Torres v. Limjap

Title: Torres v.
Limjap,
[G.R. No. 34385] [September 21, 1931]
PONENTE: JOHNSON, J. NATURE:
FACTS:
a) Plaintiffs alleged that Jose B. Henson, in his lifetime, executed a chattel mortgage on his drug store
Farmacia Henson to secure a loan of Php 7,000, though the instrument was made to appear worth Php
20,000 on the loan.
b) The defendant, the special administrator of deceased Jose B. Henson, denied the allegations and set up a
defense construing that chattel mortgages are null and void for lack of sufficient particularity in the
description of properties that were mortgaged.
c) A judgement was rendered by the lower courts favoring the plaintiff and against the defendant.
d) Defendant appealed, made multiple assignment of errors of the lower courts, citing:
i. The lower court erred in failing to make a finding on the question of the sufficiency of the
description of the chattels mortgaged and in failing to hold that the chattel mortgages were null
and void for lack of particularly in the description of the chattels mortgaged.
ii. The lower court erred in refusing to allow the defendant to introduce evidence tending to show
that the stock of merchandise found in the two drug stores was not in existence or owned by the
mortgagor at the time of the execution of the mortgages in question.
iii. The lower court erred in holding that the administrator of the deceased is now estopped from
contesting the validity of the mortgages in question.
iv. The lower court erred in failing to make a finding on the counterclaims of the defendant."
e) Defendant then insists that a stipulation authorizing the disposal and substitution of chattels mortgage
does not operate to extend the mortgage to after-acquired party, and that such stipulation is in
contravention of the express provision of the last paragraph of section 7 Act No. 1508, which provides
that
“A chattel mortgage shall be deemed to cover only the property described therein and not like or
substituted property thereafter acquired by the mortgagor and placed in the same depository as the
property originally mortgaged, anything in the mortgage to the contrary notwithstanding”.
ISSUE/S:
The Issue/s:
a. Whether or not the provision in the chattel mortgage law actually extends coverage to that of an after-
acquired property is legal, valid, and binding. (YES)
b. Whether or not plaintiffs violated the last paragraph of Section 7 Act No. 1508. (NO)
DOCTRINES | HELD:
RULING:
In order to give a correct construction to the above-quoted provision of our Chattel Mortgage Law, the spirit and
intent of the law must first be ascertained. The primary aim of that law-making body was undoubtedly to
promote business and trade in these Islands and to give impetus to the economic development of the country. In
the interpretation and construction of a statute the intent of the law-maker should always be ascertained and
given effect, and courts will not follow the letter of a statute when it leads away from the true intent and purpose
1
of the Legislature and to conclusions inconsistent with the spirit of the Act. A stipulation in the mortgage,
extending its scope and effect to after-acquired property, is valid and binding. Cobbey, a well-known authority
on Chattel Mortgages, recognizes the validity of stipulations relating to after-acquired and substituted chattels.
Hence, the court held that the provision of the last paragraph of section 7 of Act No. 1508 is not applicable to
drug stores, bazaars and all other stores in the nature of a revolving and floating business and that the stipulation
in the chattel mortgages in question, extending their effect to after-acquired property, is valid and binding.
The judgment appealed from is in accordance with the facts and the law, and the same should be and is hereby
affirmed, with costs.
NOTES:
The Intent of a Statute is the Law. — If a statute is valid it is to have effect according to the purpose and
intent of the lawmaker. The intent is the vital part, the essence of the law, and the primary rule of construction is
to ascertain and give effect to that intent. The intention of the legislature in enacting a law is the law itself, and
must be enforced when ascertained, although it may not be consistent with the strict letter of the statute. Courts
will not follow the letter of the statute. Courts will not follow the letter of a statute when it leads away from the
true intent and purpose of the legislature and to conclusions inconsistent with the general purpose of the act.
Intent is the spirit which gives life to a legislative enactment. In construing statutes the proper course is to start
out and follow the true intent of the legislature and to adopt that sense which harmonized best with the context
and promotes in the fullest manner the apparent policy and objects of the legislature." (Vol. II Sutherland,
Statutory Construction, pp. 693-695.)
A stipulation in the mortgage, extending its scope and effect to after-acquired property, is valid and binding —
". . . where the after-acquired property is in renewal of, or in substitution for, goods on hand when the mortgage
was executed, or is purchased with the proceeds of the sale of such goods, etc." (11 C. J., p. 436.)

Torres v. Limjap

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

Torres v. Limjap

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Title

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

Torres v. Limjap

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

Title: Torres v.

You might also like