The second battle around Kulm [Arbesau/Teplitz] (17 September 1813?

) provides

a number of examples of batteries effectively engaging other artillery. During the

3:00pm French attack, a French battery (initially of ten guns, later reinforced), positioned

on a ridge northeast of Schande, drove off the Prussian battery (size unspecified) on the

Horka. The allied artillery (position and quantity unspecified) redoubled its fire,

silencing the French battery supporting the attack (presumably the same one?). The

French then brought more guns forward to continue the engagement (number

unspecified).

Later, during the 3:30pm allied attack, two Austrian batteries were assigned to fire

on the French battery by Schande (presumably the same one as above, is this the same

fire as above?). After the Austrian batteries silenced the French guns they turned their

fire on the French infantry.1

On 5 June 1800, Boudet was attempting to force a crossing of the Po, opposed by

Austrian GM Mosel. Boudet’s troops approached the bridgehead in columns, receiving

canister fire at 800 paces (presumably from the bridgehead, number of guns unspecified),

whence Boudet brought up his guns (number unspecified) and “shelled” the bridgehead.

The Austrians then brought up a battery of 16 guns on the opposite (south) bank that

silenced the French guns. French attempts to storm the bridgehead failed, then the

Austrians withdrew their guns across the river during the night, abandoning the bridge.2

The battle of Marengo (14 June 1800) offers a number of examples of the

effective use of counter-battery fire. During the third Austrian assault, La Marseille’s

1
Nafziger. ...Leipzig. pp. 23-24
2
Hollins. Marengo 1800. Pp.36-37
Austrian battery provided close support (firing canister) as a battalion of Infantry

Regiment (IR) #63 crossed the wet ditch north of Marengo on the backs of some

Pioneers. General Lannes brought up a battery to engage the Austrians. Kaim committed

a reserve battery under Major Perczel to counter Lannes’ move. The batteries exchanged

fire while the Austrian Pioneers completed the crossing.3 After silencing the French

battery, Perczel turned his guns against the Marengo farm, while the rest of IR #63

crossed.4 As Zach followed up the Austrian victory in the first phase of the battle, Desaix

had Marmont collect a battery of sixteen guns (all that remained) north of the main road,

supported by Guenand’s brigade. Zach deployed his three reserve cavalry batteries to fire

on Marmont’s guns (and Guenand’s infantry behind them). Desaix moved Kellerman’s

cavalry to Guenand’s right in support because Marmont was losing the artillery duel.

Marmont’s guns fell back as the Austrian grenadiers moved to the attack (three guns fired

on and disordered the flank battalion of the attack immediately before they withdrew,

preparing the way for Kellerman’s success).5 On this action, David Chandler differs a

little (the battery is 18 guns, counting eight that Boudet had brought to the field instead of

six), He mentions, of the artillery duel, only that Marmont “... opened a heavy fire on the

Austrians for twenty minutes, damaging many enemy guns, and tearing great gaps in the

flank of Zach’s ponderously advancing column.”6 Of the parting shots into the flank

battalion mentioned in Hollins, Chandler adds that (in addition to being four guns instead

of three) that Marmont’s light guns unlimbered in order to fire,7 which would be

consistent with the withdrawal of his battery as in Hollins.

3
Hollins. Marengo 1800. P. 69
4
ibid. p. 71
5
ibid. pp. 88-89
6
Chandler. Campaigns... pp. 294-295
7
ibid p. 296
 Jomini comments that ”It should be borne in mind that the chief office of all

artillery in battles is to overwhelm the enemy’s troops, and not to reply to their batteries.

It is, nevertheless, often useful to fire at the batteries, in order to attract their fire. A third

of the disposable artillery may be assigned this duty, but two-thirds at least should be

directed against the infantry and cavalry of the enemy.”8

On 18 August 1812 the Bavarian battalion (7th Line Infantry Regiment) in which

Franz Joseph Hausmann served was assigned to cover two batteries positioned behind the

Polota (a stream). The action began at about eight o’clock in the morning. These well-

placed batteries were causing a great deal of damage in the Russian army (as observed by

Hausmann), so the Russians deployed twenty guns against them. Hausmann said that this

was all of their artillery. He describes a “stiff cannonading” lasting until four o’clock in

the afternoon. He says that in support of the battery his brigade [the second in its

division] was very lucky, losing only six wounded (five by musketry) while the 3rd

Regiment’s loss was “very insignificant” as well. The 2nd and 6th Regiments [the

division’s first brigade] lost about 200 men each.9

According to Philipp Coates-Wright, Gouvion St.-Cyr opened the action around

three o’clock in the afternoon. Wrede’s division (of which the 7th Regiment was a part)

carried the right of Spas, while Deroy’s division took the village supported by a battery of

thirty guns.10

8
Jomini p. 317
9
Hausmann p. 149
10
Coates-Wright “’The Owl’ – Gouvion St.-Cyr” in Chandler (ed.) Napoleon’s Marshals. P. 133
 Early on the morning of 6 October 1813 Oberst Desfours led a small force

towards Penig by way of Hartmannsdorf. He had one infantry battalion (of which he

detached one company as a reserve), four squadrons of chevaulegers and two guns

(horse[?] artillery). His leading cavalry squadron drove in a Polish cavalry outpost on ist

way to the Galgenberg heights south of Penig which were occupied by Polish infantry

supported by two guns. Hauptmann Heim (of the general staff) sent the thrid rank of the

infantry against the Poles as skirmishers and brought up the two guns and infantry

reserve. One of the Polish guns was quickly dismounted by the Austrian artillery.

Combined with the Austrian skitmishers protected by cavalry (preventing the Polish

cavalry from driving the skirmishers off) the Poles found their position untenable and

withdrew beyond Penig. Desfours did not believe he could hold Penig (due to more

Polish troops on nearby heights) and recalled his skirmishers that had been advancing.11

Winder at Cedar Mountain (ACW)

“General Winder saw fit to turn his personal attention to getting supporting artillery into

firing positions, rather than hurrying his third brigade into a position on his left flank ...

He had observed enemy batteries moving to position from which they could pose a real

threat to his deploying brigades. ... Another part of his immediate concern was the all too

evident fact that an intense artillery “duel” was in progress, and incoming enemy rounds

were already beginning to fall uncomfortably close to Poague’s battery, which Winder

was overseeing at the time.” He was observing fire while directing a sections fire when

he was wounded by a shell (mortally).12

11
Nafziger, Leipzig pp.71-72.
12
Wood, W. J. Civil War Generalship, The Art of Command. (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press. 1997,
reprint by Da Capo Press. 2000.) p. 58
 In Masséna’s orders for the attack at Bussaco he specified what the artillery of

each of his three corps would do. While the 2me Corps attacked the enemy’s right “Its

artillery will be disposed in a manner to be able to counter-batter that of the enemy, and

to serve it as a point of support.” The 6me Corps artillery would be placed to “in different

positions, to be able to support at need.” Ney’s Corps was to be waiting to march on the

convent of Bussaco until Reynier was “master of the heights.” Ney was to press his

attack if he saw that the enemy was advancing to make a movement on Reynier or make

a movement of retreat. The 8me Corps was to take position and make its dispositions to

support the attacking corps as needed. Its artillery was to be “placed in a manner to stop

the enemy if he makes a movement forward.”13

At Rossbach (5 November 1757) Prussian Colonel Moller placed twelve 12-

pounders, four short 24-pounders and two howitzers on the Janus Hill to bear on the

allied flank march.14 At 3:15 Moller opened fire on the allied cavalry. The allied high

command assumed that it was to cover the Prussian retreat. The fire paused at 3:30 as the

Prussian cavalry came over the ridge to attack.15 After the Prussians won the extended

cavalry battle Seydlitz disengaged his cavalry and began to reassemble it.16 Frederick

extended his infantry line to cross the “T” of the allied infantry columns which continued

their march. Moller had brought his battery down to support the line. The approaching

French never did deploy from their marching columns. Prussian infantry shredded the

leading regiments, while Moller’s battery fired down the length of the column (from its

front) while more Prussian heavy artillery in front of Lunstädt fired on the left flank of
13
reproduced in Oman, vol. 3 p. 549
14
Duffy Prussia’s Glory p. 74
15
Duffy PG 76-77
16
Duffy PG 79
the French columns. The allied reply was ineffective. They had about thirty heavy guns

that had to be brought through the left column of infantry to bear, then they were

scattered in seven batteries. The ground was such that only the tops of the Prussians’

wheels were visible and the allies were firing against high ground at extreme elevation.17

In siege operations at Schweidnitz (October-November 1757) Duffy relates that

“the first phase of the seige followed an entirely conventional course, whereby ground

was won towards the fortress by successive parallels (support lines) and zig-zags

(approach trenches). At the same time batteries of heavy cannon were planted with the

purpose of beating down the enemy artillery, and only at a later stage would it be possible

to bring them much closer and smash open breaches in the ramparts.”18

At Breslau Prince Charles presented Maria-Theresa’s suggestion about how to

drive Bevern out of his entrenched camp at Breslau. She recommended that they use the

same methods as at Liegnitz: drive the Prussians out of the outlying villages and redoubts

with accurate artillery fire, then a show of force would cause them to quit their position.

His generals responded that Liegnitz had been a different situation. Feuerstein argued

that at Liegnitz all of the Austrian forces were ready to exploit the artillery success,

whereas at Breslau they were “‘acting from a considerable distance.’”19

When the Austrians opened their attack on Breslau (22 November 1757), they had

dug nine batteries the night before. Eight of those batteries were to “open the way for the

attack” with 10 24-pounders and thirty-six 12-pounders. This bombardment, that began

at 9:45 in the morning, “caused useful damage among the redoubts nearest the Lohe,” but

little harm in the fortified villages. After an hour the Austrians threw seven pontoon

17
Duffy PG 80-81
18
Duffy PG 111
19
Duffy PG 114-15
bridges across the Lohe (taking 45 minutes to do it), covered by their batteries.

Cuirassiers that threatened the bridgehead were driven off by the grenadiers’ (who had

crossed) musketry and canister (source unspecified, the covering batteries?). The

Prussians brought heavy fire (artillery?) on the crossings “in spite of the counter-fire from

a particularly large Austrian battery.” After the Prussian infantry had been driven out of

Gräbschen the battalion of de Ligne came under converging fire from a nearby redoubt

and a battery near a windmill. Lieutenant Przezina brought up eight guns to fire on the

windmill battery. In the duel the Prussian guns were silenced and all of the Austrian

artillerists were killed or wounded.20

At Leuthen (5 December 1757) the Austrians (who had left most of their heavy

artillery in the fortified camp at Breslau) scattered their available heavy artillery in four

batteries along their main frontage (facing west) and a fifth (facing south) in front of

Nádasdy’s corps.21 While the Austrian high command was oblivious to the purpose of

the Prussian flank march, Württemberg Colonel Nicolai realized what was going to be

coming at them. He watched the Prussian army deploy into line and bring about forty

guns into the intervals between battalions. The Wurttembergers had only a few

regimental pieces to match them.22 With the advance guard and immediate right wing of

the main army, which were to make the attack on the Wurttembergers, were ten

brummers (fortress 12-pounders) to its right as close fire support. The rest of the

Prussian heavy artillery was divided into four mixed batteries of 12-pounders and

howitzers, one on each flank of the infantry and two in front of the first line.23 As the

Meyerinck regiment drove the Croats from the woods behind Schriegwitz, the Brummers
20
Duffy PG 118-119
21
Duffy PG 141
22
Duffy PG 147
23
Duffy PG 149-150
were moving up the Glanz-Berg to its left.24 According to Colonel Nicolai, after the

Croats had fled through the Wurttembergers, the Wurttemberg artillery opened fire

around 12:30 (Duffy suggests that it was later), and “drew in return a hail of Prussian

cannon shot and canister, which not only put both of our regimental pieces out of action

(we had nothing heavier), but demoralised [sic] our men totally.”25 The Brummer battery

continued in action from the Glanz-Berg, cannonading the fleeing Wurttembergers and

Bavarians, and firing “over the heads of the Meyerinck regiment and down the length of

Nádasdy’s Austrian infantry behind.” The effects of its fire reached to the second line

and prevented the Austrians from rallying there.26

On the Prussian left, Colonel Moller concentrated 50-60 guns on the Juden-Berg,

and brought them forward with the leading infantry. When in range they “‘invariably

brought a superior fire against the point which had been selected for the attack.’” Duffy

suggests that this concentration was made up of the battery from the left wing and the two

from the center. These guns kept up their fire during the advance and kept pace with the

advancing infantry. The Austrians had too many of their heavy guns deployed out of

reach on their right flank “to be able to respond in kind,” but did redeploy the two

batteries from west and northwest of Sagschütz to the Kirch-Berg behind it, where

Nádasdy’s shaken infantry masked their fire. A new Prussian attack broke the infantry

and captured the guns. The Prussians brought their guns forward from the Juden-Berg to

the Kirch-Berg and added the battery of Brummers from the right of the Advance

Guard.27

24
Duffy PG 151
25
Duffy PG 152
26
Duffy PG 155
27
Duffy PG 155-156
 The Austrian reserve, having been sent north originally, doubled back to face the

new threat to the south. They passed to the east of Leuthen and formed up south of it

under fire of roundshot and canister (source unspecified).28 The reserve was withdrawn

to the windmill hill north of Leuthen while another two brigades were brought from the

right (northern) end of the first line. An officer (cited by Duffy) reported that there was

great disorder among the German auxiliaries and the Austrians who had tried to relieve

them (the reserve) “Things were made worse because the heavy cannon and the

ammunition carts to our front came under fire from howitzer shells and mortar bombs as

well as cannon shot, and they fell back at great speed, reducing our regiment to chaos.”29

The Prussians used their field artillery to breach the churchyard wall in support of

the infantry attack. After the Austrians had fallen back from the village the Prussian

advance out of the village was disrupted by the ditch along the northern edge of the

gardens. Austrian artillery was massed for the first time on the windmill hill where it

bore on the Prussian left wing. Frederick’s observation point in the Radaxdorfer Goy (a

small wood) was “caught in the cross-fire between the Austrian artillery and a number of

pieces which … Prince Ferdinand brought up to the Prussian centre. The king had to

send word to Ferdinand to desist until he could find another viewpoint.”30

In The Military Experience in the Age of Reason, Duffy said that before the

Seven Years War artillery was not particularly important in field battles, but became

more so in every campaign during it. He cites attacking infantry “massacred under the

guns” at Kolin (1757), Liegnitz (1760) and Torgau in the East. In the West, at Bergen

28
Duffy PG 157
29
Duffy PG 158
30
Duffy PG 161-164
(13 April, 1759) the French were able to repel Ferdinand of Brunswick’s attacks

primarily because “he was totally outgunned and had no means of driving the French

from their positions.” By Minden (1 August 1759) Ferdinand had increased his artillery

so that he had superiority and was able to “beat… down the French artillery and

slaughter… their infantry and horse.”31

In both theaters, Duffy says, “confrontations between armies sometimes

developed into cannonades which lasted for hours at a stretch,” citing Waldenburger-

Gebirge (17 September 1760) and Amöneburg (21 September 1762). He sees a basic

change in the relationship between artillery and the other arms, and quotes Frederick’s

Testament Politique of 1768 that “artillery does everything, and the infantry can no

longer come to grips with cold steel.”32 Duffy attributes this change to

militarization/professionalization of the gunners and the introduction of artillery systems

that reduced the weight of the guns and improved their mobility.33

Duffy cites Nockern de Schorn (1783) on the best deployment and use of artillery

in the field. Large batteries (of medium and heavy guns) should be used set up a cross-

fire. On the offensive they should be used to “‘overthrow… lengths of the enemy line

and make… gaps therein. On the defensive they sweep extensive areas of ground, and

beat and defend the approaches and avenues along which the enemy must advance. … try

to take up positions from where you may take the enemy in enfilade and in the rear, so

that you take them under an oblique fire and torment them from every side.’” Low hills

were preferable for batteries because offered a wide field of fire and allowed them to

make best use of grazing fire.34

in Duffy) expected it to take three rounds to find the range. The first shots were usually

the most effective. “Guns were clean and cool, and loaded and aimed by gunners who

were out of reach of the enemy musketry.” Frederick (in 1782) expected artillery officers

to come under pressure from infantry officers (usually of higher rank) to open fire early.

In his instructions he said that if a general ordered it they had to obey, but should fire

slowly and aim very carefully so that the shots would not be wasted.35

In describing the types of rounds that the British artillery used Mercer says that

the French hated shrapnel shell because “they could not reply to it.” Twelve pounders

had longer range than the English artillery, but could not compete with shrapnel at 800

yards. “A simple shrapnel-shell had been known to kill every horse in a gun team, even

at long range.” 36 At Genappe he engaged “a French battery effectively with ‘spherical

case’ – otherwise shrapnel.” After he ran out of ammunition he left the fight to the rocket

troop.37 Interesting observation, having nothing to do with counter battery, in a narrow

road the battery countermarched by unlimbering.38 Mercer says that Sir Augustus Frazer

intended the five nine-pounder horse artillery batteries to be used as a grand battery in

reserve, but that they ended up being dispersed to various cavalry brigades instead,

though he did not end up joining his division until after the battle.39

At Nivelle, with sounds of battle in the distance, Mercer’s troop lit their slow

matches and loaded the powder charges in their guns, held in by priming wires in the

35
Duffy ME 235
36
Mercer xiii (intro by Fortescue)
37
Mercer (Fortescue) xv
38
Mercer 61
39
Mercer 87
vents, but kept the shot itself in their “leathern cartouches” then moved on, “ready for

immediate action.”40

At one point during the retreat, Mercer was left behind without orders as the

hussar pickets withdrew. On his own authority he retired across the “little dip” between

his battery and Vandeleur’s brigade, taking up a position in front of it. He intended to be

able to fire (“a round”) at the French as they attacked, then withdraw through the

intervals in Vandeleur’s brigade. Vandeleur was upset that Mercer was blocking his front

so that he could not charge and ordered the guns out of the way. Uxbridge came by,

asked Mercer if he could clear the front after firing, and when so assured overruled

Vandeleur.41

40
Mercer 136
41
Mercer 146-147