Matalam v. The 2nd Division of the Sandiganbayan, et al., G.R. No.

165751, April
12, 2005
Crim Pro - Rule 110

Facts:
On November 15, 2004, Datu Guimid Matalam, the Vice-Governor of Cotabato City and
the Regional Secretary of DAR, and other low-ranking public officials were charged with
violation of Section 3(e) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. Allegedly, Matalam
illegally and unjustifiably refused to pay the monetary claims of several employees of the
DAR. Later, the Information was amended charging him of illegally dismissing from the
service the complaining employees. He then insisted that he is entitled to a new
preliminary investigation.

Issue: Whether or not Matalam is entitled to a preliminary investigation since he was not
informed that he is being charged for the alleged dismissal of the complaining witnesses.

Held: Yes. According to the SC, if the petitioner is not to be given a new PI for the
amended charge, his right will definitely be prejudiced because he will be denied his right
to present evidence to show or rebut evidence regarding the element of evident bad faith
and manifest partiality on the alleged dismissal. He will be denied due process. Although
the charge remained the same, which is violation of Sec. 3 (e) of RA 3019 as amended,
the prohibited act allegedly committed changed, that is, failure to pay monetary claims to
illegal dismissal, and he was not given the opportunity to submit his evidence on the
absence or presence of evident bad faith and manifest partiality as to the illegal dismissal.
Accused has not waived his right to a new PI and in fact asked for one.
[G.R. NO. 165751. April 12, 2005]

DATU GUIMID P. MATALAM, Petitioners, v. THE SECOND DIVISION OF THE

SANDIGANBAYAN and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.

RESOLUTION

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

Before Us is a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules on Civil Procedure
assailing the resolutions1 of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. 26381, admitting
the Amended Information2 and denying petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration,3 dated
12 January 2004 and 03 November 2004, respectively.

An information dated 15 November 2004 was filed before the Sandiganbayan charging
petitioner Datu Guimid Matalam, Habib A. Bajunaid, Ansari M. Lawi, Muslimin Unga
and Naimah Unte with violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended,
for their alleged illegal and unjustifiable refusal to pay the monetary claims of Kasan I.
Ayunan, Abdul E. Zailon, Esmael A. Ebrahim, Annabelle Zailon, Pendatun Mambatawan,
Hyria Mastura and Faizal I. Hadil. The accusatory portion of the information reads:

That from the period January 1998 to June 1999, in Cotabato City, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the accused ARMM Vice-Governor and Regional
Secretary, DAR, DATU GUIMID MATALAM, a high ranking public official, HABIB A.
BAJUNAID, ANSARI M. LAWI, MUSLIMIN UNGA and NAIMAH UNTE, all low-
ranking public officials, committing the offense while in the performance of their official
duties and taking advantage of their public position, conspiring, confederating and
mutually aiding one another, did there and then, willfully, unlawfully and criminally,
cause undue injury to several employees of the Department of Agrarian Reform, cotabato
City, thru evident bad faith in the performance of their official duties to wit: by illegally
and unjustifiably refusing to pay the monetary claims of the complaining DAR
employees namely: KASAN I. AYUNAN, ABDUL E. ZAILON, ESMAEL A.
EBRAHIM, ANNABELLE ZAILON, PENDATUN MAMBATAWAN, HYRIA
MASTURA and FAIZAL I. HADIL, for the period of January 1998 to June 1999
amounting to P1,606,788.50 as contained in Civil Service Resolutions Nos. 982027 and
990415 in the nature of unpaid salaries during the period when they have been illegally
terminated, including salary differentials and other benefits.4

On 14 August 2002, petitioner filed a Motion for Reinvestigation.

Per order of the court, a reinvestigation of the case was conducted where petitioner filed
his Counter-Affidavit.5

After the reinvestigation, the public prosecutor filed a "Manifestation and Motion to
Admit Amended Information Deleting the Names of Other Accused Except Datu Guimid
Matalam"6 to which petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss and Opposition to the Motion to
Admit the Alleged Amended Information Against the Accused Guimid P. Matalam.7
Thereafter, the public prosecutor filed his Reply8 to which petitioner filed a Rejoinder.

The Amended Information reads:

That on December 16, 1997 and for sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in cotabato
City, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above named accused a
public officer being then the ARMM Vice-Governor and Regional Secretary DAR,
committing the offense while in the performance of his official duties and thru evident
bad faith and manifest partiality did there and then, willfully, unlawfully and criminally,
cause undue injury by illegally dismissing from the service complaining DAR-
Maguindanao employees, cotabato City, namely: Kasan I. Ayunan, Abdul E. Zailon,
Annabelle Zailon, Pendatum Mambatawan, Hyria Mastura and Faizal I. Hadil, to their
damage and prejudice amounting to P1,606,788.50 by way of unpaid salaries during the
period when they have been illegally terminated including salary differentials and other
benefits.9

In his Motion to Dismiss, petitioner alleged that the amended information charges an
entirely new cause of action. The corpus delicti of the amended information is no longer
his alleged refusal to pay the backwages ordered by the Civil Service Commission, but
the alleged willful, unlawful and illegal dismissal from the service of the complaining
witnesses. He insists that the amended information charging a separate and entirely
different offense cannot be admitted because there would be a serious violation of due
process of law. He claims he is entitled to a preliminary investigation since he was not
informed that he is being charged for the alleged dismissal of the complaining witnesses
and that he was not given the opportunity to explain.

On 12 January 2004, the Sandiganbayan granted the Manifestation and Motion to Admit
Amended Information Deleting the Names of Other Accused Except Datu Guimid P.
Matalam. It admitted the Amended Information charging solely petitioner for Violation of
Section 3(e) of Rep. Act No. 3019. The court a quo ruled:

What seems to be more crucial here is, whether the amendments made are not prejudicial
to the rights of the accused and are considered as a matter of form only, so that, if the
Amended Information is admitted, there would be no need to require the Public
Prosecutor to conduct another preliminary investigation in the observance of the rights of
the accused to due process. On the other hand, if the amendment would be substantial,
necessarily, another preliminary investigation should be accorded to the accused.
Distinction of the two is thus imperative.

...

The Amended Information charges essentially the same offense as that charged in the
original Information which is a Violation of Sec. 3(e) of R.A. 3019. Theoretically,
therefore, the amendment is a matter of form only.
Interestingly, however, the change in the recital of cause of action in the Amended
Information is very much noticeable. As correctly pointed out by accused Matalam, the
corpus delicti in the original Information was the alleged willful and confederated refusal
of the accused to pay the backwages of the complaining witnesses. The corpus delicti in
the Amended Information is now altered into the alleged illegal dismissal of the
complainants from their service by accused Matalam. Certainly, the two causes of action
differ differently from each other.

Following the aforementioned principles laid down by the Supreme Court, the
amendments seem to be substantial considering that the main defense of all the accused
in the original information - the lack of a corresponding appropriation for the payment of
the monetary claims of the complaining witnesses - would not, in itself alone, stands [sic]
as a defense for accused Matalam in the Amended Information anymore. In the same
manner, the evidence that accused Matalam would have to present in the original
Information, had it not been found to be without prima facie evidence, will not be equally
available to bail him out in the Amended Information anymore. And further, although the
nature of the offense charged has not changed, the theory of the case as against accused
Matalam is now deemed to have been changed because the cause of action now varies
and therefore, he would have to formulate another defense again.

However, after making a meticulous and independent assessment on the evidence

obtaining on record, this Court agrees with the findings and recommendation of the
Public Prosecutor that the real and exact issue in this case is actually the alleged illegal
dismissal of the complaining witnesses. The issue of non-payment of their backwages is
merely incidental because had it not been for the alleged illegal dismissal, their demand
for monetary claims should have not arisen. Put in another perspective, the surrounding
circumstances that brought about the issue of the alleged illegal dismissal were actually
the ones that spewed the issue of unpaid backwages.

Furthermore, as correctly observed by the Public Prosecutor, the change in the recital of
the cause of action does not conceivably come as a surprise to the accused. In fact, in his
counter-affidavit submitted before the Public Prosecutor, accused Matalam already took
the occasion to elaborate his version on the surrounding circumstances that brought about
the alleged illegal dismissal of the complaining witnesses. And these chain of
circumstances, actually, were the very preceding circumstances as to why the
complaining witnesses had suffered their alleged injury. The need for another preliminary
investigation is therefore not necessary.

Given the foregoing factual milieu, the rights of accused Matalam are not, after all, in any
way prejudiced because an inquiry to the allegations in the original cause of action would
certainly and necessarily elicit substantially the same facts to the inquiry of the
allegations in the new cause of action contained in the Amended Information.

To remand this case again to the Public Prosecutor would certainly be a waste of time
considering that accused, in his counter-affidavit, had already explained extensively his
defense on the new allegations contained in the Amended Information sought to be
admitted. And definitely, his projected defense would be the same assuming that another
preliminary investigation be conducted and that he would be required to submit another
counter-affidavit again.10

On 11 February 2004, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration11 which the

prosecution opposed.12 On 03 November 2004, the Sandiganbayan denied the Motion.13
It explained:

While it is true that accused-movant's defense in the original information could not by
itself stand alone as his defense to the amended one, however, the same would still be
available for the latter because although the two questioned causes of action literally
varied, they are nonetheless interrelated with each other. The essential ingredients of the
amended information are actually identical with those constituting the original, such that,
the inquiry into one would elicit substantially the same facts that an inquiry into the other
would reveal. And since these two causes of action had emanated from the same set of
factual settings, the evidence that accused-movant might have under the original
information would still be available and applicable to the amended one.

Be it noted that the private complainants lodged their complaint due to the alleged injury
they suffered as a consequence of the alleged refusal of the accused-movant to pay them
of their backwages. And notably, based on the affidavit that the accused-movant had
submitted, his defense to this was due to the lack of funds appropriated for the said
purpose. But why was there no appropriation? Because, allegedly, the private
complainants were illegally dismissed from their service and as a result thereof, their
names were subsequently stricken off from the roster of employees in the government
agency where they were connected.

Culled from these factual settings, the root cause of the alleged injury suffered by the
private complainants would therefore be their alleged illegal dismissal from the service.
Otherwise, their names would not have been stricken off from the roster of employees in
the agency which they were connected with and the appropriation for the payment of
their salaries would have been continuously made.

Thus, from the foregoing, although there was a change in the recital of the cause of action
(from non-payment of backwages into illegal dismissal), the amendment of the
information did not however affect or alter the nature of the offense that was originally
charged. Neither did it change the basic theory of the prosecution since this remained to
be a violation of Sec. 3(e) of R.A. 3019 on account of the alleged injury caused to the
private complainants. And even if the prosecution's theory would now be premised on the
new cause of action (illegal dismissal), this would not however cause surprise to the
accused-movant nor would require him to undergo a material change or modification in
his defense because in presenting his defense, he still has to commence from the very
same set of factual settings that preceded the original cause of action. And evidently, this
is the reason why in the affidavit he submitted during the reinvestigation, his discussions
therein consisted not only of his defense to the original information but also included an
extensive discussion regarding his defense to the amended one.
This being so, the outright admission of the amended information even without affording
the accused-movant a new preliminary investigation did not amount to a violation of his
rights. To afford him another process of preliminary investigation would no longer serve
him and this court any better considering that he had already explained in the said
affidavit his defense to the amended information. Otherwise, if he is allowed to submit
another one, he is likely to elaborate again the very same arguments that he had already
invoked in his previous affidavit.

Hence, this petition.

Petitioner argues that the resolutions of the Sandiganbayan dated 12 January 2004 and 03
November 2004 admitting the Amended Information charging a new offense without
conducting a preliminary investigation were issued without jurisdiction and/or with grave
abuse of jurisdiction amounting to lack of jurisdiction.

From the arguments raised by petitioner, the issue boils down to whether or not petitioner
was deprived of due process of law when the Sandiganbayan admitted the Amended
Information without conducting another or new preliminary investigation. Firstly,
petitioner maintains that a new preliminary investigation should have been ordered
because the corpus delicti in the Amended Information is the termination of services of
the complaining witnesses, while the corpus delicti in the Original Information is the
alleged refusal to pay the backwages of the complaining witnesses. In other words, there
being a new and distinct offense, he should be entitled to a new preliminary investigation.
Secondly, he contends he was denied due process when the Sandiganbayan ruled that if
"he were allowed to submit another counter-affidavit, he is likely to elaborate again the
very same argument that he had invoked in his previous affidavit" considering that he
would have pointed out certain facts not contained in his counter-affidavit. He added that
despite the finding of the Sandiganbayan that "the theory of the case against him changed
because the cause of action varies, and that he would have to formulate another defense,"
the Sandiganbayan did not remand the case to the public prosecutor for preliminary
investigation because it was a waste of time since he had already explained extensively in
his counter-affidavit his defense on the new allegations contained in the Amended
Information. Thirdly, he asserts he was not given the opportunity to show that he did not
act with manifest partiality and evident bad faith in the dismissal of the seven employees
inasmuch as there are other factors and circumstances that would support his posture.

In its Comment, respondent People of the Philippines, thru the Office of the Special
Prosecutor, stated that the admission of the Amended Information without another
preliminary investigation would not violate petitioner's right to due process on the ground
that the amendment is merely formal, and to require another preliminary investigation
would not be in obedience to, but in disregard of, the prime purpose for which a
preliminary investigation is ordained by law and jurisprudence. It maintains that
petitioner acted with evident bad faith and manifest partiality in illegally terminating the
complainants from service.
On 10 March 2005, petitioner filed his Reply.14

The initial question to be resolved is what kind of amendment was made in the
Information?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

Section 14 of Rule 110 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure provides:

SEC. 14. Amendment or substitution. - A complaint or information may be amended, in

form or in substance, without leave of court, at any time before the accused enters his
plea. After the plea and during the trial, a formal amendment may only be made with
leave of court and when it can be done without causing prejudice to the rights of the
accused.

However, any amendment before plea, which downgrades the nature of the offense
charged in or excludes any accused from the complaint or information, can be made only
upon motion by the prosecutor, with notice to the offended party and with leave of court.
The court shall state its reasons in resolving the motion and copies of its order shall be
furnished all parties, especially the offended party.

Before the accused enters his plea, a formal or substantial amendment of the complaint or
information may be made without leave of court. After the entry of a plea, only a formal
amendment may be made but with leave of court and if it does not prejudice the rights of
the accused. After arraignment, a substantial amendment is proscribed except if the same
is beneficial to the accused.15

A substantial amendment consists of the recital of facts constituting the offense charged
and determinative of the jurisdiction of the court. All other matters are merely of form.16

The following have been held to be merely formal amendments: (1) new allegations
which relate only to the range of the penalty that the court might impose in the event of
conviction; (2) an amendment which does not charge another offense different or distinct
from that charged in the original one; (3) additional allegations which do not alter the
prosecution's theory of the case so as to cause surprise to the accused and affect the form
of defense he has or will assume; (4) an amendment which does not adversely affect any
substantial right of the accused;17 (5) an amendment that merely adds specifications to
eliminate vagueness in the information and not to introduce new and material facts, and
merely states with additional precision something which is already contained in the
original information and which adds nothing essential for conviction for the crime
charged.18

The test as to whether a defendant is prejudiced by the amendment has been said to be
whether a defense under the information as it originally stood would be available after the
amendment is made, and whether any evidence defendant might have would be equally
applicable to the information in the one form as in the other. An amendment to an
information which does not change the nature of the crime alleged therein does not affect
the essence of the offense or cause surprise or deprive the accused of an opportunity to
meet the new averment had each been held to be one of form and not of substance.19

In the case at bar, the amendment was indeed substantial. The recital of facts constituting
the offense charged was definitely altered. In the original information, the prohibited act
allegedly committed by petitioner was the illegal and unjustifiable refusal to pay the
monetary claims of the private complainants, while in the amended information, it is the
illegal dismissal from the service of the private complainants. However, it cannot be
denied that the alleged illegal and unjustifiable refusal to pay monetary claims is related
to, and arose from, the alleged illegal dismissal from the service of the private
complainants.

According to Retired Senior Associate Justice Florenz D. Regalado, before the plea is
taken, the information may be amended in substance and/or form, without leave of court;
but if amended in substance, the accused is entitled to another preliminary investigation,
unless the amended charge is related to or is included in the original charge.20

Thus, the rule is: Before or after a plea, a substantial amendment in an information
entitles an accused to another preliminary investigation. However, if the amended
information contains a charge related to or is included in the original information, a new
preliminary investigation is not required.

The Sandiganbayan and the public prosecutor maintain that petitioner is not entitled to a
new preliminary investigation because the charges in the original information and
amended information are related and the latter has already presented his defense on the
amended charge. Further, remanding the case to the Public Prosecutor for another
preliminary investigation would be a waste of time considering that petitioner had already
explained extensively his defense on the new allegations contained in the Amended
Information, that is, the accused already elaborated his version on the surrounding
circumstances that brought about the alleged dismissal of the complaining witnesses. It
added that the change in the recital of the cause of action will not come as a surprise to
the accused because the causes of action, though different, are nonetheless interrelated,
and that the rights of the accused will not be prejudiced since the inquiry to the
allegations in the original information will certainly and necessarily elicit substantially
the same facts to the inquiry of the allegations in the Amended Information.

On the other hand, petitioner insists he should be given a new preliminary investigation
because he was not, among other things, given the opportunity to show that he did not act
with manifest partiality and evident bad faith in the dismissal of the private complainants.

While it is true that the charges in the original and amended informations are related, i.e.,
an inquiry into one would have elicited substantially, if not precisely, the same facts that
an inquiry into the other would have brought into light,21 this fact should not necessarily
deprive an accused to his right to a new preliminary investigation. As above-stated, the
rule is that a new preliminary investigation is needed if there is a substantial amendment.
The exception, i.e., charge is related or included in the original information, should not be
applied automatically. The circumstances in every case must be taken into consideration
before the accused is deprived of another preliminary investigation.

The following indispensable elements must be established to constitute a violation of

Section 3(e) of Rep. Act No. 3019, as amended:

1. The accused is a public officer discharging administrative or official functions or

private persons charged in conspiracy with them;

2. The public officer committed the prohibited act during the performance of his official
duty in relation to his public position;

3. The public officer acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable
negligence; andcralawlibrary

4. His action caused undue injury to the government or any private party, or gave any
party any unwarranted benefit, advantage or preference to such parties.22

The third element of the offense states that the public officer acted with manifest
partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence in committing the prohibited
act. Admittedly, the alleged illegal dismissal contained in the amended charge gave rise to
the original charge of failure to pay the monetary claims of private complainants. It
cannot be disputed that petitioner already discussed circumstances surrounding the
termination of services of the private complainants in his counter-affidavit. However, we
find nothing therein that would show that he had already touched the issue of evident bad
faith or manifest partiality. As can be gathered from the counter-affidavit, there were
arguments tending to counter the presence of evident bad faith, manifest partiality or
gross inexcusable negligence, but the same refer to the allegation of failure to pay the
monetary claims and not to the alleged illegal dismissal. Although one allegation
stemmed from the other, the court a quo and the public prosecutor cannot say the element
of evident bad faith, manifest partiality or gross inexcusable negligence is the same in
both. This being an element of the offense charged, petitioner should be given the
opportunity to thoroughly adduce evidence on the matter.

If petitioner is not to be given a new preliminary investigation for the amended charge,
his right will definitely be prejudiced because he will be denied his right to present
evidence to show or rebut evidence regarding the element of evident bad faith and
manifest partiality on the alleged dismissal. He will be denied due process.

A component part of due process in criminal justice, preliminary investigation is a

statutory and substantive right accorded to the accused before trial. To deny their claim to
a preliminary investigation would be to deprive them of the full measure of their right to
due process.23

Our rulings in the cases of People v. Magpale24 and Lava v. Gonzales25 where no new
preliminary investigation was given because the charges in the amended informations
were related to, or included in, the original charges cannot apply in the case at bar. The
factual milieu in those cases is different from the case before us.

In Magpale, the accused was charged with violation of Article 176 of the Revised Penal
Code for illegal possession of iron brand, and making or ordering the making thereof. In
the notices sent to the accused in connection with the preliminary investigation of the
complaint, the accused was informed not of one but of both. He was given the chance,
and was placed on guard, to defend himself for both charges. Moreover, the right of the
accused to have another preliminary investigation was waived when he went forward
with the trial.

In Lava, the accused was charged with Complex Rebellion but the charge was later
amended to Simple Rebellion. This court held that a new preliminary investigation was
not necessary there being no change in the nature of the crime charged, and that accused
failed to ask for a reinvestigation upon learning of the amended information.

In the case of petitioner herein, although the charge remained the same (Violation of
Section 3(e), Rep. Act No. 3019, as amended), the prohibited act allegedly committed
changed, that is, failure to pay monetary claims to illegal dismissal, and he was not given
the opportunity to submit his evidence on the absence or presence of evident bad faith
and manifest partiality as to the illegal dismissal. Petitioner has not waived his right to a
new preliminary investigation and, instead, is asking for one.

It is settled that the preliminary investigation proper, i.e., the determination of whether
there is reasonable ground to believe that the accused is guilty of the offense charged and
should be subjected to the expense, rigors and embarrassment of trial, is the function of
the prosecution.26

Our ruling in this case does not in any way divest the public prosecutor of its duty under
the Rules. This Court is not determining if petitioner should or should not be brought to
trial. What we are looking into is whether or not petitioner was given all the opportunity
to present countervailing evidence on the amended charge. Accordingly, finding that
petitioner was not given the chance to fully present his evidence on the amended
information which contained a substantial amendment, a new preliminary investigation is
in order.

As to statement of the court a quo that the conduct of another preliminary investigation
would be merely a waste of time, it must be emphasized that though the conduct thereof
will hold back the progress of the case, the same is necessary in order that the accused
may be afforded his right to a preliminary investigation. The right of the accused to a
preliminary investigation should never be compromised or sacrificed at the altar of
expediency.

Finally, as to petitioner's prayer that the Amended Information be quashed and dismissed,
the same cannot be ordered. The absence27 or incompleteness28 of a preliminary
investigation does not warrant the quashal or dismissal of the information. Neither does it
affect the court's jurisdiction over the case or impair the validity of the information or
otherwise render it defective. The court shall hold in abeyance the proceedings on such
information and order the remand of the case for preliminary investigation or completion
thereof.

WHEREFORE, the Petition for Certiorari is hereby GRANTED. Respondent court's

resolutions dated 12 January 2004 and 03 November 2004 in Criminal Case No. 26381
are REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. Respondent court is directed to order the Office of
the Ombudsman to forthwith conduct a preliminary investigation of the charge embodied
in the Amended Information filed against petitioner. It is further directed to suspend the
proceedings in the said case pending termination of the preliminary investigation, and
thereafter to take such action on petitioner's case as may be warranted by the results of
said preliminary investigation.

SO ORDERED.