7/31/2020 G.R. No.

205260

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SECOND DIVISION

July 29, 2019

G.R. No. 205260

C/INSP. RUBEN LIWANAG, SR. y SALVADOR, Petitioner

DECISION

LAZARO-JAVIER, J.:

The Case

This Petition for Review assails the dispositions of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 25943 entitled "People
of the Philippines v. C/Insp. Ruben Liwanag, Sr. y Salvador":

1) Decision1 dated June 27, 2011, affirming petitioner C/Insp. Ruben Liwanag's conviction for falsification of public
document; and

2) Resolution2 dated October 21, 2011, denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration.

The Proceedings Before the Trial Court

The Charge

By Information3 dated November 15, 1996, petitioner C/Insp. Ruben Liwanag, a police officer of the Western Police
District Command, was indicted for falsification of public document, as defined and penalized by Article 171 of the
Revised Penal Code (RPC), viz:

That on or about June 10, 1994, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused being then a police
officer of the Western .Police District Command, this City, and therefore, a public officer, with intent to
cause damage, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and felomously commit acts of falsification of a
public document, in the following manner, to wit: the said accused having somehow obtained
possession of a Temporary Operator's Permit (TOP) No. 02774452-A of the Land Transportation Office
(LTO), Quezon City, an instrumentality of the Republic of the Philippines and, therefore, a public
document which was originally issued to C/Insp[.] Antonio D. Salas of the said Western Police District
Cornman( d), this City, prepared, forged and falsified the said Temporary Operator's Permit (TOP) No.
02774452-A, by then and there filling up or caused to be filled up the blank spaces thereon, among
others, by writing the date , "10 June 94"; the name of the accused's son "RUBEN RUBIO LIWANAG,
JR."; the entry pertaining to the badge no. of the accused which was misdeclared from 04580 to 50480
and leaving the space blank intended for the permit/registration number which should reflect to the
driver's license of said RUBEN RUBIO LIWANAG, [JR.] thereby making it appear, as it did appear, that
said TOP No. 02774452-A dated June 19, 1994 was issued to the latter, when it (sic) truth and in fact
as the said accused fully well knew that the said Temporary Operator's Permit (TOP) is spurious as the
same was not duly authorized to issue the said TOP to RUBEN RUBIO LIWANAG, JR. neither did the
said LTO nor Chief Inspector Antonio D. Salas to whom the said TOP booklet containing the said serial

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number was issued, participate or intervene in the preparation and execution of the said document,
thereby making untruthful statements in a narration of facts which the said accused has the legal
obligation to disclose the truth; that once the said document has been forged and falsified in the
manner above setforth (sic), the son of the accused, said RUBEN RUBIO LIWANAG[,] JR. while driving
a car, Kia Pride with Plate No. PSX 844 was involved in a vehicular accident with Nelia E. Enoc and
Noel Agcopra, introduced and presented the said TOP No. 02774452-A to the PNCC guards, knowing
the same to be spurious, to the damage and prejudice of the said Nelia E. Enoc and Noel Agcopra
and/or public interest.

Contrary to law.

The case was raffled to the Regional Trial Court, Branch 6, Manila. On arraignment, petitioner pleaded
not guilty. 4

Prosecution's Version

On July 3, 1994, a vehicular accident occurred in Bifian, Laguna. Petitioner's son, Ruben Liwanag, Jr. drove a Kia
Pride car which collided with a military jeep driven by Noel Agcopra. Ruben Liwanag, Jr. was not able to present a
valid driver's license but showed Temporary Operator's Permit (TOP) No. 02774452-A instead to the investigating
officer, Conrado Tamayo of the Philippine National Construction Company (PNCC). The TOP showed that it was
issued on June 10, 1994 to "Ruben Rubio Liwanag" who was purportedly born on June 27, 1974. It also appeared
that petitioner issued the TOP to his own son.5

During the investigation, it was discovered that per certification by the Land Transportation Office (LTO), Ruben
Liwanag, Jr. indeed did not have a driver's license. At the time of the accident, Ruben Liwanag, Jr., who was born on
June 27, 1977 according to his birth certificate, was still a minor and was not eligible to hold a driver's license. His
birth date on the TOP, however, was "June 27, 1974."6

In view of the dubious entries on the TOP, Nelia Enoc and Noel Agcopra, owners of the military jeep, filed an
affidavit-complaint for falsification of public document against petitioner, which led to his indictment therefor in court.
7

C/Insp. Antonio Salas, who was also a police officer at the Western Police District Command, testified that when a
driver commits a traffic violation and his driver's license is confiscated by the apprehending officer, a TOP is issued.
TOP permits the violator to drive for the period that his actual license is not in his possession. The TOP is valid for
fifteen days.8

C/Insp. Salas further stated that TOP No. 02774452-A was part of the booklet issued to him by the LTO. He denied
ever issuing the TOP in question and he only came to know of its issuance when the same was traced to have come
from him. In truth, the TOP in question was among the other TOPs which were detached from the LTO booklet
issued to him. He also confirmed that petitioner was a fellow officer at the Western Police District Traffic Command.
He and petitioner used to share a room together at their headquarters and he sometimes forgot to secure his locker
where he kept his TOP booklet.9

The prosecution submitted the following documentary evidence: a) LTO Certification dated November 4, 1994,
certifying that petitioner was not a deputized agent; b) LTO Certification dated August 4, 1994, certifying that TOP
No. 02774452-A was issued to C/Insp. Salas; c) LTO Certification dated August 16, 1994, certifying that Ruben
Liwanag, Jr. who was born on June 29, 1974, was not a licensed driver; and d) Ruben Rubio Liwanag, Jr.'s
certificate of live birth. 10

The Defense's Version

Petitioner admitted that he filled out the TOP but denied issuing it to his son. He only used the TOP as part of his
instructional materials when he lectured on the duties and functions of traffic aides. He was deputized to issue
TOPs, including the one subject of the case. His son had his own driver's license and the TOP was only recovered
from his son's car during the accident. 11

The Trial Court's Ruling

By Decision dated August 24, 2001, the trial court found petitioner guilty as charged. It took into account petitioner's
admission that it was his handwriting and signature which appeared on the TOP. Also, per LTO certification,
petitioner was not authorized to issue TOPs. The TOP in question formed part of the LTO booklet issued to C/Insp.
Salas. Further, petitioner's son was issued a driver's license only on June 13, 1994, three (3) days after the
accident. PNCC investigator Conrado Tamayo categorically testified that petitioner's son himself showed what he
claimed was his TOP in lieu of his supposed driver's license. 12 The trial court decreed:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court finds accused C/INSP. RUBEN LIWANAG, SR. Y
SALVADOR GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of FALSIFICATION OF PUBLIC
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DOCUMENT and hereby sentences him to suffer an indeterminate sentence of FOUR (4) YEARS,
TWO (2) MONTHS AND ONE (1) DAY TO SIX (6)YEARS.

SO ORDERED.13

The Proceedings before the Court of Appeals

On appeal, petitioner faulted the trial court for rendering the verdict of conviction despite the alleged failure of the
prosecution to formally offer the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses. There was no evidence that he illegally
obtained and issued the TOP to his son. The certifications presented by the prosecution were not identified by the
persons who issued them. 14

In refutation, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), countered that petitioner failed to object, hence, was deemed
to have waived any objection to the presentation of Nelia Enoc, Antonio Salas, Noel Ag copra, and Conrado Tamayo
as prosecution witnesses. Besides, through its Order dated May 5, 1999, the trial court had admitted the
prosecution's documentary exhibits and testimonial evidence. 15

The Court of Appeals' Ruling

By its assailed Decision dated June 27, 2011, the Court of Appeals affirmed. It noted that although the transcript of
stenographic notes reveal that the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses were not formally offered, the defense
did not object to their presentation. In fact, the defense counsel even cross-examined the prosecution witnesses. 16

Petitioner moved for reconsideration which the Court of Appeals denied through its assailed Resolution dated
October 21, 2011.

The Present Petition

Petitioner now implores the court to exercise its discretionary appellate jurisdiction to review and reverse the
assailed dispositions of the Court of Appeals. He asserts that he never had any malicious or wrongful intent to injure
a third person, which is an essential element of the offense. His son Ruben Rubio Liwanag, Jr. never used the TOP
which was merely recovered from his car. He merely filled out the TOP on June 10, 1994 only as a visual aid or
educational tool when he gives lectures to traffic enforcers. 17

On the other hand, the OSG submits that the petition raises a factual, not a legal issue. In any event. the trial court's
factual findings, especially affirmed by the Court of Appeals, are binding on this Court. 18

Issue

Did the Court of Appeals err in affirming the verdict of conviction for falsification of public document against
petitioner?

Ruling

The petition lacks merit.

Falsification of a public document is defined and penalized under Article 171 19 of the Revised Penal Code. It
requires the following elements: 1) the offender is a public officer, employee, or notary public; 2) he takes advantage
of his official position; and 3) he falsifies a document by committing any of the aforementioned acts.20

In falsification of public or official documents, the presence of intent to gain or intent to injure a third person is not
necessary. For what is punished is the violation of the public faith and the destruction of the truth as therein
1awp++i1

solemnly proclaimed.21

Here, petitioner was indicted for and convicted of falsification of public document under Article 171 (par. 4) of the
Revised Penal Code because when he issued TOP No. 02774452-A he made untruthful statements in a narration of
facts, i.e. a) he entered his son's name "Ruben Rubio Liwanag, Jr." on the TOP; b) he made a false entry pertaining
to his son's birthdate i.e. June 27, 1974 instead of June 27, 1977 (his son's true birthdate); and c) he altered his
badge number from "04580" to "50480," thus, making it appear that he had authority to issue the subject TOP.22

To be convicted under Article 171(par. 4) of the Revised Penal Code, the following elements must concur: 1) the
offender makes in a public document untruthful statements in a narration of facts; 2) he has a legal obligation to
disclose the truth of the facts narrated by him; and 3) the facts narrated by him are absolutely false. 23

Petitioner does not deny the presence of these elements here. He, nonetheless, insists on his plea that he had no
malicious or wrongful intent to injure a third person. On this score, suffice it to state that intent to gain or intent to
injure is not an element of the crime of falsification of public document. Nor is it a valid defense. Typoco, Jr. v.
People24 is apropos:

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In addition, petitioners argue that damage to the government should have been proven considering that
this was alleged in the Information. We do not agree. In falsification of public or official documents, it is
not necessary that there be present the idea of gain or the intent to injure a third person because in the
falsification of a public document, what is punished is the violation of the public faith and the destruction
of the truth as therein solemnly proclaimed.

The law is clear that wrongful intent on the part of the accused to injure a third person is not an
essential element of the crime of falsification of public document. It is jurisprudentially settled that in the
falsification of public or official documents, whether by public officers or private persons, it is not
necessary that there be present the idea of gain or the intent to injure a third person for the reason that,
in contradistinction to private documents, the principal thing punished is the violation of the public faith
and the destruction of truth as therein solemnly proclaimed. In falsification of public documents,
therefore, the controlling consideration is the public character of a document; and the existence of any
prejudice caused to third persons or, at least, the intent to cause such damage becomes immaterial.

So must it be.

Indeed, absent any showing of any glaring errors, gross misapprehension of facts or unsupported conclusions, the
trial court's findings are accorded the highest respect and conclusiveness especially if affirmed in full by the Court of
Appeals, 25 as in this case.

Lastly, we modify the penalty imposed on petitioner. The trial court imposed the penalty of "FOUR (4) YEARS, TWO
(2) MONTHS AND ONE (1) DAY TO SIX (6) YEARS." This is not correct. Goma v. Court of Appeals26 dictates
what the imposable indeterminate penalty is for the crime of falsification of public document under Article 171 of the
Revised Penal Code if there are no aggravating or mitigating circumstances, thus:

Finally, the penalty imposed by the RTC, as affirmed by the CA, is proper. Art. 171 of the RPC provides
for a single divisible penalty of prision mayor to public officers or employees who, taking advantage of
their official positions, shall cause it to appear that persons have participated in any act or proceeding
when they did not in fact participate. And where neither aggravating nor mitigating circumstance
attended the execution of the offense, as here, the imposable penalty is, according to Art. 64 of the
RPC, that of the medium period provided. The medium period for prision mayor is from eight (8) years
and one (1) day to ten (10) years.

Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the penalty imposable would be that of a degree lower than
the medium period of prision mayor as minimum, and the maximum is any period included in the
medium period of prision mayor. The degree lower than the medium period of prision mayor is the
medium period of prision correccional which ranges from two (2) years, four (4) months, and one (1)
day to four (4) years and two (2) months.

Applying Goma, we sentence petitioner to two (2) years, four (4) months, and one (1) day, as minimum, to eight (8)
years and one (1) day, as maximum.

ACCORDINGLY, the petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision dated June 27, 2011 and Resolution dated October
21, 2011 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 25943 are AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION, sentencing
petitioner C/Insp. Ruben Liwanag, Sr. to two (2) years, four (4) months, and one (1) day, as minimum, to eight (8)
years and one (1) day, as maximum.

SO ORDERED.

Carpio, Senior Associate Justice, (Chairperson), Perlas-Bernabe, Caguioa, and J. Reyes, Jr., JJ., concur.

Footnotes
1
Penned by Associate Justice Danton Q. Bueser with the concurrence of Associate Justices Hakim S.
Abdulwahid and Ricardo R. Rosario, rollo, pp. 40-55.
2
Rollo, pp. 37-38.
3
Id. at 41-42.
4
Id. at 42.
5
Id. at 42-43.
6
Id. at 43.
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7
Id. at 41-42.
8
Id at43.
9
Id. at 43-44.
10
Id. at 44.
11
Id. at 45.
12
Id. at 45-46.
13
Id. at 40-41.
14
Id. at 48-49.
15
Id. at 49.
16
Id. at 51.
17
Id. at 14-17.
18
Id. at 75-91.
19
Article 171. Falsification by public officer, employee or notary or ecclesiastic minister. - The penalty of
prision mayor and a fine not to exceed P5,000 pesos shall be imposed upon any public officer, employee, or
notary who, taking advantage of his official position, shall falsify a document by committing any of the
following acts:

1. Counterfeiting or imitating any handwriting, signature or rubric;

2. Causing it to appear that persons have participated in any act or proceeding when they did not in
fact so participate;

3. Attributing to persons who have participated in an act or proceeding statements other than those in
fact made by them;

4. Making untruthful statements in a narration of facts;

5. Altering true dates;

6. Making any alteration or intercalation in a genuine document which changes its meaning;

7. Issuing in an authenticated form a document purporting to be a copy of an original document when

8. Intercalating any instrument or note relative to the issuance thereof in a protocol, registry, or official
book.

The same penalty shall be imposed upon any ecclesiastical minister who shall commit any of the
offenses enumerated in the preceding paragraphs of this article, with respect to any record or
document of such character that its falsification may affect the civil status of persons.
20
Regidor, Jr. v. People, 598 Phil. 714, 732 (2009).
21
Id.
22
Rollo, pp. 46-47.
23
Galeas v. People, 657 Phil. 500, 520 (2011).
24
G.R. No. 221857, August 16, 2017, 837 SCRA 306, 328-329.
25
See Espino v. Amara, 571 Phil. 210,214 (2008).
26
596Phil. 1, 13-14(2009).

The Lawphil Project - Arellano Law Foundation

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