Bus Protection Application

Challenges

KN Dinesh Babu - Megger

JC Theron, Lubomir Sevov– GE Grid Solutions

2017 Texas A&M Protective Relay Conference

Content

• Introduction
• Application Challenges
• Increase Security with Supervising Elements
• Open CT Detection
• Monitoring Isolator Positions
• Detection of External Faults
• Engineering Experience of Complex Bus Protection
Schemes
• End Fault Protection Schemes
• Conclusions
Challenges to Bus Zone Protection

High fault current levels can:

• Damage equipment from mechanical stress on busbars
• Lead to CT saturation
• Cause high levels of arc flash

Mal-operation of bus protection has significant impact

• Loss of customer loads may damage customer assets
• Detrimental impact on industrial processes
• System voltage levels stability may be adversely impacted
Challenges to Bus Zone Protection
Many different bus topologies
• Many switchyard configurations possible
• Many different CTs possible
• Single bus, double bus, main and transfer bus, breaker-
and-a-half, etc.
Buses may reconfigure at any time
• Different components may be connected/disconnected
to a bus
• Switching invoking bus reconfiguration
occurs from different sources

Bus Protection Must be Dependable

and Secure, With Emphasis on
Security…
Additional Security for The Bus Differential Zone
• No matter reliability, any relay may fail. For bus applications,
any MTBF never high enough
• Consider securing the application against reasonable
contingencies
• CT problems, AC wiring problem
• Problems with aux. switches for breakers, isolators
• DC wiring problems involving the Dynamic Bus Replica
• Failure of relay hardware (single current input channel, single digital
input)

• Security above and beyond inherent security mechanisms in

IEDs
• CT Saturation Detector
• Directional (Phase) Comparison
• Isolator monitoring
External Check Zone
• Principle: • Guards against:
• Develop independent copy of • CT problems and AC wiring
differential current for entire bus problems
regardless of dynamic zones for • Malfunctioning of auxiliary
individual bus sections 52/89 contacts for breakers and
• Use the check zone to supervise isolators
the tripping zone(-s) • DC wiring problems for dynamic
• Use independent CTs / CT cores bus replica
if possible to guard against CT • Failures of current inputs
and wiring problems
• Use independent relay current
inputs to guard against relay
problems
• Alarm on spurious differential
Application of Overcurrent Check Zone

• External check zone can be configured as unrestrained zone

that (ideally) uses separate CTs or CT cores
• IOC function can be configured to operate on the externally
summated currents (from different IED or Inputs)
• For external zone, CTs summed for this overcurrent must:
• Have identical CT ratios or matching transformers are required
• Be of same type
• Make use of three ground CT inputs (IG) and Ground IOC or unused 3-
phase bank & Phase IOC elements as check zone
Application of Overcurrent Check Zone

87B phase A supervised by IOC1

phase A; the IOC responds to the
externally formed differential
current

Three-phase trip command

External IED Check Zone

Equivalent Bus Zone

• Use two different CTs /
CT cores
• Place the supervising
zone in a different
chassis
• Strong security bias,
practically a 2-out-of-2
independent relay
scheme
• Use fail-safe output to
substitute for the
permission if the
supervising relay fails /
is taken out of service
External IED Check Zone

External Voltage
Supervision
• Place the supervising
voltage inputs in a different
IED
• Guards against relay
problems and bus replica
problems
• Does not need any extra ac
current wiring
• Use fail-safe output to
substitute for the
permission if the
supervising relay fails / is
taken out of service
Open CT Detection

• CT problems and AC wiring problems challenge security of

Bus Protection
• Secondary open CT must be identified – hazardous
overvoltage (Safety)
• Multifunctional IEDs calculating sequence components (I2)
capable to detect
• Phase Segregated IEDs can’t calculate sequence
components (Centralized schemes)
• Alternative: use CT Trouble/Low Diff, Breaker status and
Current Supervision.
• Implemented in Centralized 400kV & 220kV schemes
Monitoring Isolator Positions
• Reliable “Isolator Closed” signals needed for Dynamic Bus
Replica
• In simple applications, a single normally closed contact
sufficient
• For maximum security:
• Use both N.O. (89a) and N.C. (89b) contacts
• Alarm for non-valid combinations (open-open, closed-closed)
• Inhibit switching operations until bus image is recognized
• Optionally block 87B operation from Isolator Alarm
• Each isolator position signal determines:
• Circuit currents to be included in the differential calculations
• Circuit breakers to be tripped ZONE 1

ZONE 2
Typical Isolator Connections
Isolator Switching Sequence
• Time of Open/Close of 89a/89b must be
adjusted to ensure current of circuit included
when Isolator closes
• 89a/89b close indication must be just before
circuit current flowing through Isolator; not after
• 89a/89b open indication must be just after
Isolator interrupted current
Isolator Switching Sequence Importance Eg. 1

ZONE 3=CHECK ZONE

L7

CB1-2

ISO31
L8
ZONE 1=BUS1

ISO32
ZONE 2=BUS2
ISO10

ISO11

ISO13

ISO14

ISO16

ISO17

ISO19

ISO20

ISO22

ISO23

ISO25

ISO26

ISO28

ISO29
CB4 CB5 CB6 CB7 CB8 CB9 CB10
ISO12

ISO15

ISO18

ISO21

ISO24

ISO27

ISO30
F4 F5 F6 F7 F8 L1 L2

What happens when an AG fault occurs on Bus 2 during

transition of F7 from Bus 1 to Bus 2 with both Isolators Iso19
and Iso20 closed?
Isolator Switching Sequence Importance Eg. 2
ZONE 3=CHECK ZONE
L7

CB1-2

ISO31
L8

ZONE 1=BUS1

ISO32
ZONE 2=BUS2

ISO22

ISO23

ISO25

ISO26

ISO28

ISO29
ISO10

ISO11

ISO13

ISO14

ISO16

ISO17

ISO19

ISO20
ISO8

CB4 CB5 CB6 CB7 CB8 CB9 CB10

ISO24

ISO27

ISO30
ISO12

ISO15

ISO18

ISO21
F3 F4 F5 F6 F7 F8 L1 L2

What happens when an Internal AG fault occurs on feeder F7

with bypass Isolator Iso21 closed?
• Zone 2 Disabled
• Only Active Protection
• Breaker Fail
• Backup O/C
Detection of External Faults
• Bus configuration could require
large CT ratio differences:
• Main power feeders large CT ratio
• Load/small generation feeders
low CT ratio’s
• Hence, I2 due to F2 will be
significantly larger than I1 due to
F1
• General recommendation:
increase CT ratio
• Load/small generation feeder CT
sized for load and not system fault
condition;
• Hence, significant CT saturation
can occur due to I2
External Faults: CT Saturation Detection
• CT saturation detection in some IEDs counts on
Differential vs Restraining current trajectory
• Expect trajectory to move from t0 to t1, then to t2
• This is possible with at least 2ms saturation-free current
External Faults: Extreme CT Saturation Detection
• CT saturation below in less than 2.5ms at 50Hz
• CT saturation too fast to guarantee secure CT saturation detection
External Faults: CT Saturation Alternative
• General recommendation: Increase CT ratio
Not economical feasible
Increased CT ratio impacts local feeder protection sensitivity
• Alternative: use very fast current magnitude detection faster than 87B
• Conventional current detection based on DFT too slow – slower than 87B
• Time domain sample-based overcurrent (3 – 5ms reaction) faster than 87B
• Comparison between full cycle Fourier (Green) and Fast OC Mag Det (Red)
• Fast OC Mag Detection used to supervise 87B on external faults
Engineering Experience : Complex Buses (1)
• Complex bus arrangements (Double bus with 2 transfer busses) can have
Main Bus operated as Transfer Bus – 4 Zones plus 2 check zones
• Complex operational procedures to facilitate maintenance requirements
• Traditionally very complex operational procedures required on Bus
Protection (Main Bus to act as Aux Bus) to maintain protection security
• Very unreliable operations achieved if not followed in detail – misoperations
• With a low impedance IED bus replica bus protection, this is eliminated.
Engineering Experience : Complex Buses (2)
• Fault at F1 detected as Bus 2 fault – trips all Bus 2 Breakers.
• However fault in Bus 1 – hence not cleared since seen as external fault
• Normally cleared by Breaker Failure – unacceptable time delay
• End Fault used for accelerated tripping (40ms) – normal circumstances
• Delayed tripping logic (150ms) added from Bus 1 OR Bus 2 trip in event
breaker contacts or wiring failed.
End Fault Protection: Changing the Zone

“Over-trip” spot for

CB bus protection
contract

CT

• “Over-trip” between CB and CT when CB is open

• When CB is open, current must be removed from 87B
calculation – contracting 87B zone to CB
• This exposes this small part of the power system to uncleared
faults until cleared by backup protection, but…
End Fault Protection: Changing the Zone

Blind spot for

CB bus protection

CT

• But…
• A blind spot is created when the bus zone contracted to the CB
• End Fault Protection is required to trip remote circuit breaker(s)
for this fault
End Fault Protection (EFP)

CB

CT

• Instantaneous overcurrent enabled when associated CB is open to

cover blind spot between CB and line-side CT
• Pickup delay must be long enough to ride-through ramp down of
current interruption (1.3 cycles max)
• EFP sends transfer trip to remote end of circuit/PS component
• End Fault Protection must be inhibited from Manual Close command
• Most Bus Protection IEDs (Centralized and De-centralized) do have EFP
Conclusions

• Power systems are evolving; hence the need that Bus Protection
should follow
• Bus Protection must remain very dependable and secure
• Low Impedance most suitable for new application challenges
• Six application challenges, with implemented changes, covered
where conventional Bus Protection falls short
Thank You

Questions?