment rendered
therein is void and is not entitled to the respect accorded to a valid
judgment.

Consequently, the Court of Appeals rightfully denied petitioners’ motion

to set aside the judgment rendered on December 12, 1986, in the land
registration case.1âwphi1.nêt

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the decision of the Court of

Appeals dated June 27, 1986 in AC-G.R. SP No. 07115, is
hereby AFFIRMED in toto.

Without pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED.