Heirs of Malabanan vs. Republic

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HEIRS OF MALABANAN v.

REPUBLIC
G.R. No. 179987, 29 APRIL 2009, EN BANC (BERSAMIN, J.)

DOCTRINE OF THE CASE

Without satisfying the requisite character and period of possession — possession and
occupation that is open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious since June 12, 1945, or
earlier — the land cannot be considered ipso jure converted to private property even
upon the subsequent declaration of it as alienable and disposable.

FACTS

Mario Malabanan filed an application for land registration covering a parcel of


land in Silang, Cavite. He claimed that he had purchased the property from Eduardo
Velazco, and that he and his predecessors-in-interest had been in open, notorious, and
continuous adverse and peaceful possession of the land for more than thirty (30) years.
His case was raffled in the RTC, where he presented a Certification issued by
Community Environment & Natural Resources Office, Department of Environment and
Natural Resources (CENRO-DENR), which stated that the subject property was
"verified to be within the Alienable or Disposable land.” RTC rendered judgment in favor
of Malabanan,
approving his application for registration and thus places under the operation of Act 141,
Act 496 and/or P.D. 1529, otherwise known as Property Registration Law.

Republic interposed an appeal to the Court of Appeals, arguing that Malabanan


had failed to prove that the property belonged to the alienable and disposable land of
the public domain, and that the RTC had erred in finding that he had been in possession
of the property in the manner and for the length of time required by law for confirmation
of imperfect title. CA rendered a Decision reversing the RTC and dismissing the
application of Malabanan. It held that under Section 14(1) of the Property Registration
Decree any period of possession prior to the classification of the lots as alienable and
disposable was inconsequential and should be excluded from the computation of the
period of possession. It noted that since the CENRO-DENR certification had verified
that the property was declared alienable and disposable only on 15 March 1982, the
Velazcos' possession prior to that date could not be factored in the computation of the
period of possession. This interpretation of the Court of Appeals of Section 14(1) of the
Property Registration Decree was based on the Court's ruling in Republic v. Herbieto.
Petitioners, before this Court, rely on our ruling in Republic v. Naguit, which was handed
down just four months prior to Herbieto. Petitioners suggest that the discussion
in Herbieto cited by the Court of Appeals is actually obiter dictum since the Metropolitan
Trial Court therein which had directed the registration of the property had no jurisdiction
in the first place since the requisite notice of hearing was published only after the
hearing had already begun. Naguit, petitioners argue, remains the controlling doctrine,
especially when the property in question is agricultural land. Therefore, with respect to
agricultural lands, any possession prior to the declaration of the alienable property as
disposable may be counted in reckoning the period of possession to perfect title under
the Public Land Act and the Property Registration Decree.

ISSUE

Whether an applicant is entitled to registration only when the land subject of the
application had been declared alienable and disposable since June 12, 1945 or earlier.

RULING

YES. As a general rule and pursuant to the Regalian Doctrine, all lands of the
public domain belong to the State and are inalienable. Lands that are not clearly under
private ownership are also presumed to belong to the State and, therefore, may not be
alienated or disposed.

The following are excepted from the general rule:

Agricultural lands of the public domain are rendered alienable and disposable
through any of the exclusive modes enumerated under Section 11 of the Public Land
Act. If the mode is judicial confirmation of imperfect title under Section 48(b) of
the Public Land Act, the agricultural land subject of the application needs only to be
classified as alienable and disposable as of the time of the application, provided the
applicant’s possession and occupation of the land dated back to June 12, 1945, or
earlier. Thereby, a conclusive presumption that the applicant has performed all the
conditions essential to a government grant arises, and the applicant becomes the owner
of the land by virtue of an imperfect or incomplete title. By legal fiction, the land has
already ceased to be part of the public domain and has become private property.

Lands of the public domain subsequently classified or declared as no longer


intended for public use or for the development of national wealth are removed from the
sphere of public dominion and are considered converted into patrimonial lands or lands
of private ownership that may be alienated or disposed through any of the modes of
acquiring ownership under the Civil Code. If the mode of acquisition is prescription,
whether ordinary or extraordinary, proof that the land has been already converted to
private ownership prior to the requisite acquisitive prescriptive period is a condition sine
qua non in observance of the law (Article 1113, Civil Code) that property of the State not
patrimonial in character shall not be the object of prescription.

To reiterate, the petitioners failed to present sufficient evidence to establish that


they and their predecessors-in-interest had been in possession of the land since June
12, 1945. Without satisfying the requisite character and period of possession —
possession and occupation that is open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious since
June 12, 1945, or earlier — the land cannot be considered ipso jure converted to private
property even upon the subsequent declaration of it as alienable and disposable.
Prescription never began to run against the State, such that the land has remained
ineligible for registration under Section 14(1) of the Property Registration Decree.
Likewise, the land continues to be ineligible for land registration under Section 14(2) of
the Property Registration Decree unless Congress enacts a law or the President issues
a proclamation declaring the land as no longer intended for public service or for the
development of the national wealth.

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