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1. REPORT DATE (DD-MM-YYYY) 2. REPORT TYPE 3. DATES COVERED (From - To)
(27-10-2010) FINAL
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE 5a. CONTRACT NUMBER
Deception Recognition: Rethinking the Operational Commander’s Approach
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6. AUTHOR(S) 5d. PROJECT NUMBER

5e. TASK NUMBER

Mr. Denver E. McPherson, CIV, DOD
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Paper Advisor: Captain Michael Fitzpatrick, USN
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Joint Military Operations
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Naval War College
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Distribution Statement A: Approved for public release; Distribution is unlimited.

A paper submitted to the Naval War College faculty in partial satisfaction of

13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES
the requirements of the Joint Military Operations Department. The contents of this paper reflect
my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the NWC or the Department of the Navy.
14. ABSTRACT
The United States today is generally seen as the predominant world superpower because of its economic,
political, and military might. Consequently any state or non-state actor at odds with United States policy or strategy
is likely to plan and utilize deception as part of an asymmetrical approach to conflict or manipulation against the
operational commander. How the operational commander plans for it, and protects against it, should be paramount in
the day-to-day implementation of the theater commanders‘ strategy.
This paper explores the operational commander‘s vulnerability to this threat. It will define the scope of
deception as it is understood today and will identify weaknesses in military deception doctrine and theory. It will
explore current counterdeception theory and practice and discuss potential counterarguments that may be made.
Finally, the paper draws conclusions concerning the recognition of adversary deception as a critical component of
military deception practice and implementation and how it should be operationally addressed.

15. SUBJECT TERMS

Deception, counterdeception, counter-deception, deception recognition, foreign deception, military
deception, MILDEC, adversary deception, deception and denial
16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF: 17. LIMITATION 18. NUMBER 19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE PERSON
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a. REPORT b. ABSTRACT c. THIS PAGE 19b. TELEPHONE NUMBER (include area code)
UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED UNCLASSIFIED 24 401-841-3556

Standard Form 298 (Rev. 8-98)

 NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
Newport, R.I.

Deception Recognition: Rethinking the Operational Commander’s Approach.

by

Denver E. McPherson

Civilian, Department of Defense

A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the
requirements of the Department of Joint Military Operations.

The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily
endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.

Signature: _____________________

27 October 2010
 Contents

Introduction 1

Contemporary Examples of Deception 2

Understanding Deception Planning 5

Counterdeception Analytic Taxonomy 6

Joint Doctrine On Operational Deception 12

Analysis and Recommendations 13

Conclusions 16

Notes 18

Bibliography 20

ii
 Abstract

The United States today is generally seen as the predominant world superpower

because of its economic, political, and military might. Consequently any state or non-state

actor at odds with United States policy or strategy is likely to plan and utilize deception as

part of an asymmetrical approach to conflict or manipulation against the operational

commander. How the operational commander plans for it, and protects against it, should be

paramount in the day-to-day implementation of the theater commanders‘ strategy.

This paper explores the operational commander‘s vulnerability to this threat. It will

define the scope of deception as it is understood today and will identify weaknesses in

military deception doctrine and theory. It will explore current counterdeception theory and

practice and discuss potential counterarguments that may be made. Finally, the paper draws

conclusions concerning the recognition of adversary deception as a critical component of

military deception practice and implementation and how it should be operationally addressed.

iii
 INTRODUCTION

―Though fraud in other activities may be detestable, in the management of war it is laudable
and glorious, and he who overcomes the enemy by fraud is as much to be praised as he who
does so by force.‖ -Niccolo Machiavelli, Arte Della Guerra

Deception planning and execution is a critical function within the operational art of

warfare and has been used effectively by commanders for centuries. Deception has proven

time and again to be an effective force multiplier. There is no shortage of examples of

brilliant deception operations of past ages. Making an argument for deception and deception

planning is rather straightforward. Deception is applied by state and non-state actors, and the

level of sophistication is not directly correlated to size, gross domestic product or maturity of

actor. Much has been written, studied, practiced, documented, and taught on how to plan

deception or make it, but, with the growing importance of deception in the contemporary

operating environment, it is at least as critical to examine how to detect deception or break it1

– and here, past research and practice offers much less guidance. ―
All states are vulnerable

to deception, including even those whose officials are sophisticated practitioners of the art

themselves.‖2

The operational level commander is vulnerable to adversary deception and should

formalize an internal systemic deception recognition process. The United States (U.S.) has,

in fact, planned and used military deception (MILDEC) throughout its history, and yet in

many ways this has rendered it more vulnerable to having deception used against it as well.

Planning and conducting MILDEC is typically classified and, in many cases,

compartmentalized while limiting participation of planners and decision makers.

Consequently, it is an element in the art of war that usually gets little academic attention or

rigor simply because most relevant material cannot be obtained by researchers or debated in

1
open publications. This paper will initially leverage analytic theory and doctrine while fully

taking into account that ―

theory is an academic term not much in vogue in the Intelligence

Community, but it is unavoidable in any discussion of analytical judgment,‖3 and

counterdeception in particular.

Considering there is a plethora written about deception and its history, in addressing

this, there will be only a brief review of past experience. This paper will also focus upon

historical precedents where they reveal principles affecting deception‘s use by and against

the United States in the contemporary setting. Next, this paper will identify where deception

recognition and understanding falls short in academia as well as doctrine. Recommendations

will then be offered on how the operational commander might address this threat in a

systemic way through structure and analytical processes.

CONTEMPORARY EXAMPLES OF DECEPTION

Deception has been around as long as warfare itself. In fact, ―

deception must be seen

as an accepted and integral part of every military commander‘s repertoire.‖4 Deception is

practiced in many ways. Political deception is overtly recognized and is almost an

acceptable practice in the geopolitical landscape. Although, the political environment is

norms of behavior and morality,‖5 the operational commander can be and

subject to its own ―

usually is directly affected by both political deception and MILDEC and must be able to

recognize and respond to each as a matter of course. MILDEC is found throughout all levels

of war, strategic through tactical, and is less understood and recognized the more strategic it

comes. This analysis will focus only on MILDEC at the operational level while

understanding that political, strategic, and operational deception can easily overlap as in a tri-

level Venn diagram. Each usually has a cause related to, or effect on the other.

2
 The following two contemporary examples of deception reinforce the assertion that

the threat of deception is real and establishes the value of understanding how to both use and

protect against it. In the first example Saddam Hussein used deception to hold the world at

bay and intimidate his neighbors, which ultimately resulted in the invasion of his country.

On September 12th, 2002 the White House released a paper entitled ―

a Decade of Deception

and Defiance: Saddam Hussein‘s Defiance of the United Nations.‖6 In this document, the

UNITED STATES contended that Saddam Hussein violated over 16 United Nations (UN)

resolutions in the preceding decade including the ―

development of Weapons of Mass

Destruction including Biological Weapons, Chemical Weapons, and Nuclear Weapons.‖7

Further, the document cites several examples of Iraqi defectors admitting to Iraq‘s production

of biological agents, and secret facilities set up for the production of chemical, biological,

and nuclear weapons.8 All of these deceptive measures were eagerly accepted by senior U.S.

authorities as the catalyst for war. On March 21st, 2003, the United States, along with the

United Kingdom, Australia, and Poland, invaded Iraq under the sovereignty of UN resolution

1441.9 After the invasion and subsequent capture of the Iraqi leader, he was interrogated for

months during which he admitted that, in June 2000, he deceived the world in a speech he

gave concerning Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD). He told his interrogator that most

of the WMD in his country had been destroyed by UN inspectors during the 1990s and the

WMD which had not been destroyed by the inspectors had been dismantled by Iraq itself.

When asked why he kept this a secret, Hussein replied that it was very important for him to

project that he had WMD to ensure he stayed in power. Doing so ensured the Iranians were

not emboldened to attack and prevented them from invading Iraq.10

3
 The next example continues along this same storyline. In an uncommon level of

openness, General Tommy Franks, in his book American Soldier, chronicles how he used

deception during the invasion of Iraq in Operation Iraqi Freedom. Even before the first

kinetic phase of the war began, he describes how he fed disinformation to the Iraqi

intelligence directorate the Mukhabarat. In this deception operation, ―

which was so sensitive

that only a few of us in the U.S. government were aware of it,‖11 he chronicled how an

April Fool‖12 was recruited by the Mukhabarat and

American military officer code named ―

subsequently doubled back as an agent of the U.S. intelligence apparatus. General Franks

describes how his CENTCOM deception cell developed documents marked Top Secret/Polo

Step and used these documents to create doubt among Iraq‘s leadership as to ―w
here, when,

and with what size force the coalition would launch its attack.‖13 The result was Iraq‘s

decision to keep the Republican Guard and regular army division‘s in place and focused

toward the north as UNITED STATES and coalition forces were building up and

subsequently attacking from the south.14

Clearly, Saddam Hussein and General Franks knew that deception was an integral

part of the art of war. Saddam Hussein used deception to prevent conflict with Iran but

ended up provoking invasion by the United States and coalition forces. General Franks used

deception to prosecute successful operational level combat operations. The lesson here is

that both were successful in making deception, but in the end, warfare might have been

prevented if counterdeception recognition cells were dedicated toward systemically watching

for deception by Hussein. It is safe to assume that there were few, if any, specially trained

strategic or operational counterdeception recognition cells systematically and specifically

4
looking for deception to ensure that the operational commander and strategic leadership

understood exactly what they were up against. The question is why not?

UNDERSTANDING DECEPTION PLANNING

To some degree, planning for a deception operation is different than any of the other

operational planning processes. Deception recognition will generally be accomplished with a

much smaller team, who must understand both the friendly operational plan and the nature of

any adversary vulnerabilities the deception might effectively target. To do this, it takes the

talented efforts of operational and intelligence planners in close concert with each other to

make sure that the intended deception is believable.

A deception story must embody four characteristics to be successful. It must be

believable, verifiable, consistent, and executable.15 Failing on any of these dimensions

means that the plan will most likely fall short of its objective. With this in mind, deception

planning should progress along the four steps of See, Think, Do,16 and Goal. See is

identifying the observables, the events and actions and means in which to reach the target.

Think is the story: the perception we want our target to have. Do is the reaction or objective

of the story. Goal is the end state desired: what decision or action does the planner want the

decision maker to make?17

Joint doctrine effectively directs MILDEC as a function in the operational planning

process. Understanding deception is important enough to be established in policy in the form

of JP 3-13.4 (Military Deception), which defines MILDEC as ―

those actions executed to

deliberately mislead adversary decision makers as to friendly military capabilities, intentions,

and operations, thereby causing the adversary to take specific actions (or inactions) that will

contribute to the accomplishment of the friendly mission.‖18 In providing guidance in

5
MILDEC planning, joint doctrine dictates that the commander must adhere to six basic

principles:

FOCUS – Target the adversary decision maker

OBJECTIVE – cause an adversary to take or not to take specific action

CENTRALIZED PLANNING AND CONTROL – self-explanatory

SECURITY – deny adversary knowledge of the friendly plan

TIMELINESS – carefully timed for when it is likely to have maximum

impact in distracting the adversary from the friendly plan

INTEGRATION – full integration with the operational planning, especially

to divert adversary attention at decisive points in the friendly plan19

Planning MILDEC is not an amateur sport. Joint doctrine dictates that MILDEC

planners should be specifically trained to accomplish this planning.20 If a MILDEC

operation was to be detected by the adversary it could easily result in counterdeception

operations being conducted against the operational commander, potentially ending with

disastrous results.

COUNTERDECEPTION ANALYTIC TAXONOMY

Counterdeception includes the detection of deception.21 This is accomplished

through a series of steps by individuals who not only intimately understand their target but

also have a deeper understanding of themselves and how they think. Being able to predict

deception early on, or as it is happening, would be the equivalent of an intelligence coup

d‘état within the analytical process. This rarely happens. Yet, many dedicate their life‘s

work toward this goal. Having the experience and training to do this is the difference

between an average analyst and a great analyst. To be at the top of the analytical game, one

6
would have the ability to minimize cognitive bias or pre-conception, identify the potential

deception and see the situation as it relates to the target. This is the terribly complex and

difficult part of counterdeception and is most likely why many shy away from its theory and

practice. This is also why much of this paper will be spent on dissecting the characteristics

of counterdeception analysis in order to validate why the operational commander‘s

counterdeception cell must be specifically trained and systemically focused toward their

target.

To understand your enemy is to understand his culture. ―

To wage war, become an

anthropologist. Lose the fascination with Clausewitz, and embrace culture as the way to

understand conflict. Or so argue a number of strategists, historians, and officers on both

sides of the Atlantic.‖22 In this statement, Patrick Porter is emphasizing that different

countries and cultures invariably have different norms and mores, and ways of looking at the

world, and to know this is to win at war. This is also fundamental to understanding

adversary deception. A culture‘s norms will dictate its appropriate and inappropriate values,

beliefs, attitudes and behaviors. Understanding this cultural relativism gives us insight into

intent. Social norms tend to be tacitly established and maintained through body language and

non-verbal communication between people in their normal social discourse. This will have a

cause and effect on both the part of the analyst‘s perception and the intent of an adversary in

the course of deception activity.

Because other countries and cultures have dramatically different norms than ours,

cognitive analysis, as it relates to deception, must be approached with a clear understanding

of both the adversary‘s norms and one‘s own. Cognitive bias, read norms, will often have as

7
much influence on the analyst‘s perception of the target as the information collected on the

target itself.

As an example, to understand the People‘s Republic of China intent one must

understand that Chinese preferences and prejudices are much different than in the western

culture. In the Chinese culture, people respond to Guanxi, which is to establish an overt

social relationship, before conducting business. Americans typically bypass the concept of

Guanxi, and consider it an impediment to business. In another example, the concept of

―
face‖ in dealing with people in a personal or professional relationship is first and foremost

in the Chinese culture. The western analyst should be aware that to dishonor one‘s self or

family is far more of a concern in the Chinese culture than to lie to an individual or business

entity. In western society, which has its roots in Judea Christian beliefs, people are

motivated by guilt. Therefore, westerners have a hard time reconciling that lying to save

honor is not wrong.

Counterdeception analysts should understand themselves as well as they understand

the enemy. Richard Heuer‘s fundamental study of the epistemological question, ―

What is

truth and how can we know it?‖ is the foundation for his theory and writings about cognitive

challenges in intelligence analysis. His findings are applicable in the study of the cognitive

challenges and appropriate for a counterdeception analyst to consider when dealing with, or

identifying, a deceptive threat against the operational commander. His theory of cognitive

(judgmental) bias is not based on analytical incompetence or laziness by the analyst, but a

subconscious human mental procedure for processing information. Look at it as a thinking

error, which distorts the analyst‘s evaluation of evidence, in some cases even after that

evidence has been discredited. Heuer asserts that because humans are predisposed to bias,

8
 reject the possibility of deception because they see no evidence of it.‖23 He
analysts often ―

further states ―
that the possibility of deception should not be rejected until it is disproved or,

at least, until a systematic search for evidence has been made and none has been found.‖ 24

What we see from this argument is that there is an innate or inborn predisposition to

the way an analyst will process information and develop a hypothesis, and that one does not

have the ability to completely separate this predisposition (and cultural influences) from

―
objective‖ knowledge of the world acquired through past experience. In other words,

everyone is a prisoner of their own history. Considering this, we can argue that in order to

fully understand the meaning of information or messages as they are intended to be received,

those within a counterdeception cell should be trained in the ability to consciously recognize

and compensate for, to any extent possible, these learned experiences and influences.

The inability to set biases aside, resulting in analytical faux pas like mirror imaging,25

is a human characteristic affecting analysts. Richard Heuer offers a potential solution for this

dilemma. He argues that tools and techniques that gear the analyst‘s mind toward applying

higher levels of critical thinking would substantially improve analysis on complex issues

such as deception analysis. One of these tools, which has been described as one of Richard

most important contributions,‖26 is Analysis of Competing Hypothesis (ACH).27

Heur‘s ―

Simply put, ACH is a technique used to challenge and compete, against each other, a series

of plausible hypothesis to see which one is least incompatible with available information. A

detailed discussion of ACH is beyond the scope of this paper but suffice it to say there is

hope for the counterdeception analyst!

Identifying potential adversary deception requires a structured cognitive process not

typically exercised today. This is referred to as the Deception Analysis Cognitive Process

9
(DACP).28 The explicit reference to analysis is most likely the reason the commander and

his J3 typically defer to the J-2 as the lead. This is problematic for many reasons. Deception

planners are typically a cell of operational, planning, and intelligence personnel. The

deception planning skills are the foundation on which a second cell of similar composition,

augmented with specialized counterdeception training, would need to build upon to

successfully apply the DACP. Currently, the DACP is broken down into eight separate

phases: Recognition, Evaluation, Emulation, Selection, Implementation, Collection,

Integration, and Resolution (REESICIR).29 This process has been used at the strategic level

with success. It should be one of the central processes an operational commander would

expect from his counterdeception cell. Recognizing Richard Heuer‘s assertions that all

analysts bring intrinsic biases to the table, the DACP will help mitigate this to some extent.

The use of these phases tailored for the counterdeception cell might appear as follows:

RECOGNITION: The counterdeception cell must recognize what to look for. This

can be self-initiated by observing anomalies or understanding the targets historical

predisposition to using deception. Requirements can also come from higher HQ‘s or

as a result of cross-cueing by other intelligence sources.

EVALUATION: This is a thorough evaluation of not only the target but also a

review of the counterdeception cell member‘s vulnerabilities (biases). An evaluation

of the target should contain an analysis of whether it is plausible and feasible for the

target to conduct deception and to what extent. Is it plausible, or has the target done

this before?

EMULATION: This is the question of identifying or recognizing how the threat will

conduct deception. A study of the deceptive events that led up to the 1973 Yom

10
Kippur War, or deceptive actions taken by India prior to its nuclear test detonations in

1998, which caught most of the world by surprise, would show us that identifying

deception is more than seeing one anomaly or act. A counterdeception cell must be

expert in the target country‘s history, culture, and likely future intent.

SELECTION: This refers to choosing the approach by which the counterdeception

cell would identify activities of deception. This is where sophisticated analytical

skills and use of tools is critical. There are many different processes one might use.

We have already identified ACH as one such tool.

IMPLEMENTATION: This is self-explanatory. It is implementing the process that

the counterdeception cell has chosen. If the cell chooses to use ACH then it would

implement the 8 steps involved.30

COLLECTION: This includes the identification of tools like the Tripwire Analytic

Capability (TAC) program (an unclassified system) already used by intelligence

analytic teams at all levels. The TAC system allows the cell to develop very

sophisticated inquiries into anomalies of current and historical information. Then the

cell might develop a collection strategy to fill gaps, or resolve anomalies.

INTEGRATION: This is the assimilation of the information from the collection

plan and other tools to begin the formulation of a hypothesis or recommendation.

Integrating the information will give the counterdeception cell a more refined picture

of what it is seeing. As well, it will give it a better foundation to develop its

hypothesis and eventually its recommendation.

11
 RESOLUTION: This is the culmination of the DACP. The cell will make a

determination at this point of whether the target is highly likely, likely, or not likely

to be conducting deception.

Having the right team, properly trained, and specifically looking for adversary

deception will give the operational commander a significant advantage in identifying

deception against his command‘s mission. So why isn‘t this team a regular part of the

commands structure and mission?

JOINT DOCTRINE ON OPERATIONAL DECEPTION

Joint doctrine is the cornerstone used by operational commanders when organizing

and managing their commands, yet is used sparingly when addressing the complex

phenomena of counterdeception. Joint Publication (JP) 3-0 (Joint Operations) doesn‘t

mention deception operations. JP 3-13 (Information Operations) describes MILDEC as a

core capability of the Information Operations (IO) program and posits that it is fundamental

to the success of the IO program. It briefly describes MILDEC from the operational

perspective in how it should be coordinated and complement the Operational Security Plan.

It states that ―
MILDEC planning and oversight responsibility is normally organized as a staff

deception element in the operational directorate (J-3).‖31 It does reference JP 3-58 (Joint

Doctrine for Military Deception) for further discussion. JP 3-58 has subsequently been

replaced by JP 3-13.4 (Military Deception). JP 3-13.4 discusses in great detail how to plan

and execute deception from a military point of view but falls short of adequately helping the

operational commander understand how to protect against adversary deception operations. It

addresses counterdeception as an element of MILDEC. Its primary assertion is that

12
―
countering deception is difficult. Knowing deception methods an adversary has used

successfully is important.‖32 Oddly, the follow-on discussion about counterdeception focuses

on what to do after a deception operation is revealed. It is interesting to note that all of this

Detection of Adversary Deception,‖33 yet there is

discussion is under the paragraph labeled ―

no discussion concerning how to detect adversary deception. JP 5-0 (Joint Operation

Planning) does not discuss or mention deception planning at all. Milan N. Vego, considered

one of the foremost scholars of Joint Operational Warfare, discusses in great detail in his

book Joint Operational Warfare; Theory and Practice operational/strategic deception and

how to make it but provides no insight into how to protect against it, or break it. Doctrine

and academia present adequate insight into planning for deception but fall considerably short

in addressing the detection of adversary deception. There is no standardized guidance or

frame of reference for the operational commander and his staff to adequately address this

potential threat. Consequently, commanders and their staffs are left to their own devices to

determine if and when adversary deception operations are being conducted against them.

Breaking it, or recognizing adversary deception, has typically been relegated to

chance, with the operational commander deferring to the Director of Intelligence (J-2) and

his analysts to identify adversary deception in the normal course of their running analytical

review of the operational environment. This is problematic, since most, if not all,

operational-level J-2 analysts lack training in the cognitive analytical techniques needed to

adequately recognize deception directed against the operational commander. Yet, the threat

is real, it is in many cases sophisticated, and it is ongoing. Failing to recognize this and

protect against it is to assume significant risk to current and future operations by leaving the

operational commander vulnerable to adversary deception.

13
 ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

One might argue that J-2 analysts are the most appropriate tool the commander has in

recognizing this threat, as superficially alluded to in JP 3-13.4. This argument places too

much confidence in a typically undertrained, overburdened group and oversimplifies the

techniques involved and the metacognition34 skills required to identify this type of threat.

Recognizing adversary deception requires a cell of focused analysts who are specifically

trained in the fundamental techniques of deception analysis. Richards Heuer, universally

recognized as one of the leading authorities in the psychology of intelligence analysis and

denial & deception theory, makes three fundamental observations reinforcing this. He asserts

that the mind is poorly wired for effectively dealing with inherent uncertainty and induced

uncertainty; increased awareness of cognitive bias does little to deal effectively with

uncertainty; and techniques in assisting the analyst in applying a higher level of critical

thinking will substantially improve the analytical ability to deal with complex issues when

faced with information that is incomplete, ambiguous, and many times deliberately

distorted.35

A typical active duty military intelligence analyst within the operational command is

not usually given the opportunity to study and analyze a targeted adversary for more than a

three year assignment. During this tour, this analyst might receive specialized formal

instruction in basic analysis techniques such as storyboarding etc. In some cases, this analyst

might be lucky enough to be assigned to a counterintelligence or counterterrorism section

and be given more analytical training geared toward a specific discipline. In rare

circumstances will the organization allow the time for an analyst to step away from his

already substantial day-to-day duties to study denial and deception analytical techniques.

14
Basic analytical training is usually adequate to support the day to day understanding of the

conventional threat within the theater of operations but is inadequate when facing a more

complex threat such as deception. It is generally accepted among professional intelligence

agencies, civilian and military, that to become an effective general analyst one should study

the target for a minimum of three years.36

To adequately address the deception threat, the commander should have a cell of

experts dedicated to looking at this problem set. This organic cell wouldn‘t need to be large,

but should consist of one or two trained target intelligence analyst‘s, one operational (non-

intel) member and a Directorate of Plans (J5) planner who is familiar with the command‘s

operational plan directed at the adversary. This cell would need to work together as a long-

term systemic team that has been specifically trained in deception analysis. A

counterargument would be of course that this is simply too taxing on an already understaffed

and overburdened command. This is an understandable perspective. Yet, consider the

operational staff deception element mentioned in JP 3-13 or the CENTCOM operational

deception cell mentioned by General Franks in his book. If it is important enough to dedicate

assets to plan and manage the execution of deception, it certainly would be just as important

to have a cell of experts to ensure protection against it.

Not every operational commander will need a cell focused on potential adversary

deception. In an ideal world, there would be such a cell in every Combatant Command

headquarters or staff. Although, if the command decides that it cannot afford to devote the

bodies, it might be facing too much risk if they are not addressing one of these known

deception practitioner‘s such as Pacific Command (PACOM) for North Korea, and China,

European Command (EUCOM) facing Russia, and Central Command (CENTCOM) dealing

15
with Iran, and non-state actors such as Al Qaida, certainly should consider dedicated

adversary counterdeception cells within their commands.

An effective cell brought together to identify adversary deception should be drawn

from individuals who already understand how to operationally plan deception. It is important

to emphasis that the skills in planning for deception are not synonymous with the skills

needed in how to recognize it. There is no known correlation between being good at

planning deception and being good at analyzing deception. The challenge will be in finding

individuals who have been trained in the fundamentals of recognizing it. Where this cell

resides is not as important as the task it will face. Depending on the commander‘s

established area of operations, the J-2 will structure his Joint Intelligence Center (JIC) by

regional teams or country teams. There is no patent solution since every command dynamic

is different. Having a dedicated, well-trained counterdeception analytical cell is the key for

the operational commander to protect against adversary deception. This team would fit fine

in either the J-2‘s JIC or within an operational cell within the J-3.

Although the focus of this paper is on the operational commander addressing this

threat organically, it is appropriate to mention that it would be unreasonable for him to be

able to expect this cell to work in a vacuum and still be successful. In other words, this cell

will need dedicated strategic counterdeception support. Although not within the scope of this

paper, there are many defense agencies and interagency organizations that should consider

like type cells and processes which would be in direct support of a specific theatre

commander.

16
 CONCLUSIONS

For the operational commander to minimize risk in all phases of war he must be

comfortable that the decisions he makes are based on a clear, true, unambiguous

understanding of his adversary to the maximum extent possible. He must feel comfortable

that the decisions he makes are not a result of adversary deception influencing his actions.

As we have seen, this could be the difference in whether a nation goes to war or not -- and if

so, could mean the difference between success and failure.

To ensure the recognition of deception is adequately addressed, he should have a

group of dedicated, well-trained personnel who understand not only the adversary but ensure

that their own cognitive bias and ambiguity are minimized. We have seen that this does not

take a large group, but a small, focused effort from the intelligence, operational, and planning

directorates. This cell must train, and work together on a systemic basis ensuring that the

whole is truly greater than the sum of its parts.

This cell must understand how to plan deception but only to the extent in which to

provide a foundation for understanding how to facilitate their identifying and breaking an

adversarial deception plan. This cell should be solely dedicated toward counterdeception

activities.

This cell should be specifically trained in cognitive counterdeception techniques to

have insight in cognitive bias, mirror imaging, ACH and REECISER. This will give them

the tools that will enable them to successfully carry out their critical mission.

17
 NOTES
1
As taught by the National Defense Intelligence College (NDIC), Denial & Deception Advanced Studies
Program (DDASP), Making it and Breaking it are teaching concepts which discuss the art of planning deception
and recognizing deception.
2
Cynthia M. Grabo, Anticipating Surprise; Analysis for Strategic Warning (Washington, DC: Joint Military
Intelligence College‘s Center for Strategic Intelligence Research, 2002), 129.
3
Richards J. Heuer, Jr., Psychology of Intelligence Analysis (Washington, DC: Center for the study of
Intelligence CIA, 1999), 34.
4
Michael I. Handel, ―
Military Deception in Peace and War,‖ Jerusalem Papers on Peace Problems 38 (1985), 7.
5
Ibid., 7.
6
America.gov, ― A Decade of Deception and Defiance,‖ Department of State; Office of International
Information Programs, http://www.america.gov/st/washfile-
english/2002/September/[email protected] (accessed 16 October 2010).
7
Ibid.
8
Ibid.
9
United Nations, Security Council 4644th Meeting (AM), ―S
ecurity Council Holds Iraq In ‗Material Breach‘ Of
Disarmament Obligations, Offers Final Chance To Comply,‖ S/Res/1441/2002,
http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2002/SC7564.doc.htm (accessed 16 October 2010).
10
Interrogator Shares Saddam‘s Confessions,‖ CBSNEWS.COM, 27 January 2008,
Henry Shuster, ―
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2008/01/24/60minutes/main3749494.shtml (accessed 16 October 2010).
11
Tommy Franks and Malcolm McConnell, American Soldier (New York, NY: HarperCollins Publishers,
2004), 434.
12
Ibid.
13
Ibid.
14
Ibid.
15
As taught by the National Defense Intelligence College (NDIC), Denial & Deception Advanced Studies
Program (DDASP).
16
Chairman, U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Military Deception, Joint Publication (JP) 3-13.4 (Formerly JP 3-58)
(Washington, DC: CJCS, 13 July 2006), IV-1. The noun Goal is added by the author. Goal is taught at the
National Defense Intelligence College (NDIC), Denial & Deception Advanced Studies Program (DDASP) and
has not been formally incorporated into US Joint Doctrine as of the date of this paper.
17
As taught by the National Defense Intelligence College (NDIC), Denial & Deception Advanced Studies
Program (DDASP).
18
Chairman, U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Military Deception, Joint Publication (JP) 3-13.4 (Formerly JP 3-58)
(Washington, DC: CJCS, 13 July 2006), IV-1.
19
Ibid., viii.

18
20
Ibid., x.
21
John Gooch and Amos Perlmutter, Military Deception and Strategic Surprise (London, England: Routledge
Taylor and Francis Group, 1982), 190.
22
Patrick Porter, Good Anthropology, Bad History: The Cultural Turn in Studying War (Carlisle, PA: US Army
War College Press, 2007),1. http://www.carlisle.army.mil/USAWC/parameters/Articles/07summer/porter.pdf
(accessed 3 October 2010).
23
Richards J. Heuer, Jr., Psychology of Intelligence Analysis (Washington, DC: Center for the study of
Intelligence CIA, 1999), 98.

24
Ibid, 98.

25
Ibid, 70. Heur defines mirror imaging as ― One kind of assumption an analyst should always recognize and
question is mirror-imaging—filling gaps in the analyst‘s own knowledge by assuming that the other side is
likely to act in a certain way because that is how the US would act under similar circumstances.‖
26
Ibid, 95.
27
Ibid.
28
As taught by the National Defense Intelligence College (NDIC), Denial & Deception Advanced Studies
Program (DDASP).
29
As taught by the National Defense Intelligence College (NDIC), Denial & Deception Advanced Studies
Program (DDASP), REESICIR is an acronym used to describe the deception analysis cognitive process used by
analysts in detecting deception.
30
Richards J. Heuer, Jr., Psychology of Intelligence Analysis (Washington, DC: Center for the study of
Intelligence CIA, 1999), 96.
31
Chairman, U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Information Operations, Joint Publication (JP) 3-13 (Washington, DC:
CJCS, 13 July 2006), II-3.
32
Chairman, U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, Military Deception, Joint Publication (JP) 3-13.4 (Formerly JP 3-58)
(Washington, DC: CJCS, 13 July 2006), II-1.
33
Ibid., II-2.
34
Metacognition as defined by the World English Dictionary is thinking about one's own mental processes.
Metacognition is the cornerstone philosophy is training counterdeception techniques and adversary deception
recognition.
35
Richards J. Heuer, Jr., Psychology of Intelligence Analysis (Washington, DC: Center for the study of
Intelligence CIA, 1999), xx.
36
This theory is a rule of thumb and not a specific requirement for advancement at the Defense Intelligence
Agency. Civilian analysts are usually trained in fundamental analytical techniques and generally given two to
three years before their analysis of a given target is considered authoritative based on experience and training.
Most analysts who are seen as experts have spent years studying their target and training in the nuances of
fundamental analysis, not necessarily deception analysis.

19
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21