VOL. 234, JULY 20, 1994 255: Magtajas vs. Pryce Properties Corp., Inc

1/24/2020 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 234
VOL. 234, JULY 20, 1994 255

Magtajas vs. Pryce Properties Corp., Inc.
*
G.R. No. 111097. July 20, 1994.
MAYOR PABLO P. MAGTAJAS & THE CITY OF

CAGAYAN DE ORO, petitioners, vs. PRYCE
PROPERTIES CORPORATION, INC. & PHILIPPINE
AMUSEMENT AND GAMING CORPO-RATION,
respondents.
Constitutional Law; Separation of Powers; Gambling; The

morality of gambling is not a justiciable issue.—The morality of
gambling is not a justiciable issue. Gambling is not illegal per se.
While it is generally considered inimical to the interests of the
people, there is nothing in the Constitution categorically
proscribing or penalizing gambling or, for that matter, even
mentioning it at all. It is left to Congress to deal with the activity
as it sees fit. In the exercise of its own discretion, the legislature
may prohibit gambling altogether or allow it without limitation or
it may prohibit some forms of gambling and allow others for
whatever reasons it may consider sufficient. Thus, it has
prohibited jueteng and monte but permits lotteries, cockfighting
and horse-racing. In making such choices, Congress has consulted
its own wisdom, which this Court has no authority to review,
much less reverse. Well has it been said that courts do not sit to
resolve the merits of conflicting theories. That is the prerogative
of the political departments. It is settled that questions regarding
the wisdom, morality, or practicibility of statutes are not
addressed to the judiciary but may be resolved only by the
legislative and executive departments, to which the function
belongs in our scheme of government. That function is exclusive.
Whichever way these branches decide, they are answerable only
to their own conscience and the constituents who will ultimately
judge their acts, and not to the courts of justice.
Local Governments; Tests of a valid ordinance.—The tests of
a valid ordinance are well established. A long line of decisions has
held that to be valid, an ordinance must conform to the following
substantive requirements: 1) It must not contravene the
constitution or any statute; 2) It must not be unfair or oppressive;
central.com.ph/sfsreader/session/0000016fd36238b921937a3f003600fb002c009e/t/?o=False 1/28
3) It must not be partial or discriminatory; 4) It must not prohibit

but may regulate trade; 5) It must be general and consistent with
public policy; 6) It must not be unreasonable.
______________
* EN BANC.
256
256 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Same; Gambling; Statutory Construction; Local Government

Code; Under the rule of noscitur a sociis, a word or phrase should
be interpreted in relation to, or given the same meaning of, words
with which it is associated, and, since the word “gambling” is
associated with “and other prohibited games of chance,” under Sec.
458 of the Local Government Code, the word should be read as
referring only to illegal gambling.—We begin by observing that
under Sec. 458 of the Local Government Code, local government
units are authorized to prevent or suppress, among others,
“gambling and other prohibited games of chance.” Obviously, this
provision excludes games of chance which are not prohibited but
are in fact permitted by law. The petitioners are less than
accurate in claiming that the Code could have excluded such
games of chance but did not. In fact it does. The language of the
section is clear and unmistakable. Under the rule of noscitur a
sociis, a word or phrase should be interpreted in relation to, or
given the same meaning of, words with which it is associated.
Accordingly, we conclude that since the word “gambling” is
associated with “and other prohibited games of chance,” the word
should be read as referring to only illegal gambling which, like the
other prohibited games of chance, must be prevented or
suppressed.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Statutes; The ordinances in
question contravene P.D. 1869 which has not been repealed by the
Local Government Code.—The apparent flaw in the ordinances in
question is that they contravene P.D. 1869 and the public policy
embodied therein insofar as they prevent PAGCOR from
exercising the power conferred on it to operate a casino in
Cagayan de Oro City. The petitioners have an ingenious answer
to this misgiving. They deny that it is the ordinances that have
changed P.D. 1869 for an ordinance admittedly cannot prevail
against a statute. Their theory is that the change has been made
by the Local Government Code itself, which was also enacted by
the national lawmaking authority. In their view, the decree has

been, not really repealed by the Code, but merely “modified pro
tanto” in the sense that PAGCOR cannot now operate a casino
over the objection of the local government unit concerned. This
modification of P.D. 1869 of the Local Government Code is
permissible because one law can change or repeal another law. It
seems to us that the petitioners are playing with words. While
insisting that the decree has only been “modifiedpro tanto,” they
are actually arguing that it is already dead, repealed and useless
for all intents and purposes because the Code has shorn PAGCOR
of all power to centralize and regulate casinos. Strictly speaking,
its operations may now be not only prohibited by the local
government unit; in fact, the prohibition is not only discretionary
but mandated by Section 458 of the Code if the word “shall” as
used therein
257
VOL. 234, JULY 20, 1994 257
is to be given its accepted meaning. Local government units have

now no choice but to prevent and suppress gambling, which in the
petitioners’ view includes both legal and illegal gambling. Under
this construction, PAGCOR will have no more games of chance to
regulate or centralize as they must all be prohibited by the local
government units pursuant to the mandatory duty imposed upon
them by the Code. In this situation, PAGCOR cannot continue to
exist except only as a toothless tiger or a white elephant and will
no longer be able to exercise its powers as a prime source of
government revenue through the operation of casinos.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Implied Repeals; It is a
familiar rule that implied repeals are not lightly presumed in the
absence of a clear and unmistakable showing of such intention.—
It is noteworthy that the petitioners have cited only Par. (f) of the
repealing clause, conveniently discarding the rest of the provision
which painstakingly mentions the specific laws or the parts
thereof which are repealed (or modified) by the Code.
Significantly, P.D. 1869 is not one of them. x x x Furthermore, it
is a familiar rule that implied repeals are not lightly presumed in
the absence of a clear and unmistakable showing of such
intention.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; It is a canon of legal
hermeneutics that instead of pitting one statute against another in
an inevitably destructive confrontation, courts must exert every
effort to reconcile them, remembering that both laws deserve a

becoming respect as the handiwork of a coordinate branch of the
government.—There is no sufficient indication of an implied
repeal of P.D. 1869. On the contrary, as the private respondent
points out, PAGCOR is mentioned as the source of funding in two
later enactments of Congress, to wit, R.A. 7309, creating a Board
of Claims under the Department of Justice for the benefit of
victims of unjust punishment or detention or of violent crimes,
and R.A. 7648, providing for measures for the solution of the
power crisis. PAGCOR revenues are tapped by these two statutes.
This would show that the PAGCOR charter has not been repealed
by the Local Government Code but has in fact been improved as it
were to make the entity more responsive to the fiscal problems of
the government. It is a canon of legal hermeneutics that instead
of pitting one statute against another in an inevitably destructive
confrontation, courts must exert every effort to reconcile them,
remembering that both laws deserve a becoming respect as the
handiwork of a coordinate branch of the government. On the
assumption of a conflict between P.D. 1869 and the Code, the
proper action is not to uphold one and annul the other but to give
effect to both by harmonizing them if possible. This is possible in
the case before us. The proper resolution of the problem at hand is
to
258
hold that under the Local Government Code, local government

units may (and indeed must) prevent and suppress all kinds of
gambling within their territories except only those allowed by
statutes like P.D. 1869. The exception reserved in such laws must
be read into the Code, to make both the Code and such laws
equally effective and mutually complementary.
Same; Same; Same; There are indeed two kinds of gambling,
to wit, the illegal and those authorized by law.—This approach
would also affirm that there are indeed two kinds of gambling, to
wit, the illegal and those authorized by law. Legalized gambling is
not a modern concept; it is probably as old as illegal gambling, if
not indeed more so. The petitioners’ suggestion that the Code
authorizes them to prohibit all kinds of gambling would erase the
distinction between these two forms of gambling without a clear
indication that this is the will of the legislature. Plausibly,
following this theory, the City of Manila could, by mere ordinance,
prohibit the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office from
conducting a lottery as authorized by R.A. 1169 and B.P. 42 or

stop the races at the San Lazaro Hippodrome as authorized by
R.A. 309 and R.A. 983.
Same; Same; The rationale of the requirement that the
ordinances should not contravene a statute is obvious as municipal
governments are only agents of the national government and that
the delegate cannot be superior to the principal or exercise powers
higher than those of the latter.—In light of all the above
considerations, we see no way of arriving at the conclusion urged
on us by the petitioners that the ordinances in question are valid.
On the contrary, we find that the ordinances violate P.D. 1869,
which has the character and force of a statute, as well as the
public policy expressed in the decree allowing the playing of
certain games of chance despite the prohibition of gambling in
general. The rationale of the requirement that the ordinances
should not contravene a statute is obvious. Municipal
governments are only agents of the national government. Local
councils exercise only delegated legislative powers conferred on
them by Congress as the national lawmaking body. The delegate
cannot be superior to the principal or exercise powers higher than
those of the latter. It is a heresy to suggest that the local
government units can undo the acts of Congress, from which they
have derived their power in the first place, and negate by mere
ordinance the mandate of the statute.
Same; Same; Congress retains control of the local government
units although in significantly reduced degree now than under the
previous Constitutions.—This basic relationship between the
national
259
VOL. 234, JULY 20, 1994 259
legislature and the local government units has not been enfeebled
by the new provisions in the Constitution strengthening the policy
of local autonomy. Without meaning to detract from that policy,
we here confirm that Congress retains control of the local
government units although in significantly reduced degree now
than under our previous Constitutions. The power to create still
includes the power to destroy. The power to grant still includes
the power to withhold or recall. True, there are certain notable
innovations in the Constitution, like the direct conferment on the
local government units of the power to tax, which cannot now be
withdrawn by mere statute. By and large, however, the national
legislature is still the principal of the local government units,

which cannot defy its will or modify or violate it.
PADILLA, J., Concurring:
Gambling; It is worth remembering that 1) what is legal is not

always moral and 2) the ends do not always justify the means.—
However, despite the legality of the opening and operation of a
casino in Cagayan de Oro City by respondent PAGCOR, I wish to
reiterate my view that gambling in any form runs counter to the
government’s own efforts to reestablish and resurrect the Filipino
moral character which is generally perceived to be in a state of
continuing erosion. It is in the light of this alarming perspective
that I call upon government to carefully weigh the advantages
and disadvantages of setting up more gambling facilities in the
country. That the PAGCOR contributes greatly to the coffers of
the government is not enough reason for setting up more
gambling casinos because, undoubtedly, this will not help
improve, but will cause a further deterioration in the Filipino
moral character. It is worth remembering in this regard that, 1)
what is legal is not always moral and 2) the ends do not always
justify the means.
Same; The national government (through PAGCOR) should
reexamine and re-evaluate its decision of imposing the gambling
casino on the residents of Cagayan de Oro City.—In the present
case, it is my considered view that the national government
(through PAGCOR) should re-examine and re-evaluate its
decision of imposing the gambling casino on the residents of
Cagayan de Oro City; for it is abundantly clear that public opinion
in the city is very much against it, and again the question must be
seriously deliberated: will the prospects of revenue to be realized
from the casino outweigh the further destruction of the Filipino
sense of values?
260

DAVIDE, JR., J., Concurring:
Pleadings and Practice; Prohibition; Court of Appeals;

Hierarchy of Courts; The petition for prohibition should have been
initially filed with the Regional Trial Court, instead of the Court
of Appeals.—It must at once be noted that private respondent
Pryce Properties Corporation (PRYCE) directly filed with the
Court of Appeals its so-called petition for prohibition, thereby
invoking the said court’s original jurisdiction to issue writs of

prohibition under Section 9(1) of B.P. Blg. 129. As I see it,
however, the principal cause of action therein is one for
declaratory relief: to declare null and unconstitutional x x x the
challenged ordinances enacted by the Sangguniang Panglungsod
of the City of Cagayan de Oro. x x x Accordingly, the Court of
Appeals does not have jurisdiction over the nature of the action.
Even assuming arguendo that the case is one for prohibition,
then, under this Court’s established policy relative to the
hierarchy of courts, the petition should have been filed with the
Regional Trial Court of Cagayan de Oro City. I find no special or
compelling reason why it was not filed with the said court. I do
not wish to entertain the thought that PRYCE doubted a
favorable verdict therefrom, in which case the filing of the petition
with the Court of Appeals may have been impelled by tactical
considerations. A dismissal of the petition by the Court of Appeals
would have been in order pursuant to our decisions in People vs.
Cuaresma (172 SCRA 415 [1989]) and Defensor-Santiago vs.
Vasquez (217 SCRA 633 [1993]).
Constitutional Law; Statutory Construction; A contravention
of a law is not necessarily a contravention of the constitution.—
The nullification by the Court of Appeals of the challenged
ordinances as unconstitutional primarily because it is in
contravention to P.D. No. 1869 is unwarranted. A contravention
of a law is not necessarily a contravention of the constitution. In
any case, the ordinances can still stand even if they be conceded
as offending P.D. No. 1869. They can be reconciled, which is not
impossible to do. So reconciled, the ordinances should be
construed as not applying to PAGCOR.
Gambling; Gambling, even if legalized, would be inimical to
the general welfare of the inhabitants of the City, or of any place
for that matter, accordingly, PAGCOR must consider the valid
concerns of the people of the City of Cagayan de Oro and should
not impose its will upon them in an arbitrary, if not despotic,
manner.—From the pleadings, it is obvious that the government
and the people of Cagayan de Oro City are, for obvious reasons,
strongly against the opening of the gambling casino in their city.
Gambling, even if legalized, would be inimical to the general
welfare of the inhabitants of the city, or of any place for that
261
VOL. 234, JULY 20, 1994 261
matter. The PAGCOR, as a government-owned corporation, must

consider the valid concerns of the people of the City of Cagayan de
Oro and should not impose its will upon them in an arbitrary, if
not despotic, manner.
PETITION for review of a decision of the Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

Aquilino G. Pimentel, Jr. and Associates for
petitioners.
R.R. Torralba & Associates for private respondent.
CRUZ, J.:
There was instant opposition when PAGCOR announced

the opening of a casino in Cagayan de Oro City. Civic
organizations angrily denounced the project. The religious
elements echoed the objection and so did the women’s
groups and the youth. Demonstrations were led by the
mayor and the city legislators. The media trumpeted the
protest, describing the casino as an affront to the welfare of
the city.
The trouble arose when in 1992, flush with its
tremendous success in several cities, PAGCOR decided to
expand its operations to Cagayan de Oro City. To this end,
it leased a portion of a building belonging to Pryce
Properties Corporation, Inc., one of the herein private
respondents, renovated and equipped the same, and
prepared to inaugurate its casino there during the
Christmas season.
The reaction of the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cagayan
de Oro City was swift and hostile. On December 7, 1992, it
enacted Ordinance No. 3353 reading as follows:
ORDINANCE NO. 3353
AN ORDINANCE PROHIBITING THE ISSUANCE OF

BUSINESS PERMIT AND CANCELLING EXISTING
BUSINESS PERMIT TO ANY ESTABLISHMENT FOR THE
USING AND ALLOWING TO BE USED ITS PREMISES OR
PORTION THEREOF FOR THE OPERATION OF CASINO.
BE IT ORDAINED by the Sangguniang Panlungsod of the City
of Cagayan de Oro, in session assembled that:
262

SECTION1.—That pursuant to the policy of the city banning

the operation of casino within its territorial jurisdiction, no
business permit shall be issued to any person, partnership or
corporation for the operation of casino within the city limits.
SECTION2.—That it shall be a violation of existing business
permit by any persons, partnership or corporation to use its
business establishment or portion thereof, or allow the use thereof
by others for casino operation and other gambling activities.
SECTION3.—PENALTIES.—Any violation of such existing
business permit as defined in the preceding section shall suffer
the following penalties, to wit:
a) Suspension of the business permit for sixty (60) days for

the first offense and a fine of P1,000.00/day
b) Suspension of the business permit for Six (6) months for
the second offense, and a fine of P3,000.00/day
c) Permanent revocation of the business permit and
imprisonment of One (1) year, for the third and
subsequent offenses.
SECTION4.—This Ordinance shall take effect ten (10) days

from publication thereof.
Nor was this all. On January 4, 1993, it adopted a sterner

Ordinance No. 3375-93 reading as follows:
ORDINANCE NO. 3375-93
AN ORDINANCE PROHIBITING THE OPERATION OF

CASINO AND PROVIDING PENALTY FOR VIOLATION
THEREFOR.
WHEREAS, the City Council established a policy as early as 1990

against CASINO under its Resolution No. 2295;
WHEREAS, on October 14, 1992, the City Council passed
another Resolution No. 2673, reiterating its policy against the
establishment of CASINO;
WHEREAS, subsequently, thereafter, it likewise passed
Ordinance No. 3353, prohibiting the issuance of Business Permit
and to cancel existing Business Permit to any establishment for
the using and allowing to be used its premises or portion thereof
for the operation of CASINO;
WHEREAS, under Art. 3, section 458, No. (4), sub paragraph
VI of the Local Government Code of 1991 (Rep. Act 7160) and
under Art. 99, No. (4), Paragraph VI of the implementing rules of
the Local Government Code, the City Council as the Legislative
Body shall enact
263
VOL. 234, JULY 20, 1994 263

measure to suppress any activity inimical to public morals and

general welfare of the people and/or regulate or prohibit such
activity pertaining to amusement or entertainment in order to
protect social and moral welfare of the community.
NOW THEREFORE,
BE IT ORDAINED by the City Council in session duly

assembled that:
SECTION1.—The operation of gambling CASINO in the City
of Cagayan de Oro is hereby prohibited.
SECTION2.—Any violation of this Ordinance shall be subject
to the following penalties:
a) Administrative fine of P5,000.00 shall be imposed against

the proprietor, partnership or corporation undertaking the
operation, conduct, maintenance of gambling CASINO in
the City and closure thereof;
b) Imprisonment of not less than six (6) months nor more
than one (1) year or a fine in the amount of P5,000.00 or
both at the discretion of the court against the manager,
supervisor, and/or any person responsible in the
establishment, conduct and maintenance of gambling
CASINO.
SECTION3.—This Ordinance shall take effect ten (10) days

after its publication in a local newspaper of general circulation.
Pryce assailed the ordinances before the Court of Appeals,

where it was joined by PAGCOR as intervenor and
supplemental petitioner. Their challenge succeeded. On
March 31, 1993, the Court of Appeals declared the
ordinances invalid and issued 1
the writ prayed for to
prohibit their enforcement. Reconsideration
2
of this
decision was denied on July 13, 1993.
Cagayan de Oro City and its mayor are now before us in
this petition
3
for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court. They aver that the respondent Court of Appeals
erred in holding that:
_______________
1 Rollo, pp. 64-94.

2 Ibid., pp. 53- 62.
3 Pryce was dropped as private respondent in the resolution of the
Court dated June 13, 1994.
264

1. Under existing laws, the Sangguniang Panlungsod

of the City of Cagayan de Oro does not have the
power and authority to prohibit the establishment
and operation of a PAGCOR gambling casino within
the City’s territorial limits.
2. The phrase “gambling and other prohibited games
of chance” found in Sec. 458, par. (a), sub-par. (1)-
(v) of R.A. 7160 could only mean “illegal gambling.”
3. The questioned Ordinances in effect annul P.D.
1869 and are therefore invalid on that point.
4. The questioned Ordinances are discriminatory to
casino and partial to cockfighting and are therefore
invalid on that point.
5. The questioned Ordinances are not reasonable, not
consonant with the general powers and purposes of
the instrumentality concerned and inconsistent
with the laws or policy of the State.
6. It had no option but to follow the ruling in the case
of Basco, et al. v. PAGCOR, G.R. No. 91649, May
14, 1991, 197 SCRA 53 in disposing of the issues
presented in this present case.
PAGCOR is a corporation created directly by P.D. 1869 to

help centralize and regulate all games of chance, including
casinos on land and sea within the territorial jurisdiction of
the Philippines. In Basco4
v. Philippine Amusements and
Gaming Corporation, this Court sustained the
constitutionality of the decree and even cited the benefits of
the entity to the national economy as the third highest
revenue-earner in the government, next only to the BIR
and the Bureau of Customs.
Cagayan de Oro City, like other local political
subdivisions, is empowered to enact ordinances for the
purpose indicated in the Local Government Code. It is
expressly vested with the police power under what is
known as the General Welfare Clause now embodied in
Section 16 as follows:
SEC.16.—General Welfare.—Every local government unit shall

exercise the powers expressly granted, those necessarily implied
therefrom, as well as powers necessary, appropriate, or incidental
for its efficient and effective governance, and those which are
essential to the promotion of the general welfare. Within their

respective territorial jurisdictions, local government units shall
ensure and support, among other things, the preservation and
enrichment of culture, promote health and safety, enhance the
right of the people to a balanced ecology,
______________
4 197 SCRA 53.
265
VOL. 234, JULY 20, 1994 265

encourage and support the development of appropriate and self-

reliant scientific and technological capabilities, improve public
morals, enhance economic prosperity and social justice, promote
full employment among their residents, maintain peace and order,
and preserve the comfort and convenience of their inhabitants.
In addition, Section 458 of the said Code specifically

declares that:
Sec.458.—Powers, Duties, Functions and Compensation.—(a) The

Sangguniang Panlungsod, as the legislative body of the city, shall
enact ordinances, approve resolutions and appropriate funds for
the general welfare of the city and its inhabitants pursuant to
Section 16 of this Code and in the proper exercise of the corporate
powers of the city as provided for under Section 22 of this Code,
and shall:
(1)Approve ordinances and pass resolutions necessary for an efficient and

effective city government, and in this connection, shall:
xxx
(v) Enact ordinances intended to prevent, suppress and impose appropriate
penalties for habitual drunkenness in public places, vagrancy, mendicancy,
prostitution, establishment and maintenance of houses of ill repute, gambling
and other prohibited games of chance, fraudulent devices and ways to obtain
money or property, drug addiction, maintenance of drug dens, drug pushing,
juvenile delin-quency, the printing, distribution or exhibition of obscene or
pornographic materials or publications, and such other activities inimical to the
welfare and morals of the inhabitants of the city;
This section also authorizes the local government units to

regulate properties and businesses within 5their territorial
limits in the interest of the general welfare.
The petitioners argue that by virtue of these provisions,
the Sangguniang Panlungsod may prohibit the operation of
casinos because they involve games of chance, which are

detrimental to the people. Gambling is not allowed by
general law and even by
_____________
5 Sec. 458, [2(vi-xv); [3(ii-vii)]; [4(i-ix)], Local Government Code, 1991.
266

the Constitution itself. The legislative power conferred

upon local government units may be exercised over all
kinds of gambling and not only over “illegal gambling” as
the respondents erroneously argue. Even if the operation of
casinos may have been permitted under P.D. 1869, the
government of Cagayan de Oro City has the authority to
prohibit them within its territory pursuant to the authority
entrusted to it by the Local Government Code.
It is submitted that this interpretation is consonant with
the policy of local autonomy as mandated in Article II,
Section 25, and Article X of the Constitution, as well as
various other provisions therein seeking to strengthen the
character of the nation. In giving the local government
units the power to prevent or suppress gambling and other
social problems, the Local Govern-ment Code has
recognized the competence of such communities to
determine and adopt the measures best expected to
promote the general welfare of their inhabitants in line
with the policies of the State.
The petitioners also stress that when the Code expressly
authorized the local government units to prevent and
suppress gambling and other prohibited games of chance,
like craps, baccarat, blackjack and roulette, it meant all
forms of gambling without distinction.6 Ubi lex non
distinguit, nec nos distinguere debemos. Otherwise, it
would have expressly excluded from the scope of their
power casinos and other forms of gambling authorized by
special law, as it could have easily done. The fact that it did
not do so simply means that the local government units are
permitted to prohibit all kinds of gambling within their
territories, including the operation of casinos.
The adoption of the Local Government Code, it is
pointed out, had the effect of modifying the charter of the
PAGCOR. The Code is not only a later enactment than P.D.
1869 and so is deemed to prevail in case of inconsistencies
between them. More than this, the powers of the PAGCOR

under the decree are expressly discontinued by the Code
insofar as they do not conform to its philosophy and
provisions, pursuant to Par. (f) of its repealing clause
reading as follows:
_______________
6 Where the law does not distinguish, neither ought we to distinguish.
267
VOL. 234, JULY 20, 1994 267

(f) All general and special laws, acts, city charters, decrees,
executive orders, proclamations and administrative regulations,
or part or parts thereof which are inconsistent with any of the
provisions of this Code are hereby repealed or modified
accordingly.
It is also maintained that assuming there is doubt

regarding the effect of the Local Government Code on P.D.
1869, the doubt must be resolved in favor of the petitioners,
in accordance with the direction in the Code calling for its
liberal interpretation in favor of the local government
units. Section 5 of the Code specifically provides:
Sec.5. Rules of Interpretation.—In the interpretation of the

provisions of this Code, the following rules shall apply:
(a) Any provision on a power of a local government unit shall be
liberally interpreted in its favor, and in case of doubt, any question
thereon shall be resolved in favor of devolution of powers and of
the lower local government unit. Any fair and reasonable doubt as
to the existence of the power shall be interpreted in favor of the
local government unit concerned;
xxx
(c) The general welfare provisions in this Code shall be liberally
interpreted to give more powers to local government units in
accelerating economic development and upgrading the quality of
life for the people in the community; x x x (Emphasis supplied.)
Finally, the petitioners also attack gambling as

intrinsically harmful and cite various provisions of the
Constitution and several decisions of this Court expressive
of the general and official disapprobation of the vice. They
invoke the State policies on the family and the proper
upbringing of the youth and, as might be expected, 7
call
attention to the old case of U.S. v. Salaveria, which
sustained a municipal ordinance prohibiting the playing of

panguingue. The petitioners decry the immorality of
gambling. They also impugn the wisdom of P.D. 1869
(which they describe as “a martial law instrument”) in
creating PAGCOR and authorizing it to operate casinos “on
land and sea within the territorial jurisdiction of the
Philippines.”
_____________
7 39 Phil. 102.
268

This is the opportune time to stress an important point.

The morality of gambling is not a justiciable issue.
Gambling is not illegal per se. While it is generally
considered inimical to the interests of the people, there is
nothing in the Constitution categorically proscribing or
penalizing gambling or, for that matter, even mentioning it
at all. It is left to Congress to deal with the activity as it
sees fit. In the exercise of its own discretion, the legislature
may prohibit gambling altogether or allow it without
limitation or it may prohibit some forms of gambling and
allow others for whatever reasons it may consider
sufficient. Thus, it has prohibited jueteng and monte but
permits lotteries, cockfighting and horse-racing. In making
such choices, Congress has consulted its own wisdom,
which this Court has no authority to review, much less
reverse. Well has it been said that courts8 do not sit to
resolve the merits of conflicting theories. That is the
prerogative of the political departments. It is settled that
questions regarding the wisdom, morality, or practicibility
of statutes are not addressed to the judiciary but may be
resolved only by the legislative and executive departments,
to which the function belongs in our scheme of government.
That function is exclusive. Whichever way these branches
decide, they are answerable only to their own conscience
and the constituents who will ultimately judge their acts,
and not to the courts of justice.
The only question we can and shall resolve in this
petition is the validity of Ordinance No. 3355 and
Ordinance No. 3375-93 as enacted by the Sangguniang
Panlungsod of Cagayan de Oro City. And we shall do so
only by the criteria laid down by law and not by our own
convictions on the propriety of gambling.
The tests of a valid9 ordinance are well established. A
long line of decisions has held that to be valid, an
ordinance must conform to the following substantive
requirements:
1) It must not contravene the constitution or any

statute.
2) It must not be unfair or oppressive.
_______________
8 Garcia v. Executive Secretary, 204 SCRA 516, quoting Cooley,

Constitutional Limitations, 8th ed., 379-380.
9 Tatel v. Municipality of Virac, 207 SCRA 157; Solicitor General v.
Metropolitan Manila Authority, 204 SCRA 837; De la Cruz v. Paras, 123
SCRA 569; U.S. v. Abandan, 24 Phil. 165.
269
VOL. 234, JULY 20, 1994 269

3) It must not be partial or discriminatory.

4) It must not prohibit but may regulate trade.
5) It must be general and consistent with public
policy.
6) It must not be unreasonable.
We begin by observing that under Sec. 458 of the Local

Government Code, local government units are authorized
to prevent or suppress, among others, “gambling and other
prohibited games of chance.” Obviously, this provision
excludes games of chance which are not prohibited but are
in fact permitted by law. The petitioners are less than
accurate in claiming that the Code could have excluded
such games of chance but did not. In fact it does. The
language of the section is clear and unmistakable. Under
the rule ofnoscitur a sociis, a word or phrase should be
interpreted in relation to, or given the same meaning of,
words with which it is associated. Accordingly, we conclude
that since the word “gambling” is associated with “and
other prohibited games of chance,” the word should be read
as referring to only illegal gambling which, like the other
prohibited games of chance, must be prevented or
suppressed.
We could stop here as this interpretation should settle

the problem quite conclusively. But we will not. The
vigorous efforts of the petitioners on behalf of the
inhabitants of Cagayan de Oro City, and the earnestness of
their advocacy, deserve more than short shrift from this
Court.
The apparent flaw in the ordinances in question is that
they contravene P.D. 1869 and the public policy embodied
therein insofar as they prevent PAGCOR from exercising
the power conferred on it to operate a casino in Cagayan de
Oro City. The petitioners have an ingenious answer to this
misgiving. They deny that it is the ordinances that have
changed P.D. 1869 for an ordinance admittedly cannot
prevail against a statute. Their theory is that the change
has been made by the Local Government Code itself, which
was also enacted by the national lawmaking authority. In
their view, the decree has been, not really repealed by the
Code, but merely “modified pro tanto” in the sense that
PAGCOR cannot now operate a casino over the objection of
the local government unit concerned. This modification of
P.D. 1869 of the Local Government Code is permissible
because one law can change or repeal another law.
270

It seems to us that the petitioners are playing with words.

While insisting that the decree has only been “modified pro
tanto,” they are actually arguing that it is already dead,
repealed and useless for all intents and purposes because
the Code has shorn PAGCOR of all power to centralize and
regulate casinos. Strictly speaking, its operations may now
be not only prohibited by the local government unit; in fact,
the prohibition is not only discretionary but mandated by
Section 458 of the Code if the word “shall” as used therein
is to be given its accepted meaning. Local government units
have now no choice but to prevent and suppress gambling,
which in the petitioners’ view includes both legal and
illegal gambling. Under this construction, PAGCOR will
have no more games of chance to regulate or centralize as
they must all be prohibited by the local government units
pursuant to the mandatory duty imposed upon them by the
Code. In this situation, PAGCOR cannot continue to exist
except only as a toothless tiger or a white elephant and will
no longer be able to exercise its powers as a prime source of
government revenue through the operation of casinos.
It is noteworthy that the petitioners have cited only Par.

(f) of the repealing clause, conveniently discarding the rest
of the provision which painstakingly mentions the specific
laws or the parts thereof which are repealed (or modified)
by the Code. Significantly, P.D. 1869 is not one of them. A
reading of the entire repealing clause, which is reproduced
below, will disclose the omission:
SEC.534. Repealing Clause.—a) Batas Pambansa Blg. 337,

otherwise known as the “Local Government Code,” Executive
Order No. 112 (1987), and Executive Order No. 319 (1988) are
hereby repealed.
(b) Presidential Decree Nos. 684, 1191, 1508 and such other
decrees, orders, instructions, memoranda and issuances related to
or concerning the barangay are hereby repealed.
(c) The provisions of Sections 2, 3, and 4 of Republic Act No.
1939 regarding hospital fund; Section 3, a (3) and b (2) of Republic
Act. No. 5447 regarding the Special Education Fund; Presidential
Decree No. 144 as amended by Presidential Decree Nos. 559 and
1741; Presidential Decree No. 231 as amended; Presidential
Decree No. 436 as amended by Presidential Decree No. 558; and
Presidential Decree Nos. 381, 436, 464, 477, 526, 632, 752, and
1136 are hereby repealed and rendered of no force and effect.
271
VOL. 234, JULY 20, 1994 271

(d) Presidential Decree No. 1594 is hereby repealed insofar as

it governs locally-funded projects.
(e) The following provisions are hereby repealed or amended
insofar as they are inconsistent with the provisions of this
Code: Sections 2, 16, and 29 of Presidential Decree No.
704; Sections 12 of Presidential Decree No. 87, as
amended; Sections 52, 53, 66, 67, 68, 69 70, 71, 72, 73, and
74 of Presidential Decree No. 463, as amended; and
Section 16 of Presidential Decree No. 972, as amended,
and
(f) All general and special laws, acts, city charters, decrees,
executive orders, proclamations and administrative
regulations, or part or parts thereof which are inconsistent
with any of the provisions of this Code are hereby repealed
or modified accordingly.
Furthermore, it is a familiar rule that implied repeals are

not lightly presumed in the absence of a clear and
unmistakable
10
showing of such intention. In Lichauco & Co.
v. Apostol, this Court explained:
The cases relating to the subject of repeal by implication all

proceed on the assumption that if the act of later date clearly
reveals an intention on the part of the lawmaking power to
abrogate the prior law, this intention must be given effect; but
there must always be a sufficient revelation of this intention, and
it has become an unbending rule of statutory construction that
the intention to repeal a former law will not be imputed to the
Legislature when it appears that the two statutes, or provisions,
with reference to which the question arises bear to each other the
relation of general to special.
There is no sufficient indication of an implied repeal of P.D.

1869. On the contrary, as the private respondent points
out, PAGCOR is mentioned as the source of funding in two
later enactments of Congress, to wit, R.A. 7309, creating a
Board of Claims under the Department of Justice for the
benefit of victims of unjust punishment or detention or of
violent crimes, and R.A. 7648, providing for measures for
the solution of the power crisis. PAGCOR revenues are
tapped by these two statutes. This would show that the
PAGCOR charter has not been repealed by the Local
Government Code but has in fact been improved as it were
to make the entity more responsive to the fiscal problems of
the
______________
10 44 Phil. 138.
272

government.
It is a canon of legal hermeneutics that instead of pitting
one statute against another in an inevitably destructive
confrontation, courts must exert every effort to reconcile
them, remembering that both laws deserve a becoming
respect as the handiwork of a coordinate branch of the
government. On the assumption of a conflict between P.D.
1869 and the Code, the proper action is not to uphold one
and annul the other but to give effect to both by
harmonizing them if possible. This is possible in the case
before us. The proper resolution of the problem at hand is
to hold that under the Local Government Code, local

government units may (and indeed must) prevent and
suppress all kinds of gambling within their territories
except only those allowed by statutes like P.D. 1869. The
exception reserved in such laws must be read into the
Code, to make both the Code and such laws equally
effective and mutually complementary.
This approach would also affirm that there are indeed
two kinds of gambling, to wit, the illegal and those
authorized by law. Legalized gambling is not a modern
concept; it is probably as old as illegal gambling, if not
indeed more so. The petitioners’ suggestion that the Code
authorizes them to prohibit all kinds of gambling would
erase the distinction between these two forms of gambling
without a clear indication that this is the will of the
legislature. Plausibly, following this theory, the City of
Manila could, by mere ordinance, prohibit the Philippine
Charity Sweepstakes Office from conducting a lottery as
authorized by R.A. 1169 and B.P. 42 or stop the races at
the San Lazaro Hippodrome as authorized by R.A. 309 and
R.A. 983.
In light of all the above considerations, we see no way of
arriving at the conclusion urged on us by the petitioners
that the ordinances in question are valid. On the contrary,
we find that the ordinances violate P.D. 1869, which has
the character and force of a statute, as well as the public
policy expressed in the decree allowing the playing of
certain games of chance despite the prohibition of gambling
in general.
The rationale of the requirement that the ordinances
should not contravene a statute is obvious. Municipal
governments are only agents of the national government.
Local councils exercise only delegated legislative powers
conferred on them by Congress as the national lawmaking
body. The delegate cannot be superior
273
VOL. 234, JULY 20, 1994 273

to the principal or exercise powers higher than those of the

latter. It is a heresy to suggest that the local government
units can undo the acts of Congress, from which they have
derived their power in the first place, and negate by mere
ordinance the mandate of the statute.
Municipal corporations owe their origin to, and derive their

powers and rights wholly from the legislature. It breathes into
them the breath of life, without which they cannot exist. As it
creates, so it may destroy. As it may destroy, it may abridge and
control. Unless there is some constitutional limitation on the
right, the legislature might, by a single act, and if we can suppose
it capable of so great a folly and so great a wrong, sweep from
existence all of the municipal corporations in the state, and the
corporation could not prevent it. We know of no limitation on the
right so far as to the corporation themselves are concerned. They 11
are, so to phrase it, the mere tenants at will of the legis-lature.
This basic relationship between the national legislature

and the local government units has not been enfeebled by
the new provisions in the Constitution strengthening the
policy of local autonomy. Without meaning to detract from
that policy, we here confirm that Congress retains control
of the local government units although in significantly
reduced degree now than under our previous Constitutions.
The power to create still includes the power to destroy. The
power to grant still includes the power to withhold or
recall. True, there are certain notable innovations in the
Constitution, like the direct conferment12
on the local
government units of the power to tax, which cannot now
be withdrawn by mere statute. By and large, however, the
national legislature is still the principal of the local
government units, which cannot defy its will or modify or
violate it.
The Court understands and admires the concern of the
petitioners for the welfare of their constituents and their
apprehensions that the welfare of Cagayan de Oro City will
be endangered by the opening of the casino. We share the
view that “the hope of large or easy gain, obtained without
special effort,
_______________
11 Clinton v. Ceder Rapids, etc. Railroad Co., 24 Iowa 455.

12 Art. X, Sec. 5, Constitution.
274

13
turns the head of the workman” and that 14
“habitual
gambling 15is a cause of laziness and ruin.” In People v.
Gorostiza, we declared: “The social scourge of gambling
must be stamped out. The laws against gambling must be

enforced to the limit.” George Washington called gambling
“the child of avarice, the brother of iniquity and the father
of mischief.” Nevertheless, we must recognize the power of
the legislature to decide, in its own wisdom, to legalize
certain forms of gambling, as was done in P.D. 1869 and
impliedly affirmed in the Local Government Code. That
decision can be revoked by this Court only if it contravenes
the Constitution as the touchstone of all official acts. We do
not find such contravention here.
We hold that the power of PAGCOR to centralize and
regulate all games of chance, including casinos on land and
sea within the territorial jurisdiction of the Philippines,
remains unimpaired. P.D. 1869 has not been modified by
the Local Government Code, which empowers the local
government units to prevent or suppress only those forms
of gambling prohibited by law.
Casino gambling is authorized by P.D. 1869. This decree
has the status of a statute that cannot be amended or
nullified by a mere ordinance. Hence, it was not competent
for the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Cagayan de Oro City to
enact Ordinance No. 3353 prohibiting the use of buildings
for the operation of a casino and Ordinance No. 3375-93
prohibiting the operation of casinos. For all their
praiseworthy motives, these ordinance are contrary to P.D.
1869 and the public policy announced therein and are
therefore ultra vires and void.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED and the
challenged decision of the respondent Court of Appeals is
AFFIRMED, with costs against the petitioners. It is so
ordered.
Narvasa (C.J.), Feliciano, Bidin, Regalado, Romero,

Bellosillo, Melo, Quiason, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan and
Mendoza, JJ., concur.
Padilla and Davide, Jr., JJ., See separate opinions.
______________
13 Planiol, Droit Civil, Vol. 2, No. 2210.

14 Ibid.
15 77 Phil. 88.
275
VOL. 234, JULY 20, 1994 275

SEPARATE OPINION
PADILLA, J.:
I concur with the majority holding that the city ordinances

in question cannot modify much less repeal PAGCOR’s
general authority to establish and maintain gambling
casinos anywhere in the Philippines under Presidential
Decree No. 1869. In Basco v. Philippine Amusement and
Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR), 197 SCRA 52, I stated in
a separate opinion that:
“x x x I agree with the decision insofar as it holds that the

prohibition, control, and regulation of the entire activity known as
gambling properly pertain to ‘state policy.’ It is, therefore, the
political departments of government, namely, the legislative and
the executive that should decide on what government should do in
the entire area of gambling, and assume full responsibility to the
people for such policy.” (emphasis supplied)
However, despite the legality of the opening and operation

of a casino in Cagayan de Oro City by respondent
PAGCOR, I wish to reiterate my view that gambling in any
form runs counter to the government’s own efforts to re-
establish and resurrect the Filipino moral character which
is generally perceived to be in a state of continuing erosion.
It is in the light of this alarming perspective that I call
upon government to carefully weigh the advantages and
disadvantages of setting up more gambling facilities in the
country.
That the PAGCOR contributes greatly to the coffers of
the government is not enough reason for setting up more
gambling casinos because, undoubtedly, this will not help
improve, but will cause a further deterioration in the
Filipino moral character.
It is worth remembering in this regard that, 1) what is
legal is not always moral and 2) the ends do not always
justify the means.
As in Basco, I can easily visualize prostitution at par
with gambling. And yet, legalization of the former will not
render it any less reprehensible even if substantial revenue
for the government can be realized from it. The same is
true of gambling.
In the present case, it is my considered view that the
national government (through PAGCOR) should re-
examine and re-
276

evaluate its decision of imposing the gambling casino on

the residents of Cagayan de Oro City; for it is abundantly
clear that public opinion in the city is very much against it,
and again the question must be seriously deliberated: will
the prospects of revenue to be realized from the casino
outweigh the further destruction of the Filipino sense of
values?
SEPARATE OPINION
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
While I concur in part with the majority, I wish, however,

to express my view on certain aspects of this case.
I.
It must at once be noted that private respondent Pryce
Properties Corporation (PRYCE) directly filed with the
Court of Appeals its so-called petition for prohibition,
thereby invoking the said court’s original jurisdiction to
issue writs of prohibition under Section 9(1) of B.P. Blg.
129. As I see it, however, the principal cause of action
therein is one for declaratory relief: to declare null and
unconstitutional—for inter alia, having been enacted
without or in excess of jurisdiction, for impairing the
obligation of contracts, and for being inconsistent with
public policy—the challenged ordinances enacted by the
Sangguniang Panglungsod of the City of Cagayan de Oro.
The intervention therein of public respondent Philippine
Amusement and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR) further
underscores the “declaratory relief” nature of the action.
PAGCOR assails the ordinances for being contrary to the
non-impairment and equal protection clauses of the
Constitution, violative of the Local Government Code, and
against the State’s national policy declared in P.D. No.
1869. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals does not have
jurisdiction over the nature of the action. Even assuming
arguendo that the case is one for prohibition, then, under
this Court’s established policy relative to the hierarchy of
courts, the petition should have been filed with the
Regional Trial Court of Cagayan de Oro City. I find no
special or compelling reason why it was not filed with the

said court. I do not wish to entertain the thought that
PRYCE
277
VOL. 234, JULY 20, 1994 277

doubted a favorable verdict therefrom, in which case the

filing of the petition with the Court of Appeals may have
been impelled by tactical considerations. A dismissal of the
petition by the Court of Appeals would have been in order
pursuant to our decisions in People vs. Cuaresma (172
SCRA 415, [1989]) and Defensor-Santiago vs. Vasquez (217
SCRA 633 [1993]). In Cuaresma, this Court stated:
“A last word. This court’s original jurisdiction to issue writs of

certiorari (as well as prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto,
habeas corpus and injunction) is not exclusive. It is shared by this
Court with Regional Trial Courts (formerly Courts of First
Instance), which may issue the writ, enforceable in any part of
their respective regions. It is also shared by this court, and by the
Regional Trial Court, with the Court of Appeals (formerly
Intermediate Appellate Court), although prior to the effectivity of
Batas Pambansa Bilang 129 on August 14, 1981, the latter’s
competence to issue the extraordinary writs was restricted by
those ‘in aid of its appellate jurisdiction.’ This concurrence of
jurisdiction is not, however, to be taken as according to parties
seeking any of the writs an absolute, unrestrained freedom of
choice of the court to which application therefor will be directed.
There is after all a hierarchy of courts. That hierarchy is
determinative of the venue of appeals, and should also serve as a
general determinant of the appropriate forum for petitions for the
extraordinary writs. A becoming regard for that judicial hierarchy
most certainly indicates that petitions for the issuance of
extraordinary writs against first level (`inferior’) courts should be
filed with the Regional Trial Court, and those against the latter,
with the Court of Appeals. A direct invocation of the Supreme
Court’s original jurisdiction to issue these writs should be allowed
only when there are special and important reasons therefor,
clearly and specifically set out in the petition. This is established
policy. It is a policy that is necessary to prevent inordinate
demands upon the Court’s time and attention which are better
devoted to those matters within its exclusive jurisdiction, and to
prevent further over-crowding of the Court’s docket. Indeed, the
removal of the restriction of the jurisdiction of the Court of
Appeals in this regard, supra—resulting from the deletion of the
qualifying phrase, ‘in aid of its appellate jurisdiction’—was

evidently intended precisely to relieve this Court pro tanto of the
burden of dealing with applications for extraordinary writs which,
but for the expansion of the Appellate Court’s corresponding
jurisdiction, wouldhave had to be filed with it.” (citations omitted)
And in Vasquez, this Court said:

278

“One final observation. We discern in the proceedings in this case

a propensity on the part of petitioner, and, for that matter, the
same may be said of a number of litigants who initiate recourses
before us, to disregard the hierarchy of courts in our judicial
system by seeking relief directly from this Court despite the fact
that the same is available in the lower courts in the exercise of
their original or concurrent jurisdiction, or is even mandated by
law to be sought therein. This practice must be stopped, not only
because of the imposition upon the previous time of this Court but
also because of the inevitable and resultant delay, intended or
otherwise, in the adjudication of the case which often has to be
remanded or referred to the lower court as the proper forum
under the rules of procedure, or as better equipped to resolve the
issues since this Court is not a trier of facts. We, therefore,
reiterate the judicial policy that this Court will not entertain
direct resort to it unless the redress desired cannot be obtained in
the appropriate courts or where exceptional and compelling
circumstances justify availment of a remedy within and calling for
the exercise of our primary jurisdiction.”
II.
The challenged ordinances are (a) Ordinance No. 3353
entitled, “An ordinance Prohibiting the Issuance of
Business Permit and Canceling Existing Business Permit
To Any Establishment for the Using and Allowing to be
Used Its Premises or Portion Thereof for the Operation of
Casino.” and (b) Ordinance No. 3375-93 entitled, “An
Ordinance Prohibiting the Operation of Casino and
Providing Penalty for Violation Therefor.” They were
enacted to implement Resolution No. 2295 entitled,
“Resolution Declaring As a Matter of Policy to Prohibit
and/or Not to Allow the Establishment of the Gambling
Casino in the City of Cagayan de Oro,” which was
promulgated on 19 November 1990—nearly two years
before PRYCE and PAGCOR entered into a contract of

lease under which the latter leased a portion of the former’s
Pryce Plaza Hotel for the operation of a gambling casino—
which resolution was vigorously reiterated in Resolution
No. 2673 of 19 October 1992.
The challenged ordinances were enacted pursuant to the
Sangguniang Panlungsod’s express powers conferred by
Section 458, paragraph (a), subparagraphs (1)-(v), (3)-(ii),
and (4)-(i), (iv), and (vii), Local Government Code, and
pursuant to its implied power under Section 16 thereof (the
general welfare clause) which reads:
279
VOL. 234, JULY 20, 1994 279

“Sec.16. General Welfare.—Every local government unit shall

exercise the powers expressly granted, those necessarily implied
therefrom, as well as powers necessary, appropriate, or incidental
for its efficient and effective governance, and those which are
essential to the promotion of the general welfare. Within their
respective territorial jurisdictions, local government units shall
ensure and support, among other things, the preservation and
enrichment of culture, promote health and safety, enhance the
right of the people to a balanced ecology, encourage and support
the development of appropriate and self-reliant scientific and
technological capabilities, improve public morals, enhance
economic prosperity and social justice, promote full employment
among their residents, maintain peace and order, and preserve
the comfort and convenience of their inhabitants.”
The issue that necessarily arises is whether in granting

local governments (such as the City of Cagayan de Oro) the
above powers and functions, the Local Government Code
has, pro tanto, repealed P.D. No. 1869 insofar as
PAGCOR’s general authority to establish and maintain
gambling casinos anywhere in the Philippines is concerned.
I join the majority in holding that the ordinances cannot
repeal P.D. No. 1869.
III.
The nullification by the Court of Appeals of the challenged
ordinances as unconstitutional primarily because it is in
contravention to P.D. No. 1869 is unwarranted. A
contravention of a law is not necessarily a contravention of
the constitution. In any case, the ordinances can still stand
even if they be conceded as offending P.D. No. 1869. They
can be reconciled, which is not impossible to do. So

reconciled, the ordinances should be construed as not
applying to PAGCOR.
IV.
From the pleadings, it is obvious that the government and
the people of Cagayan de Oro City are, for obvious reasons,
strongly against the opening of the gambling casino in their
city. Gambling, even if legalized, would be inimical to the
general welfare of the inhabitants of the city, or of any
place for that matter. The
280

Lucero vs. Commission on Elections
PAGCOR, as a government-owned corporation, must

consider the valid concerns of the people of the City of
Cagayan de Oro and should not impose its will upon them
in an arbitrary, if not despotic, manner.
Petition denied; Challenged decision affirmed.
Notes.—Properties of the local government which are

devoted to public service are deemed public and are under
the absolute control of Congress. Hence, local governments
have no authority whatsoever to control or regulate the use
of public properties unless specific authority is vested upon
them by Congress (Macasiano vs. Diokno, 212 SCRA 464
[1992]).
As a matter of policy, direct recourse to the Supreme
Court should not be allowed where relief is available from
lower courts (Gelindon vs. De la Rama, 228 SCRA 322
[1993]).
——o0o——
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1/24/2020 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 234

VOL. 234, JULY 20, 1994 255

MAYOR PABLO P. MAGTAJAS & THE CITY OF

Constitutional Law; Separation of Powers; Gambling; The

3) It must not be partial or discriminatory; 4) It must not prohibit

256 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Magtajas vs. Pryce Properties Corp., Inc.

Same; Gambling; Statutory Construction; Local Government

the national lawmaking authority. In their view, the decree has

VOL. 234, JULY 20, 1994 257

Magtajas vs. Pryce Properties Corp., Inc.

is to be given its accepted meaning. Local government units have

effort to reconcile them, remembering that both laws deserve a

258 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Magtajas vs. Pryce Properties Corp., Inc.

hold that under the Local Government Code, local government

conducting a lottery as authorized by R.A. 1169 and B.P. 42 or

VOL. 234, JULY 20, 1994 259

Magtajas vs. Pryce Properties Corp., Inc.

legislature is still the principal of the local government units,

PADILLA, J., Concurring:

Gambling; It is worth remembering that 1) what is legal is not

260 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

DAVIDE, JR., J., Concurring:

Pleadings and Practice; Prohibition; Court of Appeals;

invoking the said court’s original jurisdiction to issue writs of

VOL. 234, JULY 20, 1994 261

Magtajas vs. Pryce Properties Corp., Inc.

matter. The PAGCOR, as a government-owned corporation, must

PETITION for review of a decision of the Court of Appeals.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

There was instant opposition when PAGCOR announced

ORDINANCE NO. 3353

AN ORDINANCE PROHIBITING THE ISSUANCE OF

262 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

SECTION1.—That pursuant to the policy of the city banning

a) Suspension of the business permit for sixty (60) days for

SECTION4.—This Ordinance shall take effect ten (10) days

Nor was this all. On January 4, 1993, it adopted a sterner

ORDINANCE NO. 3375-93

AN ORDINANCE PROHIBITING THE OPERATION OF

WHEREAS, the City Council established a policy as early as 1990

VOL. 234, JULY 20, 1994 263

measure to suppress any activity inimical to public morals and

BE IT ORDAINED by the City Council in session duly

a) Administrative fine of P5,000.00 shall be imposed against

SECTION3.—This Ordinance shall take effect ten (10) days

Pryce assailed the ordinances before the Court of Appeals,

1 Rollo, pp. 64-94.

264 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

1. Under existing laws, the Sangguniang Panlungsod

PAGCOR is a corporation created directly by P.D. 1869 to

SEC.16.—General Welfare.—Every local government unit shall

essential to the promotion of the general welfare. Within their

4 197 SCRA 53.

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encourage and support the development of appropriate and self-

In addition, Section 458 of the said Code specifically

Sec.458.—Powers, Duties, Functions and Compensation.—(a) The