FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. 155012. April 14, 2004.]

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES , petitioner, vs . CARMENCITA M.

ALCONABA; LUISITO B. MELENDEZ; CONCEPCION M. LAZARO;
MAURICIO B. MELENDEZ, JR.; and MYRNA M. GALVEZ, represented
by CONCEPCION M. LAZARO , respondents.

DECISION

DAVIDE, JR. , C.J : p

To serve the ends of social justice, which is the heart of the 1987 Constitution, the
State promotes an equitable distribution of alienable agricultural lands of the public
domain to deserving citizens, especially the underprivileged. A land registration court
must, therefore, exercise extreme caution and prudent care in deciding an application for
judicial con rmation of an imperfect title over such lands so that the public domain may
not be raided by unscrupulous land speculators. 1
At bar is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Civil Procedure seeking
to set aside the decision 2 of the Court of Appeals of 26 August 2002 in CA-G.R. CV No.
64323, which a rmed the decision 3 of the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Cabuyao,
Laguna, 4 of 1 September 1998 in MTC LRC Case No. 06 ordering the registration in favor
of the respondents of parcels of land situated at Barangay Sala, Cabuyao, Laguna,
designated as Lot 2111-A, 2111-B, 2111-C, 2111-D, and 2111-E.
The pertinent facts are as follows:
On 14 November 1996, the respondents led before the MTC of Cabuyao, Laguna,
an application 5 for registration of title over ve parcels of land, each with an area of 5,220
square meters, situated in Barangay Sala, Cabuyao, Laguna. In their application, they
stated, among other things, that they are the sole heirs of Spouses Melencio E. Melendez,
Sr., and Luz Batallones Melendez, original owners of Lot 2111 of CAD-455, with an area of
2.6 hectares. Their parents had been in possession of the said property since 1949, more
or less. After the death of their mother and father on 19 February 1967 and 5 May 1976,
respectively, they partitioned the property among themselves and subdivided it into ve
lots, namely, Lots 2111-A, 2111-B, 2111-C, 2111-D, and 2111-E. Since then they have been
in actual possession of the property in the concept of owners and in a public and peaceful
manner.
Petitioner Republic of the Philippines, through the O ce of the Solicitor General
(OSG), opposed the application on the following grounds: (a) neither the respondents nor
their predecessors-in-interest possess su cient title to the property or have been in open,
continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the land in question
since 1945 or prior thereto; (b) the muniments of title, i.e., tax declaration and tax receipts,
presented by the respondents do not constitute competent and su cient evidence of a
bona fide right to registration of the land under Section 48(b), Commonwealth Act No. 141,
otherwise known as The Public Land Act, 6 as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1073;
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 (c) the claim of ownership in fee simple on the basis of a Spanish title or grant can no
longer be availed of by the respondents; and (d) the land is part of the public domain
belonging to the Republic of the Philippines. 7
At the trial on the merits, respondents Mauricio B. Melendez, Jr., and Carmencita M.
Alconaba testi ed to establish their claim over the subject lots. Mauricio claimed that he
and his co-respondents acquired by inheritance from their deceased parents Lot 2111 of
Cad-455, which is an agricultural land. Their parents had been in possession of the said
land since 1949 and had been religiously paying the taxes due thereon. When their parents
died, he and his siblings immediately took possession of said property in the concept of
an owner, paid taxes, and continued to plant rice thereon. On 24 June 1996, he and his co-
heirs executed an Extrajudicial Settlement with Partition over the said lot and subdivided it
into five lots. 8
For her part, Carmencita testi ed that Lot 2111 of Cad-455 had been in the
possession of their parents since 1940 and that after the death of their parents she and
her siblings immediately took possession of it and religiously paid the taxes thereon. The
land is being cultivated by Julia Garal, their tenant. She admitted that no improvements
have been introduced by their family on the lot. On cross examination, she admitted that
plans to sell the property were at hand. 9
In its decision of 1 September 1998, the trial court found that the respondents have
su ciently established their family's actual, continuous, adverse, and notorious
possession of the subject property for more than fty-seven years, commencing from the
possession of their predecessors-in-interest in 1940, and that such possession was in an
adverse and public manner. Likewise, it found that the land in question is alienable and
disposable and is not within any reservation or forest zone. Thus, it con rmed the title of
the respondents over the said lots; directed the Register of Deeds of Laguna, Calamba
Branch, to cause the registration of said parcels of land in the name of the respondents
upon payment of fees; and ordered the issuance of a Decree of Registration once the
decision becomes final and executory.
Upon appeal 1 0 by the petitioner, the Court of Appeals a rmed the decision of the
trial court. Hence, this petition.
The OSG argues that both the trial court and the Court of Appeals erred in (a) giving
weight to the self-serving testimonies of Mauricio and Carmencita that the respondents
and their predecessors-in-interest had been in open, continuous, and adverse possession
of the lots in question in the concept of an owner for at least thirty years; and (b) holding
that respondents' tax declaration is su cient proof that they and their parents have been
in possession of the property for at least thirty years, despite the fact that the said tax
declaration was only for the year 1994 and the property tax receipts presented by the
respondents were all of recent dates, i.e., 1990, 1991, 1992, 1994, 1996, and 1997. Finally,
the OSG states that even granting for the sake of argument that the respondents have
been in possession of the property since 1940, their adverse possession should be
reckoned only from 28 September 1981 when the property was declared to be within
alienable and disposable zone.
The petition is meritorious.
While the rule is well settled that the ndings of fact of appellate courts are
conclusive upon us, 1 1 there are recognized exceptions thereto, among which is where the
ndings of fact are not supported by the record or are so glaringly erroneous as to
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 constitute a serious abuse of discretion. 1 2 This exception is present in this case. ETDaIC

Section 48(b) of C.A. No. 141, as amended by Republic Act No. 1942, 1 3 reads as
follows:
Section 48. The following described citizens of the Philippines,
occupying lands of the public domain or claiming to own any such lands or an
interest therein, but whose titles have not been perfected or completed, may apply
to the Court of First Instance of the province where the land is located for
con rmation of their claims and the issuance of a certi cate of title therefor,
under the Land Registration Act, to wit:

xxx xxx xxx

(b) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-

interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious
possession and occupation of agricultural lands of the public domain,
under a bona de claim of acquisition of ownership, for at least thirty
years immediately preceding the ling of the application for con rmation
of title except when prevented by war or force majeure. These shall be
conclusively presumed to have performed all the conditions essential to a
Government grant and shall be entitled to a certi cate of title under the
provisions of this chapter.

This provision was further amended by P.D. No. 1073 14 by substituting the phrase "for
at least thirty years" with "since June 12, 1945"; thus:
SEC. 4. The provisions of Section 48(b) and Section 48(c), Chapter VIII,
of the Public Land Act are hereby amended in the sense that these provisions
shall apply only to alienable and disposable lands of the public domain which
have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation by the applicant himself or through his predecessor-in-interest, under
a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership, since June 12, 1945.

The date "12 June 1945" was reiterated in Section 14(1) of P.D. No. 1529, 15 otherwise
known as the Property Registration Decree, provides:
SEC. 14. Who may apply. — The following persons may le in the
proper Court of First Instance [now Regional Trial Court] an application for
registration of title to land, whether personally or through their duly authorized
representatives:
(1) Those who by themselves or through their predecessors-in-interest
have been in open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession
and occupation of alienable and disposable lands of the public
domain under a bona de claim of ownership since June 12, 1945,
or earlier. (Emphasis supplied).
Applicants for con rmation of imperfect title must, therefore, prove the following:
(a) that the land forms part of the disposable and alienable agricultural lands of the public
domain; and (b) that they have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious
possession and occupation of the same under a bona de claim of ownership either since
time immemorial or since 12 June 1945.
There is no doubt that the subject property is part of the disposable and alienable
agricultural lands of the public domain. But it is not clear as to when it was classi ed as
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 alienable and disposable by proper authorities.
We do not nd merit in OSG's claim that the subject property was classi ed as
within the alienable and disposable zone only on 28 September 1981, and hence,
possession by respondents' predecessors-in-interest before that date cannot be
considered. In support of this claim, the OSG relies on a statement appearing in the survey
plan marked as Exhibit "Q," which reads:
This survey is inside alienable and disposable area as per Project No. 23-A
L.C. Map No. 004 certi ed on September 28, 1981 and is outside any civil or
military reservation.

As postulated by the respondents, the phrase "certi ed on September 28, 1981" could
not have meant that Lot 2111 became alienable and disposable only on 28 September
1981. That date obviously refers to the time that Project No. 23-A L.C. Map No. 004
was certified.
Neither can we give weight to the contention of the respondents that since Project
No. 23-A L.C. Map No. 004 of which Lot 2111 forms part was approved on 31 December
1925 by the then Bureau of Forestry, Lot 2111 must have been disposable and alienable as
early as of that date. There is nothing to support their claim that 31 December 1925 is the
date of the approval of such project or the date of the classi cation of the subject
property as disposable and alienable public land. It is settled that a person who seeks
registration of title to a piece of land must prove his claim by clear and convincing
evidence. 1 6 The respondents have failed to discharge the burden of showing that Lot
2111 was classi ed as part of the disposable and alienable agricultural lands of public
domain as of 12 June 1945 or earlier.
Likewise, the respondent have miserably failed to prove that they and their
predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious
possession and occupation of the subject property under a bona de claim of ownership
either since time immemorial or since 12 June 1945.
The trial court and the Court of Appeals based the nding of fty-seven years of
possession by the respondents and their predecessors-in-interest on the testimonies of
Carmencita and Mauricio. The two were aged 62 1 7 and 60, 1 8 respectively, when they
testi ed in 1997. Thus, they must have been born in 1935 and 1937, respectively. If the
asserted possession lasted for a period of fty-seven years at the time they testi ed, the
same must have commenced sometime in 1940, or at the time that Carmencita was just 5
years old and Mauricio, about 3 years old. It is quite impossible that they could fully grasp,
before coming to the age of reason, the concept of possession of such a big tract of land
and testify thereon nearly six decades later. In short their testimonies could not be relied
upon to prove the adverse possession of the subject parcel of land by their parents.
In any case, respondents' bare assertions of possession and occupation by their
predecessors-in-interest since 1940 (as testi ed to by Carmencita 1 9 ) or since 1949 (as
testi ed to by Mauricio 2 0 and declared in respondents' application for registration) are
hardly "the well-nigh incontrovertible" evidence required in cases of this nature. Proof of
speci c acts of ownership must be presented to substantiate their claim. They cannot just
offer general statements which are mere conclusions of law than factual evidence of
possession. 2 1 Even granting that the possession by the respondents' parents
commenced in 1940, still they failed to prove that their predecessors-in-interest had been
in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession and occupation of the subject
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 land under a bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership.
The law speaks of possession and occupation. Since these words are separated by
the conjunction and, the clear intention of the law is not to make one synonymous with the
other. Possession is broader than occupation because it includes constructive
possession. When, therefore, the law adds the word occupation, it seeks to delimit the all
encompassing effect of constructive possession. Taken together with the words open,
continuous, exclusive and notorious, the word occupation serves to highlight the fact that
for an applicant to qualify, his possession must not be a mere ction. 2 2 Actual possession
of a land consists in the manifestation of acts of dominion over it of such a nature as a
party would naturally exercise over his own property. 2 3
No evidence on record shows that Spouses Mauricio and Luz Melendez cultivated,
had control over, or used the whole or even a greater portion of the tract of land for
agricultural purposes. 2 4 Moreover, only one tenant worked on the land, and there is no
evidence as to how big was the portion occupied by the tenant. Moreover, there is no
competent proof that the Melendez Spouses declared the land in their name for taxation
purposes or paid its taxes. While tax receipts and declarations are not incontrovertible
evidence of ownership, they constitute, at the least, proof that the holder has a claim of
title over the property. 2 5 The voluntary declaration of a piece of property for taxation
purposes not only manifests one's sincere and honest desire to obtain title to the property,
but also announces an adverse claim against the State and all other interested parties with
an intention to contribute needed revenues to the government. Such an act strengthens
one's bona fide claim of acquisition of ownership. 2 6
The respondents claim that they immediately took possession of the subject land
upon the death of their parents, Mauricio and Luz Melendez, who died on 5 May 1976 and
19 February 1967, respectively, and that they had been religiously paying the taxes thereon.
If that were so, why had they not themselves introduced any improvement on the land? 2 7
We even nd unsubstantiated the claim of Carmencita that they had a tenant on the land.
They did not present any tenant. In any case, we wonder how one tenant could have
cultivated such a vast tract of land with an area of 2.6 hectares.
The records also reveal that the subject property was declared for taxation
purposes by the respondents only for the year 1994. They paid the taxes thereon only for
the years 1990, 1991, 1992, 1994, 1996, and 1997. Being of recent dates, we cannot trust
the assertion of the respondents that they immediately took possession of the property in
the concept of an owner after the death of their parents. While belated declaration of a
property for taxation purposes does not necessarily negate the fact of possession, 2 8 tax
declarations or realty tax payments of property are, nevertheless, good indicia of
possession in the concept of an owner, for no one in his right mind would be paying taxes
for a property that is not in his actual or, at least, constructive possession. 2 9
Likewise, it is noteworthy that none of the respondents reside on the subject
property. Carmencita even admitted that plans of selling the property were at hand. Thus, it
would be rational to conclude that this move for registration is just but a camou age by
smart land speculators who saw in the land applied for expected pro ts from its
existence.
In a nutshell, the respondents did not have in their favor an imperfect title over the
land subject of the application at the time MTC LRC Case No. 06 was led with the trial
court. They failed to prove that (1) Lot 2111 was classi ed as part of the disposable and
alienable agricultural lands of public domain as of 12 June 1945 or earlier; (2) they and
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 their predecessors-in-interest have been in continuous, exclusive, and adverse possession
and occupation thereof in the concept of owners from 12 June 1945 or earlier. HTaIAC

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED, and the decisions of the Court of Appeals of
26 August 2002 in CA-G.R. CV No. 64323 and of the Municipal Trial Court of Cabuyao,
Laguna, of 1 September 1998 in MTC LRC Case No. 06 are hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The land registration case MTC LRC Case No. 06 is hereby ordered DISMISSED.
Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
Panganiban, Ynares-Santiago, Carpio and Azcuna, JJ ., concur.

Footnotes
1. Director of Lands v. IAC, G.R. No. 68946, 22 May 1992, 209 SCRA 214, 231.
2. Per Associate Justice Perlita J. Tria Tirona concurred in by Associate Justices
Buenaventura J. Guerrero and Rodrigo V. Cosico. Rollo, 11-16.
3. Per Judge Zenaida Lubriga Galvez. Rollo, 125-127.
4. In its capacity as Cadastral and Land Registration Court by virtue of Section 34 of the
Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended by R.A. No. 7691, entitled An Act Expanding the
Jurisdiction of the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal
Circuit Trial Courts, Amending for the Purpose Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, Otherwise
Known as the "Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980," which became effective on 15
April 1994 as declared by SC Administrative Circular No. 09-94.
5. Rollo, 58-64.
6. Footnote reference not supplied in the original.
7. Rollo, 97-98.
8. TSN, 17 July 1997, 5-10; Rollo, 105-110.
9. TSN, 20 November 1997, 2-7; Rollo, 115-120.
10. By virtue of Section 34 of B.P. Blg. 129, as amended by R.A. No. 7691, which provides
that decisions of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit
Trial Courts in their capacity as cadastral and land registration courts are appealable in
the same manner as decisions of the Regional Trial Courts.
11. Chan v. Court of Appeals, No. L-27488, 30 June 1970, 33 SCRA 737, 738; Director of
Lands v. IAC, supra note 1, at 221.
12. Samson v. Court of Appeals, No. L-40771, 29 January 1986, 141 SCRA 194, 199;
Municipality of Meycauayan, Bulacan v. IAC, No. L-72126, 29 January 1988, 157 SCRA
640, 642-643.
13. Effective on 22 June 1957.

14. Effective on 25 January 1977.

15. Effective on 11 June 1978.

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 16. Republic v. IAC, No. L-66069, 28 September 1984, 132 SCRA 395, 397; Edaño v. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 83995, 4 September 1992, 213 SCRA 585, 592.
17. TSN, 20 November 1997, 1; Rollo, 114.

18. TSN, 17 July 1997, 1; Rollo, 100.

19. TSN, 20 November 1997, 2; Rollo, 115.
20. TSN, 17 July 1997, 7; Rollo, 107.
21. Republic v. Court of Appeals, No. L-62680, 9 November 1988, 167 SCRA 150, 156.
22. Director of Lands v. IAC, supra note 1, at 222-223.
23. Ramos v. Director of Lands, 39 Phil. 175 (1918); Republic v. Court of Appeals, G.R. Nos.
115747 and 116658, 20 November 2000, 345 SCRA 104, 115.

24. Director of Lands v. Buyco, G.R. No. 91189, 27 November 1992, 216 SCRA 78, 96.
25. Director of Lands v. Reyes, No. L-27594, 28 November 1975, 68 SCRA 177, 194.
26. Director of Lands v. IAC, supra note 1, at 227.
27. Republic v. Court of Appeals, supra note 21, at 157.
28. Republic v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 116372, 18 January 2001, 349 SCRA 451, 462.
29. Republic v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 108926, 12 July 1996, 258 SCRA 712, 720.

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