EN BANC

[G.R. No. L-18630. December 17, 1966.]

APOLONIO TANJANCO , petitioner, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS and

ARACELI SANTOS , respondents.

P. Carreon and G. O. Veneracion, Jr. for petitioner.

Antonio V. Bonoan for respondent.

SYLLABUS

1. CIVIL LAW; DAMAGES; REQUISITES FOR RECOVERY OF MORAL DAMAGES

UNDER ARTICLE 21, CIVIL CODE. — The essential feature under Article 21 of the Civil
Code is seduction, that in law is more than mere sexual intercourse, or a breach of
promise of marriage; it connotes essentially the idea of deceit, enticement, superior
power or abuse of con dence on the part of the seducer to which the woman has
yielded (U.S. vs. Buenaventura, 27 Phil. 121; U.S. vs. Arlante, 9 Phil. 595).
2. ID.; ID.; NO RECOVERY OF MORAL DAMAGES UNDER ARTICLE 21, IF
SEDUCTION IS ABSENT; CASE AT BAR. — In the case at bar the facts show that for one
whole year, from 1958 to 1959, plaintiff-appellee, a woman of adult age, maintained
intimate sexual relations with appellant, with repeated acts of intercourse. Such
conduct is incompatible with the idea of seduction. Plainly, there is here voluntariness
and mutual passion, for had the appellant been deceived, had she surrendered
exclusively because of the deceit, artful persuasions and wiles of the defendant, she
would not have again yielded to his embraces, much less for one year, without exacting
early fulfillment of the alleged promises of marriage, and would have cut short all sexual
relation upon nding that defendant did not intend to ful ll his promises. Hence, no
case is made under Article 21 of the Civil Code and, no other cause of action being
alleged, no error was committed by the Court of First Instance in dismissing the
complaint. Of course, the dismissal must be understood as without prejudice to
whatever actions may correspond to the child of the plaintiff against defendant-
appellant, if any.

DECISION

REYES, J.B.L. , J : p

Appeal from a decision of the Court of Appeals (in its Case No. 27210-R)
revoking an order of the Court of First Instance of Rizal (in Civil Case No. Q-4797)
dismissing appellant's action for support and damages.
The essential allegations of the complaint are to the effect that, from December,
1957, the defendant (appellee herein), Apolonio Tanjanco, courted the plaintiff, Araceli
Santos, both being of adult age; that "defendant expressed and professed his undying
love and affection for plaintiff who also in due time, reciprocated the tender feelings";
that in consideration of defendant's promises of marriage plaintiff consented and
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 acceded to defendant's pleas for carnal knowledge; that regularly until December 1959,
through his protestations of love and promises of marriage, defendant succeeded in
having carnal access to plaintiff, as a result of which the latter conceived a child; that
due to her pregnant condition, to avoid embarrassment and social humiliation, plaintiff
had to resign her job as secretary in IBM Philippines, Inc., where she was receiving
P230.00 a month; that thereby plaintiff became unable to support herself and her baby;
that due to defendant's refusal to marry plaintiff, as promised, the latter suffered
mental anguish, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, and social
humiliation. The prayer was for a decree compelling the defendant to recognize the
unborn child that plaintiff was bearing; to pay her not less than P430.00 a month for her
support and that of her baby, plus P100,000.00 in moral and exemplary damages, plus
P10,000.00 attorney's fees.
Upon defendant's motion to dismiss, the Court of First Instance dismissed the
complaint for failure to state a cause of action.
Plaintiff Santos duly appealed to the Court of Appeals, and the latter ultimately
decided the case, holding with the lower court that no cause of action was shown to
compel recognition of a child as yet unborn, nor for its support, but decreed that the
complaint did state a cause of action for damages, premised on Article 21 of the Civil
Code of the Philippines, prescribing as follows:
"ART. 21. Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to another in a
manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall
compensate the latter for the damage."

The Court of Appeals, therefore, entered judgment setting aside the dismissal
and directing the court of origin to proceed with the case.
Defendant, in turn, appealed to this Court, pleading that actions for breach of a
promise to marry are not permissible in this jurisdiction, and invoking the rulings of this
Court in Estopa vs. Piansay, 109 Phil. 640; Hermosisima vs. Court of Appeals, L-14628,
January 29, 1962; and De Jesus vs. SyQuia, 58 Phil. 886.
We find this appeal meritorious.
In holding that the complaint stated a cause of action for damages, under Article
21 above mentioned, the Court of Appeals relied upon and quoted from the
memorandum submitted by the Code Commission to the Legislature in 1949 to
support the original draft of the Civil Code. Referring to Article 23 of the draft (now
Article 21 of the Code), the Commission stated:
"But the Code Commission has gone farther than the sphere of wrongs
de ned or determined by positive law. Fully sensible that there are countless gaps
in the statutes, which leave so many victims of moral wrongs helpless, even
though they have actually suffered material and moral injury, the Commission
has deemed it necessary, in the interest of justice, to incorporate in the proposed
Civil Code the following rule:

'ART. 23. Any person who willfully causes loss or injury to

another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public
policy shall compensate the latter for damage.'

"An example will illustrate the purview of the foregoing norm: 'A' seduces
the nineteen-year old daughter of 'X'. A promise of marriage either has not been
made, or can not be proved. The girl becomes pregnant. Under the present laws,
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 there is no crime, as the girl is above eighteen years of age. Neither can any civil
action for breach of promise of marriage be led. Therefore, though the grievous
moral wrong has been committed, and though the girl and her family have
suffered incalculable moral damage, she and her parents cannot bring any action
for damages. But under the proposed article, she and her parents would have
such a right of action."

The Court of Appeals seems to have overlooked that the example set forth in the
Code Commission's memorandum refers to a tort upon a minor who has been
seduced. The essential feature is seduction, that in law is more than mere sexual
intercourse, or a breach of a promise of marriage; it connotes essentially the idea of
deceit, enticement, superior power or abuse of con dence on the part or the seducer to
which the woman has yielded (U.S. vs. Buenaventura, 27 Phil. 121; U.S. vs. Arlante, 9
Phil. 595).
It has been ruled in the Buenaventura case (supra) that —
"To constitute seduction there must in all cases be some su cient
promise or inducement and the woman must yield because of the promise or
other inducement. If she consents merely from carnal lust and the intercourse is
from mutual desire, there is no seduction (43 Cent Dig. tit. Seduction, par. 56). She
must be induced to depart from the path of virtue by the use of some species of
arts, persuasions and wiles, which are calculated to have and do have that effect,
and which result in her ultimately submitting her person to the sexual embraces
of her seducer" (27 Phil. 123).

And in American Jurisprudence we find:

"On the other hand, in an action by the woman, the enticement, persuasion
or deception is the essence of the injury; and a mere proof of intercourse is
insufficient to warrant a recovery.

Accordingly it is not seduction where the willingness arises out of sexual

desire or curiosity of the female, and the defendant merely affords her the needed
opportunity for the commission of the act. It has been emphasized that to allow a
recovery in all such cases would tend to the demoralization of the female sex, and
would be a reward for unchastity by which a class of adventuresses would be
swift to profit." (47 Am. Jur. 662)

Bearing these principles in mind, let us examine the complaint. The material
allegations there are as follows:
"I. That the plaintiff is of legal age, single, and residing at 56 South E.
Diliman, Quezon City, while defendant is also of legal age, single, and residing at
525 Padre Faura, Manila, where he may be served with summons;
II. That the plaintiff and the defendant became acquainted with each
other sometime in December, 1957 and soon thereafter, the defendant started
visiting and courting the plaintiff;
III. That the defendant's visits were regular and frequent and in due
time the defendant expressed and professed his undying love and affection for
the plaintiff who also in due time reciprocated the tender feelings;

IV. That in the course of their engagement, the plaintiff and the
defendant as are wont of young people in love had frequent outings and dates,
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 became very close and intimate to each other and sometime in July, 1958, in
consideration of the defendant's promises of marriage, the plaintiff consented
and acceded to the former's earnest and repeated pleas to have carnal knowledge
with him;

V. That subsequent thereto and regularly until about July, 1959 except
for a short period in December, 1958 when the defendant was out of the country,
the defendant though his protestations, of love and promises of marriage
succeeded in having carnal knowledge with plaintiff;
VI. That as a result of their intimate relationship, the plaintiff started
conceiving which was confirmed by a doctor sometime in July, 1959;
VII. That upon being certain of her pregnant condition, the plaintiff
informed the defendant and pleaded with him to make good his promises of
marriage, but instead of honoring his promises and righting his wrong, the
defendant stopped and refrained from seeing the plaintiff, since about July, 1959
has not visited the plaintiff and to all intents and purposes has broken their
engagement and his promises."

Over and above the partisan allegations, the facts stand out that for one whole
year, from 1958 to 1959, the plaintiff-appellee, a woman of adult age, maintained
intimate sexual relations with appellant, with repeated acts of intercourse. Such
conduct is incompatible with the idea of seduction. Plainly there is here voluntariness
and mutual passion; for had the appellant been deceived, had she surrendered
exclusively because of the deceit, artful persuasions and wiles of the defendant, she
would not have again yielded to his embraces, much less for one year, without exacting
early fulfillment of the alleged promises of marriage, and would have cut short all sexual
relations upon nding that defendant did not intend to ful ll his promises. Hence, we
conclude that no case is made under Article 21 of the Civil Code, and no other cause of
action being alleged, no error was committed by the Court of First Instance in
dismissing the complaint.
Of course, the dismissal must be understood as without prejudice to whatever
actions may correspond to the child of the plaintiff against the defendant-appellant, if
any. On that point, this Court makes no pronouncement, since the child's own rights are
not here involved.
FOR THE FOREGOING REASONS, the decision of the Court of Appeals is
reversed, and that of the Court of First Instance is affirmed. No costs.
Concepcion, C.J., Barrera, Dizon, Regala, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar,
Sanchez and Castro, JJ., concur.

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