Inquiry Into Edinburgh Schools February 2017 FINAL VERSION

Report of the Independent Inquiry into
the Construction of Edinburgh Schools
February 2017
CONTENTS
CLAUSE PAGE
SECTION 1 - PURPOSE AND SCOPE OF THE INQUIRY ................................................................................................................. 1

SECTION 2 - BACKGROUND ........................................................................................................................................................ 2
2.1 INTRODUCTION ......................................................................................................................................................... 2
2.2 METHODOLOGY ......................................................................................................................................................... 2
2.3 INFORMATION AND DOCUMENTS ............................................................................................................................. 3
2.4 WITNESSES................................................................................................................................................................. 4
SECTION 3 - EXECUTIVE SUMMARY ........................................................................................................................................... 5
3.1 REMIT ITEM 1 ............................................................................................................................................................ 6
3.2 REMIT ITEM 2 ............................................................................................................................................................ 8
3.3 REMIT ITEM 3 .......................................................................................................................................................... 10
3.4 REMIT ITEM 4 .......................................................................................................................................................... 11
3.5 REMIT ITEMS 5 AND 6.............................................................................................................................................. 15
3.6 REMIT ITEM 7 .......................................................................................................................................................... 17
3.7 REMIT ITEM 8 .......................................................................................................................................................... 20
3.8 CONCLUSIONS ......................................................................................................................................................... 20
SECTION 4 - PPP1 SCHOOLS – DEVELOPMENT AND CONSTRUCTION RESPONSIBILITIES ....................................................... 24
4.1 LIST OF PPP1 SCHOOLS ............................................................................................................................................ 24
4.2 ORIGINAL AND CURRENT OWNERSHIP OF SHARES IN ESP ...................................................................................... 27
4.3 RESPONSIBILITY FOR DESIGN AND CONSTRUCTION ................................................................................................ 28
4.4 DESIGN TEAM .......................................................................................................................................................... 28
4.5 CONSTRUCTION TEAM............................................................................................................................................. 29
4.6 RESPONSIBILITY FOR INDEPENDENT CERTIFICATION .............................................................................................. 31
4.7 COUNCIL MANAGEMENT STRUCTURE FOR OVERSEEING THE PPP1 DEVELOPMENT .............................................. 32
4.8 MANAGEMENT OF THE OPERATIONAL PHASE OF THE PPP1 SCHOOLS AFTER OCCUPANCY ................................... 34
SECTION 5 - CHRONOLOGY ...................................................................................................................................................... 37
5.1 COLLAPSE OF THE GABLE WALL AT OXGANGS PRIMARY SCHOOL........................................................................... 37
5.2 RELEVANT TECHNICAL TERMS ................................................................................................................................. 40
5.3 INVESTIGATIONS AS TO THE CAUSE OF THE COLLAPSE AT OXGANGS SCHOOL ....................................................... 46
5.4 EXTENSION OF STRUCTURAL SURVEYS TO THE REST OF THE PPP1 SCHOOL ESTATE .............................................. 50
5.5 RESULTS OF EXTENDED SURVEYS AND DECISION TO CLOSE PHASE 2 PPP1 SCHOOLS ............................................ 51
5.6 PROPOSED STRATEGY FOR AN EARLY REOPENING .................................................................................................. 56
5.7 TECHNICAL SOLUTION TO RESOLVE INADEQUATE EMBEDMENT OF WALL TIES ..................................................... 58
5.8 DISCOVERY OF MISSING OR INADEQUATELY SPACED HEAD RESTRAINTS ............................................................... 60
5.9 DECISION TO CLOSE ALL PPP1 SCHOOLS ................................................................................................................. 62
5.10 DECANTING AND RELOCATION OF PUPILS AND STAFF ............................................................................................ 63
5.11 COUNCIL MANAGEMENT OF THE CONTRACTUAL ISSUES ....................................................................................... 69
5.12 INABILITY TO ACCESS ORIGINAL STRUCTURAL DESIGN DRAWINGS AND OTHER RELEVANT INFORMATION .......... 69
5.13 RESULTS OF THE SURVEYS OF CAVITY WALLS .......................................................................................................... 71
5.14 EXTENT OF WORKS REQUIRED BEFORE SCHOOLS COULD BE SAFELY REOPENED ................................................... 84
SECTION 6 - ACTIONS FOLLOWING THE OXGANGS SCHOOL WALL COLLAPSE ..................................................................... 101
6.1 REASSURANCE IN RESPECT OF OTHER AREAS OF THE COUNCIL ESTATE ............................................................... 101
6.2 REPORTS OF DEFECTIVE FIRE-STOPPING PPP PROJECTS........................................................................................ 103
6.3 CONTRACTUAL ENTITLEMENT TO DEDUCTIONS FOR CLOSURES OF THE PPP1 SCHOOLS ..................................... 110
SECTION 7 - REMIT ITEM 1: PPP FINANCING – RATIONALE AND IMPACT ............................................................................ 113
7.1 POLITICAL CONTEXT FOR PROCUREMENT IN THE 1990S....................................................................................... 113
7.2 PFI IN THE PROCUREMENT OF SCHOOLS IN SCOTLAND ........................................................................................ 114
7.3 APPLICATION FOR GOVERNMENT FUNDING FOR EDINBURGH SCHOOLS REDEVELOPMENT ............................... 114
7.4 PROCUREMENT OF THE PPP1 EDINBURGH SCHOOLS PROJECT............................................................................. 116
7.5 CONCLUSIONS – RATIONALE FOR USING PPP ........................................................................................................ 117
7.6 CONCLUSIONS - EFFECT ON THE QUALITY OF CONSTRUCTION ............................................................................. 122
SECTION 8 - REMIT ITEM 2: CONTRACTUAL ARRANGEMENTS WITH ESP ............................................................................. 124
8.1 COUNCIL REVIEW OF DRAWINGS PRIOR TO CONSTRUCTION ............................................................................... 124
8.2 THE REQUIREMENT FOR AS-CONSTRUCTED DRAWINGS ....................................................................................... 127
8.3 THE CONTRACTUAL ROLE OF THE INDEPENDENT CERTIFIER ................................................................................. 129
8.4 QUALITY ASSURANCE UNDER THE PPP1 CONTRACT ............................................................................................. 132
8.5 CONCLUSIONS ....................................................................................................................................................... 134
SECTION 9 - REMIT ITEM 3: REASONS FOR WALL COLLAPSE AND SCHOOL CLOSURES ........................................................ 136
9.1 BEHAVIOUR OF WIND AROUND BUILDINGS .......................................................................................................... 136
9.2 REASON FOR THE COLLAPSE OF THE WALL AT OXGANGS SCHOOL ....................................................................... 138
9.3 REASON FOR THE CLOSURES OF THE SCHOOLS ..................................................................................................... 151
SECTION 10 - REMIT ITEM 4: QUALITY ASSURANCE PROCESSES .......................................................................................... 161
10.1 INDEPENDENT SCRUTINY OF CONSTRUCTION QUALITY ........................................................................................ 161
10.2 EMPLOYMENT OF CLERKS OF WORKS TO PROTECT QUALITY ............................................................................... 165
10.3 EFFECTIVENESS OF THE INDEPENDENT CERTIFIER IN PROTECTING QUALITY........................................................ 166
10.4 IMPACT OF COUNCIL INTERNAL RESOURCING ON QUALITY ASSURANCE ............................................................. 166
10.5 COUNCIL INTERNAL REVIEW OF PERFORMANCE ON PPP1 PROJECT ..................................................................... 167
10.6 COUNCIL ADMINISTRATION OF STATUTORY BUILDING STANDARDS .................................................................... 171
10.7 BUILDING STANDARDS CERTIFICATION – PPP1 PHASE 1 ....................................................................................... 175
10.8 BUILDING STANDARDS CERTIFICATION – PPP1 PHASE 2 ....................................................................................... 178
10.9 ISSUE OF AVAILABILITY CERTIFICATES BY INDEPENDENT CERTIFIERS ................................................................... 180
10.10 SITE INSPECTIONS BY EDINBURGH BUILDINGS STANDARDS DEPARTMENT .......................................................... 183
10.11 EFFECTIVENESS OF THE BUILDING STANDARDS SYSTEM ....................................................................................... 186
10.12 CERTIFICATION BY THE INDEPENDENT CERTIFIERS ............................................................................................... 187
10.13 RESPONSIBILITY FOR INSPECTION OF CONSTRUCTION QUALITY .......................................................................... 190
10.14 QUALITY MANAGEMENT WITHIN THE SUPPLY CHAIN........................................................................................... 195
10.15 DEFECTIVE CONSTRUCTION MORE WIDESPREAD WITHIN THE INDUSTRY ............................................................ 198
10.16 FOUR SCHOOLS OUTSIDE EDINBURGH WHICH SUFFERED DAMAGE IN HIGH WINDS ........................................... 200
10.17 EXAMPLES OF SIMILAR DEFECTS FOUND IN OTHER SCHOOLS IN SCOTLAND........................................................ 204
SECTION 11 - REMIT ITEMS 5 AND 6: MAINTENANCE OF BUILDINGS AND MANAGEMENT OF CONTRACTS ...................... 208
11.1 COULD THE CURRENT DEFECTS HAVE BEEN FOUND EARLIER? ............................................................................. 208
11.2 MANAGEMENT AND MAINTENANCE OF THE SCHOOLS SINCE CONSTRUCTION ................................................... 209
SECTION 12 - REMIT ITEM 7: EDINBURGH COUNCIL'S HANDLING OF THE INCIDENT ........................................................... 212
12.1 ORGANISATIONAL RESPONSE ................................................................................................................................ 212
12.2 MANAGEMENT OF THE CLOSURE OF ALL PPP1 SCHOOLS ..................................................................................... 213
12.3 THE ROLE OF THE COUNCIL IN ENSURING EFFECTIVENESS OF REMEDIAL WORKS ............................................... 215
12.4 REVIEW OF TECHNICAL AND DESIGN INFORMATION ............................................................................................ 220
12.5 IMPACT ON EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT ............................................................................................................. 221
12.6 TABLES COMPARING EXAM ATTAINMENT IN 2016 WITH RECENT ........................................................................ 221
12.7 SUPPORT TO PARENTS OR FAMILIES OF DECANTED PUPILS.................................................................................. 226
SECTION 13 – REMIT 8: RECOMMENDATIONS ...................................................................................................................... 228
1. PROCUREMENT RECOMMENDATIONS .................................................................................................................. 230
2. INDEPENDENT CERTIFIER RECOMMENDATIONS ................................................................................................... 232
3. CLIENT'S RELATIONSHIP WITH THE DESIGN TEAM ................................................................................................ 234
4. INFORMATION SHARING RECOMMENDATIONS .................................................................................................... 235
5. CONSTRUCTION RECOMMENDATIONS ................................................................................................................. 238
6. TRAINING AND RECRUITMENT RECOMMENDATIONS ........................................................................................... 241
7. BUILDING STANDARDS RECOMMENDATIONS ....................................................................................................... 242
8. INFORMATION SHARING RECOMMENDATIONS .................................................................................................... 244
9. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE CITY OF EDINBURGH COUNCIL ............................................................................ 245
10. FURTHER INVESTIGATIONS .................................................................................................................................... 246
APPENDIX 1 ............................................................................................................................................................................ 247
LIST OF THOSE INVITED TO PROVIDE EVIDENCE TO THE INQUIRY .......................................................................................... 247
1. CITY OF EDINBURGH COUNCIL............................................................................................................................... 247
2. TEACHERS AND PARENTS ...................................................................................................................................... 247
3. PROJECT PARTIES ................................................................................................................................................... 248
4. CONSTRUCTION CONTRACTORS ............................................................................................................................ 248
5. ADVISORS ENGAGED FOLLOWING OXGANGS SCHOOL WALL COLLAPSE .............................................................. 251
6. CONTRACTORS ENGAGED FOLLOWING THE OXGANGS SCHOOL WALL COLLAPSE ............................................... 251
7. NATIONAL BUILDING STANDARDS ......................................................................................................................... 252
8. INDUSTRY BODIES.................................................................................................................................................. 252
9. OTHER ORGANISATIONS ........................................................................................................................................ 253
APPENDIX 2 ............................................................................................................................................................................ 255
EXAMPLE OF LETTERS OF REASSURANCE AS TO THE STRUCTURAL SAFETY OF THE REMEDIAL WORKS ................................ 255
APPENDIX 3 ............................................................................................................................................................................ 261
TWO AVAILABILITY CERTIFICATES MADE AVAILABLE TO THE INQUIRY .................................................................................. 261
APPENDIX 4 ............................................................................................................................................................................ 263
LIST OF ACRONYMS................................................................................................................................................................. 263
Section 1 – Purpose and Scope of the Inquiry
SECTION 1 – PURPOSE AND SCOPE OF THE INQUIRY
This section sets out the formal remit for this Inquiry as agreed between the City of
Edinburgh Council and the appointed Chair of the Inquiry. It was:
To inquire into and report on the following matters:
1. The rationale for the Council entering into the PPP1 contract for schools and the
effect this financing arrangement may have had on the construction process;
2. The contractual arrangements between the Edinburgh Schools Partnership and

Edinburgh Council;
3. Establish the reasons(s) for, and necessity of, the school closures, including a
review of the reasons for the Oxgangs Primary School wall collapse;
4. The role of the Council with regard to the quality assurance of the construction of
the buildings, including the granting of completion certificates to allow the
buildings to be occupied and to become operational, the management of risks to
the Council; and if standard practice regarding quality assurance provided
adequate checks and balances for all parties to the contract;
5. The management and maintenance of the buildings since construction, including

advising on whether the current defects should have been found earlier;
6. The management of the contract by the relevant parties since construction; and
the quality of the contract undertaken.
7. A review of Edinburgh Council's handling of the incident from January 2016 to the
reopening of the schools in Summer 2016; and
8. Provide advice and recommendations on any specific or wider lessons which can
be learned from these unfortunate events for Edinburgh Council and any other
bodies;
9. Any further matters the Chair of the Inquiry wishes to pursue relevant to this
matter.
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Section 2 – Background
SECTION 2 - BACKGROUND
2.1 INTRODUCTION
2.1.1 This Report presents the findings of an independent Inquiry commissioned by

the Chief Executive of the City of Edinburgh Council. The holding of the Inquiry
followed the collapse of part of an external wall at Oxgangs Primary School
Edinburgh on 29th January 2016 in the hours prior to the normal school opening
time, and the discovery in the subsequent investigative surveys of defects in the
construction of the external walls of 16 other schools in Edinburgh, resulting in
the enforced closure of all 17 schools (in addition to a Secure Unit and a
Community Centre) for a period of several months. All these buildings had been
built as part of the same Public Private Partnership contract ("PPP1") with
Edinburgh Schools Partnership Limited ("ESP").
2.1.2 The Report has been compiled by the appointed Chair of the Inquiry, Professor
John Cole CBE, an architect and retired senior civil servant. In undertaking the
Inquiry, and in the production of the Report, the Chair was supported by Mr.
Stewart Macartney, a structural engineer and a director in a multi-disciplinary
engineering consultancy and by Mr Chris Phillips, a lawyer and a partner in an
established legal practice. This panel of three members was provided with
administrative support and office accommodation by the City of Edinburgh
Council.
2.2 METHODOLOGY
2.2.1 The methodology adopted by the Inquiry followed the standard stages of an
Inquiry of this type namely:
 Agreement by the Chair with the commissioner of the Inquiry to a final

formal remit for the Inquiry. The final remit is presented in full in Section 1
of this Report.
 Selection and appointment of panel members and administrative support.
 Information gathering including all key documentation available.
 Familiarisation with all documentation, the chronology of events and

establishment of the emerging issues.
 Visits to inspect the properties in question.
 Development of a protocol for the Inquiry.
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 Identification of a list of desired witnesses and issue of invitations to

attend the Inquiry.
 The holding of interviews with witnesses, the transcription of evidence

taken, the issue of same to the witness in question for comment and any
necessary amendment, and the finalisation and signing of witness
statements.
 The analysis and professional scrutiny of information and evidence

collected.
 A review by the panel of the preliminary findings and recommendations of

the Inquiry.
 The preparation and submission of the Report of the Inquiry to the

commissioner of the Inquiry.
2.3 INFORMATION AND DOCUMENTS
2.3.1 Whilst the Inquiry was established as an Independent Inquiry, like many
inquiries, it had to rely on the cooperation of organisations and individuals to
carry out its work, not having had the authority to compel the production of
documents or the attendance of witnesses for interview.
2.3.2 In this regard the Inquiry has enjoyed the full cooperation of the Councillors, the
Chief Executive, the officers and the staff of the City of Edinburgh Council in an
open and transparent manner throughout the course of the Inquiry in seeking to
respond as fully as possible to the requests for information from the Inquiry. In
so doing the essential independence of the Inquiry in undertaking its work was
acknowledged and respected at all times.
2.3.3 The information, on which the analysis of the period of the procurement, design
and construction of the projects from 1998 to 2005 has been based, is limited to
that which was made available to the Inquiry by the Council or provided by other
participants involved in the project.
2.3.4 Unfortunately, some of the information dating from the 2000 to 2005 period,
which would have been of benefit to the Inquiry, had either not been retained,
could not be discovered within the archives, or was not offered to the Inquiry by
those organisations that may still hold relevant information in their possession.
This fact will be referred to in the recommendations of this Report.
2.3.5 The Inquiry Team would like to express our thanks to those many organisations
and individuals who gave of their time to attend as witnesses or make
submissions to the Inquiry.
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2.3.6 A small number of individuals or representatives of organisations, involved in

the project or in possession of information relevant to the Inquiry, and from
whom the Inquiry would have wished to take evidence, had deceased, had
retired, were no longer traceable, or, when invited, were unwilling to appear
before or cooperate with the Inquiry.
2.4 WITNESSES
2.4.1 It was important that the Inquiry had the maximum possible access to all
available knowledge and information relevant to the remit of the Inquiry that
was held. This required the cooperation of a wide range of organisations that
had been directly involved in both the original development and the subsequent
necessary remediation of the PPP1 projects and other bodies engaged in or with
experience and expertise in the various relevant aspects of similar projects.
2.4.2 The list of organisations and individuals invited to provide witnesses or attend as
witnesses and their willingness or otherwise to do so, or alternatively to provide
written submissions to the Inquiry is provided in Appendix 1 to this Report.
2.4.3 In relation to the procedural arrangements to be adopted at the interview

sessions, potential witnesses were advised as follows in the letter of invitation to
give evidence to the Inquiry:
"The evidence-taking sessions will not be open to the public. Each witness will
be seen on their own and questions relating to their involvement in or
knowledge of the project or knowledge of equivalent project processes will be
addressed directly to them. If you so wish, you can be accompanied by a
friend, colleague or legal representative of your choice but any costs incurred
as a result would not be reimbursed.
It is intended that during the interview a recording will be made of the

proceedings so that a statement accurately reflecting the evidence provided
by each witness can be drawn up. Once drafted this statement will be
forwarded to the relevant witness so that they can advise of any amendments
and/or clarifications they may feel are required. These statements will be used
to help inform the writing and conclusions of the final report of the Inquiry."
2.4.4 In writing the Report it is not proposed to name individuals but rather to refer to
the organisation they represented, the position they held in that organisation
and/or the role that they played in terms of its relevance to this Inquiry.
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Section 3 – Executive Summary
SECTION 3 - EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
 This Executive Summary will briefly address in turn each item of the remit set for
the Inquiry and provide an overview of the related findings of the Inquiry. It will
not seek to repeat the chronology of events which is detailed in Section 5 or
repeat the more in-depth analysis behind the findings as contained in the
relevant sections of this Report. Only the more significant findings will be
presented here. The full list of recommendations emanating from this Report is
provided in Section 13.
 Before presenting the Executive Summary on the remit items, the Inquiry would
wish to emphasise the importance of the subject matter underlying this Inquiry
and of the need for the matters raised by it to be properly addressed by the
construction industry itself, by public sector and other clients of the construction
industry, by regulatory authorities and by actions of Governments as necessary.
 This Report has addressed the remit set for it, which did not extend to a wider
investigation of the potential prevalence of the defects that led to the collapse
of the Oxgangs School wall in all buildings or building types recently constructed
in Scotland. It is impossible to draw definitive conclusions as to the answer to
this question without relevant evidence. However, it would be naïve to assume
that the lack of quality control evidenced in the construction of the walls of the
Edinburgh schools is limited either to Edinburgh or to school buildings.
 The fact that no injuries or fatalities to children resulted from the collapse of the
gable wall at Oxgangs School was a matter of timing and luck. Approximately 9
tons of masonry fell on an area where children could easily have been standing
or passing through. One does not require much imagination to think of what the
consequences might have been if it had happened an hour or so later.
 The Inquiry has become aware that this was one of five avoidable incidents of
external masonry panels failing in strong winds at Scottish schools in the last few
years. Five may seem a relatively modest number but, given the potential
implications of failures of this type, one such collapse is one too many. The
reason that the incidents are described as avoidable is that in all cases it would
appear that proper quality control at the time of building could have identified
and have rectified the basic defects in construction that led to the failures.
 As will be seen in this Report, in addition to the 17 schools in Edinburgh,

evidence has been provided on the discovery at a number of other schools in
Scotland of panels of brick or blockwork, located at high levels in school
buildings, that were not securely fixed. Similar construction defects to those
discovered in the Edinburgh schools were also found at these schools.
5
 The underlying faults that gave rise to this Inquiry occurred during the original
period of procurement, design and construction of the PPP1 schools between
2000 and 2005.
 The remediation of all 17 PPP1 schools, undertaken in the first half of 2016,
while it should not have been required and unquestionably caused very
considerable disruption to pupils, parents and teachers, was completed to a
good standard within a comparatively short period of time through the
combined and significant efforts of the City of Edinburgh Council, ESP, Galliford
Try, Amey and their professional advisers. For this they should be commended.
3.1 REMIT ITEM 1
3.1.1 Remit Item 1 asked the Inquiry to consider the decision by the Council to use the
Public Private Partnership ("PPP") methodology and whether this procurement
methodology had an impact on the level of defective construction discovered in
the PPP1 schools.
3.1.2 In 1998, when the project was first being considered, there was a pressing need
to address the condition, configuration, efficiency and capacity of the school
estate in Edinburgh, which had suffered from a lack of investment in both
maintenance and new infrastructure. Action to address these problems could
not have been reasonably delayed for any significant period, other than to the
detriment of the educational achievement of school-children in Edinburgh.
The use of PPP for the Schools
3.1.3 The on-going availability of public sector capital funding was at an inadequate
level to facilitate the required level of investment and no further funding of this
type was available from central Government. At the time, the U.K. Government
and subsequently the Scottish Executive, were actively promoting PPP as their
favoured route and were implementing a scheme called 'Levelling the Playing
Field' under which they were offering the City of Edinburgh Council an ongoing
contribution of £6.2m towards the annual revenue cost of the PPP1 project. This
contribution made the PPP scheme affordable to the Council.
3.1.4 In making their decision to use PPP, the Council were aware that this
procurement model had recently been successfully used by other Local
Authorities in Scotland to replace worn out school infrastructure.
3.1.5 An Outline and Final Business Case had been prepared by the City of Edinburgh
Council in accordance with the required procedural guidance, which
demonstrated that the PPP1 process represented value-for-money. These
business cases received formal approval from the Council itself, Audit Scotland
and the Scottish Government.
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3.1.6 The comparison of the PPP option with a public sector funded option (the Public
Sector Comparator or "PSC") was a mandatory aspect of this business case
process. However, Local Authorities knew in advance that, even if the publicly
funded option was found to be better value-for-money, this was not a realistic
option due to the non-availability of public sector funding. It is perhaps not
surprising therefore, that following the risk adjustments required by the process,
the PPP option frequently became less (rather than more) expensive than the
public sector option.
3.1.7 The following is an extract from a 2002 Report produced by Audit Scotland
entitled, 'Taking the Initiative – Using PFI Contracts to Renew Council Schools'.
(For the purpose of this Inquiry, the terms Private Finance Initiative ("PFI") and
PPP are used interchangeably). It read:
"Audit Scotland's analysis is that, in most cases, the main costs underlying the
PFI option are not significantly different from or are higher than the
equivalent forecast costs under the PSC. In most cases the risk adjustment
tipped the balance back in favour of the PFI option.
A further consideration is the inevitable subjectivity that surrounds

judgements on which the PSC costings are based and wider decisions
regarding the respective merits of the PFI and any alternative solution to
providing new schools. Under the terms of the competition for financial
support from the Scottish Executive for PFI projects, no funding for the PSC
was available. Consequently, if the PSC had suggested that the PFI was not
economic it would have proved fatal to the project (no PFI schools project has
so far failed this test)."
3.1.8 From the evidence provided to the Inquiry, it would appear that an objective
and professional approach was taken by the Council, with the support of their
external consultants, to the assessment of the value of the risk being transferred
to the PPP company. The Inquiry has not sought to rerun that somewhat
complicated process.
3.1.9 In the case of the PPP1 Project, the fact that the costs, associated with the
remedial works arising from the collapse of the wall at Oxgangs and the
discovery of defective construction in all 17 schools, and the responsibility for
implementation of the necessary remedial works have been borne by ESP,
demonstrates the application of risk transfer to the Private Sector.
3.1.10 The conclusion of the Inquiry on this first part of Remit Item 1 is that, given the
above context, the City of Edinburgh Council had a sound rationale for their
decision to adopt the PPP methodology for the funding and procurement of the
PPP1 schools and acted both appropriately and pragmatically in making this
decision.
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Impact of the financing on project quality
3.1.11 The second part of Remit Item 1 whether the PPP financing method had
impacted on the quality of construction.
3.1.12 It is the view of the Inquiry that while the financing method was not responsible
for the defective construction, aspects of the way in which the PPP methodology
was implemented on these projects did increase the risk of poor quality design
and construction. In this regard, however, the approach adopted on the
Edinburgh scheme was quite typical of that adopted generally at the time.
3.1.13 The Inquiry is of the view that a fundamental weakness of the process adopted
was the lack of properly resourced and structured scrutiny of the building work
at an appropriate level of detail by the external appointment or direct
employment of those with requisite experience acting on behalf of the City of
Edinburgh Council. There was an over-reliance on the part of the Council,
without adequate evidence, that others in the project structure, including those
building the schools would comprehensively fulfil this essential role.
3.1.14 However, the method of financing the project, per se, did not negatively
influence the quality of construction in the Edinburgh schools. There is no
reason why properly managed privately financed public sector buildings should
not be capable of delivering buildings constructed to a very high standard, if best
practice approaches to ensuring the quality of design and construction are
properly incorporated. There does however need to be a greater understanding
amongst clients and those advising them as to what does represent best practice
in this regard.
3.2 REMIT ITEM 2
3.2.1 Remit Item 2 asked the Inquiry to consider the adequacy of the contractual
arrangements between the Council and ESP.
The quality of the contract
3.2.2 It is the view of the Inquiry that while there are several areas within the PPP1
Contract that could have been strengthened to provide additional assurance for
the Council, the Contract was generally adequate for its purpose. The
incorporation of a number of additional provisions, such as were found by the
Inquiry in examining typical contemporaneous contracts, while perhaps
beneficial, would have been unlikely to have prevented the occurrence of the
defective construction subsequently identified in the completed schools.
3.2.3 The omission of collateral warranties in favour of the Council from principal
building subcontractors and members of the professional teams appointed by
the building contractor was somewhat surprising, as even then this was a
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common provision. However, this was not directly relevant to the issue of the
defective construction at the schools.
The role of the Independent Certifiers
3.2.4 A stronger contract in relation to the definition of the responsibilities of the

Independent Certifier in terms of the actual level of inspection of construction
required may however have had a positive impact. The evidence to the Inquiry
indicated that quite different approaches were adopted in the practical exercise
of these responsibilities by the different Independent Certifiers for Phase 1 and
Phase 2 of the construction of the PPP1 schools despite the use of the same
terms of appointment, although in their roles as Independent Certifier neither
approach succeeded in identifying the defects in the construction of the external
walls.
3.2.5 It is the view of the Inquiry that there should be greater clarity for clients as to
the level of scrutiny that Independent Certifiers are required to carry out and
the degree of reliance they can reasonably place on the issue of Availability
Certificates as evidence that the quality of construction is fully compliant with
the Project Requirements. In this regard the Contract was considered to be less
than totally clear.
Failure to prepare or maintain appropriate as-installed records
3.2.6 The PPP1 Contract contained a requirement for the preparation, provision to the
Council and maintenance of as-installed drawings and related documentation.
This provision has not been adequately complied with as evidenced to the
Inquiry by the main organisations involved in the remediation process.
3.2.7 This omission was particularly surprising as the concession period for this
contract has still more than 15 years to run and reference to these documents
will inevitably be required by the various parties over this period. In addition to
the limited number of drawings able to be made available, the Inquiry found
difficulty in the course of its work in accessing some of the key contract
documents from the records of the Council.
3.2.8 The Inquiry is of the view that insufficient attention was paid by ESP and its
relevant sub-contractors to the accurate documenting, storage and maintenance
of as-installed drawings and related records of the schools. The absence or
inaccessibility of these led to a more prolonged and probably more extensive
remediation process than would have been required had this documentation
been readily available as required under the Contract.
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3.3 REMIT ITEM 3
3.3.1 Remit Item 3 required the Inquiry to establish the reasons for, and necessity of,
the school closures, including a review of the reasons for the Oxgangs Primary
School wall collapse.
The cause of the wall collapse
3.3.2 The response to this question from a technical perspective is reasonably

straightforward.
3.3.3 It is the view of the Inquiry that the primary cause of the collapse of the wall at
Oxgangs school was poor quality construction in the building of the wall which
failed to achieve the required minimum embedment of 50mm for the wall ties,
particularly in the outer leaf of the cavity wall. The poor quality relates to all
three of the following aspects:
 the direct laying of the bricks and the positioning of the wall ties;
 the direct supervision of the laying of the bricks and the positioning of the
wall ties; and
 the quality assurance processes used by the sub- contractor and main
contractor to confirm the quality of the construction of the walls.
3.3.4 All three issues were ultimately the responsibility of the design and build
contractor in charge of the site.
3.3.5 It is also reasonable to conclude, based on the information in the meteorological

records provided, that if the wall had been designed and built to the required
appropriate standard it would have been able to withstand the level of wind
loading to which it was subjected. The limited embedment of the wall ties in the
outer leaf meant that the outer face of brick was simply pulled away from the
inner leaf of blockwork due to the action of the wind.
3.3.6 Other factors that may have contributed to the poor quality of bricklaying are
discussed in later sections of this Report.
The necessity for closure of the schools
3.3.7 Given the position that the Council found itself facing on 8 th April 2016, it is the
view of the Inquiry that the only practical and safe course of action in these
circumstances was to close the schools in question and commence an
immediate programme of remediation. The factors that made this the only
sensible decision were:
10
 the already identified significant problem of poor embedment across the

schools;
 the nature of the letter received from ESP on 8 th April 2016 withdrawing
their previous confirmation of 5th April 2016 that the schools were safe to
occupy;
 the significant reduction in the effective capacity of the brick panels to

withstand wind-loading as a result of the reported omission of head
restraints;
 the increased risk of an internal as well as external collapse of wall panels;
 the fact that there were only two days remaining before the schools were
due to open, leaving no time for any alternative action (if such was
available); and
 the unacceptability of the continuity of teaching time over the remaining

three months being dependent on the weather.
3.4 REMIT ITEM 4
3.4.1 Remit Item 4 relates to the role of the Council with regard to the quality
assurance of the construction of the buildings, including the granting of
completion certificates to allow the buildings to be occupied.
Lack of adequate independent scrutiny
3.4.2 It is the unequivocally held view of the Inquiry that there were fundamental and
widespread failures of the quality assurance processes of the various contractors
and sub-contractors, who built or oversaw the building of the PPP1 schools, to
identify and rectify both defective construction of the cavity walls and the
omission of the proper incorporation of required masonry restraints and
secondary steelwork.
3.4.3 Given the widespread nature of the presence of the same defective construction
which was the primary cause of the collapse of the wall at Oxgangs school, in
terms of varying cavity width and lack of embedment of wall ties, the Inquiry can
only conclude that those responsible for the supervision and quality assurance
of this work either did not inspect the work adequately or did inspect it and
failed to take appropriate action to have it removed or remedied.
3.4.4 The significant number of defects reported in the surveys of fire-stopping in the
PPP1 schools, which surveys were undertaken during the period of this Inquiry,
raise further concerns as to the degree of scrutiny applied to the quality of
construction, particularly in relation to such a critical aspect of construction.
11
3.4.5 The Inquiry is of the view that it was insufficient for public sector clients, with a
responsibility to protect the safety of the communities they serve, to so largely
rely on the quality assurance processes of contractors for confirmation that key
aspects of the building impacting on the safety of users have been properly
constructed. An appropriate level of independent scrutiny was missing.
3.4.6 It is completely possible and practical for appropriate levels of independent

scrutiny, provided by a range of professionals, especially the use of Clerks of
Works, to be incorporated into the more recent procurement methodologies
used to procure public buildings. As will be expanded upon further, the role of
Independent Certifier, certainly as undertaken on the PPP1 projects, did not
provide the level of independent scrutiny of the quality of construction that this
Inquiry considers both appropriate and prudent for clients to require.
3.4.7 From evidence provided to the Inquiry, it was clear, however, that misplaced
assumptions were made by the Council and other parties regarding the level of
assurance one could place on the quality of construction as a result of the role
undertaken by the Independent Certifiers.
3.4.8 The appointment of the Independent Certifiers is a joint appointment between

the parties to the Contract. How this role is undertaken in practice can vary
significantly from project to project but as generally practised it in no way
replicates the level of close on-going independent scrutiny or inspection of
construction that is provided by a Clerk of Works service which, as
circumstances would indicate, was required on these sites. Visits by
Independent Certifiers to site and time spent by them on site are much less
frequent and shorter than that provided by a project Clerk of Works and do not
have the same detailed focus on the quality of construction.
3.4.9 Information provided by several Local Authorities in Scotland indicated that they
had retained Clerks of Works to provide independent inspection of their PPP
programmes for new schools. Several of those organisations who used Clerks of
Works on their school building programmes expressed the benefits of doing so
in their responses to the Inquiry. Edinburgh Council, in common with probably a
significant majority of public sector clients undertaking PPP projects, did not
appoint Clerks of Works to provide inspection services on the PPP1 schools.
3.4.10 While the presence of Clerks of Works cannot guarantee the absence of defects
in building construction, there is no doubt in the view of the Inquiry that the use
of experienced and properly resourced high quality Clerks of Works results in a
much greater likelihood of defective work being identified before it is closed in.
Secondly, the Inquiry is also of the opinion that the awareness by site operatives
of the presence of Clerks of Works on site can impact positively on their
approach to the quality of their work.
12
Council resourcing of the project
3.4.11 The Inquiry had access to two internal reviews undertaken by the Council in
2002 and 2004 respectively, for doing which they are to be applauded, that
examined the lessons to be learnt from both their involvement in the
procurement stages of the project and their feedback after the completion of
the Phase 1 schools.
3.4.12 It is clear from these reviews that the Council itself recognised that it had failed
to appreciate the demands of the PPP process in terms of the requirement for
adequate internal resources and external support for internal resources, and
that as a result had under-resourced the team that represented or advised the
Council as client in the relationship with the Consortium.
3.4.13 Equally, and with some justification in the opinion of the Inquiry given the
complexity of the project and the time within which it was delivered, the
Council's review concluded that:
"Overall it is recognised that the Council team and project manager, in

conjunction with advisers did an excellent job in delivering PPP1."
3.4.14 However, at the time of these reviews by the Council, there was no knowledge
of the hidden fundamental flaws in the construction of the external walls that
were yet to be discovered.
The role of Building Standards and the certification of the schools
3.4.15 The Inquiry formed the view that there was a common misconception, even
among some Council officers, as to the extent of the reliance that can be placed
on the quality of construction of a building because it had successfully gone
through the statutory Buildings Standards process.
3.4.16 The resource available within the Building Standards section of the Council
tended to be focused on the approval of warrant drawings but with limited
effective follow up in terms of checking the compliance to the same level of
detail of what was actually built on site with what was shown on the approved
drawings.
3.4.17 The issue of a limited resource of qualified staff within the Buildings Standards
Department was raised with the Inquiry on several occasions in terms of how
this translated into a limited allocation of time for inspections of the quality and
compliance of the construction of projects on site. From the information and
evidence of witnesses provided to the Inquiry, it was clear that a preponderance
of those visits made to the school sites related to checks on drainage rather than
to the compliance of other aspects of the construction.
13
3.4.18 The Inquiry was informed that the issues of lack of embedment of wall ties or
the failure to include head restraints in walls were not areas that would normally
be inspected on visits to site by the Council's building inspectors. It was the view
of the Inquiry that it was not reasonable to expect the level and frequency of
inspection visits by Building Control required to identify failures of this type on
such large buildings from the visits of building inspectors.
3.4.19 If the inspections undertaken by the Independent Certifier are also not at this
level, then this represents a gap in the level of assurance provided to the public
sector client, unless a separate resource is put in place to undertake this level of
scrutiny on behalf of the client.
3.4.20 The responsibility to ensure the compliance of the building with the required
standards lies with the builder who should have in place proper inspection of the
works, however by definition such self-managed inspections cannot be
independent of the builder.
3.4.21 In relation to the submission, processing and certification of the schools in

compliance with the Building Standards system in Scotland, the information,
which was provided to the Inquiry by the Building Standards Department, raised
concerns as to the appropriate application of the statutory requirements.
3.4.22 The analysis of this information suggests that issues of non-compliance, each
occurring in the case of several schools, included: failures to submit notifications
of intention to start work; starting work without approved warrants; failures to
submit requests for amended warrants; and occupying schools in advance of the
issue of a temporary occupation or completion certificate.
3.4.23 Two of the Phase 1 schools, Craigmount High School and Royal High School, have
never received approved completion certificates. In the case of a third school,
Gracemount High school, the Certificate of Completion was applied for on 18 th
May 2010 and issued by Building Standards on 7th June 2010, some seven years
after the school was occupied.
3.4.24 It should be noted that to occupy a new building without the issue of a
Completion Certificate is a breach of both the original Building (Scotland) Act
1959 and the amended Building (Scotland) Act 2003.
3.4.25 The Inquiry had a further concern in relation to this issue. Completed Certificates
of Availability signed by the Independent Certifier, as well as certifying that a
school was available for occupation and that Council payments for that school
were due from that date, were also required to confirm that all Building
Standards certificates had been issued. From an analysis of the information
available to the Inquiry, it would appear that some of these certificates in fact
predated the issue of Temporary Occupancy Certificates or Completion
14
Certificates by Building Standards. It is, however, recognised that in a number of

cases the required certificates were issued shortly thereafter.
Discovery of defective fire-stopping in the schools
3.4.26 The final concern of the Inquiry, in relation to the certification and Inspection
processes, is the level of recorded breaches in the fire-stopping of the schools
that were identified in surveys carried out during the last few months. Fire-
stopping is the process of sealing any spaces or holes in fire-rated walls or
enclosures with approved fire resistant materials in order to protect means of
evacuation, and prevent the spread of smoke or flame from one area to another
that could otherwise lead to avoidable risk to life and unnecessary damage to
property. From the photographs provided in the survey reports, it would appear
that a proportion of these breaches are likely to have dated from the time of the
original construction but they had not been detected until the recent surveys.
3.4.27 At the time of writing this Report, the Council have been advised by ESP that the
necessary fire-stopping remedial work is complete or nearing completion. It has
been agreed that this work will be subject to inspection by a fire-safety expert
jointly appointed by the Council and ESP to confirm that all necessary remedial
work has been done and that it has been done to the required standards.
3.4.28 The mandatory provision of prescribed fire-stopping is an aspect of construction

that must be treated with the importance that it deserves, due to the potential
implications for the safety of building users and the protection of property as a
result of defects in this area. On the evidence of the surveys of the PPP1 project,
it is the view of the Inquiry that the Council should review its approach in terms
of the degree of reassurance provided on fire-safety aspects of the construction
of all their facilities.
3.4.29 Given that, for some considerable time, there has been relatively widespread
knowledge within the PFI industry that defective fire-stopping had been
discovered to be a potentially problematic issue in PPP schools and hospitals, it
is surprising that ESP had not taken a more proactive approach at an earlier
stage to establish the condition of fire-stopping in the PPP1 schools.
3.5 REMIT ITEMS 5 AND 6
3.5.1 Remit Item 5 asked the Inquiry to consider the management and maintenance
of the buildings since construction, including advising on whether the current
defects should have been found earlier. Remit Item 6, also briefly discussed
here, relates to the management of the contract by the relevant parties since
construction.
15
The management and maintenance of the school buildings
3.5.2 Those members of staff or parents of children who gave or submitted evidence
to the Inquiry were generally very positive in their opinions on the quality of
maintenance of the buildings as undertaken by Amey Facilities Management
("Amey FM", now known as "Amey Communities") since construction. The level
of planned and response maintenance was regularly compared positively with
their experience of that provided in the schools directly owned and maintained
by the Council.
3.5.3 It should be noted that the City of Edinburgh Council are under a contractual
obligation to pay for the provision of the maintenance and upkeep of the PPP1
schools to the specified standard and at the level of cost built into the unitary
charge as agreed in the PPP1 Project Agreement. Unfortunately, there is no
similar obligation in relation to the Council-owned schools, which do not receive
the same level of budgetary allowance from the City of Edinburgh Council for
their maintenance.
3.5.4 In relation to the issue of whether the defective wall construction should have
been found earlier by Amey FM, the Inquiry were advised that in the period
immediately following the collapse of the wall at Oxgangs School, several firms
of professional structural consultants undertook visual surveys of the external
walls of all 17 schools without reporting any visible signs that would suggest
defective construction. Without any such outwards signs of distress, the only
time that this defect could and should have been found was at the time that the
schools were being constructed through a process of proper supervision and
inspection of the work in question.
3.5.5 The view of the Inquiry in relation to whether the breaches of fire-stopping in
the schools as described in the survey reports should have been discovered
earlier is quite different. These breaches, if originating from the construction
stage, should have been identified either by the original contractors or by
Building Standards inspectors at final inspection stages, and if not then they
should have been identified by Amey FM acting in their facilities management
role through regular inspections of the integrity of the fire-stopping in the
building.
The management of the PPP1 contract
3.5.6 In relation to the ongoing management of the Contract, the level of deductions
for non-availability or non-performance of satisfactory services since completion
has been low. Provided that the contract is being applied with the appropriate
degree of rigour, this would reflect a generally good standard of service,
confirming the opinion already expressed by teachers and parents.
16
3.5.7 The one area where there was a unanimous degree of frustration expressed in
relation to the management of the contract by all those same teachers and
parents, was on the level of difficulty they encountered in seeking to implement
even minor improvements in the facilities of the schools due to what they
perceived as overly complicated administrative processes and inflated costings
of the work. The explanation from ESP that these costings were higher because
they had to price to cover the maintenance and replacement as necessary of the
additional or upgraded items over the period of the 30-year concession although
legitimate was not generally well accepted by teachers and parents.
3.6 REMIT ITEM 7
3.6.1 Remit Item 7 asks the Inquiry to review the City of Edinburgh Council's handling
of the incident from January 2016 to the reopening of the schools in Summer
2016.
The quality of the Council's response to the incident
3.6.2 It is the view of the Inquiry that, despite the unavoidable disruption and
inconvenience caused to pupils, parents and teachers, the response to the initial
collapse of the wall on 29th January 2016 by the Council in relation to their
decision to immediately close Oxgangs School was prompt, effective and
appropriate in the known circumstances at the time. The reopening of the
School on 2nd February 2016 was also appropriate based on the actions that had
been taken and the information then available to the Council.
3.6.3 The decision on 8th April 2016 to close all 17 PPP1 schools had much more
significant implications for the Council, in terms of dealing with the sudden
requirement to relocate within the shortest possible time 3,198 primary school
children, 4,327 secondary school pupils, 107 children with additional support
needs and 738 nursery children; a total of 8,371 pupils.
3.6.4 The Inquiry was advised that alternative teaching accommodation, alternative
transport and alternative catering arrangements had been put in place for most
pupils by Thursday 14th April 2016 and for all pupils by Wednesday 20th April
2016.
3.6.5 It is the view of the Inquiry that this was quite a remarkable feat to have
achieved within an extremely short time, especially without the benefit of any
lead-in period and within only a few days of the unexpected announcement that
the schools would have to close.
3.6.6 The evidence suggests that it was an excellent example of collaboration by many
diverse organisations, groups and individuals working towards an immensely
difficult but shared goal. To succeed, as it did, required clear leadership, rapid
17
but effective decision-making and a total commitment on the part of all

involved. Many staff, from throughout the wide range of organisations and
schools involved, remained working late into many evenings and over weekends
to help put all the necessary and complex arrangements in place. For this they
should be strongly complimented.
Communications with parents
3.6.7 Having given due praise for this logistical achievement of providing a place for
every pupil, the impact of the enforced arrangements also caused significant
additional concern, inconvenience and disruption to the lives of many pupils and
parents. Some of the parents expressed the view that the level of anxiety caused
by the uncertainty and disruption to their daily arrangements was not fully
appreciated by the Council.
3.6.8 There was little that the Council, itself a victim of circumstances, could do to
mitigate this negative impact but a complaint made by several parents who gave
evidence or made submissions to the Inquiry, was in relation to the lack of clear
information from the Council at the early stages of the process. In a number of
circumstances, it is evident that this led to a degree of frustration on the part of
some parents.
3.6.9 On the Council's part, particularly at the early stages of the closures, the reason
for the somewhat limited content in their communication with parents was that
they in turn were unable to get the information they needed from ESP to allow
them to give firm information to teachers and parents on the extent of the
defects, the level of remedial works required, and most importantly, dates for
the completion of remedial works and the reopening of schools.
3.6.10 ESP, also in turn experienced difficulty, particularly in the initial weeks, in getting
firm information from their supply chain.
3.6.11 A very much more positive view was expressed by those parents interviewed on
the quality of communication by the Council during the later stages of the
decant, once clearer information had been made available to the Council.
3.6.12 Despite this initial problem, there was also extensive praise expressed to the
Inquiry for the many individual contributions made by a wide range of
individuals and teams from within the Council and the schools. There was also a
major appreciation of the pressures that heads and teachers had been put under
and the level of resilience and positivity they were able to maintain throughout
the process.
18
Impact on pupils' educational attainment
3.6.13 The implications for the daily length of time spent travelling to and from their
new school base were very significant for some pupils, particularly for some of
those requiring special support. This resulted in considerable reductions for
some pupils in the time they actually spent in class or in related activities.
3.6.14 Information provided to the Inquiry by the Council indicates that the average
daily teaching time lost per pupil in secondary schools was approximately 12
minutes, whereas in the primary schools it was much higher at 71 minutes per
pupil per day.
3.6.15 It is difficult to determine, and it will subsequently be difficult to prove, whether

the closure and decant of the schools has had any longer-term negative impact
on the educational attainment of the pupils affected. However, based on the
opinions provided by the head teachers consulted and on the good results
achieved by the exam classes affected, the Inquiry is of the view that any
negative impact is likely to have been relatively limited. This impact may also
have been offset to some extent in certain instances by unexpected positive
impacts of the experience (as evidenced by several witnesses to the Inquiry).
Effectiveness of remedial work to school walls
3.6.16 A key objective of the Council was of course to ensure that the remedial works
were undertaken properly and permanently resolved any issues relating to the
structural integrity of the defectively constructed walls. The Council was
particularly and correctly insistent that they received a comprehensive set of
specified documentation providing the required level of assurance from both
contractors, from the two firms of structural engineers acting for Galliford Try
and ESP respectively, from ESP themselves and from the Council's own
independent structural engineering advisor.
3.6.17 Following the technical review of the information provided to it, the Inquiry
concluded that a satisfactorily robust approach had been adopted to the process
of structural assessments of the buildings following the identification of defects
relating to lack of head restraints, poor wall tie embedment, and missing or
inconsistent bed joint reinforcement and windposts.
3.6.18 The Inquiry found that the design process for the remedial works was thorough
and comprehensive, resulting in a high level of confidence that the risk of
structural failure arising from the defects uncovered on the buildings has been
properly addressed.
3.6.19 Based on the above, the Inquiry has concluded that the safety factors required
within the relevant design standards, as specified in the Building Regulations,
19
have been satisfactorily reinstated in the masonry wall panels through the
implementation of the programme of remedial works.
3.7 REMIT ITEM 8
3.7.1 Remit Item 8 sought advice and recommendations on any specific or wider
lessons which can be learnt from these unfortunate events for the City of
Edinburgh Council and any other bodies.
3.7.2 These recommendations are included in the various sections of the Report
addressing a particular Remit Item and are then brought together in a
comprehensive list in Section 13 of this Report.
3.8 CONCLUSIONS
3.8.1 In conclusion, the City of Edinburgh Council were faced with a totally
unexpected problem, which they have managed extremely well despite the very
significant challenges which they had to address. For this they are to be
complimented. The problems they have had to face were fundamentally the
result of poor quality construction and poor quality supervision of construction,
which in slightly different circumstances, could have resulted in the injury or loss
of the lives of school children.
3.8.2 This Edinburgh Schools problem has a greater significance than it otherwise
might have had, due to the fact that the same set of fundamental defects,
impacting on the structural integrity of the external walls of the schools, were
found across 17 schools built by a range of different main contractors,
bricklaying subcontractors, and bricklaying squads. This was not the result of the
isolated incompetence of a rogue sub-contractor or bricklaying squad.
3.8.3 Similar defects have been identified across other school buildings in Scotland.
Some of these, predating the collapse in Edinburgh, also resulted in the collapse
of brickwork panels. Again, fortuitously, these did not cause injury to school
children.
3.8.4 Following the Report of the extent of defective construction found at the
Edinburgh Schools, the Scottish Government requested all local authorities in
Scotland to undertake a review of their school buildings. This sensible step
resulted in the identification of the need for remedial work to a number of
schools.
3.8.5 It would, however, be naive to suggest that this is a problem only relating to the
construction of schools and that contractors apply a better standard of quality
assurance on other building types. If these defects are present in school
buildings, there is also a likelihood that they are present with similar frequency
20
in other buildings that contain large masonry panels or where masonry panels
are required to be tied back to a structural frame.
3.8.6 What is also significant about the Edinburgh situation is that highly professional
and competent teams of structural engineers were unable to identify, through
detailed visual inspections, the existence of serious defects in the construction
of the walls they examined. This point is worthy of wider consideration by
those who may have relied on visual inspections as a form of assurance that
the underlying construction of walls are sound. Any such inadequacies in the
construction of masonry panels, must therefore, be detected prior to walls being
closed-up or there is no easy practical way of ensuring they have been built
properly. This requires effective quality assurance and scrutiny during
construction.
3.8.7 It is incumbent upon the construction industry to develop and promulgate best
practice methods that can be relied upon to provide the necessary level of
assurance in relation to those areas of construction that become quickly closed-
up to inspection, the failure of which could impact on the safety of the users of
buildings. In addition to the construction of masonry panels, fire-stopping has
been identified in the Report as another such area deserving of special
attention.
3.8.8 It is also clear that clients, particularly public sector clients with statutory duties
in relation to the communities they serve, cannot simply delegate away from
themselves the responsibility of putting in place an appropriate level of
informed, independent scrutiny to ensure the safety of the public buildings they
procure. By independent scrutiny the Inquiry is referring to inspection by
individuals or organisations appointed by or directly employed by the client who
are independent of the project company or contractor undertaking the project.
3.8.9 The exact nature and effectiveness of the role of Building Standards in this
regard is also worthy of further review and consideration. The potential
extension of the current requirement for formal certification of parts of the
work by qualified individuals, as is the case for electrical and plumbing
installations, may offer a possible solution to the lack of inspections that Building
Standards can practically carry out in relation to elements of the structure or
fabric of buildings that could cause injury if not constructed properly.
3.8.10 Despite the significant increasing reliance being placed on the quality assurance
by contractors of their own work, there is no formal requirement for the
personnel within contracting organisations charged with undertaking this role to
have undergone any recognised test of competency to do so.
3.8.11 It is the view of the Inquiry that the problem associated with the PPP1 schools
has raised issues that are of considerable significance in relation to ensuring that
21
the quality and safety of buildings produced by the construction industry in

Scotland (and potentially the rest of the UK) are delivered to the required
standards.
3.8.12 The construction industry is a part of our economy that suffers greatly from the
boom and bust syndrome, resulting in difficulty in maintaining the availability of
highly skilled tradesmen because of the lack of a guaranteed continuity of work.
The traditional and hugely valuable concept of building contractors employing
and training tradesmen such as bricklayers and joiners through apprenticeships
within their own workforce has also largely disappeared. Additionally, the image
of the construction industry is one that currently does not appear to be
attractive to young people.
3.8.13 The quality of a building is ultimately dependent on the quality of the individual
tradesmen who build it. Across all of the witnesses who expressed an opinion on
this issue to the Inquiry, there was a common concern that this is a growing
problem which the construction industry must address.
3.8.14 The level of inspection required in any manufacturing pursuit should be

designed to reflect the risk or the level of occurrence of defective work. To those
with experience of the building industry, and as evidenced in these projects and
many more, that risk unfortunately remains real and until evidence
demonstrates otherwise, appropriate independent inspection will be a sensible
provision by clients.
3.8.15 Recent changes to models of procurement of public building, driven by a desire

for greater efficiency, and an unachievable desire to transfer all risk away from
the client, have unfortunately not appreciated the need to build into these
models the essential provision of an appropriate level of independent scrutiny.
3.8.16 Frequently clients under such arrangements have limited direct access to the
architects and engineers who design their projects or to any reports they may
produce other than through the contractor. Not only does this inevitably impact
on the overall design quality achieved, but with these changes the presence of
architects and engineers on site has reduced. Increasingly, Clerks of Works and
resident engineers are also not being employed to assist in the protection of the
quality of construction.
3.8.17 A number of witnesses to the Inquiry identified a desire to reduce the cost of
fees as a major factor in deciding the level of provision of effective inspection of
construction, rather than a serious assessment of the risks of not providing for
adequate independent scrutiny.
3.8.18 A review of the drivers that have resulted in the virtual removal of appropriate
independent scrutiny is required to bring the pendulum back to a more realistic
22
position in this regard. As stated before, best practice methods are available,
and could be incorporated into all models of procurement to address what is
clearly emerging as a shortcoming in the way the construction industry currently
operates. The procurers of buildings need to consider whether the drive for
faster, lower cost construction may be being achieved to the detriment of its
quality and safety.
23
Section 4 – PPP1 Schools - Development and Construction Responsibilities
SECTION 4 – PPP1 SCHOOLS – DEVELOPMENT AND CONSTRUCTION RESPONSIBILITIES
 This section of the Report will set out a list of the school projects delivered as
part of the PPP1 project and describe the various organisational structures and
the allocation of responsibilities in relation to the management, procurement,
funding, design, construction and operation of the PPP1 schools. The project
structure is shown in Diagram 1 below.
 Between 2002 and 2005, 17 new or refurbished and extended schools in

Edinburgh were completed as part of a public private partnership arrangement,
PPP1, between the City of Edinburgh Council and ESP, the special purpose
private sector company formed to deliver the project. Oxgangs School was one
of a second phase of four PPP1 projects following a first phase of 13 projects,
making up the total of 17 projects.
 The initial submission from ESP in relation to the PPP1 schools project was
headed by Amey Ventures. This organisation acted as the consortium sponsor
that put together the various members of the consortium and their supply chain
members.
4.1 LIST OF PPP1 SCHOOLS
4.1.1 The first phase (which was complete by the end of 2003) consisted of the
following 13 projects: 11 school projects (providing 13 schools due to the co-
location of Pirniehall and St. David's Primary Schools, and Broomhouse and St.
Joseph's RC Primary Schools) and two non-school projects.
1. Pirniehall and St. David's Primary Schools

2. Craigroyston Primary School
3. Broomhouse and St. Joseph's RC Primary Schools
4. Craigour Park Primary School
5. Forthview Primary School
6. Castleview Primary School
7. Drummond Community High School
8. Craigmount High School
9. Gracemount High School
10. Royal High School (Refurbishment and Extension)
11. Rowanfield Special School
12. Goodtrees Neighbourhood Centre
13. Howdenhall Secure Unit
4.1.2 The final makeup of the second phase, referred to as the '2004 schools', was
determined following issues with site availability and other unforeseen factors
such as a fire at the original Oxgangs Primary School. The implementation of the
required changes was undertaken using the 'change procedure' as laid down in
24
the contract and was subject to a new full business case approval from the
Scottish Executive. The four '2004 schools' projects which were completed in
2005 were as follows:
1. Oxgangs Primary School

2. St. Peter's RC Primary School
3. Braidburn Special School
4. Firrhill High School
4.1.3 The map on the following page (Image 1) shows the locations of the schools
across Edinburgh. The school and non-school projects in Phase 1 are marked in
yellow, and the Phase 2 schools in white.
25
Image 1: Map showing location of the PPP1 schools across Edinburgh.
Key
PHASE 1 SCHOOLS PHASE 2 SCHOOLS
1. Pirniehall and St. David's Primary Schools 12. Oxgangs Primary School
2. Craigroyston Primary School 13. St. Peter's RC Primary School
3. Broomhouse and St. Joseph's RC Primary 14. Braidburn Special School
Schools 15. Firrhill High School
4. Craigour Park Primary School
5. Forthview Primary School OTHER FACILITIES (PHASE 1)
6. Castleview Primary School
7. Drummond Community High School 16. Goodtrees Neighbourhood Centre
8. Craigmount High School 17. Howdenhall Secure Unit
9. Gracemount High School
10. Royal High School
11. Rowanfield Special School
4.1.4 The Council undertook a second PPP project for a further eight schools (referred
to as the PPP2 schools) which were completed in 2010. This contract was
undertaken by a different organisation to that involved in the PPP1 schools.
PPP2 is not included in and nor should it be confused with the subject of this
Inquiry.
26
4.2 ORIGINAL AND CURRENT OWNERSHIP OF SHARES IN ESP
4.2.1 The equity funding represented 11% of the total funding for the project. In 2001,
at the time the PPP1 project was signed, the shares in ESP (Holdings) Ltd were
held by the following companies:
(i) Amey Ventures Limited;

(ii) Miller Construction (UK) Limited;
(iii) Quayle Munro PFI Fund Limited Partnership; and
(iv) Uberior Infrastructure Investments Limited
4.2.2 According to filings at Companies House, the original shareholders disposed of

their shares as follows:
(i) Disposal of shares of Amey Ventures Limited ("AMV"):
 Prior to completion of the second phase of PPP1, AMV disposed

of all its shares to Equion Plc in 2004;
 In 2008 Equion Plc changed its name to John Laing Social

Infrastructure Limited;
 John Laing Social Infrastructure Limited disposed of half its

shareholding to John Laing Pension Trust in 2010, followed by the
remainder of its shareholding in 2012; and
 John Laing Pension Trust disposed of its shares to Palio (No.19)

Limited between May 2013 and May 2014.
(ii) Disposal of shares of Miller Construction (UK) Limited ("Miller

Construction"):
 In 2005, about the time of completion of the second phase of

PPP1, Miller Construction disposed of all its shares to SMIF UK
Limited;
 SMIF UK Limited disposed of all its shares in May 2008 to Trillium

PPP Investment Partners No. 2 Limited, which changed its name
to Semperian PPP Investment Partners No. 2 Limited in February
2009.
(iii) Disposal of shares of Quayle Munro PFI Fund Limited Partnership

("QM"):
 QM disposed of its shares in May 2008 to PFI Infrastructure

Finance Ltd.
27
(iv) Disposal of shares of Uberior Infrastructure Investments Limited

("Uberior")
 Uberior disposed of all its shares in May 2009 to Uberior

Infrastructure (No.3) Limited, which later changed its name to
Aberdeen Infrastructure (No.3) Limited.
4.2.3 The current shareholders in ESP (Holdings) Ltd are therefore:
(i) Palio (No.19) Limited;
(ii) Semperian PPP Investment Partners No. 2 Limited;
(iii) PFI Infrastructure Finance Limited; and
(iv) Aberdeen Infrastructure (No.3) Limited.
4.2.4 The original lending institutions that provided 89% of the funding (debt) for the
project to ESP were:
 The Bank of Scotland; and
 The European Investment Bank.
4.3 RESPONSIBILITY FOR DESIGN AND CONSTRUCTION
4.3.1 Responsibility for the design and construction of the schools was sub-contracted
by ESP to a joint venture, ("AMJV") between Amey Asset Services Limited (now
known as Amey Programme Management Ltd.) and Miller Construction.
4.4 DESIGN TEAM
4.4.1 Two firms of architects were appointed by AMJV, each to act separately as lead
consultant and designers for a number of the schools as follows:
(i) Holmes Architects of Edinburgh (since renamed Holmes Miller) were

appointed for:
 eight Primary Schools in Phase 1 PPP1;
 two Primary Schools in Phase 2 PPP1 (including Oxgangs Primary

School);
 Rowanfield Special School in Phase 1 PPP1;
 Braidburn Special School in Phase 2 PPP1; and
 Howdenhall Secure Unit in Phase 1 PPP1.
28
(ii) 3D Architects of Edinburgh (since renamed 3DReid) in collaboration with

Hickton Madeley Architects of Telford England (since dissolved as a
company) were appointed for:
 four High Schools in Phase 1 PPP1; and
 one High School in Phase 2 PPP1.
(It should be noted that 3DReid after originally agreeing to attend the Inquiry
subsequently decided they did not wish to do so. The Inquiry was therefore
unable to examine how 3DReid undertook their responsibilities, their
relationships with contractors or their views on the inspection of the quality
of construction in relation to the five High Schools listed above nor was this
information able to be provided by other witnesses who did attend. The same
construction defects that were found in the ten Primary Schools and two
Special Schools undertaken by Holmes Architects were also found to be
present in the five High schools designed by 3D Architects).
4.4.2 WSP Parsons Brinckerhoff ("WSP"), a large international multi-disciplinary

consultancy was separately appointed by AMJV to undertake responsibility for
the civil and engineering structural design of all 17 projects, working as part of
the separate design teams led by the two architectural practices respectively but
not answerable to them.
4.5 CONSTRUCTION TEAM
4.5.1 The approach adopted by AMJV in relation to the construction of the first phase
(13 projects) of PPP1, was to take overall responsibility for the management of
both design and construction and enter a series of separate construction
contracts with individual construction companies for the construction of each of
the schools. The Tier 2 contractors, including Miller Construction, effectively
became sub-contractors to AMJV, of which Miller Construction was itself one of
the two parties. The Tier 2 sub-contractors are listed in the following table with
the school(s) they built and the date they were completed.
29
Tier 2 sub-contractor School Date completed
Miller Construction: Forthview PS June 2003

Castleview PS Sept. 2003
Rowanfield Special School Oct. 2002
Howdenhall Secure Unit Oct. 2003
Goodtrees Comm. Centre July 2003
Craigmount HS July 2003
Gracemount HS July 2003
Dickie Construction Drummond Community HS July 2003
(Commenced by Dickie –
completed by Miller)
Robertson Construction Royal High School Aug. 2003
(Commenced by
Robertson – completed by
Miller Construction)
Lilley Construction Pirniehall/St David's PS Aug. 2002
Broomhouse/St Joseph's PS Oct. 2002
Tulloch Construction Craigroyston PS Nov. 2002
Ogilvie Construction Craigour Park PS Dec. 2002
4.5.2 The architects and engineers on the Phase 1 PPP1 schools were not novated to
the individual Tier 2 contractors and had no direct contractual relationship with
them. They continued to be employed by, take instruction from, and report to
AMJV.
4.5.3 All formal communication to the Tier 2 contractors from the design team
members in relation to the design and construction of the Phase 1 PPP1 schools,
including drawings, specifications and technical requirements was required to be
channelled through, approved and issued by design managers and project
managers directly employed by AMJV.
4.5.4 The strategy adopted on Phase 1 PPP1 by AMJV, of subcontracting the

construction of individual schools to local contractors, was not followed on the
four Phase 2 PPP1 schools, all of which it was decided should be constructed by
Miller Construction, acting in the role of a Design and Build contractor.
4.5.5 In the case of the four Phase 2 schools listed below, with the dates they were
completed, Miller Construction did not further sub-contract out the building
work. The design team members had a direct contractual relationship with the
building contractor Miller Construction, thus facilitating more direct
communication.
30
School Date Completed
Oxgangs Primary School Feb. 2005

St. Peter's RC Primary School Oct. 2005
Braidburn Special School June 2005
Firrhill High School June 2005
4.5.6 In 2004, prior to the completion of the construction of the Phase 2 schools,
Amey disposed of their shares in ESP (Holdings) Ltd. Amey BPO Services Ltd,
(Amey FM, now known as Amey Communities), had been appointed as the
service provider of facilities management services to the Phase 1 schools, and
were subsequently also appointed to undertake the same role in relation to the
Phase 2 schools, thus maintaining an ongoing involvement of Amey in the
project.
4.6 RESPONSIBILITY FOR INDEPENDENT CERTIFICATION
4.6.1 A standard requirement of the PFI process is the appointment of a consultant to

act in the role of what is referred to as the Independent Certifier or Independent
Tester. The Independent Certifier is required to act independently between the
public sector client and the private sector consortium in determining when the
consortium has achieved full compliance with the contractual requirements and
then certifying that that the facilities are completed and available for use.
4.6.2 It should be noted that this certification role is completely different to and
separate from that undertaken by the Building Standards Department of the City
of Edinburgh Council, which is responsible for implementing the statutory
process of building control. This subject will be addressed in Section 10 of this
Report.
4.6.3 Mouchel (previously Mouchel Parkman), a large international multi-disciplinary

consultancy with its UK headquarters in Woking was appointed to act as
Independent Certifier for the 13 projects undertaken as Phase 1 of PPP1. This
work was undertaken from their Edinburgh office. This company was acquired
by the Kier Group in April 2015 and subsequently acquired from the Kier Group
by WSP Parsons Brinckerhoff in October 2016.
4.6.4 Ove Arup and Partners Scotland Limited ("Arup (Scotland)"), also part of a large
multi-disciplinary consultancy with its UK headquarters in London, was
appointed to act as Independent Certifier for the four projects undertaken as
Phase 2 of PPP1. It also did so through its Edinburgh office.
4.6.5 The appointments for both Independent Certifiers were joint appointments
between the respective companies providing the Independent Certifier services
31
and ESP, the City of Edinburgh Council and The Governor and Company of the
Bank of Scotland.
4.7 COUNCIL MANAGEMENT STRUCTURE FOR OVERSEEING THE PPP1

DEVELOPMENT
4.7.1 An internal organisational structure was put in place by the City of Edinburgh
Council to provide governance and management of the project during the
business case preparation, procurement and preferred bidder stages leading up
to financial close of the deal with ESP for the PPP1 schools in Nov 2001. The City
of Edinburgh Council structure is described below.
4.7.2 A Project Board, chaired by the Director of Education, acted as the internal
sponsor body and provided strategic direction to the project. Its membership
included representation at a senior level from relevant areas of the Council as
follows:
 Director of Education (Chair);
 Head of Support Services (Education);
 Head of Corporate Finance (Finance);
 PPP Project Manager (Education);
 Personnel and Management Services Manager (Corporate Services);
 Head Teacher Representatives (Education);
 Head of Property Management (City Development);
 Head of Architectural Services (Corporate Services); and
 Head of Support Services (Social Work).
4.7.3 A Project Team composed of Council officers reported to this Project Board and
took responsibility for the day to day management activities. The membership of
the Project Team consisted of:
 PPP Project Manager (Education) (Chair);
 PPP Project Development Manager (Education);
 PPP Head Teacher Liaison Officer (Education);
 Strategic Structure Planning Manager (Education);
 Finance Manager Education Department (Education);
32
 Principal Accountant (Finance);
 Principal Solicitor (Corporate Services); and
 External Advisers
4.7.4 Legal, financial and technical External Advisers were appointed to support the
Council officers and augment in-house expertise in these areas. They reported
through the Project Manager to the Project Board. They included:
 Turner and Townsend Project Management (Lead Adviser);
 Turner and Townsend Project management (Technical);
 Dundas and Wilson (Legal); and
 Arthur Andersen (Financial).
4.7.5 There was a significant change in the structure and resourcing of the client team
representing the City of Edinburgh Council in their dealings with ESP
immediately following financial close of the PPP1 deal in November 2001 and in
the period thereafter.
4.7.6 The stages after financial close included user client liaison and consultation;
detailed design development; assessment and approval of all reviewable data
including design and content changes; cost management of variations; and the
subsequent construction, equipping, commissioning, certification and
occupation of the schools.
4.7.7 At its largest, post-financial close, the City of Edinburgh Council team allocated
to the project on a full-time basis consisted of four members of the staff of the
Council. The Project Manager who had acted for the Council up to financial close
remained in post for a short time thereafter before leaving for another position.
4.7.8 On the departure of the Project Manager, the person who took over as the main
interface with ESP was the Council officer who up to then had reported to the
previous Project Manager as the senior adviser on facilities management issues
associated with PPP1.
4.7.9 After some six months, an administrative assistant was appointed to support the
acting Project Manager/facilities management adviser who until then had
become effectively the only full-time member of the Project Team.
4.7.10 At the same time as the appointment of the administrative assistant, another
officer of the Council was appointed to act as the main interface with ESP in
relation to the design and construction of the school buildings, with the acting
Project Manager retaining responsibility for facilities management issues. This
33
new appointment was given the slightly misleading title of Construction Project
Manager, a term more appropriately used to describe an executive role in a
construction company.
4.7.11 The 'Construction Project Manager' was subsequently supported by the

appointment of a Quantity Surveyor to the PPP1 Project Team making a full
complement of four staff allocated by the Council to the oversight of the
implementation of these post-contract stages of the PPP1 project.
4.7.12 Additionally, this small team had access to the support of other staff, including
professional/technical staff, working in the Council, who had been returned to
their normal full-time duties after contract signing had been achieved.
4.8 MANAGEMENT OF THE OPERATIONAL PHASE OF THE PPP1 SCHOOLS AFTER

OCCUPANCY
4.8.1 For the operational phase the City of Edinburgh Council put in place a small
Contract Management Team as the interface for ESP in relation to all
operational matters associated with the on-going implementation of the 30-
year concession.
4.8.2 The responsibilities of the Contract Management Team include:
 ensuring that the City of Edinburgh Council's contractual position is

protected and the agreed allocation of risk is maintained;
 direct liaison on behalf of the City of Edinburgh Council with both the
Schools and with ESP in relation to all issues impacting on the execution of
the contract;
 effective monitoring of the service provider's performance against that

specified in the Project Agreement;
 ensuring that in the event of failure to perform by ESP, appropriate action

is taken both in relation to addressing the performance issues and the
application of the financial implications of failures as provided for in the
Agreement; and
 managing requests for variations to buildings, equipment or services

provided under the contract, and negotiation and implementation to
manage in accordance with the provisions of the contract.
4.8.3 Under the PPP1 contract ESP was responsible for Designing, Building, Financing
and Operating (DBFO) the schools for a 30-year concession period for which they
are paid a unitary charge.
34
4.8.4 Currently the payment for accommodation and related services made by the
Council to ESP (the unitary charge) amounts to approximately £1.5 million per
month. The contract entitles the City of Edinburgh Council to make deductions
from this payment for any of a range of specified failures to deliver the
contracted services including the non-availability for use of school areas or
failures in the performance of contracted services.
35
Diagram 1: Edinburgh Schools PPP1 Project – Current Structure:
City of Edinburgh
Council
Semperian PPP
Investment
Partners No. 2
Project Agreement
Limited
Bank of Scotland5
PFI
Infrastructure
The Edinburgh
Finance Limited
Schools
ESP (Holdings) Equity Partnership Debt
Limited European
Limited Investment Bank5
D&B Guarantee
Aberdeen
Infrastructure 2004 D&B Contract
(No. 3) Limited (4 Schools)
Amey plc
and The TheMiller
Miller Amey plc
Group
Group
Limited4
Palio (No. 19) Limited4
Limited
Design and Build Joint Miller Amey BPO
Venture between Amey
Construction Services
Asset Services Limited1 Limited3
and Miller Construction
(UK) Limited2
(UK) Limited2
Holmes Architects Main Contractors Holmes Architects

for 6 Primary VB Contracts
WSP Structural (Miller/Ogilvie/ for 2 Primary
Engineers for Schools + 3 other Brick-laying Sub- Schools and1 WSP Structural
projects. Lillie/Tulloch/ Contractors on Special School Engineers for all
all 13 projects
Robertson or all 4 schools as 4 schools
3D / Hickton Dickie as 3D / Hickton
Madeley Architects chosen by Miller
appropriate) Madeley Architects
for 4 High Schools Construction
for 1 High School
Range of Brick-
laying Sub-
Contractors as
chosen by Main
Contractors
1 Now called Amey Programme Management Limited 4 Now known as GT TMGL Limited
2 Now called Galliford Try Construction (UK) Limited 5 These were the original lenders and may not reflect the
3 Now called Amey Community Limited current position
Diagram 1 : Edinburgh Schools PPP1 Project – Current Structure

49822935
36
Section 5 – Chronology
SECTION 5 – CHRONOLOGY
 This section of the Report will set out in chronological order the sequence of
related events from the collapse of a wall at Oxgangs School in January 2016 up
to the reoccupation of all the PPP1 schools in August 2016. In doing so it is
intended to be as far as possible an accurate statement of the facts, reliant as it
is on the Inquiry's interpretation of the information provided as evidence or
submissions, together with that contained in records and reports made available
to the Inquiry.
 In so doing there has been an assumption by the Inquiry that documents

provided to it can generally be taken as accurate in relation to the recording and
description of the sequence of events over the period in question.
 This section will not include the findings of the Inquiry in relation to these facts.
A separate section of this Report deals with each remit item in which the
Inquiry's analysis of those elements of these facts relevant to that remit item will
be provided.
5.1 COLLAPSE OF THE GABLE WALL AT OXGANGS PRIMARY SCHOOL
5.1.1 On the evening of the 28th January 2016 and on the following day Scotland and
the North of England suffered significant disruption as a result of Storm
Gertrude sweeping across the country. The storm resulted in schools being shut,
homes losing power, and trains, flights and ferries being cancelled across
Scotland.
5.1.2 On the morning of Friday 29th January 2016, in the hours prior to the normal
opening time of Oxgangs Primary School, a substantial section of the upper level
of the external brickwork face of a non-structural cavity wall to a two-storey
gable of the school, weighing approximately 9 tons, collapsed onto the pathway
below.
5.1.3 Fortunately, due to the early hour, no one was in the vicinity of the wall that
collapsed and no injuries resulted. However, the Inquiry was advised that the
area onto which the significant amount of masonry had fallen was one where
shortly later children could easily have been standing waiting to go in to school
or walking past. In slightly different circumstances this event could have resulted
in considerable injury or even fatalities to staff and children.
5.1.4 The following photographs (Images 2, 3 and 4) are of the gable wall at Oxgangs
School taken after the collapse.
37
Image 2: Photograph taken at Oxgangs School of the gable wall after the collapse.
38
5.1.5 A Capitals Programme Senior Manager from the Council, who will be referred to
for the purposes of this Report as the Council's Project Manager ("CPM"), took
charge of the incident and was subsequently appointed to act throughout the
following months as the main interface on all technical matters between ESP
and the Council's senior management team.
5.1.6 Following an early morning visit by the CPM and other staff of the Council, it was
decided that the school should be closed with immediate effect until more
information was available. The priority of the Council officers was to have those
remaining areas of the damaged wall that were clearly unstable, and could easily
fall, removed and to arrange for immediate temporary repairs to render the wall
structurally safe.
5.1.7 That morning the CPM requested Will Rudd Davidson ("WRD"), a firm of
Edinburgh-based structural engineers, to provide them with advice on both any
further risks to safety that might be associated with the collapse and the nature
of remedial work required to render the building safe for use.
5.1.8 The CPM also instructed WRD to undertake a precautionary visual inspection of
the external walls of the three other Phase 2 PPP1 schools built at the same time
and by the same contractor, Miller Construction, as Oxgangs School. These were
St. Peter's RC Primary School, Firrhill High School and Braidburn School. This
visual inspection did not raise any concerns.
5.1.9 Temporary works were undertaken over the next three days by Amey FM and
their appointed sub-contractor to render the gable wall at Oxgangs school safe
from risk of any further collapse. These works involved removing all remaining
parts of the damaged wall that were at risk of falling, installing a bracing
structure to the internal face of the inner leaf of the cavity wall and applying a
temporary external cladding to protect it from the elements. Additionally, the
area around the wall was fenced off to prevent access to it by pupils.
5.1.10 On Sunday 31st January ESP, in recognition of the relative responsibilities of the
parties as established under the PPP1 contract, formally took over from the City
of Edinburgh Council the appointment of WRD as structural engineering
consultants to advise them directly in relation to the collapse. The school
remained closed on Monday 1st February, thereby causing pupils to miss a total
of two days of school attendance.
5.1.11 Prior to re-opening on Tuesday 2nd February, the City of Edinburgh Council
required a letter from the structural engineers, WRD, confirming that it was safe
to occupy the school provided the area around the wall remained securely
cordoned off. The letter also advised ESP that further intrusive investigations
would be necessary to understand the cause of the failure of the wall.
39
5.1.12 On 3rd February 2016, prior to the undertaking of the comprehensive

investigations of the Oxgangs wall collapse, as a precautionary measure ESP
commissioned WRD to visually inspect the external walls of all 17 PPP1 projects
and provide a Report by the week ending 12th February.
5.1.13 These reports, based on visual inspections by WRD, indicated no apparent

problems and advised that the schools remained safe to occupy.
5.2 RELEVANT TECHNICAL TERMS
5.2.1 Prior to presenting the information provided to the Inquiry in relation to the
investigations into the collapse of the wall at Oxgangs, a brief explanation of
some of the key building components that will subsequently be referred to, may
prove beneficial to some readers of this Report.
5.2.2 Wall ties are important to the stability of cavity walls in that they are used to tie
the inner and outer leaves together, enabling them to act as a single structural
element thereby increasing the stiffness of the wall and its resistance to lateral
wind-loading. Failure to install wall ties correctly may lead to cracking or collapse
of walls.
5.2.3 The requirement for a minimum embedment of 50mm by wall ties into the bed
joints of both inner and outer faces of masonry cavity walls was clearly stated in
the specification produced by the design team for the PPP1 schools. This
requirement is in accordance with both recognised standards within the
construction industry at the time and with the guidance that currently applies.
For walls with a designed cavity width of 120mm, as in the case of the PPP1
schools, a wall tie with a minimum length of 250mm is required.
5.2.4 It is also recommended that ties should be evenly distributed over the area of a
wall to provide a minimum of 2.5 ties per square metre (900mm horizontal x
450mm vertical centres). Additionally, at vertical edges of openings or at
unbonded edges, wall ties should be placed at 300mm centres vertically at a
maximum 225mm from the open edge.
5.2.5 Diagram 2 which follows shows the generic arrangement and minimum spacing
required for wall ties on a cavity wall including door and window openings.
40
Diagram 2:
5.2.6 A structural engineer designing the structure of a building is required to consider

the stability of masonry wall panels to ensure that they can withstand wind-
loadings arising from wind-speeds and loadings as currently prescribed in British
Standard BS EN 1991-1-4: 2005 for use with PD 6697 2010, (BS 6399 applied at
the time of the design of the PPP1 schools). Both standards take account of
location, topographical exposure and orientation.
5.2.7 In so doing, a critical element is the size of the masonry panel in terms of its
breadth and height. The larger the panel, the greater will be its requirement to
be stiffened or restrained by tying it back to core structural elements of the
building. The more sides on which a masonry panel is restrained, the greater its
resistance to lateral wind-loading, although even if restrained on all four sides,
additional reinforcement of the panel may be required to satisfy the mandatory
wind-loading requirements.
5.2.8 Structural engineers, having tested the wind resistance of masonry panels
through calculations, will therefore frequently be required to incorporate into
their design solutions components including wall head restraints, bed joint
reinforcement or secondary steelwork such as windposts, to achieve the
required structural resistance, particularly in the case of larger panels.
5.2.9 These three types of component can be used either in isolation or in conjunction
with each other depending on the customary practice and design intent of the
structural engineer responsible for their specification. However, all three may be
required for certain size and orientation of panels and geographical locations of
buildings. A brief explanation of each of these elements is provided below.
41
5.2.10 Wall head restraints are used to connect the top of a cavity wall at either
intermediate floor or roof level to the structural concrete floors or steel or
concrete horizontal beams that are part of the structural frame of the building
and run immediately adjacent and parallel to the top of the wall panels. Their
installation, usually at around 900mm centres, increases the ability of the panel
of masonry to resist wind or other lateral loading. They are built into the mortar
joints at the top of brick or blockwork walls and, if it is a steel–framed building,
are fixed to the steel beam using either bolted screws fitted into holes drilled in
the steel or self-drilling 'Tek' screws. Some contractors still use shot-firing to fix
the head restraints to the steel beams but this is no longer viewed as good
practice.
5.2.11 Head restraints are normally built into the mortar joints on the inner leaf of
cavity walls but versions are also used that are built into both inner and outer
leaves. (See Diagram 3 below) This was the type specified for the PPP1 schools.
5.2.12 It should be noted that the absence of head restraints per se is not necessarily
a fault as structural analysis may show that they are not required on some
narrower horizontal wall panels. However, the strength of wider panels to
resist wind loads is dramatically reduced if they are not properly restrained at
their head. It is generally easier for design teams to specify them throughout
buildings so that there should be no doubt on the part of the bricklayers fitting
them as to whether or not to include them in a particular panel.
5.2.13 Lateral restraint fixings are similar to and as important as head restraints in that
they are used at regular intervals to tie masonry panels to the vertical columns
or stanchions to either side of masonry panels also in order to increase the
resistance to wind–loading of the masonry panels.
5.2.14 Bed joint reinforcement is used to improve the structural performance of

masonry walls by providing additional resistance to lateral loads such as wind. It
consists of stainless steel wires, normally two, joined at intervals by welded steel
cross-wires to form standard lengths (2 to 3 metres long normally) of a ladder
form open steel mesh of a width that is less than that of the brick or block on
which it will sit. For a standard 102.5mm wide brick the normal width would be
approximately 60mm. These lengths of mesh are placed longitudinally in the
mortar bed on top of the brick or block courses at vertical centres as specified by
the structural engineer. (See Diagram 3 below)
5.2.15 Windposts are designed either to span vertically between floors or between
floors and structural beams or to act as vertical cantilevers to provide additional
lateral support for otherwise inadequately restrained masonry panels. They can
be constructed using a range of different structural steel sections, including
42
channels and angles, to suit different design situations in cavity walls. (See
Diagram 4 below)
5.2.16 The design specification for the external cavity wall that collapsed at Oxgangs
Primary School was the same specification as that used for most of the external
walls throughout the 17 projects constructed under both phases of PPP1.
5.2.17 The standardised design for the cavity walls in the PPP1 schools consisted of an
internal leaf built of 140mm wide blockwork, a 120mm cavity consisting of
70mm wide insulation slabs clipped to the inner face of the inner blockwork leaf
and a 50mm wide air space, and an outer leaf of either 102.5mm wide facing
brick or 100mm wide blockwork with a rendered finish. Diagram 3 (below)
shows a representation of this type of construction.
43
Diagram 3: Representation of the standardised design for cavity walls in PPP1 Schools:
Above: Example of cavity wall construction including insulation slabs installed in a similar fashion
to that specified for the PPP1 schools.
Above: Example of bed joint reinforcement similar to that specified for the PPP1 schools. .
Left: Example of a head restraint attaching both inner and

outer leaves of a cavity wall to a steel beam similar to that
specified for the PPP1 schools.
44
Diagram 4: Windposts
Typical connection of windpost to steel beam at head of wall.
Typical arrangement for tying inner leaf of blockwork and

outer leaf of brickwork to a windpost.
Examples of how windposts are connected to concrete slabs

at base.
Diagrams 2, 3 and 4 have been reproduced with the kind permission of Ancon Ltd.
45
5.3 INVESTIGATIONS AS TO THE CAUSE OF THE COLLAPSE AT OXGANGS SCHOOL
5.3.1 Following a series of investigations of the wall in question undertaken in

February by WRD, they produced a structural report, setting out their views as
to the reason for the wall failure at Oxgangs. The Report was dated 29th
February 2016.
5.3.2 Their Report concluded that the wind strength of Storm Gertrude at the time of
the collapse, as advised by the Met Office, should alone not have been sufficient
to lead to the failure of the brickwork panels if the panels had been designed
and constructed correctly. The Claim Check Service of the Met Office recorded
gusts of up to 69 mph around the time of the collapse of the wall, which were at
a level 20% lower than the design requirements as specified in the British
Standard BS 6399 on wind loadings, for which the walls should have been
designed and constructed to be capable of resisting.
5.3.3 The graph presented at the end of this section shows a representation of the
wind speed over the period during which the wall collapsed. This indicates that
the strongest gusts recorded occurred at 7.00 am on the morning of 29 th January
2016. It was thought that the collapse occurred sometime around this period
although no one is recorded as actually witnessing it. This would only be shortly
before children would have started to arrive at the school.
5.3.4 The WRD Report, the remit for which at the time did not extend to other parts
of the external walls of Oxgangs School, identified the primary contributory
factor for the collapse of the wall to be insufficient embedment of many of the
wall ties in the external leaf of brickwork, as a result of incorrect construction
and/or installation.
5.3.5 On receipt of the Report ESP instructed its lawyers to issue what is called a
'defect notice' to the main contractor, originally Miller Construction, now
Galliford Try, inviting them to remediate the defects at Oxgangs and
encouraging them to investigate the other Phase 2 schools to ensure similar
defects did not exist. The defects liability period had not expired for the four
Phase 2 schools and so the original contractor was still contractually bound to
make any defects good.
5.3.6 The conclusions of the WRD Report on the Oxgangs wall included the following
statements:
"Cavity width is variable in width and would not consistently allow the
minimum 50mm of embedment of wall tie to be achieved with the specified
250mm wall ties"
46
"Wall ties not being positioned central to the cavity, thus not consistently
allowing the 50mm embedment into the outer leaf"
"A combination of excessive cavity width, related non-verticality, incorrectly

constructed wall ties, has resulted in a cavity wall construction which in many
of the ties had insufficient embedment of the wall ties in the outer leaf. This in
our view was the primary contributory factor."
5.3.7 The following are some of the more specific findings of the WRD Report based
on site investigations and measurements undertaken by WRD:
 wall ties were generally found to be spaced at 450mm vertically and

900mm horizontally in accordance with standard guidance;
 WRD assessed the width of the cavity to the collapsed wall to have ranged
from between 15mm to 40mm wider than the width specified in the
design of 120mm;
 measurements of the projecting length of 19 wall ties left in the inner leaf
after the collapse showed that over 50% of these would have been
insufficiently long to have provided the required minimum embedment of
50mm in the outer face assuming a cavity width of 120mm; and
 in one of the structural bays in the gable wall containing additional

diagonal flat bar steel bracing, the blockwork to the inner leaf had been
reduced from 140mm to 100mm locally around the steel bracing
effectively increasing the cavity width to 160mm at these locations.
5.3.8 The WRD Report contained the following four recommendations:
1. "The gable wall is rebuilt to match the existing with particular attention
paid to cavity widths, wall tie specifications and connections to the
steelwork."
2. "Strengthening to the 100mm blockwork areas around the cross-bracing

should be provided."
3. "The results of this investigation may be indicative of generic defects by

the same build team. An intrusive investigation into all other similar
external walls in the school should therefore be carried out to determine
cavity widths and wall tie embedment at other locations. As we have a
sample wall tie that has distinctive markings it may be possible to achieve
this investigation by borescope survey, as opposed to removing areas of
outer leaf masonry. We would recommend that this is carried out within
the next three-month period."
47
4. "Ensure management plan is in place with regard to Meteorological

Office advice and 'Take Action' recommendations."
5.3.9 The last of these four recommendations related to the view previously
expressed by WRD in their Report that the school should check to ensure that it
had a management plan in place for any re-occurrence of severe weather
events.
5.3.10 The '''Take Action' recommendations'', mentioned in recommendation 4, refers

to the advice given by the Meteorological Office as to how people should
respond when that office issues 'Red' level warnings. This advice includes the
following recommendations:
 "Stay indoors as much as possible"; and
 "If you do go out, try not to walk or shelter close to buildings or trees."
Image 5: Photograph of exposed inner blockwork leaf of gable after removal of insulation
demonstrating the recessed blockwork in the braced bay which resulted in extending the
width of the cavity.
48
ANALYSIS OF WIND DIRECTION, WIND SPEED AND WIND GUST SPEED

LEADING UP TO THE COLLAPSE OF WALL AT OXGANGS PRIMARY
SCHOOL
300
29/1/16 10:00 W
250
28/1/16 20:00 WSW
28/1/16 21:00 WSW
29/1/16 08:00 WSW
29/1/16 09:00 WSW
29/1/16 11:00 WSW
29/1/16 12:00 WSW

28/1/16 22:00 SW
28/1/16 23:00 SW
29/1/16 00:00 SW
29/1/16 01:00 SW
29/1/16 02:00 SW
29/1/16 03:00 SW
29/1/16 04:00 SW
29/1/16 05:00 SW
29/1/16 06:00 SW
200
29/1/16 07:00 SSW

150
100
69 66
55 58
50 47 51 49 52 52 48
46 45 45
34 36 33 37 33 38 36 36
31 29 30 28 32 29
22 23 23 24
18 17 17
0
Wind Angle (Degrees Clockwise from N) Wind Speed (mph) Wind Gust (mph)
DATE & TIME OF OBSERVED DATA (TAKEN FROM MET OFFICE RECORDS)
Figure 1: Graph showing an analysis of wind direction, wind speed and wind gust speed leading up to
the collapse of the gable wall at Oxgangs Primary School.
49
5.4 EXTENSION OF STRUCTURAL SURVEYS TO THE REST OF THE PPP1 SCHOOL

ESTATE
5.4.1 ESP had reserved the right within their letter to Galliford Try to undertake their
own investigations. After a short delay, ESP proceeded to instruct WRD to
undertake cavity wall tie inspections on all 17 projects, including the four Phase
2 schools that Galliford Try was responsible for making good.
5.4.2 On 9th March 2016, following consideration of the 29th February Report, the
appointment of WRD was extended by ESP to undertake a series of appropriate
intrusive surveys, i.e. opening holes in the walls at appropriate intervals so they
could determine whether there was any presence of similar defects associated
with the lack of wall tie embedment in the other external walls of Oxgangs
School and in the external walls of any of the remaining 16 schools that had
been completed as part of the PPP1 schools programme. Initial visual
inspections at these schools had previously failed to identify any areas of
concern.
5.4.3 The City of Edinburgh Council advised ESP that the three-month period they
were proposing for undertaking structural surveys was not acceptable to the
Council and that these should be completed much sooner than this so as to
more quickly identify any further risks. This requirement for acceleration of the
surveys was agreed as appropriate by ESP who anticipated that these surveys
could be completed over the following two to three weeks. A letter was sent by
the City of Edinburgh Council to the schools and to parents of school pupils
advising them that surveys of the schools would be commencing.
5.4.4 In recognition of the potential significance of the findings of the WRD Report,
the Chief Executive of the City of Edinburgh Council on 18th March 2016 initiated
regular meetings of a Corporate Incident Management Team ("CIMT") with
membership, including himself, of senior members of staff from all relevant
Departments within the Council.
5.4.5 The remit for the CIMT was to assist the Chief Executive in the overall strategic
management of and operational response to the issues that would emerge from
the discovery of defective construction at the schools.
5.4.6 Over the next ten weeks up to 20th May 2016, a meeting of this team was held
almost daily and from that date on at very regular intervals until all pupils had
returned to their own schools. The Inquiry was provided with minutes of these
meetings, which have proved useful in assisting the Inquiry in the formulation of
this chronology of events.
5.4.7 In mid-March 2016, due to the requirement for a more rapid completion of this
work, WRD augmented the size of the engineering inspections team by
50
appointing Harley Haddow, another Edinburgh-based structural engineering

firm, to assist them with the undertaking of the structural surveys on behalf of
ESP.
5.4.8 The undertaking of these investigations was made significantly more difficult
than it might have been by the reported inability of ESP, Amey, Galliford Try or
the City of Edinburgh Council to provide access to sets of good quality as-built
drawings of the original construction of the PPP1 schools.
5.5 RESULTS OF EXTENDED SURVEYS AND DECISION TO CLOSE PHASE 2 PPP1

SCHOOLS
5.5.1 Preliminary information on the results of the wider surveys of Oxgangs Primary
School was communicated by WRD to the City of Edinburgh Council on 15th
March 2016. It indicated a wider presence of inadequate wall tie embedment to
the perimeter walls of Oxgangs School.
5.5.2 The initial analysis by WRD suggested that up to 50% of the wall ties might not
be sufficiently embedded. On receipt of this Report a decision was made by
Council Officers to close Oxgangs School from the following day, Wednesday
16th March 2016. The following explanation of their approach to this decision
was expressed in communications from the City of Edinburgh Council:
"Whilst the structural engineer has indicated that the building could continue
to operate safely, a more precautionary approach has been taken to close the
school to allow remedial work to be undertaken. The extent of the issue
around the building renders the provision of an exclusion zone impractical"
5.5.3 Following the receipt of further structural reports containing indications of

evidence of similarly inadequate embedment of wall ties to the external walls of
all three of the remaining Phase 2 schools, it was decided at a meeting, held on
17th March, between Council elected members and senior Council officers that
Braidburn School and St. Peter's Primary, two of the three remaining Phase 2
PPP1 schools, should also be closed with immediate effect from Friday 18th
March 2016.
5.5.4 In so doing there was the expectation that the necessary remedial works to
these schools would be completed in time to allow the schools to be safely re-
opened on Monday 11th April, the day that pupils were due to return from their
Easter break.
5.5.5 It was also decided that the fourth Phase 2 school, Firrhill High School, would
close from the 18th March 2016 to allow the undertaking of detailed structural
surveys but re-open again on 21st March 2016, which was what occurred.
51
5.5.6 The meeting also decided that, pending the results of the on-going surveys, the
13 Phase 1 projects should remain open until the commencement of the Easter
school holidays on 24th March 2016.
5.5.7 The Inquiry was advised that this decision was based on a risk assessment using
the information available to the City of Edinburgh Council at the time. Until
information from the surveys would subsequently unfortunately indicate
otherwise, the Council considered it to be a reasonable assumption that the
defects relating to the wall-ties were confined to the four Phase 2 schools, all
having been built at the same time in a separate phase by the one contractor,
Miller Construction.
5.5.8 However, over the following days, the information from the on-going surveys
of the Phase 1 schools indicated that similar problems of varying cavity width
and lack of wall tie embedment had been identified across the PPP1 schools
and it was recognised that the remedial programme would also have to be
expanded to cover defective construction in these schools as well as in the four
Phase 2 schools.
5.5.9 The following are examples of photographs taken from these survey reports
showing the embedment of wall ties below the 50mm minimum requirement.
52
Images 6 and 7: Photographs from survey reports showing the lack of embedment. These are
two examples from Craigmount High School, showing embedment of 0mm and embedment of
24mm.
53
Image 8: Photograph from the survey reports showing the lack of

embedment. This is an example of no embedment of a wall tie at
Howdenhall Centre.
Image 9: Photograph from the survey reports.

This photograph shows very limited
embedment of a wall tie at Forthview Primary
School.
54
Image 10: An example of poor embedment at

Gracemount High School
Images 11 and 12: Examples of virtually no embedment at Drummond High

School (taken with borescope camera).
55
5.5.10 Following the novation of the appointment of WRD from the Council to ESP an in
light of the emerging information on the extent of structural defects, the Council
appointed a structural engineer to act solely on their behalf. A Director from the
Glasgow office of Scott Bennett Associates, a structural engineering consultancy,
was appointed to provide direct advice to the City of Edinburgh Council on how
ESP and ESP's consultants and sub-contractors were addressing the on-going
issues and to undertake a peer review of the nature and outcomes of the
ongoing surveys and the emerging design proposals and methodologies for
remediation of the schools.
5.5.11 Despite the contractual issues that the collapse of the Oxgangs School wall had
given rise to between ESP and the City of Edinburgh Council, the Inquiry has
been advised by those giving evidence to it that throughout this part of the
process there appeared to be an open and transparent sharing of technical and
survey information between ESP, WRD and the City of Edinburgh Council.
5.6 PROPOSED STRATEGY FOR AN EARLY REOPENING
5.6.1 In the period leading up to the commencement on 24 th March 2016 of the Easter
holidays, proposals were developed by ESP in conjunction with officers from the
City of Edinburgh Council and their advisers for the implementation of a strategy
to facilitate the early reopening of the schools.
5.6.2 The strategy relied upon a combination of:
 immediate remediation over the holiday period by the installation of

remedial wall ties to all areas of wall identified as high risk including at
entrances and means of escape;
 the erection of protective fencing to create exclusion zones around all

other areas assessed by the surveys as carrying risk, these areas to be
remediated in the summer holiday period; and
 the implementation of a strict management protocol for ensuring the

safety of children should there be any further periods of high wind.
5.6.3 The last part of the strategy was based on a proposal that either the schools
would be closed or pupils in schools would be restricted from going outside the
school buildings in periods of high winds, based on close and regular monitoring
of meteorological forecasts and severe weather warnings.
5.6.4 It was proposed that once satisfactory completion of this work had been
achieved over the Easter holiday period, the currently closed PPP1 schools i.e.
Oxgangs, St. Peter's, Firrhill and Braidburn, could reopen on 11th April 2016,
whilst any remedial work that remained outstanding on these schools at this
date could be completed during the summer months of the school holiday
56
period. This proposal was supported as being an acceptable approach from a

structural safety perspective by the structural engineers representing both ESP
and the City of Edinburgh Council.
5.6.5 In the case of the 13 Phase 1 PPP1 projects, the contractual period for which the
original contractors remained liable for latent construction defects had expired
prior to the collapse of the Oxgangs School wall. Following completion of the
surveys and the preparation of the design and specification for the required
remedial work, the remedial construction work would therefore be undertaken
by sub-contractors appointed under the management of Amey Communities.
5.6.6 However, the Phase 2 schools had been completed in 2005 under a contract
which had a limitation period of 12 years during which the responsibility for
making good latent construction defects remains with the original contractor.
This period had not yet expired.
5.6.7 ESP had therefore requested that Galliford Try comply with their contractual
responsibilities for undertaking all remedial works required to the four Phase 2
schools. This large national construction company had acquired Miller
Construction in 2014 and thereby assumed their contractual liabilities.
5.6.8 Following further consideration by the City of Edinburgh Council, the strategy to
facilitate the reopening of the schools on 11th April 2016 was accepted as the
best way to proceed. At a meeting of the Corporate Incident Management Team
on the 21st March 2016 the following points were discussed:
 The intention was that all closed schools would re-open after the Easter
break
 All remedial measures to the schools were required to be fully complete

by the start of August 2016
 Confirmation should be issued to school staff and parents of pupils that

the schools were safe and that pupils were being taught in a secure
environment
 The necessary mitigation measures in the event of severe weather would

be required to be fully operational in all schools prior to the return to
schools on 11th April 2016.
5.6.9 In relation to the introduction of the severe weather protocol, it had been
agreed at the CIMT on the previous day, Sunday 20th March, that Meteorological
Office weather warnings would be monitored by the Corporate Resilience Unit
of the City of Edinburgh Council four times a day until 25th March, the start of
the Easter break, and any warnings would be issued immediately to all
concerned.
57
5.6.10 It was also reported at the meeting that Galliford Try would begin a programme
of remedial works for the Phase 2 projects on the day following the meeting,
22nd March 2016, starting at Oxgangs School which had already been closed.
5.6.11 Galliford Try had appointed the Edinburgh-based firm of structural engineers,
Goodson Associates Ltd., to advise them directly on the extent and nature of
remediation works that would be required on the Phase 2 schools. This was not
a shared appointment so in relation to this work Goodson Associates only
reported to Galliford Try.
5.6.12 Goodson Associates had been provided with a copy of the 29 th February WRD
Report on the gable wall collapse at Oxgangs School and were addressing the
recommendations therein as their initial brief together with any specific
instructions from Galliford Try. Galliford Try did not at this time seek clearance
from ESP, the City of Edinburgh Council or their respective structural engineering
advisers on the nature or extent of the work they planned to carry out. In order
to fulfil their contractual obligations, they intended simply to repair the
defective work and report to ESP when the work was complete.
5.6.13 At the commencement of the Easter school holiday period on Friday 25 th March,
Amey commenced work on the wall tie remediation to the areas around
entrances and exits at the 13 Phase 1 projects. Work also started on the erection
of Heras fencing to create exclusion zones around those areas of wall which
were not designated high risk areas and for which the remedial works would be
undertaken during the period when the schools had closed for the summer
holidays.
5.7 TECHNICAL SOLUTION TO RESOLVE INADEQUATE EMBEDMENT OF WALL TIES
5.7.1 As more results of the on-going intrusive structural surveys continued to show
evidence of defective construction, it had become increasingly apparent that the
lack of embedment of wall ties was present throughout the PPP1 school
buildings. A more extensive scheme of wall tie remediation than was originally
envisaged would be required.
5.7.2 At a relatively early stage following discovery of the extent of the problem
associated with the wall ties, it was acknowledged by ESP, Galliford Try and
Amey that it would prove impractical to locate and replace the required quantity
of defective wall ties through opening up and rebuilding the walls. Accordingly,
both Galliford Try and Amey had proposed to undertake a process of installing
retrofitted proprietary remedial wall ties to all suspect areas of the external
masonry walls of the schools.
5.7.3 This type of tie is installed from the outside of the building by drilling holes
through the outer leaf and into the inner leaf of the cavity wall to the necessary
58
depth to allow satisfactory embedment. The use of such ties had the advantage
of being much less disruptive to existing brickwork and being very significantly
quicker to complete than an approach based on locating and repairing defective
ties.
5.7.4 A variety of resin-grouted ties, mechanically-fixed ties or helical screw-in ties are
manufactured for this use. To ensure their effectiveness, it is a requirement of
the manufacturers of these products that either specialist sub-contractors
approved by them are employed to undertake the work or that any other
tradesmen employed to do so have relevant experience and expertise, and have
received specific training in the use of their product. There is also a requirement
for sample testing of the suitability of the retrofitted ties using a specialist
testing machine to undertake 'pull tests' to establish that the strength of the
installed ties is satisfactory. The wall ties were satisfactorily installed in
accordance with these requirements.
5.7.5 The installation of the wall ties was undertaken by sub-contractors overseen
respectively by qualified staff from within Amey for Phase 1 schools and from
within Galliford Try for Phase 2 schools. The design and specification for this
work and the subsequent inspection thereof was undertaken respectively by
WRD for the Phase 1 schools and Goodson Associates for the Phase 2 schools.
5.7.6 The use of the retrofitted wall ties had been agreed as an appropriate design
solution by Scott Bennett Associates, acting on behalf of the City of Edinburgh
Council.
5.7.7 On the 5th April 2016, ESP confirmed by letter to the Chief Executive of the City
of Edinburgh Council that the schools could be safely reopened for the summer
term as normal on Monday 11th April as they predicted that all the specified
provisions, including wall tie remediation to the high-risk areas, would then be in
place.
5.7.8 It was intended that a letter with this information would be made available to
the staff and parents of children at the affected schools to reassure them that it
was safe to re-occupy the schools. The key sentence within the letter from ESP
to the City of Edinburgh Council was:
"The purpose of this letter is to confirm that, as we discussed at our meeting

of 21st March, these buildings are safe for occupancy, and have been at every
stage since the incident of 29 January 2016."
5.7.9 This letter from ESP was supported by a letter written on 4 th April to ESP by
WRD, their structural engineering advisers, advising them that in their opinion,
as a consequence of the various remedial works undertaken and the creation of
59
exclusion zones in all other necessary areas that all schools 'could continue to be
normally utilised'.
5.8 DISCOVERY OF MISSING OR INADEQUATELY SPACED HEAD RESTRAINTS
5.8.1 In the same week as the above letter of 5th April 2016 was written by ESP, the
supervising structural engineering consultants Goodson Associates were advised
by the contractor on the Phase 2 Schools, Galliford Try, that during the
reconstruction of the collapsed gable wall at Oxgangs Primary School, members
of staff of the contractor had reported to Galliford Try the discovery of an
apparent lack of expected head restraints at the top of the walls.
5.8.2 At this stage, in early April, the Inquiry have been advised that Galliford Try had
succeeded in acquiring a number of construction drawings for the four Phase 2
schools from WSP, the original design team structural engineers for the PPP1
schools.
5.8.3 Further investigations were undertaken by Galliford Try to establish the

presence and form of any head restraints. The investigations undertaken
established that in several situations head restraints had either not been
installed or were inadequately spaced.
5.8.4 In response to this situation, a structural review to establish the capacity of a

range of the masonry panels at Oxgangs School was undertaken by Goodson
Associates, involving calculating the strengths of the panels on the assumption
that head restraints had not been fitted. This review concluded that in the case
of the majority of the external masonry panels assessed, it would be necessary
to retrofit head restraints to achieve the necessary resistance to wind loading.
5.8.5 From the information provided to the Inquiry, it would appear that as early as
23rd March, the day after Galliford Try commenced their remedial work at
Oxgangs School, Goodson Associates had already on behalf of Galliford Try
carried out calculations on the brickwork panels in the Oxgangs School gable
wall that had collapsed. These calculations, which predated the discovery of the
missing head restraints, had assumed that the panels in question were
restrained on all four sides i.e. that head restraints had been fitted.
5.8.6 The calculations completed by Goodson Associates on 23rd March 2016 showed
that given the size, location and orientation of the largest panel, and assuming
that head restraints were present in accordance with the original specification,
which was subsequently found not to be the case, additional bed joint
reinforcement or secondary steelwork in the form of windposts would still have
been necessary to satisfy the required wind-loadings.
60
5.8.7 The Inquiry has been advised that this information, which demonstrated a
requirement for not only head restraints but windposts to be installed, was not
conveyed by Galliford Try to ESP or to the City of Edinburgh Council.
5.8.8 From an examination of photographs taken after the collapse of the wall, it is
clear that neither windposts nor bed joint reinforcement had been installed in
the wall.
5.8.9 An emergency meeting of the Council's Corporate Incident Management Team

was convened at 12.30 pm on Friday 8th April 2016 following a request from ESP
for a meeting. The information on this newly emerging issue was shared with
the Council officers present. In addition to the Council officers this meeting was
attended by a representative of ESP from the Edinburgh-based consultancy
Infrastructure Management Limited ("IML") which oversees the implementation
of the contract on behalf of ESP, and representatives of WRD, Goodson
Associates, Amey and Galliford Try.
5.8.10 The record of the meeting states:
"…a further serious issue had been identified with regard to Oxgangs Primary
School. Support at the head restraints was missing in some places and sparse
in others offering insufficient support at wall heads which now posed an
unacceptable risk and could cause internal walls to collapse. 21 panels had
been checked at Oxgangs Primary School which had failed the accepted
standard – equates to 20%. As a result of these findings it was deemed
necessary that the school be closed until further investigation and remedial
works had been undertaken."
5.8.11 The Inquiry was advised by Council officers as part of their evidence that the
nature of the defective construction newly reported at this meeting was
considered to be of major significance and the cause of great concern on the
party of the Council officers present.
5.8.12 Under the proposed strategy for reopening the schools on 11 th April 2016, it had
been assumed that any further failure of the outside leaf due to poor
embedment of wall ties would result in a collapse of masonry into an
unoccupied exterior exclusion zone in the school grounds, an area inaccessible
to schoolchildren and others.
5.8.13 However, the Council officers were now advised that a failure of the inner leaf of
the cavity wall to resist wind-loading, as a result of the reported absence of or
inadequacy of head restraints, could result in an inward collapse of masonry into
a classroom or other area occupied by children, teachers or staff. The Council
officers considered this to be an unacceptable risk.
61
5.8.14 The Inquiry was informed by officers of the Council who had attended this
meeting that, whilst they understood the technical and causal issues were
somewhat different, they were all inevitably aware of the recent fatal injuries
caused to a pupil at Liberton School in Edinburgh through the collapse of an
internal free-standing masonry partition wall on 1st April 2014. Although the
cause of the collapse of the internal free-standing wall at Liberton School was
quite different and in no way linked to the Oxgangs failure, the memory of it
reinforced the determination on the part of Council officers that they were not
prepared to take any risks which might have compromised the safety of the
school population.
5.8.15 It was agreed by the Council officers present at the meeting that the Leadership
of the Council should be advised immediately of the situation and of the
recommendations of the officers that all 17 PPP1 projects be closed with effect
from the following Monday 11th April 2016.
5.9 DECISION TO CLOSE ALL PPP1 SCHOOLS
5.9.1 Later on the same day of this meeting, 8th April 2016, a representative of ESP
wrote to the Chief Executive of the City of Edinburgh Council formally confirming
the information that they had previously provided at the meeting. The key
paragraphs of this letter read as follows:
"Shortly before noon today we were advised by the design and build
contractor who is executing the remedial works at Oxgangs Primary and St.
Peter's Primary that it had discovered serious defects as a result of which it
has advised that these schools are no longer safe to occupy. Representatives
of the Council were advised of the position this afternoon at a meeting with
ourselves and the design and build contractor."
"At present, it is impossible to confirm whether the same defect may exist at
the other Estate (PPP1) buildings. In these circumstances, we are afraid that
we have no option but to withdraw the confirmation contained in our letter of
5 April 2016 that the Estate buildings identified in the letter are safe for
occupancy."
(The list of buildings identified in the letter of 5 April included all the PPP1
schools).
5.9.2 The Leader of the Council told the Inquiry in evidence that, when he inquired as
to whether closure of the schools was the only course of action available, he was
advised that there were no alternative options to the decision to close all
schools. This decision was then ratified by the Leader of the Council.
62
5.9.3 Due to the legal implications for moving vulnerable young people, priority was
given to the carrying out of further inspections of Howdenhall Secure Unit.
These inquiries identified the fact that it was generally of a different
construction to the schools and was considered safe for occupancy apart from
the gymnasium, which would require similar remedial work to that required on
the schools in relation to wall ties. The gymnasium was closed and isolated until
the remedial work had been completed so that no residents were put at risk.
5.10 DECANTING AND RELOCATION OF PUPILS AND STAFF
5.10.1 The enforced closure of the 17 projects with immediate effect set in train a
huge, logistical task of a scale that normal emergency planning processes could
not reasonably have been expected to deal with. It involved putting in place as
quickly as possible alternative accommodation for the education of
approximately 7,600 primary and secondary pupils, 740 nursery pupils and the
relocation of 655 teachers.
5.10.2 To do so required the coordinated and concentrated input of:
 all the Senior Management Team and most of the Departments, teams
and staff within the Council;
 ESP and Amey Communities in relation to their on-going responsibility for

providing facility management services to the schools;
 the head teachers, teaching and related staff who worked in the buildings
affected;
 the head teachers and staff of other schools who would be required to
assist in accommodating the decanted pupils; and
 many other agencies from both the public sector and private sector willing
to offer available resources and/or expertise required.
5.10.3 It also required significant effort, inconvenience and time on the part of many
parents and pupils in helping to make the alternative arrangements work
effectively.
5.10.4 On the evening of 10th April 2016, the Communities and Families Directorate of
the City of Edinburgh Council invited the Head Teachers of the schools affected
to attend a meeting on Monday 11th April 2016, the day the schools had been
due to return from the Easter break. The Heads were given a better
understanding of the issues and the benefit of their experience and expertise
was sought in assisting with the development of proposals for the alternative
arrangements required.
63
5.10.5 A communications strategy managed by the City of Edinburgh Council, using a

range of media, was put in place to provide schools, parents and children with
essential information in relation to the closures and alternative arrangements.
This was an area throughout the period of the decant that the Council constantly
sought to focus on, recognising the importance of information to concerned
parents and teachers. In the earlier stages of the process the Council were
somewhat frustrated in these good intentions by the on-going lack of clear
information from ESP as to a programme for the completion of the remedial
works and the reopening of the schools that could be relied upon.
5.10.6 The Inquiry was advised that a key part of the relocation strategy adopted by the
City of Edinburgh Council was to give priority to those pupils at the High Schools,
particularly pupils in S4 – S6 who would be sitting examinations. This situation
was helped by the fact that in the case of Firrhill, Royal High and Drummond
High Schools, significant parts of the original schools had been retained under
the original PPP1 development and would be safe to continue occupying if
appropriate arrangements were put in place to prevent access by pupils to the
parts built under the PPP1 contract.
5.10.7 Priority was also attached to the relocation of pupils from Rowanfield and
Braidburn Special Schools for which some of the logistics were more
complicated than for the other schools due to the special requirements of some
of the pupils.
5.10.8 The emergency arrangements succeeded in having alternative accommodation

in place for most pupils by Thursday 14th April 2016, with all affected pupils
having access to alternative arrangements by Wednesday 20th April 2016.
Monday 18th April had been a public holiday.
5.10.9 To achieve this required the daily use of over 70 coaches for pupils and the
facilities of 61 alternative schools (including nurseries and Early Years Centres).
5.10.10 In order to accommodate the number of additional places required at the

alternative school locations, the Council had to hire and relocate 24 temporary
classrooms many of which had to be transported significant distances from
around the country. School furniture and equipment also had to be transferred
from the existing schools to the new locations.
5.10.11 Over the following days and weeks, seeking to be responsive to concerns raised
by groups of parents or teachers, the City of Edinburgh Council implemented a
number of adjustments to the locations of some groups of pupils. As an example
of such relocations, following complaints from some parents about the
perceived quality of the temporary accommodation their children had been
allocated at Wester Hailes Education Centre, the City of Edinburgh Council
64
arranged to relocate 90 Oxgangs Primary School pupils to Niddrie Mill Primary

School.
5.10.12 The following table demonstrates the complexity of the logistics required in
terms of the number of receiving schools that were required.
PPP1 Secondary Schools
Name of Classes Receiving Pupil Expected re- Walking Time lost due
PPP1 Establishment Nos. opening date /Bus to travel
Secondary mins/day
School
Craigmount S1 Forrester/ 174 17/08/2016 Walking 40
HS St Augustine's /Bus
HS
Craigmount S2 James 176 17/08/2016 Bus 90
HS Gillespie's HS
Darroch Annexe
Craigmount S3 Forrester/ 220 17/08/2016 Walking 40
HS St Augustine's /Bus
HS
Craigmount S4-6 Tynecastle HS 509 17/08/2016 Public N/A
HS Trans.
Gracemount S1-3 WHEC 351 17/08/2016 Bus 60
HS
Gracemount S4-6 Liberton HS 235 17/08/2016 Walking N/A
HS
Firrhill HS S1-6 N/A 1123 06/06/2016 N/A
The Royal S1-6 N/A 1231 20/06/2016 N/A
High
Drummond S1-6 N/A 460 20/06/2016 N/A
HS
65
PPP1 Primary Schools
Name of PPP1 Classes Receiving Pupil Expected re- Walking Time lost
Primary School Establishment Nos. opening /Bus due to
date travel in
mins/day
Broomhouse Canal View 58 w/c 27 June Bus 20
Nursery Primary
Broomhouse P2/3,P3/ Carricknowe 79 w/c 27 June Walking 40
Primary 4 Primary
Broomhouse P1-2 Clermiston 68 w/c 27 June Bus 40
Primary Primary
Broomhouse P5-7 Gylemuir 68 w/c 27 June Walking 40
Primary Primary
Castleview P1-7 Castlebrae High 318 17/08/2016 Walking N/A
Primary
Craigour Park Craigmillar EYC 33 17/08/2016 Bus 60
Nursery
Craigour Park Greengables 60 17/08/2016 Bus 60
Nursery Nursery
Craigour Park P1-2, Brunstane 171 17/08/2016 Bus 120
Primary P5A Primary
Craigour Park P3-4 Craigour Park 151 17/08/2016 As N/A
Primary Primary Normal
Craigour Park P5-6 Gilmerton 90 17/08/2016 Walking N/A
Primary Primary
Craigour Park P7 Liberton 44 17/08/2016 Bus 100
Primary Primary
Craigroyston P1-7 Craigroyston 233 17/08/2016 Walking N/A
Primary CHS
Craigroyston Cramond 83 17/08/2016 Bus 60
Nursery Primary School
Craigroyston Queensferry 17/08/2016 Bus 85
Nursery Primary
Forthview Clovenstone 32 17/08/2016 Bus 40
Nursery Nursery
Forthview WHEC 60 17/08/2016 Bus 40
Nursery
Forthview P2 Canal View 54 17/08/2016 Bus 70
Primary Primary
Forthview P5 Fox Covert 91 17/08/2016 Bus 60
Primary Primary
Forthview P5/6 Fox Covert RC 25 17/08/2016 Bus 60
Primary Primary
Forthview P1 Granton 49 17/08/2016 Bus 60
Primary Primary
66
date travel in
mins/day
Forthview P6-7 Leith Primary 58 17/08/2016 Bus 60
Primary
Forthview P3-4 Leith Walk 115 17/08/2016 Bus 60
Primary Primary
Oxgangs Hailesland EYC 8 24/05/2016 Bus 40
Nursery
Oxgangs Moffat EYC 79 24/05/2016 Bus 40
Nursery
Oxgangs P4-5 Bonaly Primary 58 24/05/2016 Bus 40
Primary
Oxgangs P5, P5/6 Clovenstone 54 24/05/2016 Bus 60
Primary Primary
Oxgangs P3, P3/4 Colinton 49 24/05/2016 Walking N/A
Primary Primary
Oxgangs P1 Pentland 60 24/05/2016 Bus 60
Primary Community
Centre
Oxgangs P2-3 Pentland 84 24/05/2016 Bus 60
Primary Primary
Oxgangs P4 St Marks 27 24/05/2016 Walking N/A
Primary Primary
Oxgangs P6-7 Niddrie Mill 84 24/05/2016 Bus 80
Primary Primary
Pirniehall Brunstane 40 17/08/2016 Bus 50
Nursery Primary
Pirniehall P4, P5/6, Davidson Mains 71 17/08/2016 Bus 30
Primary P6 Primary
Pirniehall P2, P7 Flora Stevenson 56 17/08/2016 Bus 30
Primary Primary
Pirniehall P2, P4, Wardie Primary 67 17/08/2016 Bus 30
Primary P5
St David's Lochrin EYC 14 17/08/2016 Bus 60
Nursery
St David's Viewforth EYC 40 17/08/2016 Bus 60
Nursery
St David's P3, P7 Hermitage Park 59 17/08/2016 Bus 100
Primary Primary
St David's P5-6 St Davids 76 17/08/2016 As N/A
Primary Primary Normal
St David's P3/4, P4 St Francis 58 17/08/2016 Bus 100
Primary Primary
67
date travel in
mins/day
St David's P2 St Mary's 27 17/08/2016 Bus 100
Primary Edinburgh
Primary
St David's P1 St Ninians 50 17/08/2016 Bus 100
Primary Primary
St Joseph's Dalry Primary 62 w/c 27 June Bus 30
Nursery
St Joseph's Sighthill EYC 14 w/c 27 June Bus 30
Nursery
St Joseph's P1, P2, Blackhall 101 w/c 27 June Bus 40
Primary P3/2 Primary
St Joseph's P3, P4/3 Holycross 51 w/c 27 June Bus 60
Primary Primary
St Joseph's P4-5 St Johns 62 w/c 27 June Bus 60
Primary Primary
St Joseph's P6-7 Trinity Primary 78 w/c 27 June Bus 60
Primary
St Peter's St Leonards 60 24/05/2016 Bus 60
Nursery Nursery
St Peter's P7 Broughton 54 24/05/2016 Bus 60
Primary Primary
St Peter's P5-6 Dalry Primary 55 24/05/2016 Bus 60
Primary
St Peter's P2 James 58 24/05/2016 Bus 60
Primary Gillespies
Primary
St Peter's P6 Preston St 29 24/05/2016 Bus 60
Primary Primary
St Peter's P1 Deanbank 59 24/05/2016 Walking N/A
Primary Annexe
St Peter's P3 Gracemount 59 24/05/2016 Bus 60
Primary Primary
St Peter's P5 South 28 24/05/2016 Walking N/A
Primary Morningside
Primary
St Peter's P4 Tollcross 61 24/05/2016 Bus 90
Primary Primary
5.10.13 An assessment of the City of Edinburgh Council's overall response in managing

the situation in relation to its impact on schools, pupils and their parents will be
provided in Section 12 of this Report.
68
5.11 COUNCIL MANAGEMENT OF THE CONTRACTUAL ISSUES
5.11.1 The City of Edinburgh Council wrote to ESP on the 14th April 2016 advising ESP
that it intended to exercise its right under the provisions of the PPP1 Project
Agreement to make deductions from the unitary charge as a result of the service
failures at all schools from the 8th April 2016, when ESP withdrew its previous
confirmation that the schools were safe for occupancy.
5.11.2 The Council also confirmed that it reserved its right to apply contractual
deductions due to the service failures resulting from defects that may have been
present and/or materialised in respect of the period prior to 8th April 2016.
5.11.3 The Council subsequently commenced making deductions, in accordance with

their assessment of the contractual provision for deductions, from their
payment of the unitary charge to ESP. They continued to make such calculated
deductions over the following months to reflect the periods of unavailability for
each school until satisfactory remedial works had been completed and each
school was available for re-occupation.
5.11.4 The Council also advised ESP in a letter sent on 27th April 2016 that, as a result of
the closure of the schools, it had incurred significant additional expenditure
under a range of headings including accommodation, transport, meals,
deployment of staff and procurement of external advice and would require
reimbursement of all additional costs so incurred.
5.12 INABILITY TO ACCESS ORIGINAL STRUCTURAL DESIGN DRAWINGS AND OTHER

RELEVANT INFORMATION
5.12.1 On the 18th April 2016, it was reported at a meeting of the CIMT that the ability
of the engineers to draw conclusions in relation to the Phase 1 schools,
particularly in relation to the need or otherwise for wall head restraints, was
being hampered by the unavailability of as-built or as-designed drawings.
Without access to the appropriate structural design drawings, it would be
necessary for the teams of structural engineers to undertake calculations from
first principles as to whether individual brick panels had sufficient structural
strength to resist the required wind-loadings.
5.12.2 If these calculations demonstrated the need for head restraints, bed joint
reinforcement or windposts and there was insufficient evidence from their on-
site surveys of the presence of such restraints, then the only option would be to
assume they were not present and design and fit the required elements as part
of the programme of remedial works.
69
5.12.3 This necessitated significant design work by the structural engineers employed
by ESP and a commensurate delay to the implementation of the remedial works
on the Phase 1 buildings.
5.12.4 In this regard, on 14th April 2016, the City of Edinburgh Council had contacted,
by phone and email, WSP, the consultancy firm that had been responsible for
the original structural design of the 17 PPP1 projects, to seek copies of the
original design and construction drawings for the Phase 1 schools. The requests
from the City of Edinburgh Council pointed out that access to these documents
could greatly assist ESP's team by reducing the amount of work and time that
would otherwise be necessary to finalise the design and specification of
remedial work required on the Phase 1 schools.
5.12.5 As explained above, the liability period on the Phase 1 schools under the original
design and build contract between ESP and AMJV had expired.
5.12.6 In a reply by email on 18th April 2016, WSP advised the City of Edinburgh Council
that the appropriate route for seeking these drawings was through their client
for the schools, AMJV. The email also stated that, to date, AMJV had not
contacted WSP on the matter.
5.12.7 While this statement may have been correct, the evidence provided to the
Inquiry showed that, in respect of the four Phase 2 schools, Galliford Try had
received copies of at least some of the structural drawings from WSP in the first
week of April 2016. According to written evidence provided by Galliford Try,
these drawing had only been provided by WSP following Galliford Try raising
Court proceedings to compel them to release these drawings which WSP had
been unwilling to do on a voluntary basis.
5.12.8 Over the next weeks, there followed a series of email communications all of
which failed to result in the information requested being provided by WSP. ESP
on several occasions sought the release of the drawings for the Phase 1 schools
from WSP, whose approach was to restate that they could only release them
with the approval of their original clients AMJV, or the component parts of
AMJV, i.e. Amey and Galliford Try. From the email evidence provided to the
Inquiry, despite both these latter parties having given their agreement to WSP to
release the information to ESP, none of the requested information was released
to ESP, to their professional advisors or to the City of Edinburgh Council.
5.12.9 While some of the Phase 2 information had clearly been retained by WSP in
their archive, their responses ultimately, as seen below in the emails below,
suggest that the drawings for the Phase 1 schools had not been retained by
them, however their email correspondence was in this regard initially confusing
to the City of Edinburgh Council.
70
5.12.10 The Council’s Project Manager on 2nd June 2016, in an attempt to help a
frustrated ESP to get access to drawings that would have been very helpful, in an
email to WSP specifically requested design information on one of the Phase 1
schools, Drummond High School.
5.12.11 WSP replied as follows:
"We do not want to appear unhelpful but as you will understand from your
conversation with --------, we are constrained by our contractual relationship
with Amey/Miller JV and are not in a position to provide information directly
to a third party until we are instructed to do so. May we respectfully request
that you raise any further requests for information directly with Amey/Miller
JV.
We can however, advise you that we have relayed your request to

Amey/Miller and have provided them with such information as we are able in
relation to Drummond High School."
5.12.12 On 6th June 2016, an email from WSP, replied to a follow up question by email
from the City of Edinburgh Council as to what information WSP had on
Drummond High School, with the following response:
"We would confirm that we have advised Amey/Galliford Try that following a
review of the information we retain in our archive we do not have any
information relating to Drummond High School."
5.13 RESULTS OF THE SURVEYS OF CAVITY WALLS
5.13.1 In the period following the Report on the 8th April 2016 of the missing head
restraints, a series of comprehensive exercises was undertaken by a
combination of the structural engineering firms appointed by ESP which sought
to establish the position in relation to the actual detailed construction of the
cavity walls. The structural engineering firms involved were Will Rudd Davidson,
supported by Harley Haddow, and Goodson Associates. Harley Haddow, also
structural engineers, had been appointed by WRD as their sub-contractor to
assist them in the surveys of the Phase 1 schools.
5.13.2 For clarity, while Galliford Try had appointed Goodson Associates in March 2016
to act directly for them in relation to the design and inspection of the remedial
works to the four Phase 2 schools, ESP subsequently also appointed them, under
a completely separate appointment, to assist WRD in undertaking some of the
surveys, reports and remedial design work for the Phase 1 schools.
5.13.3 As previously stated in the Report, despite certain of the Phase 1 schools having
been built by Miller Construction as construction sub-contractor (see the table
at paragraph 4.5.1), Galliford Try did not become involved in any aspect of their
71
remediation due to the contractual 12-year liability period under the original
contract with AMJV having expired prior to the date of collapse of the wall and
the discovery of the defective construction on the Phase 1 schools.
5.13.4 On the Phase 1 schools Amey were asked to provide or arrange for the provision
of the necessary building work support to open sections of the external walls so
that the consultant engineers could undertake the level of intrusive
investigations required.
5.13.5 Extensive structural surveys, resulting in comprehensive survey reports, were

ultimately undertaken for all the Phase 1 schools. As much information as
possible had already been extracted from the very limited construction drawings
that had been located from various archives. The walls of the schools were then
checked to establish to what degree they had been built in accordance with
these drawings.
5.13.6 Based on the analysis of these findings, calculations were undertaken, firstly to
establish whether the original design solutions would have provided the
required strength of panel, and secondly to establish if what had been found to
be built or could reasonably be assumed to have been built would meet the
structural requirements for the panels.
5.13.7 The structural engineers were then required, in the case of any panels that were
found to be inadequate, to produce remedial design proposals based on fresh
calculations from first principles.
5.13.8 The results of these surveys and subsequent calculations identified, in addition
to the lack of embedment of wall ties and the absence or inadequate spacing of
head restraints, a wider range of inadequate implementation of the structural
design in relation to the lack of inclusion of necessary or specified bed joint
reinforcement or secondary steelwork in the cavity walls.
5.13.9 It was found that in many of the schools the bed joint reinforcement that had
been calculated as necessary and specified was either totally missing or not
installed at the required spacing.
5.13.10 In certain areas, it was found that panels of brickwork, even if head restraints
had been fitted, would still have required the installation of windposts to
provide the required resistance to wind-loading. In other areas, it was found that
necessary lateral and corner restraints to the masonry panels were not present.
5.13.11 Below are some examples from the surveys of some of the Phase 1 schools.
72
Image 13: Marked up survey drawing of the gym at Howdenhall Centre.

The note to the top on the left-hand side of this drawing says: 'WALL HEAD
INSPECTED, NO TIES FOUND'.
Image 14: Survey photographs demonstrating failure to find head restraints at Goodtrees
Neighbourhood Centre.
73
Images 15 and 16: Examples at Craigour School where remedial head

restraints have been fitted to connect the inner leaf of the cavity wall to
the steel beam.
74
5.13.12 Whilst varying in degree from school to school, the results of the surveys
showed consistent failures across the schools in relation to the quality of
construction of the walls or omissions of specified reinforcement or secondary
steelwork in the construction of the walls.
5.13.13 In evidence, a Director of WRD, who had acted as structural engineering advisors
for ESP stated;
"Bed joint reinforcement was specified in these constructions but again it was
inconsistently applied. We instructed Amey to drill and find the reinforcement.
Sometimes they did but quite often they did not. The same was true of
windposts. They were found in some locations but not in others. On some
occasions, they were found but not in the locations one would expect. As we
came across these types of problems our confidence in the integrity of the
construction began to drop further and further."
5.13.14 The approach adopted by Galliford Try in relation to the remedial works for the
Phase 2 schools was significantly at variance with that adopted by ESP and
Amey.
5.13.15 Although the City of Edinburgh Council had expressed an urgency to have the
remedial work completed as quickly as possible, Amey had decided that they
would first seek to establish as much information as possible about the
structural design of the schools, what had actually been built at the different
schools and what was required to rectify defective panels on a largely panel by
panel basis.
5.13.16 The approach taken by Galliford Try was to seek to get the remedial works
completed as soon as possible to allow the schools to be reopened. They had
already determined that they would install remedial wall ties to 100% of the
external walls. Having established definitively in early April the absence of head
restraints, following some limited further intrusive investigations, Galliford Try
decided to proceed immediately with the installation of head restraints in the
Stage 2 schools in accordance with the remedial design solutions prepared by
Goodson Associates.
5.13.17 As a result, the Phase 2 schools were not subjected to the same level of detailed
surveys prior to commencement of construction as those undertaken in relation
to the Phase 1 schools and the Inquiry did not receive the same level of detailed
information as to the omission or otherwise of specified or required head
restraints, bed joint reinforcement or windposts.
5.13.18 An analysis, undertaken by the Inquiry of the results of the information

contained in the surveys and from subsequent records taken during the
construction process, is presented in the following table. This summary table has
75
been prepared using data contained in the investigation and remedial works
reports prepared by WRD, Goodson Associates, Harley Haddow, Amey and
Galliford Try.
5.13.19 The table seeks to illustrate the extent of investigations undertaken and extent
of remedial works carried out. It should be noted that in some cases the extent
of investigations were limited but that those limited investigations consistently
recorded a sizeable percentage of non-compliance or defects from the small
sample rate.
5.13.20 It can clearly be seen from the tables that across all the PPP1 schools, in both
Phase 1 and Phase 2, there were significant failures on the part of those
responsible for their construction. Where information was not contained in the
reports made available to the Inquiry or was not made available to the Inquiry,
this has been noted in the tables.
76
Percentage
Percentage Percentage Percentage of Percentage of
of Wall
Number of Cavities Percentage of of Wall Panels Panels
Panels that
Name of School of checked Ties exposed Panels that investigated for investigated
had
and Masonry that were that had had Head Restraints that had
Remedial
(Contractor) Panels outside Inadequate Remedial which had no missing Bed
Wall Head
tested Permitted Embedment Wall Ties Head Restraints Joint
Restraints
Tolerances installed found Reinforcement
installed
PHASE 1 SCHOOLS
Broomhouse/
St. Joseph’s PS 1 Information not
38% 11% 33% 34% 13% 21%
(Lilley available
Construction)
Pirniehall/
St. David’s PS 2
45% 18% 50% 35% 39% 39% 68%
(Lilley
Construction)
Craigour Park
PS 3 Information not
30% 11% 67% 59% 100% 83%
(Ogilvie available
Construction)
46 panels were
Craigroyston investigated;
None shown
PS survey results
43% 4% 25% 65% 100% on warrant
(Tulloch insufficient to
drawings
Construct) derive
percentage
Castleview PS
Information not
(Miller 31% 64% 50% 100% 100% 67%
available
Construction)
6 panels were
investigated;
Forthview PS
survey results
(Miller 57% 25% 25% 57% 96% 29%
insufficient to
Construction)
derive
percentage
7 panels were
investigated
Goodtrees NC
4 Survey results
(Miller 35% 0% 67% 25% 4% 100%
insufficient to
Construction)
derive
percentage
1
Remedial wall ties installed to gable wall panels and critical corner panels. Wind posts and head restraints added.
2
3
Remedial wall ties installed to gable wall panels and critical corner panels; some panels on the main elevations also
treated. Additional wind posts and head restraints added.
4
Remedial wall ties installed to gable wall panels and critical corner panels and some other wall panels. Additional wind
posts and head restraints added.
77
Percentage
of Wall
Panels that
had
Remedial
Wall Head
Restraints
installed
59% Plans for
main building
Howdenhall show 100%
Centre missing at attic 5 Information
22% 5% 40% 78% 34%
(Miller level in gym not available
Construction) hall. Elsewhere
Head Restraints
inconsistent.
Rowanfield SS
6
(Miller 42% 25% 67% 42% 50% 74% 50%
Construction)
Craigmount
HS 7 8
40% 14% 60% 45% 16% 8% 100%
(Miller
Construction)
Drummond HS
(Dickie
9
Construction) 32% 11% 63% 86% 100% 63% 57%
(Completed By
Miller)
Gracemount
High School Information not
34% 40% 75% 68% 19% 100%
(Miller available
Construction)
The Royal HS
(Robertson
10 Information
Construction) 22% 14% 33% 40% 67% 59%
not available
(Completed By
Miller)
5
Where no Head Restraints were found, WRD undertook panel assessments for each panel to determine where new
head restraints should be added. WRD note “The wall panel designs are based on the edge support conditions and
panel geometry required to yield a design ‘PASS’. Where this required the provision of edge restraint that was found not
to be present by the exploratory investigations, the requirement for additional edge restraint ties is shown on the
remedial works drawings.”
6
7
8
A detailed panel assessment was undertaken by Goodson Associates for each masonry panel where head restraints
were found to be missing. The design capacity to the panels was reinstated by the installation of new head restraints or
the addition of wind posts to sub-divide the panel, or both.
9
10
78
Percentage
of Wall
Panels that
had
Remedial
Wall Head
Restraints
installed
PHASE 2 SCHOOLS
Oxgangs PS
Information not Information
(Miller 13% 92% 92% 100% 55%
available not available
Construction)
0% Information
4 locations not available
were
Braidburn
opened. All
School Information not
35% 50% ties were 100% 10%
(Miller available
found to
Construction)
have
adequate
embedment
St Peters Information not Information
(Miller 13% 100% 29% 100% 50%
Construction)
Firrhill HS Information not Information
(Miller 11% 23% 75% 100% 75%
Construction)
79
5.13.21 The very significant extent of defective work and omission of components across
the PPP schools is very evident from the above table as is the consistency of the
presence of defects across the 17 projects.
 The percentage of checks on the width of cavities that were outside

permitted tolerances ranged from 0% in Goodtrees Neighbourhood
Centre up to 100 % in St. Peter's Primary School, averaging 29% across all
17 projects.
 The percentage of wall ties exposed that had inadequate embedment

(less than 50mm) ranged from 0% to 92%, averaging 47% across the 17
projects.
 The percentage of panels that required to have remedial wall ties installed
varied from 34% to 100% across all 17 projects.
 The percentage of all the wall panels in all the schools that had remedial
wall head restraints installed ranged from 8% to 100% with an average of
52% across the 17 schools.
 The percentage of wall panels inspected that were found to have specified
bed joint reinforcement missing ranged from 21% to 100%, averaging
67%.
5.13.22 It should be noted that the full detail as to the level of missing head restraints
and bed joint reinforcement was not available to the Inquiry, particularly in
relation to the Phase 2 schools repaired by Galliford Try.
5.13.23 The nature of the remedial work undertaken was fourfold:
 The retrofitting of wall ties to all panels, where it was determined that
embedment was inadequate, by drilling through the outer leaf of the
cavity wall into the required depth in the inner leaf and installing
proprietary wall ties designed for this purpose.
 The installation of bolted folded steel plate head restraints connecting the
steel beams of the structural frame to the blockwork inner leaf at
specified centres on those panels where they were found to be necessary
and the occasional incorporation of lateral and corner ties where they
were also found to be missing.
 The installation of stainless steel windposts on those panels where

required bed joint reinforcement had been omitted (as this cannot be
retrofitted) or where the design requirements demonstrated that
windposts were necessary to reduce the span of larger panels. These
were, other than in the case of one school where they were fitted
80
externally, fitted to the inside face of the cavity wall spanning vertically
between steel beams and floor slabs or spanning horizontally between
steel columns. They serve to tie the blockwork inner leaf to the structural
frame.
 As the area of the collapsed panels in the gable wall at Oxgangs School
had to be completely rebuilt, it was possible in that one location to install
the required bed joint reinforcement as the wall was built.
5.13.24 The size of the problem of inadequate construction is demonstrated when one
considers that approximately 440 heavy steel wind posts were required to be
retro-installed across the 17 PPP1 schools to provide the required structural
integrity to the wall panels.
5.13.25 The drawing below (Image 17) is a typical drawing of those produced to instruct
the contractors undertaking the remedial works as to the remedial installations
required on the various elevations of the schools in addition of course to the
retrofitting of the wall ties.
5.13.26 The elevation shown is of the West facing gable of Braidburn School.
5.13.27 The dotted red lines on the drawing indicates where wall head restraints were
required to be fitted, in this case along both sloping gable end steel beams and
over one window.
5.13.28 The lighter blue upright lines on the elevation indicate the locations for
additional windposts. The photograph below the drawing (Image 18) shows a
typical example of retro-installed windposts and wall head restraints (to both
intermediate and roof level beams) in Oxgangs School.
81
Image 17: A typical drawing of those produced to instruct the contractors undertaking
the remedial works as to the remedial installations required on the various elevations of
the schools in addition of course to the retrofitting of the wall ties.
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Image 18: Vertical windpost spanning from intermediate horizontal beam to roof beam and
wall head restraints fitted to both beams as installed prior to boxing in and painting at
Oxgangs School.
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5.14 EXTENT OF WORKS REQUIRED BEFORE SCHOOLS COULD BE SAFELY REOPENED
5.14.1 Following the discovery of the lack of adequate head restraints, there had been
significant discussion and some difference of opinion between ESP and the City
of Edinburgh Council as to whether some of the schools could be re-occupied
prior to completion of all the remediation work that had been identified as
necessary by the intrusive surveys, which were still ongoing.
5.14.2 WRD, the structural engineers advising ESP, had analysed the wide range of
masonry panels that made up the perimeter walls of the PPP1 school buildings
and designated them using a Red, Amber and Green classification.
5.14.3 The red classification was allocated to areas of the perimeter of the buildings
that would represent high risk and which would require full remediation prior to
occupancy of the school buildings.
5.14.4 The amber classification was allocated to areas of the perimeter of the buildings
that would require remediation but which, combined with the introduction of
agreed mitigation measures and protocols, it was proposed could allow for the
safe use of the buildings, either whilst the remediation work was being carried
out, or until a natural period of closure of the schools such as the summer break
during which period the work could be implemented.
5.14.5 The green classification was allocated to those areas which either had been
assessed as not requiring remediation or for which the remedial work had
already been completed.
5.14.6 The mitigation measures and protocols proposed in relation to the areas
classified as amber were as follows:
 the erection of secure protective fencing to create exclusion zones in the

school grounds around the areas of wall classified as amber into which
only approved personnel would be allowed to enter; and
 the implementation of a strict management protocol for ensuring the

safety of children should there be any further periods of high wind prior
to remediation of the areas designated amber. In such situations, based
on regular monitoring of meteorological forecasts, weather warning
notifications would be issued following which either the schools would be
closed for the periods of high wind or pupils already inside schools would
be restricted from going outside the buildings.
5.14.7 The Inquiry was advised that the rationale behind this proposal, that the schools
could be occupied before completion of the remedial works to the areas of wall
designated amber, included consideration of the fact that there was a reduced
likelihood of the occurrence of severe storms similar to Storm Gertrude during
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the late Spring and Summer months. ESP felt that this should significantly reduce
the risk of having to implement either of the two courses of action set out in the
proposed severe weather protocols. Further it was intended by ESP that all
remedial work would be complete before the end of August 2016 and thus
before the subsequent increased potential for severe storms in the following
autumn and winter months.
26th April 2016
5.14.8 At a meeting of the CIMT on the morning of 26 th April, the City of Edinburgh
Council expressed some concern as to the visibility of ESP, as all dealings on the
issues arising from the collapse at Oxgangs had been carried out with
representatives from IML, the consultancy acting on ESP's behalf. Questions
were raised as to the adequacy of the resources, particularly from a technical
perspective, that were being applied by ESP to the resolution of the problems.
The meeting notes referred to a sense of frustration on the part of the Council
that the pace of action was not adequate, particularly in relation to receiving
firm programmes for the remediation works and potential reopening dates of
the closed schools.
5.14.9 Amey Communities' expressed position in relation to the Phase 1 schools was
that they were awaiting the outcome of the full structural reports and the final
designs for the required remedial work before they would be able to produce a
programme for this work. These designs were being prepared by WRD for ESP.
ESP had accordingly advised representatives of the City of Edinburgh Council
that they were not yet in a position to provide a programme for the Phase 1
schools remediation.
5.14.10 In relation to the Phase 2 schools it was reported that Galliford Try had moved
construction teams on site and proceeded with a programme of remedial work
aimed at addressing the identified absence of head restraints, bed joint
reinforcement and secondary steelwork at the Phase 2 schools.
5.14.11 The CPM and Scott Bennett Associates had previously and appropriately advised
the CIMT that the wall tie remediation, referred to as Stage 1 work, had required
a relatively simple fix, the retrofitting of new remedial wall ties to those walls
where the surveys had identified them as necessary. This was a generic solution
not requiring structural calculations. The key aspects in carrying out the
retrofitting of wall ties was the quality assurance of the installation of the
remedial wall ties, including pull-tests, and confirming that this work had been
undertaken to all the areas identified as requiring it.
5.14.12 However, the issue in relation to the remedial works required to deal with
inadequate provision of wall restraints and bed joint reinforcement, referred to
as Stage 2 work, was more complex. There was a continued absence of the
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original drawings or calculations that had been produced by WSP, the structural
engineers who had been responsible for the structural design of the PPP1
projects. This was making it very difficult for WRD and Goodson Associates to
understand the original design intent and the reliance of that design solution on
the various possible combinations of different brickwork accessories and
elements of secondary steelwork in individual cavity wall panels.
5.14.13 Also, whilst the surveys undertaken had been sufficient to identify the extent of
the problems, it was practically impossible, without taking down a significant
proportion of the external walls of the schools, to be definitive as to what
structural components had or had not been built into the walls at each panel
location.
5.14.14 In order to provide the necessary reassurance of the structural integrity of the
remedial works, the design of the Stage 2 work for the Phase 1 schools, being
undertaken by WRD, and the design of the Stage 2 work for the Phase 2 schools,
being undertaken by Goodson Associates, would in both cases be required to be
based on a combination of calculations from first principles and any available
survey information that was definitive.
5.14.15 Scott Bennett Associates, acting in the role of peer reviewer on the part of the
City of Edinburgh Council had sought to have sight of this design work so that it
could be independently verified by them as presenting satisfactory solutions
prior to its implementation on site.
5.14.16 However, the Inquiry were advised by representatives of the City of Edinburgh
Council and ESP that, at what was now a relatively advanced stage of the
remedial works that were being undertaken to the Phase 2 schools, no
information had been provided to either organisation or to Scott Bennett
Associates by Galliford Try as to the nature and extent of the remedial work that
they had undertaken or intended to undertake on the Phase 2 schools.
5.14.17 Galliford Try, in evidence on this point, stated that they had provided all
information that was requested of them by ESP and that they did not have a
contractual route to provide this information directly to the City of Edinburgh
Council.
5.14.18 Galliford Try would still be required to demonstrate to Scott Bennett that the
processes they had implemented and the work they had carried out was to the
satisfaction of the Council in terms of both design and implementation. To do so
would require the submission of both appropriate documentation by the
contractors and their advisers, including structural calculations, and post-
completion inspections to be undertaken jointly by Scott Bennett Associates and
the Clerk of Works subsequently appointed by the City of Edinburgh Council.
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5.14.19 The Scottish Futures Trust ("SFT") had been in contact with the City of Edinburgh
Council and advised them that, should the Council require it, they were
prepared to provide assistance with any legal issues that may arise relating to
these issues.
5.14.20 The City of Edinburgh Council felt that it was important to express their concerns
about the construction failures and the remedying of them directly with the
Directors of ESP and the large lending organisations that had provided the
majority of the funding for the PPP1 projects.
5.14.21 A meeting was held on the afternoon of 26th April 2016 attended by the Chief
Executive of the City of Edinburgh Council and other senior Council officials, the
shareholders of ESP and representatives of the banks behind the PPP1
development. The dissatisfaction of the Council with the way in which matters
were being handled was expressed at this meeting.
5.14.22 The Chief Executive advised those attending the meeting that the Council's
strongly preferred course of action was the 'green' solution, i.e. the completion
of all required remedial works prior to reopening of the schools and that they
would no longer be content with the 'amber' or two-stage approach.
5.14.23 In the series of meetings with the ESP representative, the Council officers had
expressed the requirement that, given the circumstances leading up to the
closures, head teachers, members of staff and particularly the parents of pupils
would all require an acceptable level of assurance of the safety of each
remediated school before that school building was reoccupied. There was
considerable debate as to the required final form and content of such
assurances and which organisations would be required to provide it.
27th April 2016
5.14.24 At the CIMT meeting on the 27th April, it was reported that the remedial work by
Galliford Try to Oxgangs and St. Peter's Primary Schools could be complete by
the next day, 28th April 2016, followed shortly by the teaching wing at Braidburn
Special School and after a further short period, Firrhill High School. This was
considerably faster than had been expected.
5.14.25 The structural engineers employed to advise the City of Edinburgh Council, Scott
Bennett Associates, stated at the meeting that at this stage they had not yet
received sufficient information to allow them to verify the design process and
construction methodology in relation to the work that was being undertaken by
Galliford Try on these projects. Whilst this work had been carried out very
quickly, there was reportedly a lack of knowledge on the part of ESP and the City
of Edinburgh Council as to what had been done and how comprehensive or
otherwise it had been.
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5.14.26 The meeting then discussed the range of documents that would be required by
the City of Edinburgh Council to be shown to parents in order to assure them as
to the safety of each school once the remedial work had been completed. The
following list of documents was itemised:
 a letter from ESP stating that the school was safe to occupy;
 a letter from the structural engineer responsible for the design of the
remedial works to the school;
 a letter from the relevant contractor, Amey or Galliford Try, confirming

they had carried out the works prescribed by the engineers;
 a risk assessment of the structural integrity of the walls; and
 a letter verifying the design and construction of the remedial work as

appropriate from the independent engineer employed by the Council.
28th April 2016
5.14.27 At the CIMT meeting on 28th April 2016 it was reported that the four Stage 2
schools would be reoccupied on Tuesday 24 th May 2016, subject to all remedial
work being complete and the resolution of the issues in relation to the
production of satisfactory documentation to provide the required assurances.
5.14.28 In this regard, it was reported that the first of the several structural reports that
were required by the City of Edinburgh Council, that for Oxgangs School, had
been provided by Galliford Try. It was noted at the meeting that the first three
paragraphs within the Report were confidentiality clauses. This was irrespective
of the fact that, besides the fundamental requirement to provide evidence to
the City of Edinburgh Council of the adequacy of the work undertaken, one of
the main reasons for the urgency in seeking the reports was to be able to
publish them to parents in advance of reoccupation of the schools.
5.14.29 It was also reported at the meeting that during the previous week, the Chief
Executive of the City of Edinburgh Council had attended a meeting with
Directors of the Scottish Office who had asked if the UK Government required to
be advised of the nature and extent of the defects that had been discovered.
The Chief Executive had explained that whilst the information currently available
was insufficient for him to be definitive, the evidence would suggest that the
problems identified could be generic in nature and that this fact would be
explored as part of an Independent Inquiry.
5.14.30 On 28th April 2016, ESP wrote to the City of Edinburgh Council in relation to their
proposed approach to the resolution of the reported defective wall construction
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aimed at achieving early re-occupancy of some of the Phase 1 schools. The letter
contained the following paragraphs:
"In seeking to fulfil that aim, (the resolution of the issues that had arisen
following the Oxgangs wall failure) Will Rudd Davidson have been liaising
with Harley Haddow, Goodson Associates and the Council's engineers, Scott
Bennett Associates to obtain assurances as to the structural integrity of the
Project Schools.
We are pleased to report that following a robust risk-based assessment of the

Project Schools, Will Rudd Davidson have now confirmed that, subject to
agreed exclusion zones being put in place, the following Project Schools are
from a structural perspective safe for normal occupation until up to the end of
August 2016:
Craigour Park Primary School

Pirniehall Primary School
Broomhouse Primary School & St. Joseph's Primary
Craigmount High School
Rowanfield Special School
Forthview Primary School
Craigroyston Primary School
Goodtrees Neighbourhood Centre
We understand that your engineers, Scott Bennett Associates, agree with the
foregoing assessments. In the circumstances, we should be grateful if you
would confirm that pupils of the above Project Schools will be returning to
their own schools as soon as possible."
5.14.31 A construction programme provided by ESP with this letter was based on the
adoption and implementation of the 'amber' rather than the 'green' solution
that had been requested by the City of Edinburgh Council.
29th April 2016
5.14.32 On 29th April 2016, the Chief Executive of the City of Edinburgh Council replied
to this letter. He reiterated that he had previously made it clear that he was
requiring ESP to propose and implement a 'green' only solution and that he had
thought that this had already been accepted by them. His letter contained the
following sentence;
"The notion that the schools are safe to re-occupy other than in strong winds
only has to be put down on paper to be seen as absurd and unacceptable..."
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5.14.33 At the CIMT meeting on 29th April 2016, it was confirmed that structural reports
had now been provided for all the Phase 1 schools but had not yet been received
for all the Phase 2 schools. However, Galliford Try had indicated that they would
be willing to provide the list of documentation set as a pre-requisite by the
Council before any of the Phase 2 schools could re-open.
5.14.34 It was confirmed at the meeting that a Clerk of Works had been appointed by
the City of Edinburgh Council to undertake, on behalf of the Council, inspections
of the remedial work. The Clerk of Works would report through the structural
engineers, Scott Bennett Associates, appointed to advise the Council.
5.14.35 As the work was already virtually complete on the Phase 2 schools, site
inspections of the work done at these schools could only be in relation to what
was visible of the additional secondary steelwork added. However, as the
required work arising from the absence of the head restraints had not
commenced on the Phase 1 schools by Amey, the Clerk of Works would be able
to carry out more comprehensive site inspections as this work proceeded.
5.14.36 It was further reported that an issue had arisen in relation to the required
structural reports on the remedial works. There had not been up to that point a
written agreement on the part of the structural engineering firms as to the level
of assurances they were being asked to provide in the required assurance
documents and the wording thereof. In further meetings between the various
parties the debate was subsequently resolved with agreement to a standard
wording that was acceptable to both the City of Edinburgh Council and the
structural engineering firms.
5.14.37 A set of the standard documentation, required to provide assurance as to the

adequacy of the remedial works and the safety of the schools, including letters
from the structural engineers involved, was ultimately provided for both the
Phase 1 and Phase 2 schools after considerable legal analysis by the various
parties. A set of this documentation as provided for the Oxgangs School, typical
of those provided for all the schools, is attached as Appendix 2 to this Report.
3rd May 2016
5.14.38 On the 3rd May 2016 Scott Bennett reported to the City of Edinburgh Council
that they had visited the Phase 2 schools the previous day and that he was
impressed with the work that was being carried out, describing it as 'belt and
braces'. It was reported that they had received some of the requested reports
on these schools and, while still in the process of checking these through,
believed more work was required on the design considerations submitted.
5.14.39 The City of Edinburgh Council had produced a draft letter setting out the level of
assurances that they would require from ESP in relation to both the safety and
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the compliance of the schools with the requirements of the PPP1 Project
Agreement.
4th May 2016
5.14.40 On 4th May 2016, an email received by the City of Edinburgh Council from ESP
confirmed the commitment of ESP to complete a fully green solution prior to re-
opening of the schools and not to pursue further their proposed amber solution
in relation to the Phase 1 schools. It stated:
"Finally, to be clear ESP is now working solely to a fully green solution and it is
my understanding that Rudd's (WRD) are meeting with Scott Bennett
Engineers today and will clearly define the 'finish line' in that regard (in terms
of what assurances, method statements etc. can/will be provided). It is our
intention to outline this agreed package when we write to the Chief Executive
next week."
(See extract from this letter sent to the Chief Executive on 11 th May at
paragraph 5.14.56).
5.14.41 In the same email, ESP reported that Galliford Try had already adopted the
approach of full remediation, the 'green' solution in relation to the Phase 2
schools and had advised ESP that all work on these schools would be complete
by 9th May 2016.
5.14.42 Galliford Try were still required to demonstrate to Scott Bennett, the advisers to
the Council, that the work to the Phase 2 schools had been done to their
satisfaction and hence the satisfaction of the Council.
5.14.43 In relation to the programme of work for the Phase 1 schools, ESP reported that
Amey had now commenced work at each of:
 Broomhouse/St. Josephs;
 Pirniehall/St. David's;
 Forthview Primary;
 Craigour Park Primary; and
 Goodtrees neighbourhood centre.
5.14.44 ESP further reported that it was planned that work would commence at
Rowanfield on the next day, 5th May 2016, and at Gracemount High School on or
before Monday 9th May. It was noted that work had already been undertaken at
these schools by Amey in relation to that element of the remedial work to the
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wall ties that had been completed prior to the end of the Easter break on 11 th
April 2016 in expectation of the schools reopening on that date.
5.14.45 The extent and detailed specification of the works to be undertaken on the
Phase 1 schools was currently being established as part of their design process
by WRD, the structural engineers appointed by ESP. This work was based on the
information provided by the surveys as contained in the then recently
completed structural reports on the existing schools and the limited information
that had been made available to them in relation to the original design.
5.14.46 Amey were reported as being unwilling to commit to the production of a

detailed programme for the completion of this work until more information was
available to them as to the construction requirements being specified for the
remedial work by WRD. They were however proposing to allocate more
construction teams than they had originally planned for so that they could work
in parallel across the various sites and shorten the time otherwise required to
complete all of the work.
5.14.47 To supply the design information to this increased number of teams would
require the simultaneous rapid development of design solutions across the 13
projects by WRD. ESP viewed this as placing a very heavy demand on the already
fully committed resources of WRD.
5.14.48 To counter any potential delay that might arise from design information not
being ready, ESP appointed Goodson Associates to undertake the design
element for those of the Phase 1 schools for which they had undertaken the
structural surveys and reports. This was done with the full support and
involvement of WRD. This was treated by all parties as a totally discrete service
from that Goodson Associates were providing for Galliford Try on the Phase 2
schools.
10th May 2016
5.14.49 At a meeting of the CIMT on 10th May 2016 it was noted that the date scheduled
for the re-opening of three of the Phase 2 schools, Oxgangs, St. Peter's and
Braidburn Schools had already been publicised to parents as Tuesday 24th May.
The work to these schools would have to be completed by 17 th May 2016 and
the required documentation submitted on the same day if this was to be
achieved.
5.14.50 The meeting was however informed that as a result of the level of assurances
required, Goodson Associates had advised Galliford Try that additional
windposts were required in the Phase 2 schools. Therefore, despite previous
statements that all work to the Phase 2 schools would be completed by 9 th May
2016, the installation of more than 30 windposts was currently underway at St.
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Peter's Primary School and at the other Phase 2 schools. This would delay the
completion beyond 9th May 2016. The contractor, Galliford Try, still expected to
deliver the schools by the 17th May 2016.
5.14.51 The original windposts specified for the schools were generally to have been in
the form of steel angles that were to be built into the inner blockwork leaf of the
cavity so that they would not have been visible from either inside or outside the
building.
5.14.52 Where the results of the surveys and structural calculations identified the need
for windposts to be retrofitted to achieve the required strength in some of the
masonry panels, it had been determined that the least disruptive and quickest
methodology of fitting them was to attach them on the internal face of the
blockwork walls.
5.14.53 As a result, the retrofitted windposts, of which many more than originally
envisaged were required across both Phase 1 and Phase 2 schools, would be
highly visible from within the school and also intrude slightly into the internal
rooms and spaces. To reduce the visual impact, it was proposed that they should
be boxed in and painted to match the walls to which they were fixed.
5.14.54 Representative photographs (Images 19 and 20) of the results of the application
of the boxed in retrofitted windposts in the gymnasium at Drummond High
School are shown below.
Images 19 and 20: Boxed in retrofitted windposts, Drummond High School.
5.14.55 The meeting of the 10th May was also advised that the Leader of the Council had
announced that an Independent Inquiry into the closure of the schools would be
held. However, it was intended that the main work of the Inquiry would not
commence until after the schools were occupied.
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11th May 2016
5.14.56 On 11th May 2016 ESP responded to the letter of 29th April 2016 from the Chief
Executive of the City of Edinburgh Council, stating:
"...we have not declared the schools to be not safe"; and
"…this approach (the 'amber' solution) has been signed off as appropriate
and reasonable by all four sets of structural engineers." (Will Rudd Davidson,
Goodson Associates, Harley Haddow and Scott Bennett Associates).
5.14.57 The letter from ESP however went on to state:
"...notwithstanding the foregoing, we have now provided you with a

remediation programme which implements the 'Green' solution. This has
been provided without prejudice..."
5.14.58 In giving evidence to the Inquiry, several senior officers of the Council expanded
on their analysis at the time that only a 'green' solution was acceptable. Having
gone through the disruptive exercise of decanting and re-accommodating some
8,340 pupils and nursery children, they had considered that it would be
unacceptable to move them back to their original schools prior to full
remediation if, as a result, there was the risk of the schools having to be closed
in the event of an unseasonal storm.
5.14.59 The officers of the Council had also formed the opinion that, as the schools were
now vacated, this would allow for unrestricted access by the various
construction teams to undertake the remedial works in the quickest possible
time and without creating additional risk to pupils who otherwise could have
been in close proximity to these works.
17th May 2016
5.14.60 On the 17th May 2016, it was reported that the Chief Executive of the City of
Edinburgh Council had met with ESP and Galliford Try on the previous evening.
The discussions had been positive with both parties acknowledging that they
understood the Council's requirement for a clear audit trail of the process of
remediation. They had agreed to provide a programme of all outstanding work
and the required documentation, including CDs of technical details and
photographs of the works.
5.14.61 On the evening of the 17th May 2016, Galliford Try had advised the City of
Edinburgh Council that the work to the schools due to reopen on 24 th May 2016
had been completed. On the 18th May 2016, Scott Bennett Associates confirmed
that they had that day received CDs of the calculations and remedial work
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undertaken for these schools and that it would take two to three days to assess
them, making it just possible to achieve sign off before the due date.
18th May 2016
5.14.62 In relation to the Phase 1 schools, it was reported at a meeting of the CIMT on
18th May 2016, that despite having been advised by Amey that additional teams
to the previously planned four teams would be made available, only four Phase
1 schools were currently being worked on.
19th May 2016
5.14.63 On 19th May 2016, the City of Edinburgh Council was concerned that the re-
openings for those Phase 2 schools due for the 24 th May 2016 might not be
achieved. The meeting of the CIMT was advised that Galliford Try had discovered
they had to do some additional work to the schools which had delayed them
slightly longer than expected, however, during the meeting an email was
received from Galliford Try confirming that the work was now complete.
5.14.64 In relation to the provision of the required reports, Scott Bennett Associates
advised that they had received full reports for Braidburn and St. Peter's but had
had to ask for further information. Scott Bennett Associates had confidence in
the professionalism of the structural engineers who had undertaken the work
and had received sufficient information to know what was done and that it had
been recorded properly. However, they had not been provided with the
required calculations to show that the remedial measures applied to each panel
of masonry had been properly designed.
5.14.65 Scott Bennett Associates reported that the paperwork for the third school due
to open on 24th May 2016, Oxgangs School, had been delivered to their office at
1.00 am that morning.
5.14.66 It was agreed at the meeting that due to the need to give adequate notice if the
schools were not to open as planned, that ESP should be advised that, if all
requirements had not been satisfied by 4.00 pm [that day, 19th May,] the
openings could not go ahead on 24th May 2016 and the public would be notified
accordingly.
5.14.67 Later that day in relation to the Phase 2 schools, Scott Bennett reported that
they had received that morning the final information required in relation to St.
Peter's and already had cleared the documentation for Oxgangs and Braidburn
Schools. Final cleaning of the schools would be completed in time and
accordingly, based on this information, the Council gave the go-ahead for the
necessary packing and relocation of equipment and materials so that these
three schools could reopen on Tuesday 24th May 2016.
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5.14.68 It was agreed that the required dossiers of information providing assurances as
to the safety of the schools would be available for parents and others to see on
the Council's web-site from the morning of Monday 23rd May.
5.14.69 The three Phase 2 schools were subsequently re-opened successfully on 24th
May 2016 with no complaints or adverse comments being received from
teachers on the extent of the steel windposts now visible inside the
schoolrooms.
20th May 2016
5.14.70 On the morning of 20th May 2016, the Chief Executive of the City of Edinburgh
Council met with ESP to discuss their ability to deliver the required dates for
reoccupation of the Phase 1 schools. Amey advised that they would submit a
revised programme in the following week.
24th May 2016
5.14.71 On 24th May 2016, the City of Edinburgh Council was advised that it was now
unlikely that either Drummond or Royal High Schools (both Phase 1 schools)
would be able to reopen in line with their previously advised date of 20 th June
2016. This was as a result of the structural analysis which had been undertaken,
which demonstrated the need for up to 80 retrofitted windposts in just one of
the schools.
5.14.72 There was however some positive news in that it was being predicted that
several schools could possibly reopen ahead of their scheduled date. The schools
in question were:
 Pirniehall/St. David's (Phase 1).
 Broomhouse/St. Joseph's (Phase 1).
 Rowanfield (Phase 1).
 Howdenhall (Phase 1).
 Firrhill (Phase 2).
5.14.73 In order that Amey would have a better idea of the scale and nature of the work
that was required to be undertaken by them on the Phase 1 schools, ESP had
taken Amey to see the completed remedial work at Oxgangs School. It was
confirmed by ESP that Amey would use the same sub-contractors employed by
Galliford Try to benefit from their familiarity with the nature of the work.
5.14.74 The proposal previously put forward by Amey to increase the size of their
workforce had not yet taken place.
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26th May 2016
5.14.75 On 26th May 2016, it was confirmed that Drummond and Royal High Schools
would not reopen on 20th June 2016. The delay was in part due to the ongoing
further investigations that were being carried out at the schools. These had
raised questions as to whether the windposts intended to be installed as part of
the original structural design and construction of the schools had been installed.
31st May 2016
5.14.76 On 31st May 2016, a further meeting was organised by the City of Edinburgh
Council with ESP and Amey to discuss the revised programme they had
submitted. The programme showed Pirniehall/St. David's, Broomhouse/St.
Joseph's Primary Schools, Rowanfield Special School and the work to the
gymnasium at Howdenhall finishing prior to the end of the current term with the
remaining Phase 1 schools being completed prior to the date in August that the
schools were due to reopen after the summer holidays.
5.14.77 The meeting was advised that Amey were still awaiting a set of the original
construction drawings from WSP, which was delaying progress on finalising the
design for the remedial solution for Drummond High School. The City of
Edinburgh Council was subsequently advised by WSP that they had not retained
any of their design information on this school.
5.14.78 At that point the CPM from the Council did not have a direct contact point
within Amey in relation to the management of the remedial works on Phase 1
schools and were finding it difficult to understand who in Amey was taking
responsibility for the project.
5.14.79 Subsequently, Amey put in place a highly experienced and effective construction
manager, who acted as a point of liaison with ESP and the City of Edinburgh
Council and who oversaw the remedial works on the Phase 1 schools.
5.14.80 A small delay had been caused to the projected completion of the work to
Firrhill School in that ESP and Galliford Try had not been aware that one of the
extensions to the school had been built under the PPP1 scheme and as a result
had only recently commenced work on it. However, it was agreed that Firrhill
High School, the only Phase 2 school still currently closed, would reopen on 6th
June 2016 subject to the standard requirements in relation to assurances being
met by Galliford Try.
7th June 2016
5.14.81 On 7th June, it was reported at a CIMT meeting that a further revised programme
would be submitted by ESP in relation to the Phase 1 schools on Thursday 9 th
June 2016.
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5.14.82 Amey had recently identified a further problem with the wall-tie solution in
relation to the need to check expansion joints at the corners but they felt this
could be dealt with without affecting their current programme dates. On review
of whether this might equally be a problem on the Phase 2 schools, it was
confirmed that the issue of the corner details had been dealt with and certified
as acceptable.
5.14.83 Amey were still encountering problems getting any original drawings for
Drummond High School. The currently proposed solution would require
installing windposts to the walls within the main gymnasium hall but doing so
would effectively reduce the free space in the gym to below that specified as
required in the PPP1 Project Agreement. An alternative solution of attaching the
windposts to the exterior of the gymnasium walls was being explored.
5.14.84 It was reported that Amey were working from 7.00 am to 7.00 pm and had now
90 workers and three steelwork teams engaged across the schools.
9th June 2016
5.14.85 On 9th June, it was reported that Amey were now in possession of a set of
drawings for Drummond High School, which had been discovered in further
searches of the ESP archive (not provided by WSP), and Goodson Associates had
developed a solution in which the only protrusion of the necessary additional
windposts would be to the outside of the building, thereby preserving the
internal dimensions of the clear space in the gymnasium. Subsequent liaison
with the Planning Department of the City of Edinburgh Council confirmed that
this would not be treated as a material change and would therefore not require
planning consent.
16th June 2016
5.14.86 On 16th June 2016, it was reported that significant progress had been made and
there was now greater clarity on the position in relation to the programme for
the Phase 1 schools.
5.14.87 The situation was reported as follows:
 Broomhouse/St Joseph's Primary Schools would reopen on Monday 20th

June 2016 (Subsequently achieved).
 Pirniehall/St. David's Primary Schools would reopen on Monday 20 th June

2016 (Subsequently achieved).
 The gymnasium at Howdenhall would be available for reuse by 23 rd June

2016 (Subsequently achieved).
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 Rowanfield Special School would reopen on 27th June 2016 (subsequently

reopened on 24th June 2016).
 The required information dossiers on assurances were being received by

Scott Bennett for processing and approval prior to the reopening of the
schools.
21st June 2016
5.14.88 An update on progress on 21st June 2016 showed that:
 Forthview Primary School was undergoing minor adjustments to the

steelwork, however it was hoped to be complete by 26 th June 2016
(Subsequently delayed until 30th June 2016 due to the steelwork issue);
 Craigour Park Primary School was expected to be complete by the end of

June;
 Craigroyston Primary School was expected to be complete in mid-July;
 Craigmount High School was on target for completion on 6 th July 2016

(Subsequently delayed until 11th July 2016);
 Goodtrees Community Centre would reopen on 8th July;
 Castleview Primary School was expected to be complete by mid-July;
 Drummond High School was in the process of having significant steelwork

installed in but it was still on schedule to complete by the end of July;
 Gracemount High School was due to complete by the end of July; and
 The Royal High School was also due to complete by the end of July.
August 2016
5.14.89 The final remedial works and documentation were in fact completed for the final
school, the Royal High School, on 11th Aug 2016 thus enabling the reopening of
all the PPP1 schools for the return of the pupils after the summer holidays on
17th August.
5.14.90 The following is a consolidated list of the dates on which each of the PPP1
schools were handed back to the council with all works and documentation
satisfactorily completed.
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School Hand back date
Braidburn School 20 May 2016
Oxgangs Primary School
St Peters RC Primary School
Firrhill High School 2 June 2016
Pirniehall and St David’s Primary Schools 15 June 2016
Broomhouse and St Joseph’s Primary Schools
Rowanfield School 22 June 2016
Howdenhall Centre
Forthview Primary School 29 June 2016
Goodtrees Neighbourhood Centre 8 July 2016
Craigour Park Primary School 20 July 2016
Castleview Primary School
Craigroyston Primary School 22 July 2016
Craigmount High School 27 July 2016
Gracemount High School 5 August 2016
Drummond Community HS 10 August 2016
Royal High School 11 August 2016
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Section 6 – Actions following the Oxgangs School wall collapse
SECTION 6 – ACTIONS FOLLOWING THE OXGANGS SCHOOL WALL COLLAPSE
 This section of the Report will consider precautionary actions taken by the City
of Edinburgh Council in relation to more general concerns created as a result of
the extent of defective construction that was discovered in the PPP1 schools.
6.1 REASSURANCE IN RESPECT OF OTHER AREAS OF THE COUNCIL ESTATE
6.1.1 Following the evidence, provided by the comprehensive surveys of masonry

panels in the PPP1 schools, of the widespread presence of non-compliant or
defective construction, there was a natural concern on the part of the City of
Edinburgh Council that similar defects might be present in other buildings in the
ownership or under the management of the Council. The concerns were
essentially about seeking to ensure that these buildings provided appropriately
safe environments for all occupants, users or members of the public visiting
them. There was a clear understanding by the Council of the need to undertake
an appropriate course of action to demonstrate due diligence on its part in this
regard.
6.1.2 On 28th June 2016, a paper, produced by the CPM, was presented to a meeting
of the CIMT proposing a risk-based assessment of the estate to determine the
level of requirement for and the prioritisation of an extension of intrusive
investigations across the Council's estate.
6.1.3 The paper made the point that there was currently no reason to believe that the
City of Edinburgh Council estate was at any greater risk of having similar defects
to those found in the PPP1 schools than any other property across the United
Kingdom.
6.1.4 The view had been expressed by the CPM and the structural engineers advising
the City of Edinburgh Council that the likelihood of the occurrence of similar
defects would be greatest in buildings constructed during the last 20 years, as a
result of the introduction during that period of the practice of increasing cavity
widths to facilitate the incorporation of insulation slabs in cavity wall
construction.
6.1.5 Accordingly, it was recommended that the proposed risk-based assessment, if

adopted, would prioritise buildings constructed during this period and would
start with those of a similar construction to the PPP1 schools. Other risk factors,
including the usage category of the buildings, the procurement method used for
the building, if design and build had been used and the presence of large
masonry panels such as those found in the school buildings, would each be
considered in a systematically applied process undertaken by a professional
team.
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6.1.6 On the 17th August 2016, the Corporate Incident Management Team formally
requested that consideration be given to a proportionate and structured
approach to investigating the wider estate, specifically regarding the issues
identified on the PPP1 Estate (wall tie embedment and head restraint provision).
The recorded recommendations of the meeting were that the Council
Leadership Team should do as follows:
 Review the full Council's Estate (Operational, Non-Operational, Housing,

Edinburgh Leisure) specifically about wall tie embedment and masonry
panel restraint in response to the defects addressed on the PPP1 new
build estate.
 Approve the proposed methodology to delivering a risk based approach to

prioritising, delivering investigations and any associated remedial works.
 Note the PPP1 inspections were limited to the new build PPP1 estate.
 Note that a technical working group had been established consisting of

structural engineers with direct experience of the investigations and
remedial works delivered on the PPP1 estate.
 Note that it was not possible to estimate the costs of the works as the
scope was undefined at this time. An initial working budget had been
identified by the Finance Department. As part of the programme
reporting there will be monthly cost reporting would be put in place.
6.1.7 It was subsequently agreed, following consultation with elected members, that
this approach should be developed and implemented. Approval was also given
for the appointment of Scott Bennett Associates and Will Rudd Davidson (WRD)
to provide the professional and technical structural engineering support for this
work. In relation to this decision, although it was considered that there may be a
minor potential conflict of interest with the involvement of WRD (due to their
appointment by ESP in relation to the PPP1 schools), the benefit of their hands-
on experience in the PPP1 schools was viewed as outweighing any such concern.
6.1.8 In undertaking these inspections, it was appreciated that access for intrusive
investigations, particularly in relation to establishing the presence or otherwise
of head restraints, could prove logistically difficult to facilitate without
disruption and the possibility of raising potentially undue concern on the part of
the building users.
6.1.9 The Chair of this Inquiry recommended that other recent schools buildings of
broadly similar design and construction should be amongst the first to undergo
testing and asked that the Inquiry be provided with early feedback on this
exercise.
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6.1.10 At the time of writing this Report, the initial risk-assessment process is
progressing on those buildings where good quality record information is
available. The process of instructing intrusive investigations has also
commenced where a desk-top analysis and associated peer review has
identified potentially higher risk items.
6.1.11 Until the results of this process are available, it will be impossible to confirm
whether other buildings in the estate of the City of Edinburgh Council contain
similar defects and for the Council to implement appropriate and
proportionate responses to any such findings.
6.1.12 Equally, this information could be highly relevant in helping to establish the
extent of the type of defective construction encountered in the PPP1 schools
and the likelihood or not of it being more generally present in the work of the
construction industry in Scotland.
6.2 REPORTS OF DEFECTIVE FIRE-STOPPING PPP PROJECTS
6.2.1 During the period of the closure of the PPP1 schools the City of Edinburgh
Council had sought and received assurances from ESP as to the on-going safety
of the schools and their compliance with all statutory requirements in this
regard in accordance with the contract.
6.2.2 In April 2016, the City of Edinburgh Council had become aware of a number of
projects in the UK that had been procured using similar Public Private
Partnership arrangements, for which reports had indicated the discovery of
significant incidents of inadequate fire-stopping. Following the discovery of the
issue of the lack of head restraints, the City of Edinburgh Council wrote to ESP
on 14th April 2016 seeking confirmation from them that they had no concerns as
to defects other than that relating to the wall ties and head restraints.
6.2.3 For readers of this Report, fire-stopping is the process of sealing any spaces or
holes in fire-rated walls or enclosures with approved fire resistant materials in
order to protect means of evacuation and prevent the spread of smoke or flame
from one area to another that could otherwise lead to avoidable risk to life and
unnecessary damage to property. Proper implementation of fire-stopping to fire
compartment enclosures is a mandatory requirement of the Scottish Building
Standards.
6.2.4 The concerns of the City of Edinburgh Council were further raised following a
programme on BBC Radio 4 broadcast on the 5th July 2016 called 'The Price of
PFI'.
6.2.5 The programme, as well as discussing the problems being experienced by the
City of Edinburgh Council in relation to the Edinburgh Schools, identified
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problems with fire-stopping in PFI schools and hospitals around the United
Kingdom, particularly in regard to the required provision of proper
compartmentation in the spaces above ceilings.
6.2.6 Amongst those school buildings reported on was a group of eight schools
provided as part of a PPP project in Knowsley, Merseyside. Following a kitchen
fire at one of the schools in 2015, in which smoke had penetrated to an
adjoining protected staircase, a review of fireproofing was undertaken at all
eight schools. In every case, the fireproofing was reported to have been found to
be sub-standard. This was particularly problematic in relation to the absence or
condition of fire-dampers in ducts passing through fire-walls. The programme
also stated that similar defective fire-stopping had been reported by fire-
brigades in schools from all parts of the country and that the problem was
widespread. It also pointed out that these problems were not restricted to
schools.
6.2.7 Peterborough Hospital, a hospital acquired using PFI, was specifically identified
as having seriously inadequate fire-stopping. It was estimated that the required
remedial work would not be completed until 2019. The programme also
identified that the Chief Fire Officers Association had advised them that this was
one of ten NHS PFI Hospitals that had experienced similar defects. It was
estimated that some millions of pounds would be needed to undertake the
required remedial work to the defective fire-stopping.
6.2.8 Having been alerted by the information provided in this programme, the City of
Edinburgh Council wrote a further letter to ESP on 14th July 2016 stating:
"In our letter to you dated 14th April we asked you for confirmation that
neither ESP nor its officers were aware of or had any concerns about defects
at the schools other than the issues with wall ties and head restraints.
In the light of the publicity about fire safety in PFI buildings, including schools,
we should be grateful for your assurance as to the fire stopping and fire alarm
position in the schools, in particular that ESP is satisfied that each school is
fully compliant with all applicable laws and regulations and is safe from a fire
safety perspective. Please can you revert to me on this within 7 days."
6.2.9 These issues were subsequently discussed at monthly liaison meetings with the
Council representatives. At one such meeting, held on 18 th August 2016, it was
reported that Amey had commissioned a specialist firm to undertake surveys of
the PPP1 schools to establish the adequacy or otherwise of the fire-stopping
within the schools. ESP subsequently confirmed in an email to the City of
Edinburgh Council that Amey had advised the meeting that:
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"There were a number of remediation measures required across the estate

but these were considered to be minor in nature and, importantly, did not
impact on the safe operating of the sites or any requirement to revisit the fire
exit strategies for any of the sites."
6.2.10 On becoming aware at the end of October 2016 of the existence of these
surveys, this Inquiry requested that it receive copies of the fire-stopping surveys
from ESP.
6.2.11 On 4th November 2016 ESP confirmed the following by email:
"I am pleased to confirm that AMEY has advised that the majority of works
(circa 95%) were completed on or before the October break and the
remaining outstanding works should be completed before the end of the
month."
6.2.12 Following a further request from the Inquiry, copies of the fire-stopping surveys
were received on 18th November 2016.
6.2.13 The survey reports identified a significant number of, what were described in the
reports as, breaches of fire-stopping across all 17 PPP1 projects ranging from
minor gaps around pipes and cables to some larger holes or gaps in what were
described as fire compartmentation. Most of these reported breaches occurred
in the roof spaces of the schools.
6.2.14 Photographs had been taken during the surveys of each breach identified,
however the survey reports also stated that due to the limitations of access they
could not guarantee that all breaches had been spotted and recorded.
Photographs of examples of these breaches of fire compartmentation taken
from the reports of the surveys together with the extracted related comment in
the reports are shown below.
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Image 21: Example of a breach of fire compartmentation from fire-stopping

survey of Oxgangs School, dated 22nd August 2016: "there is no plasterboard
above the fire door, therefore creating a large breach in the compartment. the
area is not fire stopped and a breach exists."
Image 22: Example of a breach of fire compartmentation from the fire-stopping

survey of Royal High School, dated 22nd August 2016 : "the pipe has not been fire
stopped and a breach exists."
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6.2.15 It was difficult to determine from the photographs how many of these breaches
dated from inadequacies in the original construction or had happened as a result
of any subsequent alterations carried out to the premises in the intervening
years. However, from the nature of many of the breaches shown in the
photographs, it would appear that a significant number are more likely to have
resulted from the time of the original construction of the schools than from any
subsequent work carried out in the roof spaces since the opening of the schools.
6.2.16 Despite the reference by ESP, in the above email to the City of Edinburgh
Council, that these breaches had been considered by Amey to be "of a minor
nature", the Inquiry was surprised at the extent and nature of the breaches
indicated in the surveys. It was also surprised that these breaches had not been
identified through a process of regular inspections of the integrity of fire-
stopping in the buildings.
6.2.17 Finally, it was surprised that the results of these surveys had not been shared by
ESP earlier in the process with the City of Edinburgh Council and that Council
representatives had not been offered the opportunity to inspect these defects
before they were fixed.
6.2.18 On receiving the survey reports, the Chair of this Inquiry felt it necessary to bring
this matter to the attention of the Chief Executive of the Council, with a
recommendation that the remedial work, required to ensure the integrity of the
fire-stopping, should be subjected to independent scrutiny by appropriately
qualified personnel appointed by the City of Edinburgh Council. Further it was
recommended that an inspection be undertaken of any fire-dampers within the
schools to ensure that they were in place and operating effectively, as these had
not been specifically referred to in the reports, yet represented a significant
element of the type of breaches that had been reported in the BBC programme.
6.2.19 It was also suggested that, in light of the evidence from the PPP1 school surveys,
it might be appropriate to undertake a series of reviews of the
comprehensiveness of fire-proofing and fire safety provision in other school
projects in Edinburgh, including those procured through the later and
completely separate PPP2 contract for schools in Edinburgh.
6.2.20 In early December, the City of Edinburgh Council appointed an independent

specialist to undertake a review of the PPP1 schools, which process is still
underway at the time of writing. While the final outcome of this process is not
finalised, on the basis of the examination of two of the schools by the Council-
appointed specialist, a number of further examples of defective fire-stopping to
compartment walls were identified. This specialist also pointed out that not all
of the gaps and holes that had been repaired in walls on the basis of the earlier
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ESP surveys appeared to be in compartment walls and that some of the repairs
already carried out might not have been required.
6.2.21 In January 2017, as the writing of this Report was nearing completion, the
Inquiry was advised by a representative of ESP that they had just undertaken a
review of the findings of the fire-stopping surveys that had originally been
provided by themselves, ESP, to the City of Edinburgh Council in November
2016. Following this second review they too were of the opinion that not all of
the defects reported, despite the fact that they had already undergone remedial
work, had been located in fire-compartment walls or enclosures. However, they
did fully accept that there had been defects present.
6.2.22 It would appear, from the information currently available to the Inquiry, that the
two photographs above, taken as examples from the original ESP surveys
provided to the City of Edinburgh Council in November, are in compartment
walls and would have required the remedial action undertaken.
6.2.23 As a consequence of ongoing discussions in relation to this issue, ESP has agreed
to the joint appointment with the Council of a further independent fire safety
expert to undertake a full review of all the PPP1 schools to determine the overall
position in relation to fire safety matters (whether relating to fire
compartmentation or otherwise) and to identify any aspects of fire safety in the
buildings that may remain to be remedied. This is being progressed as a matter
of urgency at the Council's insistence and rectification and/or other fire safety
measures will be implemented as matters progress.
6.2.24 The Council is also undertaking an appropriate fire safety review in relation to
the wider Council estate, including the PPP2 schools.
6.2.25 The ultimate responsibility for the safety of pupils, staff and members of the
public who may be present in their buildings must lie with the City of Edinburgh
Council. Any delegation by the Council of responsibility for ensuring an
appropriately safe environment to commercial organisations must include the
provision of appropriate mechanisms to ensure that these companies are
fulfilling all their obligations.
6.2.26 The application of financial penalties after the fact, as provided for in PPP
contracts across the United Kingdom, has clearly not been a sufficient
mechanism in the reported cases to ensure the prevention of such defects in the
original provision and maintenance of compliant fire safety installations.
6.2.27 A best practice guide on the subject of fire-stopping, published in February 2015
by the British Research Establishment, contained the following comments:
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"The fire protection of concealed spaces is of prime importance because any

deficiencies in installation and materials are not readily apparent and may
quickly be covered over. Any inadequacies in such fire protection cannot be
observed by the building users and, unlike other engineering provisions within
the building, will not be directly apparent by its impact on every-day life. Any
inadequacies in the fire protection of concealed spaces will only become
apparent during the very time that their effectiveness is required – during a
fire."
Compartmentation in roof voids is a particular issue with respect to hidden

fire spread. The biggest issue remains that of quality of construction. The
research presented here and supported by the case studies shows that poor
workmanship with inappropriate materials are the main reasons for the
inadequate protection of concealed spaces.
There is a clear and demonstrable need to ensure that buildings are designed
and constructed so that the unseen spread of fire and smoke within concealed
spaces within its structure and fabric is inhibited, as required by the Building
Regulations. There is adequate guidance available in the public domain to
allow this to be achieved."
6.2.28 The discovery of the significant number of defects in fire-stopping across the 17
PPP1 projects coupled with the reports from other parts of the United Kingdom
raises a further question mark as to the level of reliance that can be placed on
the current arrangements under PPP schemes for the proper inspection and
quality assurance of projects. This is clearly at its most important in relation to
aspects of the construction of buildings that can have an impact on the safety of
occupants.
6.2.29 The final position in relation to the fire safety aspects of the construction of
the PPP1 schools and of other schools in Edinburgh, including the PPP2
schools, will not be known until the appropriate independent investigations
are carried out.
6.2.30 In relation to the current estate, this Report recommends:
 that the Council reviews its current arrangements in terms of ensuring

the adequacy of fire-stopping in the buildings it owns or operates based
on a sound fire strategy for each building;
 that in relation to the completed surveys or those currently being

undertaken of the schools, the Council seek confirmation that the
presence and condition of any fire-dampers in ducts penetrating fire
compartments is satisfactory;
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 that a risk-prioritised programme of remedial work is established to

address any further defective installation or absence of fire-stopping
identified; and
 that once remedied, an appropriate protocol for the checking of the

effective maintenance of fire-stopping through the life of buildings is
implemented.
6.2.31 Amey advised the Inquiry that Amey FM are required to carry out visual
inspections of fire-stopping materials annually and that records of inspections
are maintained by Amey FM.
6.2.32 The issues in relation to the proper installation and inspection of fire-stopping in
the construction of new buildings is addressed in the wider recommendations of
this Report.
6.3 CONTRACTUAL ENTITLEMENT TO DEDUCTIONS FOR CLOSURES OF THE PPP1

SCHOOLS
6.3.1 As previously stated in this Report, in accordance with the conditions set down
in the PPP1 Project Agreement, the City of Edinburgh Council is entitled to make
deductions from the unitary payments, to which ESP would otherwise be
entitled, for certain failures of performance of the contracted services or non-
availability for use of the accommodation provided under the contract.
6.3.2 The City of Edinburgh Council commenced the implementation of this provision
of the contract following the collapse of the wall at Oxgangs and as the need for
further closure of schools was identified the level of deductions was
appropriately increased.
6.3.3 Following the discovery of the missing head restraints and the decision to close
all schools from 11th April, in accordance with the requirements of the contract,
the City of Edinburgh Council formally wrote to ESP on 14th April 2016 informing
them of these extensive service failures on the part of ESP and listing the
relevant clauses relating to availability of the facilities and the maintaining of the
facilities to the appropriate compliant standards.
6.3.4 The City of Edinburgh Council confirmed its intentions to continue to exercise its
rights to make deductions in relation to service failures arising from the non-
availability of the schools as from 8th April 2016 and advised ESP that it also
reserved its rights to apply deductions for service failures in relation to defects
that may have been present prior to 8th April 2016.
6.3.5 There followed several exchanges of letters expressing disagreement between

the two parties in relation to the quantum of deductions being applied. The City
of Edinburgh Council were convinced of the appropriateness of their
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methodology for calculating the deductions they proposed and proceeded to

apply them in relation to the closures that commenced on 8 th April 2016. The
provisions of the contract were such that deductions became due to be made in
the second month after a service failure. Accordingly, the first of these
significant larger monthly deductions was due to be made in June 2016, two
months after the closure decision taken in April.
6.3.6 In a letter dated the 27th April 2016 from the City of Edinburgh Council to IML, in
respect of their role as representatives of ESP, it was stated that, in addition to
the deductions made by the Council from the payments due to ESP as part of the
Unitary Charge, the Council would require reimbursement of all expenses and
losses caused by the closure of the schools.
6.3.7 In so doing they stated that they were differentiating between deductions, being
a contractual adjustment to the payment stream, and damages for breach of
contract.
6.3.8 The payment schedule below reflects the fact that a payment is not made in July
due to the holiday closure and that the last remedial works, in relation to the
problems associated with the structure of the external walls to the schools,
finished on 12th August 2016 on which day the last of the schools was handed
back as available for use.
DEDUCTIONS from PPP1 UNITARY CHARGE
Month Deduction (£) Deduction Period

Jan-16 £424.79 Deduction for November 15
Feb-16 £495.59 Deduction for December 15
Mar-16 £778.78 Deduction for January 16
Apr-16 £54,235.71 Deduction for February 16
May-16 £862,325.71 Deduction for March 16
Jun-16 £1,369,483.39 Deduction for April 16
Jul-16 £1,416,017.36 Deduction for May 16
Aug-16 £1,416,017.36 Deduction for June 16
Sep-16 £251.19 Deduction for July 2016
Oct-16 £1,238.84 Deduction for August 2016
Nov-16 £13,965.84 Deduction for September 2016
Dec-16 £1,229.28 Deduction for October 2016
Total deductions 2016 £5,136,463.84
6.3.9 The Inquiry is satisfied that, as provided for in the contract, the Council took
appropriate steps, including seeking legal advice, in relation to the application
of deductions from payments otherwise due to ESP.
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6.3.10 It is not, however, the intention of this Inquiry to comment on the precise
amount of deductions made and any subsequent separate pursuit of
compensation by the Council.
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Section 7 – Remit Item 1: PPP Financing – Rationale and Impact
SECTION 7 - REMIT ITEM 1: PPP FINANCING – RATIONALE AND IMPACT
Remit Item 1:
"The rationale for the council entering into the PPP1 contract for schools and the effect this
financing arrangement may have had on the construction process."
7.1 POLITICAL CONTEXT FOR PROCUREMENT IN THE 1990S
7.1.1 On 11th December 1992, the Private Finance Initiative (PFI) was introduced as a
new procurement method by the Chancellor of the Exchequer, the Conservative
MP Norman Lamont. In his Autumn Statement, he called for "ways to increase
the scope for private financing of capital projects." Projects in Scotland were to
feature significantly in the subsequent roll-out of this new policy.
7.1.2 In October 1995, the Skye Bridge, the first PFI-funded public infrastructure in the
UK was opened. The bridge, which crosses over Loch Alsh in Scotland, had an
initial estimated cost of around £15 million.
7.1.3 Also in Scotland on 31st October 1996, the first PFI hospital, Ferryfield House, a
£32 million community hospital for the treatment of patients with dementia was
opened. It was the first of many NHS facilities across the UK to be provided
through the PFI model over the following decade.
7.1.4 In 1997 New Labour took power and the newly-elected Government gave fresh
impetus to the Private Finance Initiative. Two months after taking office the
Health Minister Alan Milburn made clear to public servants that PFI was
increasingly to be the primary choice for the procurement of major public sector
projects. "When there is a limited amount of public-sector capital available, as
there is," he said, "it's PFI or bust."
7.1.5 In July 1997, the Labour Government established a PFI Taskforce within the
Treasury. Its aim was to provide central co-ordination for a large-scale roll-out of
PFI. By the end of its first term in power New Labour had signed 210 PFI
contracts with a total capital value of £11.6 bn. In their second term a further
206 PFI Contracts with a total capital value of £12.7bn were signed between
2001 and 2005.
7.1.6 By the late 1990s the general strategy being adopted by the UK Government was
that public bodies undertaking major construction projects adopt as their
procurement methodology in order of preference either (1) the Private Finance
Initiative, (2) Design and Build, or (3) Prime Contracting. These routes involve
contracting with an integrated supply team to design, construct and sometimes
finance, operate and maintain the development. It was also increasingly the
view from Government Procurement Agencies that the more traditional
procurement route of separate contracts for design and construction, that up to
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then had been the pre-dominant model, should not be used unless it could
clearly be demonstrated that its use would offer better value.
7.2 PFI IN THE PROCUREMENT OF SCHOOLS IN SCOTLAND
7.2.1 The terms PFI and PPP are largely interchangeable. The first refers to the Private
Finance Initiative, which introduced private finance into the funding of public
sector projects, and the second refers to Public Private Partnerships, which
describes the relationship between public and private sector organisations using
private finance to fund public sector projects.
7.2.2 The Scottish Government subsequently introduced the Non-Profit Distributing

(NPD) model to describe a variant of the PFI arrangement to be used in Scotland.
7.2.3 The first PFI schools programme in Scotland commenced in 1998 prior to
Scottish devolution in 1999. It involved ten local authorities, 75 schools and
represented investment worth over £500m. The first schools were delivered in
2000 and the last school under this first scheme was completed in 2005.
7.2.4 The Scottish Government provided financial support for this programme as a
means of encouraging participation by Local Authorities. The programme was
known as Level Playing Field Support (LPFS). By 2010 the amount of annual
revenue support from the Scottish Executive for LPFS amounted to £44.4m.
7.2.5 The ESP PPP1 project for 17 schools was one of those that received support
under this programme.
7.2.6 The second schools PFI/NPD programme in Scotland commenced in 2002. It

involved 30 local authorities, 200+ schools and represented investment in the
school estate worth around £2.8 billion. The first schools under this programme
were delivered in 2004.
7.2.7 In 2006, under this programme and following a separate PPP procurement
process, Edinburgh Council signed a second PPP contract ("PPP2") for a further
eight schools which were completed in 2010.
7.3 APPLICATION FOR GOVERNMENT FUNDING FOR EDINBURGH SCHOOLS

REDEVELOPMENT
7.3.1 In June 1998, the City of Edinburgh Council submitted an Outline Business Case
(OBC) to the Scottish Office (now Scottish Government) in support of a bid for
revenue funding for a proposal to upgrade its Schools Estate through a Public
Private Partnership model under an initiative of the City of Edinburgh Council
called 'Investing for Education'.
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7.3.2 The OBC stated that, in many areas of Edinburgh, school communities were
having to make considerable efforts to cope in less than satisfactory
environments in schools that were overcrowded, unsuitable for their intended
purpose, inefficiently used or suffering from serious infrastructure deficiencies.
7.3.3 As at August 2000, 32% of Edinburgh's primary schools and 35% of Edinburgh's
secondary schools were operating at levels in excess of 100% occupancy whilst
43% of primary schools and 25% of secondary schools were operating at
between 40% and 80% occupancy.
7.3.4 The stated principal objectives of the 'Investing for Education' initiative were to
ensure that the Council's school and related buildings could both fully comply
with legislative requirements and would be capable of responding to the
significant list of new Government and Council educational and community-
related initiatives.
7.3.5 The OBC stated that the demand of these national and local initiatives had not
been matched with sufficient resources to address them. Additionally, it argued
that the Council's capital budgets had been insufficient to address the backlog of
repairs and maintenance in school and community buildings.
7.3.6 An independent property survey undertaken in 1998 calculated that within the
following 5-year period there would be a repairs and maintenance requirement
of £53m for the school estate which would still not address the need for an
additional £51m to bring schools up to current building regulations standards.
7.3.7 'Investing for Education' was seen by the Council as a plan to address much
more of its priority school infrastructure issues than would be possible under the
constraints of traditional capital funding models. The proposed alternative
funding model could attract support from the Scottish Executive under the 'Level
Playing Field Support' of up to a maximum of £6.62m per annum revenue
funding based on a 30-year concession period.
7.3.8 The desired outcomes of the overall proposal as stated in the Outline Business
Case included:
 alleviation of accommodation pressures in key areas of the City;
 resolution of inefficiencies in the delivery of education in terms of the

utilisation of facilities;
 upgrading environments that were no longer suitable for modern

teaching;
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 reconfiguration of provision to address the special needs of children in

terms of their integration into mainstream education and the creation of
Centres of Excellence; and
 contribution to the overall regeneration of deprived areas of the City.
7.3.9 In terms of affordability the financial analysis produced by the City of Edinburgh
Council with the support of external advisors, used a PPP shadow financial
model to establish a baseline affordability target for the Council of £12m for the
Year 1 Unitary Charge. This figure was set as the initial affordability target for the
bidders in the Invitation to Negotiate (ITN) process but would be subject to
some revision as the process developed and additional requirements were
identified.
7.3.10 The determination of this initial level of affordability assumed that the sale of
surplus sites created, as a consequence of the rationalisation of the schools,
could deliver a capital contribution of £15.4m towards the cost of the project.
This valuation was independently verified as an appropriate professional
assessment of the development value of the sites.
7.3.11 The funding by the City of Edinburgh Council of the Unitary Charge was planned
to be made up from a combination of the Scottish Executive's contribution of
£6.62m per annum and the transfer of existing Council annual budgets for those
services which would now be provided as part of the scope of the PPP project,
i.e. maintenance, cleaning, catering etc.
7.4 PROCUREMENT OF THE PPP1 EDINBURGH SCHOOLS PROJECT
7.4.1 Following the commencement of a formal procurement process by the City of

Edinburgh Council in October 1999 by way of an OJEC Notice, an initial list of
eight potential bidders was reduced to four pre-qualified bidders, leading
subsequently to the request for Best and Final Offers (BAFO) from two bidders;
these latter two being (1) Capital Schools and (2) ESP.
7.4.2 Following formal and systematic evaluation of these BAFO bids it was
recommended that ESP be nominated as 'preferred bidder' and Capital Schools
be nominated as 'reserve bidder' until preferred bidder negotiations be
successfully negotiated. The ESP consortium was headed by Amey
Ventures/Amey plc.
7.4.3 The BAFO bid received from ESP equated to a first-year Unitary Charge of
£11.695m which fell within the Council's initial affordability target of £12.0m.
7.4.4 It was a requirement of the PPP approval process that, as part of their Full
Business Case submission, the City of Edinburgh Council undertook an Economic
Appraisal which included the development of a Public Sector Comparator (PSC)
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to test that the PPP deal represented equal or better value-for-money than a
publicly funded model.
7.4.5 This analysis by the City of Edinburgh Council and their advisors calculated the
basic Net Present Value of the PSC to be £116.52m as at 1 April 2000 compared
to a Net Present Value of £122.342m for the ESP bid.
7.4.6 The established Treasury PFI process, however, required that a realistic
assessment of the value of the risks associated with the delivery and life-cycle
operation of the buildings that were being transferred to ESP under the contract
be added to the PSC for a more appropriate comparison of Net Present Values.
7.4.7 A sub-group of the City of Edinburgh Council PPP Project Team, consisting of
representatives of the Council staff, financial advisers and technical advisers,
undertook an exercise to quantify these risks. This resulted in an assessed
construction risk of £5.043m and an assessed operational phase risk of £8.381m,
a total of £13.424m being added to the basic PSC net profit value, making a total
adjusted PSC of £129.944m or £7.602m (6%) more than the net profit value of
the ESP bid.
7.4.8 The Full Business Case presented this analysis as evidence that the proposed PPP
solution represented better value-for-money than the publicly-funded option.
The Full Business Case was approved by the City of Edinburgh Council on 23 rd
August 2001 and subsequently, prior to signing, was also approved by both Audit
Scotland and the Scottish Executive.
7.4.9 A Project Agreement was signed between the City of Edinburgh Council and ESP
on 8th November 2001 in relation to the design, building, finance and
maintenance of a programme of 13 new or refurbished/extended schools and
related projects (Phase 1).
7.4.10 This was subsequently amended by supplemental agreements in 2003 and 2004
to include a further four projects, known as the 2004 schools (Phase 2).
7.4.11 These contracts required ESP to undertake the provision of maintenance,

cleaning, catering and associated facility management requirements of all the
accommodation and facilities provided under the PPP1 Project Agreement and
Supplemental Agreements for a period of 30 years.
7.5 CONCLUSIONS – RATIONALE FOR USING PPP
7.5.1 This first item in the remit of the Inquiry is to inquire into and report on 'The
rationale for the City of Edinburgh Council entering into the PPP1 contract for
schools and the effect this financing arrangement may have had on the
construction process'.
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7.5.2 This remit item needs to be broken down into two distinct questions, the first in
relation to whether there was a sustainable rationale for the Council to use
access to private finance through the Private Public Partnerships arrangements
that were being promoted at the time as a means of upgrading the schools'
infrastructure, the second in relation to the potential impact of this decision on
the quality of the construction of the completed schools.
7.5.3 There has been considerable political debate and various reports produced over
many years since the emergence of the Private Finance Initiative in the early
1990s. The debate and the content of reports have tended to focus on whether
the model provided 'value-for-money' and much less on assessing the quality of
the buildings, produced under this methodology from either an aesthetic,
functional or construction perspective.
7.5.4 The access to private finance offered by the PFI was used across a wide range of
public sector organisations to replace or provide necessary new infrastructure,
for which public sector capital funding was not being made available. Major
programmes were initiated for investment in infrastructure for transport,
hospitals, schools and prisons.
7.5.5 Most commentaries suggest that a key underlying factor in the requirement set
by Governments to consider PFI as the first procurement option for virtually all
schemes of a reasonable size was to facilitate what was effectively a significant
increase in Government borrowing but presented in a manner which allowed it,
or was at the time interpreted as allowing it, to be treated as 'off balance sheet'.
Over time there was an increased awareness in the official guidance of the need
to ensure the quality of the product.
7.5.6 The following is an extract from a Report published by the Scrutiny Unit of the
House of Commons in June 2008.
"In the past, some advocates of PFI have argued that PFI projects have
allowed more investment than would have been possible through
conventional procurement methods. Other supporters argue that PFI projects
are generally more efficient than projects undertaken through conventional
procurement because they enable private sector innovation, and because they
allow some risks to be better managed by transferring them to the private
sector."
"In 2000 the Treasury Committee reported that "the original justification for
PFI in the Autumn Statement of 1992 was that it would enable more
investment to take place." The Treasury saw it as a way of tackling past
capital under-investment. Later, government announcements tended to focus
on PFI generating 'value for money."
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"Treasury guidance on PFI, published in November 2006, highlighted value for

money as the condition for choosing PFI as a procurement option: "PFI should
only be pursued where it represents VfM in procurement. VfM is defined as
the optimum combination of whole-of-life costs and quality (or fitness for
purpose) of the good or service to meet the user's requirements. VfM is not
the choice of goods and services based on the lowest cost bid."
7.5.7 In relation to the funding of projects, this Report is not seeking to form or
provide an opinion as to the overall advantages or disadvantages of using
private finance as a means of enabling the delivery of public sector projects.
Rather its remit is to examine the rationale of the City of Edinburgh Council, in
the circumstances that prevailed at the time of the PPP1 project, of adopting it
in their programme for the renewal of their schools' infrastructure.
7.5.8 In June 2002, just six months after the contract for Phase 1 PPP1 schools had
been signed, this issue was addressed in an Audit Scotland Report examining the
growing use of PFI for Scottish schools, which had as part of their exercise used
information from PPP programmes for the replacement of schools in six Scottish
Council areas including the Edinburgh PPP1 schools.
7.5.9 The Report was entitled 'Taking the Initiative – Using PFI Contracts to Renew
Council Schools'. The Report includes the following extracts:
"The single most important driver of PFI as the procurement route for new
schools has been the opportunity to obtain substantial additional investment.
There was clear evidence of a high priority for renewal of inadequate,

redundant or dilapidated school buildings in each PFI schools project that
Audit Scotland examined. But financial considerations were dominant
regarding the selection of the PFI procurement route. In practice the Scottish
Executive has determined the level of investment in each case as well as the
financing/procurement route. Alternative traditionally funded procurement
routes have not been a viable option within the financial framework in
operation."
7.5.10 The substance of this analysis was repeated in the evidence given to the Inquiry
by those witnesses who were involved in the process from the Council or had
acted as advisors to the Council at the time of the decision to use PPP.
7.5.11 Since the introduction of PFI, it has been a requirement of Government that
prior to approval to PFI funding it is necessary to compare the PFI option with a
publicly funded option to demonstrate that it represents value-for-money. This
is required to be carried out even though in many, if not most cases, no such
public funding is available or likely to become available.
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7.5.12 The Audit Scotland Report also noted that the centrally imposed process to be
used in forming this comparison between the PSC (publicly funded) and the PPP
options did not allow the calculations to reflect in the PSC the significantly lower
cost of financing available to Local Authorities. It read:
"The cost of private finance is higher than in the public sector. In any project
requiring financial investment there is a cost for capital. Where borrowing is
the chosen source of funding the cost will be the financing charges made by
the lender. Where there is also equity investment, shareholders will seek
dividends. In PFI schools projects the overall financing cost incurred by the PFI
provider is part of the project costs and adds to the level of charge the council
pays in return for the service.
For the six PFI school projects (including Edinburgh) Audit Scotland examined
the overall financing cost for the private sector. This cost generally varied in
the range of 8% to 10% a year, 2.5% to 4% higher than a council would pay if
it borrowed money on its own account for a similar project. This higher cost of
capital adds costs of between £0.2 million and £0.3 million a year for each
£10 million invested in a project.
This difference has not been reflected in the costings which councils have
prepared when comparing the forecast cost of each PFI schools deal with a
hypothetical publicly funded alternative (the public sector comparator)
And, despite extensive technical and professional work and input to the
costings in each case, there is an emphasis on the bottom line and a
perception of the PSC as a simple pass/fail test. The analysis for PFI school
projects most often resulted in a set of costings, which indicated the PFI
solution was more economic but without an analysis of the reasons. Audit
Scotland's analysis is that, in most cases, the main costs underlying the PFI
option are not significantly different from or are higher than the equivalent
forecast costs under the PSC. In most cases the risk adjustment tipped the
balance back in favour of the PFI option.
A further consideration is the inevitable subjectivity that surrounds

judgements on which the PSC costings are based and wider decisions
regarding the respective merits of the PFI and any alternative solution to
providing new schools. Under the terms of the competition for financial
support from the Scottish Executive for PFI projects, no funding for the PSC
was available. Consequently, if the PSC had suggested that the PFI was not
economic it would have proved fatal to the project (no PFI schools project has
so far failed this test).
A great deal therefore hangs on professional and technical judgements

underpinning the PSC costings. Although the costings invariably involve a
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significant degree of subjectivity and inherent uncertainty, reliance on them is

critical to the decision whether a project will proceed or not. It is important,
too, to understand how council borrowing rates, that are typically below
actual PFI financing costs in individual school projects, affect the relative costs
of the PSC compared to the PFI option. But the method of constructing the
PSC means that this important difference in financing costs is not included in
the comparison. Audit Scotland considers that, for local authorities, the actual
costs of debt financing are a relevant if not necessarily decisive factor in
testing the economy and ultimately the value for money of a PFI schools
contract."
7.5.13 There have been significant changes in the way such considerations are
currently undertaken, however the remit of this Report is to look at the rationale
of decisions taken by the City of Edinburgh Council in 2001.
7.5.14 The facts, as stated above in relation to the specifics of the Edinburgh Outline
Business Case and procurement process, and the contemporaneous findings by
Audit Scotland regarding the political, procedural and economic context at the
time the decision was made to use PPP, are relatively clear.
7.5.15 Accordingly, this Inquiry's findings in relation to the first part of the Remit Item 1
are:
1. There was a pressing need to address the condition, configuration,

efficiency and capacity of the school estate in Edinburgh, which had
suffered from a lack of investment in both maintenance and new
infrastructure. This could not reasonably be delayed for any significant
period, other than to the detriment of the educational achievement of
school-children in Edinburgh.
2. The on-going availability of public sector capital funding was at a totally

inadequate level to facilitate the required level of investment and no
further funding of this type was available from central Government.
3. The U.K. Government and subsequently the Scottish Executive were

actively promoting PPP as their favoured route and were implementing
a scheme called 'Levelling the Playing Field' under which they were
offering the City of Edinburgh Council an ongoing contribution of £6.2m
towards the annual revenue cost of the PPP1 project. This contribution
made the PPP scheme affordable to the Council.
4. This model had recently been successfully used by other Local

Authorities in Scotland.
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5. The Outline and Final Business Cases, as prepared by the City of

Edinburgh Council in accordance with the required procedural
guidance, demonstrated that the PPP1 process represented value-for-
money.
6. The Full Business Case was approved by the Council, Audit Scotland and
the Scottish Government.
7.5.16 Based on this analysis the conclusion of the Inquiry on this first point of Remit
Item 1 is that, given the above context and circumstances, the City of
Edinburgh Council had a sound rationale for their decision to adopt the PPP
methodology for the funding and procurement of the PPP1 schools and acted
both appropriately and pragmatically in making this decision.
7.6 CONCLUSIONS - EFFECT ON THE QUALITY OF CONSTRUCTION
7.6.1 The second part of Remit Item 1 asks the question if this financing method had
an effect on the quality of construction.
7.6.2 In this question, there is an implication that there might have been a direct
relationship between the method of financing and the poor quality of
construction that was discovered in the exterior walls of the schools.
7.6.3 It is the view of this Inquiry that the financing method per se did not have such
a direct relationship with the presence of defective aspects of the construction
in the Edinburgh schools. There is no reason why properly managed privately
financed public sector buildings, using best practice approaches, should not be
capable of delivering buildings constructed to a very high standard.
7.6.4 The Inquiry is concerned however that some elements of best practice
associated with more traditional models of procurement failed to be
consistently incorporated into the implementation of PPP projects.
7.6.5 Remit Item 3 asks this Inquiry to establish the reasons(s) for, and necessity of,
the school closures, including a review of the reasons for the Oxgangs Primary
School wall collapse. This will be dealt with in full in Section 9 of this Report.
7.6.6 Unfortunately, the findings of the Inquiry will show that there were multiple
factors which contributed to the defective construction of the wall in question
and of the walls to all the schools. These factors included the nature of the
organisation, governance and incentives of the approach to the delivery of the
scheme.
7.6.7 So, while the financing method, in itself, is not to blame, it is the view of the
Inquiry that aspects of the way in which the PPP methodology was
implemented on these projects, in common with many other PPP projects, in
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terms of how it addressed the design and construction processes, did increase
the risk of poor quality design and construction.
7.6.8 The Inquiry is of the view, the reasons for which will be expanded on later in
the Report, that a fundamental weakness of the process adopted was the lack
of properly resourced and structured independent scrutiny of the construction
and an over-reliance on the part of the City of Edinburgh Council, without
adequate evidence, that others in the project structure would
comprehensively fulfil this essential role.
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Section 8 – Remit Item 2: Contractual Arrangements with ESP
SECTION 8 - REMIT ITEM 2: CONTRACTUAL ARRANGEMENTS WITH ESP
Remit Item 2:
"The contractual arrangements between the Edinburgh Schools Partnership and Edinburgh
Council."
 This section will briefly examine the contract documentation used for the PPP1
project in terms of the key relevant provisions of the contract arrangements in
relation to the responsibilities of the parties.
 The Inquiry is not intending to provide an in-depth analysis of the legal form
used but to highlight issues that may have had a significance in terms of the
quality assurance of the design, construction and operation of the PPP1 schools.
8.1 COUNCIL REVIEW OF DRAWINGS PRIOR TO CONSTRUCTION
8.1.1 A fundamental aspect of the intention behind the Private Finance Initiative was
to transfer responsibility for the risks associated with the design, construction
and some aspects of the operation of public sector facilities from the public
sector to private sector providers. Other than in respect of the form, content
and overall quality of the design and construction of buildings, there has been a
precautionary tendency on the part of many public sector bodies causing them
to be hesitant about examining to any depth the technical design of projects in
case any resulting interventions served to reduce this intended transfer of risk.
Equally to do so, for example in terms of structural calculations etc., would
require a replication of a significant element of the input of the private sector
and the related professional consultancy costs.
8.1.2 During the design development stage after the appointment of the preferred
bidder, in order to ensure that the facilities meet all the requirements of the
public sector client, there is a process for the client to review specifically
prescribed elements of design data, referred to as Reviewable Design Data
("RDD"), as normally listed in a schedule to PPP contracts. These provisions were
incorporated into the PPP1 Contract. Under these provisions, no construction
work relating to these aspects of the work is supposed to commence until the
requirements of RDD have been satisfied in accordance with the process laid
down.
8.1.3 This schedule, included as Appendix A to Part 7 of the Contract, did not require
the submission of detailed design and construction information for the cavity
walls of the schools for approval by the client.
8.1.4 However, in addition to the requirement to submit the specific RDD for review
by the client, there was a provision within Schedule 11 of the Contract that
required ESP to provide additional information to the City of Edinburgh Council
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that is not included with that to be dealt with under the reviewable data
process. The following extracts from the clauses in this schedule provided the
client with the opportunity to undertake a more detailed scrutiny of the detailed
design of a number of aspects of the design including the construction and
structural integrity of the walls.
"SCHEDULE PART 11 (Information Specification)
(a) Architectural
The Service Company (ESP) will prepare the following information

for the Council's professional advisors to check compliance with
defined standards.
Scheme design drawings, plans (including full room layout

information, sections) (scale) and elevations at a scale appropriate
for design review and construction.
Detailed design drawings covering the following:
 Wall sections of typical locations at a scale appropriate for

design review and construction indicating sectional details
and constructional arrangements.
(b) Structural Engineering
Structural drawings for all floor levels and roofs at a scale

appropriate for design review and construction to show the
proposed structural form and the principal features including:
 Stability
 Provisions for structural movement
 Column positions
 Plantrooms and basements
 Foundation layouts
 Retaining wall layouts
 Roof layouts
Sections and layouts at a scale appropriate for design review and

construction showing floor slab construction, type, retaining walls,
typical edge beam arrangements and junctions with existing
buildings……….
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 Structural key plans marked up to show design loading

throughout the building
 Summary sheets of assumptions used in the design
 Reinforcement drawings as and when required.
 Design specifications for structural elements"
8.1.5 It is notable that sub-clause '(a) Architectural' above specifically requires that:
"The Service Company will prepare the following information for the Council's
professional advisors to check compliance with defined standards."
8.1.6 Sub-clause (c) (Structural Engineering) above, while requiring detailed

information on aspects of the structure, either intentionally or through
oversight, failed to include a similar mention as to the purpose of the structural
engineering information, although there would be little point in a requirement
to provide the information unless there was an intention to examine it.
8.1.7 Examination of the required submission of 'sectional details and constructional

arrangements' of walls under 'Architectural' and issues associated with
'stability' under 'Structural engineering' would have facilitated a focus on the
areas of the building that subsequently failed to comply with requirements.
8.1.8 The Inquiry are of the view that while the 'defined standards' referred to are not
specified in the Contract, it would be reasonable to assume that these standards
would include those set down in British Standard Codes of Practice, such as
those referring to wind-loading and/or referred to in the Building Regulations,
which are a mandatory requirement of the Building Warrant approval process.
8.1.9 No evidence was provided to the Inquiry to demonstrate that the specific
'Architectural' or 'Structural Engineering' information referred to was either
submitted to the Council by ESP or checked by the Council's professional
advisors. For public sector clients to undertake the scrutiny of technical design
documentation to a high degree of detail would, in the experience of the
Inquiry, be unusual in PPP projects. Despite the provision for doing so in the
Contract, should the Council not have undertaken or arranged for such checks of
compliance, this would in no way have reduced the responsibility of ESP for any
subsequent failures in design or construction. Clause 4.4 states:
"The submission of documentation to the Council Representative, its

examination by or on behalf of the Council and the making of any comments
thereon (including any approvals) shall in no way relieve the Service Company
of any of its obligations under this Agreement or of its duty to ensure the
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accuracy, correctness or suitability of the matter or thing which is the subject

of the submission, review or comment."
8.1.10 The general view offered by witnesses to the Inquiry was that the Council took a
very much 'hands-off' approach once the Project Agreement was signed and
would have been unlikely to have taken up the provision to examine the
structural engineering proposals in relation to the 'stability' of the external walls
although 'stability' of the structure was specifically identified in the clause.
8.1.11 The Project Manager at the time said in evidence,
"With regard to build quality assurance issues, the team we had was quite
small. There were 3 Council architects, a couple of quantity surveyors as well
as some education staff."
"The team put forward by the Council to deal with the Special Purpose Vehicle
(ESP) included a construction manager, two head teacher liaison staff but no
real structural technicians. The approval of room layouts would have been
done by the single construction manager. I would accept that this was a very
small team for what was a very large batch school project."
8.1.12 It is the view of the Inquiry that there was facility built into the contract for the
Council and its professional consultants to undertake more in-depth
examination specifically of the structural design than they appear to have
undertaken. However, failure to apply this requirement by the Council would
not have been inconsistent with general practice of PPP at the time, and in this
case, would have been unlikely to have prevented the occurrence of the
defects subsequently identified.
8.2 THE REQUIREMENT FOR AS-CONSTRUCTED DRAWINGS
8.2.1 There was much evidence provided to the Inquiry as to the significant additional
complexity that both ESP, the City of Edinburgh Council, their professional
advisors and the building contractors faced following the collapse of the wall at
Oxgangs in dealing with the issues of the structural design of the walls of the
school due to the absence of 'as-constructed' drawings.
8.2.2 The requirement for ESP and for the Design and Build Contractor, AMJV, to issue
sets of 'as-installed' or 'as-constructed' drawings is clearly spelt out in Clauses
9.6.5 of both the Project Agreement and the Design and Build Contract.
8.2.3 In evidence to the Inquiry, several representatives of professional consultancy

firms, said that as a point of policy then and now, they are only willing to provide
'final issue construction' drawings as opposed to 'as-installed' drawings. This is
as a result of their inability without a significant site presence to confirm the
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detail of what the contractor actually builds, as changes on site are not always
notified to them, particularly under Design and Build arrangements.
8.2.4 It was a generally expressed view, that while contractors may seek to include
this requirement into the appointment of design teams, only the contractor was
in a position to mark-up drawings showing accurately what, if anything, had
changed on site from the drawings issued by the design team members.
8.2.5 Irrespective of how the 'as-installed' drawings are produced, there is a clear
requirement in the Contract to supply two copies of 'as-installed drawings' to
the Council "…on or before the Certificate date for any project school…" and "to
periodically update (these) in accordance with Good Industry Practice."
8.2.6 The Inquiry were unable to establish if properly comprehensive 'as-constructed'

drawings had ever been produced, although it would appear from the evidence
to the Inquiry, that if they had been, they were not regularly updated.
8.2.7 The absence of accurate as-built record drawings proved to be a major problem
after the collapse of the wall and caused significant delay to the teams that
undertook the analysis of the existing school buildings and the design of the
necessary remedial works. As a result of the non-availability of this
documentation, it is likely that some of the remedial work that was undertaken
might have been avoided.
8.2.8 As will subsequently become clear further into this Report, there were
significant differences between the design details on the limited number of 'final
issue construction drawings' that were eventually made available to the Inquiry
and what had been actually been constructed in relation to the external walls of
many of the schools.
8.2.9 The failure by the contractor, if aware of these changes, to record amendments
to the structural reinforcement of the walls on properly produced 'as-installed'
drawings or to instruct the design team to do so, would have reduced the
usefulness of this information even had it been properly maintained for access.
8.2.10 The Chief Operating Officer of Galliford Try stated in evidence to the Inquiry in
relation to the inability to access this information that:
"… these records had been incomplete, inconsistent, and the quality of
information relating to each of the schools was so poor that it was felt it
could not be relied upon"
8.2.11 It can be seen in a response dated 6th June 2016 to the request for drawings by
the Council, that WSP, the structural engineers who had designed the PPP1
schools, had advised the Council that they had not retained a comprehensive
record of their information in relation to the schools. They had however
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ultimately provided some information to Galliford Try in relation to the Phase 2

schools only.
8.2.12 The Inquiry was particularly surprised at the absence of this key information, as
one of the main arguments put forward in support of the use of the PPP
procurement methodology is the focus on the whole life management of the
buildings by the companies concerned. It would seem reasonable to assume that
to do so effectively would require the well-organised maintenance and
management of accurate records as to the detailed construction of the buildings
and that the production and retention of accurate as-built drawings would have
been a key objective and requirement of ESP and Amey.
8.2.13 The Inquiry is of the view that insufficient attention was paid by the ESP and
its relevant sub-contractors to the accurate documenting, storage and
maintenance of 'as-constructed' drawings and related records of the school
and that the absence of these led to a more prolonged and probably more
extensive remediation process than would have been required had this
documentation been readily available as required under the Contract. The
primary responsibility for the maintenance of the records lies with ESP.
8.3 THE CONTRACTUAL ROLE OF THE INDEPENDENT CERTIFIER
8.3.1 The Contract sets down specific responsibilities to be undertaken by the

Independent Certifier. The Appointment Document for the Independent Certifier
uses the terminology 'Completion Services' as the heading for the list of services
which the appointment requires to be undertaken. This terminology conveys the
view that these services are largely undertaken as the individual school projects
near completion.
8.3.2 However, in addition to the core responsibility of issuing 'Availability

Certificates', which should certify that all availability criteria have been met,
Clause 6 (iv) of the relevant schedule of services requires the Independent
Certifier to;
"Observe and monitor mock-ups, fabrication, construction and installation

works so as to satisfy itself that the Project complies with the requirements of
the Project Agreement, and any subsequent compliant design development."
8.3.3 This would appear to imply an on-going comprehensive inspection during the
construction of the schools, otherwise how could Independent Certifiers satisfy
themselves that this was the case in relation to those many areas of the building
that will no longer be visible once closed up as part of the on-going building
process.
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8.3.4 Whilst this is the wording in the Contract, it is suggested that the service as
frequently delivered in the construction industry would tend to reflect more
closely the implication that one might attach to the terminology, 'Completion
Services'.
8.3.5 However, from the evidence given to the Inquiry, it was clear that there was a
belief amongst some of the client representatives that the certification they
received more greatly reflected Clause 6 (iv) and provided confirmation of the
quality of construction, not just the completion of the building and the provision
of the required accommodation, services and equipment.
8.3.6 The Inquiry is of the view that there appears to be a lack of clarity and definition
in respect of the specific nature of the requirements placed on the Independent
Certifier by the Contract and how these duties are performed. This lack of clarity
was repeated in the evidence of several witnesses to the Inquiry.
8.3.7 Whilst the appointment of Independent Certifier is a joint appointment between

public and private sector parties to the Contract, the view was expressed on
more than one occasion that there was significantly less understanding of the
role in the public than private sector in terms of the quite limited level of
detailed scrutiny that as a norm is actually applied by the Independent Certifier
to ensuring the quality of the main elements of the on-site construction.
8.3.8 Several witnesses suggested that the role needs better definition and
consistency of application. The variation in how the role is delivered was evident
in the different approaches taken by the two Independent Certifiers, Mouchel
and Arup (Scotland) used respectively on Phase 1 and Phase 2 of the PPP1
schools project.
8.3.9 The Independent Certifier on the 13 Phase 1 projects was Mouchel, whose
contract provided for a total of 611 man days over 26 months, being the
equivalent of only approximately 1.8 man days per school per month if averaged
out. While the work was inevitably focussed more towards the end of the
project, there was still a proportion of time allocated throughout the period of
construction. However, this time provision included for the significant
administrative element attached to the role, allowing even less than this period
of time to be allocated for inspection visits to the 13 sites.
8.3.10 The Inquiry was advised in evidence however, as will be discussed later in the
Report, that the Independent Certifier for Phase 1, when on these sites, did
regularly raise issues with the Contractor and sought to inspect the quality of the
construction in so far as he could within the time constraints he was working to.
8.3.11 Arup (Scotland) were appointed as Independent Certifiers for the four Phase 2
schools. In contrast to the approach of Mouchel on Phase 1, a Project Director
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from Arup (Scotland), who had overseen the delivery of the Independent
Certifier service on these schools, said that they had understood their role in the
case of the Phase 2 schools as not requiring on-going inspection of the works. He
stated that their Independent Certifier:
"………. had not inspected the construction works beyond general site walk
arounds … to monitor general progress"
8.3.12 He advised that the focus of the service as delivered by Arup (Scotland) on the
Phase 2 schools were:
"……. pre-availability, shadow sign-off and availability inspections that had

taken place shortly before the buildings were completed."
and that:
"In principle, the documentation comprising the 'Availability Criteria' reflected

that construction complied with the 'Council Requirements'."
8.3.13 The Inquiry was advised that the contract of appointment of the Independent
Certifier for both phases of the PPP1 schools was the same. The Inquiry was
unable to get confirmation from the Council that there had been any agreement
with ESP and Arup (Scotland) that the role of the Independent Certifier on Phase
2 was to be focused on completion of the project and had not required on-going
inspection of the construction process other than in relation to general progress.
8.3.14 A separate witness to the Inquiry, currently involved at a senior level with
projects for which Independent Certifiers have been appointed, referred to what
he perceived as an ongoing pressure to reduce the level of fees paid for this
service, as a result of which companies are forced to reduce the amount of time
they can afford to spend undertaking the work.
8.3.15 It is the view of the Inquiry that the nature of such a fundamental service
should not be determined by the level of fees that the client is prepared to pay
but that the fees should reflect the level of service required to be provided,
which should be made explicit in the conditions of appointment.
8.3.16 The wording of the Contract states that the Independent Certifier shall:
"satisfy itself that the Project complies with the requirements of the Project
Agreement"
but there is no clarity as to what degree of self-satisfaction is required in relation

to the quality of construction. In the case of the PPP1 schools, unfortunately
neither the somewhat more intensive approach taken on Phase 1 nor the
somewhat less intensive approach taken on Phase 2 to site inspection was
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sufficient to identify significant defective construction throughout the external

walls of the various schools, despite which the Independent Certifiers did each
certify the buildings as compliant with the requirements of the Project
Agreement.
8.3.17 There is clearly a problem if clients believe they are getting a more
comprehensive service than they may in reality be getting, particularly if it is
mistakenly viewed as giving them reassurance in relation to the level of scrutiny
being applied to ensuring the quality of construction. This may also have the
adverse result of causing some clients to feel that they do not need to put in
place more effective mechanisms in order to obtain the required level of
reassurance.
8.3.18 Despite the fundamental importance of the issue of the Certificate of Availability
by the Independent Certifier in confirming that the design and construction of
each school had reached the point where it complied with the requirements of
the Project Agreement, the Inquiry was surprised at the limited period of liability
required of the Independent Certifiers for the PPP1 schools. Clause 10.1 of their
appointments states:
"The liability of the Independent Certifier in respect of all matters certified by

any or all of the availability certificates shall expire 5 years after the date of
issue of the Project Availability Certificate…."
8.3.19 This is significantly less than the 12 years which will normally apply to most of
the contractors and design team members employed on the project who have
signed their contracts of appointment under deed. The level of Professional
Indemnity required to be provided by the Independent Certifier was £2 million.
8.3.20 It is the view of the Inquiry that there should be greater clarity for clients as to
the level of scrutiny that Independent Certifiers are required to carry out and
the degree of reliance that clients can reasonably place on the issue of
Availability Certificates as evidence that the quality of construction is fully
compliant with the Project Requirements. In this regard the Contract was
considered to be less than totally clear.
8.4 QUALITY ASSURANCE UNDER THE PPP1 CONTRACT
8.4.1 This section focuses on how the Edinburgh PPP1 Contract deals with provisions
aimed at seeking to ensure the quality of the project and in particular
opportunities for the supervision and scrutiny of the construction works.
(i) Supervision of the Works
The Contract does not include an express obligation on ESP to supervise

the works, although such an obligation might be implied by other
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obligations such as the requirement to comply with Good Industry

Practice. The Inquiry notes that an express obligation to supervise the
construction works is often imposed on other project companies by the
terms of comparable contracts.
(ii) Quality Plan
The Contract refers expressly to the need for a Quality Plan and requires
ESP to appoint a Project Quality Manager, who was to be 'independent
from the Project Management Team' to ensure the effective operation of
the quality systems and to review and audit them together with the
Council Representative. This would seem a positive attempt to provide a
focus on the quality of the project however, no evidence was provided to
the Inquiry as to the degree to which this requirement was implemented
and whether an independent Project Quality Manager was ever
appointed.
(iii) Inspection of the works by the Council
Under the Contract, the Council has a right of access to the Works for the
purposes of inspection and attending and tests and investigations.
However, the Contract does not contain a right for the Council to open
up the Works where the Council reasonably believes that they may be
defective nor does it have any increased monitoring rights in the event
that its inspections reveal defects or other issues.
The inclusion of specific clauses of this nature would have strengthened

the position of the Council in relation to their rights of inspections of the
quality of construction, had there been concerns raised as to the quality
of closed up areas such as the walls.
(iv) Collateral Warranties in favour of the Authority from Principal Building

Sub-Contractors and Members of the Professional Teams
The Contract does not place an obligation on ESP to procure collateral

warranties for principal subcontractors and members of the design team.
In the Inquiry's experience, this is an unusual omission as this was a

relatively standard provision in most contracts of this type at the time
and was also a standard approach in Design and Build contracts.
Further, there is nothing in the Contract terms that requires details of the
appointments of the individual members of the design teams to be
provided to the Council. Accordingly, there appears to have been no
direct requirement on the part of the City of Edinburgh Council to be
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informed as to the level of service that was to be provided by the key

members of the design teams involved.
In the Inquiry's experience, the architect, structural engineer, etc. can

through their undertaking of regular site inspections, and reporting
thereof, provide an additional highly valuable check on the quality of
construction but only if their appointment with the D&B Contractor
provides for this. The inclusion of the provision for collateral warranties
would, indirectly at least (as the relevant appointments would also need
to have been provided to the Council) have informed the Council as to
the level of service that these key members of the design team were
required to perform, including any requirement for regular site
inspections.
(v) Overview of relevant Contract provisions
In 2001, when the Contract for the PPP1 schools was signed, PPP was still
a relatively recent development. A standard form of contract had not yet
been produced so, while there was clearly significant replication of
clauses from earlier project agreements, there was still significant
variation between the finally negotiated terms for each project. In
particular, it must be recognised that in the negotiation of any major
contract there will be trade-offs and compromises made between the
parties.
It should also be noted that the provisions referred to in this section are
only beneficial if they are properly implemented and the Council has due
processes and resources in place to ensure that this is the case.
Unfortunately, due to the passage of time and the departure of many of
those involved, it has been difficult for the Inquiry to establish how
effectively the provisions of the Contract were actually implemented and
the level of quality assurance in relation to these provisions undertaken
by the Council during the design and construction processes.
8.5 CONCLUSIONS
8.5.1 It is the view of the Inquiry that there are a number of areas within the PPP1
Contract that could have been strengthened in relation to the subject matter
of this Report and which may have provided additional assurance for the
Council. However, the incorporation of such provisions, while perhaps
beneficial, would have been unlikely (in the case of most of these provisions)
to have helped prevent the occurrence of the defective construction
subsequently identified.
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8.5.2 There is one area where a stronger contract may have had an impact and that
is in relation to the definition of the responsibilities of the Independent
Certifier in terms of the actual level of inspection of construction required.
8.5.3 A contract form currently being used on a PPP project in Scotland to appoint
Independent Certifiers is much more demanding in this regard than the
Edinburgh Contract. It should also be noted that it refers to the additional role of
the Authority's Clerk of Works, a role not provided for by the Council in the
Edinburgh project.
8.5.4 It also specifically refers to the facility for arrangements to be made for the
advanced inspection by the Independent Certifier of areas of the building that
may be closed up, which provision could be seen to have a particular relevance
to the case of the PPP1 projects.
8.5.5 The contract referred to includes the following requirement;
"CONSTRUCTION REVIEW
The Independent Tester shall:
5.1 Visit the Site and monitor the Works for their compliance with the
Authority's Construction Requirements, Project Co's Proposals and the
Approved RDD. The frequency and timing of the Independent Tester's
visits are dependent on the progress of construction on Site. The
Contractor shall agree a programme with the Independent Tester for the
inspection of key construction processes and the completed Works and
shall give the Independent Tester advance notice of these Works being
carried out on Site. The Independent Tester shall identify any aspect of
the Works which needs to be inspected before being covered over by
subsequent activity so that he may satisfy himself that these have been
constructed in accordance with the Contractor's Quality Plan without
the need for opening up.
5.2 Randomly check that the Works are being undertaken in accordance
with the Construction Quality Plan that has been agreed by the Authority
and Project Co.
5.3 Liaise with the Authority's Clerk of Works on a regular basis and as a
minimum prior to each monthly site meeting and raise any issues
identified by the Authority Clerk of Works."
8.5.6 Additionally, this contract sets the liability period and professional indemnity
requirement at 12 years and £10 million respectively as opposed to the
Edinburgh PPP1 Contract requirement of only five years and £2 million.
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Section 9 – Remit Item 3: Reasons for wall collapse and school closures
SECTION 9 - REMIT ITEM 3: REASONS FOR WALL COLLAPSE AND SCHOOL CLOSURES
Remit Item 3:
"Establish the reasons(s) for, and necessity of, the school closures, including a review of the
reasons for the Oxgangs Primary School wall collapse."
 This section of the Report will address the fundamental question asked in Remit
Item 3 as to the reasons for the collapse of the wall and the subsequent closure
of the schools.
 There are two distinct aspects to this Remit Item, which although connected, will
be dealt with separately. The first of these is the reason for the collapse of the
wall at Oxgangs School, the second is the reason for the enforced closures of the
17 PPP1 projects.
 The analysis of the Inquiry on these issues is based on the information set down
previously in Section 5 which gave a detailed chronology of events from the
collapse of the wall at Oxgangs School through to the reopening of the closed
schools. It also relies on the accuracy of the observations made by the various
teams of structural engineers in their written reports and in their evidence to
the Inquiry.
9.1 BEHAVIOUR OF WIND AROUND BUILDINGS
9.1.1 Before addressing the specifics of the PPP1 schools it may be useful to
demonstrate briefly how the wind behaves when a building is in its path.
9.1.2 The wind will flow around and over the building and will exert positive pressures
on some parts of the building and negative pressures (suction) on other parts.
The building acts as an obstruction to the flow of the wind, in the same way as a
boulder in a river or stream, interrupting the flow of the water and causing
turbulence around the boulder. Diagram 5 below illustrates the flow of air over
and around a simple building.
Diagram 5: Wind related pressure around a building.
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9.1.3 As the wind flows around and over the building it is forced to accelerate around
the corners and over the ridge of the roof, causing high suction pressures to
develop.
9.1.4 This is the reason ridge tiles are blown off buildings and why the leading edges
of roof and the corners of buildings suffer the most damage in strong winds. It is
also why in the case of Oxgangs Primary School the gable wall sustained
damage.
9.1.5 Diagram 6 below illustrates where high pressure positive and low pressure
negative zones are created around a simple rectangular structure.
Diagram 6:
9.1.6 If the wind was to blow in the opposite direction, then the areas that are subject
to the high local pressures will change; likewise, if the wind turns through 90
degrees, then the pressure distribution around the building will change and
areas that were previously subject to positive pressure will be subject to suction.
9.1.7 When the wind blows directly onto a wall panel it exerts a positive pressure,
effectively trying to push the panel into the building. If the panel is at a corner
then depending on the direction of the wind, the masonry panel may be subject
to high local suction forces, which try to pull the wall away from the building.
The behaviour and strength of the panel is a direct function of:
 the way in which the panel is restrained at the top, sides and bottom;
 what the wall is constructed from;
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 what reinforcement has been added to the panel to strengthen it, if any;
and
 in the case of a cavity wall how well the inner and outer leaves are tied
together.
9.2 REASON FOR THE COLLAPSE OF THE WALL AT OXGANGS SCHOOL
9.2.1 It is the view of the Inquiry that the primary cause of the collapse of the wall at
Oxgangs School was a direct result of poor quality construction, in the building
of the external cavity wall which, in the case of a significant proportion of the
wall ties failed to achieve the required minimum embedment of 50mm,
particularly in the outer leaf of the cavity wall. The poor quality relates to all
three of the following aspects:
 the direct laying of the bricks and the poor positioning of the wall ties in
the mortar bed;
 inadequate supervision of the laying of the bricks and the positioning of

the wall ties in the mortar beds; and
 the quality assurance processes as implemented by sub-contractors and

main contractors to confirm the quality of the construction of the walls.
9.2.2 All three issues were ultimately the responsibility of the contractor in charge
of the site.
9.2.3 Based on the analysis presented in the 'Oxgangs Primary School: Report on the
Gable Wall Failure' produced by Will Rudd Davidson, dated 29th February 2016,
it is reasonable to conclude that the outer leaf of the gable wall was not
sufficiently tied to the inner leaf to allow it to act together with the inner leaf to
resist the combination of positive and negative pressures that were applied to
the wall as a result of the strong wind associated with Storm Gertrude. It should
be noted that this Report was produced by WRD who were acting as advisors to
ESP at the time and that it was not commissioned or its findings influenced by
the City of Edinburgh Council.
9.2.4 It is also reasonable to conclude, based on the information in the

meteorological records provided, that if the wall had been designed and built
to the required appropriate standard it would have been able to withstand the
level of wind loading to which it was subjected.
9.2.5 The recognised construction industry standard at the time of the construction of
the PPP1 schools required wall ties to be distributed broadly as shown in
Diagram 2 at paragraph 5.2.5. In addition to the general requirement of at least
2.5 wall ties per square metre, a second key factor in determining the strength
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of the tie of the outer leaf to the inner leaf is the depth of embedment of the
wall ties, which according to the relevant British Standard should be a minimum
of 50mm.
9.2.6 This 50mm requirement is considered very much a minimum figure. A leading
manufacturer of wall ties recommends that embedment in the use of their wall
ties should be between 62.5mm and 75mm. All competent building contractors
and sub-contractors would be expected to be fully aware of the minimum
requirement of 50mm whether or not it is specified in the project
documentation.
9.2.7 In line with the standard minimum requirements, the specification produced
by the design team for the Oxgangs School did also specifically require a
minimum embedment of 50mm into the bed joint of both inner and outer
leaves of the cavity walls in accordance with the requirements of the relevant
British Standard. Therefore, in this specific regard the issue was not as a result
of any fault in the specification.
9.2.8 The specification clauses provided in relation to the installation of the wall ties,
as produced jointly by the architects for the Oxgangs School, Holmes
Partnership, and the structural engineers, WSP were as follows:
"233 FIXING TIES IN MASONRY WALLS WITH PARTIAL FILL CAVITY

INSULATION
 Bed not less than 50mm into bed joint of each leaf.
 Slope downwards towards the outer leaf with drip centred in the
cavity and pointing downwards. Do not bend ties to suit
coursing.
 Evenly space in horizontal and vertical rows (i.e. not staggered)

at 900 centres horizontally and 300mm centres vertically, unless
otherwise specified.
 Provide additional ties within 225mm of reveals of unbonded

opening."
(It should be noted that the 300mm dimension specified above for vertical
centres is not a practical spacing for blockwork and is most likely a typing error.
This was probably intended to be 225mm, i.e. one blockwork course, as was
indicated on several drawings produced by the design team).
9.2.9 The results of the structural survey undertaken by WRD, acting on behalf of ESP,
led them to conclude in their Report dated 29th February 2016 as follows:
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"A combination of excessive cavity width, related non-verticality, and

incorrectly constructed wall ties has resulted in a cavity wall construction
which in many of the ties had insufficient embedment of the wall ties in
the outer leaf. This in our view is the primary contributory factor." (of the
collapse of the wall)
9.2.10 The Inquiry has no reason to disagree with this analysis.
9.2.11 The fact that in further investigations a similar lack of adequate embedment of
wall ties, to that reported in the survey of the gable wall at Oxgangs School, was
subsequently discovered to be present throughout the rest of the external walls
of Oxgangs School, and in a further series of investigations was found to be
present throughout the remaining PPP1 schools, lends strong support to this
being a realistic and accurate assessment of the condition of the wall and a
prime cause of the collapse of the wall.
9.2.12 The reported variance in cavity width and the references to verticality issues in
the blockwork inner leaf of the cavity wall are likely to have contributed to the
lack of embedment of wall ties.
9.2.13 On the following photograph of the collapsed section of the Oxgangs gable wall,
one can see against the remaining inner blockwork leaf, the use of diagonal flat
steel bracing bars in one of the structural bays. In order to accommodate these
bars, the blockwork in their vicinity had to be cut back or reduced to around
100mm thick in some locations as opposed to 140mm thick blockwork
elsewhere. The staggered joint line of the reduced blockwork can be seen in the
area encircled red.
9.2.14 The wall ties that were installed in this location can also be seen where they
remained as the external leaf of brickwork was pulled outwards off the wall ties
by the suction of the wind, the embedment of wall ties in the outer face being
insufficient to resist this negative pressure.
9.2.15 Any wall ties in the reduced areas would have to span a cavity width of 160mm
rather than 120mm. The specified 250mm long wall ties used would therefore
be unable to achieve the minimum required embedment of 50mm to both
leaves at these locations, (i.e. 50mm + 160mm + 50mm = 260mm), and any
deficit in embedment would be exacerbated by any further occurrence of the
defective construction that resulted in a widened cavity elsewhere in the wall or
through greater than 50mm embedment in the inner leaf as the result of it being
built first.
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Image 23: Photograph of the collapsed section of the Oxgangs gable wall.
9.2.16 Part of the evidence provided to the Inquiry was information that the inner
blockwork leaf of the cavity wall had been built prior to the construction of the
outer leaf of the wall.
9.2.17 This has come to be a common approach adopted by builders anxious to quickly
provide a dry enclosed envelope to the building so that internal trades can
commence at an earlier stage of the construction process than they could
otherwise do. Doing so, without taking appropriate additional quality protection
measures, does however bring with it several risks to the quality of the
construction, including specifically the lack of proper embedment of wall ties.
9.2.18 In the case of the PPP1 schools, the internal leaves of the panels of blockwork of
the cavity walls were built between the steel columns of the structural frame of
the building so that their internal face aligned with the internal face of the
columns. If there had been any slight misalignment in the steelwork erected, as
can occur and which, if within allowed tolerances, can be acceptable, then in
order to ensure a consistent inner face of blockwork with the face of the
columns, the bricklayers will have followed the line of the steelwork columns
and beams rather than seeking to ensure that the walls were being built exactly
plumb or in line. If the outside leaf is then completed later and is built plumb
and to line, this can lead to variation in the width of the cavity between top and
bottom of the wall and along its length, resulting in a possible widening of the
cavity and reduction in the embedment of wall ties achieved.
9.2.19 A practical difficulty associated with constructing the inner blockwork leaf first,
is that the wall ties are required to be built into the wet mortar bed of the inner
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leaf as the wall is built and be left with sufficient length projecting out so that
the other end of the wall tie can be built with the correct embedment into the
outer leaf when it is eventually constructed.
9.2.20 As the outer leaf is not yet there when the inner leaf is being built and the
bricklayer is not able to see the actual cavity, there is not the same visual
reference and reassurance that the wall tie is being placed, as required,
equidistantly between the two leaves.
9.2.21 There is also a risk that the protruding ties may fall out due to either over-
balancing as the force of their cantilevered weight could be stronger than the
restraining force of the grip of the still wet mortar or as a result of being
knocked out before the outer leaf is built. As a result, bricklayers, seeking to
prevent this, can tend to place the wall ties further into the mortar bed of the
inner leaf than required, potentially leaving an inadequate length projecting to
allow the achievement of the minimum 50mm embedment in the outer face.
9.2.22 The type of wall ties used in the construction of the Oxgangs gable wall was a
250mm heavy duty strip tie of the type produced by a company called Vista, an
example of which is depicted below.
Diagram 7: A Vista VT1 heavy duty wall tie similar to those used in the Oxgangs
gable wall and clip for retaining insulation against inner leaf.
9.2.23 The Inquiry received evidence from an experienced technical services engineer
employed by Ancon, one of the leading manufacturers of wall ties in the UK. He
was asked, when shown one of the wall ties that had been recovered from the
collapsed Oxgangs wall, how easily and successfully he felt this type of wall tie
could be installed in the situation where the leaves of a cavity wall are built
separately. He responded:
"Looking at the strip wall tie, this would be quite difficult to use if
installing in the inner leaf first, before the outer leaf catches up. When
placing one end of the tie in the mortar of the inner block, the tie would
almost certainly overbalance before the mortar has had time to fully cure,
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due to the weight and projection of the tie itself. Sometimes, a bricklayer
will embed the tie more on the inner leaf to stop this from happening."
9.2.24 To overcome the risk of ties falling before the mortar hardens, rather than
embedding the wall ties in each joint as the wall is built, bricklayers have been
known to push them into the still wet joints between blocks from the outside
face. This is regarded as unacceptable practice, as the wall tie will create a void
in the mortar as it is pushed in and as a result will not give the required degree
of adhesion between wall tie and mortar to provide the required strength of
connection between the inner and outer leaves of the wall.
9.2.25 A further risk, associated with building the leaves separately, is that as the leaves
are built, potentially by different teams of bricklayers, the brick courses in the
outer face may, as the wall rises, become out of alignment with those of the
already built blockwork inner face. This makes the proper installation of the
projecting wall ties into the outer leaf even more difficult. The heavy-duty ties
which were used would prove particularly difficult to bend by bricklayers seeking
to deal with any potential non-alignment of coursing between the two leaves.
9.2.26 In line with what was standard practice, the specification jointly produced by the
architects and structural engineers on the original design team contained the
following extracts from clauses:
"535 Height of Lifts
 Raise no portion of the work more than 1.2 m above another at

any time
 Do not carry up one leaf more than 1.5 m in any one day unless
permitted by the CA
545 Levelling of Courses
 Bring both leaves of cavity walls to the same level at every

course containing vertical twist type ties or other rigid ties"
9.2.27 The Inquiry were advised as part of the evidence given by the architects, the
Holmes Partnership, that failure to comply with this requirement had been
raised by them initially during the construction of the Phase 1 schools. They
advised that the circulated notes of a visit to site showed that this issue had
been brought to the attention of both AMJV and the Tier 2 contractor Lilley
Construction, during the construction of Pirniehall Primary School, a Phase 1
school.
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9.2.28 The following is an extract from a written statement relating to this issue offered
in evidence to the Inquiry by The Holmes Partnership (now Holmes Miller).
(References to "CJV" are to AMJV):
"It appears Contractors, and the CJV, ignored this requirement, building
the inner leaf first and following on building the outer leaf at a later date.
The matter was highlighted in our Site Visit Notes from Pirniehall/St.
David's on 5th April 2002, but was not acted upon and carried on through
the course of the project. We had no power to instruct the
CJV/Contractors to comply with our F10 specification; we could only
highlight to the CJV/Contractors where there were deviations from the
specifications"
9.2.29 As part of their verbal evidence, a Director of The Holmes Partnership, who had
been directly involved in the projects at the time as an architect and associate
within the practice added:
"…the Holmes Partnership had concerns due to worries about coursing

and how the wall ties would be built in to avoid water being directed
back towards the inner leaf"
and that:
"…it was not uncommon for the specification requirement to build both
leaves in parallel to be ignored in D&B projects for programme
reasons."
9.2.30 Evidence given to the Inquiry identified the bricklaying sub-contractor who built
the wall that failed at Oxgangs School as VB Contracts. Despite several attempts,
the Inquiry failed to receive a response to an invitation to give evidence sent to
what is thought to be the current address of the person who was Chief Executive
of VB Contracts at the time of the construction of Oxgangs School. VB Contracts
was appointed by Miller Construction to build the masonry walls for all four
Phase 2 schools. The company is reported as having gone into liquidation in
2008.
9.2.31 The Chief Operating Officer of Galliford Try, the company that acquired Miller
Construction, in his evidence to the Inquiry in relation to the construction of the
wall said:
"There is a reverse hierarchy of responsibility in regard to the way the wall

had been built, and in my view the bricklayer who built the wall will have
known that the wall had not been correctly built and that it had knowingly
been left in an unsafe condition due to the embedment issues caused by
the cavity variations."
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9.2.32 When asked how it was that the Quality Management Systems in place had
failed to identify these defects, the Chief Operating Officer replied:
"It was incumbent on each Main Contractor to ensure that the buildings
had been built properly. It would be expected that a bricklayer should
have brought the wall tie embedment issue to the attention of the main
contractor. As a wall is closed up, then a supervisor would not always
have the opportunity to inspect the cavity and the wall head restraints.
There is always reliance on people doing what they are supposed to do."
9.2.33 The view of the Inquiry on these issues is that even though as stated every
member of the construction team has a duty to carry out their responsibilities
in an appropriate and conscientious manner, evidence would suggest,
unfortunately, that this is sometimes not the case and cannot safely be relied
upon to be the case.
9.2.34 Accordingly, systems must be employed by contractors that are able to

provide the level of assurance required as to the quality of all aspects of the
construction, especially in relation to those elements of construction the
failure of which could result in injury to users of buildings.
9.2.35 It is the view of the Inquiry that the quality management systems, as
implemented on the PPP1 projects, were insufficient to prevent the defective
construction that could, in slightly different circumstances, have resulted in
the fatalities of children.
9.2.36 The structural engineers appointed to support this Inquiry undertook a

structural analysis of all the panels in the Oxgangs gable wall, including the
panels that collapsed. These calculations showed that to meet the required
wind-loadings, the collapsed panels would not only have had required to be
properly restrained on all four sides, including the use of the missing head
restraints, but would also have required additional stiffening in the form of
either bed joint reinforcement or windposts.
9.2.37 This confirmed the conclusion reached separately, following their analysis of
these panels, by Goodson Associates, the structural engineers appointed by
Galliford Try to undertake the design of the remedial work to Oxgangs School. To
satisfy this requirement, Goodson Associates specified the incorporation of bed
joint reinforcement at 225mm centres to the brickwork panels in the rebuilding
of the external leaf of the collapsed gable wall.
9.2.38 WSP did not agree with these findings and advised the Inquiry that they:
“have carried out our own calculations on the wall panels in the wall that
collapsed. This was done for the wall construction as designed by WSP
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and we can confirm that our calculations demonstrate that the panels
provide suitable capacity.”
9.2.39 The Inquiry requested sight of these calculations to allow the design parameters
used and methodology adopted to be reviewed against the independent
calculations, but WSP advised that were unable to release this information for
contractual reasons.
9.2.40 In examining the original 'construction status' drawings for Oxgangs school, that
were provided to the Inquiry by Galliford Try, the Inquiry established that while
the drawings produced by structural engineers WSP, showed the requirement
for bed joint reinforcement and windposts to be incorporated into other walls of
the school, no requirement for either component was shown on the drawings
for the panels that collapsed.
9.2.41 If bed joint reinforcement had been specified and built into the outer brick leaf
of the gable wall, this would have stiffened the panel, helping to hold it
together, and may have to some small degree compensated for the inadequate
embedment of the wall ties, making the panel slightly more capable of resisting
the suction force of the wind. However, the structural integrity of the wall and
the contribution of the bed joint reinforcement to the two leaves of the wall
acting as one single element, depends on the two leaves being adequately tied
together by the wall ties, which due to the lack of embedment was not the case.
9.2.42 The discovery of the absence of the specified head restraints in this wall was
made by Galliford Try as they were commencing their programme of installation
of remedial wall ties. The type of head restraint that had been specified by the
original design team required both inner and outer leaves of the cavity wall to
be tied back to the steel beams at 900 centres along their length.
9.2.43 As well as tying the individual leaves to the beam, this type of head restraint
would have also provided a row of additional wall ties connecting inner and
outer leaf along the top of the wall panels. While the fundamental fault remains
the lack of embedment of the general wall ties, the failure to install these
restraints meant that, in the circumstances of the storm, a somewhat greater
loading than would have otherwise been the case, was required to be borne by
the inadequately embedded wall ties, thus again contributing to the cause of the
collapse of the inadequately tied outer leaf.
9.2.44 The gable affected by the collapse is illustrated below. Panels A, B, C, D, F and H
were affected by the collapse.
9.2.45 As previously mentioned, after being appointed by Galliford Try, Goodson

Associates undertook calculations to check the design of the wall panels at
Oxgangs School, including panel 'B' as shown on the drawing below. These
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calculations together with some of the construction drawings for the Phase 2
that had been provided to Galliford Try by WSP were made available to the
Inquiry. The calculations showed that panel ‘B’ would have failed the required
wind loadings test, unless in addition to restraints on all four sides, additional
strengthening of the panel was provided in the form of windposts or bed joint
reinforcement.
9.2.46 This assessment found that the same issues, in relation to inadequacies in the
structural design of panel 'B', applied to panel 'K' which would also fail to satisfy
the required wind loading. Further calculations indicated that the design of
panel 'H' would equally have failed.
9.2.47 The structural engineering advisor to this Inquiry undertook a similar detailed
assessment of the panels in the same gable at Oxgangs using the "Construction"
status drawings released to the Inquiry by Galliford Try and came to the same
conclusions in relation to inadequacies in the design of panels 'B', 'K', and 'H '.
9.2.48 The remedial designs developed by Goodson Associates and implemented by

Galliford Try satisfactorily addressed these issues.
Image 24: Structural construction drawing.
9.2.49 From the photographs of the bricks from the collapsed wall lying on the ground
and of the exposed outer face of the inner blockwork leaf, it is reasonably
apparent that neither bed joint reinforcement or wind posts were built in as part
of the original construction of the wall. This was in accordance with the
information on the structural 'construction drawings' as produced by WSP and
provided to the Inquiry by Galliford Try, which showed no requirement for
either.
9.2.50 It is the conclusion of the Inquiry that in addition to the lack of embedment of
wall ties, as the primary cause of the collapse, there was a failure to install the
147
head restraints as specified in the design documentation, the absence of which

may have also contributed to the collapse of the panels.
9.2.51 It is also the conclusion of the Inquiry based on the calculations undertaken by
Goodson Associates, and on the independently undertaken calculations by the
structural engineering advisor to the Inquiry, that the structural design of
panel B, the collapsed panel, would appear to be inadequate. (As previously
stated, WSP have advised the Inquiry that they do not agree with this
conclusion).
9.2.52 While this was not the primary cause of the collapse of the panel, the absence
of bed joint reinforcement in this gable wall, despite being specified by WSP
elsewhere in the exterior walls of Oxgangs School, may also have contributed
to the failure of the panel.
9.2.53 The following possible causes in construction projects in general, rather than
specifically in the case of these schools, of failures to install specified
components such as head restraints were put forward by a number of witnesses,
in each case based on their considerable experience of working in the
construction industry.
 The information provided by the design team may not have been clear as
to what was required.
 The information provided to the sub-contractor by the main contractor

may not have been complete either for pricing by the sub-contractor or
for implementation on site.
 The information in relation to the head restraints provided by the sub-

contractor to the specific brick-laying squad or bricklayer may not have
been complete or sufficiently clear.
 The number of head restraints may have been intentionally reduced to

reduce costs.
 The bricklayers, who were generally paid by the area of wall they
completed in a day and not for the number of hours they had worked,
may have omitted the head restraints as the installation of restraint
fittings can significantly slow up the rate at which bricks can be laid and
hence the amount the bricklayers could earn in a day.
 The bricklayers involved may not have had the requisite skills necessary to
install the head restraints or were not aware of the implications of
omitting them.
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9.2.54 The Inquiry would wish to emphasise that these potential reasons for the
missing head restraints were offered by witnesses as examples of possible
scenarios that could have led to their omission and there is no definitive
evidence to support these possible causes as having occurred.
9.2.55 However, some witnesses gave evidence which lent support to the list of
possible reasons. This included evidence given to the Inquiry by a senior
qualified structural engineer who advised that, at the time of the design and
construction of the PPP1 schools, he had been the Technical Director of WSP
responsible for the delivery of the structural engineering services in relation to
the PPP1 schools. He is no longer a member of staff of WSP, having left the
company some years ago.
9.2.56 In relation to the provision of secondary steelwork he advised the Inquiry that
he thought:
"At the time the sub-contractors were pricing the jobs, that only
architects' drawings had been available, as the level of secondary
steelwork had not been fully developed and therefore may not have been
allowed for in the costs agreed."
9.2.57 He added that he recalled:
"As the design was developed there had been heated arguments
regarding the extent of secondary steelwork needed on the project."
9.2.58 However, he also expressed his confidence that the design had been undertaken
very thoroughly and diligently. He specifically advised the Inquiry that in his
opinion WSP had been particularly thorough in defining bed joint reinforcement
requirements, although he did not know what had been given to the bricklayer.
He added that a bricklayer may not think to ask for structural drawings.
9.2.59 When asked on whose drawings he thought that these types of restraint and
reinforcement details should be shown, he noted that in his opinion there was a
reluctance for architects to show these details on their drawings due to concerns
about attracting liability.
9.2.60 This view concurred with the evidence provided by the current Director of
Holmes Miller Architects, who had been involved in the projects and had advised
the Inquiry that he would rely on the information in relation to the requirement
for head restraints and bed joint reinforcement being properly provided on the
structural engineers' drawings and in the specifications.
9.2.61 Further to this point, the ex-WSP Director advised the Inquiry that before
qualifying as a structural engineer he had himself worked as a bricklayer for
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about eight years and he could not recall having been given structural engineers'
drawings, normally only having been provided with architects' elevations.
9.2.62 One of the two witnesses who attended the Inquiry as representatives of the
Scottish Building Federation, who also was previously a bricklayer and is
currently a Construction Director with a medium-sized construction company,
echoed this view. He stated:
"We would emphasize though that a bricklayer will generally just build
walls. A foreman should normally have access to all the drawings and use
those to brief the bricklayer. The bricklaying squad would usually be given
general plans and elevation drawings but may not be provided with all the
additional details that may be available to the managers and supervisors.
The squad won't necessarily ask for copies of all the available drawings.
So, for example, unless they and the bricklayers are made aware or told
that bed joint reinforcement or wall head restraints for that matter are
required, they won't automatically know that it should be there and build
it in."
9.2.63 Given the wide extent of failure to incorporate elements of reinforcement and
restraint to the brick panels that were shown on engineers' drawings across
the PPP1 schools, and the fact that these schools were built by a range of
different contractors and subcontractors, it is perhaps appropriate that the
construction industry reviews how effectively information is produced,
coordinated, presented and communicated to contractors and to tradesmen
on site so that there is clarity at all levels as to the precise requirements of the
design.
9.2.64 Finally, in relation to identifying the cause of the collapse of the Oxgangs School
wall, as several witnesses to the Inquiry stated, the quality of construction of a
masonry wall is primarily determined by the competence of the bricklayer and
the quality of the workmanship applied.
9.2.65 On this issue, there was virtual unanimity in the opinions expressed by witnesses
from all sectors as regards the current parlous state of traditional skills such as
bricklaying in today's construction industry and the lack of availability of high
quality experienced bricklayers, many of whom have left the industry. Evidence
suggested that, over at least the last twenty years, it has been increasingly
difficult to attract young people to take up these trades, due to the nature of the
work, the nature of the construction industry and the uncertainty of a continuity
of employment.
9.2.66 In evidence to the Inquiry a Regional Manager of the Construction Training

Board said:
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"Sub-contractors are not often seen to be part of the team due to the way
they are treated and the short periods that they are often involved on a
project. There is little interest in the follow-on activities or trades.
Bricklayers are often enticed to move on through better rates which
reduces their feeling of ownership on a project."
9.2.67 The Inquiry is of the view that, given the widespread nature of similar
defective construction across the 17 PPP1 projects, undertaken by bricklayers
from different sub-contracting companies, and from different squads within
these companies, there is evidence of a problem in ensuring the appropriate
quality in this fundamental area of construction. The construction industry
needs to re-examine its approach to the recruitment, training, appointment,
means of remuneration, vetting, supervision and quality assurance of
bricklayers.
9.3 REASON FOR THE CLOSURES OF THE SCHOOLS
9.3.1 Section 5 of this Report has set out the chronology of events which ultimately
led up to the decision on 8th April 2016 to close all the schools with immediate
effect.
9.3.2 There were in fact three separate occasions of closures of schools:
 the closure of Oxgangs School on 29th January 2016, the day of the
collapse of the gable wall;
 the closure of the three remaining Phase 2 schools in the week

commencing 14th March 2016, following initial survey reports of evidence
of similar lack of embedment of wall ties in these schools; and
 the closure of all the PPP1 schools with effect from 11 th April 2016
following the Council being advised that it had been discovered that
required head restraints were missing.
9.3.3 It is the view of the Inquiry that the decision to close Oxgangs School on the
day of the collapse was entirely reasonable and appropriate. At this stage the
Council did not know the cause of the collapse, other than an assumption that
it was related to the strong winds associated with Storm Gertrude.
9.3.4 Oxgangs School reopened on Tuesday 2nd February after temporary shoring was
installed to prevent any potential further collapse of the now exposed remaining
inner leaf of the gable cavity wall.
9.3.5 In early March, the Council were advised that the outcome of the investigation
into the collapse of the gable wall, which investigation was at that time
restricted to solely the wall in question, had determined that the primary cause
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of the collapse was failure to properly embed many of the wall ties sufficiently
into the bed joints of the outer brick face of the cavity wall.
9.3.6 During the week commencing 14th March 2016, decisions were taken to close all
four Phase 2 schools at meetings of Council officers held to review information
from the follow up intrusive surveys of the Phase 2 schools. The first survey
received indicated the wide presence of inadequate wall tie embedment to the
perimeter walls of Oxgangs School. The initial analysis of this information by
WRD suggested that up to 50% of the wall ties in the School might not be
sufficiently embedded.
9.3.7 The view of the Council officers was that the reported extent of potentially
defective external brickwork wall panels around the complete perimeter of the
school was such that it was impractical to seek to assure the safe operation of
the school and grounds, even with the creation of exclusion zones. A decision
was made to close Oxgangs School with effect from the next day, Wednesday
16th March 2016.
9.3.8 Information from further surveys advising of the presence of similar defects in
the other three Phase 2 schools was received on 17th March. This quickly led to a
decision to close all three of the other Phase 2 schools, Braidburn School, St.
Peter's Primary and Firrhill High School with immediate effect from the morning
of Friday 18th March 2016.
9.3.9 In the case of Firrhill High School, which had been an extension and
refurbishment rather than a completely new school, it was decided that it would
close from the 18th March 2016 to allow the undertaking of detailed structural
surveys but re-open again on 21st March 2016 until 24th March 2016 when the
Easter holiday period would commence.
9.3.10 The Inquiry was advised in evidence that the decision to close the schools was
made purely as a result of the unwillingness of the Council to expose school
children and staff to avoidable risk in light of the information provided as a
result of the surveys. Effectively they had been advised that the same defect in
construction, reported to have caused the collapse of the gable wall at Oxgangs,
was also potentially widespread throughout the Phase 2 schools.
9.3.11 In a practical sense, it was also hoped that this short extension to the upcoming
period of closure would allow the planned necessary remedial works to be
completed prior to the end of the Easter holiday period and the reopening of the
schools on 11th April 2016.
9.3.12 The Council also decided that, pending the results of the on-going surveys of the
Phase 1 schools, these schools should remain open until the commencement of
the Easter school holidays on 24th March 2016.
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9.3.13 The Inquiry was advised that the logic behind the decision was that there was no
evidence at that time to indicate that the defective installation of wall ties
extended to the Phase 1 schools that had been built some two years before the
Phase 2 schools. The fault was at this stage thought to be restricted to the four
Phase 2 schools all of which had been built by the same contractor, Miller
Construction. This reasonable assumption would be found to be incorrect within
only a few days of this decision as the survey information on the Phase 1 schools
began to emerge.
9.3.14 It should be noted that the perimeter walls of all the PPP1 schools had been
subjected to a visual inspection undertaken by structural engineers immediately
after the collapse of the Oxgangs wall. In no case had this led to concerns as to
the presence of similar defects in the construction of the external walls of these
schools as it was reported that there were no visible signs of structural distress
in the masonry.
9.3.15 The subsequent discovery of significant defects, following intrusive

investigations, would suggest that visual inspections are not sufficient on their
own to provide an informed opinion as to the existence or otherwise of
defects of this type.
9.3.16 It is the view of the Inquiry that it was an appropriate decision by the Council
to close the four Phase 2 schools following information from the structural
engineering consultants, who were acting for ESP, which suggested that up to
50% of the wall ties in the schools could be inadequately embedded in the
external walls of these schools; this having previously been identified by the
same consultants as the primary cause for the collapse of the wall at the
Oxgangs School.
9.3.17 The last closure of the schools was the most significant, commencing on the 11 th
April 2016 and extending until it had been independently confirmed, in the case
of each school, that the remedial works had rendered the buildings safe to
reopen.
9.3.18 The circumstances leading up to the decision to close the schools were most
unfortunate in terms of their timing. On 5th April 2016, ESP had presented letters
of assurance as to the completion of all interim remedial measures previously
agreed with the Council as necessary to provide a safe environment for pupils
and staff due to return to school on 11 th April 2016 after the Easter holiday
period.
9.3.19 On 8th April 2016, after advising Council officers of the facts at a meeting that
afternoon, ESP formally wrote to the Council confirming that the situation in
relation to their ability to provide assurances as to the safety of the schools had
changed. This had followed the discovery by Galliford Try employees, working on
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the Oxgangs School, of the apparent absence or inadequate spacing of head

restraints that were normally required to connect the head of external cavity
wall panels to the structural frame of buildings. The key extract from the ESP
letter is repeated here for convenience of the reader:
"Shortly before noon today we were advised by the design and build
contractor who is executing the remedial works at Oxgangs Primary and
St. Peter's Primary that it had discovered serious defects as a result of
which it has advised that these schools are no longer safe to occupy.
Representatives of the Council were advised of the position this afternoon
at a meeting with ourselves and the design and build contractor.
At present, it is impossible to confirm whether the same defect may exist

at the other Estate buildings. In these circumstances, we are afraid that
we have no option but to withdraw the confirmation contained in our
letter of 5 April 2016 that the Estate buildings identified in the letter are
safe for occupancy."
9.3.20 The receipt of a letter stating categorically in relation to Oxgangs and St. Peter's
Schools that the Contractor for the schools had advised that 'these schools are
no longer safe to occupy' on the Friday before the Monday when all the schools
were due to open left the Council with little option other than to close these two
schools with immediate effect.
9.3.21 The statement by ESP that they would 'have no option but to withdraw the
confirmation contained in our letter of 5 April 2016 that the Estate buildings
identified in the letter are safe for occupancy' was equally concerning to the
Council. The letter of 5th April 2016 had in fact listed all the PPP1 schools, so this
statement effectively advised the Council that ESP could no longer confirm the
safety of any of the 17 PPP1 projects. The inference in the letter from ESP was
that there was a possibility of the same absence of head restraints in the rest of
the school buildings. Accordingly, they could not continue to provide the Council
with an assurance that the buildings were safe for occupancy.
9.3.22 Up to this point, when the only problem that had been identified to the Council
was the lack of embedment of wall ties, the Council had, somewhat reluctantly,
agreed to accept the 2-staged approach to the completion of the remedial
works, with the second stage planned to be undertaken during the normal
period of closure of the schools over the summer.
9.3.23 Their agreement to this approach had followed consideration of both the survey
information and the expert opinion provided. This indicated that any further
failure due to lack of embedment of the outer leaf would most likely result in a
similar collapse to that experienced with the Oxgangs School; that is, a collapse
of the outer leaf brickwork towards the exterior of the building. Mitigation
154
measures had been proposed that would ensure that any such collapses would
be into exclusion zones which would be inaccessible to school children or
members of the public.
9.3.24 The Report, on the 8th April, advising of the lack of head restraints in two of the
Phase 2 schools and uncertainty as to whether it might be present in the Phase 1
schools, (subsequently found to be the case) changed the analysis of risk.
9.3.25 As will be explained further below, the information provided on 8 th April 2016 to
the Council suggested that the wall panels of the schools might not meet the
requirements of the design codes. The absence of the head restraints meant
that complete wall panels, both inner and outer leaves, may not have the
necessary resistance to wind loading required to provide an assurance that the
schools were safe.
9.3.26 If subjected to very strong winds of storm force, the absence of head restraints
could contribute to the failure of both leaves of the cavity wall panels, not just
the outer leaf. Both leaves of inadequately restrained wall panels, if exposed to
strong wind pressure, could potentially collapse inwards as well as outwards.
Such an eventuality could not be catered for by the proposed strategy that up to
then had been accepted by the Council i.e. the creation of external exclusion
zones.
9.3.27 The proposed strategy involved keeping pupils inside the buildings if they were
already there when a wind warning was received. The adoption of this strategy
would now have meant that those children, and the staff looking after them,
could have been at risk from an inward collapse of masonry.
9.3.28 Also, if due to lack of embedment of wall ties there was to be a repetition of the
collapse of only the external brickwork face of a wall panel in any re-occurrence
of strong wind, the inner blockwork leaf, its structural integrity already
significantly compromised by the lack of head restraints and loss of the
contribution to overall structural capacity provided by the outer leaf, would now
be fully exposed to further gusts, which it might then be unable to withstand.
9.3.29 Finally, the proposal from ESP that, if severe winds were expected and warnings
were issued prior to the commencement of the school day, then pupils should
remain at home, made the weather a determinant as to the provision or not of
the essential continuity of access by pupils to education on designated
schooldays. If the schools were not considered safe for pupils to enter during
occasional periods of the high wind speeds that they had been required to be
designed for, then the schools were effectively not fit for purpose.
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9.3.30 It is the view of the Inquiry given:
 the already identified significant problem of poor embedment;
 the nature of the letter received from ESP withdrawing their previous
confirmation that the schools were safe to occupy;
 knowledge of the dramatically reduced effective capacity of the brick

panels to withstand wind-loading as a result of the omission of head
restraints;
 the new awareness of the increased risk of an internal as well as

external collapse of the cavity wall panels;
 the fact that there were only two days remaining before the schools
were due to open; and
 the unacceptability of the continuity of teaching time over the remaining

months being dependent on the weather
that the only practical and safe course of action in these circumstances was to
close the schools in question, decant teachers and pupils elsewhere and
commence an immediate programme of remediation.
9.3.31 The following provides a further explanation of the issues impacting on the
necessity to close the schools.
9.3.32 The structural design of cavity wall panels is based upon the two leaves being
held together by properly embedded wall ties to allow them to act as one in
providing the required resistance to wind-loading. The capacity of the panel in
this regard varies significantly depending on the number of sides on which the
panels are effectively restrained. The overall general specification, which was
applied to all the PPP1 schools, had required head restraints for connecting the
cavity wall to the steel beams of the structural frame, and lateral restraints for
fixing the cavity wall to the steel columns of the structural frame on either side
of the panel. The wall panel is assumed to be restrained at its base.
9.3.33 The general specification document produced by the design team described the
required centres at which restraints were to be fitted as 900mm. However, more
detailed information on some of the limited number of construction drawings
available to the Inquiry, indicated a requirement for head restraints to be fitted
at 450mm centres rather than the 900mm centres in the specification.
9.3.34 It is a recognised convention, that where there is a difference between

specification and drawing information, the contractor should seek confirmation
156
from the design team as to which requirement should take precedent. The
Inquiry was unable to establish if this had happened.
9.3.35 Under the National Building Specification approach that was adopted by the
original design team, head restraints are described under the general heading of
'Wall Ties'. The relevant clauses produced by the design team were:
"211 WALL TIES
Fixing blockwork inner leaf to steel columns (1 required at alternate

block course)
 To BS 1243, type MF2 Ties to be fitted with a de-bonding sleeve

DBS2 by Metsec or equal where the blockwork panel between
steel columns exceeds 6.0m in length
 Material/finish: Stainless steel
 Size: 75 x 40mm
212 WALL TIES
Fixing blockwork Inner leaf and Brick leaf to Steel Eaves Beam
 To BS 1243, type SAW-1-130 with ties type TWT-275 and TWT-

130 at 900mm centres by Metsec or equal
 Material/finish: Stainless steel"
9.3.36 A drawing demonstrating the detailed application of the head restraint and its
connections to the steel beam and the two leaves of the cavity wall is shown
below in Diagram 8. This is an example of where the drawing shows a difference
in the centres of the head restraints to that described in the general
specification; 450mm centres as opposed to 900mm centres. This is one of the
limited number of detailed drawings originally produced by WSP for use in the
construction of the Royal High School, a Phase 1 PPP1 school, that ESP, Amey
and the structural engineering advisers had access to. These copies of drawings
were retrieved from the ESP archive. As previously stated in this Report they had
not been provided by WSP to ESP.
9.3.37 The drawings below demonstrate the design team requirement for a three-part
head restraint tie; the sliding anchors, SAW-2-115/100, of the head restraints to
be fitted at 450mm centres to the underside of the steel beam with TEK screws;
the one-way-tie, OWT-130, connecting the outer brickwork leaf to the sliding
anchor; and the two-way-tie, TWT-275, (not notated but shown on the drawing)
connecting both the outer brickwork leaf and the inner blockwork leaf to the
sliding anchor. The 130 and 275 figures refer respectively to the lengths in
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millimetres of the one-way and two-way ties that are built into either one leaf or
both leaves and connected to the sliding anchor which in turn this drawing
shows to be required to be fixed to the overhead steel beam at 450mm centres.
9.3.38 This drawing shows how this type of head restraint not only ties the leaves to
the steel beam but also helps tie the leaves to one another.
Diagram 8: Structural drawings for the Royal High School showing the
requirement for head restraints tying steel beam to both inner and outer leaves
of cavity wall.
9.3.39 The reports written in April 2016 by Goodson Associates describing the outcome
of the intrusive surveys of the cavity walls at the Royal High School Edinburgh,
which should have been built in accordance with the above drawing, state that
in their examination of 39 of the 102 panels of brickwork, no head restraints
whatsoever were found to be present in 13 of the 39 panels opened up. In
another 13 panels of the 39, head restraints were found but their installation
was reported to be defective.
9.3.40 In a further nine of the 39 panels, the head restraints were built in at 900mm
centres. Only the final four of the 39 panels had restraints built in at 450mm
centres as shown on the drawing.
9.3.41 If the wider spacing of the head restraints at 900mm centres is ignored, the
results show that 67% of the panels tested would be defective. If we consider
the wider spacing of 900mm as defective, then 90% rather than 67% of the
panels tested would be rated defective.
9.3.42 In relation to this last point, Ancon, a leading manufacturer of these fittings,
advise in their technical literature that a similar type of head restraint
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manufactured by them when fitted at 450mm centres provides a design

resistance of 3429 Newtons/metre, whereas if it is fitted at 900 centres, the
design resistance provided is halved to 1714 Newtons/metre.
9.3.43 The failure to install head restraints at all, would have reduced the capacity to
resist wind-loading of one of the typical larger masonry panels found in schools
by a factor of up to 45%. The results of the structural surveys, as previously
shown, demonstrate the percentage of investigations which failed to find the
required restraints in the various schools.
9.3.44 The Inquiry is of the view that the disparity between what was built and what
was designed, in relation to the lack of head restraints, must ultimately be the
responsibility of the design and build contractors, AMJV for the Phase 1
schools and Miller Construction for the Phase 2 schools.
9.3.45 Following the analysis by the Inquiry of the information provided in the survey
reports and in the limited number of drawings and specifications made available
to the Inquiry, a further concerning aspect of the construction of the schools was
identified. This related to the issue of the incorporation or otherwise of bed joint
reinforcement, an explanation of the typical use of which has already been
provided in Section 5 of this Report.
9.3.46 The general specification produced by the design team for the PPP1 schools
included a specification for the use of bed joint reinforcement. The relevant
clause read as follows:
"271 JOINT REINFORCEMENT FOR 365mm CAVITY WALLS
 Manufacturer and reference: BRC Brickforce SBF35-50
 Material: Stainless steel
 Width: Approximately 40-50mm less in width than wall or leaf
 Lay on an even bed of mortar in a continuous strip with 225mm

laps at joints and full laps at angles. Keep back 20mm from face
of external work, 12mm back from face of internal work and
finish mortar join to normal thickness."
9.3.47 This specification clause does not provide information as to the extent of bed
joint reinforcement that is to be used in the cavity walls. This should be provided
either in annotated drawings of the elevations of the walls or through a detailed
descriptive schedule of the work required for each panel. This information
would have to include details in terms of at what centres or number of courses
the bed joint reinforcement was required to be installed in the case of both the
blockwork inner and brick and blockwork outer leaves of each panel of the cavity
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wall. Across many of the schools surveyed it was found on investigation that the
bed joint reinforcement specified had either not been installed at all or had not
been installed consistent with the requirements of the specification.
9.3.48 It is the view of the Inquiry that, as in the case of the missing head restraints,
the failure to incorporate the specified bed joint reinforcement in accordance
with the design, impacted significantly on the capacity of the panels to resist
the required levels of wind-loading and undermined the integrity of the
structural design of the external walls of the schools.
Image 25: Example of bed joint reinforcement
9.3.49 Amongst the design team structural engineers' drawings provided to the Inquiry,
there are examples of drawings providing the additional information required by
the bricklaying sub-contractor to properly locate where and to what extent the
bed joint reinforcement was required. It is not however possible to confirm
whether this information was comprehensively provided in all cases due to the
limited receipt of this type of information by the Inquiry or, as a result,
specifically to what extent the design engineer had specified it in all schools.
9.3.50 This does however show that the structural engineers had viewed the use of bed
joint reinforcement as a key component of their design strategy in addressing
the issue of the required capacity of panels to withstand wind-loadings.
9.3.51 Unfortunately, from comparing the information provided and the results of
the intrusive structural surveys, it is again evident that there were failures on
the part of the construction teams to construct the buildings in accordance
with the required designs.
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Section 10 – Remit Item 4: Quality Assurance Processes
SECTION 10 - REMIT ITEM 4: QUALITY ASSURANCE PROCESSES:
Remit Item 4:
"The role of the council with regard to the quality assurance of the construction of the
buildings, including the granting of completion certificates to allow the buildings to become
operational, the management of risks to the council; and if standard practice regarding
quality assurance provided adequate checks and balances for all parties to the contract."
 This section of the Report will consider the approach adopted in relation to the
quality assurance of the design and construction of the PPP1 schools. However,
before examining how these particular aspects were managed specifically in the
case of the PPP1 project, it was considered useful to set out how the approach
to quality assurance in the construction industry has changed over recent years
with the advent of new procurement models.
 The final quality of a building is determined by many factors, including the focus
given to design quality in the client brief and what weight is attached to this in
the processes used for the assessment of bids. It is the responsibility of all
informed clients to incorporate mechanisms that both clearly articulate the
quality objectives for their projects and facilitate the proper assessment of bids
before appointment to ensure that the stated quality objectives are being met.
As will be read below, Council officers, in reviewing the PPP1 projects, came to
the conclusion that insufficient attention had been paid to the issue of design
quality. This would appear to have been an opportunity missed.
 Given the nature of the problems that gave rise to this Inquiry, this Report does
not intend to focus on a detailed analysis of the overall design quality of the
schools, but simply consider this briefly as part of the review of the approach of
the Council to this stage of the project. The primary focus of this section of the
Report will be in relation to the quality assurance of the construction processes
used that ultimately failed to deliver the required standards of building
construction.
10.1 INDEPENDENT SCRUTINY OF CONSTRUCTION QUALITY
10.1.1 The traditional procurement process was not a panacea for Clients but there
were many positive aspects of it that had been developed over years of
construction experience to address real issues in the construction industry that
could be incorporated into current procurement models to their benefit but
appear to have been lost in the transition. Under the traditional model the client
generally employs the design team to separately design the project and provide
an independent scrutiny of the performance of the contractor selected to build
it.
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10.1.2 On medium to larger projects this would generally have also involved the
employment of Clerks of Works or Resident Engineers, who would be the eyes
and ears of the design team on site and undertake on-going inspections of all
aspects of the works. Specialist Clerks of Works would be employed to provide
this service in relation to areas such as the Mechanical and Electrical
installations. For the largest projects, it would be normal that resident architects
and engineers would be based on the site to inspect and report on the quality of
work and to require the removal and replacement of any sub-standard
construction.
10.1.3 This in no way removed the fundamental responsibility from contractors to

undertake the detailed supervision of the work to ensure it was built to the right
quality in accordance with that specified by the design team in the contract
documents. Contractors, sub-contractors and even individual tradesmen, are of
course expected to operate effective quality assurance processes in relation to
their own work, however it is self-evident that clients receive an extra level of
assurance through inspections not carried out by those organisations or
individuals that have done the work.
10.1.4 With the increasing adoption over recent years by the public sector of other
models of procurement under which the design team is employed, and their
terms of employment determined, by the building contractors, the level of
independent scrutiny of construction has been significantly reduced. This
situation would generally be typical of the approach used in Public Private
Partnership arrangements, as exemplified by the PPP1 schools.
10.1.5 All the architects, engineers, building control officers and other professional
representatives of public sector client bodies, who gave evidence to the Inquiry,
expressed concern as to the impact of the increasing lack of independent
scrutiny on the quality of construction in the industry.
10.1.6 A strongly shared view, expressed to the Inquiry by many witnesses, was that
the reduced requirement for visits by the design team to site was now an
increasingly common feature in the conditions of appointment of design teams
as set by the contractors employing them. Many saw this as preventing the
designers of buildings playing an effective and necessary role in ensuring that
the design intent behind their drawings and specifications is actually understood
and implemented on site. This point, while generally applicable, has a particular
significance in relation to the structural design and construction of masonry
walls.
10.1.7 It was stated by many witnesses that, in their recent experience, it was now
much rarer for public sector bodies either to employ in-house Clerks of Work or
to recruit them from external agencies for projects. The increasing diminution in
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the use of Clerks of Work by the public sector was considered by many witnesses
to be a real risk to quality. A consultant structural engineer, whose evidence to
the Inquiry typified the sentiments expressed by many other witnesses, said:
"With regard to the role of the Clerk of Works, I am a big fan, particularly
in public sector projects. They are usually tradesmen, who have come up
through their trade and know the shortcuts that the tradesmen on site
may try to take. Certainly, if you could re-introduce the Clerk of Works on-
site more widely, that would go some way to restoring public confidence
in the quality of buildings."
10.1.8 Several of the representatives of contracting organisations who gave evidence to

the Inquiry also stated that they saw benefit and value in having a properly
qualified Clerk of Works as an extra pair of eyes on site.
10.1.9 As a result of the predominance of these new models of procurement for public
sector projects, reliance is now increasingly being placed almost entirely on the
internal quality assurance processes of contractors, effectively requiring them to
police themselves.
10.1.10 For these essential arrangements to work effectively, requires the establishment
of a wide range of detailed protocols for appropriate inspections by suitably
qualified and trained personnel of the various elements of construction.
However, such systems are only effective if what is contained within the written
quality assurance files is actually implemented on site.
10.1.11 To do so contractors must invest in sufficient properly qualified management

and supervisory staff, who are prepared to condemn without question sub-
standard work undertaken by their own company and others, and are under no
pressures in terms of the impact such condemnations may have on additional
costs to their employer or resultant potentially expensive delays to programmes.
Inevitably, there is the potential for conflicts of interest to arise in such
circumstances.
10.1.12 There are many factors which can be seen as having potentially contributed to
both the collapse of the wall and the failure to construct the masonry external
walls in accordance with the required standards for resistance to wind-loading.
10.1.13 However, it is the unequivocally held view of the Inquiry that there were
fundamental and widespread failures of the quality assurance processes of the
various contractors and sub-contractors, who built or oversaw the building of
the PPP1 schools, to identify and rectify both defective construction of the
cavity walls and the omission of the proper incorporation of secondary
steelwork.
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10.1.14 Given the widespread nature of the presence of defective construction in

terms of varying cavity width and lack of embedment of wall ties, the Inquiry
can only conclude that those responsible for the supervision and quality
assurance of this work either did not inspect the work adequately or did
inspect it and failed to take appropriate action to have it removed or
remedied.
10.1.15 It is of considerable concern to the Inquiry that the same defects and omissions
were present to greater or lesser degrees in all 17 projects, even though they
were constructed over a period of several years by a range of different
contractors and bricklaying sub-contractors, each no doubt with their own
quality assurance systems in place.
10.1.16 The reports on fire-stopping, which have just recently been completed, would
equally appear to demonstrate a failure of quality assurance processes on the
part of the various contractors and sub-contractors involved to ensure the
satisfactory installation of building elements specifically designed to protect the
safety of the users of buildings.
10.1.17 This inevitably raises the question as to whether these failures of quality
assurance systems are restricted to the 17 PPP1 school buildings in Edinburgh or
are likely to be found in other school buildings in Edinburgh and elsewhere in
Scotland and the U.K., or are likely to be found in recent buildings generally.
10.1.18 In order to seek further information as to whether the primary cause of the
collapse, the lack of embedment of wall ties, and the omissions of secondary
steelwork were as a result of particular failings of the contractors engaged on
the PPP1 schools, or whether the cause was related to more generic failings
within the construction industry, the Inquiry sought information from all 32
Local Authorities in Scotland as to whether they had encountered or discovered
evidence of similar defects in their buildings. The outcome of these inquiries
revealed that similar faults had been identified in a number of schools
throughout Scotland. Evidence provided to the Inquiry from these sources
suggests that significant failings in quality assurance are still occurring in the
present-day construction of buildings for Local Authorities and other public
bodies.
10.1.19 The facts, as provided in evidence, show that the same recurring faults were
discovered in buildings built by different contractors, different bricklaying sub-
contractors and different bricklayers at different times. There is no doubt that
the nature of these faults could result in serious consequences for users of the
buildings.
10.1.20 Accordingly, based on the evidence of defective construction provided, the

Inquiry has come to the view that, it is insufficient for public sector clients with
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a responsibility to protect the safety of the communities they serve, to rely

solely on the quality assurance processes of contractors for confirmation that
key aspects of the construction of buildings, impacting on the safety of users,
have been properly constructed.
10.1.21 It is completely possible and practical for appropriate levels of independent

scrutiny, provided by a range of professionals, especially the use of Clerks of
Works, to be incorporated into the new procurement methodologies that are
increasingly being used to procure public buildings.
10.2 EMPLOYMENT OF CLERKS OF WORKS TO PROTECT QUALITY
10.2.1 Several witnesses to the Inquiry suggested that the principal reason that Clerks
of Works have not tended to be included is related to both a lack of awareness
on the part of those designing such models of the need for independent
inspection and, perhaps more usually, a desire to drive down the cost of
projects.
10.2.2 In the case of the PPP1 schools, the Inquiry was advised by witnesses that the
approach adopted by the Council was that ESP was seen as being completely
responsible for all aspects of the design and building process and that the
Council saw itself as having a very limited role in relation to ensuring the quality
of the construction.
10.2.3 As a result, the Council did not seek to employ, or have any of its agents employ,
Clerks of Works to provide on-going independent inspection of the quality of
construction of the schools and of compliance with the construction drawings. In
this regard the Council was by no means out of step as this approach was that
being generally promulgated and adopted across the country on PPP projects.
10.2.4 However, information provided by several other Local Authorities in Scotland

indicated that they had retained Clerk of Works to provide independent
inspection of their PPP programmes for new schools.
10.2.5 An argument that is frequently put forward, by those promoting a more hands-
off approach by public sector clients, is that there is a single entity to sue if
something goes wrong with the building and there are no complications as to
whom is responsible for failures, leaving no direct liability with the public body.
10.2.6 This argument is probably acceptable if it were only ever to be found necessary
to recover the cost of remedial construction and related disruption. It appears
much less robust, if, because of unsafe construction, lives were lost or members
of the public injured as could so easily have been the outcome in the case of
Oxgangs Primary School.
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10.2.7 The fact that no injury or fatality occurred in the Oxgangs situation was a
matter of timing and luck.
10.2.8 The Inquiry is strongly of the view that there should be a greater emphasis on
providing the correct resources and mechanisms at the start of a project, to
prevent things going wrong, rather than designing an approach to
procurement which has as its focus, ease of litigation when matters do go
wrong.
10.3 EFFECTIVENESS OF THE INDEPENDENT CERTIFIER IN PROTECTING QUALITY
10.3.1 With the introduction and expansion of the PPP methodology, the role of
Independent Tester or Independent Certifier was developed to provide a
process for testing followed by formal certification that the respective
obligations of each party are met and that service availability is achieved in
accordance with the requirements of the contract.
10.3.2 There was evidence of a view amongst some Council Officers that this
Independent Certifier function would provide the necessary quality assurance
through its monitoring of the work.
10.3.3 The appointment of the Independent Certifiers is a joint appointment between

the parties to the Contract. How this role is undertaken in practice can vary
significantly from project to project but as generally practised it in no way
replicates the level of close on-going independent scrutiny or inspection of
construction that is provided by a Clerk of Works service. Visits by Independent
Certifiers to site and time spent by them on site are much less frequent and
rigorous than what is provided by a project Clerk of Works.
10.3.4 It is most unlikely that the nature of defects that have been discovered and
which led to the collapse of the Oxgangs wall would have been identified at the
level of scrutiny generally applied by Independent Certifiers. To discover such
defects, the level of detailed inspection similar to that undertaken by a properly
resourced and experienced Clerk of Works service would have been required.
10.3.5 From evidence provided to the Inquiry, it was clear, however, that false
assumptions were made by the Council and other parties, including
shareholders, regarding the level of assurance one could place on the quality of
construction as a result of the role undertaken by the Independent Certifiers.
10.4 IMPACT OF COUNCIL INTERNAL RESOURCING ON QUALITY ASSURANCE
10.4.1 From the evidence provided to the Inquiry, it is clear that in the period prior to
the signing of the PPP1 Project Agreement, the Council recognised the need for
appropriate procedural compliance and sought to act in accordance with the
central guidance on PPP. However, it was also clear that the Council itself had
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few people within the organisation with significant knowledge and expertise in
the delivery of major programmes of works undertaken through the PPP
process.
10.4.2 This was the first time the Council had used the PPP methodology and perhaps
explains why the organisational structure did not appear to have sufficient
project experience and professional, technical or procurement skills in terms of
the composition and resourcing of the project board and project team.
10.4.3 A project of this size and complexity would normally require a fully resourced,
dedicated team on a full-time basis. Many of the inputs from the various
essential skill sets across the Council were on a part-time basis, as most people
were still required to undertake their normal day-to-day jobs. This deficit was
helped by the recruitment of a professionally qualified project manager, who
had been involved in the Glasgow Schools PPP project, but the Council was still
extremely dependent on the input of external advisers.
10.4.4 Despite these limitations in expertise, resources and organisational

arrangements, because of the combined and committed input of those involved,
the programme for the new schools was delivered broadly on time, which, given
these circumstances, was a considerable achievement.
10.5 COUNCIL INTERNAL REVIEW OF PERFORMANCE ON PPP1 PROJECT
10.5.1 The Council officers must also be given credit for undertaking in February 2002,
only three months after the signing of the Project Agreement, a structured
workshop to review how they had managed the procurement of Phase 1 of the
PPP1 project. It was attended by senior officers from the various departments of
the Council who had been involved in the project up to that point.
10.5.2 The record of the workshop, being so close to the completion of this stage of the
project, probably presents the best evidence to the Inquiry as to an accurate
reflection of the perception of Council officers at the time of the success of the
project in delivering a quality outcome.
10.5.3 The workshop acknowledged the success of the project in achieving handover
dates that matched their initial projections. It was also felt by those attending
that their process of consultation with stakeholders throughout the period had
been thorough and effective. The following are extracts from the record of the
workshop:
"Overall it is recognised that the Council team and project manager, in

conjunction with advisers did an excellent job in delivering PPP1."
10.5.4 The conclusions from the workshop, however, also identified some key areas
which would have benefitted from a greater focus in the stages leading up to the
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signing of the Project Agreement. The following are extracts from the Council
record of the review.
"INADEQUATE INTERNAL RESOURCING OF THE PROJECT
"Resourcing is considered to be the biggest failing of this project. Due to

project pressures, a number of unacceptable management practices were
adopted by the Council whereby intolerable pressures were put on
individuals to "get the job done." It is recommended that an appropriately
staffed, dedicated, project team should be established for future projects."
PROJECT BOARD NOT CLOSE ENOUGH TO PROJECT
"It is noted on occasion that the full Project Board did not have an overall
view of the important issues facing the project. It is recommended that
the Project Board should be limited and consist of key representation only
in order that they are close enough to the project to make truly informed
decisions."
LACK OF INNOVATION
"The team noted that there was an element of disappointment from the
technical teams in the lack of innovation seen in the bidders' responses. In
future, the balance between innovative and prescriptive approaches to
design should be agreed such that the Council objectives are understood
and achieved."
DESIGN QUALITY
"It was considered that design as an issue did not get the priority it
deserved."
"Design is considered OK and adequate, not outstanding in aesthetics, but

functionally suitable."
"……. had wanted a parallel to the secondary schools in Leith………. where

exciting and innovative design was achieved."
"Should have had a stronger idea of vision for the future, needed more
time."
10.5.5 In June 2004, after completion of the construction and a period of occupation of
the Phase 1 PPP1 schools, the Executive Team of the Council undertook a second
review of the PPP1 project to agree any further revisions required in their
approach to the separate forth-coming PPP2 project for a further eight schools.
This review involved significant consultation with stakeholders to seek their
views on PPP1. The resultant paper listed the perceived successes of the PPP1
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project and issues that should receive greater attention in PPP2. The successes
were recorded as:
 "Improved environment for students, staff and community users
 Modern P.E. facilities
 Bright, open and airy spaces
 Flexibility of teaching spaces in primary schools
 The valuing of school communities."
10.5.6 Amongst the issues arising from PPP1 the following points were recorded:
 "Planning and resources should be invested in ensuring that the external

environment has high quality learning, social and play spaces and greater
attention should be given to the aesthetic aspects of design of buildings…
 Specify precisely what is required in a new building at the beginning of the

project thus avoiding the need for costly and time consuming changes."
10.5.7 The view was expressed at both the 2002 and 2004 reviews of PPP1 that the
design quality in terms of the experience of the spaces within the schools, whilst
clearly providing a far superior environment compared to the schools they were
replacing, did not fully satisfy the aspirations of those involved.
10.5.8 To the credit of the Council, it was determined that design would be given a
much higher profile by the team involved in the PPP2 project and that this
decision would be reflected in a greater weighting being given to design criteria
in the assessment of the bids.
10.5.9 There was clearly a reinforced awareness on the part of the Council, both prior
to the commencement and after the completion of the construction of the
Phase 1 PPP1 schools, of the need as a client to proactively take steps to protect
quality.
10.5.10 Despite the recognition by the Council in the 2002 review that the period up to
the signing of the Project Agreement had suffered from insufficient resourcing,
evidence to the Inquiry suggested that the Council team suffered from an even
greater lack of resources for the important stages of the detailed development
of the Phase 1 schools that followed.
10.5.11 Several witnesses strongly expressed the view to the Inquiry that there was an
apparent assumption on the part of the Council, perhaps partly due to the lack
of in-house experience in PPP, that the role required of the Council would be
significantly reduced once the Project Agreement was signed and that all
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responsibility then lay on the successful consortium, ESP, to go ahead and

deliver the project, virtually on their own, in accordance with the signed
agreement.
10.5.12 This assumption could be viewed as somewhat naive on the part of the Council,
but advice from Government agencies at the time tended to support this
approach. In fact, a statement still on the Scottish Government's website, dated
as recently as 2009 on 'Non-Profit Distributing Public Private Partnerships'
includes the following commentary:
"The differences (between PPP and more conventional procurement

models) are in the nature of the work undertaken at each stage, notably
the need to focus on specification of outputs, and in the project
management activity after a contract is signed. The client is likely to be
less engaged in monitoring the progress of the construction of any asset
concerned, but will take a close interest in overall progress towards the
delivery of defined service outputs."
10.5.13 As previously described in Section 4, the Council's main interface with the
Consortium, during the demanding period of design development of the Phase 1
PPP1 schools, following the signing of the Project Agreement, was reduced for
several months to virtually a single Council officer with no previous experience
of major projects. This team was eventually only increased to a team of four
Council officers.
10.5.14 The Inquiry was advised that insufficient funding had been put in place by the
Council to provide a properly resourced internal team for this stage of the
process and that the original team of technical advisers who provided support to
the project from within the various Council departments, had been sent back to
their substantive roles and were no longer associated with the project.
10.5.15 It is during this period that the more detailed design solutions for the schools
evolved, including the frequent submission of developed or revised drawings for
review by the client, the assessment and approval of room layouts, requests for
changes, consultation with the schools, cost management and confirmation of
materials, furniture, fittings and equipment being offered by the Consortium in
relation to all 13 projects in Phase 1. These deliberations and negotiations are a
fundamental element of the PPP process in terms of their potential impact on
the final quality of the scheme and need a client team that is properly resourced
and skilled to deal with them.
10.5.16 The Inquiry was advised that the small team, amongst all the other demands it
faced, regularly struggled to cope with reviewing and approving large quantities
of drawings, many hundreds in total, which would arrive in the Project Team's
office requiring rapid turn-round by ESP. Despite the immense pressure placed
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on the members of the small team that undertook this role, they succeeded in
maintaining the required rate of progress for the project and in so doing showed
great commitment to the success of the project.
10.5.17 The issue that subsequently arose in relation to the inadequate construction of
the walls was not related to this particular lack of applied Council resources.
10.5.18 It is clear to the Inquiry that the Council itself recognised that it had
significantly failed to understand the demands of the PPP process in terms of
providing adequate internal resources, and that as a result significantly under-
resourced the in-house team that represented the Council as client in the
relationship with the Consortium.
10.5.19 It is also clear to the Inquiry that Council officers were not satisfied that the
process had optimised the opportunity for a higher overall design quality and
acknowledged that insufficient focus and time had been allocated to this issue.
10.6 COUNCIL ADMINISTRATION OF STATUTORY BUILDING STANDARDS
10.6.1 Building Standards within Edinburgh are administered by the City of Edinburgh
Council. In so doing those Council staff responsible for undertaking this function
are required to act in the same manner for building projects undertaken by the
Council as for building projects undertaken by any other client. The evidence to
the Inquiry would suggest that this was the case in relation to the PPP1 schools.
10.6.2 In a significant number of cases, witnesses to the Inquiry from both the Council
and other bodies, commented that they had taken confidence in the build
quality of the schools from the fact that they had all undergone independent
scrutiny from the Independent Certifiers, jointly appointed by ESP and the City
of Edinburgh Council, and had been subjected to the statutory Building
Standards processes of design warrants, site inspections and completion
certificates.
10.6.3 The Inquiry formed the view that there was a common misconception, even
among some Council officers, as to the extent of the reliance that can be
placed on the quality of construction of a building that has gone through the
statutory Buildings Standards process.
10.6.4 Before describing specific issues associated with the processing of the building
warrants and completion certificates for these projects, it would be useful to put
into context the nature of the Building Standards process in terms of its
underlying purpose and the level of inspection of design and construction
generally undertaken to meet this requirement.
10.6.5 It should be noted that as the PPP1 schools were completed in 2005 they were
processed under the previous Building Standards system as laid down in the
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Building (Scotland) Act 1959. This was repealed and replaced by the Building
Scotland (Act) 2003, facilitating the introduction of a new Building Standards
system, which became effective on 1st May 2005.
10.6.6 The following is an extract from a paper provided to the Inquiry by the Building
Standards Division of the Scottish Government explaining the core objective of
the regulations.
"The system is intended to ensure that building work on both new and
existing buildings results in buildings that meet reasonable standards. The
standards are set out in the building regulations, which in terms of the
Act, include securing the health, safety, welfare and convenience of
persons in or about buildings and of others who may be affected by
buildings or matters connected with buildings.
The purpose of the building standards system is to protect the public

interest. It is not intended to provide protection to a client in a contract
with a builder. The system, therefore, does not so much control building
but rather sets out the essential standards to be met when building work
or a conversion takes place and only to the extent necessary to meet the
building regulations.
The system is pre-emptive, designed to check that the proposed building

work meets the standards. Inspections during construction and on
completion are to protect the public interest in terms of compliance with
the building regulations and to discourage avoidance of the legislation.
The inspections do not provide a system to control work on site, that is a
matter for the contracts and arrangements put in place between the client
and builder."
10.6.7 Despite the changes to the system introduced in 2005, the essential
responsibilities of Building Standards Departments remained similar to those
under the previous system. Under both the previous and present systems
Building Standards Departments are:
 "responsible for the independent checking of plans and specifications

before a building warrant is approved, but only for the purposes of
ensuring that the design complies with the building regulations; and
 are required to satisfy themselves that the construction meets the

approved drawings and regulations."
10.6.8 Under the older system, which applied to the PPP1 schools, the Building
Standards Department would inspect the building during construction to ensure
that the work was carried out in accordance with the drawings and
172
specifications included in the issued warrant. Visits to site were planned to allow
monitoring of critical aspects of the construction but were at the discretion of
the building control officer. There were only two notifications required to be
made to building control; one at the start of the works and one on the
completion of the works.
10.6.9 When the building work was complete, an application was required to be made
for a completion certificate to the Building Standards Department, who were
required to carry out a final inspection within 14 days. The final inspection was
to ensure that the building complied with the approved drawings, including any
subsequent amendments to them. Following a satisfactory final site inspection,
a completion certificate would be issued. It should be noted that it was, and
remains, an offence to occupy or use a new building for which a completion
certificate had not been issued.
10.6.10 From the above it is evident that the Building Standards system is not designed
or intended to give the level of assurance that a client may require in relation to
the more detailed aspects of the construction of a building.
10.6.11 It was acknowledged by several of the professionally qualified witnesses who

gave evidence to the Inquiry that the system tended to place a greater focus and
allocate more of its resources on the approval of design drawings prior to the
issue of a warrant than on the process of ensuring that buildings were actually
constructed in accordance with the approved warrant.
10.6.12 This seems somewhat at odds with the focus of the Building (Scotland) Act of
"securing the health, safety, welfare and convenience of persons in or about
buildings", as while it is essential to have design subjected to appropriate
scrutiny to ensure that it is properly considered, safe and compliant with
regulations, there is little point in doing so if there is not an equivalent rigour
applied to ensuring that contractors actually comply with what is on the
approved drawings and seek approval for any amendments they may make to
these on site.
10.6.13 Prior to 1992 in relation to the design of the structure of buildings, all structural
calculations and drawings had been required to be submitted to local authorities
for checking as part of the warrant application. Regulations introduced in 1992
allowed self-certification of the structural design by chartered Civil or Structural
Engineers. The Inquiry was advised by a senior Edinburgh building standards
officer that, when this system of self-certification was adopted by the design
teams, as was the case with the PPP1 schools, building control officers would:
"check the certificates and do a brief review of the structural drawings.

There were not usually any calculations submitted."
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10.6.14 Drawings submitted for building warrant approval are inevitably not as
comprehensive or detailed as drawings required for actual construction. In this
regard, it was stated:
"We wouldn't see drawings and specifications of that kind. If there was a
note regarding a particular specification that was fine, but ultimately, the
applicant was self-certifying the quality of the structural design proposed.
We wouldn't look beyond that."
10.6.15 The Inquiry sought information on the level of detail in relation to the structural
design of cavity walls, including the provision of secondary steelwork and
components such as head-restraints, that the Edinburgh Building Control
Officers would have expected to see or consider. The Inquiry was advised that:
"The drawings produced would generally not be sufficient for a contractor

to build from. Specification notes would be attached to the drawings but
that would not give the detail they wanted."
10.6.16 It was recognised, with the introduction of the new Building Standards system in
2005 that, unfortunately, the system of simply requiring signed certificates from
qualified civil or structural engineers had been subject to abuse and was no
longer considered sufficiently robust to ensure that the necessary design checks
had been undertaken by those signing the certificates.
10.6.17 In 2005 a guidance note entitled 'A NEW BUILDING STANDARDS SYSTEM FOR
SCOTLAND' was produced by the Scottish Buildings Standards Agency in
collaboration with Structural Engineers Registration Ltd. It included the following
statement in relation to the self-certification system that had been used up to
then:
"Those regulations, however, became widely regarded as inadequate to

provide an acceptable level of public safety as the absence of a statutory
checking requirement made the possibility of human error a serious risk. A
further problem arose from a lack of common understanding as to how
much of the development was "structure" and therefore covered by the
certificate."
10.6.18 This last issue, in relation to practice within the construction industry, as to what
constituted structural detail as opposed to building or architectural detail was
raised in interviews by several of the witnesses. This was principally in relation to
which of the design team's documentation should include the information on
the design and construction of the cavity walls: whether on architectural
drawings, structural engineering drawings or on both; and whether necessary
supporting information on items such as wall ties and other secondary
174
steelwork, that is normally included in specifications, should also be required to

be fully incorporated on drawings.
10.6.19 A more standardised approach to this issue would assist the checking of
information of this type by building control officers as part of the examination of
documents submitted for warrant approval.
10.6.20 The Inquiry is of the view that all relevant structural information, details and
specifications impacting on the structural integrity of the building should be
included on the structural engineers' drawings in a form which is fully
integrated with the architectural design.
10.6.21 It also emerged, in the evidence to the Inquiry, that the lack of accessibility by
bricklayers on site to this information presented in a practical and manageable
form was viewed by many as potentially contributing to quality issues of the
type found in the PPP1 schools.
10.7 BUILDING STANDARDS CERTIFICATION – PPP1 PHASE 1
10.7.1 The building warrant process in Scotland is a pre-emptive system that seeks to
ensure that buildings are designed and constructed to meet the standards set in
the building regulations. It was an offence against the Building (Scotland) Act
1959, and still is against the current Building (Scotland) Act 2003, to start work
without warrant, where one is required.
10.7.2 The process of submission of documents for warrant approval for the Phase 1
schools commenced with applications for three schools in June 2001, five
months prior to the signing of the Project Agreement in November 2001. The
warrant applications for the remaining Phase 1 schools, with the exception of
Forthview and Castleview primary schools which came later, were submitted in
July and August 2001, also in advance of the signing of the Project Agreement.
10.7.3 Many of the warrant applications were made in stages to facilitate early starts
on site. The records, provided to the Inquiry by the Building Standards
Department of the Council, indicate that all the Phase 1 schools had received
approved warrants, approved stage warrants or approved amendment to
warrants.
10.7.4 However, in the case of at least six of these schools, the information provided by
the Council would indicate that, in contravention of the requirement, work
commenced on site prior to a warrant being approved. The periods by which
construction preceded the issue of the required approved warrants varied from
one to two months, up to more than a year.
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10.7.5 The Building Standards system that applied at the time of these submissions was
set down in the Building (Scotland) Act 1959. In relation to commencing work
prior to issue of a warrant it states:
"No person shall (a) in any place conduct any operations for the
construction or demolition of a building of a class to which the building
standards regulations apply, or (b) change the use of any building unless
there has been obtained from the buildings authority a warrant for the
construction, demolition or change of use, as the case may be, and any
person who contravenes this subsection shall be guilty of an offence
against this Act."
10.7.6 The records also show that the initial warrant application for Gracemount High
School, submitted for approval on 17th August 2001, was only approved on 20th
May 2003, just several months before the school opened. An amendment to the
warrant for the same school, applied for on 12th October 2001, was only
approved on 31st March 2008, some five years after the school opened.
10.7.7 The information provided by Edinburgh Buildings Standards Department further

show that the mandatory submission to Building Standards of notifications of
commencement to start work, prior to the actual commencement of work, was
only complied with by AMJV or its agents in the case of three of the 17 PPP1
projects. There is, however, a record of a sequence of visits during construction
by Building Control officers to all the sites, which will be commented on later in
this section.
10.7.8 In relation to the issue of the legally required Completion Certificates, the
records provided to the Inquiry would suggest that a number of the school
buildings were occupied for periods in advance of the issue of a Completion
Certificate by Building Standards. The periods, in most cases, ranged from a few
months to over two years.
10.7.9 This would represent a breach of the requirements of the relevant Act, unless as
provided for in the Act, Temporary Occupation Certificates were issued in
relation to these schools.
10.7.10 Sub-section 5 of Clause 9 of the Building (Scotland) Act 1959 states:
"……no person shall occupy or use a building (being a building which has
been constructed by virtue of a warrant granted under this Act) before a
certificate of completion in respect of the building has been issued by the
buildings authority, and any person who wilfully contravenes this
subsection shall be guilty of an offence against this Act ……."
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10.7.11 Two of the Phase 1 schools, Craigmount High School and Royal High School, have
never received Completion Certificates issued by Building Standards. In the case
of a third school, Gracemount High school, the Completion Certificate was only
applied for on 18th May 2010 and issued by Building Standards on 7th June 2010,
some seven years after the school was occupied.
10.7.12 The Inquiry was advised that prior to the occupation of these latter three
schools, Temporary Occupation Certificates were applied for by AMJV and
granted by Building Standards.
10.7.13 The issue of Temporary Occupation Certificates indicated that Building

Standards had been generally content with what they had seen on their final
inspection of a school but required the submission of amended drawings so they
could examine the detail of what had been changed in the design from the
original approved drawings. The new drawings would then require approval to
allow for the issue of an amendment to the warrant and a further visit to the site
by Building Standards to check compliance of the amended areas of the building,
prior to issue of a completion certificate.
10.7.14 The amendments to an original design can often be in relation to minor aspects
of a project, but until the extent of changes is defined and shown by the re-
submission of amended drawings, the necessary assurance that they are
compliant with the regulations cannot be given.
10.7.15 A Temporary Occupation Certificate can be issued following an assessment of

risk by the building inspector based on what can be seen on site and from any
available documentation as to the level of completeness of the construction and
safety systems to allow the building to be occupied. They do not give the same
level of assurance as is provided by a Completion Certificate.
10.7.16 The Temporary Occupation Certificates that were issued for the three schools
mentioned above, expired after the maximum allowed statutory period of three
years, during which period there was no submission of the required drawings
showing the amendments to the design, effectively leaving the continuing
occupation of all three schools to be a contravention of the regulations
administered by the Council itself.
10.7.17 Following the introduction of the new Building Standards system in 2005, there
was a limited transitional period provided for, during which a building owner
could retrospectively apply for a full Completion Certificate after the expiry date
of a Temporary Occupation Certificate issued under the previous system.
10.7.18 Under this interim arrangement such an application was made and approved in
respect of Gracemount High School. However, this was only done in June 2010
meaning that, for a period of approximately four years after the expiry of the
177
Temporary Occupation Certificate, Gracemount High School did not have a

legitimate Completion Certificate.
10.7.19 No such application was made in respect of the two other High Schools named
above which remain without Completion Certificates. The Inquiry was advised by
Edinburgh Building Standards that the time limit allowed in the transitional
period to apply retrospectively for Completion Certificates has now expired. As a
result of this Inquiry, Edinburgh Building Standards is seeking to regularise the
situation in relation to these schools.
10.8 BUILDING STANDARDS CERTIFICATION – PPP1 PHASE 2
10.8.1 In relation to the four Phase 2 schools, the records provided to the Inquiry
indicate that both Oxgangs and Braidburn Schools were occupied in the first half
of 2005. Temporary Occupation certificates were issued for both prior to
opening, however, the Completion Certificates for both these schools were not
issued by Building Standards until July of 2006, a full year later.
10.8.2 In the case of Firrhill School the Completion Certificate was issued in June 2005
whereas the Availability Certificate was issued three months earlier in March
2005. The Council have confirmed to the Inquiry that a Temporary Occupancy
Certificate was also issued in March 2005.
10.8.3 The Certificate of Completion for the fourth Phase 2 project, St. Peter's Primary
School, was issued in November 2005, very shortly after the date the school was
occupied.
10.8.4 The Inquiry asked why Edinburgh Buildings Standards had not pursued the
failure by ESP, AMJV or their agents to apply for the legally required completion
certificates, prior to the occupation of the schools or at all in two of the above
examples.
10.8.5 In response, the Inquiry was advised that it was the legal responsibility of the
building owner/developer, in these cases ESP, to ensure applications were made
at the commencement of and on the completion of the construction of buildings
and that it was not a responsibility, requirement or practice of the Building
Standards Department to take the initiative in actively seeking such applications,
including those for Completion Certificates.
10.8.6 The Inquiry was advised that unfortunately failures of building owners under the
old system to apply for a Completion Certificate or now, under the new system,
to submit an acceptable Completion Certificate to Building Standards for
verification by them, are not unusual occurrences. Rarely, if ever, have
proceedings been taken or sanctions applied to those who fail to do so.
178
10.8.7 The Inquiry then sought the views of the senior representative of Edinburgh
Building Standards Department as to the effectiveness of these arrangements
for ensuring the safety of buildings and their compliance with regulations in light
of the described position.
10.8.8 The Inquiry was advised that there is no internal structured system to contact
those contravening the law in this regard in circumstances where, after an
approved warrant has been issued, either the applicant does not advise Building
Standards of a date of commencement of work or, if Building Standards had
been notified that work had started, the applicant does not apply for a
Completion Certificate when the work is actually complete.
10.8.9 It would appear to the Inquiry that, in such circumstances, the safety of
buildings, and the compliance of buildings with the regulations designed to
protect users, cannot be assured to the degree intended by the Building
(Scotland) Act 2003, unless a more systematic approach is adopted in the
administration of the processes.
10.8.10 It is the view of the Inquiry that there were significant failures on the part of
those responsible for managing the process of ensuring compliance with the
statutory Building Standards requirements for the PPP1 schools. The ultimate
responsibility to make the necessary applications lay with the developer ESP.
10.8.11 It is also the view of the Inquiry that the effectiveness of the Building
(Scotland) Act 2003 and its 1959 predecessor, in delivering the key stated
policy objective of,
"securing the health, safety, welfare and convenience of persons in or about

buildings"
could be severely compromised if the processes used to implement it do not

include systematic administrative arrangements to identify, pursue and
sanction those who fail to comply with its statutory requirements.
10.8.12 Under the Building (Scotland) Act 1959, both the failure to have an approved
warrant prior to the commencement of construction and, possibly more
seriously, the failure to have an approved Completion Certificate prior to the
occupation of a building constitute offences against the Act.
10.8.13 There is no evidence to suggest that the failure to comply with these mandatory
legal requirements had any direct impact on the quality of the PPP1 buildings
and the occurrences of defective construction subsequently identified.
10.8.14 However, the failure to do so does suggest a less than fully professional
approach on the part of those involved in managing the delivery of the projects
to fully comply with or observe standard procedural requirements.
179
10.9 ISSUE OF AVAILABILITY CERTIFICATES BY INDEPENDENT CERTIFIERS
10.9.1 A fundamental aspect of the PPP Project Agreement is the signing of the
'Availability Certificates' by the Independent Certifier. In the case of the Phase 1
schools this role was undertaken by Mouchel and in the case of the Phase 2
schools, by Arup (Scotland).
10.9.2 The signing of the Availability Certificates represents a statement by the

Independent Certifier that the project has been completed in accordance with
the requirements of the Project Agreement and is ready for occupation. On the
completion of this form by the Independent Certifier for each school, the format
of which is included in the Project Agreement, ESP were entitled to commence
charging the Council for the provision of that school's facilities and the related
services. Up until this form was signed, ESP were not entitled to any payment
from the Council.
10.9.3 The Council was unable to locate or provide the Inquiry with copies of
completed Availability Certificates for any of the Phase 1 schools. In relation to
the Phase 2 schools the Council was only able to produce a copy of a completed
Availability Certificate Type 2 (Project Agreement) issued in relation to Firrhill
High School.
10.9.4 Given the fundamental importance of the issue of these certificates, both for
declaring the buildings available for use and as the mechanism to entitle the
commencement of the flow of payments to ESP by the Council, the Inquiry
consider it reasonable to assume that all 17 were issued. However, considering
their importance, the Inquiry finds it disappointing that the records and archives
system of the Council was unable to produce them.
10.9.5 Following similar requests by the Inquiry to ESP and Galliford Try, the only
further certificate made available to the Inquiry was a copy of a completed
Availability Certificate Type 1 (Design and Build Contract) for Oxgangs, also a
Phase 2 school, as provided by Galliford Try from their records.
10.9.6 The Project Agreement required a copy of both type 1 (D&B Contract) and type 2
(Main Project Agreement) Availability Certificates to be completed for each
school. The five clauses that were the central element of the two forms were
virtually identical. Clauses (2) and (3) of these five in both cases contained the
following statements:
"(2) all Required Consents for Oxgangs primary School have been obtained
(3) the certificates being (i) building control certificates and (ii) the
relevant certificates referred to in Part 8 of the Schedule to the D&B
180
Contract and listed in the Appendix hereto, have been obtained and
approved."
10.9.7 From this, it is clear that a Completion Certificate, which is perhaps the most
significant of the Building Control certificates, or at least a Temporary
Occupation Certificate, would have already have had to be issued to allow the
Independent Certifier to complete the Availability Certificate for each school.
10.9.8 The Inquiry has been unable to verify if the signed Availability Certificates were
qualified to reflect the issue of only Temporary Occupation Certificates, or if
such certificates were available at the time of the actual occupation of each
school. There is no indication on the two Availability Certificates, for Oxgangs
Primary School and Firrhill High School, that were provided to the Inquiry, that
they had been issued only on the basis of a Temporary Occupation Certificate
although that is clearly the case from the information provided by Edinburgh
Building Standards.
10.9.9 Copies of the two completed availability certificates that were made available to
the Inquiry are included in Appendix 3 to this Report.
10.9.10 The following table sets out an analysis of the information provided to the
Inquiry in relation to the relative timing of key dates in relation to the
application, approval and certification processes relating to compliance of the
PPP1 schools with Building Standards requirements. In the absence of copies of
all but two of the Availability Certificates, the dates of the issue of the remaining
certificates were provided to the Inquiry from the available records.
10.9.11 The table also records the information provided by the Building Standards
Department in relation to the number of inspection visits to sites that were
undertaken and the number of these, which from an analysis of the records of
the visits, appeared to be focused on drainage issues.
181
ANALYSIS OF BUILDINGS STANDARDS (BS) CERTIFICATION OF PPP1 SCHOOLS

Name of School Date of first Start Date of Number Number Date of last Date of issue Date of
approved Construction of Site of site Temp. of Availability Building
warrant or BS Initial Visits visits to Occupancy Certificate Standards
Site Date made by do with Cert Certificate of
BS drainage Completion
Pirniehall and St 30/11/01 21/12/01 34 27 20/08/02 12/08/02 05/03/03
David's Primary
Schools
Craigroyston 08/01/02 22/02/02 27 25 07/11/02 11/10/02 14/11/03
Primary
Broomhouse and 27/02/02 28/01/02 37 35 19/11/02 18/10/02 22/07/03
St. Joseph's
Primary Schools
Rowanfield 20/02/02 18/02/02 18 16 31/10/02 18/10/02 14/11/02
Craigour Park 20/06/02 19/03/02 28 22 04/12/02 13/12/02 30/07/03

Primary School
Castleview 02/09/02 24/09/02 35 27 06/05/03 02/05/03 11/09/03
Primary School
Gracemount High 20/05/03 22/04/02 38 37 27/06/03 04/07/03 07/06/10
School
Forthview Primary 18/10/02 26/11/02 28 21 27/06/03 11/07/03 04/11/03
School
11
Drummond 12/04/02 19/03/02 18 Not 22/03/02 11/07/03 11/10/05
Community High Known
School
Craigmount High 02/07/02 11/04/02 49 37 25/07/03 25/07/03 No BS
School Completion
Certificate
was ever
issued
Goodtrees 26/03/03 05/03/03 12 8 25/07/03 25/07/03 31/10/03
Neighbourhood
Centre
11
The Royal High 13/03/02 17/01/02 48 18 21/10/02 01/08/03 No BS
School Completion
Certificate
was ever
issued
Howdenhall 12/07/02 19/07/02 31 24 17/10/03 13/10/03 29/10/03
Children's Unit
11 Early Temporary Occupation Certificates were issued to allow completed phases of the building to be occupied whilst
work elsewhere on the same site continued.
182
Name of School Date of first Start Date of Number Number Date of last Date of issue Date of
approved Construction of Site of site Temp. of Availability Building
warrant or BS Initial Visits visits to Occupancy Certificate Standards
Site Date made by do with Cert Certificate of
BS drainage Completion
Oxgangs Primary 27/03/03 09/06/04 21 20 08/02/05 01/03/05 21/07/06
School
12 11
Firrhill High School 19/06/02 28/08/02 3 Not 02/09/02 15/03/05 16/06/05
Known
St Peter's Primary 25/05/04 09/06/04 17 11 30/04/05 08/04/05 04/11/05
Braidburn School 30/01/04 16/07/04 14 11 08/03/05 10/06/05 21/07/06
10.10 SITE INSPECTIONS BY EDINBURGH BUILDINGS STANDARDS DEPARTMENT
10.10.1 As previously stated it became apparent from the evidence provided to the
Inquiry that there was a general misconception both on the part of some
members of the staff of the Council and by others from external bodies, even
those associated with the construction industry, as to the extent and purpose of
site inspections undertaken as part of the Building Standards system.
10.10.2 The system that was in place in Scotland in 2003 was not dramatically different
from the new system introduced in 2005 regarding site visits by building control
officers. It required that occasional inspections were undertaken by building
control officers to check that buildings as constructed were being built in
accordance with approved warrant drawings and were, as far as could be
established by their visits, compliant with the regulations.
10.10.3 However, this is in no way meant that Building Control officers were responsible
for checking the quality of work done by builders or for supervising them in
undertaking their work. Under the 2005 revised Building (Scotland) Act, which
did not apply to the PPP1 schools, it is clear that responsibility for compliance
with the regulations lies with the relevant person (the developer or owner) and
any checks undertaken by Building Standards Departments as verifiers do not
remove any responsibility from the relevant person who is required to certify all
the completed work as being in accordance with the approved plans.
10.10.4 The Inquiry sought information on the quantum and purpose of site visits
undertaken by Building Standards officers to the PPP1 schools during
construction.
10.10.5 The table above presents an analysis of the information provided to the Inquiry
by Edinburgh Building Standards Department. As one can see from the
12 There is an overlap of Building Control records regarding Firrhill HS and Braidburn School as both schools are located
within the same site but approved under different warrants and dual visits were undertaken.
183
information extracted from the reports made of the visits to the PPP1 schools
undertaken by building officers, a preponderance of the effort of the inspections
carried out appears to be related to checking the quality of the drainage
installations, with very limited if any references in site visit notes to inspecting
the main elements of the structure and external envelope of the buildings. The
notes of some visits made reference to checking fire-safety aspects of the works.
10.10.6 The table above shows some variation in the number of visits paid by different
building inspectors to the various schools but there is a reasonable consistency
in this regard.
10.10.7 From this evidence, it is absolutely clear that the focus of the site inspections
was not directed at checking the quality of construction of the external walls nor
of the inclusion or otherwise of head restraints or secondary steelwork
components. Even if this had been the case, given the limited extent of the
detailed construction information that was provided by design teams, or
required by Building Standards as part of the application for warrant, the
inspectors while on site would have been unaware as to what specific design
solutions were being employed to provide the required resistance to wind-
loadings in any particular masonry panel.
10.10.8 The following statements were made as part of the evidence to the Inquiry in
relation to the inspection role of Edinburgh Building Control officers:
"At the time, as now, we focussed a lot on drainage. We undertook open

testing and final testing on every line of drainage because it was a perennial
issue."
"We would not necessarily be checking wall ties or the gauge of steel used or
bolts used in the framework. It was simply not possible."
"There isn't any way of us ensuring that the structural elements specified are
in fact present."
"However, it would be very unlikely for a building inspection to pick upon

anything like a lack of wall head restraints or an issue of wall tie embedment.
My role is very different to that of a Clerk of Works."
10.10.9 Given the sporadic nature and limited frequency of visits to site, a significant
amount of work will normally have been carried out between visits by building
control officers and much of that work may no longer be capable of inspection
other than through intrusive and disruptive investigations.
10.10.10 The wall ties in cavity walls are one of the main components of construction
which, as the walls rapidly close in, become increasingly difficult to check. It is
184
equally difficult to retrospectively check the incorporation of head restraints,

bed joint reinforcement and windposts.
10.10.11 From evidence provided to the Inquiry by the chair of the Local Authority
Building Standards Scotland (LABSS) group, the position adopted by Edinburgh
Building Standards in relation to inspection of wall construction was not
inconsistent with the general approach of other Authorities. He stated:
"Things like wall tie failures would not be picked up by a Construction

Compliance Notification Plan. It is a risk-based inspection process. It
would certainly look at things like foundations, fire-stopping and drainage
which are higher risks. It would not necessarily focus on routine structural
aspects. This is because we have to prioritise the available resources"
"We would only cover wall ties if we happened to be on site and see them
going in, but not otherwise."
10.10.12 Section 6 of this Report referred to the fact that a significant number of
occurrences of defective fire-stopping were identified as a result of recent
specialist surveys undertaken. These defects were found to create breaches to
the integrity of fire-rated partitions or enclosures across the 17 PPP1 projects.
10.10.13 It is likely, given the nature and location of these breaches as recorded in the
reports of these surveys, that a significant proportion had existed from the time
of the original construction of the PPP1 schools.
10.10.14 This is an aspect of construction which should be treated with immense care,
given the potential impact of failure of the integrity of fire compartmentation in
the case of fire. The Inquiry was advised that for this reason it is one of the areas
which, like drainage, receives greater attention from building control officers.
10.10.15 However, in-depth inspections of fire-stopping, like that of the internal

construction quality of cavity walls, can be difficult to undertake as much of the
required fire-stopping is generally located in relatively inaccessible areas of
buildings, such as roof-spaces and vertical ducts.
10.10.16 The inspection of fire-stopping by building control officers as part of their

normal pre-completion inspection of buildings could realistically only be
expected to identify defects that are readily accessible and visible. This level of
inspection could not and would not pretend to offer to clients the level of
assurance required in relation to the integrity of fire compartmentation.
10.10.17 Accordingly, it is the view of the Inquiry that it is inappropriate of clients to act
on the assumption that they can rely solely on the visits to site by building
185
control officers to ensure the quality of the construction of their buildings. This
is equally true of Local Authority clients even though one of their other
functions may be to administer the Building Standards system.
10.11 EFFECTIVENESS OF THE BUILDING STANDARDS SYSTEM
10.11.1 It has already been stated in this Report that an underlying objective of the
Building (Scotland) Act 2003 is:
"to secure the health, safety, welfare and convenience of persons in or

about buildings and of others who may be affected by buildings or
matters connected with building."
10.11.2 This Report has referred to two significant incidents of defective construction:
 the inadequate structural integrity of external masonry wall panels across

17 projects; and
 the widespread occurrence of defects in fire-stopping in the same

buildings.
10.11.3 Both these faults represent risks to the users of these buildings, which is what
the Building (Scotland) Act 2003 seeks to prevent. This would suggest that
perhaps further steps may be necessary in relation to assuring the safety of
buildings and assisting in the delivery of this core objective of Government
policy.
10.11.4 The current process appears to focus resources on ensuring submitted design
information is compliant with the regulations, yet as has been identified in the
case of the PPP1 schools, a lesser focus appears to be applied to ensuring that
what is built is compliant with the approved designs.
10.11.5 It is the view of the Inquiry that it is not appropriate for Building Standards to
be expected to undertake the type and level of detailed inspection that is
necessary to identify in a comprehensive fashion the type of defects discussed
in this Report, but that consideration should be given to requiring better
practice methods of the construction industry that would in turn provide
Buildings Standards with the proper level of assurance in these risk areas.
10.11.6 The principle of certification by approved certifiers of areas of construction such

as electrical and plumbing installations has already been established in the
current Buildings Standards system for Scotland. The evidence provided in this
Report would indicate that the two types of defective construction found in the
PPP1 schools, wall construction and fire-stopping, could perhaps be quite
common occurrences in new buildings but their presence is concealed due to a
combination of the difficulty of access and inadequate inspection.
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10.11.7 In these circumstances, there may be benefit in considering the practicality of

extending the concept of mandatory certification by approved certifiers to
other elements of the building, such as the two areas covered in this Report,
that could potentially pose significant risk to users if not constructed properly.
10.12 CERTIFICATION BY THE INDEPENDENT CERTIFIERS
10.12.1 From the evidence provided to the Inquiry by several witnesses, including
witnesses from both the Council and ESP, there was clearly a significant degree
of reliance placed by the Council and others on the role of the Independent
Certifiers in confirming that the projects were constructed fully in accordance
with the requirements of the Project Agreement.
10.12.2 The specificity of the role has developed with the introduction of the Private
Finance Initiative. It acts to provide under this model of procurement an
independent expert opinion and certification that: the detailed design and
construction of buildings have been carried out in accordance with the
requirements of the Project Agreement; that the buildings in question are now
available for use by the client; and effectively that the provider of the building is
now entitled to payment in line with the agreed payment mechanism.
10.12.3 As previously stated in this Report, the role of the Independent Certifier in
practice, and their time spent on site, tends to be focused towards the
completion stages of projects. As a result, it would be unusual for Independent
Certifiers to have inspected, to any significant level of detail, the build quality of
the core elements of the structure, frame and external envelope of projects to
confirm that the detailed construction of these elements is as required in the
approved design documentation.
10.12.4 The evidence to the Inquiry indicated that some members of the Council staff
did view the issue of the Availability Certificates by the Independent Certifier as
the certification by an independent expert that full compliance with the
requirements of the contract had been achieved, including the quality of
construction and compliance with all requirements of Building Standards. In so
doing they relied on the following clause of the Independent Certifier's
appointment used on the PPP1 projects:
"The Independent Certifier shall:
Observe and monitor mock-ups, fabrication, construction and

installation works so as to satisfy itself that the Project complies with
the requirements of the Project Agreement and any subsequent
compliant design development."
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10.12.5 It is the stated responsibility under this clause that the Independent Tester,
through monitoring and observing construction, satisfy itself that the project
complies with the requirements of the Project Agreement. The most general of
these requirements in relation to the construction of the schools, as specified in
the Project Agreement under 'Council Requirements Section B.6.0
Accommodation Provisions', reads:
"All Project Schools to comply with applicable laws and statutory

standards."
10.12.6 The contract does not specify how an Independent Tester should satisfy itself in
this regard. To do so effectively, would require an intensive regime of
inspections and sign offs of all aspects of the construction where statutory
standards were at risk of not being complied with. The Building Standards in
Scotland come under the heading of statutory standards so it could be implied
that under the terms of the contract the Independent Tester is required to
monitor compliance with Building Standards throughout the project.
10.12.7 It can be argued that it would be unreasonable for a client to expect this level of
assurance from this service, but it should therefore also be clear to the public
sector client as to what the service does and does not provide in terms of
reassurance as to the quality of construction.
10.12.8 The Inquiry was somewhat surprised, although perhaps this is a reflection of the
perceived limited level of involvement of Independent Certifiers in the detail of
projects, that neither of the two companies were approached by any of the key
participants in the aftermath of the wall collapse at Oxgangs School, and at the
subsequent discovery of the extent of defective construction, which under the
general certification of the Independent Certifiers had been certified as
compliant with the requirements of the Project Agreement.
10.12.9 The situation, as previously described in this Report in relation to the significant
differences in the approaches adopted on the two Phases of PPP1 by the two
different Independent Testers appointed under the same conditions of contract,
reinforces the inconsistency in application and expectations of the role.
10.12.10 The Inquiry sought evidence from Mouchel as to the nature of their involvement
and the level of inspections they had carried out as Independent Certifier for the
Phase 1 schools. Unfortunately, the company was unable to provide any specific
information or records as to the PPP1 project, advising the Inquiry that they no
longer held any information on the project and that no one who worked on the
project was still with their company. A Commercial Director from Kier, which
company had acquired Mouchel (recently sold on again to WSP), agreed to meet
with the Inquiry to discuss the nature of the current Independent Certifier role
as delivered by his own company.
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10.12.11 Speaking in a general sense he indicated that his team considered that a greater
level of specification in the appointment of an independent certifier would be
desirable to assist all parties in their understanding of what is to be delivered
which could only be helpful for contracting parties. His experience was that
original tender documents are often not terribly detailed in relation to the
Independent Certifier's role.
10.12.12 The view expressed in evidence to the Inquiry by the Deputy Chief Executive of
the Scottish Futures Trust (SFT) assumed a significant degree of reliance on the
Independent Certifier's role.
"If you accept that the Independent Certifier or tester has the job of
certifying the work then it is also within their remit to certify that the
construction has been done in compliance with the original specification.
Of course, they cannot check each and every variation in the design which
may have been implemented on site. Only those people who oversee
things on a daily basis can do this and that would be the contractors."
10.12.13 In relation to the benefit of the use of Clerks of Works to protect quality on the
part of the public sector client, he stated:
"I have seen no link between the use of Clerks of Works and quality issues.
Overall I have seen no evidence that one approach is more or less quality
conscious."
10.12.14 While this was clearly the experience of the Deputy Chief executive of the SFT,
this experience was very much at variance with those described by many of the
witnesses to the Inquiry.
10.12.15 Previous comments have been made in this Report by the Inquiry as to the
need for greater clarity as to the level of scrutiny of construction that the
Independent Certifier role should be required to undertake and as to the
degree of reliance that can be placed on it by public sector clients in relation to
assurance of build quality.
10.12.16 It is vital that this should be properly understood by staff in public sector client
bodies who may only have a requirement to use these services once or twice
in their careers and may have formed mistaken assumptions as to the nature
of the Independent Certifier role as generally undertaken in practice.
10.12.17 A further related aspect raised in the Inquiry was the nature of the process of
selection and appointment of the Independent Certifiers. Clearly the word
'Independent' is of key importance in this context as the Independent Certifiers
have to carry out a role which shows no favour to either party.
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10.12.18 The Inquiry was informed that the nomination for the appointment of the
Independent Certifiers for the PPP1 was made as a proposal of the private sector
party to the Contract and that there was no process of public advertisement
used to invite applications from interested professional firms, even though this
was required to be a joint appointment with the Council. This approach would
appear to have been in line with that adopted on other PPP projects at the time
and would appear still to be the case in some current procurements.
10.12.19 The Inquiry would suggest that it would be more appropriate if such
appointments are made following compilation of an agreed scope of the
service required and a properly convened public competition to reflect the
independent nature of the role.
10.12.20 This is in no way intended to suggest that in the case of the PPP1 schools the
service was undertaken with a less than total independence of approach.
10.13 RESPONSIBILITY FOR INSPECTION OF CONSTRUCTION QUALITY
10.13.1 The fact that neither the building inspectors from Edinburgh Council nor either
firm of Independent Certifiers, in line with their understandings of their own
respective roles, carried out on-going inspections of the quality of construction
at the level that is more normally undertaken by a Clerk of Works, meant that
the Council were effectively totally reliant in this regard on the quality assurance
procedures of ESP and their construction supply chain. In the case of the
contractors this effectively meant marking their own homework. The amount of
defective construction subsequently discovered demonstrates that
unfortunately, any such reliance on self-marking by the construction supply
chain was, at least in relation to quality of construction of the walls, on this
occasion misplaced.
10.13.2 If one were to compare this procurement method with the more traditional
model of public sector procurement, while not without its problems, the latter
offers public sector clients a further level of assurance in that the architect and
structural engineer, under that model directly employed by the public sector
client, provide a degree of independent scrutiny of the quality of construction
work throughout the construction process. This professional scrutiny would
normally be supported, certainly on projects similar in size to the PPP1 projects,
by the employment of experienced Clerks of Works and/or resident engineers,
who would act as the permanent on-site eyes and ears of the design team.
10.13.3 In the PPP1 arrangement, as is the case in the Design and Build model that is
increasingly the predominant model used by the public sector, the design team
was employed by the construction joint venture, AMJV on Phase 1 or directly by
Miller Construction on Phase 2. Under these arrangements, the primary
contractual obligation of the members of the design team is to the contractor
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and the scope of their service, including whether or how often they attend site,
is also determined by the contractor.
10.13.4 Unless a separate team is appointed to do so, public sector clients in this
situation do not enjoy the benefits of independent inspections of the quality of
the construction work by members of the professional team representing the
clients' interests. Also with the move to Design and Build and PPP types of
procurement, where the role of the design team is largely determined by the
contractor, the unwillingness for contractors to pay for the presence of
architects and structural engineers on site to inspect the work of the contractors
employing them, has been reflected by a significant reduction over recent years
in the level of this crucial activity undertaken on these types of project.
10.13.5 Of equal concern is the reduction by public sector clients in the direct
employment or external appointment of Clerks of Works whose essential role in
public sector projects has been to protect the quality of construction which
represents significant investments of public funds.
10.13.6 It is the view of the Inquiry that such reductions in the core aspect of quality
assurance on behalf of public sector clients is frequently a false economy.
10.13.7 It was reported to the Inquiry in evidence, as previously advised in this Report,
that the approach of Edinburgh Council was based on an assumption that quality
assurance in the delivery of the project was essentially the responsibility of ESP
and that the Council should have a very limited role in this regard.
10.13.8 On that basis, no Clerks of Works were appointed to act on behalf of the Council
on the PPP1 projects.
10.13.9 The representatives from virtually all the public sector bodies and the large
majority of private sector bodies interviewed by the Inquiry, expressed concern
at the ongoing reduction in the use of Clerks of Works in the construction
industry and saw this as a contributory factor to problems of quality in the
industry as a whole.
10.13.10 Specific instances in relation to the current delivery of public buildings in

Scotland by approved major contractors were referred to in evidence to the
Inquiry. Examples were given in which the Clerk of Works played a central role in
identifying major failures in the quality of the construction of both the structure
and fabric in new school buildings. A senior estates manager from the Local
Authority in question stated in evidence:
"My experience has been that the level of inspection allowed for by the
funders and the delivery company has been minimal. We have had to put
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in place our own directly employed staff and clerks of works to ensure the
quality of construction and level of supervision that we require."
10.13.11 In the opinion of some of those who gave evidence to the Inquiry, rather than
the increased use of 'Design and Build' leading to a better integration of these
two fundamental aspects of the construction process, its use can lead to an
artificial separation of design and construction and a potential deskilling of
design team members as a result of their reduced exposure to experience on
site. As one example of this, a Director of an established firm of structural
engineers said in evidence to the Inquiry:
"I would also add that the supervision element of the engineer on site has
almost disappeared in construction projects. Historically, we would have
resident engineers on site but this costs money. In the past, this would
have altered the mentality and approach of the contractor on site as they
knew that there was somebody appointed by the client on site either all
the time or very regularly watching what they were doing.
Our view is that the workmanship issues found on the schools has little to
do with PFI, it is an issue to do with the construction industry more
widely."
10.13.12 Similar views in relation to the impact of the reduced role of architects and
engineers under the newer procurement models, in terms of their role in
inspecting the quality of work on site, were expressed by the majority of
professional consultants and professional client representatives who appeared
before the Inquiry.
10.13.13 The Inquiry received a written submission from the Royal Incorporation of
Architects in Scotland which included specific commentary on this issue. The
following extracts were considered particularly relevant in relation to this issue
by the Inquiry.
"The traditional position on inspection has long been that supervision of

construction by the parties responsible for it is an essential first line of
defence. Independent inspection by persons experienced in construction
inspection, combined with effective sanctions in the case of non-
compliance with standards, were always essential safeguards. Non-
traditional forms of construction, if they remove or dilute the independent
inspection role and the sanctioning authority of the construction inspector
from the construction process, cannot provide the assurance of quality
sought in public sector guides."
"Traditionally the ultimate sanction of an architect finding defective work,

was to refuse to issue sums on an interim certificate which was required
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to authorise payment to the contractor. Where the architect is engaged

by the contractor this is, of course, not possible."
"It is not uncommon for architects involved in alternative procurement

projects to be advised that site inspection is not necessary, or that
architects instructions, (by which contract works are varied traditionally)
are not required."
10.13.14 Perhaps naturally enough the issue of a perceived constant pressure on reducing
professional fees was frequently raised in evidence. The following is one
example from the evidence of a Director at another established firm of
structural engineers.
"With regard to the question of fees, inevitably your fee level determines
how much time you are able to be on site. You want it to be done as best
you can. Ideally, you would like to be there often, but fees remain tight.
Nowadays, we are often encouraged to rely on emails or photos of the
work being done and this type of shortcut does drive down fees.
When the fee is tight, things are compromised. Although our professional
indemnity covers our design, we can't possibly guarantee the quality of
workmanship on site."
10.13.15 There is a fundamental difference between the traditional and alternative forms
of procurement, in terms of the nature of the relationship between public sector
clients and design team architects or structural engineers. Public sector clients
may assume that the involvement of these professionals in the project provides
the same level of assurance in Design and Build or PPP projects as under
previous forms of contract. This is not the case. These consultants owe their
direct contractual obligations to their employers the contractors, who will
normally ensure that all key correspondence from the design team goes to them
directly for a decision as to how that information should be processed.
10.13.16 In evidence a Director of WSP Parsons Brinckerhoff, a major international firm of

consultants and also the structural engineers who were responsible for the
structural design of the PPP1 schools, in response to a general question on this
issue, and specifically not referring to any situation at the PPP1 schools,
explained his view of the relationship stating:
"If a structural engineer from our practice goes in and sees a lack of wall
ties, under the terms of a Design and Build appointment, we would have
discharged our responsibility if we were to inform the contractors. If we
go back again and it still hasn't been done, then we would report it again.
Under the terms of our appointment we would not report it directly to
the commissioning clients. If it was a novation and a dual appointment
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where we were also retained by the end client, we would have a duty to
report beyond the contractor as our clients."
10.13.17 A similar view was expressed by the Property Director from a Local Authority in
Scotland;
"In my experience, if an architect speaks out then they risk not getting
more work from main contractors. They will be reluctant to speak out in
this way so for that reason we find ourselves being much more proactive
because we know that there is this conflict."
10.13.18 The result of acting on a report of defective work from members of the D&B
design team in such situations is likely to incur significant financial penalties for a
contractor, either as a result of the cost of having to remove and rebuild the
sub-standard work identified or as a result of the delay to completion this might
cause. In such circumstances there is an inevitable conflict of interest which may
impact on the judgement made by the contractor as to what actions are taken.
10.13.19 The experience of the Inquiry would strongly suggest that the majority of
contractors will act with integrity in such circumstances and remove the
defective work. However, evidence to the Inquiry has also suggested that there
may be a resistance on the part of some contractors to have design team
members inspecting the quality of the work on site for these reasons.
10.13.20 In the case of the PPP1 Projects the appointment of the architects, as provided
in evidence to the Inquiry by Galliford Try, did require them to visit the site. It
read:
"Attend site to determine the quality of workmanship and materials are

being executed generally in accordance with the Consultant's design. The
Consultant shall provide a written Report to the Contractor where he finds
a material deviation from the requirement of his design."
10.13.21 Equally the appointment of the structural engineers had the following
requirement.
"Make such visits to the site as the Consulting Engineer shall consider
necessary to satisfy himself that as to the performance of any site staff
and that the Works are executed generally according to the designs and
specifications and otherwise in accordance with good engineering
practice."
10.13.22 As previously mentioned in Section 9 of this Report, in the evidence from

Holmes Miller, the architects for the PPP1 primary schools, it was stated that the
architects had raised concerns with the contractor following site visits by them,
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with the contractor in relation to failing to comply with the specification

requirement that stated:
"Raise no portion of the work more than 1.2 m above another at any
time"
and that, as they had no power to instruct the AMJV/contractors to comply, this
approach was carried on throughout the course of the various school projects.
10.13.23 The Inquiry is of the view that, if possible, there should be a mandatory
provision built into such contracts that where a contractor fails to take
appropriate action on issues that could impact on the subsequent safety of
building users, the consultant in question should be required to inform the
public sector client of the advice provided to the contractor.
10.13.24 If the commissioning client is also made aware of concerns expressed by

members of the design team, the dynamic of the situation is quite different.
10.13.25 It is the view of the Inquiry that public sector clients should specify in their
'statement of client's requirements' any particular provisions they may wish to
have incorporated into the scope of services to be provided by design teams in
Design and Build arrangements, particularly in relation to the inspection of and
reporting on the quality of construction and compliance with the approved
design.
10.13.26 They should also require to see the conditions of appointment of the design
team members to understand the comprehensiveness or otherwise of the
services that the design team are being required to provide by the contractor.
10.13.27 The Inquiry was advised that in the case of the PPP1 projects as far as it was
possible to say, the conditions of appointment and range of services to be
provided by the design team were not requested by or provided to the Council
Project Team.
10.14 QUALITY MANAGEMENT WITHIN THE SUPPLY CHAIN
10.14.1 The effectiveness of quality management and implementation of quality

assurance methodologies by the main contractor, given the increasingly large
proportion of actual construction that is undertaken by sub-contractors, is
dependent on ensuring that those sub-contractors have in turn quality systems
that align with those of the contractor.
10.14.2 The requirement for main contractors to carry out due diligence on sub-
contractors was raised in evidence to the Inquiry by a representative attending
on behalf of the Scottish Building Federation, who was a Director of a Building
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Company, which also provided sub-contracting bricklaying services on larger

projects. He stated:
"We would normally expect the contractor to check out the sub-contractor
and do due diligence in the marketplace. However, we would think it
unlikely that they would be in a position to check the operatives who the
subcontractors engage."
"There is a tendency for good contractors to get more and more work but
they will eventually get to the point where they will be unable to properly
resource jobs they take on and quality can go down."
"Certainly, a main contractor will assume that their sub-contractors will

employ competent tradesmen but the main contractor cannot necessarily
control it. You will then have to rely on a supervisor or even a Clerk of
Works or both."
"Building standards and quality issues can sometimes be enhanced if the

client puts in place additional supervision as a check. However many
clients won't have anyone on site to act in their interest as an additional
set of eyes and ears..."
10.14.3 The availability of well-trained bricklayers has already been raised as a concern
within the construction industry. In periods of heavy demand, such as when so
many schools were simultaneously being built, there can be a pressure on
contractors and sub-contractors to use members of the workforce that may not
be well known to them and who may not have the requisite skills or even
training.
10.14.4 In evidence to the Inquiry it was acknowledged that while operatives coming on
site would be required to show Construction Skills Certification Scheme (CSCS)
cards, the focus of this system tended to be on safety matters rather than on the
skillset or competence as a tradesman. This was acknowledged by several
witnesses as a potential weakness in the on-site quality control of those
undertaking the work.
10.14.5 Another issue raised in discussion about the quality assurance of sub-contractors
was the influence of the way in which individual bricklayers were paid. It has
become commonplace over recent years, with the increasing demise of
bricklayers being permanent employees of main contractors, that payment is on
the basis of the number of bricks laid or square metres of wall completed in a
day. The bricklayer is not normally paid anything extra for the incorporation of
wall ties, corner ties, bed joint reinforcement or head restraints. The more
complicated and numerous the accessories to be fitted the longer it takes and
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the less bricks are laid, reducing the earnings for that day. For that reason some
bricklayers will not take on more complicated work.
10.14.6 The Inquiry was advised by two senior Clerks of Works, permanently employed
by a large public sector organisation in Scotland, that the quality of bricklaying
was still today a constant problem for them, requiring their on-going inspection.
They both were of the view that the common means of remunerating
bricklayers, as described above, was one of the contributory factors in bringing
about this situation.
10.14.7 One of them described a recent example from a major project where they
spotted that a bricklayer was building a significant section of the wall he had
been working on without building in any wall ties. When he was stopped by the
Clerk of Works and queried, his response was that as the contractor hadn't
provided enough wall ties they had run out, and he could not afford to sit
around as his earnings for that day were dependent on him completing the wall.
10.14.8 The Inquiry would not expect that this is a regular occurrence in the practice of
the trade but in the situation described, without the inspection of Clerks of
Works, another wall could have been built that represented a potential danger
to members of the public using or in the proximity of the building.
10.14.9 In the case of the PPP1 schools, it is particularly noticeable that throughout the
various buildings, the areas that tended to be least provided with head restraints
were those areas where the steel beams were sloping upwards at the angle of
the roof, making it more difficult and time-consuming for a bricklayer to install
head restraints than in the case where the beam they were to be attached to
was horizontal .
10.14.10 The chair of this Inquiry was informed during a visit to the site of one of the
PPP1 Schools, undergoing remedial work, by a representative of the builder
undertaking the remedial work, that a number of head restraint fittings were
found sitting on top of the steel beams where the bricklayer has placed them
rather than take the time to connect them to the steel beam and build them into
the adjacent wall, from which they were found to be missing.
10.14.11 It is also of notice that throughout the schools in those walls where head
restraints were fitted, the specified more complicated head restraint fitting,
which was designed to connect both leaves rather than just the inner leaf to the
steel beam, were rarely found. Instead they tended to be replaced by the
simpler single leaf fitting, which was quicker to fit but did not share the
structural advantage of helping to tie the two leaves to each other as well as to
the steel beam.
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10.14.12 From the programmes provided, it is clear that the schools were built quite
quickly, the incentive to do so being that if they failed to achieve the required
dates for the start of school terms, they risked losing income from Council
payments. In evidence the Inquiry was told by an experienced contractor and ex-
bricklayer that a focus on speed of construction in which tradesmen such as
bricklayers are required to accelerate can often be at the cost of quality.
10.14.13 It is difficult for the Inquiry to be categorical about the degree to which any of
these factors may have impacted on the quality of the brickwork in the PPP1
schools given the non-availability or unwillingness of witnesses involved in the
actual construction of the walls to come forward. The Inquiry also experienced
difficulty in getting representatives from a number of invited specialist
bricklaying sub-contractor, who had not been involved in the PPP1 projects, to
agree to give evidence to the Inquiry on quality in the Industry.
10.14.14 However, it is clear that the quality systems and supervision in place were
inadequate to prevent the repeated and widespread occurrence of similar
defects across a range of school projects delivered by a range of contractors and
sub-contractors. It is also clear that the lack of embedment of ties on the scale
discovered must have been obvious to those building the walls and should have
been obvious to anyone supervising them.
10.15 DEFECTIVE CONSTRUCTION MORE WIDESPREAD WITHIN THE INDUSTRY
10.15.1 The fact that this sub-standard, unacceptable and potentially dangerous
quality of construction simultaneously failed to be identified and rectified on
so many different sites would suggest that the standard of wall construction in
the industry may be a more widespread problem and not limited to the
Edinburgh PPP1 schools.
10.15.2 The Inquiry sought information from each of the 32 Local Authorities in Scotland
in order to understand whether the underlying cause of poor quality
construction, and non-compliance with building standards or approved warrant
drawings, in the construction of cavity walls was something that extended
beyond the Edinburgh schools. The Local Authorities were asked to advise the
Inquiry of any relevant information they held in relation to any similar
recurrences to the problems of defective construction as experienced in
Edinburgh or if anything of relevance had emerged as the outcome of
precautionary investigations undertaken since they had been notified of the
Edinburgh incident by the Scottish Futures Trust. The Inquiry first wrote seeking
this information in August 2016. Most Local Authorities responded quickly and
positively.
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10.15.3 The Inquiry also sought from the SFT the collation of information that had been
collected by them following the Edinburgh incident. The following is an extract
from a letter received by the Inquiry from SFT in December 2016.
"Across Scotland, four related instances of partial wall collapse over the
past four years have been reported to SFT, in addition to the Edinburgh
PPP1 project. A number of Authorities have identified some issues with
wall ties in similarly constructed buildings. The use of intrusive survey
techniques such as the borescope, and the removal of individual bricks
and blocks have been found to be the preferred methods for identifying
similar issues. A number of Local Authorities have undertaken intrusive
investigations, either following observed signs of distress on visual
inspection, or directly following risk assessment of their building types.
Where related issues have been identified, these have included:
 Minor structural observations such as deteriorating mortar bed

joints and evidence of hairline settlement cracks in the building
fabric which required minor precautionary remedial works;
 Instances where cavity walls have been built wider than

specified or wider than would appear to have been the original
design intent;
 Wall ties installed with depth of embedment in one or both

leaves of cavity walls less than the recommended minimum;
 Number of wall ties or horizontal and vertical spacing of wall

ties not according with normal standards;
 Wall ties around door and window openings not installed at

closer centres as normal standards suggest;
 Walls not evidently tied to the main steel framed structure,

including potentially inadequate or missing ties at the interface
between head of wall and header beam and column supports –
though it can be difficult to be clear whether head restraint had
been required as part of the original design;
 Evidence of defects to blockwork walls particularly in large

expansive panels in gymnasium/assembly halls and/or around
wall mounted sports equipment."
10.15.4 The above information, while clearly identifying that similar problems had been
found in other schools across Scotland, did not provide details on the frequency
of these findings or where they were found. However, as stated in the letter,
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many Local Authorities, recognising the significance of the issue, were most
helpful in providing comprehensive information directly to the Inquiry.
10.15.5 The level of information provided to the Inquiry by Local Authorities varied and,
from the nature of the responses received, it was apparent that the level of
investigations undertaken by different Local Authorities had also varied, from
simply receiving statements of reassurance from Project Companies or
contractors, to visual inspections of external walls to preliminary and follow-up
intrusive testing.
10.15.6 There was an unwillingness on the part of some Local Authorities to provide
copies of the structural reports that had been commissioned into their schools.
10.15.7 The Inquiry is of the view that while Local Authorities may not wish to have
information on defects in their buildings publicised for various reasons, there
should be a public duty on such organisations to openly share with each other
and the construction industry, information on recurring defects of a type,
which unless addressed by the construction industry and regulatory bodies,
may present an on-going risk to the public they serve.
10.15.8 The risk of injury from falling masonry will be greatest in circumstances where
defective masonry is present in larger panels that are not properly restrained or
reinforced and are located higher up a building. In several of the following
examples of defects described to the Inquiry by Local Authorities, it can be seen
that, due to the recurring poor quality of wall construction, this risk was real.
10.15.9 The following information is based on a small selection of extracts taken from
structural engineering reports voluntarily provided to the Inquiry by the relevant
Local Authorities. These highlight the recurrence of a similarity of defects to
those found in the Edinburgh PPP1 schools. The reports were commissioned by
Local Authorities or by the relevant PPP companies, either following problems
encountered with wall construction in newly built schools or as a precautionary
follow-up after being informed of the Edinburgh wall collapse.
10.15.10 The reports indicate that the defects identified below in the various schools
either have been fully addressed or are in the course of being addressed by the
relevant Local Authority or its PPP Company.
10.16 FOUR SCHOOLS OUTSIDE EDINBURGH WHICH SUFFERED DAMAGE IN HIGH

WINDS
10.16.1 South Lanarkshire schools
10.16.2 In early January 2012 during a period of exceptionally high winds, external wall
panels collapsed at two secondary schools, Trinity High School and Duncanrig
Secondary School in South Lanarkshire. Fortuitously both schools were closed at
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the time of the collapse for the Christmas holiday period. These schools were
built in 2009 under a PPP contract.
10.16.3 As shown in the photograph below, the Trinity High School collapse had a
striking similarity to the collapse at Oxgangs School, with the corner brickwork
panel of the external leaf of a gable wall separating from the internal leaf and
falling from a height onto a playground below.
Image 26: Photograph of the collapsed panel at Trinity High School.
10.16.4 An extract from a structural report on the collapse at Trinity High School stated:
"The wall tie pattern evident at the collapsed outer leaf locations did not take
account of the outer leaf movement joints and only provided ties at 900
centres vertically and not set out horizontally to provide the 225mm
horizontal dimensions from the joint location.
The as-built spacing of cavity ties at the movement joints would lead to the
wall ties near the joints being subjected to an increasing tensile and
compressive loading compared with loads had the ties been installed to code
spacing requirements. It should also be noted that the overall length of the
two-part tie (400mm) in light of the cavity width of 330mm does not provide
the minimum code requirement of 50mm embedment in the inner and outer
leaves."
10.16.5 This last point is particularly important; if the same embedment had been
provided to each leaf, this could only have achieved 35mm embedment which is
30% less than the minimum British Standard requirement of 50mm. In fact, for
two-part ties a greater embedment of 75mm is recommended by leading wall tie
manufacturers, making the defect potentially more serious.
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10.16.6 At Duncanrig School, a brick panel on a gable wall collapsed inwards against the
internal leaf of the cavity wall. A structural report on the event stated that the
head of the brick panel did not appear to be restrained. In relation to the
embedment of the wall ties it stated:
"It appears that the wall ties had significantly less than this 50mm and in
some instances the ties were not embedded at all."
10.16.7 The following photographs, together with the comments below the
photographs, are taken from the structural reports and show evidence of the
lack of wall ties and improperly installed wall ties at Duncanrig School.
Image 27: Photograph from Duncanrig Secondary School. 'Note no ties or head restraints
to inner face of outer brick leaf'.
Image 28: Photograph from Duncanrig Secondary School. 'Note wall ties with no
embedment in outer brick leaf of cavity wall'.
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10.16.8 Stirling Council
10.16.9 In May 2016, Balfron High School in Stirlingshire was partially closed after
structural problems were identified. A wall at the school had been damaged
during winter storms and after checks were carried out by engineers, issues with
walls in the stairwell, gym and atrium were discovered. Stirling Council advised
that defects had been discovered in relation to insufficient wall ties and lack of
embedment of wall ties. The school which opened in 2001 was delivered under a
PPP contract. The Inquiry was not provided with further details as to the extent
of the defects.
10.16.10 Glasgow Council
10.16.11 The following paragraphs on Lourdes Primary School in Glasgow are based on
information provided in evidence to the Inquiry as the structural report was not
made available to the Inquiry.
10.16.12 At Lourdes Primary School, on the 3rd January 2012, during a period of
exceptionally high winds, a wall at a high level partially collapsed, damaging the
roof section onto which it fell. The section which came down was approximately
15 square metres in total.
10.16.13 This school was not procured under a PPP scheme but, most unusually, was built
for the Council as part of a land swap deal with a major retailer, who procured
the school through a design and build/turn-key arrangement, whereby the
Council was provided with a completed school.
10.16.14 The structural engineering report concluded that there had been a lack of wall
head restraints on the wall panel that had collapsed. Also, there was an
insufficient number of wall ties and those that were there had not consistently
adequate embedment.
10.16.15 When the walls were subsequently intrusively examined, similar defects were
found on five other gable walls at the school. A two-part wall tie had been used
where the cavity width was 300mm but in many cases, only one half of the two-
part wall ties was found to be present. A number of walls were taken down and
in large part rebuilt. Remedial wall ties, lateral ties and wall head restraints were
installed where found missing and a number of windposts were added.
10.16.16 It was also noted in the Report that bed joint reinforcement which had been
specified at 600mm centres, were found to have been installed at 900mm
centres.
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10.17 EXAMPLES OF SIMILAR DEFECTS FOUND IN OTHER SCHOOLS IN SCOTLAND
10.17.1 In addition to the above four schools outside Edinburgh where actual physical
damage to or collapse of external walls had been caused by the force of the
wind, other Local Authorities advised the Inquiry of the discovery in some of
their schools of the same range of defects that caused the collapses elsewhere.
The following is a sample of these findings.
10.17.2 Inverclyde Council
10.17.3 Inverclyde Council provided the Inquiry with structural engineering reports on
surveys completed in August 2016 on four PPP schools and four Non-PFI/PPP
schools. The surveys were commissioned following reports of the problems with
the Edinburgh schools.
10.17.4 The reports on the four PPP schools indicated the following:
(i) All Saints Primary School, Greenock:
The structural report stated that a wall panel over a doorway some 4m
wide by 2m high was found to have no wall ties over the full area of the
panel and required the installation of remedial wall ties. Otherwise the
wall ties were found to be generally compliant.
(ii) Notre Dame High School, Greenock and Clydeview Academy, Gourock:
The structural reports state that in both schools there was inadequate
embedment where two-part wall-ties had been used in the wider
cavities. The embedment was reported as being only 30mm at the
inspection locations as opposed to the recommended 75mm for these
type of wall ties. The installation of remedial wall ties was
recommended at these locations.
(iii) Aileymill Primary School, Greenock:
No defective construction was identified in the surveys.
10.17.5 The reports on the four Non-PPP Schools indicated the following.
(i) Inverclyde Academy, Greenock:
The structural report stated that a panel of brickwork, approximately

2m x 2m located in a high part of the building was found to be held with
only one wall tie, in an area of the building that was exposed to the
highest concentration of wind-loading. The installation of remedial wall
ties was recommended.
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(ii) Newark Primary School, Port Glasgow and St. Joseph’s Primary School,
Greenock:
No defective construction identified in either school.
(iii) Kings Oak Primary School, Greenock:
No defective Construction identified in the surveys but further testing

suggested as a final check.
10.17.6 Angus Council
10.17.7 Six PPP schools constructed in Angus, which opened in 2009, were inspected
following the Report of the Oxgangs school wall collapse. Five of the six schools
were found to have been constructed where head restraints were not in
accordance with the construction drawings. Insufficient wall tie embedment was
identified in three of the six schools. In one of these latter three, there were
differences in the coursing levels of the inner and outer leaf resulting in ties not
being horizontal and in some cases missing.
10.17.8 Dundee Council
10.17.9 Eight PPP schools under the control of the Dundee City Council, which opened in
2009, were inspected following the Report of the Oxgangs school wall collapse.
Three of the eight PPP schools were found to have deficiencies. Two schools had
a lack of provision of bed joint reinforcement and wall head restraints in a small
number of panels and in one other school wall tie embedment was found to be
less than the minimum requirement in some locations and in several wall panels
the required wall head restraints were found to be missing.
10.17.10 East Renfrewshire Council
10.17.11 East Renfrewshire Council provided to the Inquiry structural reports produced in
2011 on two PPP schools, St. Ninian's High School and Mearns Primary School
built in 2006. Remedial work was required in 2011 to both schools in relation to
the lack of provision or proper embedment of wall ties. Examples of the
defective work at St. Ninian's High School are shown below. These photographs
were taken during the remedial works contract in 2011.
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St Ninian's High School, East Renfrewshire
Image 29: St Ninian's High School;

"Photo showing one of the defective wall
ties (no embedment) in place behind the
internal skin of blockwork in the sports
hall."
Commentary and photograph from the
Structural Report.
Image 30: St Ninian's High School;

"No wall ties have been installed into a large
section of the wall."
Commentary (and photograph) from the
Structural Report.
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Image 31: St Ninian's High School.

The structural report refers to:
'misalignment of bed joints' between the
two leaves of the wall';
'deformation of wall ties allowing the
transfer of water to the inner leaf';
'the slope of the wall tie at 105 degrees is
not permissible'; and
'the spacing of wall ties at 675mm x 900mm
fails to meet the required 450mm x 900mm'.
10.17.12 The Inquiry is of the view that the nature of defects identified in the above
examples from other schools in Scotland clearly posed risks to those using the
schools, which risks could have been avoided if effective quality assurance
processes had been in place during the original construction of these schools.
10.17.13 There is sufficient evidence of the repetition of the same basic faults in the
building of external masonry walls across a range of schools in Scotland to
demonstrate that this issue requires a proactive response on the part of both
clients and contractors in relation, respectively, to enhanced independent
inspection and improved quality management to seek to eradicate this
repeated failing of the construction industry.
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Section 11 – Remit Items 5 and 6: Maintenance of Buildings and Management of Contracts
SECTION 11 - REMIT ITEMS 5 AND 6: MAINTENANCE OF BUILDINGS AND MANAGEMENT

OF CONTRACTS
Remit Item 5:
"The management and maintenance of the buildings since construction, including advising
on whether the current defects should have been found earlier."
Remit Item 6:
"The management of the contract by the relevant parties since construction; and the quality
of the contract undertaken."
 This section of the Report will deal with both Items 4 and 5 together as there is a
significant overlap between the two issues.
11.1 COULD THE CURRENT DEFECTS HAVE BEEN FOUND EARLIER?
11.1.1 In relation to the key question asked in Remit Item 5, the Inquiry is of the view
that the defective embedment of the wall-ties and the presence or otherwise
of secondary steelwork such as head restraints could not have been found
earlier through normal visual inspection of the walls unless there had been
some outwardly visible indications or signs of distress, such as bulging or
cracking of the walls.
11.1.2 A visual inspection of the external walls of all the PPP1 schools had been carried
out as a precautionary check after the collapse of the wall at Oxgangs School.
Despite the subsequent evidence of widespread defects discovered through the
programme of intrusive surveys undertaken, the visual inspection undertaken by
teams of experienced structural engineers gave no reasons for concern that the
similar defects were present.
11.1.3 The only time at which this defective construction within the cavity could have
been detected was during regular quality inspections of the work at the time
of construction prior to the work being closed in or through subsequent
requested opening up of walls for inspection during construction, which would
not have been usual without some outward indication that the work may be
defective.
11.1.4 In relation to the recent discovery of breaches in the fire-stopping, the Inquiry is
of the view that their discovery should not have required a proactive request
from the Council for reassurance on this issue and that these breaches of fire-
stopping should have been identified and remedied much earlier through
appropriate on-going inspection of the premises by the facilities management
company.
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11.1.5 It is difficult for the Inquiry to be specific about the number of breaches
identified in the fire-stopping surveys that dated from the original construction
but it would appear from evidence of the photographs that a proportion would
have done so. What is irrefutable is that many of these breaches did not
suddenly appear in recent months.
11.1.6 Accordingly, it is the view of the Inquiry that the defective fire-stopping could
have been identified earlier and that, prior to the recent actions of ESP and
Amey, there had been a failure to identify, report and remedy the breaches in
fire-stopping from which ever date they were first caused.
11.2 MANAGEMENT AND MAINTENANCE OF THE SCHOOLS SINCE CONSTRUCTION
11.2.1 In relation to the general management of the schools since opening, the Inquiry
was given limited reason to suggest that the day-to-day management was
carried out other than largely to the satisfaction of the users.
11.2.2 A level of satisfaction was expressed by several witnesses from the Council
including the Head of Finance who said;
"We have been getting the service that we wanted to the standard
required at the price set out in the Contract. I believe, until the closures,
the Contract had worked well in Edinburgh.
Here in Edinburgh Head Teachers have fed back to us that the standard of
service they have been getting has been generally good compared to non-
PFI funded schools. In a non-PFI school, if there are problems or repairs
required, these need to be considered against budget availability and
priorities elsewhere. In a PFI school it is reported to the Helpdesk and the
work is undertaken within a timescale set out in the Project Agreement."
11.2.3 The Acting Head of Property and Facilities Management at the Council broadly
agreed with this view;
"…in terms of ongoing service and maintenance over the life of the
Contract I would say that overall the PFI model does represent value-for-
money …"
"…we have service levels agreements in place which appear to work well."
11.2.4 This Inquiry was also keen to hear the views from the perspective of the
recipients of the service at first hand, who were best placed to comment on the
day-to-day experience. The views expressed by Council representatives were
generally supported by representatives of both teaching staff and parents of
children at the PPP1 schools. The Head Teacher of Oxgangs stated;
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"I have been a Head Teacher both in the PPP school Oxgangs and also
previously in non-PPP schools. I would say that overall my PPP experience
has been very positive. Things are very well maintained and if there are
issues they are fixed relatively quickly. Overall, I would say that a school
like Oxgangs is a fantastic environment. I am very happy there."
11.2.5 There was a relative unanimity of opinion on this issue. The Head Teacher of
Braidburn said;
"Overall, the maintenance at a PPP school is better than in a traditional

set-up. Repairs and damage are attended to very promptly. The janitors at
Braidburn take great pride in the school. The catering is also very good as
is the landscaping and other facilities."
11.2.6 A Chair of a Parent Council at one of the schools also agreed with this
assessment;
"So far as maintenance and cleanliness are concerned the standards are
very good. Amey as the facilities management team are very helpful and
go out of their way to ensure that things run smoothly.
By way of more general conversation, I have had some contact with

Parent Councils at non-PFI schools in the city. I know from speaking to
them that they have a constant battle to get improvements at those
schools. There are difficulties at both types of schools but for different
reasons. I know that there are constant maintenance issues with leaks,
flooring and other elements."
11.2.7 Whilst generally positive about the maintenance and repair regimes in the PPP1
schools, there was one aspect of the PPP Contract on which a consistent degree
of frustration was expressed by the parent councillors and head teachers, who
gave evidence to the Inquiry. This related to the difficulties, in terms of what
they considered to be both excessive levels of cost and lengths of time required
under the PPP process in seeking to incorporate minor changes or
improvements to the schools even in relation to items for which they were
prepared to provide the funding.
11.2.8 In response to this issue in evidence to the Inquiry, representatives of ESP

explained that they had no option but to include in their estimates the whole life
costs of additions and not just the initial capital cost, as they would have to
maintain and replace these items as appropriate over the period of the 30-year
concession. Due to this factor, some desired requirements had been rendered
unaffordable to some of the schools seeking them.
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11.2.9 A measurement of the quality of services provided should be broadly related to

the amount of deductions made by the Council from otherwise due payments to
ESP for any failures by ESP to meet the performance standards as a result of the
application of the contract management processes set down in the Project
Agreement. The following table provided by the Council shows the level of
deductions made over the last five years excluding the current year, 2016, for
which the deductions made are not representative.
Calendar Year Deductions by Council

2010 £9,700.02
2011 £4,146.94
2012 £34,011.19
2013 £10,174.92
2014 £9,558.36
2015 £5,254.00
11.2.10 In the years since 2010, the level of deductions has been very modest, the worst
year amounting to only 0.23% when expressed as a percentage of the annual
payment of approximately £15 million. If all due deductions are currently being
made, this would infer that, prior to the recent major set-back, the service has
been consistently provided in line with the requirements of the Project
Agreement, only attracting minor deductions.
11.2.11 It is the view of the Inquiry that the level of service provision under the
Contract has been largely consistent with the requirements of the Contract
and would generally seem to have been to the satisfaction of the staff and
members of the Parent Councils of the PPP1 schools.
11.2.12 The Council may wish to investigate what flexibilities there may be in the
approach to and management of requests for minor changes within the
schools, which was identified as an on-going source of frustration by those
members of staff and of Parent Councils who gave evidence to the Inquiry.
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Section 12 – Remit Item 7: Edinburgh Council's Handling of the Incident
SECTION 12 - REMIT ITEM 7: EDINBURGH COUNCIL'S HANDLING OF THE INCIDENT
Remit Item 7:
"A review of Edinburgh Council's handling of the incident from January 2016 to the
reopening of the schools in Summer 2016"
 This section of the Report will examine how effectively the City of Edinburgh
Council responded to the overall situation arising from the collapse of the wall at
Oxgangs School and the subsequent discovery of defective construction in the
external walls of the remaining PPP1 schools.
12.1 ORGANISATIONAL RESPONSE
12.1.1 The significance of this issue emerged over several weeks with further results of
the evermore intrusive surveys throughout the 17 PPP1 projects revealing a
widening range of defects with an increasingly widespread level of occurrence.
Over that period, what had initially seemed to be a localised problem with one
wall in one school, turned into one of the most demanding logistical tasks the
Council may have ever faced.
12.1.2 Initially, the reasonable view taken by the Council officers was that the collapse
of the wall at Oxgangs School was an isolated incident resulting from Storm
Gertrude and a senior manager with a professional construction-related
qualification from within the Council was allocated to directly manage the issue.
This council officer would subsequently play a hugely effective role in the wider
remediation process that was at this stage still unsuspected.
12.1.3 The school was closed with immediate effect, information was issued to parents,
consultant engineers WRD were appointed to advise the Council and temporary
works were designed and carried out to the wall to render it safe. The school
was able to reopen within a matter of only three days including a weekend.
12.1.4 Additionally, a precautionary programme of visual inspections of all the PPP1

schools was commissioned to seek to identify any signs of damage or stress to
the external walls of rest of the PPP1 the schools. This investigation raised no
such concerns.
12.1.5 Once the immediate practical objective had been completed of seeking to
ensure a safe environment at Oxgangs and the other schools, a detailed report
on the reason for the collapse of the wall was sought from WRD, whose
appointment had been transferred to ESP as owners of the schools.
12.1.6 It is the view of the Inquiry that, despite the unavoidable disruption and
inconvenience caused, the response to the initial collapse of the wall by the
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Council was prompt, effective and appropriate in the known circumstances at

the time.
12.1.7 It was only subsequently, when the possible extent of the defective construction
was identified through further surveys, that it was recognised that there could
be a requirement for closure of some or all of the schools.
12.1.8 On the 18th March 2016, the Chief Executive responded to concerns expressed in
emerging survey information, which reported that the presence of defective
embedment of wall ties was not limited to the gable wall at Oxgangs and had
been discovered in the other Phase 2 schools. He declared the situation should
be considered as a 'serious incident' and established and instigated daily
meetings of a Corporate Incident Management Team (CIMT), with senior
representation from all the relevant sections of the Council.
12.1.9 This team supported the Chief Executive in developing the strategic response
and directing the operational management of the situation as it evolved in
response to the constantly changing information being received from ESP.
12.1.10 It is evident to the Inquiry from the minutes of the meetings of the CIMT and
from the evidence provided by Council witnesses that at all times the key
central objective of the Council was to protect the safety of pupils and staff
and that this factor was the underlying consideration in relation to all
decisions taken by the Council throughout the process. The establishment of
the CIMT and the role it played was critical in providing a fully coordinated
management response to the situation.
12.2 MANAGEMENT OF THE CLOSURE OF ALL PPP1 SCHOOLS
12.2.1 On 8th April 2016, ESP reported to the Council the discovery of further defects
and as a result withdrew their previous confirmation that the schools were safe
to occupy.
12.2.2 Up to this point the only defect that the Council has been aware of was the lack
of embedment of wall ties across the PPP1 schools. To deal with this, while the
Council had strongly stated a preference for all of the remedial work necessary
to be carried out immediately, a compromise option had been agreed with ESP.
12.2.3 As previously described, this compromise would have allowed the schools to
reopen, after the Easter holiday, on 11th April 2016 subject to the later
completion in the holiday period of: the installation of remedial wall ties at
entrances and exits to schools; the creation of adequately protected external
exclusion zones around areas of wall that had not been remediated during this
period; and the introduction of an inclement weather protocol.
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12.2.4 With the announcement on Friday 8th April, only three days before reopening
of the schools was due, of a second serious deficiency in the construction of
the walls, followed by the withdrawal by ESP of confirmation that the schools
were safe to occupy, the Council had little option but to close all the PPP1
schools with immediate effect. The Inquiry has already concluded that this was
the correct decision in the circumstances.
12.2.5 This decision was largely driven by the determination of the Council not to
expose pupils and staff to what were largely indeterminate risks.
12.2.6 The Head of Schools and Life Long Learning at the Council stated in evidence to
the Inquiry:
"There was at that time talk about initiating a more measured approach
with a 'red, amber, green' system of effectively prioritising different sites.
But to be honest, we wanted everything to be green and completely safe.
We needed to have confidence in the safety of the buildings and to be
able to convey that confidence to parents. A risk based approach was not
enough to satisfy us or the parents."
12.2.7 The decision to close the schools had major implications for the Council in terms
of dealing with the requirement to relocate within the shortest possible time
3,198 primary school children, 4,327 secondary school pupils, 107 children with
additional support needs and 738 nursery children; a total of 8,371 pupils.
12.2.8 The Inquiry was advised that alternative teaching accommodation, alternative
transport and alternative catering arrangements had been put in place for most
of the pupils by Thursday 14th April 2016 and for all by Wednesday 20th April
2016.
12.2.9 It is the view of the Inquiry that this was quite a remarkable feat to have
achieved within an immensely short time, especially without the benefit of any
lead-in period and within only a few days of the unexpected announcement
that the schools would have to close.
12.2.10 As a result of clear and timely decision making by the leadership team at the
Council, the concerted efforts of all parties concerned and the generous support
of a range of other agencies, what would have been considered at the outset to
be almost impossible was achieved. Emergency arrangements might be
expected to cater for the closure of perhaps one or two schools simultaneously
but to cope as effectively as was done with the simultaneous closure of 17
schools is deserving of praise to all those involved.
12.2.11 The solution, while finding places for all the children, did however create a range
of unavoidable difficulties for pupils, parents and teaching staff.
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12.2.12 The difficulties in coping with the logistics of the decant in relation to Rowanfield
and Braidburn were particularly significant for pupils, parents and teachers.
12.2.13 Because of the city-wide nature of the catchment population for these two
schools, the disruption of having the pupils dispersed over several sites across
the City was particularly difficult to cope with. The more complex needs of the
pupils required access to special catering, special equipment and specialist
teaching support, all of which because of the dispersed locations of pupils
required additional transport and storage arrangements.
12.2.14 The Inquiry was informed by one of the two Head Teachers that it was
impossible, because of the time lost travelling between the sites, to maintain the
same level of access to specialist teachers and allied health professionals who
provide direct therapy support for a range of the pupils. She also advised the
Inquiry that the changes were particularly unsettling for that group of pupils
who were on the autistic spectrum for whom any change to routine can be
problematic.
12.2.15 The additional travel time was seen as perhaps the worst aspect of the enforced
moves for this group. She added;
"Journey times increased very significantly for some pupils who could find
themselves being bussed from their muster points to the alternative
accommodation and that taking anything up to an hour each way. That
would need to happen both at the beginning and at the end of each
school day so that in some extreme cases, pupils were not leaving to go to
their school facilities until ten thirty in the morning and were coming back
by two thirty in order for pick up. Given their lunch break they were only
getting about three hours of education a day."
12.2.16 While relocating the pupils and teaching staff was clearly a major achievement,
the process of having to do so was undoubtedly the cause of disruption and
inconvenience to many parents in homes throughout Edinburgh. There was little
that the Council could effectively do to avoid these inevitable consequences of
the enforced moves, however it was clear to the Inquiry that at all times
throughout the decant period the Council were very sensitive to the concerns of
pupils, parents and teaching staff and sought to address them in every way
possible.
12.3 THE ROLE OF THE COUNCIL IN ENSURING EFFECTIVENESS OF REMEDIAL WORKS
12.3.1 Immediately following notification of the collapse at Oxgangs School, the Council
acted quickly and effectively, firstly, by allocating one of the senior building
professionals in the Council to act as their main representative in relation to the
215
issue and secondly, by appointing WRD to provide them with professional

structural engineering advice and services in relation to the collapse.
12.3.2 Within a matter of days, in recognition of the fact that under the contract
responsibility for making Oxgangs School safe to occupy lay with ESP, the Council
transferred the appointment of WRD to ESP. At this stage, the Council had no
reason to suspect that this was more than an isolated failure of a gable wall
although they had sensibly asked for precautionary checks to be carried out
elsewhere.
12.3.3 In accordance with interim arrangements made with ESP, the remedial works for
Phase 1 were undertaken by Amey under the professional direction of WRD and
for Phase 2 were undertaken by Galliford Try as advised by the structural
engineers they directly appointed, Goodson Associates. This latter relationship
was very similar to a Design and Build arrangement in that ESP had no direct
contractual relationship with Goodson Associates in regard to this particular
area of work and also had limited access to the technical information they
produced other than through Galliford Try.
12.3.4 These arrangements while properly reflecting the contractual structures

underlying the PPP contract indicate a level of separation created by the
procurement model between the Council and direct access to core information
relating to the actual fabric of schools, the condition of which determined the
Council's ability to meet its statutory obligations in providing a safe environment
for the pupils and teachers in Edinburgh.
12.3.5 It has been noted that even though there were clearly contractual issues
between the Council and ESP arising from the discovery of defective
construction and the enforced enclosure of the schools, there was a relatively
open and transparent sharing of technical information between these two
parties. It is clear, however, from evidence to the Inquiry that the timely making
available of all relevant information to the Council was less than ideal. This was
particularly true in relation to the lack of clarity provided to the Council by ESP
as to the detailed proposals that Galliford Try were adopting in their approach to
the remedial work.
12.3.6 When evidence began to emerge of the extent of defects across the schools, the
Council appointed Scott Bennett to provide them with independent professional
advice and to quality assure any structural proposals that were put to them by
ESP.
12.3.7 In evidence to the Inquiry, supported by that contained in copies of

correspondence and minutes of meetings held at the time, the Council felt that
the response from ESP and communications with ESP largely carried out through
its agents, initially tended to be more focussed on legal and financial matters
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and was less clear as to how to address the practical issues arising from the
defective construction.
12.3.8 In minutes from the Corporate Incident Management Team held on the morning
of 26th April 2016 there was discussion as to the quality of responsiveness and
capability of ESP in relation to the management of the remediation works. The
following extract from the minutes stated:
"There was also concern that it was not exactly clear who ESP were,
making it difficult to have direct dialogue and get firm answers. There was
frustration that the pace of action was not adequate."
12.3.9 The meeting discussed proposals that the Council might suggest to ESP in
relation to strengthening their team from a technical and construction project
management perspective. However, there was also a concern that the Council
should not undertake any direct actions that could be seen to dilute the full
responsibility that lay with ESP.
12.3.10 On the afternoon of the same day, 26th April 2016, the Council held a meeting
with the funders and directors of ESP at which they expressed their concerns.
12.3.11 It would certainly have been a key objective of ESP to achieve the earliest
completion of the remedial works with the least period of closure of schools,
both to reduce the level of disruption to the education of the children and in
order to minimise the reductions from payments to ESP made by the Council as
a result of the closures.
12.3.12 ESP still felt that this could be achieved through their proposed phased approach
to remediation, with the second phase of remedial works occurring in the period
when the schools would be closed for the summer. At the meeting the Council
made it explicitly clear to the funders that this was an option which they would
no longer accept and sought confirmation from the meeting that full
remediation would be undertaken in a single phase.
12.3.13 When it was confirmed to Galliford Try that a two-phased solution was not
acceptable, they continued with the implementation of the full extent of the
required remedial works on the Phase 2 school. However, they did so in advance
of the completion of detailed surveys of the defects to the structure of the
external walls of the schools and without submission of the details of their
proposed remedial works to ESP or through them to the City of Edinburgh
Council.
12.3.14 In evidence Galliford Try stated that they were seeking to achieve the earliest
return of pupils to their original schools, as indeed they were being encouraged
to do so by the Council. They were successful in this regard, in that they
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completed the remedial work to the Phase 2 schools significantly before this was
achieved for any of the Phase 1 schools.
12.3.15 It had been reported at a CIMT meeting held on 22nd April that there was a
perceived reluctance on the part of Galliford Try to provide the same level of
documentary reassurance that ESP had agreed to provide to the Council in
relation to the quality and effectiveness of the remedial works. The meeting was
advised that Galliford Try believed that they were acting in compliance with the
full extent of the requirements in their contract and that this requirement
exceeded the obligations placed on them by the contract.
12.3.16 In this situation, the nature of the PPP contract structures seemed to act to
inhibit the Council in its desire to undertake due diligence in seeking appropriate
assurance as to the safety of the schools. Ultimately, agreement was reached
that all relevant participants, including Galliford Try and Goodson Associates
who had acted as their structural engineers, would provide the required
assurances.
12.3.17 However, by proceeding with the remedial works without the opportunity for
prior comment by Council advisors as to the adequacy or acceptability of the
proposed engineering solutions or the opportunity by Council appointees to
inspect the carrying out of the work while it was being done, they to some
degree replicated the situation of the original construction of the school, where
there had been no contemporaneous independent scrutiny of the quality and
appropriateness of the design and construction in advance of their
implementation.
12.3.18 The situation was resolved through the appropriate insistence of the Council and
their engineering advisors, Scott Bennett, that prior to the reopening of any
schools they would require the receipt of certified documentation as to the
detailed nature of the works undertaken and the structural calculations on
which these works had been based.
12.3.19 The Phase 2 works, somewhat after-the-fact, were further checked against this
documentation by a Clerk of Works appointed by the Council. Fortunately, the
major proportion of the remedial installation of head restraints and windposts
was visible for inspection due to being retrofitted on the inner faces of the inner
leaves of cavity walls.
12.3.20 Due to the unusual nature of the circumstances and the nature of the work, it
was agreed that retrospective building warrant applications could be made
based on evidence supplied by other inspecting parties.
12.3.21 Will Rudd Davidson and Goodson Associates as structural engineers, and Amey
and Galliford Try as contractors, provided ESP with letters stating that they were
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satisfied with the standard and safety of the remediated buildings. Scott Bennett
Associates, the Council's Structural Engineers, reviewed the evidence on which
Will Rudd Davidson and Goodson Associates had based their designs, and the
signed records of implementation of these designs by Amey and Galliford Try.
They confirmed that they were satisfied with the evidence provided.
12.3.22 The fact that both firms of structural engineers responsible for the design and
supervision of the remedial works and Scott Bennett Associates had members
registered with the Structural Engineers Registration Ltd ("SER") gave greater
legitimacy to this approach. SER have been appointed by the Scottish
Government to administer the national scheme for certification of building
design through which SER-certified engineers have the authority to certify that
designs comply with building regulations.
12.3.23 In addition to an in-depth review of this documentation, a final inspection of all

remediated buildings was undertaken by Scott Bennett Associates supported by
Hickton, the firm of Clerks of Works appointed by the City of Edinburgh Council
to inspect the remedial works to the schools.
12.3.24 Taking the above evidence into account, the Council's Building Standards team
was satisfied that retrospective building warrant applications would be
appropriate. This approval method was seen by the Council as being the most
expedient route to re-open the schools.
12.3.25 The process of approval of the 'Completion Certificate Where No Building

Warrant Obtained' for each of the PPP1 schools is at the time of completion of
this Report still on-going. The description of the works submitted in these
applications primarily are in respect of the retro-fitting of the windposts to all
the PPP1 schools.
12.3.26 Given the limited nature of the work involved, the certification and counter
checking by structural engineers who are registered with the SER scheme and
the urgency of getting the pupils back to their schools for the beginning of the
new school year, the Inquiry is of the view that the response was pragmatic, if
not fully compliant, and in the circumstances was an understandable
approach.
12.3.27 As the same level of pre-remediation reports of surveys of the walls of the Phase
1 schools was not produced by Galliford Try or made available to the Inquiry,
with regard to the Phase 2 schools, the Inquiry was unable to undertake the
same level of analysis as that undertaken for the Phase 1 schools in relation to
the level of missing head restraints, bed joint reinforcement or windposts in the
Phase 2 schools.
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12.3.28 While, in addition to the defective wall ties, it had been confirmed by Galliford
Try that all three elements had been found not to be in full accordance with the
design, the lack of survey information in relation to these items makes it difficult
to be precise as to the full extent of the failure by the original contractor Miller
Construction to properly construct the external walls of these four schools.
12.3.29 The Inquiry is of the view that the Council could have been more proactive in
terms of seeking to ensure that proper surveys were undertaken and records
made of the defects or omissions in the construction of the external walls of
the Phase 2 schools and could in relation to these schools have more actively
pursued its rights under the contract.
12.3.30 It is also the view of the Inquiry that, given the original problems were
associated with the poor quality of construction, the Council could possibly
have appointed a Clerk of Works at an earlier stage than was done, so that all
opening up of walls and remedial construction work could have been
inspected as it was being done rather than relying on retrospective inspection
of the completed work as in the case of the four Phase 2 schools.
12.4 REVIEW OF TECHNICAL AND DESIGN INFORMATION
12.4.1 As part of the Inquiry process, the structural engineering advisor to the Inquiry
undertook a comprehensive review of the technical reports, drawings and
design information made available to the Inquiry by the Structural Engineers
acting for ESP, Galliford Try and the City of Edinburgh Council.
12.4.2 This technical review examined and considered the following:
 the nature of the investigations undertaken;
 the nature of the defects identified, and the scale of defects found;
 the design calculations prepared by the different Structural Engineering

Consultants as part of the structural assessments process and design of
remedial works; and
 the scope, appropriateness, and extent of the remedial works that had
been designed and installed.
12.4.3 The technical review did not carry out detailed checks of the designs prepared
by the Engineers, as this was beyond the remit of the Inquiry. The Inquiry has
been advised that comprehensive design checks for the remedial works had
been undertaken by the structural engineers employed respectively by ESP and
Galliford Try, and that these were submitted for scrutiny by the structural
engineer appointed by the City of Edinburgh Council, before a final letter of
assurance was issued for each school.
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12.4.4 Following the technical review of the information provided, the Inquiry
concluded that a satisfactorily robust approach had been adopted to the
process of structural assessments of the buildings following the identification
of defects relating to lack of head restraints, poor wall tie embedment, and
missing or inconsistent bed joint reinforcement or windposts.
12.4.5 The Inquiry found that the design process for the remedial works was
thorough and comprehensive, resulting in a high level of confidence that the
risk of structural failure arising from the defects uncovered on the buildings
has been properly addressed.
12.4.6 Based on the above, the Inquiry also concluded that the factors of safety
required within the relevant design standards, as required under the Building
Regulations, have been satisfactorily reinstated in the masonry wall panels
through the implementation of the programme of remedial works.
12.5 IMPACT ON EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT
Perhaps the most significant issue arising from the dislocation of so many pupils
over the eight to ten weeks of closure of their schools is the impact that this may
have had on the educational growth and attainment of the pupils. It is
somewhat easier to assess this in relation to any unexpected variation in the
grades attained by those pupils sitting standard exams than in the case of those
that were not. The following tables show this information for the exam classes
and would suggest that there has been no apparent disadvantage to that
particular group of pupils as a result of the disruption, at least in terms of
results.
12.6 TABLES COMPARING EXAM ATTAINMENT IN 2016 WITH RECENT
12.6.1 The following tables were provided to the Inquiry by the City of Edinburgh
Council as provisional information and have been compiled from several
different sources with no national or comparator information yet available. They
should therefore be treated with a degree of caution.
12.6.2 The column for each school for 2016 has been colour-coded as follows:
 green if the percentage attaining awards is higher than 2015; and
 red if the percentage is the lowest over the four year-period since 2013.
12.6.3 The measures used are those that were available in August 2016. Using the eight
measures for each school, only one school is coloured red, for one measure.
Across all schools, there is the type of normal fluctuation that would be
expected from year to year, with some measures going up and others down.
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12.6.4 However, all the five schools show improvement in at least half of the measures,
which would suggest that the exam results have not been negatively affected by
closure/decant.
Craigmount High School

Percentage of the S4 roll attaining awards at SCQF levels
By the end of S4
2013 2014 2015 2016
5@5+ 46 54 51
By the end of S5
1@6+ 59 63 66 74
3@6+ 40 43 38 55
5@6+ 21 23 19 27
By the end of S6
1@6+ 60 67 69 76
3@6+ 45 53 51 50
5@6+ 34 36 39 36
1@7+ 24 26 32 28
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Drummond Community High School

By the end of S4
2013 2014 2015 2016
5@5+ 16 12 22
By the end of S5
1@6+ 42 38 38 51
3@6+ 14 16 12 14
5@6+ 3 4 1 3
By the end of S6
1@6+ 38 57 48 45
3@6+ 24 23 25 22
5@6+ 15 10 18 13
1@7+ 5 9 11 5
Firrhill High School

By the end of S4
2013 2014 2015 2016
5@5+ 49 54 51
By the end of S5
1@6+ 65 60 62 62
3@6+ 47 37 43 43
5@6+ 22 19 24 23
By the end of S6
1@6+ 69 73 66 70
3@6+ 57 55 51 51
5@6+ 47 45 34 42
1@7+ 30 31 25 27
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Gracemount High School

By the end of S4
2013 2014 2015 2016
5@5+ 11 15 10
By the end of S5
1@6+ 29 29 36 40
3@6+ 12 9 17 14
5@6+ 3 4 2 5
By the end of S6
1@6+ 53 34 39 43
3@6+ 19 21 17 24
5@6+ 9 13 11 11
12 10 5 9
The Royal High School

By the end of S4
2013 2014 2015 2016
5@5+ 58 58 62
By the end of S5
1@6+ 63 71 69 75
3@6+ 37 53 54 50
5@6+ 23 27 35 27
By the end of S6
1@6+ 75 69 78 76
3@6+ 61 53 62 67
5@6+ 45 37 52 53
1@7+ 36 27 36 35
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12.6.5 It is however a fact that, as the above groups of pupils were due to sit exams,
there was a degree of prioritisation attached to protecting their teaching time.
Due to the period of the year they were also able to benefit from the exam study
leave so they could work at home for some of the time. It is therefore perhaps
not that surprising that their performance in exams was much in line with the
attainment of previous years.
12.6.6 In evidence, there was concern expressed in relation to the effect on S3 pupils,
as during the latter period of the decant from mid-May onwards they would
normally have been commencing their transition to S4, including the initial
preparation of course work which ultimately will be examined at the end of the
S4 year.
12.6.7 It is more difficult to assess the impact on primary school pupils. The information
provided by the Council indicate that whereas the average lost teaching time per
pupil per day in the secondary schools was approximately 12 minutes, the
equivalent for primary schools was 71 minutes per pupil. The Inquiry has no way
of assessing the impact of this over the period of approximately ten weeks of
being decanted, however this does represent a significant proportion of each
school day over the period.
12.6.8 The Inquiry took the view as Oxgangs school was initially closed in January as a
result of the wall collapse and subsequently from mid-March up until May, the
head teacher from that school was well-placed to provide an informed opinion
on the impact of these events on educational development.
12.6.9 In her evidence, she offered the view that there were positives as well as
negatives in relation to the children's development during this period. She said;
"As far as any detriment to the children was concerned, I do not believe
there was anything significant. In fact, there were many positives which
came out of this experience which the children found initially at least a
"big excitement"."
"In many cases children came back to Oxgangs after their experiences in
other schools with lots of good ideas that they had seen elsewhere.
Although they were fed up towards the end of the decant and were keen
to get back. Following the situation, I expected to see a big dip in levels of
attainment but in fact this never materialised. In fact, in some cases I have
seen something of an improvement. Overall, I would say that the
experience for children has been at worst neutral."
12.6.10 The Inquiry also sought the views of the head teacher at Braidburn in relation to
the impact on the attainment of pupils with additional needs.
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"We would reiterate that it was disruptive but they did make progress at a
rate which was not unduly affected. Our targets in terms of educational
attainment were still met but the day-to-day experience for many of the
children was not the same as it would have been in Braidburn.
There were some positives that came out of the situation. Our children
mixed well when they were at some of the decant locations. That was a
very positive experience. Unfortunately, some of our children went to
different facilities and did not have that opportunity. However, it was not
necessarily a bad experience in every sense. For the staff, it was helpful in
that it strengthened partnerships between us and other groups. It was
good for staff development and teamwork."
12.6.11 It is difficult to determine and it will subsequently be difficult to prove

whether the closure and decant of the schools has had any longer-term
negative impact on the educational attainment of the pupils affected.
However, on the basis of the evidence provided, the Inquiry is of the view that
any negative impact is likely to have been of a limited nature and that these
may have been offset in certain instances by some unexpected positive
impacts of the experience.
12.7 SUPPORT TO PARENTS OR FAMILIES OF DECANTED PUPILS
12.7.1 Having given due and appropriate praise to all involved in achieving the hugely
challenging logistical task of providing an alternative place for every pupil within
an amazingly short time-scale, there is still little doubt that the impact of the
enforced arrangements resulted in significant concern, inconvenience and
disruption to the lives of pupils, parents and staff. Some of the parents
expressed the view that the level of anxiety caused by the uncertainty and
disruption to their daily arrangements was not fully appreciated by the Council.
12.7.2 There was little that the Council, itself a victim of circumstances, could do to
mitigate this negative impact but a complaint made by several parents who gave
evidence or made submissions to the Inquiry, was in relation to the lack of clear
information from the Council at the early stages of the process. In a number of
circumstances, it is evident that this led to a degree of frustration on the part of
some parents.
12.7.3 It is also evident to the Inquiry from the records of the daily meetings held, that
the Council were constantly aware of the importance of good communication
and anxious to keep parents as fully advised as possible. This issue was discussed
at every meeting of the CIMT and was viewed as a priority issue. It is also clear
from these minutes as to the degree of frustration felt by officers of the Council
as to their inability to provide more information and greater certainty in their
communications in the early stages of the decant period.
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12.7.4 On the Council's part, particularly at the early stages of the closures, the reason
for the somewhat limited content in their communication with parents was that
they in turn were unable to get the information they needed from ESP to allow
them to give firm information to teachers and parents on the extent of the
defects, the level of remedial works required and, most importantly, dates for
the completion of remedial works and the reopening of schools.
12.7.5 ESP also in turn experienced difficulty, particularly in the initial weeks, in getting
firm information from their supply chain.
12.7.6 A very much more positive view was expressed by those parents interviewed as
to the quality of communication by the Council during the later stages of the
decant, once clearer information had been made available to the Council.
12.7.7 Despite this initial problem, there was also extensive praise expressed to the
Inquiry for the many individual contributions made by a wide range of
individuals and teams from within the Council and the schools. There was also a
major appreciation of the pressures that heads and teachers had been put under
and the level of resilience and positivity they were able to maintain throughout
the process.
12.7.8 The Inquiry would suggest that, if it has not already happened, the Council
should facilitate a joint meeting with representatives of the Parent Councils
and heads of schools to review all issues relevant to the management of the
closure, and to help inform the development of protocols for future
emergency situations which hopefully will not be on the same scale as this
one.
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Section 13 – Remit Item 8: Recommendations
SECTION 13 – REMIT ITEM 8: RECOMMENDATIONS
Remit Item 8:
"Provide advice and recommendations on any specific or wider lessons which can be learned
from these unfortunate events for Edinburgh Council and any other bodies."
 This Section will set out a series of recommendations for consideration by the
City of Edinburgh Council. The Inquiry is of the view that many of these
recommendations have a wider relevance to those engaged in the procurement,
design and construction of public buildings. It is not intended to repeat here the
evidence provided earlier in this Report from which these recommendations
have been derived.
 Many of the recommendations relate to factors which, when combined over

time, have helped to create circumstances in the procurement of public
buildings, such that the collapse of the wall at Oxgangs appears to be a symptom
of a broader problem.
 The collapse of the wall at Oxgangs School and the defects found in the
construction of the 17 Edinburgh projects were fundamentally the result of a
combination of poor quality of workmanship, inadequate supervision and
ineffective quality assurance within the construction industry. The level of
independent scrutiny applied to the construction on behalf of the Council was
also insufficient to identify and seek rectification of the defective construction
that subsequently caused the failure of the wall.
 Whilst it is not suggested that this lack of quality is representative of the

construction industry as a whole, the recurring nature of similar defects in
relation to the construction of masonry walls undertaken by a range of
contractors, subcontractors and bricklaying squads in the Edinburgh schools and
other schools across Scotland, can only indicate that the risk of occurrence of
defects of this nature is high. Accordingly, clients should ensure that they
incorporate into their procurement arrangements the provision of appropriately
qualified and resourced independent scrutiny that provides the necessary level
of assurance as to the quality of the buildings being procured.
 By independent scrutiny, the Inquiry is referring to inspection by individuals or

organisations appointed or directly employed by the client who are independent
of the contractor undertaking the project.
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THE LIST OF RECOMMENDATIONS
The full list of recommendations of this Inquiry as provided below is based on an analysis of
the evidence provided to the Inquiry. The 40 individual recommendations are listed under
the following nine headings.
1. Procurement
2. Independent Certifier
3. Client's Relationship with the Design Team
4. Information Sharing
5. Construction
6. Training and Recruitment
7. Building Standards
8. Sharing of Information
9. Recommendations for the City of Edinburgh Council
10 Further Inspections
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1. PROCUREMENT RECOMMENDATIONS
Recommendation 1.1 - Expertise and resources
Public sector bodies engaged in the procurement of public buildings should

maintain, or have assured access to, a level of expertise and resources that allows
that body to act as an 'intelligent customer' in undertaking transactions with
Private Sector Construction Companies. Before commencing a programme of work
or an individual project, a public body should first assess this requirement and
ensure that it has in place the requisite and appropriate resources in terms of
governance arrangements, type of expertise, allocated time and the funding
required to enable it to act as an 'Intelligent Customer'.
Recommendation 1.2 - Ensuring compliance with specification
In any construction contract let by a public body, the public body should ensure
that due diligence is undertaken at an appropriate level to confirm that the
requirements of that contract are actually delivered in accordance with the terms
of that contract. The level of due diligence applied should be determined through
an informed assessment of risk of the likelihood or implications of non-compliance.
Recommendation 1.3 - Public bodies cannot delegate duties
In seeking to transfer as much risk as possible away from themselves in relation to

the design and construction of facilities, public bodies should understand that they
cannot delegate to others the duty that they ultimately owe to the public to ensure
the provision of a safe environment for the delivery of services to their
communities and this should inform their approach to their quality assurance
processes of projects. There should always be an appropriate level of independent
scrutiny in relation to all aspects of design and construction that are in effect
largely or partly self-certified by those producing them.
Recommendation 1.4 - Building it right first time
The procurement strategies adopted by public bodies should include appropriate

investment in the provision of informed independent scrutiny of projects when
they are being designed and constructed so that they are built right first time,
rather than clients subsequently seeking to rely on their ability to seek remediation
or compensation if they are not. It is the view of the Inquiry that seeking savings
through cutting investment in quality assurance is inevitably a false economy.
Recommendation 1.5 - Quality of design and construction
 There should be a more informed approach among public bodies as to how

best practice methodologies aimed at optimising the quality of design and the
quality of construction can be incorporated into the current models of
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procurement of public buildings, whilst maintaining other benefits of these

processes. One key element of such processes is a clear and considered
articulation in a comprehensive brief by the client of the quality objectives for
a project and of the methodology to be used for ensuring the achievement of
that quality in both the design and construction phases.
 Appropriate time and resource should be allocated by clients during the initial
stages of a project and during the development of the brief in order to
establish and clearly define these quality objectives and approaches to
ensuring quality.
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2. INDEPENDENT CERTIFIER RECOMMENDATIONS
Recommendation 2.1 - Nature of Inspection
 There would appear to be a lack of shared understanding, both by those

commissioning and providing the services of Independent Certifier in PPP
forms of contracts, with regard to the level of inspection to be undertaken by
the Independent Certifier and the degree of reliance that clients can place on
the issue of Availability Certificates as to the quality of the construction.
 The level of service provided by Independent Certifiers needs to be reviewed

and contracts of appointment written to reflect what clients actually require
of the role, so that clients better understand exactly what they are getting
and providers of the service better understand what is required of them.
Standard forms for these appointments should spell out the nature of the
inspection required.
 The Inquiry is of the view that one possible model or option to overcome the
type of issues identified in the PPP1 project would be to extend the range of
services required in the appointment of Independent Certifiers to include the
provision and management of Clerks of Works services.
Recommendation 2.2 - Professional indemnity insurance and Liability Period
 The level of professional indemnity insurance sought and the liability period
for Independent Certifiers should be assessed to properly and appropriately
reflect the significance of their Certification processes and the degree of
reliance that is to be placed on it.
Recommendation 2.3 - Method of appointment of Independent Certifier
Given the essential requirement that those undertaking the role of Independent
Certifier are truly independent, the appointment of Independent Certifiers should
be made following properly advertised and conducted public procurement
processes and not through nomination or recommendation by the private sector
party (as appears frequently to have been the case).
Recommendation 2.4 - Fees of Independent Certifier
The fees for undertaking the Independent Certifier role should reflect the level of
service required, rather than the service being restricted to fit a predetermined
budget.
Recommendation 2.5 - Independent Inspection of the Works
 Public sector clients should engage appropriately qualified individuals or

organisations with the necessary professional construction expertise to
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undertake on their behalf an appropriate level of ongoing inspection of the

construction of their buildings. This is in order to identify and report defective
work to the client and to ensure proper rectification of same.
 Depending on the nature of the project, this inspection role, at the level at
which the defects in the Edinburgh PPP1 schools occurred, is traditionally
undertaken by a combination of resident architects, resident engineers and
Clerks of Works, the use of whom has dramatically reduced over recent years,
yet the essential role they played does not appear to have been effectively
provided for by alternative arrangements within the forms of procurement
currently in vogue.
 Clients need to reappraise this gap in the assurance processes which has been
allowed to develop.
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3. CLIENT'S RELATIONSHIP WITH THE DESIGN TEAM
Recommendation 3.1 - Scope of service of design team members
 Under current models of procurement, the relationship between the client

and key members of the design team has tended to become at least one or
more steps removed, yet the inherent fundamental quality and safety of
projects as determined by the design of spaces, the specification of materials
and the structural intent behind the design, relies on the creativeness and
effectiveness of their designs and the proper implementation of these on site.
The extent of their appointments and the level of involvement of design team
members (either with clients or on site) is now frequently delegated to
contractors to determine.
 Public bodies should review current procurement arrangements to ensure

they are providing the optimum level of communication between clients and
key members of the design team and that clients are able to benefit to the
fullest extent from their professional advice and expertise. They may wish to
consider how more direct communication could be incorporated into current
forms of contract, in addition to the existing requirement for the provision of
collateral warranties.
Recommendation 3.2 - Role of design teams in inspecting works on site
If clients do not wish to prescribe in their tender documentation the minimum level
of services which they require to be provided by design team members when
employed by a contractor, public sector clients should at least require that
submitted tenders include a full description of the proposed scope of design team
services, including any proposed role in the inspection of the works on site. This, in
addition to the quality of the proposed design team or proposed design, should be
important factors in the assessment of such tenders.
Recommendation 3.3 - Notification of issues to public sector client
The Inquiry is of the view that, where possible, there should be a mandatory
provision built into such contracts that where, to the knowledge of a professional
design team member, a contractor has failed to take appropriate action as advised
by a member of the professional design team on issues that could impact on the
subsequent safety of building users or functionality of the building, the consultant
in question should be required to inform the public sector client of the advice
provided to the contractor.
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4. INFORMATION SHARING RECOMMENDATIONS
Recommendation 4.1 - Production, retention and updating of information
 The production, retention and updating of accurate construction and

operational information and related documentation on projects should be
regarded as a fundamental requirement and requires a systematic and
disciplined approach by all parties to the contract.
 Public bodies should establish a mandatory protocol for receipt and

processing of all such project information within their own organisations.
Recommendation 4.2 - Provision of as-built drawings
 The process of producing as-built drawings is frequently included in

appointment documents as a requirement of the design team. In evidence to
the Inquiry, design team members have stated a practical limitation on them
in that they may be unaware of the detail of on-site changes to the issued
design drawings or specifications that may be made by the contractor or its
supply chain.
 Contractors should be required to put in place appropriate arrangements for

the recording of all subsequent changes to final 'construction issues' drawings
and arrange for the production of a final as-built set of documents to a
standard suitable for issue to the client for retention as a permanent record
of the detail of the project.
 Contractors should also be required to certify that the 'as-built'

documentation as provided is an accurate record of what has actually been
built.
Recommendation 4.3 - Provision of as-built drawings to Building Control
It is also recommended by the Inquiry that consideration be given to the

requirement for 'as built' drawings as prepared for and certified by the Contractor
to be submitted to Building Standards as a definitive record of what was built. This
could be a formal part of the Completion Certificate process.
Recommendation 4.4 - On-site accessibility of design information
 It is critical that there is effective communication of essential design

information in an accessible form to tradesmen such as bricklayers working
on site. In relation to the construction of walls and the incorporation of
related structural accessories, in order to avoid mistaken omissions of
accessories such as wall ties, head restraints or bed joint reinforcement, it is
recommended that all relevant information should be fully integrated into a
235
single document, rather than requiring reference by bricklayers to a range of

different documents produced by different members of the design team.
 The design and construction professions should consider the need for the
development of a better approach to the integration of documentation to
reflect the practical needs associated with the implementation of design
information in a building site environment.
 From the evidence provided to the Inquiry, there was a unanimous view that
a comprehensive set of all such information in regard to the construction of
external cavity walls should be provided on a document produced by the
structural engineering consultants.
Recommendation 4.5 - Communication of design intent
 The evidence to the Inquiry suggested that the design intent in relation to the
importance to the structural integrity of masonry panels of the proper
installation of wall accessories and secondary steelwork, may not always be
adequately conveyed in design documentation and may not be fully
understood by those reviewing the documentation (or perhaps more
importantly by those actually building the walls).
 Structural engineers should be required to describe in their documentation

and drawings the approach and design philosophy adopted in their designs in
terms of the reliance on the inclusion of bed joint reinforcement, wall head
and lateral restraints or windposts in the required locations and in accordance
with the specification, and the relative inter-dependence of these various
components.
Recommendation 4.6 - Structural amendments to be approved
The approved building warrant system relies on buildings being constructed in

accordance with the approved drawings. Contractors should ensure that any
amendments to the structural design of buildings should only be implemented after
having undertaken any necessary checks or amendment to the design by the
structural engineer and any changes to the approved design should be documented
and processed in compliance with the statutory obligations imposed by the
Buildings Standards regulations under the amendment to warrant process.
Recommendation 4.7 - Access to original construction information
 The City of Edinburgh Council was not automatically provided with all
relevant design, construction and survey information relating to the original
construction, the subsequent investigations and the implementation of the
remedial works to the PPP1 schools. In response to requests for elements of
this information, the Council was advised by various members of the supply
236
chain that it did not have a direct contractual right to this information and
would have to seek it through the various levels of ESP's supply chain,
including members of their original supply chain who may be out of contract.
 PPP contract arrangements should incorporate clearly the right for public
sector clients to be provided, by members of current and original PPP supply
chains (and where relevant in return for an appropriate fee), with copies of all
design and technical information, surveys, proposed amendments and as-
built documentation in relation to their projects.
237
5. CONSTRUCTION RECOMMENDATIONS
Recommendation 5.1 - Building of leaves of cavity walls separately
The evidence from this Inquiry suggests that the subsequent practical difficulties
that arise from building the inner and outer leaves of cavity walls at different times
may have been significant contributory factors in the lack of embedment of wall
ties achieved. The construction industry should carefully review this practice and if
the separate building of the leaves of cavity walls is still required to achieve
programme dates, it is recommended that standard wall ties should not be used
and instead be replaced by alternative approved ties or by alternative construction
to blockwork for the inner leaf e.g. use of structural framing systems.
Recommendation 5.2 - Design of wall ties
There would be significant benefit if the design of wall ties, particularly the type
used on the Oxgangs School, more readily enabled both those laying the bricks and
those inspecting cavity walls before closure, to determine that the minimum or
recommended embedment of wall ties was being or had been achieved. Clearer
calibration or marking of these points through the introduction of colour, texture or
shape could assist in this process, by making the level of embedment more clearly
visible.
Recommendation 5.3 - Design and use of head restraints
 There may be benefit in designers, contractors and manufacturers reviewing

the practical complexity of installing the different forms of head restraints,
particularly when being connected to sloping beams, and seeking to simplify
this in terms of specification, design and fixing of this component, thereby
reducing the time required to fit them and any potential reluctance on the
part of bricklayers to install them.
 As in the case of the wall ties, it would be beneficial if they were designed to
incorporate some visible indicator to prove in any subsequent inspections
that they had actually been fitted, thus preventing the need for avoidable
intrusive investigations.
Recommendation 5.4 - Payment of bricklayers
The most common method of paying bricklayers in recent years has tended to be
based on the number of bricks laid rather than on the time that bricklayers work.
As generally applied, this approach would appear not to take account of the
number, type and complexity of accessories that are required to be incorporated.
The construction industry should seek to review this approach to remove any
perverse incentive of the payment mechanism to encourage the omission of
elements providing the essential structural integrity of walls.
238
Recommendation 5.5 - Contractor quality assurance processes
 The quality assurance processes applied by the contractors on the PPP1

projects failed to identify or rectify fundamental non-compliance with
required standards in the construction of masonry walls. Irrespective of the
potential role of independent inspections by agents of the client, such failures
are and remain the direct responsibility of the contractor.
 The repeated failures across many different projects would suggest that
either the quality assurance processes themselves or the manner in which
these processes are implemented have frequently proved inadequate.
 It is therefore recommended that the construction industry should seek to

introduce, develop and promulgate standardised best practice methods in
relation to the requirements of the related quality assurance processes, how
they are implemented and who implements them.
 The design of such processes should consider the potential greater use of
modern technology in relation to the digital recording of such areas of work.
Recommendation 5.6 - Inspection and sign-off of cavity walls
 It is particularly important to note that in the case of the 17 PPP1 projects,

visual only inspections of the external walls of these schools, by experienced
teams of qualified structural engineers, failed to identify any indications of
the subsequently identified presence of significant deficiencies in the
construction of the walls.
 While visual inspections are clearly the first part of any structural assessment
of walls and can help identify any movement, bulging or alignment issues,
they should not be relied upon as evidence that the walls are properly
constructed and have the required structural capacity to resist strong winds.
 It is therefore recommended that quality assurance processes on site are such

that they prevent the closure of walls before proper inspection and sign-off
has been facilitated to confirm the quality and completeness of the work.
Recommendation 5.7 - Bricklaying profession
 The Inquiry is of the view that, given the widespread nature of similar
defective construction across the 17 PPP1 projects, undertaken by bricklayers
from different sub-contracting companies, and from different squads within
these companies, there is clear evidence of a problem in ensuring the
appropriate quality in this fundamental area of construction.
239
 It is therefore recommended that the construction industry should re-

examine its approach to recruitment, training, selection and appointment of
brick-laying subcontractors, means of remuneration, vetting of qualifications
and competence, supervision and quality assurance of bricklayers.
Recommendation 5.8 - Fire-stopping and fire-proofing
 Fire-stopping and fire-proofing are fundamental aspects of the safety of

buildings and must be treated with the importance that they deserve due to
the potential implications for the safety of building users and the risk to
property as a result of defects in their incorporation into the building.
 There has been significant evidence of failures of fire-stopping in PPP projects

in England and questions have been raised as a result of the initial surveys of
fire-stopping undertaken across the 17 PPP1 projects in Edinburgh.
 It is recommended that, in relation to these aspects, consideration be given

to the introduction of independent in-depth inspection and certification by a
suitably qualified person or specialist company, in accordance with the
provisions made within the Building (Scotland) Act 2003, and that this
certification be required to be provided to Building Standards as evidence of
fully compliant installation, prior to the approval of the Completion
Certification by Building Standards.
240
6. TRAINING AND RECRUITMENT RECOMMENDATIONS
Recommendation 6.1 - Provision of training and recruitment
 The evidence to the Inquiry from several experienced sources suggested that
there is an increasing shortage of essential skills and/or deskilling in the
construction industry which is impacting on its ability to deliver and ensure
the required quality of construction.
 Three particular areas were identified where a combination of a lack of

funding, lack of appropriate training courses and lack of recognition of the
level of requirement has led to serious skills shortages and difficulties in
recruitment. The three areas were:
 Bricklaying
 Clerks of Works
 Building Standards Inspectors
 The appropriate authorities should undertake a review of the current level of

provision of training in these areas, and any others considered relevant, to
ensure that the construction industry has access to an adequate properly
trained and qualified resource in each of these areas.
Recommendation 6.2 - Apprenticeships
 In relation to the training of bricklayers, the Construction Industry Training

Board (CITB) should review with the industry the effectiveness of current
apprenticeship arrangements in meeting the objective of developing a highly
skilled bricklaying workforce.
 The current apprenticeship course and skills tests should also be reviewed to
ensure that there is sufficient focus on understanding the function of and the
practical installation of brickwork accessories.
241
7. BUILDING STANDARDS RECOMMENDATIONS
Recommendation 7.1 - Scope of Building Standards inspection and certification
 The Inquiry formed the view that there was a common misconception as to
the extent of the reliance that can be placed on the quality of construction of
a building because it had successfully gone through the statutory Buildings
Standards process.
 The typical frequency of site visits and the level and nature of inspections
undertaken, as provided in evidence, can only confirm that buildings are
being built generally in accordance with approved warrants.
 It would not appear to be either practical or appropriate for Building

Standards Departments to be expected to undertake the type and level of
detailed inspection that would be necessary to identify the risks to user safety
that have been identified in this Report. However, an underlying core
objective of their function as expressed in the Building (Scotland) Act 2003 is
'securing the health, safety, welfare and convenience of persons in or about
buildings'.
 To resolve this issue, there is a need for Government and the construction
industry to consider the introduction of methods that would provide Buildings
Standards with the required level of assurance in risk areas.
 In this regard, it is recommended that consideration be given to the

practicality of extending the concept of mandatory inspection and
certification of construction by approved certifiers to elements of the building
that could potentially pose significant risk to users if not constructed properly
and which level of inspection cannot practically be undertaken by Building
Inspectors themselves.
Recommendation 7.2 - Sanctions for non-compliance with Building Standards
 The evidence provided to the Inquiry showed a number of breaches in

relation to the PPP1 schools compliance with the statutory applications and
certification processes required under the Building (Scotland) Act 2003.
 The Inquiry noted that: (a) there does not appear to be an automatic follow
up by Building Standards Departments to require compliance, where proper
processes have not been complied with; and (b) that the non-application for
and non-issue of completion certificates for new buildings would not appear
to be an infrequent occurrence.
 The Inquiry would recommend that in order to improve the effectiveness of

the revised Building (Scotland) Act 2005, in delivering the key stated policy
242
objective of, ‘securing the health, safety, welfare and convenience of persons
in or about buildings’, systematic and appropriate administrative
arrangements should be developed and implemented by verifiers to identify,
pursue and sanction those who fail to comply with its statutory requirements.
Recommendation 7.3 - Temporary Occupancy Certificates
 In circumstances in PPP contracts where the Building Standards Certificate of

Completion cannot yet be issued, and the issue of an Availability Certificate is
permitted under the contract on the basis of a Temporary Occupancy
Certificate, it is recommended that there should be a specific requirement
that the Independent Certifier issuing an Availability Certificate should
formally advise the public sector client of this fact and qualify the
documentation to reflect this position.
 Additionally, it is recommended that there should be a requirement under

the contract that, in such circumstances, a date should be set by which the
Project Company should be required to have achieved an accepted Certificate
of Completion or be in default.
Recommendation 7.4 - Prioritisation of risk factors
 The Inquiry noted, from the evidence provided, the number and
preponderance of visits by Building Inspectors which focussed on drainage
issues compared to the limited number of visits that were undertaken in
relation to the compliance of the construction of the general structure and
fabric of the buildings, the design and specification of which would have
represented the vast majority of information submitted and scrutinised by
Building Standards prior to approval of the design warrant.
 It is recommended that a review be undertaken as to the overall objective of

site visits undertaken by Building Inspectors to ensure that the planning of
these properly reflects a prioritisation of the identification and inspection of
areas of highest risk.
Recommendation 7.5 - Building Standards Department of the city of Edinburgh

Council
It is recommended that a review be undertaken of the staffing and funding of the

Building Standards Department in Edinburgh Council to ensure that these are
adequate to meet the demand for services and to provide the level of service that
is required.
243
8. INFORMATION SHARING RECOMMENDATIONS
Recommendation 8 - Sharing of information on matters of structural concern
 The Inquiry found that there was a degree of reluctance on the part of some
Local Authorities to reveal to the Inquiry full details of the extent and nature
of defective construction that had been found as a result of investigations
undertaken at some of their schools. This reluctance could be related to
possible on-going litigation or a reluctance on their part (or that of their
project company) to have this information made public.
 It is recommended that there should be a formal requirement on public

bodies to make automatic disclosure to a central source of information on
building failures, particularly in relation to building failures that bring with
them potential risks to the safety of building users.
 In particular, the collation and dissemination of information relating to

matters of structural concern is a vital element of achieving safe structures.
The Standing Committee on Structural Safety (SCOSS) has introduced the
Confidential Reporting on Structural Safety (CROSS) scheme, to facilitate this
process in circumstances where those providing the information may wish to
retain a degree of anonymity. This should be used more widely.
244
9. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE CITY OF EDINBURGH COUNCIL
Recommendation 9.1 - Minor Changes within PPP1 schools
The Council may wish to investigate what flexibilities there may be, or may be
negotiated, in relation to the application of the provisions of the PPP1 Project
Agreement that might better facilitate the implementation of requests for minor
changes within the schools. This was identified as an on-going source of frustration
by those members of staff and of Parent Councils who gave evidence to the Inquiry.
Recommendation 9.2 - Parents' and schools' review of management of closure
The Inquiry would suggest that, if not already done, the Council should facilitate a
joint meeting with representatives of the Parent Councils and heads of schools to
review all issues relevant to the management of the closure, to benefit from any
learning gained from the experience and to help inform the development of
protocols for future emergency situations.
Recommendation 9.3 - Fire-stopping
In light of the results of the fire-stopping surveys of the PPP1 projects, it is

recommended that the City of Edinburgh Council should, in addition to the on-
going checking of fire safety measures and components across its wider estate,
require that appropriately frequent on-going inspections are undertaken by those
responsible for the management of these buildings to ensure that these are
properly maintained over time.
245
10. FURTHER INVESTIGATIONS
Recommendation 10 - Other clients of recently constructed buildings
 In relation to the potential presence of further defective construction in the

external walls of other of their buildings, the City of Edinburgh Council is
undertaking a proportionate and structured risk-based approach to
investigating their wider estate, specifically regarding the issues identified on
the PPP1 Estate i.e. wall tie embedment and the provision of appropriate
restraints to masonry panels.
 Other clients of recently constructed buildings of a similar scale and form of

construction to the PPP1 schools, if concerned that their buildings may
contain similar defects, may wish to adopt a similar risk-based approach to
any investigation process they may feel necessary.
246
Appendix 1 – List of those invited to provide evidence
APPENDIX 1
LIST OF THOSE INVITED TO PROVIDE EVIDENCE TO THE INQUIRY
The following is a list of those to whom invitations were sent and those who subsequently
attended or made written submissions to the Inquiry.
1. CITY OF EDINBURGH COUNCIL
Members of the City of Edinburgh Council
 Several members of Council including the Leader and Deputy Leader

attended as witnesses
The Chief Executive and Senior Officers of the City of Edinburgh Council who were
in post during the period leading up to and following the collapse of the wall at
Oxgangs School and those officers who have been involved on behalf of the Council
in managing all aspects arising from the collapse of the wall in the period from Jan
2016 onwards
 All invited officers attended as witnesses
Officers of the City of Edinburgh Council who were involved in the PPP1 project
during the time of the development of the original business case in 1998 through to
the completion of the PPP1 project in 2005 and officers who were involved in the
contract management process between 2005 and 2016;
 All those contacted attended as witnesses including three ex-officers of the

Council; one of these three having been a senior member of the project team
who led on the process up to financial close and the two others having been
involved in the process during the development phase
Representatives of the City of Edinburgh Council's Building Standards Department,

including building inspectors who were involved in some of the warrant
applications and certifications of the PPP1 school projects:
 The senior building surveyor in the Building Standards Department, who

coincidently had also undertaken the duties of building inspector in relation
to several of the PPP1 schools, attended as a witness
 A second building inspector who had acted in this role in relation to other of
the PPP1 schools also attended as a witness
2. TEACHERS AND PARENTS
Representatives of the teaching staff and of the parents of children affected by the
enforced closure of the schools
247
 All those invited attended as witnesses including three Chairs of Parent

Councils at affected schools, two School Principals and one other member of
staff.
3. PROJECT PARTIES
Representatives of the ESP in relation to their role at the original initiation and
implementation of the contract, in the intervening period since completion of
construction in 2005 and in their response to the events arising from the collapse of
the Oxgangs School wall and the subsequent discovery of building defects
 Senior representatives of all four shareholders in ESP attended as witnesses
 The operational project manager, a consultant from IML Edinburgh, who

oversees the implementation of the contract on behalf of ESP, attended as a
witness
Senior representatives of Galliford Try, the construction company which in 2014

acquired Miller Construction. Miller Construction was an original shareholder in
ESP, and undertook the construction of the majority of Phase 1, and all four of the
Phase 2 schools. Galliford Try undertook the recent remedial works to the four
PPP1 Phase 2 schools;
 The Chief Operating Officer of Galliford Try attended with other senior staff
of the company
Members of staff employed by Miller Construction at the time of the original

construction of the schools;
 Three members of Miller's staff who had been involved in the construction of
the schools attended as witnesses
4. CONSTRUCTION CONTRACTORS
Senior representatives of the several Tier 2 Building Contractors employed by

AMJV to construct Phase 1 PPP1 schools;
 Lilley Construction was appointed by AMJV to construct the Pirrie Hall/St

David's Primary School and Broomhouse/St Joseph's Primary School. This
company was dissolved in 2013.
 Tulloch Construction was appointed by AMJV to construct Craigroyston

Primary School. This company was dissolved in 2012.
 John Dickie and Son Ltd. were appointed by AMJV to undertake the
Drummond Community HS project but the construction was taken over by
248
Miller following contractual issues between the companies involved. This

company was dissolved in 2014.
 Ogilvie Construction was appointed by AMJV to construct Craigour Primary

School. The Managing Director of Ogilvie Construction attended as a witness.
 Robertson Construction was appointed by AMJV to undertake the Royal HS

project but the construction was taken over by Miller following contractual
issues between the companies involved.
Senior Managers of the firms of bricklaying sub-contractors used on the PPP1

schools by the Tier 1 and Tier 2 Contractors and representatives of current leading
firms of bricklaying sub-contractors in Scotland.
 VB Contracts were engaged as bricklaying sub-contractors by Miller

Construction for all four Phase 2 PPP1 schools. No response was received to
recorded mail requests for the attendance of an ex-senior officer in the
company. This company is stated at Companies House as being in liquidation
with the last accounts submitted in 2008.
 The Inquiry was advised that Lochpark Builders Ltd had acted as a brick-
laying sub-contractor on one or more of the PPP1 schools. An ex-senior
officer of the company when contacted expressed an unwillingness to attend
as a witness. This company is stated at Companies House as having been
dissolved in 2015.
 The Inquiry was informed that a brick-laying sub-contracting company called

Brownlee and Hogan acted as sub-contractors for Craigour Primary School,
part of Phase 1 of PPP1. The Inquiry was also advised that the Company
ceased trading and were in sequestration in 2005.
 Despite both written and verbal requests by the Inquiry to several leading
firms of bricklayers, following a period of consideration, they all expressed a
reluctance to give evidence on current practice in this area of the
construction industry.
Representatives of the three architectural practices involved in the design of the

schools; Holmes Miller of Edinburgh; 3DReid of Edinburgh and Hickton Madeley of
Telford;
 Two senior directors of Holmes Miller attended as witnesses.
 Holmes Miller also made a written submission to the Inquiry.
 3DReid Architects of Edinburgh offered a named member of their staff to

attend the Inquiry as a witness. However, shortly prior to the date of
249
attendance, the Inquiry was advised that 3DReid no longer intended to

attend, despite a further request from the Inquiry to reconsider this decision.
 The Director of 3DReid, who had at the time overseen the design of the five
PPP1 projects undertaken by 3DReid, is no longer part of that practice. He is
currently with another practice and after consideration advised the Inquiry
that he felt unable to attend the Inquiry because of a potential conflict of
interest.
 Hickton Madeley, a firm of architects from Telford that had worked

collaboratively with 3DReid on the design of the schools, was dissolved as a
company in 2011.
Representatives of the structural engineering consultancy, WSP Parsons

Brinckerhoff, which was responsible for the structural design of all 17 projects or
any past employees of the firm who had been involved in the design of the PPP1
projects;
 The WSP Operations Director for Building Structures based at Basingstoke

attended as a witness
 A senior structural engineer no longer working at WSP, but who was

Technical Director for WSP with responsibility for oversight of the provision
by WSP of structural engineering services for the original design and
construction of all the PPP1 school projects attended as a witness.
Senior Representatives of the two companies who had undertaken the role of
Independent Certifiers on the school projects, Mouchel (previously Mouchel
Parkman) on the 13 Phase 1 PPP1 projects and Ove Arup and Partners Scotland on
the four Phase 2 PPP1 schools.
 The Kier Group acquired Mouchel in April 2015. A senior representative of

this company, with responsibility for the group of staff still undertaking the
roles of Independent Certifier on behalf of the Kier Group, attended as a
witness. He informed us that, as recently as October 2016, WSP, which had
provided structural engineering services for the PPP1 projects, had acquired
the part of Kier that undertook the Independent Certifier role although that
expertise remained with Kier.
 An associate director with Ove Arup and Partners, who had responsibility for
oversight of the member of staff, who had undertaken the role of
Independent Certifier on the Phase 2 PPP1 schools, attended as a witness.
250
5. ADVISORS ENGAGED FOLLOWING OXGANGS SCHOOL WALL COLLAPSE
Senior representatives of the three structural engineering consultancies that were

employed to advise ESP and the contractor Galliford Try on the cause of the
collapse, the nature of the structural defects and the required remediation;
 Senior members of staff of Will Rudd Davidson (appointed by ESP), attended

as witnesses
 Senior members of staff from Goodson Associates (appointed by Galliford

Try and ESP) attended as witnesses
 A senior member of staff from Harley Haddow (appointed to assist Will Rudd
Davidson) attended as a witness
The senior representative of the firm of structural engineers, Scott Bennett

Associates of Glasgow, appointed to provide the Council with independent
professional advice on the work undertaken by the team appointed by ESP in
relation to their surveys, analysis and proposals for remediation following the
January 2016 events;
 The appointed senior representative of the firm attended as a witness
Senior representatives of the firm of legal advisers, Ashurst LLP from London,
employed by the Council to advise on the legal implications arising from the
January event;
 Two Partners from Ashurst LLP gave evidence to the Inquiry
6. CONTRACTORS ENGAGED FOLLOWING THE OXGANGS SCHOOL WALL COLLAPSE
A senior representative of Amey in relation to their role in managing the

remediation projects for the Phase 1 PPP1 schools
 A Principal Engineering Manager, from the Consulting and Strategic

Infrastructure Division of Amey, who had overseen the construction of the
remedial works contract on the Phase 1 schools, accompanied by the senior
legal adviser employed by the company, attended as a witness and provided
supportive documentation to the Inquiry
Senior representatives from Amey Communities, the company responsible for the
operational and facilities management of the PPP1 schools since their opening.
 Two senior managers from the company, accompanied by the company's

senior legal adviser, attended as witnesses.
251
7. NATIONAL BUILDING STANDARDS
The head of Building Standards Division of the Scottish Government
 The senior officer of the Division attended as a witness
A senior representative from Local Authority Building Standards Scotland (LABS)
 The current Chair of LABS attended as a witness
8. INDUSTRY BODIES
A senior representative from Structural Engineers Registration Ltd (Scottish

Registration Board), an organisation that approves and holds a register of
approved certifiers of structural design
 The Chair of the Scottish Registration Board attended as a witness
A senior representative of Structural Safety, an organisation supported by the

Health and Safety Executive, the Institution of Structural Engineers and the
Institution of Civil Engineers, which operates the Confidential Reporting of
Structural Safety (CROSS), a formally recognised system established in 2005 to
improve structural safety and reduce failures by using confidential reports to
highlight lessons that have been learnt, to generate feedback and to influence
change.
 The Director of Structural Safety attended as a witness
A senior representative of the Institute of Clerks of Works
 A designated senior Scottish representative of the Institute of Clerks of

Works did arrange to attend as a witness to the Inquiry but unfortunately
had to withdraw due to unavoidable unforeseen circumstances.
 A written submission was made to the Inquiry by the Institute of Clerks of

Work
 Two Scottish members of the Institute of Clerk of Works with significant

relevant experience were subsequently interviewed
Senior representatives from Scottish Futures Trust (SFT) an organisation set up by

the Scottish Government to improve public sector infrastructure investment
processes and outcomes.
 The Deputy Chief Executive and another senior member of SFT attended as
witnesses
252
Audit Scotland in relation to any findings/reports previously undertaken that may

be relevant to this Inquiry
 A senior auditor attended as a witness
Senior Representatives from the Scottish Buildings Federation
 Two representatives attended as witnesses; one a senior employee of the

federation; the other the CEO of a main contractor, whose company also
provided sub-contracting brick-laying services to other companies
A senior representative of the Construction Industry Training Board (CITB) in

Scotland
 The Regional Delivery Manager for the CITB in Scotland attended as a

witness
9. OTHER ORGANISATIONS
A senior technical representative from one of the main manufacturers and

suppliers of wall ties, head restraints and related cavity wall accessories
 Ancon Building Products, a major supplier of steel fixings to the construction

industry provided their Technical Services Manager with responsibility for
Scotland, the North of England, Wales and Northern Ireland to attend as a
witness
 The architect who had contributed to a BBC documentary based on the

collapse of the Oxgangs School wall attended to give his views on the issues
in question
 A Chartered Surveyor who had had significant involvement in the

management of the delivery of PPP projects in Scotland offered his services
as a witness to the Inquiry and subsequently attended
Representatives from other Local Authorities in Scotland that had experienced

problems of a similar nature to that in the case of the Edinburgh schools
 The Head of Property Services from Local Authority attended as a witness
 A senior estates officer from another Local Authority attended as a witness
 Submissions were received from the large majority of Local Authorities

setting out the findings of surveys they had undertaken of their school
estates following the incident in Edinburgh. A number of Local Authorities
were unwilling to share with the Inquiry the structural reports relating to
defective construction in their schools.
253
Verbal or written submissions were also invited from several professional bodies
associated with the construction industry in relation to their views of any current
arrangements within the industry that may contribute to the type of defects that
had been identified in the PPP1 Edinburgh Schools.
Written submissions were received from the Royal Incorporation of Architects in

Scotland, from the Institution of Structural Engineers, and from the Institute of
Clerks of Works
In total some 66 witnesses gave evidence to the Inquiry, with each interview being
allocated approximately 90 minutes.
254
Appendix 2 – Example of Letters of Reassurance
APPENDIX 2
EXAMPLE OF LETTERS OF REASSURANCE AS TO THE STRUCTURAL SAFETY OF THE

REMEDIAL WORKS
255
256
257
258
259
260
Appendix 3 – Availability Certificates
APPENDIX 3
TWO AVAILABILITY CERTIFICATES MADE AVAILABLE TO THE INQUIRY
261
Appendix 3 – Availability Certificates
262
Appendix 4 – List of Acronyms
APPENDIX 4
LIST OF ACRONYMS
AMJV Amey/Miller Joint Venture
CIMT Corporate Incident Management Team of

the City of Edinburgh Council
CPM Council's Project Manager
ESP Edinburgh Schools Partnership Limited
IML Infrastructure Management Limited
NPD Non-profit distributing
PFI Private Finance Initiative
PPP Public Private Partnership
PSC Public Sector Comparator
SFT Scottish Futures Trust
WRD Will Rudd Davidson
WSP WSP Parsons Brinckerhoff
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Inquiry Into Edinburgh Schools February 2017 FINAL VERSION

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Report of the Independent Inquiry into

the Construction of Edinburgh Schools

SECTION 1 - PURPOSE AND SCOPE OF THE INQUIRY ................................................................................................................. 1

SECTION 1 – PURPOSE AND SCOPE OF THE INQUIRY

To inquire into and report on the following matters:

2. The contractual arrangements between the Edinburgh Schools Partnership and

5. The management and maintenance of the buildings since construction, including

2.1.1 This Report presents the findings of an independent Inquiry commissioned by

 Agreement by the Chair with the commissioner of the Inquiry to a final

 Selection and appointment of panel members and administrative support.

 Information gathering including all key documentation available.

 Familiarisation with all documentation, the chronology of events and

 Visits to inspect the properties in question.

 Development of a protocol for the Inquiry.

 Identification of a list of desired witnesses and issue of invitations to

 The holding of interviews with witnesses, the transcription of evidence

 The analysis and professional scrutiny of information and evidence

 A review by the panel of the preliminary findings and recommendations of

 The preparation and submission of the Report of the Inquiry to the

2.3 INFORMATION AND DOCUMENTS

2.3.6 A small number of individuals or representatives of organisations, involved in

2.4.3 In relation to the procedural arrangements to be adopted at the interview

It is intended that during the interview a recording will be made of the

SECTION 3 - EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

 As will be seen in this Report, in addition to the 17 schools in Edinburgh,

3.1 REMIT ITEM 1

The use of PPP for the Schools

A further consideration is the inevitable subjectivity that surrounds

Impact of the financing on project quality

3.2 REMIT ITEM 2

The quality of the contract

The role of the Independent Certifiers

3.2.4 A stronger contract in relation to the definition of the responsibilities of the

Failure to prepare or maintain appropriate as-installed records

3.3 REMIT ITEM 3

The cause of the wall collapse

3.3.2 The response to this question from a technical perspective is reasonably

3.3.5 It is also reasonable to conclude, based on the information in the meteorological

The necessity for closure of the schools

 the already identified significant problem of poor embedment across the

 the significant reduction in the effective capacity of the brick panels to

 the increased risk of an internal as well as external collapse of wall panels;

 the unacceptability of the continuity of teaching time over the remaining

3.4 REMIT ITEM 4

Lack of adequate independent scrutiny

3.4.6 It is completely possible and practical for appropriate levels of independent

3.4.8 The appointment of the Independent Certifiers is a joint appointment between

Council resourcing of the project

"Overall it is recognised that the Council team and project manager, in

The role of Building Standards and the certification of the schools

3.4.21 In relation to the submission, processing and certification of the schools in

Certificates by Building Standards. It is, however, recognised that in a number of

Discovery of defective fire-stopping in the schools

3.4.28 The mandatory provision of prescribed fire-stopping is an aspect of construction

3.5 REMIT ITEMS 5 AND 6

The management and maintenance of the school buildings

The management of the PPP1 contract

3.6 REMIT ITEM 7

The quality of the Council's response to the incident