CREW v. Cheney Et Al: Regarding VP Records: 12/8/08 - Cheney's Motion To Dismiss
CREW v. Cheney Et Al: Regarding VP Records: 12/8/08 - Cheney's Motion To Dismiss
CREW v. Cheney Et Al: Regarding VP Records: 12/8/08 - Cheney's Motion To Dismiss
INTRODUCTION
Congress “declin[ed] to give outsiders the right to interfere with [the Vice President’s]
recordkeeping practices, . . . presumably rel[ying] on the fact that subsequent [Vice] Presidents
would honor their statutory obligations to keep a complete record of their administrations.”
Armstrong v. Bush, 924 F.2d 282, 290 (D.C. Cir. 1991). Consistent with that finding, courts
have concluded that the PRA does not furnish private parties with either a right to seek the Vice
President’s compliance with the PRA or a remedy for any perceived violations, and have
concluded that the PRA is a statute that precludes judicial review under the Administrative
Nonetheless, on precisely those grounds, plaintiffs urge this Court to review the “policies
and guidelines implementing the PRA with respect to the records of the Vice President.” Am.
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Compl. ¶¶ 47-72. On at least three threshold grounds that deprive this Court of subject matter
jurisdiction, each of plaintiffs’ claims must be dismissed. First, the Presidential Records Act
does not provide plaintiffs any private rights or remedies for perceived PRA violations and
plaintiffs may not rely on the PRA for relief, or as a ground on which to seek declaratory or
mandamus relief. Armstrong v. Bush, 721 F. Supp. 343, 348-49 (D.D.C. 1989), rev’d in part on
Second, because the APA applies only to “agencies,” and furthermore excepts from
review actions where “statutes preclude judicial review,” or where “agency action is committed
to agency discretion by law,” plaintiffs are entitled to no relief here. 5 U.S.C. §§ 701(a)(1),
701(a)(2). Neither the Office of the Vice President nor the Vice President is an “agency” within
the meaning of the APA and neither may be sued for relief under it. In addition, consistent with
separation of powers principles, the “PRA precludes judicial review of the [Vice] President’s
recordkeeping practices and decisions” under controlling D.C. Circuit law. Armstrong v. Bush,
924 F.2d 282, 291 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (“Armstrong I”). The D.C. Circuit did not alter that
conclusion in permitting judicial review of “guidelines describing which existing materials will
be treated as presidential records in the first place,” which is properly limited to the context of
adjudicating judicially-reviewable Federal Records Act and Freedom of Information Act claims.
Armstrong v. Bush, 1 F.3d 1274, 1294 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (Armstrong II). As the D.C. Circuit later
confirmed, “record-keeping requirements of the FRA are subject to judicial review and
enforcement; those of the PRA are not.” Armstrong v. Bush, 90 F.3d 553, 556 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
For the same reasons, the Vice President’s implementation of the PRA is committed to his
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Third, plaintiffs fall far short of bearing their burden of showing a “substantial
probability” that they present a case or controversy within the meaning of Article III of the
Constitution. Sierra Club v. Environ. Protection Ag., 292 F. 3d 895, 899 (D.C. Cir. 2002).
Indeed, they cannot because the record establishes that the OVP has applied the PRA to all
“documentary materials, or any reasonably segregable portion thereof, created or received by the
[Vice] President, his immediate staff, or a unit or individual of the [Office of the Vice President]
whose function is to advise and assist the [Vice] President, in the course of conducting activities
which relate to or have an effect upon the carrying out of the constitutional, statutory or other
official or ceremonial duties of the [Vice] President.” 44 U.S.C. § 2201(2). Because the OVP
(comprised of employees and officers, including the Vice President) have complied fully with
their obligations under the PRA, plaintiffs can claim no injury upon which to stake their claims.
Nor do plaintiffs establish that their claimed injuries are imminent as opposed to conjectural.
See Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Organization, 426 U.S. 26, 44 (1976). Indeed,
none has established that it previously submitted FOIA requests for vice presidential records
from past administrations or proves that it will seek the records at issue in this litigation in the
future. Just as courts in this circuit have dismissed like claims for absence of standing, this Court
Plaintiffs invite this Court to intrude on the day-to-day operations of the Vice President
and to delve into the “separation of powers concerns that were implicated by legislation
regulating the conduct of the [Vice] President’s daily operations” that Congress “sought
assiduously to minimize.” Armstrong I, 924 F.2d at 290. Because the PRA “accords the [Vice]
President virtually complete control over his records during his term in office,” and because no
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law provides this Court with subject matter jurisdiction to accept plaintiffs’ invitation, plaintiffs’
In the alternative—and only if the Court does not dismiss any of plaintiffs’ claims for
lack of jurisdiction or failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted for the grounds
described above—defendants are entitled to summary judgment on each of the claims. The OVP
has complied fully with the PRA through recordkeeping guidance that requires preservation of
all vice presidential records as defined in the PRA. And no policy or guideline purportedly
issued by any other defendant changes the result. Summary judgment should be granted on
BACKGROUND
Sections 2201 through 2207 of title 44 of the United States Code, commonly called the
Presidential Records Act of 1978 or PRA, sets forth a scheme for the preservation and disclosure
of vice presidential records. Section 2207 provides that “Vice-Presidential records shall be
subject to the provisions” of the PRA “in the same manner as Presidential records,” and that “the
duties and responsibilities of the Vice President, with respect to Vice-Presidential records, shall
be the same as the duties and responsibilities of the President under [the PRA] with respect to
Under the PRA, the Vice President is thereby directed to take “all such steps as may be
necessary to assure that the activities, deliberations, decisions, and policies that reflect the
performance of his constitutional, statutory or other official or ceremonial duties are adequately
documented and that such records are maintained . . . .” 44 U.S.C. §§ 2203(a), 2207. The PRA
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portion thereof, created or received by the [Vice] President, his immediate staff, or a unit or
individual of the [Office of the Vice President] whose function is to advise and assist the [Vice]
President, in the course of conducting activities which relate to or have an effect upon the
carrying out of the constitutional, statutory, or other official or ceremonial duties of the [Vice]
President.” Id. § 2201(2). The PRA expressly excludes from the scope of “vice presidential
records” any “official records of an agency (as defined in section 552(e) of Title 5, United States
Code); personal records; stocks of publications and stationery; or extra copies of documents
produced only for convenience of reference, when such copies are clearly so identified.” Id.
purely private or nonpublic character which do not relate to or have an effect upon the carrying
out of the constitutional, statutory, or other official or ceremonial duties of the [Vice] President.”
Id. § 2201(3).
During the Vice President’s term, “the PRA accords [him] virtually complete control
over his records during his term of office.” Armstrong v. Bush, 924 F.2d 282, 290 (D.C. Cir.
1991). Accordingly, the PRA does not authorize the Archivist to “promulgate guidelines or
regulations to assist [the Vice President] in the development of a records management system,”
and does not permit the Archivist to “inspect the [Vice] President’s records or survey the [Vice]
President’s records management practices.” Id. Nor does the Archivist have the “authority to
veto the [Vice] President’s disposal decisions.” Id. Only upon the conclusion of the Vice
President’s term of office does the Archivist assume responsibility for the custody, control, and
preservation of, and access to, the vice presidential records of that Vice President. 44 U.S.C.
§ 2203(f)(1).
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II. The Office of the Vice President and Compliance with the Presidential Records Act
The vice presidency of Richard B. Cheney commenced at noon on January 20, 2001 and
will conclude at noon on January 20, 2009. In the course of conducting activities which relate to
or have an effect upon the carrying out of the constitutional, statutory, or other official or
ceremonial duties of the Vice President, employees and officers, including the Vice President, of
the Office of the Vice President (“OVP”) have, since January 20, 2001, created or received
records and have maintained them as vice presidential records under the PRA. And the OVP has
been carrying out—and intends to continue to carry out—section 2207 with respect to vice
presidential records until the conclusion of the vice presidency of Richard B. Cheney, when the
Archivist assumes custody, control, and an obligation to preserve the records. Indeed, the OVP
has applied the PRA to all “documentary materials, or any reasonably segregable portion thereof,
created or received by the [Vice] President, his immediate staff, or a unit of individual of the
[Office of the Vice President] whose function is to advise and assist the [Vice] President, in the
course of conducting activities which relate to or have an effect upon the carrying out of the
constitutional, statutory or other official or ceremonial duties of the [Vice] President.” 44 U.S.C.
In addition, the OVP has not relied upon Executive Order 13,233 or any guidelines issued
by the other defendants to exclude any vice presidential records from the requirements of
section 2207. Specifically, the OVP has not excluded from its obligations under section 2207
any vice presidential records that relate to the constitutional, statutory, or other official or
ceremonial duties of the Vice President as the President of the Senate, as plaintiffs specifically
allege. As a result, the OVP has carried out—and intends to continue to carry out—section 2207
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with respect to vice presidential records, for all of the Vice President’s official functions as the
PRA requires. Indeed, the OVP intends to deposit with the Archivist the vice presidential
records of the vice presidency of Richard B. Cheney within its possession, custody or control by
In their four-count Amended Complaint, plaintiffs seek judicial review of the “policies
and guidelines implementing the PRA with respect to the records of the vice president,” as well
as defendants’ “implementation of those policies and guidelines” under the PRA. Am. Compl.
¶¶ 49-50. Plaintiffs allege that the Office of the Vice President has not been maintaining all vice
presidential records within the meaning of the PRA, allegedly by relying on language from
Executive Order 13,233, purportedly limiting PRA requirements to “executive records of the
Vice President.” Id. ¶¶ 27-28. Relying on assertions that the Vice President is not a part of the
Executive Branch and inferring from those assertions that records created by the Vice President
are not “executive records,” plaintiffs allege “on information and belief” only that the OVP has
“adopted policies and guidelines that exclude from the reach of the PRA all but a narrow
category of vice presidential records created or received in the very limited circumstances in
which the vice president deems himself to be acting as part of the Executive Branch.” Id. ¶ 35;
see also id. ¶ 57. Similarly, plaintiffs allege that defendants “exclude from the reach of the PRA
records generated or received by vice presidents in their congressional capacities, i.e., when they
preside over the Senate and break a tie in the Senate votes.” Id. ¶ 37. Plaintiffs contend that
“Vice President Cheney will take with him as personal papers or otherwise dispose of a
significant percentage of those records, including records that pertain to the carrying out of his
legislative duties and functions.” Id. ¶ 41; see also id. ¶ 44.
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In Claim One, plaintiffs seek relief from the Vice President, OVP and the Executive
Office of the President under the PRA and the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201-
2202, requesting a declaration that “guidelines . . . implementing the PRA in a manner that
excludes from its reach the records that the vice president and his office create and receive in the
course of conducting activities relating to or having an effect on the carrying out of the vice
implementation of those guidelines are contrary to law.” Id. ¶ 52. On those same grounds,
plaintiffs seek mandamus relief against the Vice President and OVP in Claim Two, 28 U.S.C.
§ 1361, asserting an entitlement to enforcement of the Vice President’s “statutory duty to treat as
subject to the PRA all records of the vice president and his office that relate to the exercise of his
constitutional, statutory, and other official or ceremonial duties.” Id. ¶ 58. In Claim 3, plaintiffs
seek a declaration that alleged guidelines of the National Archives and Records Administration
(“NARA”) and the Archivist are unlawful to the extent they exclude “legislative records” from
the scope of the PRA. In addition, plaintiffs seek APA review of the Archivist’s guidelines
purportedly excluding legislative records from the PRA, 5 U.S.C. § 706, and APA review of the
“vice president’s and OVP’s guidelines implementing the PRA in a manner that excludes from
its reach all of the records that the vice president and his office create and receive.” Id. ¶¶ 63,
64. In Claim Four, plaintiffs seek mandamus relief against the Archivist and NARA.
ARGUMENT
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) permits a defendant to move to dismiss a claim
on the ground, among others, that the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction because the plaintiffs
lack standing, or because the United States has not waived its sovereign immunity. In contrast to
a motion to dismiss brought under Rule 12(b)(6), when a party moves to dismiss a complaint for
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lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1), a court may consider the motion based on
the complaint standing alone or, where necessary, on the complaint “supplemented by
undisputed facts evidenced in the record, or the complaint supplemented by undisputed facts plus
the court’s resolution of disputed facts.” Herbert v. Nat’l Acad. of Sci., 974 F.2d 192, 197 (D.C.
Cir. 1992). Upon motion, the plaintiff then bears the burden to prove by a preponderance of the
evidence that the court has jurisdiction to hear its claims. Indeed, it is “presume[d] that federal
courts lack jurisdiction unless the contrary appears affirmatively from the record.”
DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 342 n.3 (2006). When reviewing a motion to
dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, “the court need not accept inferences drawn by plaintiffs if such
inferences are unsupported by the facts set out in the complaint. Nor must the court accept legal
conclusions cast in the form of factual allegations.” Kowal v. MCI Commun. Corp., 16 F.3d
1271, 1276 (D.C. Cir. 1994). In the court’s analysis, plaintiffs’ “factual allegations in the
complaint . . . will bear closer scrutiny in resolving a 12(b)(1) motion than in resolving a 12(b)(6)
motion.” Blancett v. United States Bureau of Land Mgmt., No. 04-2152, 2006 WL 696050
To withstand a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6), a
complaint must contain “more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the
elements of a cause of action will not do. Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to
relief above the speculative level on the assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are
true (even if doubtful in fact).” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1965 (2007)
(footnote omitted) (citations omitted). In evaluating the sufficiency of the complaint, the Court
considers only “the facts alleged in the complaint, any documents either attached to or
incorporated in the complaint and matters of which [the Court] may take judicial notice.” See
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EEOC v. St. Francis Xavier Parochial Sch., 117 F.3d 621, 624 (D.C. Cir. 1997). The rules of
pleading require factual allegations “plausibly suggesting,” and “not merely consistent with,” the
elements of a valid claim for relief, and plaintiffs must comply with the “threshold requirement
of Rule 8(a)(2) that the ‘plain statement’ possess enough heft to ‘show that the pleader is entitled
If (and only if) any of plaintiffs’ claims are not dismissed for the reasons elaborated
below, summary judgment on behalf of the defendants is appropriate because the pleadings and
the evidence establish that “there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving
party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law” under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c). Id.
In a case involving a challenge to a “final agency action” under the Administrative Procedure
Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706 (“APA”), however, the standard set forth in Rule 56(c) “does not apply
because of the limited role of a court in reviewing the administrative record.” Sierra Club v.
Mainella, 459 F. Supp. 2d 76, 89 (D.D.C. 2006). “Under the APA, it is the role of the agency to
resolve factual issues to arrive at a decision that is supported by the administrative record,
whereas the function of the district court is to determine whether or not as a matter of law the
evidence in the administrative record permitted the agency to make the decision it did.” Id. at
89-90. “Summary judgment thus serves as the mechanism for deciding, as a matter of law,
whether the agency action is supported by the administrative record and otherwise consistent
I. The PRA Does Not Provide A Judicially-Enforceable Right to Pursue Private Actions in
Federal Court
The court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over plaintiffs’ PRA, declaratory judgment and
mandamus claims because the PRA does not provide a private right enforceable through private
remedies. See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 52, 58, 65, 71-72. First, it is axiomatic that courts may not infer
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causes of action absent clear language establishing both a federal right and remedy. In a
consistent line of cases beginning with Cannon v. Univ. of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677 (1979), the
Supreme Court has made clear that absent language that clearly creates judicially-enforceable
rights, courts must not imply a cause of action. Indeed, the Supreme Court recently emphasized
that implying rights of action “runs contrary to the established principle that the jurisdiction of
the federal courts is carefully guarded against expansion by judicial interpretation.” Stoneridge
Inv. Partners, L.L.C. v. Scientific-Atlanta, 128 S. Ct. 761, 772-73 (2008) (internal quotation
right, “a cause of action does not exist and courts may not create one, no matter how desirable
that might be as a policy matter[.]” Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 286-87 (2001).
Consistent with this established law, the Supreme Court held in Kissinger v. Reporters
Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 445 U.S. 136 (1980), that the Federal Records Act does not
create any private enforceable rights. Instead, the Court explained that the Federal Records Act
was intended “not to benefit private parties, but solely to benefit the agencies themselves and the
Federal Government as a whole.” Id. at 149. Accordingly, the Supreme Court held that the FRA
had “not vested federal courts with jurisdiction to adjudicate” FRA compliance “upon suit by
private party.” Id. at 149-50. So too here with the PRA. “For purposes of the private right of
action inquiry, the PRA is largely indistinguishable from the FRA; accordingly, . . . no private
action may be maintained directly under either statute in federal court.” Armstrong v. Bush, 721
F. Supp. 343, 348-49 (D.D.C. 1989), rev’d in part on other grounds, 924 F.2d 282 (D.C. Cir.
1991).
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The PRA does not provide a private right or a private remedy necessary to support
plaintiffs’ claims against any of the defendants.1 Although Congress generally “sought to
establish the public ownership of presidential records and ensure the preservation of presidential
records for public access after the termination of a President’s term in office” through the PRA,
Armstrong v. Bush, 924 F.2d 282, 290 (D.C. Cir. 1991), no language in the PRA creates rights
that may be claimed by plaintiffs for vice presidential compliance with the PRA, nor provides for
private enforcement of its terms. See 44 U.S.C. §§ 2201-2207. Like the FRA, the PRA merely
“proscribes certain conduct,” and “does not create or alter any civil liabilities.”2 Kissinger, 445
U.S. at 148. As the D.C. Circuit concluded, “it is difficult to conclude that Congress intended to
allow courts, at the behest of private citizens, to rule on the adequacy of the [Vice] President’s
record management practices or overrule his records creation, management, and disposal
decisions.”3 Armstrong v. Bush, 924 F.2d at 290. Absent a private right enforceable in court
1
Neither Armstrong I nor Armstrong II address whether the PRA provides a private right of
action. Instead, both address only whether the PRA is a statute that precludes judicial review under the
APA. As controlling law establishes, no private right or remedy exists in the PRA. Thus, it is
indisputable that even the “classification” issues plaintiffs contend are appropriate for APA review remain
foreclosed for direct review under a direct cause of action brought under the PRA. Nonetheless, as shown
below, plaintiffs’ reliance on language from Armstrong II to seek judicial review of purported
“classification” issues under the APA is not permissible for PRA-, as opposed to FRA- or FOIA-, based
claims. Armstrong II stands for the limited holding that courts, in appropriate circumstances when
presented with appropriate FRA or FOIA-based claims, may review “guidelines defining presidential
records under the rubric of substantive FOIA law” to ensure that federal records were not shielded from
the reach of FOIA by being classified as presidential records. Thus even Armstrong II does not at all
disturb the conclusion that no private right of action exists under the PRA.
2
Indeed, the only private action contemplated by the PRA is for a former President to assert his
rights or privileges over records scheduled for disclosure by an Archivist. 44 U.S.C. § 2204(e).
3
The absence of a private right of action for plaintiffs to pursue their claims against the Archivist
and the National Archives and Records Administration is clear, too, by the absence of any authorization
for the Archivist to promulgate guidelines regarding “the scope of Vice President Cheney’s records
subject to the PRA.” Am. Compl. ¶ 72. As this Circuit recognized, “although the FRA authorizes the
Archivist to promulgate guidelines and regulations to assist the agencies in the development of a records
management system, the PRA lacks an analogous provision.” Armstrong, 924 F.2d at 290; see also 44
U.S.C. § 2206 (authorizing the Archivist to promulgate regulations for disposal pursuant to 44 U.S.C.
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against the government, this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over plaintiffs’ PRA claims
and they must be dismissed pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1).4 See, e.g.,
Am. Compl. ¶ 2 (relying on 28 U.S.C. § 1331 for subject matter jurisdiction); Steel Co. v.
Citizens for a Better Environ., 523 U.S. 83, 89 (1998) (explaining that courts lack subject matter
jurisdiction over causes of action that are insubstantial or “foreclosed by prior decisions of this
Court”); Clements v. Gonzales, 496 F. Supp. 2d 70, 73 n.6 (D.D.C. 2007) (dismissing for lack of
Because the PRA does not provide plaintiffs a private right to pursue here, they lack a
cause of action to pursue any declaratory judgment as well, and the court lacks subject matter
jurisdiction over the declaratory judgment requests in claims one and three. 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201-
2202; Am. Compl. ¶¶ 52, 65. It is well-settled that “the availability of [declaratory] relief
presupposes the existence of a judicially remediable right.” Schilling v. Rogers, 363 U.S. 666,
677 (1960). The PRA creates no judicially remediable rights to review the Vice President’s
record keeping or management decisions. As the Supreme Court has explained, the Declaratory
Judgment Act is “procedural only.” Skelly Oil Co., 339 U.S. at 671 (emphasis added). Through
the provisions of the Act, Congress did not enlarge the “kinds of issues which give right to
entrance to federal courts,” or “impliedly repeal[] or modif[y]” the “limited subject matters
which alone Congress had authorized the District Courts to adjudicate.” Id. at 672. Rather,
Congress simply “enlarged the range of remedies available in federal court” and only for existing
judicially remediable issues. Id. (emphasis added); see also C&E Serv., Inc. v. District of
Columbia Water & Sewer Auth., 310 F.3d 197, 201 (D.C. Cir. 2002); College Sports Council v.
§ 2203(f)(3) and for the logistics of processing and releasing records of former Presidents, there is no
analogous provision to promulgate regulations regarding an incumbent’s recordkeeping).
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Gov’t Accountability Office, 421 F. Supp. 2d 59, 70 (D.D.C. 2006) (“Because the plaintiff has
not stated any claims upon which relief can be granted, neither the Declaratory Judgment Act nor
the All Writs Act are of any value in evaluating the Court’s ability to entertain this action.”);
Superlease Rent-A-Car, Inc. v. Budget Rent-A-Car, Inc., Civ. No. 89-0300, 1989 WL 39393, *3
(D.D.C. Apr. 13, 1989) (explaining that the Act “provides no independent cause of action. The
plaintiff must assert an interest in itself, which the law recognizes. In other words, the plaintiff
must first have a cognizable cause of action under the contracts, which is precisely what
Even if the absence of a private right in the PRA did not preclude plaintiffs’ mandamus
claims, they must be dismissed because the PRA does not provide a “clear and compelling duty”
owed to plaintiffs. In re Cheney, 406 F. 3d 723, 729 (D.C. Cir. 2005). Jurisdiction under 28
‘extraordinary situations’; it is hardly ever granted; those invoking the court’s mandamus
jurisdiction must have a ‘clear and indisputable right to relief; and even if the plaintiff overcomes
all these hurdles, whether mandamus relief should issue is discretionary.” Id. Mandamus relief
is appropriate only if a plaintiff has a clear right to relief, the defendants have a clear duty to act,
and there is no other adequate remedy available to the plaintiff. PDK Labs, Inc. v. Reno, 134 F.
Supp. 2d 24, 34 (D.D.C. 2001). The duty “to be performed by the agency must be ‘ministerial
and the obligation to act peremptory, and clearly defined. The law must not only authorize the
demanded action, but require it; the duty must be clear and indisputable.” Id. A ministerial duty
“is one that admits of no discretion, so that the official in question has no authority to determine
whether to perform the duty.” Swan v. Clinton, 100 F.3d 973, 977 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
4
For the same reasons, the claims should be dismissed for failure to state a claim under
Rule 12(b)(6).
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The PRA provides only that the Vice President “shall take all such steps as may be
necessary to assure that the activities, deliberations, decisions, and policies that reflect the
performance of his constitutional, statutory, or other official or ceremonial duties are adequately
documented and that such records are maintained as [Vice] Presidential records pursuant to the
requirements of this section and other provisions of law.” 44 U.S.C. § 2203. The section fairly
exudes deference to the Vice President to “take all such steps as may be necessary,” without
defining any clear or ministerial duty appropriate for mandamus relief, or providing plaintiffs
any “clear right to relief.” Cf. Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592, 600-01 (1988) (finding phrase
“shall deem such termination necessary or advisable in the interests of the United States” to
Even if the Court were to find subject matter jurisdiction to entertain plaintiffs’ PRA,
declaratory judgment and mandamus claims, for the reasons set forth above, plaintiffs also fail to
state a claim upon which relief may be granted and they must be dismissed pursuant to
Rule 12(b)(6).
II. The Administrative Procedure Act Does Not Provide For Judicial Review of Plaintiffs’
Claims
Plaintiffs’ only surviving claim—alleged under the Administrative Procedure Act, see
Am. Compl. ¶¶ 63, 64—must be dismissed against all defendants as well.5 Because the APA
applies only to “agencies,” and excepts from review actions where “statutes preclude judicial
review,” or where “agency action is committed to agency discretion by law,” plaintiffs are
5
Plaintiffs’ APA claims are alleged in paragraphs 63 and 64 against only the Vice President, the
OVP, the Archivist and NARA. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 63-64. But an APA claim raised against “EOP” would
be dismissed for the same reasons set forth below.
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A. The Office of the Vice President and Vice President Are Not “Agencies” Within the
Meaning of the APA
The Administrative Procedure Act provides for judicial review only of “agency action.”
5 U.S.C. § 702. Neither the Vice President nor the Office of the Vice President is an “agency”
for the purposes of the APA. Am. Compl. ¶ 64. Accordingly, this Court lacks subject matter
jurisdiction over plaintiffs’ APA claims against the Vice President and OVP. Cf. Benavides v.
United States Marshal Service, Civ. No. 07-1732, 2008 WL 1869014, *1 n.1 (D.D.C. Apr. 28,
2008) (noting court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over FOIA claims against non “agency”).
Under well-established law, the President is not an “agency” subject to suit under the
APA. Franklin v. Massachusetts, 505 U.S. 788, 802-03 (1992). Because of “respect for the
separation of powers and the unique constitutional position of the President,” the Supreme Court
found that “textual silence” in 5 U.S.C. § 551(1) defining “agency,” was “not enough to subject
the President to the provisions of the APA.” Id. at 800-01. Because of the absence of a clear
statement that Congress intended to encompass the President within the meaning of “agency,”
the Supreme Court declined to subject the President to the terms of the APA. Id. The logic of
Franklin requires the same result here for the Vice President and his office, and has been
confirmed by courts expressly holding that the Vice President and OVP are not “agencies”
within the meaning of the Freedom of Information Act.6 See, e.g., Banks v. Lappin, 539 F.
Supp. 2d 228 234 (D.D.C. 2008) (dismissing action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction
6
The definition of “agency” in the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552(f)(1), expands on
the definition of “agency” in the APA. Thus an entity that is not an “agency” within the meaning of
FOIA cannot be an agency within the meaning of the APA. See Meyer v. Bush, 981 F.2d 1288, 1292
(D.C. Cir. 1993) (noting that prior to 1974 amendments to FOIA, the term “agency” in FOIA had been
adopted from the definition of “agency” in the APA).
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because Vice President and Office of the Vice President are not “agencies” within the meaning
of FOIA).7
Because plaintiffs cannot receive relief under the APA directly against the Office of the
Vice President or the Vice President, plaintiffs cannot establish any entitlement to relief under
the APA against either the Archivist or NARA. As elaborated below, plaintiffs’ claimed injuries
cannot be redressed by seeking APA relief from the Archivist and NARA because neither has the
authority “to veto the [Vice] President’s disposal decisions,” “inspect the [Vice] President’s
records or survey the [Vice] President’s records management practices.” Armstrong, 924 F.2d at
290; see also 44 U.S.C. § 2203 (providing no authority for the Archivist to overturn any records
management decisions by the Vice President or to amend or change the Vice President’s record
keeping guidelines). Neither NARA nor the Archivist may supervise the Vice President or his
office for PRA compliance, and no order from this Court may mandate it.8 Accordingly,
plaintiffs are unable to show redressability for their claims: “a ‘substantial likelihood’ that the
requested relief will remedy the alleged injury in fact.” Vermont Agency of Natural Res. v.
United States ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765, 771 (2000) (internal citation omitted). Where “the
becomes the burden of the plaintiff to adduce facts showing that those choices have been or will
be made in such manner as to produce causation and permit redressability of injury.” Nat’l
Wrestling Coaches Ass’n v. Dep’t of Educ., 366 F.3d 930, 938 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (quoting Lujan,
7
For the same reasons, plaintiffs lack a cause of action and their APA claims must be dismissed
pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6).
8
In fact, Ms. Smith testified that she was unaware of any written documents or guidance that
NARA has issued further defining or explaining the scope of the PRA with respect to vice presidential
records. Ex. 3, Smith Rough Dep. Tr. at 29:9-14; id. at 185:15-186:20 (testifying that NARA relies on
the definition of vice presidential records in the PRA).
17
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504 U.S. at 562) (internal quotation marks omitted). Plaintiffs cannot do so here and their APA
Even if the agency status of the Vice President did not bar relief on plaintiffs’ APA
claims, the PRA itself forecloses judicial review under the APA. Because the PRA is one of the
“statutes that preclude judicial review,” no APA review of the Vice President’s compliance with
the PRA is permissible. 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(1). As this Circuit explained, “permitting judicial
review of the [Vice] President’s compliance with the PRA would upset the intricate statutory
scheme Congress carefully drafted to keep in equipoise important competing political and
Through the PRA, Congress “sought to establish public ownership of [vice] presidential
records and ensure the preservation of [vice] presidential records for public access after the
termination of a [Vice] President’s term in office,” though Congress was likewise “keenly aware
of the separation of powers concerns that were implicated by legislation regulating the conduct
of the [Vice] President’s daily operations.” Id. The PRA therefore requires the Vice President
“to maintain records documenting the policies, activities and decisions of his administration, but
leav[es] the implementation of such a requirement in the [Vice] President’s hands.” Id.
(emphasis added). Accordingly, the PRA “assiduously . . . minimize[s] outside interference with
the day-to-day operations of the [Vice] President and his closest advisors and” ensures the Vice
President’s “control over [vice] presidential records during the [Vice] President’s term in
office.” Id. (emphasis added). The PRA “accords the [Vice] President virtually complete control
over his records during his term of office.” Id. Based on these limitations in the PRA, as well as
the “cautious authority for the Archivist and Congress to question the [Vice] President’s disposal
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decisions and the lack of any authority to interfere with his records management practices,” this
Court concluded that the PRA was not intended to “allow courts, at the behest of private citizens,
to rule on the adequacy of the [Vice] President’ records management practices or overrule his
records creation, management, and disposal decisions.” Id. In sum, this Circuit held that
Id. at 290-91.
The D.C. Circuit did not alter in Armstrong II its conclusion from Armstrong I that
claims grounded on the PRA may not be adjudicated under the APA. Armstrong II, 1 F.3d at
1292. Rather, the Court merely held in Armstrong II that courts could review “guidelines
defining presidential records under the rubric of substantive FOIA law” to ensure that federal
records were not shielded from the reach of FOIA by being classified as “presidential records.”
Id. (emphasis added). In other words, although Armstrong I foreclosed judicial review of PRA
claims, it did not foreclose courts from reviewing FRA- or FOIA-based claims, and examining
any relevant guidelines to determine the scope of the federal records at issue on those FRA- or
FOIA-based claims. Armstrong II thus stands for the limited holding that Armstrong I does
shield in all circumstances presidential guidelines from review when an appropriate FRA- or
FOIA-based claim, which is judicially reviewable, calls those guidelines into question.
Armstrong II did not, however, disturb the panel’s conclusion in Armstrong I that claims seeking
19
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Examining the lower court decision on review in Armstrong II confirms the limitations of
Armstrong II and its inapplicability here. As made clear through the district court opinion on
review in Armstrong II, the plaintiffs in Armstrong II filed a second amended complaint to
conform with the limits of Armstrong I by presenting only FRA- or FOIA-based claims.
Armstrong v. Bush, 139 F.R.D. 547, 550 (D.D.C. 1991) (“In the second amended complaint, the
plaintiffs allege that: (1) substantial amounts of the information on the preserved PROFS tapes
constitute “agency records” subject to the FOIA, and that the defendants have improperly
withheld those agency records which are not exempt from disclosure under the FOIA; (2) the
guidelines issued by the Executive Office of the President (“EOP”) and the NSC are arbitrary
and capricious in violation of the FRA because they authorize destruction of agency records; (3)
certain general schedules, promulgated by the Archivist, which authorize the disposal of certain
electronic records after the lapse of specified periods of time, are arbitrary and capricious
because they authorize the disposal of agency records; and (4) the Archivist has violated his
statutory duty to initiate action to stop improper destruction of agency records on the PROFS
system. See Second Amended Complaint at 11-14.”). The plaintiffs there did not, however, seek
judicial review of a PRA-claim under the APA or raise any claims grounded on the PRA. As the
plaintiffs stated, their “Second Amended Complaint, in response to the court of appeals’
conclusion that judicial review of compliance with the Presidential Records Act is not available,
omits plaintiffs’ claims for relief under that Act.” See Ex. 4, Armstrong v. Bush, Civ. No. 89-
0142, Mot. for Leave to File Am. Compl. & 2d Am. Compl. at 1 (emphasis added).
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In the course of discovery on those FRA- and FOIA-based claims, the Armstrong
plaintiffs requested access to presidential records guidelines from the National Security Council,
which at the time was thought to create both FRA and PRA records, on “types of records [that]
should be preserved as agency records pursuant to the FRA, but others [as] ‘Presidential records’
pursuant to the PRA, or ‘convenience records.’” 139 F.R.D. at 551. In that context, the
plaintiffs argued “that the classification scheme as it distinguishes among the various types of
records directly bears on the adequacy of the guidelines for preserving records under the FRA,
since Presidential records are not governed by FRA procedures and involve different rules of
preservation and public access.” Id. (emphasis added). The defendants, in turn, broadly argued
“that the question of how Presidential records are classified is one that was specifically held not
subject to judicial review by the Court of Appeals and is therefore beyond the scope of
discovery.” Id. The district court agreed with defendants and concluded “that PRA precludes
It is that sweeping conclusion with which the D.C. Circuit disagreed in Armstrong II. As
the Armstrong II panel explained, the “Armstrong I opinion does not stand for the unequivocal
proposition that all decisions made pursuant to the PRA are immune from judicial review.”
Armstrong II, 1 F.3d 1293. In limited circumstances where the scope of presidential guidelines
may encompass federal records, those “guidelines describing which existing materials will be
treated as presidential records in the first place” may be subject to judicial review pursuant to
FRA or FOIA-based claims, and even then only “under the rubric of substantive FOIA law” to
ensure that federal records are not encompassed within the guidelines. Id. at 1293, 1294. As the
Armstrong III court confirmed after Armstrong II was issued, Armstrong I remains good law.
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Armstrong v. Bush, 90 F.3d 553, 556 (D.C. Cir. 1996). “[R]ecord-keeping requirements of the
FRA are subject to judicial review and enforcement; those of the PRA are not.” Id. at 556.
This prohibition on review of PRA claims is consonant with the reach of the APA. As
Kissinger and its progeny make clear, no private right of action exists under the PRA. See
discussion infra part I. And under the APA, only “agencies” may be sued for relief. Because the
“coverage of the FRA is coextensive with the definition of ‘agency’ in the FOIA,” any PRA-
covered entity would not be an “agency” within the meaning of FOIA and could not be sued
under the APA for PRA relief. See Armstrong III, 90 F.3d at 556 (“The FRA describes a class of
materials that are federal records subject to its provisions, and the PRA describes another
mutually exclusive set of materials that are subject to a different and less rigorous regime.”).
This absence of available parties to sue under the APA9 simply underscores what Armstrong I
teaches and what Armstrong II leaves intact: no APA review may obtain for claims seeking
Here, plaintiffs do not allege any FRA- or FOIA-based claims, or allege that the Vice
President’s recordkeeping guidelines sweep in FRA covered records within their scope,
unlawfully shielding federal records from judicial review. See generally Am. Compl. Plaintiffs
instead raise only PRA-based claims. As such, plaintiffs’ claims are squarely foreclosed by
Armstrong I. They present exactly the request “for judicial review of the [Vice] President’s
compliance with the PRA at the behest of private litigants” that Armstrong I forbids. Because
9
And as shown above and elaborated below, plaintiffs’ claimed injuries cannot be redressed by
seeking relief against “agencies” like the National Archives or the Archivist because neither has the
authority to manage the Vice President’s recordkeeping practices or supervise his guidelines.
10
At the time of Armstrong I and Armstrong II, the “agency” status of the National Security
Council had not been determined for the purposes of FOIA and the FRA. In Armstrong III, the D.C.
Circuit made clear that the NSC is not an agency within the meaning of FOIA. Accordingly, its records
22
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plaintiffs’ claims “substantially upset Congress’ carefully crafted balance of presidential control
of records creation, management and disposal during the President’s term of office,” they remain
prohibited by Armstrong I, are not reviewable under the APA, and must be dismissed.11
As a result, plaintiffs’ APA claims regarding PRA compliance remain unreviewable, and
the inapplicability of the waiver of sovereign immunity provided in the APA poses an additional
jurisdictional defect. See, e.g., Council on American Islamic Relations v. Ballenger, 444 F.3d
659, 661 (D.C. Cir. 2006). Where, as here, a statute precludes review under the APA, the APA
does not waive the United States’s sovereign immunity. See 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(1) (explaining
that the APA applies except to the extent that “statutes preclude judicial review”); Heckler v.
Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 828 (1985) (noting that APA review is inappropriate unless a plaintiff
“clear[s] the hurdle of § 701(a)”); High Country Citizens Alliance v. Clarke, 454 F.3d 1177,
1181 (10th Cir. 2006) (“In other words, before the waiver of sovereign immunity under § 702
applies, ‘a party must first clear the hurdle of § 701(a).’ ”); Tozzi v. EPA, 148 F. Supp. 2d 35, 43
(D.D.C. 2001) (“The APA’s sovereign immunity waiver does not apply where a statute has
explicitly precluded judicial review.”). Without a waiver of sovereign immunity, the Court lacks
subject matter jurisdiction and the claims must be dismissed under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(1).
C. Even if the Vice President and the OVP Were Construed as Agencies under the
APA, PRA Compliance would be Committed to their Discretion by Law
In addition to the above bars to suit, APA review would not be permissible because PRA
compliance for vice presidential records is committed to the Vice President’s discretion by law.
were subject to the PRA and not the FRA or FOIA. Consequently, the NSC is now not subject to suit
under the APA or for claims pursuant to the PRA.
11
Because the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over these APA claims seeking review under
the PRA, plaintiffs’ APA claims should be dismissed pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1). For the same reasons,
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5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2). “Agency” action is unreviewable, when, as here, “statutes are drawn in
such broad terms that in a given case there is no law to apply.” S. Rep. No. 752, 79th Cong., 1st
Sess., 26 (1945). “Even where Congress has not affirmatively precluded review, review is not to
be had if the statute is drawn so that a court would have no meaningful standard against which to
judge the agency’s exercise of discretion. In such a case, the statute (‘law’) can be taken to have
‘committed’ the decisionmaking to the agency’s judgment absolutely.” Heckler v. Chaney, 470
U.S. 821, 830 (1985). Even if statutes set forth criteria to be considered in agency action, action
is not reviewable if that criteria is not “judicially manageable.” Nat’l Federal of Fed. Employees
v. United States, 905 F.2d 400, 405 (D.C. Cir. 1990). Courts have thus concluded that actions
are not reviewable under the APA where the language of the statute, structure of the statutory
scheme, objectives of the statute, legislative history and the nature of the administrative action
permit broad agency discretion. See, e.g., Hammond v. Comptroller of the Currency, 878 F.
Supp. 1438, 1445 (D. Kan. 1995) (citing Block v. Community Nutrition Inst., 467 U.S. 340, 345
(1984)); see also Cappadora v. Celebrezze, 356 F.2d 1, 5-6 (2d Cir. 1966) (analyzing whether the
practical requirements of the task to be performed, absence of available standards or even the
fact that no useful purpose could be served by judicial review precluded APA review). Such
actions are not reviewable under the APA and must be dismissed. See Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S.
For all the reasons discussed above, as set forth in Armstrong I, the language of the PRA,
structure of the statutory scheme, objectives of the statute, legislative history and the nature of
the “administrative action” permit broad discretion on the part of the Vice President. The Vice
President alone may determine what constitutes vice presidential records or personal records,
plaintiffs fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted and must be dismissed pursuant to
Rule 12(b)(6).
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how his records will be created, maintained, managed and disposed, and are all actions that are
committed to his discretion by law. Armstrong I, 924 F.2d at 290 (PRA ensures the Vice
President’s “control over [vice] presidential records during the [Vice] President’s term in office);
(PRA leaves “implementation of [PRA] in the [Vice] President’s hands); (PRA does not provide
for the Archivist to promulgate guidelines and regulations to assist the Vice President in the
development of a records management system); (Archivist lacks authority to inspect the Vice
President’s records or survey the Vice President’s management practices); (Archivist has no
authority to veto any disposal decision); (“PRA accords the [Vice] President virtually complete
control over his records during his term of office.”); (PRA does not permit “outsiders the right to
Even if plaintiffs had raised viable claims, they lack standing to assert them, and
plaintiffs’ claims must be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(1) for failure to establish constitutional
standing. “The judicial power of the United States . . . is not an unconditioned authority” but is
limited by Article III of the Constitution. Valley Forge Christian College v. Americans United
for Separation of Church & State, 454 U.S. 464, 471 (1982). That Article “confines the federal
courts to adjudicating actual ‘cases’ and ‘controversies.’” Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 750
(1984). In the absence of an actual case or controversy, the Court is without jurisdiction to
decide the case. See Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499 (1975); see also Poe v. Ullman, 367
U.S. 497, 502 (1961). Thus, a court must ensure that its authority is invoked where there is “a
lively conflict between antagonistic demands, actively pressed, which make resolution of the
controverted issue a practical necessity,” id. at 503 – a requirement “founded in concern about
the proper – and properly limited – role of the courts in a democratic society.” Warth, 422 U.S.
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at 498. Otherwise, “the courts would be called upon to decide abstract questions of wide public
significance even though other governmental institutions may be more competent to address the
questions and even though judicial intervention may be unnecessary to protect individual rights.”
Id. at 500.
which are standing, ripeness, mootness, and the political question doctrine.” Nat’l Treas.
Employees Union v. United States, 101 F.3d 1423, 1427 (D.C. Cir. 1996). These doctrines
consist of both “prudential elements which Congress is free to override and core component[s]
which are essential and unchanging part[s] of the case-or-controversy requirement of Article III.”
Id. (internal quotations omitted). This action implicates a core component of that requirement –
Article III standing requires that a plaintiff have suffered “an (1) injury in fact--an
invasion of a legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized and (b) actual or
imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical--(2) which is fairly traceable to the challenged act, and
(3) likely to be redressed by a favorable decision.” Nat’l Treasury Employees’ Union v. United
States, 101 F.3d 1423, 1427 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see
also Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992). The doctrine of standing is
“an essential and unchanging part of the case-or-controversy requirement of Article III,” Lujan,
504 U.S. at 560, and “the party invoking federal jurisdiction bears the burden of establishing its
existence.” Steel Co., 523 U.S. at 104. In fact, this court must presume the absence of
jurisdiction “unless the contrary appears affirmatively from the record.” DaimlerChrysler, 547
U.S. at 342 n.3. Plaintiffs here lack actual injury and cannot establish that any injury is “actual
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or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical” for their claims against all defendants; and fail to
Plaintiffs cannot demonstrate standing because they have not shown that they would be
injured even if OVP was failing to comply with the terms of the PRA (which it is not). Plaintiffs
can only assert a speculative or hypothetical interest in seeking future access to vice presidential
records years from now. It is well established that speculative or hypothetical claims of injury
are insufficient to confer standing. See Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Organization,
426 U.S. 26, 44 (1976) (“unadorned speculation will not suffice to invoke the federal judicial
power”). Rather, the alleged injury “must be certainly impending,” Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495
U.S. 149, 158 (1990) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted), and “real and immediate.”
City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 102 (1983). “Although the fact that harm or injury
may occur in the future is not necessarily fatal to a claim of standing[,] ... [such circumstances
can] lessen the concreteness of the controversy and thus mitigate against a recognition of
standing.” United Transp. Union v. I.C.C., 891 F.2d 908, 913 (D.C. Cir.1998) (internal
quotation marks omitted). Thus, when a party alleges future injury alone, the party “must
demonstrate a realistic danger of sustaining a direct injury[.]” Id. (quoting Babbitt v. United
order governing records disposition based on the speculativeness of future harm arising from
future requests for records. Although the court recognized that there existed “a significant
likelihood that plaintiffs will again seek access to presidential records, and face indeterminate
delays in accessing them,” it did not find such allegations sufficient for standing. Am. Historical
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Ass’n v. Nat’l Archives & Records Admin., 310 F. Supp. 2d 216, 228 (D.D.C. 2004), later
opinion Am. Historical Ass’n v. Nat’l Archives & Records Admin, Civ. No. 01-2447, 2007 WL
[T]he Court cannot find that this future injury is sufficiently imminent, and not
conjectural and hypothetical. At this stage, Plaintiffs have no outstanding
requests for presidential records . . . . This Court, however, is not prescient, and
cannot know at this point in what way the facts will reveal themselves when
Plaintiffs themselves, or indeed other interested parties, seek the records . . . .
Id. 310 F. Supp. 2d at 228. Plaintiffs here, too, suffer from the same defect. Because claims of
speculative future harm from future, indeterminate record requests are inadequate to confer
In CREW v. Department of Homeland Security, this court also dismissed a case for
CREW’s lack of standing for prospective declaratory and injunctive relief. Civ. No. 06-0883,
Slip. Op. at 7-10 (D.D.C. Dec. 17, 2007) (RCL). Although the court acknowledged that CREW
had alleged past injuries arising from denial of access to records because of allegedly inadequate
recordkeeping practices, it stated that such “past injury-in-fact . . . does not in and of itself give
CREW standing to seek prospective relief.” Id. at 7. In concluding that CREW lacked standing,
the court dismissed CREW’s claims that it would be subject to continuing injury because it
These alleged future injuries – while certainly plausible – are too speculative and
remote at this point to give CREW standing to seek prospective relief. . . . Most
notably, CREW does not allege anywhere in its complaint or opposition brief that
it has a FOIA request pending with the DHS or that it intends to file a specific
FOIA request with the DHS for WAVES records in the near future. Without this
information, the Court cannot say that the alleged future injury is either real or
imminent. That CREW may one day file another FOIA request with the DHS
does not represent a cognizable, palpable injury which presents a case or
controversy for the Court to consider.
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Id. at 24. Thus, although informational injury could be adequate for some claims, the court
concluded that prospective relief required a further showing. “While there [was], admittedly, a
reasonable probability that CREW will seek these records in the future, this presumption is not
Plaintiffs’ only alleged injuries are that they will be denied access to “historical
presidential and vice presidential records in a timely fashion, including the records of the current
administration when they become available for public review.” Am. Compl. ¶¶ 6-12. None,
however, alleges that it has ever filed a FOIA request for vice presidential records from past
administrations, much less that it will be specifically seeking FOIA requests for this Vice
President’s (as opposed to the President’s) records in the future when they become available
pursuant to the PRA. But even if it had, such entirely hypothetical and speculative assertions
about future requests for records are insufficient to confer Article III standing.
No “case or controversy” exists here over which the Court may appropriately exercise
jurisdiction because plaintiffs have no injury on which to rely. Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better
Env’t, 523 U.S. 83, 102 (1998). First, despite plaintiffs’ contention “upon information and
belief” that the Office of the Vice President and Vice President have not followed section 2207
with respect to vice presidential records, the Office of the Vice President and Vice President
have complied with the PRA. See Am. Compl. ¶¶ 35-37. Plaintiffs therefore lack any actual
injury to invoke this Court’s jurisdiction, see Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-
61 (1992), and have no “legally cognizable interest in the final determination of the underlying
29
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The OVP has been complying with—and intends to continue to comply with—section
2207 with respect to “documentary materials, or any reasonably segregable portion thereof,
created or received by the [Vice] President, his immediate staff, or a unit or individual of the
[Office of the Vice President] whose function is to advise and assist the [Vice] President, in the
course of conducting activities which relate to or have an effect upon the carrying out of the
confirmed by the Second Supplemental Declaration and the deposition, of Assistant to the Vice
President and Deputy Chief of Staff Claire M. O’Donnell, the Office of the Vice President
correctly applies section 2207 of title 44 to vice presidential records. See Second Supp. Decl. of
Claire M. O’Donnell (“2d Supp. Decl.”). There are no vice presidential records that the Office
of the Vice President has excluded from the scope of the PRA through its guidance or policies
regarding vice presidential records. See 2d Supp. Decl. ¶¶ 4-5; see also Supp. Decl. ¶ 5. The
O’Donnell declarations and deposition testimony reflect that the Office of the Vice President
applies section 2207 to all documentary materials that constitute vice presidential records as
defined by the Presidential Records Act. See generally Ex. 1 (compiling declarations of Ms.
O’Donnell and Ms. Smith submitted to establish absence of irreparable harm for preliminary
• Ms. O’Donnell testified that all official records received or created by the OVP are treated
as vice presidential records under the PRA. See Ex. 2, Dep. Tr. of Claire M. O’Donnell,
37:15-38:1 (“Q: And what is your understanding of the documents that the Vice President is
required to transfer to NARA at the end of his administration? A: All of his executive and
legislative files. Q: Okay. Do you have any more specific understanding than that? A: Any
documents that he has either created or received in his official functions.”); 55:16-20 (“Again,
every document that we receive or create in our capacities, meaning the staff of the Vice
President, to assist him in his duties are to be kept for the Presidential Records Act.”); 54:6-9
(same); 99:19-100:22 (explaining that OVP’s guidance is to transfer all vice presidential
records as defined under the PRA that have been created or generated during the vice
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presidency of Richard B. Cheney); 102:7-103:14 (explaining that “for all practical purposes,
everything is considered official” and maintained under the PRA, except “something really
personal in your personal life outside of anything official,” like “a bank statement or a thank
you note for a wedding reception); 119:11-12 (“[I]t’s the general policy everything is a
presidential record.”); 128:17-129:1 (Q: “If a document is covered by the PRA, and by that I
mean if a document is vice presidential, if it meets the definition of vice presidential, of a vice
presidential record within the meaning of the PRA, is it your understanding that that
document has to be preserved? A: Yes.”); 136:12-16 (“I know that, again in general,
everything that is prepared by any staff member for the Vice President or by the Vice
President is considered a [vice] presidential record.”); 139:5-140:2 (explaining that “guidance
that the staff that we trust” has been given is to preserve records that have been created by the
Vice President’s staff); 140:8-12 (“I believe all documents, all documents in the Vice
President’s office, created or received by the Vice President or the Vice President’s staff are
being kept under the Presidential Records Act.”); 141:4-7 (“To the best of my knowledge, like
all other records, if records have been prepared for the Vice President, they are being kept
under the Presidential Records Act”); 141:17-19 (same); 142:6-14 (same); 142:18-143:6
(same); 144:22-145:8 (same); 147:11-13 (same); 147:20-149:2 (same); 151:5-8 (“If an
employee of the Office of the Vice President keeps records that have to do with the Vice
President’s executive or legislative duties, they are kept for the PRA); 156:18-21 (“I believe
that any documents that have been created or received by the Vice President and her staff or
his staff are considered [vice] presidential documents.”); 77:15-22 (“I could only answer that I
don’t get into the legalese of all the Vice President’s duties. We view it that everything he
does he is doing on behalf of the President and that’s our practice and that’s the guidance I
give to people that, everything you are doing here is in support of the Vice President and it’s
considered a [vice] Presidential document.”); 78:9-13 (“Again, if he is – I don’t get into the
legalese. If there are documents created, or received on behalf of his duties, and if he sits on
that board because he is Vice President, then we would consider it a [vice] Presidential
document.”); 78:14-79:2 (similar).
• She also explained, contrary to plaintiffs’ allegations, that the Vice President’s legislative
records are being managed under the PRA. Id. at 61:17-22 (explaining that legislative records
are treated “the same as the executive records are kept. Everything is considered a document
that has to be kept or filed.”); see also Ex. 3, Smith Rough Dep. Tr. at 199:6-9 (“They
confirmed to NARA that in response to a question we asked that they were treating records
that Cheney created in the Senate office as vice presidential record.”); 202:10-15 (“NARA
specifically asked Gary Stern [NARA’s general counsel], asked how were they treating
legislative or records created in the Senate office and they responded over I think it was
several conversations, not all of which I were involved in, that they were treating them as vice
presidential record.”); 203:7-12 (same).
• And she further explained that the guidance provided to the Vice President with regard to
PRA obligations did not differ from the guidance provided to other OVP staff. Ex. 2,
O’Donnell Dep. Tr. at 79:22-80:5 (stating that Vice President “supports the guidance that I
have been asked to give out and the processes, processes that we follow”); 87:21-88:6 (stating
that it is the intent of the Vice President to include “all of the papers, records, notes,
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recordings, memo that the Vice President has created since January 20, 2001, . . . as vice
presidential materials turned over to NARA under the Presidential Records Act”).
Simply put, there are no “policies and guidelines that exclude from the reach of the PRA
all but a narrow category of vice presidential records created or received in the very limited
circumstances in which the vice president deems himself to be acting as part of the executive
branch,” Am. Compl. ¶ 35; it is not true that “Vice President Cheney and the OVP will destroy,
transfer, or otherwise dispose of many of the vice president’s records under the theory they are
personal records and therefore not covered by the PRA or subject to any other record keeping
law or obligation,” id ¶ 44; there is no validity to the claim that “legislative records” are treated
as personal by this Vice President; and it is not true that the OVP and Vice President have been
violating the terms of the PRA by relying on guidelines that do not classify vice presidential
records in accord with the definition set forth in the PRA. See generally Ex. 1, Ex. 2, Ex. 3. As
established in the following exchange, the Vice President and OVP have applied guidance that
Answer: Yes.
Ex. 2, O’Donnell Dep. Tr. 128:17-129:1.12 In short, plaintiffs have no injury upon which to
Plaintiffs nonetheless have alleged that the language used in the declarations deliberately
omit assurances about PRA compliance for documentary materials that may have been received
or generated by the Vice President in carrying out some alleged functions that are not either the
12
See also Ex. 3, Smith Rough Dep. Tr. at 111:8-10 (“I’m not aware of any Cheney documents that
are carved out and are not being managed by the Office of the Vice President”).
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Vice President’s functions (1) “specially assigned to the Vice President by the President in the
discharge of executive duties and responsibilities” or (2) as President of the Senate. Seizing on
the language “specially assigned,” plaintiffs have claimed that the Vice President performs some
other functions that are not “specially assigned by the President,” and that the documentary
material relating to or having an effect on those functions are not being maintained under the
PRA.13
13
The description of the Vice President’s executive functions as those “specially assigned to the
Vice President by the President in the discharge of executive duties and responsibilities” is a well-
recognized term of art taken from 3 U.S.C. § 106. Indeed, memoranda from the Assistant Attorney
General for the Office of Legal Counsel, Walter Dellinger, use the exact same term of art. Assistant
Attorney Dellinger observed that “[t]he Vice President has no constitutional or statutory responsibilities
as an executive branch officer, and the common understanding that his executive role is limited to
advising and assisting the President (as determined by each President) is confirmed by the statute
authorizing appropriations or other assistance and services for the Vice President, . . . 3 U.S.C. § 106.” 18
U.S. Op. Off. Legal Counsel 10, *1 (1994). The Vice President undertakes executive-related activities --
all covered by section 2207 as “constitutional, statutory or other official or ceremonial duties of the Vice
President” – all of which are considered to be “specially assigned by the President in the discharge of
executive duties and responsibilities.” The “specially assigned” language is a term of art found in 3
U.S.C. § 106 that refers to all of the Vice President’s executive activity (because a Vice President has no
executive-related responsibilities whatsoever unless the President assigns them to the Vice President). In
using the “specially assigned” language, the Office of the Vice President did not narrow or limit what
falls within the scope of the Vice President’s executive-related functions, all of which are encompassed
by section 2207. As Ms. O’Donnell provides in her Second Supplemental Declaration and confirmed in
her deposition, the “Office of the Vice President construes these categories broadly, so that all of the Vice
President’s functions as Vice President fall within either of those two categories.” 2d Supp. Decl. ¶ 5.
Likewise, plaintiffs’ counsel herself submitted a brief to the court as an attorney for the
Department of Justice explaining that the Vice President performs either functions “specially assigned” to
him by the President or functions as President of the Senate. See Judicial Watch, Inc. v. Nat’l Energy
Policy Dev. Gp., Civ. No. 01-1540, Dkt. 34 (Defs.’ Mot. to Dismiss) at 13 (“The Vice President has
responsibilities to assist the President with the President’s executive duties. See 3 U.S.C. § 106
(recognizing Vice President’s function of assisting President with Executive responsibilities). . . .
Moreover, the Vice President’s important constitutional role in the legislative branch, see U.S. Const. art.
I, § 3, cl. 4, . . . further supports the view that the Vice President is not an agency under the APA.”); see
also id. at 16 (“The Constitution establishes the office of Vice President, see U.S. Const. art. II, § 1, cl. 1,
but gives the Vice President no specific executive duties. Indeed, Congress, in authorizing staff and other
assistance for the Vice President, indicated that such staff was provided ‘in order to enable the Vice
President to provide assistance to the President in connection with the performance of functions specially
assigned to the Vice President by the President in the discharge of executive duties and responsibilities.’
3 U.S.C. § 106(a) (emphasis added).”).
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As the declarations reflect and as confirmed in the deposition, the Vice President has no
official functions other than those “specially assigned to the Vice President by the President in
the discharge of executive duties and responsibilities” and those as President of the Senate, and
no documentary materials that meet the definition of vice presidential records are being excluded
from the reach of the PRA. 2d Supp. Decl. ¶ 7; Supp. Decl. ¶ 6; Ex. 2, O’Donnell Dep. Tr. at
84:16-19 (Q: “Okay. And are there any other responsibilities that he has? A: Everything would
fall under those two categories, everything else he does.”). Moreover, notwithstanding plaintiffs’
attempt to limit the reach of the phrase “specially assigned by the Vice President by the President
in the discharge of executive duties and responsibilities,” the record makes clear that the phrase
was intended to cover all of the Vice President’s duties but for his duties as the President of the
Senate. See also id. at 83:18-84:1 (Q: Is it your understanding that everything that the Vice
President does in his executive capacity is specially assigned by the President? A: In general
terms and in specific terms, yes. It’s all – they are all assigned by the President); 172:10-22 (“Q:
“The Vice President relies in substantial part on OVP personnel for support in the performance
of his official functions. What, as used herein, what does the term official functions include? A:
All of his executive and legislative functions. Q: And does that term differ in any way from
those functions that are specially assigned by the President? A: It encompasses those functions,
specially assigned.”); 66:12-22 (“He is there to take on responsibilities that the President assigns
to him. He has no other responsibilities other than to assist and work for the President. . . .
When we first came into office, that’s what we were told. We were there as Vice Presidential
staff to assist the Vice President in carrying out his function in working for the President.”);
73:5-10 (“And how does this definition, by this definition I mean Vice Presidential support of
Presidential functions differ from the specially assigned definition that you offered in the current
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litigation? A: For me, it doesn’t differ.”); see also id. at 78:14-79:2 (responding specifically to
questions about the Vice President’s duties on the National Security Council, “They are part of
his executive duties”); 78:1-13 (explaining that any documentary material created in connection
with the Vice President’s duties with regard to the Smithsonian Institution would be considered
vice presidential records). As Ms. O’Donnell explained, however, whether a specific function is
all documents in the Vice President’s office, created or received by the Vice President’s staff are
being kept under the Presidential Records Act.” Id. at 140:8-12; 74:8-13 (explaining that one
does not need to determine whether a particular activity constitutes vice presidential support of
presidential functions); 70:13-71:3 (explaining that recordkeeping guidance under the PRA does
not use “specially assigned” language). And documentary materials meeting the definition of
vice presidential record relating to both those executive and legislative functions are being
The plaintiffs bear the burden of showing a “substantial probability” that they have been
injured. Sierra Club v. Environ. Protection Ag., 292 F. 3d 895, 899 (D.C. Cir. 2002). Plaintiffs
have not come close to showing a “substantial probability” of the existence of injury through
their speculative and baseless declarations, Declaration of Stanley I. Kutler ¶ 7 (“I believe the
14
At the deposition of Ms. O’Donnell, plaintiffs’ counsel focused in large part on the specific
implementation of the guidance that the Office of the Vice President provides to staff regarding the
Presidential Records Act, and whether Ms. O’Donnell personally knew whether specific documents were
being preserved under the PRA. Ex. 2, O’Donnell Dep. Tr. at 126:10-157:20. However, even claims
appropriately brought under the FRA do not permit such record-by-record judicial review. Armstrong I,
924 F.2d at 293-94 (“[E]ven if a court may review the adequacy of an agency’s guidelines [under the
FRA], agency personnel will implement the guidelines on a daily basis. Thus agency personnel, not the
court, will actually decide whether specific documents . . . constitute “records” under the guidelines.
[M]ost importantly, the only issue the court would be asked to consider, i.e., the adequacy of appellants’
recordkeeping guidelines and directives, is clearly appropriate for judicial review.”). Regardless, as
established above, the PRA proscribes any inquiry into the Vice President’s recordkeeping guidelines or
practices for claims grounded in the PRA.
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vice president may well plan to abscond with his records when he leaves office.”); Declaration of
Anna Kasten Nelson ¶ 5 (“[T]here is legitimate fear that he will defy the PRA and either destroy
his records or secrete them[.]”), which is the only “evidence” plaintiffs have submitted in this
case. And although “the party invoking federal jurisdiction bears the burden of establishing its
existence,” Steel Co., 523 U.S. at 104, defendants have borne the burden of conclusively
establishing that plaintiffs lack injury. Indeed, in light of this conclusive record, nothing
plaintiffs show can rebut even this court’s presumption that jurisdiction is lacking as they cannot
show “the contrary . . . affirmatively from the record.” Daimler Chrysler, 547 U.S. at 342 n.3.
C. Plaintiffs’ Injuries are not Fairly Traceable to Any Alleged Actions by NARA, the
Archivist or “EOP” or Redressable By Seeking Relief Against Them
The absence of traceability from the alleged injury to relief sought from NARA, the
Archivist or EOP, is clear. Even assuming that plaintiffs asserted cognizable injuries, and even
assuming OVP was failing to comply with its obligations under the PRA (which it is not),
plaintiffs could not obtain relief from NARA, the Archivist, or EOP. Rather, the “links in the
chain of causation between the [alleged] conduct and the asserted injur[ies] are far too weak for
the chain as a whole to sustain the appellants’ standing.” Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 759
(1984). “Where “the necessary elements of causation . . . hinge on the independent choices of
the regulated [or managed] third party,” e.g., the Vice President, “it becomes the burden of the
plaintiff to adduce facts showing that those choices have been or will be made in such manner as
to produce causation and permit redressability of injury.” Nat’l Wrestling Coaches Ass’n v.
Dep’t of Educ., 366 F.3d 930, 938 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 562) (internal
It is indisputable that by statute and this Circuit’s instructions, the Vice President has the
authority to implement the terms of the PRA and alone maintains “control over [vice]
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presidential records during the [Vice] President’s term in office,” and that the Archivist lacks the
authority to promulgate guidelines and regulations to assist the agencies in the development of
records management systems, or to veto any disposal decisions of the Vice President. Armstrong
I, 924 F.32d at 290. Thus any perceived injury, even if it existed, is not traceable to any alleged
actions of NARA, the Archivist or “EOP.” See also Ex. 3, Smith Rough Dep. Tr. at 29:9-14
(NARA does not provide written guidance on definition of vice presidential record); id. at
185:15-186:20 (testifying that NARA relies on the definition of vice presidential records in the
PRA); Decl of Nancy Kegan Smith, Director of the Presidential Materials Staff in the Office of
the Presidential Libraries ¶ 4; Ex. 1, O’Donnell Decl. ¶ 7 (OVP does not rely on Executive Order
13233 of November 1, 2001 or any guidelines issued by defendants to exclude any vice
presidential records of the vice presidency of Richard B. Cheney from the requirements of
likelihood’ that the requested relief will remedy the alleged injury in fact.” Vermont Agency of
Natural Res. v. United States ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765, 771 (2000) (internal citation
omitted). For the same reasons set forth above, there is not a substantial likelihood, indeed no
likelihood, that their requested relief will remedy their alleged injuries. See Free Enterprise
Finally, prudential standing “denies a right of review if the plaintiff’s interests are so
marginally related to or inconsistent with the purposes implicit in the statute that it cannot
reasonably be assumed that Congress intended to permit the suit.” Clarke v. Sec. Indus. Ass’n,
479 U.S. 388, 399 (1987). These prudential concerns require that a “plaintiff’s grievance must
37
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arguably fall within the zone of interests protected or regulated by the statutory provision . . .
invoked in the suit.” Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 162 (1997). Even if plaintiffs’ suit did not
fatally suffer from the deficiencies outlined above, plaintiffs cannot show that their claims are
among those that are envisioned by the PRA. “Here, it cannot reasonably be inferred that
Congress intended to permit this suit under [the PRA], because [plaintiffs] have no basis upon
which to rest a private right of action under [the PRA].” Am. Fed. of Gov’t Employees, 321
F.3d at 143. Thus, for the same reasons that an implied right of action cannot be inferred from
the language, structure or history of the Act, plaintiffs lack prudential standing to pursue claims
under the statute or the APA.15 Id. at 144 (rejecting APA claim for same reason that plaintiffs
lacked prudential standing to pursue a claim under the statute); see also Fed. for Am.
Immigration Reform, Inc. v. Reno, 93 F.3d 897, 902-03 (D.C. Cir. 1996). Accordingly,
IV. Summary Judgment Should Be Granted On Behalf of the Defendants On Any Claims
That Survive the Motion to Dismiss
To the extent any claims survive the threshold motion to dismiss defenses, summary
judgment on those claims should be granted in favor of all the defendants. Plaintiffs seek a
declaration that “the guidelines of all defendants that exclude from the scope of the PRA records
of the vice president and his office created and received in the course of conducting activities
relating to or having an effect on the carrying out of his constitutional, statutory or other official
or ceremonial duties violate federal law.” Am. Compl. at 23 (prayer for relief); id. ¶¶ 52 (Claim
One), 64-65 (Claim Three). Yet, as established by the declarations and deposition testimony in
this case, as described in detail supra at Part III. B, no such guidelines exclude this Vice
15
Nor does Armstrong I dictate that plaintiffs have prudential standing for the types of claims that
plaintiffs allege here—as opposed to FRA claims seeking review of presidential guidelines that are
alleged to sweep in federal records improperly. Armstrong I, 924 F.2d at 287-88.
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President’s vice presidential records from the scope of the PRA. See 2d Supp. Decl. ¶¶ 4-5; see
also Supp. Decl. ¶ 5; Ex. 2, Dep. Tr. of Claire M. O’Donnell, 37:15-38:1 (“Q: And what is your
understanding of the documents that the Vice President is required to transfer to NARA at the
end of his administration? A: All of his executive and legislative files. Q: Okay. Do you have
any more specific understanding than that? A: Any documents that he has either created or
received in his official functions.”); Statement of Material Facts ¶¶ 2-5. In short, the record
establishes that the OVP has applied the PRA to all “documentary materials, or any reasonably
segregable portion thereof, created or received by the [Vice] President, his immediate staff, or a
unit or individual of the [Office of the Vice President] whose function is to advise and assist the
[Vice] President, in the course of conducting activities which relate to or have an effect upon the
carrying out of the constitutional, statutory or other official or ceremonial duties of the [Vice]
President.” 44 U.S.C. § 2201(2); see discussion supra at part III.B. Thus there is “no genuine
issue as to any material fact” that defendants’ guidelines comply with federal law and do not
exclude from the scope of the PRA records of the vice president and his office created and
received in the course of conducting activities relating to or having an effect on the carrying out
For the same reasons, plaintiffs are not entitled to any injunctive or mandamus relief that
defendants should “refrain from implementing guidelines that exclude from the scope of the
PRA records of the vice president and his office created and received in the course of conducting
activities relating to or having an effect on the carrying out of his constitutional, statutory or
other official or ceremonial duties.” Am. Compl. at 23-24 (prayer for relief); id. ¶¶ 58 (Claim
Two), 63-64 (Claim Three), 71-72 (Claim Four). Accordingly, summary judgment should be
39
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granted on behalf of defendants to the extent that the Court finds that any claims survive
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, defendants’ motion to dismiss, or, in the alternative, for
GREGORY G. KATSAS
Assistant Attorney General
JOHN R. TYLER
Assistant Branch Director
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Libraries at the National Archives and Records Administration (NARA). My duties as Director
of the Presidential Materials Staff include directing the staff that provides courtesy storage for
the records and gifts of the incumbent President and Vice President; training new archival staff
of the Presidential Record Act libraries; providing oversight and guidance on Presidential access
issues; directing the declassification program for Presidential Library holdings; handling special
access requests for Presidential and Vice Presidential records; and coordinating the White House
archivist at the Johnson Library, 1973-1989; Special Assistant to the head of Presidential
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Libraries, 1989-1997; Access Officer for Presidential Holdings in NARA’s Office of General
Counsel, 1997-1998; and Director of the Presidential Materials Staff from September of 1998
until the present. I have over 30 years of experience in handling Presidential access issues and
FOIA requests, appeals and litigation on behalf of NARA. I am familiar with the allegations in
the present lawsuit, and make this declaration on the basis of my personal knowledge and of
3. Since 1981, NARA has offered and been providing “courtesy storage” for the Vice
Presidential records that the incumbent Vice President and his staff create or receive under the
Presidential Records Act (PRA), 44 U.S.C. § 2207, until the records transfer at the end of the
administration into the legal custody and control of the Archivist. Records on courtesy storage
with NARA are in the physical possession of NARA until legal custody transfers to the
Archivist, while the Vice President maintains legal custody over the records during his term(s).
While the records are on courtesy storage, the Presidential Materials Staff provides reference
service to the incumbent and returns the records back to the Vice President, if requested, on a
one hour turn-around time, 24 hours a day basis. The records, gifts, and historical materials on
courtesy storage are made available only to the incumbent Administration as requested for
reference. Boxes of textual records in courtesy storage remain sealed while in NARA’s physical
possession. No archival processing takes place and only those designated by the Office of the
Vice President are permitted to see the material. At the end of the Administration, all Vice
Presidential records are transferred into NARA’s legal custody under the PRA. NARA provides
courtesy storage throughout the course of the Administration, which assists with the presidential
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transition process, as it reduces the volume of records that need to be transferred from the Office
4. NARA currently has legal custody over the Vice Presidential records from the vice
presidencies of Vice President George H. W. Bush, Vice President Dan Quayle, and Vice
President Albert Gore. At least two of these collections (those relating to the George H.W. Bush
and Albert Gore Vice Presidencies), also include records that were created or received by those
former Vice Presidents at their Vice Presidential Senate Offices. NARA’s position is to treat
these legislative records as Vice Presidential to be covered under the PRA, absent an express
indication from the former Vice President or his representative that such records are considered
to be “personal” in nature. We have not received any indication from those former Vice
5. Since 2001, NARA has routinely received records for courtesy storage from the
Office of Vice President for Vice President Richard B. Cheney. These records have consisted of
both textual Vice Presidential records from the incumbent Vice President, along with records in
other non-textual media. NARA intends to work closely with the Office of Vice President to
ensure that the remainder of the incumbent’s Vice Presidential records are moved into NARA’s
physical custody by January 20, 2009, on which date NARA will also assume legal custody of
6. NARA has been retaining, and will continue to retain and not dispose of, all Vice
Amended Complaint -- that the Vice President or the Office of Vice President has physically
transferred or will transfer to NARA. Accordingly, except for any recall request, as described in
3
08118/2008 16’02 FAX , m ~005t005
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paragraph 3 of this declaration, Rom the Vice President for access to his records before
January 20, 2009 (because he alone maintains legal custody and control over his records until
3"anuary 20, 2009), all records at i~sue in the Amended Complaint in NARA’s physical
possession will be retained and not disposed,
7, At the beginning of the Bush-Cheney Administration, NARA recornm~ded, as
we have since 198 l wirh each prior Administration governed by the PRA, that the President and
Vice P~esident seek disposal authority under section 22o3(c) of the Presidential Records Act for
the vast amount of public mail (including mail received by fax and email), wlfich we call "bulk
mail," that they and their spouses receive on a daily basis. These records are described as:
"Certain categories of public mail to the Vice President, the spouse of the Vice President, and
mail from prolific writers, and public opinion mail," and "Publications, brochures, clippings and
other types of en¢loswes in public mail, when there is no immediate or historical importance to
the mateflais." NAP.& has determined that these records in their ~tirety do not have sufficient
pma,nanem preservation under the PRA, Before the bul~ mail records are disposed of, NARA
reviews them to select and retain a smal! ’sample Of le~ers for use in the Presidential Library. A
copy of the September 21, 2001, Archivist of the United States’ ~tten view~ on this disposal
request from the Office of the Vice President under the PRA is attached at Tab A.
I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is mac and correct,
Tab A
09/11/2008 18:24 FAX ~003/003
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SEP 2 0 200t
Mr, David S. ~d ,d~nEton
Counsel to the Vice President
The White Houae
Washin~on, DC 20500
In accordance with the authority ~r~nted to me by ~e Presidential Records Act, S~on 2203(c) (2),
I approve of dispos~ of th~ ~o categories oftex~al Vice Pr~sidenti~ bulk mail d~c~b~ ~ your
letter of August 16, 2001, Those catego~s ~e:
(1) Certmin categories of public mail to the Vice President, the spouse of the Vice Presidem, and
their sta~s including anonymous correspondence, correspondence with an incomplete address, m~l
from prolific writers, and public opinion mail, Samples, when appropriate, will be retained,
(2) Publications, brochures, ¢lippin6s and other types of enclosures in public mail, when there is no
immediate or historical importance to the matm’ials,
As with the di~osal of lh’esidential bulk mail, I r~ommend that representatives of the National
Archives and Records Administration (NARA), in coordination wi~ the White House Offioe of
Records Management0 review thes~ matc’rials before disposal and rake samples when appropriate.
Thes~ samples willbe refaced perm~ently. NARA will inform you ifwo id~mtify groups of
materials that ~hould not be destroyed during sampling,
I do not’intend to take any ~ongressional action with regm’d to this request as provided for by Section
2203(e) of the Presidential Records Act,
I support your effort to continue the disposal of bulk marl, This practice has been very successful
since it began in 1982.
JOHN W, CA.P.LIN
Archivist of the United States
Official: N
Reading: N, INL, NLMS, NOC, NWIVI, NCON
N:BFidler:jw 09/20101
Doc nam~rCheneyBu.do~ file ~od¢:
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Page 1
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
--------------------------------:
Plaintiffs, :
Defendants. :
--------------------------------:
Washington, D.C.
Deposition of:
CLAIRE M. O'DONNELL,
parties:
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2 (Pages 2 to 5)
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EXHIBIT 3
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1
1 ROUGH DRAFT DEPOSITION
3 BY MS. WEISMANN:
5 record?
9 A. Yes.
2
1 Texas in Austin.
5 you do next?
7 special program.
10 A. Uh-huh, yes.
12 A. August.
15 respond.
17 BY MS. WEISMANN:
20 A. August of 1973.
22 A. As an archivist.
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3
1 Q. And what were your responsibilities as
2 an archivist?
4 records.
11 that position?
13 years.
16 somewhat changed.
18 change.
4
1 Q. Was that expertise specific to the
2 Johnson Library?
8 issues.
9 BY MS. WEISMANN:
13 Presidential Libraries.
16 A. To Washington, D.C.
19 Presidential Libraries.
21 A. Uh-huh. Yes.
5
1 were in that position?
13 of General Counsel?
17 that capacity?
6
1 A. Well the head of the access office was
3 Pugh.
6 A. Yes.
10 Q. Okay.
12 Records Act.
15 records?
16 A. Yes.
7
1 Q. And what would have been in what year?
2 A. September of 1998.
4 currently occupy?
5 A. That is correct.
8 the present?
9 A. Yes.
10 Q. How so?
18 Presidential moves.
19 Q. Okay --
20 A. And.
21 Q. I'm sorry.
29
1 categories of records, no.
2 BY MS. WEISMANN:
14 records, no.
19 Records Act?
21 personal knowledge.
109
1 there any other records, unclassified records of the
4 Management?
9 record as requested.)
10 BY MS. WEISMANN:
12 talking about.
22 A. Management.
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110
1 Q. Any retired records that come from the
2 Vice President?
4 retired.
16 BY MS. WEISMANN:
19 know.
21 A. Right.
111
1 MS. HONG: Wait, I'm not sure that
5 BY MS. WEISMANN:
7 any.
9 that are carved out and are not being managed by the
15 A. Okay.
112
1 Office of Records Management managing any records of
4 A. No.
6 break.
9 BY MS. WEISMANN:
15 A. Yes.
21 referring to?
185
1 A. I thought it was in something that CREW
2 wrote.
11 BY MS. WEISMANN:
12 Q. Go ahead.
16 the President?
19 BY MS. WEISMANN:
186
1 performs must be preserved -- records from which
8 A. Yes.
13 ceremonial.
14 Q. Right?
187
1 working with Presidential Libraries and Presidential
6 A. No.
11 Vice President?
12 A. No.
14 fine.
16 BY MS. WEISMANN:
17 Q. Okay.
19 break.
22 again.
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198
1 Q. Have you ever heard any reference to any
2 such guidance?
3 A. No.
5 A. No.
11 A. No.
20 records.
21 A. Okay.
199
1 that the Vice President's office made the final
21 back?
200
1 as Vice Presidential record.
4 consisted of?
9 of that office.
201
1 MS. WEISMANN: I just want to.
7 back.
9 BY MS. WEISMANN:
16 testimony.
202
1 (Whereupon, the reporter read the
2 record as requested.)
5 what we discussed.
6 BY MS. WEISMANN:
18 know?
203
1 from this, from the Office of the Vice President?
12 no.
19 question, but.
21 BY MS. WEISMANN:
237
1 MS. WEISMANN: We have nothing else.
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
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Case 1:08-cv-01548-CKK Document 39-6 Filed 12/08/2008 Page 1 of 6
2001 and will conclude (unless his death or resignation occurs sooner) at noon on
assigned or detailed to, the Vice President, as well as the Vice President himself—has,
since noon on January 20, 2001 carried out reasonably, diligently and in good faith the
obligations of the Vice President under section 2207 of title 44 of the United States Code.
See id. ¶ 6.
1
Defendants present their motion for summary judgment in the alternative, only, to their
motion to dismiss. For the reasons set forth in defendants’ motion to dismiss, plaintiffs’
Amended Complaint must be dismissed in its entirety. Defendants present their
“statement of material facts” only in the event the Court finds that any claim survives the
threshold defenses, and in no way concedes that this Court has jurisdiction to entertain
plaintiffs’ claims or that plaintiffs raise claims upon which relief may be granted. See
Order Setting Schedule for Further Proceedings [38] at 5 (requiring only “one final round
of briefing”).
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3. Specifically, the OVP has been carrying out—and intends to continue to carry
portion thereof, created or received by the Vice President, his immediate staff, or a unit or
individual of the Office of the Vice President whose function is to advise and assist the
Vice President, in the course of conducting activities which relate to or have an effect
upon the carrying out of the constitutional, statutory, or other official or ceremonial
duties of the Vice President. See Second Supp. Decl. of Claire M. O’Donnell (“2d Supp.
Decl.”). There are no vice presidential records that the Office of the Vice President has
excluded from the scope of the PRA through its guidance or policies regarding vice
presidential records. See 2d Supp. Decl. ¶¶ 4-5; see also Supp. Decl. ¶ 5. And the OVP
has not relied on any guidelines issued by any other defendant to exclude any vice
presidential records of the vice presidency of Richard B. Cheney from the requirements
of section 2207 of title 44. See also Ex. 3, Smith Rough Dep. Tr. at 29:9-14 (NARA does
not provide written guidance on definition of vice presidential record); id. at 185:15-
186:20 (testifying that NARA relies on the definition of vice presidential records in the
PRA); Decl of Nancy Kegan Smith, Director of the Presidential Materials Staff in the
Office of the Presidential Libraries ¶ 4; Ex. 1, O’Donnell Decl. ¶ 7 (OVP does not rely on
exclude any vice presidential records of the vice presidency of Richard B. Cheney from
4. All official records received or created by the OVP are treated as vice presidential
records under the PRA. See Ex. 2, Dep. Tr. of Claire M. O’Donnell, 37:15-38:1 (“Q:
And what is your understanding of the documents that the Vice President is required to
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transfer to NARA at the end of his administration? A: All of his executive and
legislative files. Q: Okay. Do you have any more specific understanding than that? A:
Any documents that he has either created or received in his official functions.”); 55:16-20
(“Again, every document that we receive or create in our capacities, meaning the staff of
the Vice President, to assist him in his duties are to be kept for the Presidential Records
Act.”); 54:6-9 (same); 99:19-100:22 (explaining that OVP’s guidance is to transfer all
vice presidential records as defined under the PRA that have been created or generated
during the vice presidency of Richard B. Cheney); 102:7-103:14 (explaining that “for all
practical purposes, everything is considered official” and maintained under the PRA,
except “something really personal in your personal life outside of anything official,” like
“a bank statement or a thank you note for a wedding reception); 119:11-12 (“[I]t’s the
covered by the PRA, and by that I mean if a document is vice presidential, if it meets the
definition of vice presidential, of a vice presidential record within the meaning of the
136:12-16 (“I know that, again in general, everything that is prepared by any staff
member for the Vice President or by the Vice President is considered a [vice] presidential
record.”); 139:5-140:2 (explaining that “guidance that the staff that we trust” has been
given is to preserve records that have been created by the Vice President’s staff); 140:8-
12 (“I believe all documents, all documents in the Vice President’s office, created or
received by the Vice President or the Vice President’s staff are being kept under the
Presidential Records Act.”); 141:4-7 (“To the best of my knowledge, like all other
records, if records have been prepared for the Vice President, they are being kept under
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employee of the Office of the Vice President keeps records that have to do with the Vice
President’s executive or legislative duties, they are kept for the PRA); 156:18-21 (“I
believe that any documents that have been created or received by the Vice President and
her staff or his staff are considered [vice] presidential documents.”); 77:15-22 (“I could
only answer that I don’t get into the legalese of all the Vice President’s duties. We view
it that everything he does he is doing on behalf of the President and that’s our practice
and that’s the guidance I give to people that, everything you are doing here is in support
of the Vice President and it’s considered a [vice] Presidential document.”); 78:9-13
(“Again, if he is – I don’t get into the legalese. If there are documents created, or
received on behalf of his duties, and if he sits on that board because he is Vice President,
22 (explaining that legislative records are treated “the same as the executive records are
kept. Everything is considered a document that has to be kept or filed.”); see also Ex. 3,
Smith Rough Dep. Tr. at 199:6-9 (“They confirmed to NARA that in response to a
question we asked that they were treating records that Cheney created in the Senate office
as vice presidential record.”); 202:10-15 (“NARA specifically asked Gary Stern asked
how were they treating legislative or records created in the Senate office and they
responded over I think it was several conversations, not all of which I were involved in,
that they were treating them as vice presidential record.”); 203:7-12 (same); Ex. 2,
O’Donnell Dep. Tr. at 79:22-80:5 (stating that Vice President “supports the guidance that
I have been asked to give out and the processes, processes that we follow”); 87:21-88:6
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(stating that it is the intent of the Vice President to include “all of the papers, records,
notes, recordings, memo that the Vice President has created since January 20, 2001, . . .
as vice presidential materials turned over to NARA under the Presidential Records Act”).
5. Simply put, there are no “policies and guidelines that exclude from the reach of
the PRA all but a narrow category of vice presidential records created or received in the
very limited circumstances in which the vice president deems himself to be acting as part
of the executive branch,” Am. Compl. ¶ 35; it is not true that “Vice President Cheney and
the OVP will destroy, transfer, or otherwise dispose of many of the vice president’s
records under the theory they are personal records and therefore not covered by the PRA
or subject to any other record keeping law or obligation,” id ¶ 44; there is no validity to
the claim that “legislative records” are treated as personal by this Vice President; and it is
not true that the OVP and Vice President have been violating the terms of the PRA by
relying on guidelines that do not classify vice presidential records in accord with the
definition set forth in the PRA. See generally Ex. 1, Ex. 2, Ex. 3.
//
//
//
//
//
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GREGORY G. KATSAS
Assistant Attorney General
JOHN R. TYLER
Assistant Branch Director