9/14/2020 G.R. No.

159517-18

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Republic of the Philippines

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 159517-18 June 30, 2009

HILARIO P. SORIANO and ROSALINDA ILAGAN, Petitioners,

DECISION

NACHURA, J.:

Petitioners Hilario P. Soriano and Rosalinda Ilagan (petitioners) appeal by certiorari the August 5, 2003 Decision1 of
the Court of Appeals (CA) in the consolidated cases CA-G.R. SP. Nos. 64648 and 64649.

The antecedents.

Hilario P. Soriano (Soriano) and Rosalinda Ilagan (Ilagan) were the President and General Manager, respectively, of
the Rural Bank of San Miguel (Bulacan), Inc. (RBSM). Allegedly, on June 27, 1997 and August 21, 1997, during
their incumbency as president and manager of the bank, petitioners indirectly obtained loans from RBSM. They
falsified the loan applications and other bank records, and made it appear that Virgilio J. Malang and Rogelio
Mañaol obtained loans of ₱15,000,000.00 each, when in fact they did not.

Accordingly, on May 4, 2000, State Prosecutor Josefino A. Subia charged Soriano in the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Malolos, Bulacan, with violation of Section 83 of Republic Act No. 337 (R.A. No. 337) or the General Banking Act,
as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1795, or Violation of the Director, Officer, Stockholder or Related Interest
(DOSRI) Rules (DOSRI Rules). The inculpatory portion of the Information reads:

That on or about June 27, 1997 and thereafter, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused,
in his capacity as President of the Rural Bank of San Miguel (Bulacan), Inc. did then and there, unlawfully,
feloniously, and indirectly borrow or secure a loan with Rural Bank of San Miguel-San Miguel Branch amounting to
Php15 million, without the consent and written approval of the majority of the directors of the bank, by using the
name of one depositor VIRGILIO J. MALANG of San Miguel Bulacan who have no knowledge of the said loan, and
once in possession of the said amount of Php14,775,000.00, net of interest converted the same to his own personal
use and benefit, in flagrant violation of the said law.2

On the same date, an information for estafa thru falsification of commercial document was also filed against Soriano
and Ilagan, viz.:

That on or about June 27, 1997 and thereafter, in San Miguel, Bulacan and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the said accused HILARIO P. SORIANO and ROSALINDA ILAGAN, as principals by direct participation, with
unfaithfulness or abuse of confidence and taking advantage of their position as President of Rural Bank of San
Miguel (Bulacan), Inc. and Manager of Rural Bank of San Miguel-San Miguel Branch, a duly organized banking
institutions under Philippine Laws, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another, did then and there,
willfully and feloniously falsify loan documents consisting of loan application/information sheet, and promissory note
dated June 27, 1997, disclosure statement on loan/credit transaction, credit proposal report, manager’s check no.
06514 dated June 27, 1997 and undated RBSM-San Miguel Branch check voucher, by making it appear that one
VIRGILIO J. MALANG filed the aforementioned documents when in truth and in fact, VIRGILIO J. MALANG did not
participate in the execution of said loan document and that by virtue of said falsification and with deceit and intent to
cause damage, the accused credited the loan proceeds of the loan amounting to Php14,775,000.00, net of interest,
to the account of VIRGILIO J. MALANG with the RBSM and thereafter converted the same amount to their own
personal gain and benefit, to the damage and prejudice of the Rural Bank of San Miguel-San Miguel Branch, its
creditors and the Bangko Sentral Ng Pilipinas in the amount of Php14,775,000.00.

CONTRARY TO LAW.3

The informations were docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 1719-M-2000 and 1720-M-2000, respectively, and were
raffled to Branch 14, presided by Judge Petrita Braga Dime.

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Another information for violation of Section 83 of R.A. No. 337, as amended, was filed against Soriano, this time,
covering the ₱15,000,000.00 loan obtained in the name of Rogelio Mañaol. The information reads:

That on or about August 21, 1997 and thereafter, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said
accused, in his capacity as President of the Rural Bank of San Miguel (Bulacan), Inc. did then and there, unlawfully,
feloniously, and indirectly borrow or secure a loan with Rural Bank of San Miguel-San Miguel Branch, a domestic
rural ba[n]king institution created, organized and existing under Philippine laws, amounting to Php15.0 million,
knowing fully well that the same has been done by him without the written approval of the majority of [the] board of
directors of the said bank and which consent and approval the said accused deliberately failed to obtain and enter
the same upon the record of said banking institution and to transmit a copy of which to the supervising department
of the said bank, as required by the General Banking Act, by using the name of one depositor ROGELIO MAÑAOL
of San Jose, San Miguel Bulacan who have no knowledge of the said loan, and once in possession of the said
amount of Php 15.0 million, converted the same to his own personal use and benefit, in flagrant violation of the said
law.4

Soriano and Ilagan were also indicted for estafa thru falsification of commercial document for obtaining said loan.
Thus:

That on or about August 21, 1997 and thereafter, in San Miguel, Bulacan and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the said accused HILARIO P. SORIANO and ROSALINDA ILAGAN, as principals by direct participation, with
unfaithfulness or abuse of confidence and taking advantage of their position as President of Rural Bank of San
Miguel (Bulacan), Inc. and Manager of Rural Bank of San Miguel-San Miguel Branch, a duly organized banking
institutions under Philippine Laws, conspiring confederating and mutually helping one another, did then and there,
willfully and feloniously falsify loan documents consisting of loan application/information sheet and promissory note
dated August 21, 1997, by making it appear that one ROGELIO MAÑAOL filled up the application/information sheet
and filed the aforementioned loan documents when in truth and in fact, ROGELIO MAÑAOL did not participate in the
execution of said loan document and that by virtue of said falsification and with deceit and intent to cause damage,
the accused succeeded in securing a loan in the amount of Php15.0 million, from Rural Bank of San Miguel-San
Miguel Branch in the name of ROGELIO MAÑAOL, which amount of Php 15.0 million representing loan proceeds
the accused deposited to the account of ROGELIO MAÑAOL maintained with Rural Bank of San Miguel and
thereafter converted the same amount to their own personal gain and benefit, to the damage and prejudice of the
Rural Bank of San Miguel-San Miguel Branch, its creditors, the Bangko Sentral Ng Pilipinas and the Philippine
Deposit Insurance Corporation in the amount of Php 15.0 million.

CONTRARY TO LAW.5

The cases were docketed as 1980-M-2000 and 1981-M-2000, respectively, and were raffled to Branch 77, presided
by Judge Aurora Santiago-Lagman.

Petitioners moved to quash the informations in Criminal Case Nos. 1719-M-2000 and 1720-M-2000 (pending before
Branch 14), and also in Criminal Case Nos. 1980-M-2000 and 1981-M-2000 (pending with Branch 77), on grounds
that: (i) more than one (1) offense is charged; and (ii) the facts charged do not constitute an offense. Specifically,
petitioners argued that the prosecutor charged more than one offense for a single act. Soriano was charged with
violation of DOSRI rules and estafa thru falsification of commercial document for allegedly securing fictitious loans.
They further argued that the facts as alleged in the information do not constitute an offense.

In an Order6 dated November 15, 2000, RTC Branch 77 denied the motion to quash. Rejecting petitioners’
arguments, it held:

Section 13 of Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that the complaint or information must
charge but only one offense, except only in those cases in which existing laws prescribe a single punishment for
various offenses. Under this Rule, the Information is defective when it charges two (2) or more offenses. The rule
enjoining the charging of two (2) or more offenses in one information has for its aim to give the defendant the
necessary knowledge of the charge to enable him to prove his defense (People vs. Ferrer, 101 Phil. 234, cited in
Herrera Remedial Law IV., p. 72). While Section 3 (e) of Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Court provides as one of
the grounds where the accused may move to quash the complaint or information, considering Sec. 13 of Rule 110 of
the Rules as aforestated, it is apparent that the said ground refers to a situation where the accused is being charged
in one information or criminal complaint for more than one offense. The record shows that two (2) Informations were
filed against the herein accused, one in Criminal Case No. 1980-M-2000 against accused Hilario P. Soriano for
Violation of Sec. 83 of R.A. No. 337, as amended by PD 1795, and another one in Criminal Case No. 1981-M-2000
against accused Hilario P. Soriano and Rosalinda Ilagan for Estafa Thru Falsification of Commercial Documents.
Thus, each Information charges only one offense.

Even assuming that the two (2) cases arose from the same facts, if they violate two (2) or more provisions of the
law, a prosecution under one will not bar a prosecution under another (Pp. vs. Tac-an, 182 SCRA 601; Lamera v.
Court of Appeals, 198 SCRA 186, cited in Herrera Criminal Procedure, Vol. 4, p. 453).

Upon the foregoing, this Court finds that there is no basis to quash the Informations filed in these two (2) cases as
the accused are being charged therein with only one offense in each Information. As to the assertion of the accused
that the facts charged do not constitute an offense, this Court finds that the allegations of both parties are
evidentiary and the same can only be determined after a full blown trial on the merits of these cases where both
parties will be given a chance to present their evidence in support of their respective positions.

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WHEREFORE, the instant motion is DISMISSED and the arraignment of both accused and the pre-trial of these
cases scheduled on December 4, 2000 at 10:00 o’ clock in the morning, shall proceed as scheduled.7

Petitioners’ motion to quash informations in Criminal Case Nos. 1719-M-2000 and 1720-M-2000 before Branch 14
likewise suffered the same fate, as Judge Braga Dime denied the same in an Order8 dated November 27, 2000,
holding that:

Duplicity in criminal pleading is the joinder of two or more distinct and separate offenses in the same court of an
indictment or information. (41 Am. Jur. 2d 1011). Whether two offenses are charged in an information, or otherwise,
must not be made to depend upon the evidence presented at the trial court but upon the facts alleged in the
information (Provincial Fiscal of Nueva Ecija vs. CFI, 79 Phil. 165). Where an offense may be committed in any of
the different modes provided by law and the offense is alleged to have been committed in two or more modes
specified, the indictment is sufficient. The allegations in the information of the various ways of committing the
offense should be considered as a description of only one offense and the information cannot be dismissed on the
ground of multifariousness (Jurado v. Suy Yan, L-30714, April 30, 1971)

A perusal of the criminal information filed in the above-entitled cases indubitably show that each information charges
only but one offense. Thus, in Criminal Case No. 1719-M-2000, Accused Hilario P. Soriano is charged only with
violation of Sec. 83 of RA 337, as amended by PD 1796, while in Criminal Case No. 1720-M-2000, Accused Hilario
P. Soriano and Rosalinda Ilagan are charged only with Estafa thru falsification of commercial document.

On the ground that the facts charged do not constitute an offense xxx xxx xxx

[b]y simply reading the information filed against the Accused Hilario P. Soriano, in Crim. Case No. 1719-M-2000 it is
clear that the allegations, which is hypothetically admitted by said accused, in the same information set out an
offense for violation of Sec. 83 of RA 337 as amended by PD No. 1795.

Finally, Accused, in addition to the two (2) grounds aforesaid, cited prematurity and lack of probable cause which
would warrant the quashal of the two (2) informations.

These additional grounds relied upon by the Accused for the quashal of the two (2) informations must necessarily
fail because they are not one of the grounds enumerated in Sec. 3, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Court which
this Court shall not consider, in accordance with Sec. 2, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Court.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Motion to Quash, dated September 1, 2000 filed by both Accused is
hereby DENIED, for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.9

Petitioners went up to the Court of Appeals via certiorari, assailing the Orders of Branch 77 and Branch 14. The
petitions were docketed as CA-G.R. SP. Nos. 64648 and 64649. By decision10 of August 5, 2003, the CA, which
priorly consolidated the petitions, sustained the denial of petitioners’ separate motions to quash:

WHEREFORE, FOREGOING PREMISES CONSIDERED, these petitions are DENIED DUE COURSE and
accordingly DISMISSED. The assailed Orders dated November 15, 2000 and February 12, 2001 of the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 77, Malolos, Bulacan in Criminal Case Nos. 1980-M-2000 and 1981-M-2000, entitled, "People of
the Philippines vs. Hilario P. Soriano and People of the Philippines vs. Hilario P. Soriano and Rosalinda Ilagan",
respectively, in CA-G.R. SP. No. 64648 and the Orders dated November 27, 2000 and March 9, 2001 of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 14, Malolos, Bulacan in Criminal Case Nos. 1719-M-2000 and 1720-M-2000, entitled
"People of the Philippines vs. Hilario P. Soriano and People of the Philippines vs. Hilario P. Soriano and Rosalinda
Ilagan", respectively, in CA-G.R. SP. No. 64649 are affirmed.11

Petitioners are now before this Court, submitting for resolution the same matters argued before the RTC and the
CA. They insist that RTC Branch 14 and Branch 77 abused their discretion in denying their motions to quash
informations. Thus, they posit that the CA committed reversible error in dismissing their petitions for certiorari.

The appeal should be denied.

The term grave abuse of discretion, in its juridical sense, connotes capricious, despotic, oppressive or whimsical
exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse must be of such degree as to amount to an
evasion of positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, as where the power is exercised in an
arbitrary and capricious manner by reason of passion and hostility. The word capricious, usually used in tandem with
the term arbitrary, conveys the notion of willful and unreasoning action. Thus, when seeking the corrective hand of
certiorari, a clear showing of caprice and arbitrariness in the exercise of discretion is imperative.12

We reviewed the records before us, and we discerned no caprice or arbitrariness on the part of the RTC in denying
the motions.

Petitioners assail the validity of the informations against them on the ground that more than one (1) offense is
charged. They point that Soriano was charged with violation of DOSRI Rules and with estafa thru falsification of
commercial document for allegedly obtaining loans from RBSM. Thus, they claim that the informations were
duplicitous; hence, they should be quashed. 1avvphi1

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Indisputably, duplicity of offenses in a single information is a ground to quash the Information under Section 3(e),
Rule 11713 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure. The Rules prohibit the filing of a duplicitous information to
avoid confusing the accused in preparing his defense.14

By duplicity of charges is meant a single complaint or information that charges more than one offense.15 Section 13
of Rule 110 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure clearly states:

Duplicity of Offense. – A complaint or information must charge but one offense, except only in those cases in which
existing laws prescribe a single punishment for various offenses.

Otherwise stated, there is duplicity (or multiplicity) of charges when a single Information charges more than one
offense.16

In this case, however, Soriano was faced not with one information charging more than one offense, but with more
than one information, each charging a different offense - violation of DOSRI rules in one, and estafa thru falsification
of commercial documents in the others. Ilagan, on the other hand, was charged with estafa thru falsification of
commercial documents in separate informations. Thus, petitioners erroneously invoke duplicity of charges as a
ground to quash the Informations.

Petitioners also contend that Soriano should be charged with one offense only, because all the charges filed against
him proceed from and are based on a single act of obtaining fictitious loans. Thus, Soriano argues that he cannot be
charged with estafa thru falsification of commercial document, considering that he is already being prosecuted for
obtaining a DOSRI loan.

The contention has no merit.

Jurisprudence teems with pronouncements that a single act or incident might offend two or more entirely distinct and
unrelated provisions

of law,17 thus justifying the filing of several charges against the accused.

In Loney v. People,18 this Court, in upholding the filing of multiple charges against the accused, held:

As early as the start of the last century, this Court had ruled that a single act or incident might offend against two or
more entirely distinct and unrelated provisions of law thus justifying the prosecution of the accused for more than
one offense. The only limit to this rule is the Constitutional prohibition that no person shall be twice put in jeopardy of
punishment for "the same offense." In People v. Doriquez, we held that two (or more) offenses arising from the same
act are not "the same" —

x x x if one provision [of law] requires proof of an additional fact or element which the other does not, x x x. Phrased
elsewise, where two different laws (or articles of the same code) define two crimes, prior jeopardy as to one of them
is no obstacle to a prosecution of the other, although both offenses arise from the same facts, if each crime involves
some important act which is not an essential element of the other.

xxx xxx xxx

Consequently, the filing of the multiple charges against petitioners, although based on the same incident, is
consistent with settled doctrine.

As aptly pointed out by the BSP in its memorandum, there are differences between the two (2) offenses. A DOSRI
violation consists in the failure to observe and comply with procedural, reportorial or ceiling requirements prescribed
by law in the grant of a loan to a director, officer, stockholder and other related interests in the bank, i.e. lack of
written approval of the majority of the directors of the bank and failure to enter such approval into corporate records
and to transmit a copy thereof to the BSP supervising department. The elements of abuse of confidence, deceit,
fraud or false pretenses, and damage, which are essential to the prosecution for estafa, are not elements of a
DOSRI violation. The filing of several charges against Soriano was, therefore, proper.

Petitioners next question the sufficiency of the allegations in the informations, contending that the same do not
constitute an offense.

The fundamental test in considering a motion to quash anchored on Section 3 (a),19 Rule 117 of the1985 Rules on
Criminal Procedure, is the sufficiency of the averments in the information; that is, whether the facts alleged, if
hypothetically admitted, would establish the essential elements of the offense charged as defined by law.20 The trial
court may not consider a situation contrary to that set forth in the criminal complaint or information. Facts that
constitute the defense of the petitioners against the charge under the information must be proved by them during
trial. Such facts or circumstances do not constitute proper grounds for a motion to quash the information on the
ground that the material averments do not constitute the offense.21

We have reviewed the informations and find that they contain material allegations charging Soriano with violation of
DOSRI rules and estafa thru falsification of commercial documents.

In Criminal Case Nos. 1719 & 1980 for violation of DOSRI rules, the informations alleged that Soriano was the
president of RBSMI, while Ilagan was then its general manager; that during their tenure, Soriano, with the direct
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participation of Ilagan, and by using the names of Virgilio Malang and Rogelio Mañaol, was able to indirectly obtain
loans without complying with the requisite board approval, reportorial and ceiling requirements, in violation of
Section 83 of R.A. No. 37722 as amended.

Similarly, the informations in Criminal Case Nos. 1720 & 1981 charge petitioners with estafa thru falsification of
commercial document. They allege that petitioners made it appear that Virgilio J. Malang and Rogelio Mañaol
obtained loans and received the proceeds thereof when they did not in fact secure said loans or receive the
amounts reflected in the promissory notes and other bank records.

The information in Criminal Case No. 1720 further alleges the elements of estafa under Article 315 (1)(b)23 of the
RPC to wit: (i) that money, goods or other personal property be received by the offender in trust, or on commission,
or for administration, or under any other obligation involving the duty to make delivery of or to return the same; (ii)
that there be misappropriation or conversion of such money or property by the offender, or denial on his part of such
receipt; (iii) that such misappropriation or conversion or denial is to the prejudice of another; and (iv) that there is
demand made by the offended party to the offender.

The information in Criminal Case No. 1981, on the other hand, further alleged the following essential elements of
estafa under Article 315 (2) (a)24 of the RPC: (i) that there must be a false pretense, fraudulent act or fraudulent
means; (ii) that such false pretense, fraudulent act or fraudulent means must be made or executed prior to or
simultaneously with the commission of the fraud; (iii) that the offended party must have relied on the false pretense,
fraudulent act, or fraudulent means—that is, he was induced to part with his money or property because of the false
pretense, fraudulent act, or fraudulent means; and (iv) that, as a result thereof, the offended party suffered damage.
The informations in Criminal Case Nos. 1720 & 1981, thus, charge petitioners with the complex crime of estafa thru
falsification of commercial documents.

Verily, there is no justification for the quashal of the Information filed against petitioners. The RTC committed no
grave abuse of discretion in denying the motions.

In fine, the Court has consistently held that a special civil action for certiorari is not the proper remedy to assail the
denial of a motion to quash an information. The proper procedure in such a case is for the accused to enter a plea,
go to trial without prejudice on his part to present the special defenses he had invoked in his motion to quash and if
after trial on the merits, an adverse decision is rendered, to appeal therefrom in the manner authorized by law.25
Thus, petitioners should not have forthwith filed a special civil action for certiorari with the CA and instead, they
should have gone to trial and reiterated the special defenses contained in their motion to quash. There are no
special or exceptional circumstances in the present case that would justify immediate resort to a filing of a petition
for certiorari. Clearly, the CA did not commit any reversible error, much less, grave abuse of discretion in dismissing
the petition.

WHEREFORE, the petition for review is DENIED and the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED.
Costs against the petitioners.

SO ORDERED.

ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA

WE CONCUR:

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson

MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the
writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson, Third Division

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson's Attestation, I certify that the
conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of
the opinion of the Court’s Division.

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REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice

Footnotes

1 Penned by Associate Justice Mercedes Gozo-Dadole (retired), with Associate Justices Conrado M.
Vasquez, Jr. (now Presiding Justice) and Rosmari D. Carandang, concurring; rollo, pp. 57-67.

2 Id. at 211-212.

3 Id. at 214-215.

4 Id. at 71.

5 Id. at 68-69.

6 Id. at 93-97.

7 Id. at 96-97.

8 Id. at 240-243.

9 Id. at 241-243

10 Supra note 1.

11 Id. at 66-67.

12 Torres v. Abundo, Sr, G.R. No. 174263, January 24, 2007, 512 SCRA 564, 565.

13 Sec. 3. Grounds. – The accused may move to quash the complaint or information on any of the following
grounds:

xxx xxx xxx

(e) That more than one (1) offense is charged except in those cases in which the existing laws
prescribe a single punishment for various offenses;

xxx xxx xxx

14 Loney v. People, G.R. No. 152644, February 10, 2006, 482 SCRA 194, 209.

15 Id. at 208.

16 Id.

17 Loney v. People, supra, See See Nierras v. Dacuycuy, G.R. Nos. 59568-76, 11 January 1990, 181 SCRA
1; People v. Doriquez, 133 Phil. 295 (1968); People v. Alvarez, 45 Phil. 472 (1923); People v. Cabrera, 43
Phil. 64 (1922); United States v. Capurro, et al., 7 Phil. 24 (1906).

18 Supra at 209-210, 212.

19 Section 3. Grounds. — The accused may move to quash the complaint or information on any of the
following grounds:

(a) That the facts charged do not constitute an offense;

xxx xxx xxx

20 Caballero v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 137355-58, September 25, 2007, 534 SCRA 30, 43.

21 Torres v. Hon. Garchitorena, 442 Phil. 765, 777 (2002).

22 Sec. 83. No director or officer of any banking institution shall, either directly or indirectly, for himself or as
the representative or agent of other, borrow any of the deposits of funds of such banks, nor shall he become a
guarantor, indorser, or surety for loans from such bank to others, or in any manner be an obligor for money
borrowed from the bank or loaned by it, except with the written approval of the majority of the directors of the
bank, excluding the director concerned. Any such approval shall be entered upon the records of the
corporation and a copy of such entry shall be transmitted forthwith to the Superintedent of Banks. The office
of any director or officer of a bank who violates the provisions of this section shall immediately become vacant
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and the director or officer shall be punished by imprisonment of not less than one year nor more than ten
years and by a fine of not less than one thousand nor more than ten thousand pesos.

The Monetary Board may regulate the amount of credit accommodations that may be extended,
directly or indirectly, by banking institutions to their directors, officers, or stockholders. However, the
outstanding credit accommodations which a bank may extend to each of its stockholders owning two
per cent (2%) or more of the subscribed capital stock, its directors, or its officers, shall be limited to an
amount equivalent to the respective outstanding deposits and book value of the paid-in capital
contribution in the bank: Provided, however, That loans and advances to officers in the form of fringe
benefits granted in accordance with rules and regulations as may be prescribed by the Monetary Board
shall not be subject to the preceding limitation.

23 ART. 315. Swindling (estafa). – Any person who shall defraud another by any of the means mentioned
hereinbelow shall be punished by:

xxx xxx xxx

1. With unfaithfulness or abuse of confidence, namely:

xxx xxx xxx

(b) By misappropriating or converting, to the prejudice of another, money, goods, or any personal
property received by the offender in trust or on commission, or for administration, or under any
obligation involving the duty to make delivery of or to return the same, even though such obligation be
totally or partially guaranteed by a bond; or by denying having received such money, goods, or other
property.

24 ART. 315. Swindling (estafa). – Any person who shall defraud another by any of the means mentioned
hereinbelow shall be punished by:

xxx xxx xxx

2. By means of any of the following false pretenses or fraudulent acts executed prior to or
simultaneously with the commission of the fraud:

(a) By using fictitious name, or falsely pretending to possess, power, influence, qualifications, property,
credit, agency, business or imaginary transactions, or by means of similar deceits.

xxx xxx xxx

25 Sasot v. People, G.R. No. 143193, June 29, 2005, 462 SCRA 138, 145.

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