G.R. No.

179035             April 16, 2008

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee,

vs.
JESUS PAYCANA, JR., appellant.

DECISION

TINGA, J.:

Appellant Jesus Paycana Jr. was charged1 with the complex crime of parricide with unintentional
abortion before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Iriga City, Branch 37. Appellant pleaded not guilty
during the arraignment.2 Pre-trial ensued, in which appellant admitted that the victim Lilybeth
Balandra-Paycana (Lilybeth) is his legitimate wife.3

Appellant sought to exculpate himself from the crime by setting up self-defense, claiming that it was
his wife who attacked him first. In view of the nature of self-defense, it necessarily follows that
appellant admits having killed his seven (7)-month pregnant wife, and in the process put to death
their unborn child.

The prosecution presented Tito Balandra (Tito), the father of the victim; Angelina Paycana
(Angelina), appellant’s eldest daughter who personally witnessed the whole gruesome incident;
Barangay Tanod Juan Parañal, Jr.; Dr. Stephen Beltran, who conducted the autopsy; and Santiago
Magistrado, Jr., the embalmer who removed the fetus from the deceased’s body.

The evidence for the prosecution established that on 26 November 2002, at around 6:30 in the
morning, appellant, who worked as a butcher, came home from the slaughter house carrying his
tools of trade, a knife, a bolo, and a sharpener.4 His wife was preparing their children for school and
was waiting for him to come home from his work. For reasons known to him alone, appellant
stabbed his wife 14 times.5 Tito, whose house is at back of appellant’s house, heard his daughter
shouting for help. When he arrived, he saw his daughter lying prostrate near the door and her feet
were trembling. But seeing appellant, who was armed, he stepped back. Angelina told Tito by the
window that appellant had held her mother’s neck and stabbed her. 6

Appellant claimed that he wrested the weapon from Lilybeth after she stabbed him first. According to
him, they had an altercation on the evening of 25 November 2002 because he saw a man coming
out from the side of their house and when he confronted his wife about the man, she did not answer.
On the following morning, he told her that they should live separately. As appellant got his things and
was on his way out of the door, Lilybeth stabbed him. But he succeeded in wresting the knife from
Lilybeth. And he stabbed her. He added that he was not aware of the number of times he stabbed
his wife because he was then dizzy and lots of blood was coming out of his wound.7

The trial court found appellant guilty in a decision dated 14 April 2005.8 The case was automatically
appealed to the Court of Appeals pursuant to Rule 122 Section 3(d) of the Rules of Criminal
Procedure.9 The appellate court denied appellant’s appeal in a decision dated 30 May
2007.10 Appellant filed a notice of appeal dated 14 June 2007 before the Court of Appeals.11

The Court is not convinced by appellant’s assertion that the trial court erred in not appreciating the
justifying circumstance of self-defense in his favor.
Self-defense, being essentially a factual matter, is best addressed by the trial court.12 In the absence
of any showing that the trial court failed to appreciate facts or circumstances of weight and
substance that would have altered its conclusion, the court below, having seen and heard the
witnesses during the trial, is in a better position to evaluate their testimonies. No compelling reason,
therefore, exists for this Court to disturb the trial court’s finding that appellant did not act in self-
defense.

Appellant failed to discharge the burden to prove self-defense. An accused who interposes self-
defense admits the commission of the act complained of. The burden to establish self-defense is on
the accused who must show by strong, clear and convincing evidence that the killing is justified and
that, therefore, no criminal liability has attached. The first paragraph of Article 11 of the Revised
Penal Code13 requires, in a plea of self-defense, (1) an unlawful aggression on the part of the victim,
(2) a reasonable necessity of the means employed by the accused to prevent or repel it, and (3) the
lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself.14

Unlawful aggression is a condition sine qua non for the justifying circumstance of self-defense.

Without it, there can be no self-defense, whether complete or incomplete, that can validly be
invoked.15 Appellant’s claim of self-defense was belied by the eyewitness testimony of his own
daughter Angelina, which was corroborated by the testimony of his father-in-law Tito and the medical
findings. Angelina’s testimony was very clear on how her father strangled and stabbed her mother
just as she was about to greet him upon arriving home. She begged her father to stop, and even
tried to grab her father’s hand but to no avail.16 Tito ran to appellant’s house as he heard his
daughter Lilybeth’s screaming for help, and he saw her lying prostate near the door with her feet
trembling. He moved back as he saw appellant armed with a weapon. Angelina told him by the
window that appellant had held her mother’s neck and stabbed her.17

Moreover, Dr. Rey Tanchuling, a defense witness who attended to appellant’s wound, testified on
cross-examination that the injuries suffered by appellant were possibly self-inflicted considering that
they were mere superficial wounds.18

In any event, self-defense on the part of appellant is further negated by the physical evidence in the
case. Specifically, the number of wounds, fourteen (14) in all, indicates that appellant's act was no
longer an act of self-defense but a determined effort to kill his victim.19 The victim died of multiple
organ failure secondary to multiple stab wounds.20

The Court agrees with the trial court’s observation, thus:

Angelina who is 15 years old will not testify against her father were it not for the fact that she
personally saw her father to be the aggressor and stab her mother. Telling her grandfather
immediately after the incident that accused stabbed her mother is part of the res
gestae hence, admissible as evidence. Between the testimony of Angelica who positively
identified accused to have initiated the stabbing and continuously stabbed her mother and on
the other hand, the testimony of accused that he killed the victim in self-defense, the
testimony of the former prevails.21

The RTC, as affirmed by the Court of Appeals, properly convicted appellant of the complex crime of
parricide with unintentional abortion in the killing of his seven (7)-month pregnant wife.

Bearing the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death, the crime of parricide22 is committed when: (1) a
person is killed; (2) the deceased is killed by the accused; and (3) the deceased is the father,
mother, or child, whether legitimate or illegitimate, or a legitimate other ascendant or other
descendant, or the legitimate spouse of the accused. The key element in parricide is the relationship
of the offender with the victim. In the case of parricide of a spouse, the best proof of the relationship
between the accused and the deceased would be the marriage certificate. The testimony of the
accused of being married to the victim, in itself, may also be taken as an admission against penal
interest.23

As distinguished from infanticide,24 the elements of unintentional abortion25 are as follows: (1) that

there is a pregnant woman; (2) that violence is used upon such pregnant woman without intending
an abortion; (3) that the violence is intentionally exerted; and (4) that as a result of the violence the
fetus dies, either in the womb or after having been expelled therefrom. In the crime of infanticide, it is
necessary that the child be born alive and be viable, that is, capable of independent
existence.26 However, even if the child who was expelled prematurely and deliberately were alive at
birth, the offense is abortion due to the fact that a fetus with an intrauterine life of 6 months is not
viable.27 In the present case, the unborn fetus was also killed when the appellant stabbed Lilybeth
several times.

The case before us is governed by the first clause of Article 4828 because by a single act, that of
stabbing his wife, appellant committed the grave felony of parricide as well as the less grave felony
of unintentional abortion. A complex crime is committed when a single act constitutes two or more
grave or less grave felonies.

Under the aforecited article, when a single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies
the penalty for the most serious crime shall be imposed, the same to be applied in its maximum
period irrespective of the presence of modifying circumstances. Applying the aforesaid provision of
law, the maximum penalty for the most serious crime (parricide) is death. However, the Court of
Appeals properly commuted the penalty of death imposed on the appellant to reclusion perpetua,
pursuant to Republic Act No. 9346.29

Civil indemnity in the amount of P50,000.00 (consistent with prevailing jurisprudence) is

automatically granted to the offended party, or his/her heirs in case of the former’s death, without
need of further evidence other than the fact of the commission of any of the aforementioned crimes
(murder, homicide, parricide and rape). Moral and exemplary damages may be separately granted in
addition to indemnity. Moral damages can be awarded only upon sufficient proof that the
complainant is entitled thereto in accordance with Art. 2217 of the Civil Code, while exemplary
damages can be awarded if the crime is committed with one or more aggravating circumstances
duly proved. The amounts thereof shall be at the discretion of the courts.30 Hence, the civil indemnity
of P50,000.00 awarded by the trial court to the heirs of Lilybeth is in order. They are also entitled to
moral damages in the amount of P50,000.00 as awarded by the trial court.31

In addition to the civil liability and moral damages, the trial court correctly made appellant account
for P25,000.00 as exemplary damages on account of relationship, a qualifying circumstance, which
was alleged and proved, in the crime of parricide.32

WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.