18 - (Iqbal, - Zamir - Mirakhor, - Abbas) - 2017 - Ethical Dimensions of Islamic Finance

PALGRAVE STUDIES IN
ISLAMIC BANKING,
FINANCE, AND ECONOMICS
ETHICAL
DIMENSIONS OF
ISLAMIC FINANCE
Theory and Practice
Zamir Iqbal &

Abbas Mirakhor
Palgrave Studies in Islamic Banking, Finance,
and Economics
Series Editors
Mehmet Asutay
Durham University
Durham, United Kingdom
Zamir Iqbal
Islamic Development Bank
Jeddah, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia
Jahangir Sultan
Bentley University
Boston, Massachusetts, USA
The aim of this series is to explore the various disciplines and sub-disciplines
of Islamic banking, finance and economics through the lens of theoretical,
practical, and empirical research. Monographs and edited collections in
this series will focus on key developments in the Islamic financial industry
as well as relevant contributions made to moral economy, innovations in
instruments, regulatory and supervisory issues, risk management, insur-
ance, and asset management. The scope of these books will set this series
apart from the competition by offering in-depth critical analyses of con-
ceptual, institutional, operational, and instrumental aspects of this emerg-
ing field. This series is expected to attract focused theoretical studies,
in-depth surveys of current practices, trends, and standards, and cutting-
edge empirical research.
More information about this series at

http://www.springer.com/series/14618
Zamir Iqbal • Abbas Mirakhor
Ethical Dimensions
of Islamic Finance
Theory and Practice
Zamir Iqbal Abbas Mirakhor
Islamic Development Bank INCEIF
Jeddah, Kingdom of Saudi Arabia Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia
Palgrave Studies in Islamic Banking, Finance, and Economics

ISBN 978-3-319-66389-0 ISBN 978-3-319-66390-6 (eBook)
DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-66390-6
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Foreword
This timely book reminds us all that in Islamic civilization finance was
never divorced from religious ethics going back to the Noble Quran itself
in which discussion of what is now known as finance and economics is
almost always combined with ethics. In fact, economics as a separate
“science” did not even appear in the numerous works in classical Arabic
and Persian dealing with the enumeration and classification of the sciences
from the works of al-Kindı̄ in the third/ninth century to those of Mullā
Ṣadrā composed over seven centuries later. The Greek word from which
the English term economics derives was translated as tadbı̄r al-manzil,
meaning management of the household, and the word for economics in
Arabic and Persian used today, that is, iqtiṣād, had a completely different
meaning in classical texts. The most famous classical Islamic work with this
term in its title, that is, al-Iqtisād fi’l-i‘tiqād by al-Ghazzālı̄, deals with
faith and theology and not with what we call economics today. From the
point of view of traditional Islamic thought, economics as an independent
science is not even considered as a legitimate intellectual discipline. Rather,
what is now called economics is part of the sciences of the Divine Law
(al-Sharı̄‘ah) and is inseparable from ethics.
In this context, it is important to recall that Khadı̄jah, the wife of the
Prophet, was a major businesswoman and that the Prophet himself was a
merchant in her employment before he was chosen by God as His mes-
senger. Consequently, in the Islamic world, the bazaar was always the part
of the city associated with religious devotion and bāzārı̄s were seen to be
especially imbued with piety. To this day, the Khānkhalı̄lı̄ bazaar in Cairo
is associated with the locus of religious fervor, and it is not accidental that
v
vi FOREWORD
the bazaar itself is located next to Ra’s al-Husayn, the religious heart of
Cairo. In this context, it is also worthwhile to remember the central role
of the Tehran and Qom bazaars in the Islamic Revolution in Iran led by
Ayatollah Khomeini and the close rapport between the ulamā with the
bazaar in that country.
In traditional Islamic society, financial and economic activities were
based on ethics derived from the Sharı̄‘ah, particularly the virtues of hon-
esty and trust with full attention paid to the Sharı̄‘ah categories of ḥalāl
and ḥarām. These realities persisted into modern times and, although
weakened, have not disappeared completely even now. I remember that
when I was a child the Tehran bazaar had people called “trusted ones”
(amı̄ns). Each evening, the amı̄ns would go from shop to shop in the
bazaar collecting big sacks full of money, which they would not even
count. The next morning, they would return each sack to its owner. There
was complete trust on behalf of everyone. To recreate Islamic finance in its
authentic sense, these virtues of trust and honesty have to be revived paral-
lel with the creation of contemporary financial norms and institutions
which, however, should not simply emulate secular Western economic and
financial structures and practices.
During the past few decades, “Islamic economics” has been one of the
central issues with which many Muslim scholars have been concerned and
on which numerous works have been written. Most of these works, how-
ever, have been concerned mostly with the question of ribā’ and how to
create a ribā’-free economy and even banking. Moreover, this concern has
been combined with the practical task of creating Islamic banks, a move-
ment that is spreading in many countries. But unfortunately only a few
scholars have addressed the deeper issues involved, such as the blind
acceptance of the secularized view of modern science that considers nature
as pure quantity devoid of any other value and the vision of man as a
purely earthly being whose only real needs are material. The Islamic view
of man and his real “needs” stands at the very antipode of the view of man
upon which modern economics is based. We need to develop a contempo-
rary Islamic economics and finance based on the Islamic understanding of
who man is, what the purpose of his life on earth is, and where he is going.
Dr. Zamir Iqbal and Dr. Abbas Mirakhor are eminently suited for tak-
ing steps in this direction and the present book is in fact an important step
on this path. Both men know Western economics well not only theoreti-
cally but also practically through their long association with such major
modern institutions as the World Bank and the International Monetary
FOREWORD
vii
Fund. They also know well Islamic teachings concerning economics and
finance. Moreover, they are not only nominally Muslim, but men of great
faith deeply rooted in the Islamic tradition both intellectually and in their
personal lives. And they are very aware of the current discussions about
Islamic economics as well as practices such as Islamic banking. Their work
thus marks an important addition to the field of Islamic economics and
finance. In this current atmosphere of chaos and confusion in so many
domains in the Islamic world, this work is a clarion call to clear, and at the
same time authentic, thinking and practice in a domain that is so impor-
tant to the life of Muslims today and will be so tomorrow.
I pray for their continued successful efforts in this important domain
and hope that this short but valuable book will be read widely in both the
West and the Islamic world especially by those who are seeking to recreate
an authentic Islamic economic order imbued with Islamic ethics and
spirituality and harmonious with the natural environment.
Wa’Llāhu a‘lamu bi’l- ṣawāb Seyyed Hossein Nasr

Contents
1 Ethics and Finance 1
1.1 Ethics and Economics and Finance 4
1.1.1 Frequent Financial Crises and Crimes 6
1.1.2 Expropriation of Value and Fair Valuation 8
1.1.3 Corporate Governance 9
1.1.4 Business Leadership10
1.1.5 Due Care, Honesty, and Transparency10
1.2 Moral Failure of Capitalism11
1.3 Financial Repression15
1.4 Case of Economic Crimes16
1.5 Summary20
References 22
2 Moral Sense and Ethics in Economics and Finance 25

2.1 Perspectives on Moral Sense27
2.2 Search for a Universal Moral Principle31
2.2.1 Golden Rule in Historical Context33
2.2.2 The Golden Rule as Universal Moral Principle34
2.3 Applying Golden Rule to Economics and Finance39
2.4 Theories of Business Ethics43
2.4.1 What Is Virtue Ethics?45
2.5 Islamic Perspective on Business Ethics48
References 54
ix
x Contents
3 Key Virtues of Business Ethics in Islam 61

3.1 Embracing the Unity of Creation64
3.2 Being Just and Striving for Justice66
3.3 Preservation of Rights68
3.4 Sanctity of Contracts70
3.5 Truthfulness and Integrity72
3.6 Trustworthiness73
3.7 Goodness and Excellence (Ihsān)75
3.8 Compassion and Generosity76
3.9 Prudence and Humility76
3.10 Honesty in Business Transaction78
3.11 Cooperation and Solidarity79
References 79
4 Business Ethics in Islam 81

4.1 Market Conduct82
4.2 Work and Work Ethics86
4.3 Production, Consumption, and Distribution89
4.4 Competition and Cooperation91
4.5 Stakeholders’ Rights92
4.6 Transparency93
4.7 Business Leadership94
4.8 Respecting and Protecting Environment96
4.9 Avoidance of Vices or Unethical Practices98
4.10 Conclusion99
References101
5 Ethical Dimensions of Islamic Economics and Finance103

5.1 Risk Sharing104
5.2 Ethics of Risk Sharing108
5.2.1 Avoidance of Risk Shifting and Exploitation109
5.2.2 Materiality and Financing of Real Economy
Versus Financialization110
5.2.3 Reduced Information and Agency Problems111
5.2.4 Stability of the Financial System113
5.2.5 Overcoming Financial Repression115
5.2.6 Enhancing Cooperation Among Economic Agents116
5.2.7 Government as Agent for Risk Sharing117
Contents
xi
5.3 Economic and Social Justice119

5.4 Redistributive Justice122
5.5 Role of Regulations124
5.6 Governance and Prudence128
References131
6 Sacralizing Finance: Risk-Sharing Islamic Finance135

6.1 Is the Regime of Risk Transfer Sustainable?
Impossible Contract and Inequality 140
6.2 Risk Transfer System: Debt-Economy 146
6.3 Is Risk Sharing a Better Alternative? 154
6.4 How Does Risk Sharing Make a Financial
System Antifragile? 156
6.5 Conclusion 157
References159
7 Ethical and Responsible Finance for Development163

7.1 Need for New Perspective on Economic Development165
7.2 Development Approaches: Conventional Versus Islamic169
7.3 Ethics of Islamic Perspective of Development175
7.3.1 Social and Economic Justice177
7.3.2 Equitable and Fair Distribution178
7.3.3 Redistribution (Inclusion)181
7.4 Conclusion185
References186
Index189
List of Figures
Fig. 7.1 Poverty headcount ratio at $1.90 and $3.10 a day

(2011 PPP) (% of population) 167
Fig. 7.2 Survey mean income per capita, bottom 40 percent
and total population (2005 PPP $ per day) 168
Fig. 7.3 Different proxies for comparing financial inclusion
between OIC and non-OIC countries 169
xiii
List of Tables
Table 2.1 Select variation on the golden rule 35

Table 4.1 Virtues and business ethics 100
xv
CHAPTER 1
Ethics and Finance
Discussing the role of morals and ethics in economics and finance is not
new but several developments can be attributed to a renewed interest in
discussing the relevance of ethics to economics and finance.1 (See Box 1.1).
The financial crisis of 2007–2008 and its aftermath have led to a debate
about the need to consider the role of ethics and morality in the economic
and financial workings of contemporary capitalism.2 Financial scandals,
crimes, and unethical practices by financial institutions leading to financial
repression are being noticed. For example, research into the growth of
economic and financial crimes was focused on the impact of globalization
and the resulting economic changes, but gradually attention is being paid
to the most fundamental change—the erosion of morality. In addition,
repeated failure of governance, regulations, and accountability are consid-
ered a sign of deteriorating ethics in financial markets. Finally, new evi-
dence is emerging on a widening gap in income and wealth, and reduced
opportunities for poor to share growth and prosperity, which raises serious
ethical questions. All these developments call for a deeper understanding of
1
Hoepner and Wilson (2010) show that the annual number of publications indexed by
Factiva for the search words ‘Bank’ and ‘Ethics’ increased by 357.9 percent from 4164 in the
year 2000 to 19,069 in the year 2009. This indicates a sudden increase in the topic in the
post-financial crisis era.
2
See for example, the initiative “Citizen Ethics in a Time of Crisis” by Citizens Ethics
Network (2010).
© The Author(s) 2017 1

Z. Iqbal, A. Mirakhor, Ethical Dimensions of Islamic Finance,
Palgrave Studies in Islamic Banking, Finance, and Economics,
DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-66390-6_1
2 1 ETHICS AND FINANCE
the strong roots of ethics in finance, which has been mostly ignored or
underplayed by mainstream research.
Box 1.1: Key Factors for Renewed Interest in Ethics and Finance
First, repeated financial crises and especially the financial crisis of
2007–2008 have raised the question if such crises could have been
avoided if there were strong ethics embedded in financial transac-
tions, public policy, regulations, governance, and business leader-
ship. In addition, erosion of economic value and the social cost to
the society and especially to the poor is getting serious.
Second, widening income and wealth disparity and diminishing
opportunities for sharing growth and prosperity is viewed as an
inherent outcome of capitalism when ethics are compromised.
Third, financial scandals (e.g., Enron, Worldcom, LIBOR), finan-
cial failures (e.g., Lehman Brothers), financial crises, and financial
crimes have forced academia to question the very fundamental
assumptions, such as self-interest and rational expectations, underly-
ing modern economic thinking.
Fourth, while the issues relating to deficiencies in effective gover-
nance and regulations that govern financial intermediation and its
links to the financial crises have been the focus of a global policy and
academic debate, little has been done on the actual moral and ethical
aspects of the problems and how to deal with challenges of unethical
and immoral financial transactions that might be the seed of future
global financial turbulences and meltdowns.
Fifth, increased complexity of financial transactions and financial
markets, especially with the development of complex derivatives, has
also raised ethical issues. The complexity has blurred the issue of eth-
ics and has made it difficult to establish clear accountability for indi-
vidual or corporate actions.
Sixth, ethics and morals are becoming part of investment decision-
making for some groups of investors who are concerned about the
negative impact of ignoring ethical practices. As a result, ethical
investments or Socially Responsible Investments (SRIs) are growing.
Preference for ethical investments could have an impact on corpo-
rate behavior and on corporate stock prices, depending on actual or
perceived ethical or nonethical behavior.
(continued)
1 ETHICS AND FINANCE 3
Box 1.1: (continued)

Finally, after the financial crisis of 2007–2008, leading business
schools in the USA came under attack for producing top business
executives whose academic training and thus business practices were
void of ethical behavior. This has prompted these schools to embed
discussion on ethics as a part of their curriculum. In addition, aca-
demic resources devoted to the study of ethics have also increased in
the last two decades.
Source: Maghrebi et al. (2015)
Whereas mainstream economics have strong views on keeping the

iscipline of economics value-neutral, there are a number of schools of
d
thought that challenge this approach to ethics and economics. Four main
opposing schools of thought are especially prominent: Grants Economics,
Humanistic Economics, Social Economics, and Institutional Economics.3
These schools are closely related and mostly differ in terms of degree rather
than substance. Grants and Humanistic Economics argue that altruistic
behavior is not an aberration from rationality but rather a legitimate expres-
sion of rational choice. Grants Economics asserts that altruistic transfers or
“grants” are an important part of the economy along with the formally
recognized “exchange” or trade transfers.4 Parents transfer to children
expecting nothing back, as do friends to friends and even strangers to strang-
ers. No economic model can be complete without taking into account altru-
istic as well as self-interested behavior, and incentives for both should be
taken into account in formulating economic theories. Similarly, Humanistic
Economics states that economic theory should promote human welfare by
recognizing and integrating the full range of basic human values.
Social Economics takes things a bit further by stating that economic
policy should be reformulated according to ethical considerations. One
proponent, Amartya Sen, argues that the distancing of economics from eth-
ics has impoverished Welfare Economics and also weakened the basis of a
good deal of descriptive and predictive economics, and that economics can
be made more productive by paying greater and more explicit attention to
ethical considerations that shaped human behavior and judgment. In other
words, greater morality can lead to greater efficiency and productivity.5
3
Chapra (2008).
4
See Boulding et al. (1972).
5
Chapra (2008).
Finally, Institutional Economics takes things yet another step farther by

arguing that not only can morality increase productivity but that change
in institutions can actually be used to promote productivity enhancing
morals. Organizations act as agents of change by making individuals
behave in the desired manner through changes in benefits and costs. This
School carries great promise because it can help explain how changes in
institutions over time influence the present and the future and why some
economies perform better than others do. It can also help explain
cooperation and coordination and a number of other behavioral patterns
in human society that neoclassical economics is unable to do by concen-
trating primarily on self-interest and competition. These possibilities have
gradually raised the conceptual and practical importance of studying the
role of institutions in human society.6
It is worth noting that Adam Smith, considered the father of Western
economics, wrote his book The Theory of Moral Sentiments some decade
and half before his other treatise The Wealth of Nations. An argument has
been made that the proposition discernible from The Wealth of Nations
regarding the workings of market capitalism must be placed within the
institutional framework of The Theory of Moral Sentiments, which provides
the mooring for them. The decoupling of the two books, in effect, cuts off
economics and finance from the ethics of the system envisioned by Smith.
This purging process to purify economics and finance in order to make
them “value-free” began in earnest in the second half of the twentieth
century, leaving market capitalism with only one ethics: “quid pro quo.”7
1.1 Ethics and Economics and Finance

For a long while, financial economists have resisted linking economic theo-
ries to ethics, but as financial markets advance and the complexity of finan-
cial transactions increases, it is becoming necessary to incorporate ethical
concepts such as honesty, fairness, integrity, trust, and cooperation into
mainstream financial economics in more explicit form. Aragon (2014, p. 17)
calls this phenomenon of ignoring the ethical dimension “moral muteness”
and observes that some ethical issues “are transmuted into less morally
charged terminology, for example, by referring to financial manipulation as
‘income smoothing,’ lying as ‘cheap talk,’ or theft as ‘rent seeking.’”
6
Chapra (2008).
7
See Mirakhor and Alaabed (2013).
1.1 ETHICS AND ECONOMICS AND FINANCE 5
Most economists who discuss the relationship between ethics and

finance do so indirectly. For example, they might discuss issues such as
monitoring, signaling, collateral, bonding, and corporate governance
structures as ways to reduce the negative consequences of particular moral
failures without addressing the root causes of those failures. In other
words, most economists emphasize treating the symptoms rather than the
causes of market failures such as window dressing, misleading valuation,
insider trading, and kickbacks.
Aragon (2014) argues that vast research in financial economics on the
economic consequences of imperfect information is actually dealing with
ethical issues underneath expected behavior and, therefore, has an ethical
dimension embedded in the relevant theories. Two major concepts, moral
hazard and adverse selection, are the foundation of several advance eco-
nomic and financial theories such as agency costs theory and signaling
theory. Furthermore, the development of means and mechanisms to
reduce or mitigate costs associated with moral hazard and adverse selec-
tion has led to the development of a theoretical framework of institutional
economics that focuses on the importance of formal and informal
institutions.
The classic example of unethical behavior such as dishonesty and infor-
mation asymmetries in economics is that of Akerlof’s (1970) “lemons”
model, in which information asymmetries would lead to market failure
when agents are expected to be dishonest. The dual conditions for market
failure (that is, information asymmetries and dishonesty) suggested by
Akerlof’s model reflect the key link between economic value and ethics.
This necessitates that assumptions about the moral character of economic
agents could provide deeper analysis of their economic behavior.
Similarly, the actions of financial intermediaries and creditors can
involve moral hazard if they involve excessive risk taking without provid-
ing full information to savers and lenders. Moral hazard arises when savers
are not able to observe the risk-taking behavior of financial intermediaries
while in fact the savers are at risk of losing their savings, should the worst
case be realized. This was common in the recent 2008 crisis known as the
subprime crisis. If looked at in light of fiduciary responsibilities, excessive
risk taking would be considered an ethics issue.
In the last two decades, many financial scandals have encouraged finan-
cial economists to reexamine even well-accepted assumptions and theo-
ries. For example, the assumptions that “rational expectations” and
“market-discipline” would police the market and protect investors against
informational asymmetries are flawed, as witnessed by financial crisis. Thus

financial ethics may involve, from an ethical perspective, the examination
of such diverse issues as the fiduciary duties of managers to shareholders
and society at large; to considerations of whether insider trading is moral;
and whether economic agents should, if given the chance, expropriate
value from others. Alternatively, from a financial perspective, financial
ethics involves an objective examination of the effects of, for example,
honesty on valuation, trust on efficiency, and self-interest on altruism
(Aragon 2014).
This section discusses select examples of ethics and ethical behavior
in the practice of finance. These cases demonstrate that it is not possi-
ble to keep ethics and finance separated and that there is mounting
evidence of ethical issues arising in today’s financial practices that can-
not be brushed aside.
1.1.1 Frequent Financial Crises and Crimes

Contrary to common understanding, the subprime financial crisis of
2007–2008 was not only the result of excessive risk taking and inadequate
capital and liquidity; it had been brewing for some time as a result of a
gradual deterioration of ethical business leadership, of lapses in gover-
nance and in the regulatory framework (particularly in derivatives mar-
kets), and of an ineffective risk management framework. The subprime
crisis evolved in mortgage markets as financial intermediaries provided
mortgage loans to high-risk individuals (subprime borrowers) without
adequate screening. These intermediaries started spreading this class of
toxic loans to other institutions at tempting returns compared to alterna-
tive investment opportunities in capital markets, with inadequate informa-
tion regarding the inherent risk of holding such assets, as borrowers
(subprime homeowners) could not systematically meet their debt obliga-
tions. Therefore, the holders of these toxic assets were effectively holding
increasingly worthless paper given the rising default frequency and corre-
lation of defaults.8
There is a view that considers discipline of finance as “a profoundly
moral issue, as it involves the creation of relationships of trust, often with
very high stakes indeed” (Davies 2012). This is perhaps the reason why
8
Dowd (2009) provides a detailed exposition of the involvement of moral hazard in the
recent financial crises.
the revelation of the extent of fraud and other financial and economic
crimes committed by financial institutions created intense moral outrage,
reverberating in the Occupy protest movement.9 Observers, such as
Stiglitz (2010a) and Zuboff (2009), have commented that reasons usually
given for the crisis such as deregulation, lack of oversight, and flawed
incentive structure that established a link between executive compensa-
tion, share prices, and shareholders value have merit.10 However, the most
important cause at the heart of the crisis was the terrifying moral break-
down. The apparent absence of moral compunction in finance and busi-
ness communities has been blamed on the dominant business model that
celebrates what is good for organization insiders while dehumanizing and
distancing everyone else.
It is the “narcissistic business model” that paved the way for thousands
of men and women entrusted with people’s economic well- being to sys-
tematically fail to meet minimum standard of moral behavior. Thus, in an
expression of moral outrage, Zuboff (2009) argued at its heart, what
drove the crisis was a sense of “remoteness and thoughtlessness com-
pounded by a widespread abrogation of individual moral judgment.” This
is promoted by the predominating “business model” that is characterized
by self-centeredness of its practitioners, who operate at an “emotional dis-
tance” from their victims and from the “poisonous consequences” of their
actions. It was this “narcissistic model” that “paved the way for a full-scale
administrative economic massacre…to the world’s dismay, thousands of
men and women entrusted with our economic well-being systematically
failed to meet…[a] minimum standard of civil behavior” that “says: you
can’t just blame the system for the bad things you’ve done.”11
9
Such as Occupy Wall Street movement after the financial crisis of 2007–2008.
10
See also Mirakhor and Alaabed (2013).
11
Zuboff (2009) found appropriate the philosopher Hanna Arendt’s formulation of “the
banality of evil” in her observation of Eichmann in his trial in Jerusalem. Arendt observed
that Eichman did not appear “perverted and sadistic,” but “terribly and terrifyingly normal”
(Arendt 2006). Accordingly, Eichmann was motivated by nothing except “an extraordinary
diligence in looking out for his personal advancement.” The same motivation animated the
practitioners of the “narcissistic business model” operative in the run-up to the crisis. Zuboff
argues that “the crisis has demonstrated that the banality of evil concealed within a widely
accepted business model can put the entire world and its people at risk.” She concludes that
“in the crisis of 2009 the mounting evidence of fraud, conflict of interest, indifference to
suffering, repudiation of responsibility and systemic absence of individual moral judgment
produced an administrative massacre of such proportion that it constitutes economic crime
against humanity.”
There is evidence that business community has paid high costs for this
behavior. In an article in Harvard Business Review in 2011, Porter and
Kramer argued that in recent years “companies have been considered to an
increasingly large degree the cause of social, environmental and economic
problems.12 And a large proportion of the population believes that
companies have prospered at the expense of the community.” They

emphasized that “the legitimacy of business has fallen to levels never seen
in history.”
1.1.2 Expropriation of Value and Fair Valuation

The integrity of a financial institution and its managers is a valuable asset.
One example of integrity is that the institutions do not expropriate value
from one class of capital providers to another (i.e., bond-holders versus
shareholders or current shareholders versus future shareholders).
Expropriation refers to the unwilling or unwitting transfer of value from
one party to another, which is a fancy name for theft or, since in many
cases it is legal, “theft-like.” Other synonyms used by financial economists
for this type of activity include predation, free-riding, market power, rent
seeking, implicit compensation, tunneling, shirking, externalities, and shark-
ing (Aragon 2014). Jensen (2011) calls a system without integrity an
incomplete system. Although the law does attempt to curb expropriation
by imposing some explicit obligations to current and future bondholders
and shareholders through disclosure rules and regulations, due to lack of
integrity, the managers can still act improperly and make decisions to
expropriate value.
Expectations play a critical role in economic valuation under uncer-
tainty. Valuation models for pricing assets, equity in particular, are a
function of expected cash flows, respective timing, and expected magni-
tude. Releasing of a signal or any information that would influence the
expectations in one’s favor or create erroneous expectations about the
future could be considered unethical. In this respect, ethics have a subtle
impact on the valuation of any security traded in the market. For exam-
ple, knowingly overselling of future projects or creating marketing hype
to raise expectations to increase the firm value to mislead investors,
stakeholders, bondholders, and credit agencies would be considered
unethical practices.
Porter and Kramer (2011).

12
In a recent article, Professor Pablo Fernandez questions his fellow

a cademia colleagues regarding the most common pricing model used for
equities, i.e., Capital Assets Pricing Model (CAPM). Given the well-
known and established shortcomings of CAPM, he makes the assertion
that to continue to teach a model that does not truly represent the reality
and is subject to serious criticism would amount to unethical.13 Although,
CAPM has been under rigorous scrutiny in the last couple of decades but
making an argument that continuing teaching such a model knowing that
it does not explain much about risks and return of an asset should be con-
sidered an ethical issue. Such an argument could have serious conse-
quences on the way finance is taught or practiced today.
1.1.3 Corporate Governance
Corporate governance caught the attention of policymakers after the
Asian crisis of 1997–1998, and the issues were highlighted to strengthen
the governance and risk management framework. However, the current
financial crisis showed that although governance and risk management
frameworks were in place, they failed to deliver the promise of prevent-
ing a crisis before it erupted. Managers focused on short-term profit
generation, and the boards neglected their task of asking probing, tough
questions.
Although the role of the boards of financial institutions has increased
dramatically over the last decade, they have been criticized for being too
complacent and unable to prevent collapses. Weaknesses in safeguarding
against excessive risk-taking behavior in a number of financial services
companies were exposed during the subprime financial crisis. Again, the
shareholders’ trust in governance mechanisms and the role of the boards
suffered, and this had a negative impact on the value of equity.
Corporate governance brings in the ethical dimension of responsibility
and accountability of each stakeholder in the governance framework. This
is more critical in the financial industry, due to the trust placed on the
managers, the board, and other stakeholders by individual investors in
particular. A classic case of massive breach of trust is the case of Bernie
Madoff, who cheated his investors by operating a Ponzi scheme and was
able to hide the crime despite stronger controls imposed on the asset man-
agement business.
13
Fernandez (2017).
1.1.4 Business Leadership
As mentioned earlier, the financial crisis highlighted the issue of a decline
in moral and ethical values in senior management, who seemed to care
more about circumventing regulatory constraints and finding loopholes in
the law than about morally correct behavior. Increasing greed and personal
empire-building became the norm on Wall Street, with little emphasis
being placed on producing moral and ethical business leaders.
Evidence from a survey of 401 chief financial officers (CFOs) reveals
that 78 percent of surveyed executives were willing to knowingly sacrifice
value to smooth earnings (Graham et al. 2005). Although several financial
scandals have made CFOs less willing to use accounting manipulations to
manage earnings, there is no check on their willingness to change the
operating decisions of the firm to destroy long-run value and support
short-run earnings targets, which raises serious concern about the inten-
tions and actions of business leaders.
One common trait observed in several of today’s business leaders of
financial institutions is arrogance, which can take several forms. For exam-
ple, the financial sector and its lobbyists are often accused of resisting any
substantial regulation that attempts to restrict their risky behavior. If one
believes the accusation of Nobel Laureate and professor Joseph Stiglitz
that the financial sector in the USA prefers to return to the golden (unreg-
ulated) days before the crisis, the world is in for another financial and
humanitarian catastrophe (Graafland and van de Ven 2011). Business
leaders are also accused of acting recklessly and with imprudence. Taking
excessive risks is a reflection of acting without prudence and probably for
self-interest rather than the larger interest of all stakeholders.
1.1.5 Due Care, Honesty, and Transparency

The financial sector is expected to develop a culture of transparency, and
financial institutions are expected to provide full disclosure of the fair state
of their financial affairs. If the financial institutions are not honest or trans-
parent in their dealings, it will lead to serious information asymmetries
within the system making it vulnerable, crisis prone, and instable. Analyzing
the banks’ actual behavior against three core desired traits of honesty, due
care, and accuracy, Graafland and van de Ven (2011) found that in some
cases, banks did not behave according to the very moral standards they set
themselves, despite a well-developed ethics framework, ethical values, and
1.2 MORAL FAILURE OF CAPITALISM 11
ethics training. This raises several serious issues. For example, have the
institutions developed these ethical policy statements and frameworks only
on paper, with no strict enforcement mechanism in place? Furthermore,
despite good intentions of the institutions, how does one develop the
moral character of the managers and employees so that they will comply
with the desirable ethical behavior of the institutions?
1.2 Moral Failure of Capitalism

While the recent rise in the intensity of debate on the morality of capital-
ism is due to the financial crisis, a series of corporate scandals and col-
lapses had preceded the crisis in the two preceding decades (e.g., Enron,
Tyco, and WorldCom). Nearly all of these events were considered to have
been driven by “internal corporate greed, callous executive deception
and failures in accounting (and accountability) system and in corporate
boardrooms”. These expressions were not unique or limited to a few
commentators. Joseph Stiglitz14 argued that the crisis exposed the “moral
depravity” of the exploitation of the poor and middle-class and asked if
those who knowingly cause financial and economic harm to others “have
any moral compunction?”
It is important to note that empirical observations by sociologists and
economists had noted widespread “moral erosion” in the very core of
society among “respectable citizens” even before the crisis. In 2006, for
example, Karstedt and Farrall in The British Journal of Criminology15
reported the result of their study in the UK and Germany pointing out
that moral failure in human behavior reaches “ the kitchen table, on the
settee and from desks and call centers, at cash points, in the supermarkets,
restaurants, and in interaction with builders and trade people…by people
who think themselves as respectable citizens.” They showed that 54 per-
cent of the population of their sample reported as being both victims and
offenders of such behavior. And, 64 percent had themselves engaged in
“illegal” or “shady” practices.
What is clear is that the present form of capitalism and the overall soci-
ety in which it is embedded need to regain a “moral sense.” The challenge
is to awaken individual and collective consciousness to the moral compass
inherent in “being human.” Unfortunately, it is not only the willingness
Stiglitz (2010a, b).

14
Karstedt and Farrall (2006).

15
to ignore unethical finance and business practices that do enormous harm,

it is also the fact that the present moral state of societies encourages dis-
trust, fear, and a cynical attitude, leading to widespread willingness to
engage in unfair, harmful, and even illegal behavior in the marketplace.
Recently, advocates of capitalism have mounted a moral defense of the
system arguing that it has freed the mass of people from lives of poverty.
It is the government policies that sap the moral energy of capitalism by
infringing on individual liberty. And they appeal to the idea of “self-
interest,” which they consider as the essential ingredient of the system
envisioned by “the father of capitalism” Adam Smith, who was, according
to Noam Chomsky “a figure of Enlightenment. What we would call capi-
talism he despised.” Doubts about the present form of capitalism are
widespread. Joseph A. Schumpeter in his Capitalism, Socialism and
Democracy16 expected circumstances wherein capitalism leads to the cre-
ation of an “atmosphere of almost universal hostility to its own social
order.” Perhaps, no other result of the operations of capitalism has been as
damaging to its moral standing as the strident inequality in income and
wealth observed in all societies dominated by this system.
How did capitalism and its business model evolve to its present
“despised” form with such extremely skewed income and wealth distribu-
tion? Is “moral capitalism” an oxymoron? If not, how can the present
forms of capitalism be anchored on some universal moral foundation in a
world of plurality of moral perceptions? And, can the present form of capi-
talism change its functionality to become acceptable to the majority of the
world’s population?
Briefly, the following discussion argues that capitalism as it was origi-
nally envisioned by its acknowledged “father,” Adam Smith, was to be
embedded within a moral/ethical framework that ensured convergence of
individual and public interests. In this sense, the operations of capitalism or
“commercial society” as termed by Adam Smith, need not contradict moral
principles. That framework was to have been internalized by market par-
ticipants for the economic model of the Wealth of Nations to lead to its
expected results. It is argued here that given the rapid pace of globalization
and the plurality of moral views, the ethical framework envisioned by Adam
Smith may not find universal applicability. Hence, there is need for a simple
and universally acceptable moral principle that can lead to a model of moral
capitalism without explicit commitment to a particular moral framework.
16
Schumpeter (1943).
1.2 MORAL FAILURE OF CAPITALISM 13
Capitalism was unrestrained up until the emergence of the Great

Depression in the wake of which it was “leashed” with regulations such as
Glass-Steagall Act, antitrust laws, anti-collusion, anti-price fixing, high
income and inheritance taxes. These measures were implemented first in
the epicenter of the Great Depression, i.e., the USA, and then replicated
elsewhere. This phase lasted until the emergence of conservative politics
in most of industrial countries beginning with the administration of
Reagan in the USA and Thatcher in the UK. Hence, the decade of
1980–1990 was the phase of “unleashed” capitalism with the dismantling
of regulatory structure, reduction of income, wealth and inheritance
taxes, and creation of incentive structure for business to feel unprece-
dented freedom of action.
As mentioned earlier, the most serious evidence of moral weakness of
capitalism is the emergence of highly skewed income and wealth inequality
where “1% of the population accounts for almost half of global wealth and
where the poorest 50% owes as much as the 85 richest individuals.” (Credit
Suisse Global Wealth Report.) Thomas Piketty in his Le Capital au XXle
Sièle provides massive data going back two centuries to demonstrate that
the creation of inequality is an inherent characteristic of capitalism.17 He
shows that, with the exception of few decades in which inequality’s growth
slowed, the general trend of inequality in the long run has been upward.
Aside from regulatory actions imposed during the period in which inequal-
ity slowed, high income, wealth, and inheritance taxes were the contribut-
ing factors. His data show that inequality will grow even faster for the rest
of this century unless corrective action is taken.
Piketty’s extraordinary empirical effort demonstrates the thesis of John
Maynard Keynes published in Economic Journal in 1931 that capitalism
produces two “evils”: unemployment and skewed income and wealth dis-
tribution in favor of the “rentier” class. The “villain of the piece,” Keynes
asserted, is the interest rate mechanism. Similarly, Piketty argues that there
is a race between the rate of growth of the economy “g” and the rate of
return to capital “r.” It is when r grows faster than g that inequality accel-
erates. Coincidentally with the growth of inequality, debt also grows along
with credit and leverage.
As Reinhart and Rogoff argued,18 all financial crises have been debt
crises, no matter what labels they were given at the time such as “foreign
Piketty (2013).
17
Reinhart and Rogoff (2009).

18
exchange crisis” or “banking crisis.” The incentive structure in place

during periods of the run up to crises always encourages buildup of credit,
debt, and leverage. What made the 2008 crisis so much more damaging
was the growth of the “paper economy” where financial innovation and
growth of information technology provided the means by which trade
and speculation in debt securities created a decoupling of finance from the
real economy. In 1984, Nobel laureate in economics James Tobin had
warned that such a paper economy with its own ethics and morality was
emerging where the object of finance was no longer intermediating funds
for production of real output but creating a speculative environment of
making money off paper trading; a “casino” capitalism. In such an econ-
omy, Stiglitz says, the players had learned “there was money to be made
at the bottom of the pyramid and did everything possible to move it
toward the top.” The paper economy “converted the businessman into a
profiteer.” To do this, Keynes said, “is to strike a blow at capitalism”
because a businessman is valued “so long as his gains can be held to bear
some relations to what, roughly and in some sense, his activities have con-
tributed to society.”
The widening inequality, stagnant incomes, large unemployment, string
of crippling crises, huge growth of government and consumer debts, and
a host of other ills consequent to the operation of the present form of capi-
talism have seriously challenged faith in the system. The widely held per-
ception of selfish, greedy, and harmful business has created a “regime
uncertainty” where, as many ague, there is doubt if the system can be
saved from itself or is even worth saving. There can be little doubt that the
crisis and its aftermath demonstrated a fundamentally “massive moral fail-
ure” that has, in turn, caused a “moral panic” that there is a systemic
assault upon human dignity, trust, contracts, and property, all of which
constitute fundamental elements of the institutional structure of societies.
The question pertinent to the debate is whether it is the system that has
morally failed or the people who operate in the system who have lost their
moral and ethical moorings. Compelling arguments have been made that
it is the system’s moral failure when it creates incentive structures that
unleash greed, selfishness, and self-centeredness by removing legal and
regulatory restraints on the behavior of finance and business. In these cir-
cumstances conditions are created for the Gresham effect to allow bad
ethics to drive good ethics out of the market.19
19
Gresham’s law is a monetary principle stating that “bad money drives out good”.
1.3 FINANCIAL REPRESSION 15
1.3 Financial Repression

Financial practices leading to exploitation and repression of the borrowing
class certainly raise the ethical issues on the ground of fairness and justice.
The cluster of ideas advanced by Reinhart-Rogoff and their associates
contend that: (a) all financial crises are, at root, debt crises regardless of
labels, (b) high level of debt is a drag on growth, and (c) to avoid outright
default when public debt is very large, governments resort to “financial
repression” to “liquidate” their debt. Here too, an argument can be made
that the theoretical root of these pronouncements date at least to Keynes-
Tobin-Shaw and McKinnon that laid the foundation of the financial liber-
alization, the “get the prices right” movement of 1970–1990s and,
ultimately, the “Washington consensus.” Getting the prices right meant
allowing market forces to operate freely to induce all prices to reflect
opportunity costs. All prices, that is, except the price of financial resources
whose opportunity cost was the “market rate of interest.” Never mind that
there was no such a thing as a “market rate of interest” in an environment
in which policy drove the “market rate of interest.” Tobin (1969), and
before him Keynes, had already pointed out the policy induced deviation
of interest rates from the true opportunity cost of financial resources.
Monetary policy had the ability, Tobin argued, to force a deviation
between market valuation of capital and its replacement cost. His
“fundamental-valuation efficiency” concept, interpreted as “allocative effi-
ciency,” would establish the opportunity cost of financial resources requir-
ing that they be directed to their best uses. According to the “get the
prices right” doctrine, in a market where prices were not allowed to reflect
their opportunity cost repression ruled. This was the McKinnon-Shaw
argument for liberalization of the financial sector of developing countries.
Financial repression, the deviation of the “administered” interest rate
from the “market” interest rate, led to market distortions, thus discourag-
ing saving, investment, and economic growth. In the succeeding decades
of the fierce application of financial liberalization, a basic question never
asked was how and in what sense did the “market” rate of interest reflect
the true opportunity cost of financial resources and whether indeed devia-
tion between it and prevailing rates of interest truly measured the magni-
tude of financial repression.
Currently, the issue of financial repression seems more important
than its relation to public debt restructuring. It is potentially at the heart
of a corollary of Richard Koo’s balance sheet issues and transcends the
problem of temporary disequilibrium. The central problem of major

economies is the uncoordinated and mismatched balance sheets of the
real, financial, household, and government sectors. Presumably it is the
market that is to coordinate the balance sheets for equilibrium to emerge.
Given a runaway financial sector, decoupled from the real sector, that
allocates only a very small fraction of trading in markets to capital forma-
tion in the real sector (about 0.8 percent of $33 trillion according to
John C. Bogle: Clash of Cultures 2012), a real sector with corporations
awash in cash, but not investing, Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs)
starving for financial resources, and a government sector with huge debt,
the market’s coordination capacity is seriously impaired. Clearly, James
Tobin’s prophetic warning in 1984 regarding the emergence of a “paper
economy” without much connection to the real sector has become a
reality with vengeance. Low or negative interest rates have not only cre-
ated serious debt problems; they have also led to significant incentive for
credit-financed consumption everywhere at the expense of savings. Such
an environment begs the question whether to get the balance sheets
right does not require that one must first get the prices right, meaning a
realignment of prices with opportunity costs. In that sense, one then
asks whether 4–5 percent differences between the prevailing rates of
interest and the “market” rate indeed measures the true magnitude of
financial repression when rates of return to investment in the real sector
anywhere in the world, measured by any accepted concept, is a sizable
multiple of the “market” rate of interest. Governments are repressing
but they are not the only ones. Those in the financial sector who have
mastered the art of risk shifting through leverage and debt are benefit-
ting immensely from the “paper economy” they helped create.
1.4 Case of Economic Crimes

No matter what definition or measure is used, economic and financial
crimes have been increasing at a pace that closely resembles an epidemic.20
No country, society, culture, or community is immune from their devas-
tations.21 Such crimes had been labeled as “victimless crimes.”22 However,
consideration of these crimes has evolved over the last four decades,
intensified in the aftermath of 9/11 and accelerated in the wake of the
20
Abdullah et al. (2015).
21
United Nations (2006), McAuley (2011).
22
Beloof et al. (2010).
1.4 CASE OF ECONOMIC CRIMES 17
2007–2008 financial crisis. Criminal economic activities that used to be

thought of as developing country crimes, such as bribery, corruption, and
fraud, are now also becoming concerns in rich and developed economies.
While the financial crisis focused attention on elite white collar crimes,
empirical research was pointing to another alarming development: “the
everyday crimes of the middle class,” crimes being committed by those
“at the very core of contemporary society.”23
Much of the research into the growth of economic and financial crimes
has focused on the impact of globalization and the resulting economic
changes including the accelerated pace of global expansion in information
technology.24 Very little attention has been paid to what a number of
observers consider as the most fundamental change: the erosion of morality.25
To be sure, there are theoretical and empirical classes of sociological, polit-
ical, and psychological studies that focus on “market anomie,” meaning
the weakening “market morality” or “normlessness.” To our knowledge,
however, there have been very few studies that examine the relationship
between economic and financial crimes and the erosion of morality at the
global level, even in societies where the “market” does not have a domi-
nant role in the economy.26
Some have focused their sights on the rapid weakening of general
moral standards and admit that humanity is facing a “particularly acute”
moral confusion. The cause of this “confusion,” however, is thought to
be the rapid changes that have undermined “many of the institutions or
traditions that previously formed and policed our values.” Furthermore,
the Bishop of Edinburgh Richard Holloway says: “There can be little
argument about the agent that has caused this change; it is the domi-
nance of the global market economy and the social and cultural move-
ments that have accompanied its ascendance.”27 Accordingly, globalization
led to the emergence of conservative administrations in the 1980s and
1990s that radically restructured and removed traditional restraints on
markets and on capital, in turn unleashing greed and self-centered and
self-interested behavior.
Analytic thinking about economic and financial crimes has evolved over
the four decades beginning in 1980. The most important dimension of
23
Karstedt and Farrall (2007).
24
Serio (1998), United Nations (2006).
25
Holloway (1999), Porpora (2001), Kateb (2011).
26
Akinbo (2009).
27
Holloway (1999, p. 188).
this evolution has been the changing focus from economic crime as
“victimless” to the recognition of its far reaching and adverse impact on a
broad spectrum of victims. In 1982, a leading American political scientist,
James Q. Wilson, advanced an idea that became known as the “broken
windows theory.” The metaphor argued that if a broken window in a
vacant building were left unrepaired, soon most of the windows of that
building would also be broken. The first unrepaired broken window sig-
nals that no one really cared about the building itself and its integrity.
Generalized, the idea suggests that tolerating crimes leads to epidemics
and, eventually, to social disintegration. Recently, William Black, the
author of The Best Way to Rob a Bank is to Own One, has contextualized
“the broken windows theory” to “elite white collar crime.” He suggests
that Wilson’s idea that “tolerating widespread smaller crimes would lead
to epidemic levels of larger crimes because it undermined community and
social restraint” has been proven by the “epidemics of elite white collar
crime that have driven our recurrent, intensifying financial crises.” He pre-
dicts: “Corruption that is excused and tolerated by elites is…likely to
spread in incidents and severity because it undermines community and the
rule of law. It is likely to grow more pervasive and harmful the more we
tolerate it.” Low tolerance for activities that would not appear very seri-
ous, such as consumer fraud, would soon create a Gresham’s effect “in
which businesses or CEO’s that cheat gain a competitive advantage and
bad ethics drives good ethics out of the market. These offenses degrade
ethics and erode peer restraints on misconduct.”
In the same year that Wilson advanced his theory of broken windows,
Tomlin suggested five basic typologies of victims of white collar crime: the
individual, corporate or business enterprise, governments, society, and the
“international order.” The consequences of the inability to deal with white
collar crimes, Tomlin (1982) suggested, were “…distrust of government
and other institutions, a damaging effect on the moral fabric of society,
and in the propensity of the populace to rationalize the existence of other
types of traditional crimes.” More than two decades later, these words
were echoed by the Governor of the Bank of Thailand (Deva Kula 2005)
when he asserted that the consequence of economic crime “go well beyond
the financial loss and the economic well-being of society and the country.”
The Governor argued: “What is more important than the economic well-
being is the feeling of living in a fair and just society. If drug lords continue
to live well on their ill-gotten wealth, corrupt politicians continue to exert
influence in the political arena, fraudulent bank executives continue to go
1.4 CASE OF ECONOMIC CRIMES 19
unpunished with no loss of status, and stock price manipulators continue

to get wealthier at the expense of other shareholders, people would ulti-
mately feel that the society in which they live is unfair and unjust.” And, it
was not only the domestic economic crime that needed prevention and
prosecution, there “were more subtle forms of economic crime…where
bigger nations exploit the natural resources of smaller nations…where
businessmen from large countries move into smaller countries…to exploit
the latter’s natural resources” and exploit the consumers in these coun-
tries, and “when products which are hazardous to health in bigger nations,
have been relocated for production and sale in less developed nations.”
These are the harms done to individual victims. Other crimes such as
corruption victimize whole societies. They harm the legitimacy of gov-
ernment and societal trust in government and public service. The World
Bank has conducted extensive research over decades on the harm and
damage caused by corruption and other economic crimes,28 and has con-
cluded, in part, that these crimes “have devastating impact on the capacity
of government to function properly; on the private sector to grow and
create employment; on the talents and energies of people to add value in
productive ways and ultimately on societies to lift themselves out of
poverty.”29 Recently, Krishan asserted: “Corruption and poor governance
undermine both democracy and development. The poor are dispropor-
tionally hurt—the mother who cannot afford to pay a huge bribe to get
medical attention for her dying child; the family who will be able to have
safe drinking water if it pays a bribe; and the unemployed who remain
jobless because public work projects are not implemented since corrupt
officials have pocketed the funds that were allocated for them.”30 Akinbo
expressed similar sentiments, arguing that economic and financial crimes
“are among major challenges facing all countries of the world.” They
“have damaging effect on the economic and political system of a coun-
try.” These crimes “undermine development by distorting the rule of law
and weakening the institutional foundation on which economic growth
depends…In a nutshell, they are the primary threat to good governance,
sustainable economic development, and fair business practices in the
country.”31
28
McCarthy (2011), Banuri and Eckel (2012).
29
Folsom (2007).
30
Krishnan (2011).
31
Akinbo (2009).
Not long ago, it was assumed by social scientists and politicians that
some economic and financial crimes, such as corruption, were “develop-
ing country” phenomena. Researchers often considered corruption as a
deterrent to economic development of poor and middle-income countries
in that it was thought that corruption conditioned development and good
governance. As a result, indices of corruption were designed within this
axiomatic framework. As Ades and DiTella note, no society is immune to
corruption: “Governments of all political colors in countries of all levels of
wealth are affected by corruption scandals with a frequency and intensity
that seems to be always on the increase.”32 Specifically, they argue, Western
democracies can no longer have pretentions of immunity to corruption
they viewed as “aberrant” deviation from Western norms.33 Corruption, in
its broadest sense of abuse of public office, is an economic crime and as
such afflicts all societies.
1.5 Summary
Some scholars attribute the observed, widespread “moral anomie,” “moral
confusion,” and “moral failure” to massive changes resulting from global-
ization and rapid progress in information technology over the last few
decades. For some, these changes are not dissimilar to those that occurred
in Europe in the late seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. An important
consequence of these changes was the decoupling of morality from its
theological moorings. Subsequently, a new morality, a new “moral sense”
emerged anchored on the authority of society, self-love, moral sentiments,
and natural sympathy as its sources.34
At present, there is a growing general perception of a nexus between
the accelerating pace, and widening spectrum, of economic and financial
crimes—as well as Zuboff’s moral panic regarding the growing banality
of these crimes—and moral failure. This perception points to a need for
the emergence of a new global moral sense that would motivate strong
international cooperation and coordination to lead to collective action
that would motivate development of unified legislative, judicial, legal,
and other ways and means of preventing economic and financial crimes.
The new moral sense would have to satisfy, at least, the two requirements
32
Ades and DiTella (1997).
33
Ades and DiTella (1997, pp. 496–497).
34
Turco (2003).
1.5 SUMMARY 21
proposed by Holloway: it would have to be based on the “consent” of all

parts of humanity and it would have to be based on the principle of
“harm” prevention.
It would seem doubtful whether the two approaches discussed are suf-
ficient to address moral deficits in business relations. Rather, there is a
need for an overriding moral principle to make clear that individuals must
consider the impact of their actions on others, regardless of the belief held
or their ultimate purpose. Such a moral principle could then lead to ethical
rules to promote a sense of responsibility that prevents the “narcissistic
business model,” focused on short-run gains, to lead personal and busi-
ness life to a race to the bottom.
There is a strong case to bring ethics back into economics and finance,
as it has been demonstrated that decoupling morality and ethics from
economics and finance could lead to catastrophic damage to society
through repeating financial crises, increased financial crimes, and pro-
longed financial repression. There is a need for re-examination of core
economic and financial theories and assumptions in light of morals and
ethics, which could make finance more responsible and could lead to the
betterment of society.
Whatever the causes in the erosion of morality across cultures, structur-
ing a universal moral principle, acceptable to all members of the human
community, will have to form the foundation of effective mobilization of
international cooperation in collective action against economic and finan-
cial crimes. Abdullah et al. (2015) argue that the “demand” for interna-
tional cooperation to combat these crimes has not succeeded to elicit the
desired results because of the absence of a well-articulated, globally shared
moral basis for collective action against economic crimes and therefore
such a moral foundation is urgently needed. Given the deep pluralism that
characterizes contemporary humanity, this is a daunting challenge.
Although on moral grounds there are many issues and subjects of dis-
agreement, there should be very little doubt about the moral clarity of the
harm, pain, and suffering caused by economic and financial crimes and on
the need to prevent them. It should not be beyond the realms of possibil-
ity to expect the emergence of a universal moral principle, which would
serve as the moral foundation of global collective action against these
crimes. Simply stated, these crimes are harmful on so many levels that they
pose a threat to societies and to humanity. To motivate concerted, coordi-
nated collective action on national and global levels aimed at their preven-
tion and their successful prosecution (when they occur), as well as taking
remedial, restorative action to assist the victims, there is a need for a

universal principle that would attract the consent of moral plurality.
The result of post-crisis analyses of the causes of the crisis has led to the
emergence of the view that what is now needed is a new framework for
ethical business that integrates corporate governance, social responsibility,
and sustainability. While it appears that corporate social and environmen-
tal responsibility is moving from the margins to the mainstream, there are
important challenges. These include:
(a) a bewildering array of international initiatives without an anchor

that explains how they relate to one another;
(b) the main driving force of these initiatives seems to be getting busi-
nesses to sign onto an initiative without ensuring effective
implementation;
(c) lack of credible monitoring and verification mechanism in these
initiatives; and
(d) lack of a compensation mechanism for communities harmed by
businesses that violate the norms established by these initiatives.
Existence of these initiatives seems to validate the claim of the dis-
tinction between business and ethics.
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CHAPTER 2
Moral Sense and Ethics in Economics

and Finance
The discussion in the previous chapter suggests two major explanations

of unethical behavior in the business community. The first focuses on
massive changes in social, political, and philosophical thinking of the last
few decades that have led to moral disorientation. This view would argue
that humans are innately moral and that the present is a period of moral
adjustment to shocks originating in rapid technical changes and global-
ization. However, all the changes held responsible for the present “moral
confusion” are expected to continue at their rapid pace and there is no
guarantee that their progress will slow in the future. The second view
suggests the increase in unethical behavior has resulted from the reorien-
tation of education and practices of the business away from morality and
ethics. Countering these trends would require morally and ethically
based business curricula, on the one hand, and ethically based business
practices on the other. Accordingly, ethics are being taught in business
schools as the systematic study of moral principles to determine rules
which ought to govern business behavior. The objective being to empha-
size that ethics and responsibility are at least as important as profits and
that business decision making is an exercise in morality. Whether supple-
menting regular business schools’ curricula with moral and ethical educa-
tion will correct the perception generally held that corporations and their
managers lack a moral compass remains an empirical question that will be
answered by the behavior of future business leaders who are now enrolled
in such curricula.

DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-66390-6_2
26 2 MORAL SENSE AND ETHICS IN ECONOMICS AND FINANCE
Morals, values, and ethics are related and are interlocking concepts.
Whereas morals refer to specific, articulated rules, values refer to the
underlying aesthetic valuation or determination of those rules, and eth-
ics refer to the practice of determining which rules should or should not
be adopted. For example, the moral “you should feed the hungry” could
be accompanied by the value “relieving suffering is good” and under-
pinned by an ethics that suggests that “those who have more than
enough should share with those that do not have enough.” The three
have something of a symbiotic relationship, which can lead to confusing
results if the purpose of one is obfuscated.
Ethics seek to develop moral conduct based on a set of values which
determines what is intrinsically right or wrong for a given society. How
these ethics are derived from the values is subject to diverse sources and
theories. Ethical behavior is also subject to factors such as stage of moral
development, personal morals and values, family influences, peer influ-
ences, and life experiences of individuals or societies.1 The study of ethics
can be sub-divided into three sub-domains—meta-ethics, normative eth-
ics, and applied ethics. Meta-ethics attempts to understand the metaphysi-
cal, epistemological, semantic, and psychological presuppositions and
pledges of moral thoughts and practices. Meta-ethics undertakes the study
of the linkages between beliefs, causes for action, and human motivation
to act right or wrong. Normative ethics generally exemplifies standard, or
rule, or principle, in opposition with what is “normal” for people to do, in
contrast with what they really do.2 Normative ethics is in relation with the
moral norms and a moral norm is a norm in the sense of being a regulator
with which moral agents should comply.3 Finally, applied ethics is used to
apply philosophical techniques to recognize the ethically correct course of
action in numerous domains of human life.
Before a theory of business ethics can be developed, it is critical to
form a perspective of a moral sense which can provide a philosophical
basis for ethical behavior. What values determine the moral sense and how
it affects the economic and business behavior is essential to understand.
Following section provides such a perspective from the history of eco-
nomics and raises the question if a universal moral principle can be derived
to formulate a theory of business ethics.
1
Rizk (2008).
2
Abbas et al. (2012).
3
Rawls (1971).
2.1 PERSPECTIVES ON MORAL SENSE 27
2.1 Perspectives on Moral Sense4

The eighteenth century may be seen as similar to the latter decades of the
twentieth century and at least the 16 years of the twenty-first century
because of the rapid changes that took place over 200 years ago, which
called for a “synthesis between a number of developing oppositions that
were increasingly being felt in social life.”5 As Seligman has observed, the
developing oppositions in the eighteenth century that were between “the
individual and the social, the private and the public, egoism and altruism,
as well as between a life governed by reason and one governed by passion,
have in fact become constitutive of our existence in the modern world.”6
The major social change from a feudal society to a market society and the
“emergence of capitalist market relations, with its distinction between
public and private, posed a new set of problems for the conception of the
social order” in need of articulation of new moral vision. “The freeing of
labor and capital developed together with a new awareness of individuals
acting out their private interests in the public realm.”7 Social action and
motivation were being based on self-interest. A new moral order was
required that was founded on rational self-interest rather than on “a shared
vision of cosmic order.”8
Accordingly, the new “moral sense,” a term first coined by Francis
Hutcheson, “the first Scottish philosopher to approach the problem of the
foundation of morals in an original way,”9 was based on moral sentiments,
self-love, and natural sympathy. Moral sentiments were an axiomatic prop-
erty of the human mind that united humans “by instinct, that they act in
society from affections of kindness and friendship.”10 Self-love “is the nat-
ural inclination to pursue the pleasures provided by external objects, or
the means that is used to satisfy it.”11 Sympathy is a feeling through which
“we participate in others’ feelings.”12 Fundamental to this moral sense is
the idea of benevolence which according to Hutcheson was the object of
moral sense, and is what drives individual to “seek the natural good or
4
Mirakhor (2016) and Abdullah et al. (2015).
5
Seligman (1992, p. 25).
6
Seligman (1992, p. 25).
7
Seligman (1992, p. 25).
8
Seligman (1992, pp. 25–26).
9
Turco (2003, p. 138).
10
Adam Ferguson, cited in Seligman (1992, p. 27).
11
Turco (2003, p. 138).
12
Turco (2003, p. 145).
happiness of others.”13 Indeed, Hutcheson argued that human nature

itself “included a moral sense which recognized benevolence as the core of
moral action; further that when the moral sense is enlightened and not
distorted by selfish passion, a person’s judgment and behavior will tend to
contribute to the overall happiness of society and humanity. In other
words, harmony between the moral life of the individual and perfection of
moral community is a possibility and, hence, a moral, ultimately a reli-
gious, duty for humanity.”14
In The Theory of Moral Sentiments, Adam Smith argued that “recogni-
tion” and “appreciation” by others were the primary motivator of “all toil
and bustle of the world” and that it was man’s interest in “being the object
of attention and appreciation” that motivated all economic activity. This
innate need for mutual sympathy and recognition constituted the founda-
tion of morals for individuals and motivated their economic activity.15 It
bears keeping in mind that, as Seligman points out, while the fathers of the
Scottish Enlightenment decoupled morality from theology, they did not
dispose of the Deistic or transcendent source of all things: “The Author of
Nature” in Adam Smith’s terminology.16 Anthony Ashley Cooper, the
Third Earl of Shaftesbury, who greatly influenced Hutcheson and Adam
Smith, argued—in response to Hobbes’s theory that human nature is fun-
damentally selfish—that God provided human nature with a number of
generous forms of affections that predisposed humans to live together.
Humans are also provided with natural capacity to be attracted to positive
affections and repelled by negative affections.17 In his book, Inquiry into
the Original of our Ideas of Beauty and Virtue, Hutcheson argues that God
is the source of “moral sense” to direct human action. Moral sense, he
asserts, is common to mankind and is independent of an individual’s will,
“It is immediate, that is to say, its deliverances are not mediated by consid-
eration of personal advantages or harm…As every man has a capacity to
make moral distinctions, so the weight of moral virtue is within the com-
petence of every man.” Hutcheson concludes: “Moral excellence can be
attained by any person, independently of his learning, power or riches.”18
13
Turco (2003, p. 141).
14
Haakoson in Bradic, ed., (2003, p. 209).
15
Adam Smith (1982, p. 50), Seligman (1992, pp. 27–28), Evensky (2005), Weinstein
(2007), Beisner (2012).
16
Adam Smith (1982).
17
Robertson (1964). Earl of Shaftesbury. Cited in Turco (2003, p. 136).
18
Hutcheson (1725), cited in Turco (2003).
2.1 PERSPECTIVES ON MORAL SENSE 29
In spite of (or perhaps because of) the evolution of the conception of

morality over the past two centuries, Scottish Enlightenment has found
resonance in contemporary thought. One of the most famous American
contemporary thinkers, James Q. Wilson, whose theory of broken win-
dows makes a compelling, spirited, and articulate case in his book The
Moral Sense: humans do indeed have an innate capacity to make moral
judgments. This is a counter-position to that of moral relativists’ convic-
tion that not only morality but also human nature itself is a product of
culture. As Geertz asserted in 1973, “There is no such thing as a human
nature independent of culture.”19 Three years later, Foucault went even
further suggesting that even man “is an innovation of recent date and
one perhaps nearing its end.”20 Another philosopher, Richard Rorty, has
asserted that humans do not even possess anything like a “core self” and
that there are no such things as “moral facts.” He posited further that
there is no “neutral ground on which to stand and argue that either tor-
ture or kindness is preferable to the other.” Rorty argued: “Human
beings must stop looking for some non-human or extra-human reality,
such as God, nature, spirit, matter or even human nature; for something-
in-itself that, though entirely independent of human knowing, would
nonetheless provide us with universal laws for governing our actions and
our thinking.”21
To all this, Wilson replies: “Humans do have a core self, not wholly the
product of culture”22 that has “a capacity to judge disinterestedly” how its
“interests ought to be advanced.” He further argues that even in the face
of moral confusion, most humans have no difficulty experiencing the
19
Geertz (1973).
20
Foucault (1973, p. 387). See also Robinow (1984).
21
Metcalf (2007).
22
Decades earlier Noam Chomsky (1974), had reached the same conclusion. He argued
that there must be a “mass of schematics, innate governing principles, which guide our social
and intellectual behavior…there is something biologically given, unchangeable, a foundation
for whatever it is that we do with our mental capacity.” Therefore, there must be a human
nature (Chomsky 1974, pp. 136–140). For Chomsky, “Unless there is some form of rela-
tively fixed human nature, true scientific understanding is impossible.” Robinow (1984,
p. 1). Some scholars go further to argue that humans have a moral conscious that “draws its
existence rather from that ethical totality which derives from the inner law of our being
permitting us to fulfill our entelechy, to become what we are, and what we dare not betray.
The moral conscious is that ontological truth of man’s nature, the microcosmic reflection of
the cosmic principle, the inner law of universe, which is the ethical demand we must have the
courage to face, naked and unafraid.” Anshen (1952, p. 3).
world as an arena of moral choices where human moral sense asserts itself
in daily life. Reflecting Adam Smith and Francis Hutcheson, Wilson con-
tends that “people have a natural moral sense” composed of sympathy,
fairness, self-control, and duty. These, he argues, make the moral sense
universal because they exist in various degrees in every culture. He notes
however that humanity “has a moral sense, but much of the time its reach
is short and its effect uncertain.” He warns that humans take centuries to
create a new culture of commitment to morality, but once created, such a
culture can be destroyed in “a few generations. And once destroyed, those
who suddenly realize what they have lost will also realize that political
action cannot, except at a very great price, restore it.”23
George Kateb, another contemporary scholar, echoes Wilson in his
book Human Dignity. He argues that morality needs no justification,
particularly “against relativists.” He considers relativism as meaning “that
there is no such a thing as morality; there are only different codes...
There are no principles of morality that are universally accepted or nearly
so, and there is no way of proving that one set of principles is correct
and other sets are mistaken.” In a counter-position, Kateb argues:
“There is sufficient continuity throughout recorded history in what
counts as fundamentally right or moral, despite differences in interpre-
tation and application.” Given the fact of wide acceptance of morality,
no proof is needed as “there can be no other proof of the validity of a
moral precept than the quite common and fairly steady acceptance of it
by people all over the world, for as long as there has been moral reflec-
tions…No transcendent instruction is needed: it is not even a question
of human discovery, but a sensitive awareness of the obvious that gradu-
ally accumulates adherence.”
Holloway suggests two conditions for such a moral principle. First it
should focus on preventing harm and second it must attract universal con-
sent. What is most relevant to this discussion is Kateb’s position: “Pain and
suffering are the central moral concern, and that efforts to prevent or
reduce it preoccupy moral agents. Yes, the center of morality is remedy,
where possible, for humanly caused suffering that seems needless and
dispossesses human beings of what is their desire or that neglects to pre-
serve them in it.”24 As we indicated earlier, enormous pain and suffering
are perpetrated upon victims of economic and financial crimes. The moral
23
Kimbal (1993), Raksin (1993).
24
Kateb (2011, p. 43).
2.2 SEARCH FOR A UNIVERSAL MORAL PRINCIPLE 31
principle advocated by Kateb, Holloway, and others is to prevent harm,

pain, and suffering as much as possible and to remedy their effects when-
ever necessary.
2.2 Search for a Universal Moral Principle

Searching for a simple and universal moral principle would seem challeng-
ing, given the enormous changes brought about by ongoing globaliza-
tion, the technological revolution proceeding in different fields—such as
biotechnology, molecular biology, computer science, artificial intelligence,
communications, material science, nanotechnology, robotics, finance, and
many more—and the plurality of moral perspectives characterizing con-
temporary humanity.
Concurrent with the dream of one world government, there was
another dream: the dream that humans could think of themselves as
members of single community “on the basis of a single ethical system,
while retaining cultural pluralism and individuality.”25 As witnessed, both
dreams of establishing a world government and a single ethical system
have failed to materialize as the memory of war receded and urgency gave
way to business and politics as usual. However, as part of the search for a
“single ethical system,” one idea that has proved its enduring historical
appeal to mankind resurfaced and has stayed on the moral radar for most
of humanity. In an essay published in 1952 and titled: “the Deep Beauty
of the Golden Rule,”26 Robert M. MacIver, then Professor of Political
Philosophy and Sociology in Columbia University, raised the question:
given the plurality, diversity, and relativity of ethical, moral values, is a
universal moral, ethical principle based on reason alone, and applicable to
all “in this world of irreconcilable valuation,” possible? He responded:
“There is no rule that can describe both my values and yours or decide
between them. There is one universal rule, and only one, that can be laid
down, on ethical grounds—that is, apart from the creeds of particular
religions and apart from the ways of the tribe that falsely and arrogantly
universalize themselves. Do to others as you would have others do to you.
This is the only rule that stands by itself in the light of its own reason, the
only rule that can stand by itself in the naked, warring universe, in the face
of the contending values of men and groups.”27
25
Anshen (1952, p. xi).
26
MacIver (1952, p. 41).
27
MacIver (1952, pp. 41–42).
MacIver argued that the word “universal,” as he used it, “is one of
procedure. It describes a mode of behaving, not a goal of action. On the
level of goals, of final values, there is irreconcilable conflict.” Humans hold
different principles, which they wish to become universal and try to “con-
vert” others. “Others will certainly resist and some will seek to persuade us
in turn—why shouldn’t they? Then we go no further except by resort to
force and fraud. We can, if we are strong, dominate some and we can bribe
others. We compromise our own values in doing so and we do not in the
end succeed; even if we were masters of the whole world we could never
succeed in making our principle universal. We could only make it falsely
tyrannous.”28 How prophetic indeed when one considers the history of
imposition of standards, codes, and conventions designed unilaterally by
the rich and powerful and then “encouraged” on the rest of humanity to
sign on through sheer power, “bribes,” threats and intimidation. MacIver
appeals for adoption of a different strategy: “So if we look for a principle
in the name of which we can appeal to all men, one to which their reason
can respond in spite of their differences, we must follow another road.
When we try to make our values prevail over those cherished by others, we
attack their values, their dynamic of behavior, and their living will. If we
go far enough we assault their very being. For the will is simply valuation
in action.”
Now the deep beauty of the golden rule is that instead of attacking the
will that is in other men, it offers their will a new dimension. “Do as you
would have others…,” as you would will others do. It bids you to expand
your vision, see yourself in new relationships. It bids you to transcend
your insulation, see yourself in the place of others, see others in your
place. It bids you to test your values or at least your way of pursuing them.
If you would disapprove that another should treat you as you treat him,
the situations being reversed, is not that a sign that, by the standard of
your own values, you are mistreating him? This principle makes for a
vastly greater harmony in the social scheme. At the same time, it is the
only universal of ethics that does not take sides with or contend with con-
tending values. It contains no dogma. “It bids everyone follow his own
rule, as it would apply apart from the accident of his particular fortune.”
Our sole concern is to show that the golden rule is the only ethical prin-
ciple, as already defined, that can have clear right of way everywhere in the
kind of world we have inherited. It is the only principle that allows every
28
MacIver (1952, p. 41).
man to follow his own intrinsic values while nevertheless it transforms the
chaos of warring codes into a reasonably well-ordered universe.29 MacIver
ends his essay citing Jesus: “All things therefore whatsoever ye would that
men should do unto you, even so ye also unto them; for this is the law and
the prophets.”30
2.2.1 Golden Rule in Historical Context

There has been considerable research on the history of the golden rule
dating back to Babylonians, Confucius, ancient Egypt, Greece, Rome,
Persia, European Middle Ages to the writings of contemporary philoso-
phers, scholars of law, and social scientists. Research has also shown evi-
dence that the golden rule is considered sacred in nearly all religious
traditions including Hinduism, Zoroastrian, Buddhism, Judaism,
Christianity, and Islam. All traditions consider avoidance of harm a duty.
The golden rule is found in both positive and negative forms.
Historically, the negative form of the rule is traced to Confucius who is
reported to have been asked: “Is there a single word that can serve as the
guiding principle for conduct throughout one’s life?” Confucius replied:
“Perhaps it is Shu, ‘Consideration.’ Do not impose on others what you do
not desire others to impose upon you.”31 The rule appears in its negative
and positive forms in all systems of thought throughout history.32 One of
the most powerful appearances of the negative form of the golden rule is
reported in the following incident involving Rabbi Hillel, a contemporary
of Jesus: “On another occasion it happened that a certain heathen came
before Shammai and said to him, ‘Make me a proselyte, on condition that
you teach the whole Torah while I stand on one foot.’ Thereupon he
[Shammai] repulsed him with the builder’s square which was in his hand.
When he went before Hillel, he [Hillel] said to him, ‘what is hateful to
you, do not do to your neighbor:’ that is the whole Torah, while the rest
is commentary thereon; go and learn it.”33
Not only did the rule resonate clearly and loudly among the followers
of Jesus, in his words, especially in his Sermon on the Mount, it was raised
29
MacIver (1952, p. 42).
30
MacIver (1952, p. 42).
31
Allinson (1985), King (1928), Hummel (1952), Confucius; Csikszentmihalyi (2008).
32
Abdullah et al. (2015).
33
Wattles (1996, p. 48), Muilenburg (1952), Allinson (2003), Levine (2008), Samuels
(2011).
to a much higher and more substantive pitch. In the words of Jesus, the
rule transcended the reciprocity of a mutual relation with one’s neighbor
to extending love to that neighbor.34 Accordingly, Paul Ricoeur argues
that the golden rule implies, or establishes, reciprocity between the doer
of an action and the person acted upon. This reciprocity “implies equality
between the parties concerned: If I treat others as I would wish them to
treat me, then that presupposes that they will treat me as I would treat
them, creating a social contract between equal parties.”35 Furthermore, in
contrasting the golden rule with the principle of “love your neighbor,”
Ricoeur suggests that the former is ethical and the latter is “hypothetical.”
The former, he argues, can be interpreted as being limited to a mutual
reciprocal arrangement: “I will only do this for you if you do something
for me.” The latter, however, has the logic of generosity, benevolence, and
altruism where one gives more than another deserves.36
Gensler (2013) provides an in-depth historical chronology of the
golden rule throughout the human civilizations, some of which are
re-produced in “Annex I” of this chapter to demonstrate the long history
of acceptance and application of this universal rule. Select variations of the
golden rule from a number of world religions and traditions as listed and
compiled by well-known management guru John C. Maxwell (2003) are
summarized in Table 2.1.
2.2.2
The Golden Rule as Universal Moral Principle
Certainly much has been written on the golden rule both before and after
MacIver’s essay, but few have been so succinct, clear, and forceful defense
of the rule as a universal moral principle. There have been a number of
credible theses on the history of the golden rule dating back to the
Babylonians. Others have investigated the philosophical, psychological,
sociological, theological, and political implications of the rule across
cultures throughout history. Intense debates have taken place between
opponents and proponents of the rule as a moral principle applied to
issues such as abortion, euthanasia, sexual orientation, and a host of other
issues with moral implications. There has also been a growing literature on
the application of the rule in legal and judicial proceedings. Nevertheless,
34
Wattles (1996, pp. 52–66), Kirk (2003), Chiton (2008).
35
Ricouer (1992, 1995), Simms (2004 p. 117).
36
Simms (2004, p. 117).
Table 2.1 Select variation on the golden rule

Tradition Golden rule quote
Bahai And if thine eyes be turned towards justice, choose thou for
thy neighbor that which thou choosest for thyself
Buddhism Hurt not others with that which pains yourself
Christianity Whatever you want men to do to you, do also to them
Confucianism What you do not want done to yourself, do not do to others
Hinduism This is the sum of duty; do naught unto others what you
would not have them do unto you
Islam No one of you is a believer until he loves for his neighbor
what he loves for himself (Sahih Muslim, 45)
Jainism A man should wander about treating all creatures as he himself
would be treated
Judaism What is hateful to you, do not do to your fellow man. This is
the entire law; all the rest is commentary
Yaruba proverb One going to take a pointed stick to pinch a baby bird should
(Nigeria) first try it on himself to feel how it hurts
Zoroastrianism Whatever is disagreeable to yourself, do not do unto others
Source: Maxwell (2003)
the adequacy of the knowledge of and understanding of the golden rule

by the general public is questionable. In the preface to his book The Golden
Rule, Jeffrey Wattles asks:
How is one to move beyond shock and cynicism as one confronts the evi-
dence of moral decline in society? What reaction comes more easily than to
blame them? We may be driven to act on the tendency to separate human-
kind into two camps—those who are the problem and those of us with
higher standards—but such is not the ultimate solution. I believe that we
can learn to relate more humanely and reach out more effectively by discov-
ering the golden rule. The need even for morally active people to discover
the rule is greater than I realized over a decade ago when I began my
research. I used to assume that nearly everyone was raised so that when they
heard the phrase “the golden rule” they could supply a principle worded,
approximately, “do to others as you want others to do to you.” I also
assumed that nearly everyone who heard that principle spelled out had a
roughly accurate initial grasp of its meaning. And I assumed that those who
thought highly of the principle would occasionally spend time thinking
about how to apply it. I have not made a scientific survey and would not
hazard an estimate in percentage term, but my experiences talking about the
rule with individuals and groups during the past years incline me to doubt
these assumptions. A volunteer soliciting contributions for an e nvironmental

group guessed that the golden rule was “An eye for an eye and a tooth for a
tooth.” A reporter misquoted the rule: “Do to others as will be done to
you.” Given the correct formulation, two students debated at length with
their professor that the rule meant the same as the motto “Get even.”
A pastor’s wife doubted that the rule was biblical. Philosophers often distort
the rule and dismiss it, while others who prefer a charitable interpretation
find no reply.37
Wattles argues that the rule is intuitively easy to grasp, has immediate
intelligibility, and is obvious and self-evident. “I know how I like to be
treated; and that is how I am to treat others. The rule asks me to be con-
siderate of others rather than indulging in self-centeredness.”38 Wattles
reviews the historical development of the golden rule from Confucius,
ancient Greece and Rome, the Jewish Tradition, New Testament,
European Middle Ages through to the writings of twentieth century
scholars. He concludes: “The golden rule is, from the first, intuitively
accessible, easy to understand; its simplicity communicates confidence
that the agent can find the right way…the rule is a principle in a full
sense. Even before it is formulated, its logic operates in the human mind.
Once formulated, it shows itself to be contagious and quickly rises to
prominence. It functions as a distillation of the wisdom of human experi-
ence and of scriptural tradition… Much of the meaning of the rule can be
put into practice without any religious commitment, since it is a non-
theological principle that neither mentions God nor is necessarily identi-
fied with the scriptures or doctrines of any religion. The rule is an
expression of human kinship, the most fundamental truth underlying
morality… ‘Do to others as you want others to do to you:’ is part of our
planet’s common language, shared by persons with differing but
overlapping conception of morality. Only a principle so flexible can serve
as a moral ladder for all humankind.”39
A number of scholars have developed dimensions of behavior that
could be subjected to the golden rule. For example, the rule could be
applied to specify the “rights of personhood.” Alan Gewirth suggests that
the golden rule could be interpreted as: “Do unto others as you have a
right that they do unto you.” He defines a set of rights he refers to as
37
Wattles (1996, pp. v–vi).
38
Wattles (1996, p. 3).
39
Wattles (1996, pp. 188–189).
“generic rights.” They include “life and physical integrity” and prohibi-
tion against “lying, stealing, and promise-breaking.”40 In the context of
generic rights, Gewirth’s formulation of the golden rule becomes: “Act in
accord with the generic rights of your recipient as well as of yourself.”41
John Finnis goes further in specifying rights in terms of what he calls
“basic human goods” that are “irreducible” aspects “of the fulfillment of
human person.” These are “substantive” basic goods which “correspond
to the inherent complexities of human nature, as is manifested both in
individual and in various forms of community.” The important function of
moral norms is to identify these basic goods. Moral norms being “prohibi-
tions on killing, theft, acts of dishonesty, and other similar negative and
positive precepts the capricious contravention of which anyone would
consider immoral.”42
One category of such basic goods is human “life in itself, in its mainte-
nance and transmission, health and safety.” There are other basic goods
Finnis calls “reflexive basic goods.” These goods allow humans to become
“active persons, acting through deliberation and choice.” They include
goods that are various forms of harmony and peace. In turn, these include
“peace of conscious,” which allows one to create consistency between
“one’s self and its expression,” inner peace, peace with others and “peace
with whatever more-than-human source of reality, meaning, and values
one can discover.” These two types of basic goods constitute the “integral
human fulfillment.”43 Finnis formulates a version of the golden rule which
he calls “the first and most abstract principle of morality” as follows: “In
voluntarily acting for human goods and avoiding what is opposed to
them, one ought to choose and otherwise will those and only those pos-
sibilities whose willing is compatible with integral human fulfillment.”44
He argues that to “do evil” is “to destroy, damage, or impede a basic
human good.”45 To intentionally harm a basic human good is “never
acceptable for God or man.”46
The same degree of universality inherent in the golden rules exists for
these “basic human goods” and “generic rights” defined by Gewirth and
40
Gewirth (1978).
41
Gewirth (1978, p. 135).
42
Finnis (1991, p. 42).
43
Finnis (1991, p. 45).
44
Finnis (1991, p. 45).
45
Finnis (1991, pp. 54–55; 71).
46
Finnis (1991, pp. 74–75).
Finnis. Every system of thought ancient or contemporary, religious or

secular, contains moral norms prohibiting their violation. In one form
or another, in one degree or another, their sanctity is affirmed by all cul-
tures and societies constituting humanity. As referenced earlier, Confucius
advised to avoid “harm.” Rabbi Hillel defined the essence of the teaching
of Torah as avoiding “harm” to others. A study of prophecy in ancient
Israel reveals the intense concern of the prophets with harm to human
dignity, trust, contract, and property.47 Teachings by rabbis reinforced and
further explained the concerns of the prophets. The teachings of Jesus
transcended “not doing harm” to one’s neighbor to extending “love” to
that neighbor.48 Just as in other Abrahamic traditions, Islam, clearly and
unambiguously, considers violations of these four “basic goods” as
transgressions against moral norms, laws, and prohibitions ordained by
the Creator.49 Similar positions on the non-violability of these rights are
discernible in Hinduism,50 Buddhism,51 Zoroastrian,52 and in ancient
Greek, Roman,53 and Egyptian54 thought. Earlier, references were made
to non-religious, secular thought where “harm,” and its avoidance, was
the crucial pivot of the universalization of moral principles.55
Given the universality of the golden rule, the condition of universal
consent seems to be met by the rule. Moreover, the Oxford philosopher
R.M. Hare argued that the rule possesses two logical features: universaliz-
ability and prescriptivity.56 The former suggests that by making a moral
judgment, one gives another person the right to the same in a similar situ-
ation. Prescriptivity means that one’s action is consistent with one’s moral
47
Lindblom (1967), Unterman (1959), Tamari (1987), Sachs (2012).
48
Dodd (1952), Neibuhr (1952), Ricoeur (1990), Finnis (1991), Ricoeur (1995, 2000),
Kirk (2003), Donders (2005), Chilton (2008).
49
Khan (1952), Hakim (1952), Rahman (1985), Engineer (1990), Fakhry (1991),
Al-Attas (1992), Zaroug (1999), Naqvi (2003), Oh (2007), Abuarqub (2009), Mirakhor
and Hamid (2009).
50
Nikhilananda (1952).
51
Suzuki (1952), Hummel (1952), Hallisey (2008), Scheible (2008).
52
Moazami (2008), Rost (1986).
53
Rosemont (1999), Dewald (2008), Berchman (2008).
54
Rosemont (1999), Dewald (2008), Berchman (2008).
55
Northrop (1952), Sacks (1952), Linton (1952), Von Fritz (1952), Maritian (1952),
Baier (1958), Brandt (1961), Gellner (1992), Gensler (1996), Holloway (1999), Blackburn
(2001), Epstein (2010), Kateb (2011).
56
Hare (1981) R.M. Hare, Moral Thinking: Its Levels, Method, and Point, Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 1981.
2.3 APPLYING GOLDEN RULE TO ECONOMICS AND FINANCE 39
judgment. This means that by prescribing to themselves, individuals

commit themselves to doing what their judgment requires. In absence of
obstacles, individuals must act in conformity with their prescription. The
rule contains characteristics of being able to be universalized and consis-
tent. It is not an exaggeration then to suggest that there is no other moral
principle that comes even close to being as simple, universal, fair, consis-
tent, reciprocal, and prescriptive yet non-dogmatic, while having roots in
all world religions, as the golden rule. It seems self-evident that the rule
meets the conditions of universal consent.
2.3 Applying Golden Rule to Economics

and Finance
Either in its positive or negative form, the golden rule can serve the pur-
pose of forming the moral foundation of ethical business. A number of
contemporary scholars have developed dimensions of behavior subject to
the application of the golden rule.
Every system of thought, ancient or contemporary, religious or secu-
lar, contains moral norms prohibiting their violation. In one form or
another, in one degree or another, their sanctity is affirmed by all cul-
tures and societies constituting humanity. A study of prophecy and
ancient Hebrew law reveals the intense concern of the prophets with
harm to human dignity, trust, contract and property. Teachings by rabbis
reinforced and further explained the concerns of the prophets. The
teachings of Jesus transcended “not doing harm” to one’s neighbor to
extending “love” to that neighbor. Just as in other Abrahamic traditions,
Islam, clearly and unambiguously, considers violations of these “basic
goods” as transgressions against moral norms, laws, prohibitions ordained
by The Creator. Similar positions on the non-violability of these rights
are discernible in Hinduism, Buddhism, Zoroastrian, and in ancient
Greek, Roman and Egyptian thought (Abdullah et al. 2015).
The golden rule is not the same as the typical economic view, in which
the agent is less concerned with how the other should be treated but
rather assumes that the other party is driven by self-interest and therefore
is protecting him- or herself. In some sense, the difference in economic
and ethical perspectives on life is the difference between expecting to be
treated the worst and expecting to be treated kindly. “Do as you would
have others…” As you would will others do. It bids you expand your
vision, see yourself in new relationships. It bids you transcend your insula-
tion, see yourself in the place of others, see others in your place. It bids
you test your values or at least your way of pursuing them. If you would
disapprove of another person treating you as you treated him or her, the
situations being reversed, is not that a sign that, by the standard of your
own values, you are mistreating that other person? This principle makes
for a vastly greater harmony in the social scheme. MacIver ends by citing
Jesus: “All things therefore whatsoever ye would that men should do
unto you, even so ye also unto them; for this is the law and the prophets.”
MacIver (1952, #47).57
Clearly, the “narcissistic business model” that led to the damage to life,
property and the overall well-being of so many violated the rights of the
human person defined by Gewirth and Finnis. Premeditated actions stem-
ming from the breakdown of morality represented assault upon human dig-
nity, trust, contract and property which define basic human goods. The same
degree of universality inherent in the golden rule exists for these basic human
goods. As argued earlier, every system of thought, ancient or contemporary,
religious or secular, contains moral norms prohibiting their violation. In one
form or another, in one degree or another, their sanctity is affirmed by all
cultures and societies. The golden rule prohibits harm to these basic goods.
Kenneth Costa argued that “the debt crisis simply would not have happened
had The Golden Rule been universally followed.” One may add that had the
golden rule been followed universally, wealth and income inequality and
poverty would not have been as glaring as observed today across the world
mainly due to the fact that a corollary of the rule requires that one sees one-
self in place of “the other.” This is the notion of empathy and “sympathy” as
the cornerstone of Adam Smith’s idea of how public and private interests
could converge in a “commercial” or capitalistic society.
Universal adherence to the golden rule could have a significant impact
on inequality and poverty. The need to find ways and means of slowing the
intensity of the present inequality and alleviate poverty has become a major
concern of policy makers. Various solutions have been proposed. One was
offered by His Royal Highness (HRH) Sultan Nazrin Shah in a presenta-
tion to the 2014 session of Khazanah’s Megatrends Forum.58 In this pre-
sentation, HRH argued that inequality and exclusion are threats to social
solidarity. Inequality squeezes out the middle class which is the backbone
57
The quote is from Matthew 7:12. (see Abdullah et al. 2015).
58
Shah (2014).
2.3 APPLYING GOLDEN RULE TO ECONOMICS AND FINANCE 41
of the sustainability of the economic system as it is the source of innovation

and entrepreneurship, the most important elements of the dynamism of
capitalism. It also allows social mobility that gives hope and aspiration to
lower income groups in the society. Without innovation, entrepreneur-
ship, and social mobility the economic system becomes sclerotic and unsta-
ble. He suggested that solutions to inequality, poverty, and environmental
degradation require reorientation of business and economic activities
through three paradigm shifts:
(a) from production to preservation;

(b) from maximization to optimization; and
(c) from ownership to stewardship.
It should not be difficult to envision how each of these paradigm shifts

would serve the requirement of the golden rule applied to present and
future generations since each of them would require treating others as one
would will it to become a universal law. This would mean treating others
as ends in themselves and never as means to an end, as Immanuel Kant’s
version of the golden rule would have it.
In the context of economic and financial crimes, the selection of the
golden rule as the universal principle of morality would mean that since
these crimes do harm to everyone, each member of the global community
has a reciprocal duty to ensure that no other member of the community is
harmed as a result of these crimes. Some of the important characteristics
of the golden rule are its simplicity, impartiality, consistency, reciprocity,
and fairness. As Wattles suggests, the golden rule “interpreted by moral
reason requires an even-handed consistency” and this “consistency blocks
hypocrisy and promotes harmony of thought, word and deed. In modern
rational ethics, the special point of consistency is to be impartial in applica-
tion of principles.” He argues that impartiality can only be important and
matter if the “equal basic” worth of each person has been a priori affirmed
and that is what the golden rule does “as it equates the value of the self
and other.”59 Contrast this to the present state of the international combat
against economic crime. Nearly all the standards, codes, and conventions
deal with the prevention of crimes that in the perception of powerful
members of the international community primarily harm them. As evi-
denced by decades of ignoring the pleas of poorer and less powerful
Wattles (1996, p. 180; p. 80, pp. 122–140, p. 7).

59
members for international cooperation in combating economic and finan-

cial crimes that harm them, it appears that the rich and powerful are say-
ing: “I demand that you cooperate with me to prevent what harms me but
I do not care about what harms you.”
In the context of economic and financial crimes, the above arguments
would suggest a moral principle on which international cooperation for
collective action against economic crimes could be based. The reasoning
of the golden rule could be formulated as: “A nation would not want that
other nations are harmed by economic and financial crimes.” Just as one
nation would be pleased that it is not a victim of a particular economic
crime, it should want to participate in international efforts to prevent
other nations from being harmed by that same crime. Given this moral
foundation, domestic and international legislation, law, standards, codes,
and conventions can be created that stipulate how specific crimes are to be
treated, prevented, and prosecuted.
In the present context, “generic rights” and “basic goods” defined by
Gewirth and Finnis, respectively, to specify the rights of the human per-
son would be violated by economic crimes. These ideas can be further
tailored specifically to reflect what the victims of economic and financial
crimes have described as their rights that have been violated. As men-
tioned earlier, the long list of harms that victims suffer can be classified
into four categories: assault upon human dignity; assault upon trust;
assault upon contract; and assault upon property. These four categories
would then define the “generic rights” and the “basic goods” that consti-
tute “the integral human fulfillment.”
2.4 Theories of Business Ethics

Whereas vast literature is available on the morality and ethics as a discipline
of philosophy, application of such to business is relatively new. As modern
business becomes more complex, it raises several ethical issues which are
then subject to debate. Each theory of business ethics is driven by certain
underlying philosophical foundation justifying the moral principles and
values to determine the applicable ethics to resolve business issues. There
are at least three major theories of business ethics which have emerged in
the last couple of decades.60 The philosophical perspectives underlying
60
Ali (2014).
2.4 THEORIES OF BUSINESS ETHICS 43
each business ethics theory are (a) teleological; (b) deontological; and
(c) virtue ethics.
The term teleological is derived from the Greek work telos meaning
goal or purpose. This perspective is considered a “consequences-oriented”
approach primarily focusing on the significance of consequences or results
in determining if a certain act is acceptable or not. Therefore, the ethical
test of a business decision to be ethical depends primarily on the outcome
of that particular action. Two sub-theories derived from this perspective
are egoism and utilitarianism.61
In contrast to the teleological perspective, deontological ethics (derived
from the Greek word deon or duty) places emphasis not on the outcome
but on certain duties and responsibilities. Deontologists base their judg-
ments on a set of “moral rights” people are believed to possess; in other
words, any individual has a right to be treated in ways that ensure his
dignity, respect, and autonomy. The rights driven or Kantian Model,
named for Immanuel Kant, rests on the assumption that every person has
basic rights in a moral universe, and accordingly, an action is morally cor-
rect if it minimizes the violation of the rights of all stakeholders. Intentions
are central to the deontological approach, as they determine whether or
not business decisions are ethical or unethical. Only when members of the
business community act from duty do their actions have moral worth.62
An action is not considered worthy of moral right if it is taken out of self-
interest as compared to one which is taken from a deep sense of duty.
Unlike deontological and teleological approaches, virtue ethics is
embedded in the values and beliefs that one subscribes to. It seeks to high-
light the virtues that lead to a meaningful and rewarding life. How these
are acquired, developed, and evolved is part of the domain of –ethics.
Since virtue ethics do not exist independently of the society and the envi-
ronment where a person lives, virtue ethics tend to be numerous and may
differ, in priorities, among societies. Virtues are good habits that must be
practiced. Virtue ethics, therefore, differs from previous theories as it pri-
marily revolves around individual character, attitudes, and other disposi-
tions and preferences, including values and guiding norms. These qualities
can be taught and acquired, which can induce the business community in
general to behave in an ethical way.63 Merely having an understanding and
61
Ali (2014).
62
Ali (2014).
63
Ali (2014).
knowledge of virtues is not sufficient, but the key to good ethics is deter-
mined by the degree by which such virtues are internalized by individuals
and organizations.
Virtue ethics emphasizes the virtues, or moral character, in determin-
ing the morality of actions. While teleology is concerned with the result
of an action and deontology with the intent, virtue ethics is concerned
with the character of the actor and how it fits within a holistic view of
society at large. For example, say that it can be agreed that a particular
person in need should be helped. A teleological approach, like utilitarian-
ism, would argue that you should help that person because the cost of
you helping that person is less than the value that person gets from being
helped. A deontological approach would argue that you should help that
person because it is your duty to do so. A virtue ethics approach would
argue that you should help that person because doing so would be chari-
table or benevolent, characteristics that individuals in an ideal society
should display.
A virtue is a good trait of character, so well-entrenched in an individual
that it influences which actions he or she wishes to take. For example,
honesty is a virtue. An honest person is one who tells the truth simply
because he likes truth and dislikes dishonesty. An individual is not an hon-
est person if they avoid dishonesty out of fear of being caught and pun-
ished, nor are they honest if they have to override their natural inclination
to be dishonest in conformity with a grander narrative of morality or duty.
Virtue ethics focuses on identifying which characteristics should be
taught and acquired. Within the business context, the goal is for those
involved in market decision making to properly internalize the appropriate
virtues. Of course, virtues sometimes contradict one another and a charac-
teristic that might be a virtue in one context or culture might be a vice in
another. For example, frugality might be a virtue when running a business
but a vice when helping the needy. Acceptance is a virtue, except when the
situation calls for assertiveness. Depending on the culture, justice or mercy
could be the appropriate virtue when dealing with an individual who has
committed an offense.
Virtue ethics is concerned with the type of person we should be in the
context of our relations with others and our positions in society. Virtue
ethics, therefore, differs from other theories, as it primarily revolves around
individual character, attitudes, and other dispositions and preferences,
including values and guiding norms.64 The characteristics of consistency,
64
Mirakhor (2016).
impartiality, reciprocity, and fairness become the foundation of moral rea-

son and the justification for claims that the golden rule is the only moral
principle and virtue that can attract universal adherence and the basis of
business ethics.
2.4.1
What Is Virtue Ethics?
The virtue theory of ethics is widely recognized as a workable model
which can be the basis of ethics in business. Virtue ethics—the study of
moral character—has been an important strand in moral philosophy
for literally thousands of years, but has received little attention from
contemporary economists.65 Virtue theory of ethics advocates developing
and strengthening certain desirable virtues and avoiding certain unde-
sirable vices in order to achieve higher goals of a society or organiza-
tion. The ethicist who relies upon a theory of virtue has a rich history
of philosophical thought from which to draw, though theories of virtue
with specifically commercial applications are fairly recent. Several mod-
ern thinkers—David Hume, Adam Smith, Samuel Smiles, Robert
Solomon, and Deirdre McCloskey—base their writings to application
of virtue to commerce. Despite challenges, virtue theory provides a
plausible model for considering how one may conduct business in an
ethical and successful manner.66
The guiding principle underlying the theory of virtue is how one is to
live and therefore such a theory should also be applicable to how one
ought to create, produce, and exchange. The key element is a powerful
emphasis on being rather than doing such that right actions arise only
from persons who have good qualities of character. Virtues are acquired
character traits or dispositions that are judged to be good. In virtue ethics,
actions are judged to be good because they are in character for a virtuous
person—they are constitutive of living well, of “flourishing.” A morally
well-constituted individual cultivates virtues not as rules of thumb for
moral action, but because such virtues are characteristic of the kind of
person she is or wants to be.67
The theory of virtue ethics can be applied to business in various ways.
For example, market conduct and operations could be based on the virtue
of universality such that the disposition would be to make mutually
65
Bruni and Sugden (2013).
66
Heath (2013).
67
beneficial transactions with others on terms of equality. If the market is to

be viewed as an institution with the objective to provide the widest possi-
ble network of mutually beneficial transactions, universality has to be seen
as a virtue. Its opposites—favoritism, patronage, protectionism—are all
barriers to the extension of the market and therefore are vices to achieve
universality of markets.68
The idea that markets rely on trust and trustworthiness has a long his-
tory in economics, especially when discussing enforceability and monitor-
ing of contracts. Smith (1763 [1978], pp. 538–539) recognizes the
importance of “probity” for the workings of markets and describes this
trait as a “virtue.” Significantly, Smith sees this virtue as consistent with
long-term self-interest. The idea that commercial transactions typically
depend on an element of trust has continued to be recognized by leading
economists such as Marshall (1920), Arrow (1984), and Ackerlof (1982)
whose work incorporates trust relationships in their economic models.69
The virtues of sympathy and benevolence are important in Smith’s
earlier work The Theory of Moral Sentiments, even though they play only
minor roles in his economic analysis. And for Smith, self-interest expressed
within the rules of a commercial society is not opposed to v irtue. To
the contrary, character traits associated with the pursuit of long-term
self-interest, particularly prudence, temperance, and self-command, are
virtues.70
Virtues of integrity and honesty are regarded as key elements of the
mission statements of a large number of corporations. For example, a
review of the codes of conduct of major organizations showed that the
virtue of honesty or integrity in particular (and the related concepts of
transparency and openness) is generally perceived to be important for the
financial sector.71 Similarly, honesty and transparency are virtues ensuring
that full disclosure is made to the stakeholders. If financial institutions are
not honest or transparent in their dealings, markets will make sub-optimal
choices with respect to the use of their resources. A lack of transparency
68
See Bruni and Sugden (2013) for a detailed discussion on applying virtue ethics theory
to markets.
69
70
71
Graafland and van de Ven (2011) discuss virtues which were ignored or were absent
from the conduct of bankers leading to the financial crisis. They list reference to integrity and
honesty in the statements and mission objectives of several major financial institutions such
as Deutsche Bank, Goldman Sachs, and ING. However, in practice adherence to such virtues
was in question.
would lead to typical asymmetric information in financial contracts raising

age-old moral hazards and adverse selection problems. This information-
asymmetry together with the incentive to increase profits creates an
agency-problem or the problem of moral hazard (Stiglitz 2010, p. 14).
Commitment to ethical norms and values is one way to deal with this kind
of problem, since these values indicate that one should not deceive or
mislead the customer, even if it pays to do so.72
The theory of virtue ethics applied to business provides a plausible the-
ory of business ethics. It is based on internalizing virtues in each organiza-
tion’s and person’s conduct such that that organization or person is a
living manifestation of the virtues as opposed to doing them out of
necessity. The set of virtues such as compassion, benevolence, due care,
and truthfulness are desirable to conduct ethical business. Whereas virtues
are desirable, vices are undesirable. Vices are opposite to virtues and ought
to be avoided by a virtuous person. For example, recklessness and impru-
dence are vices which any business ought to avoid. Adam Smith (1759)
argues that recklessness stands in opposition to prudence, because security
is the first and the principal object of prudence. Another vice which a busi-
ness leader should avoid is arrogance.
2.5 Islamic Perspective on Business Ethics

As compared to conventional economic thought, ethics, morality, and jus-
tice are firmly embedded in the Islamic vision of how an economy and its
finance are to operate.73 They are defined by a set of behavioral rules pre-
scribed in al-Qur’an.74 These include property rights, faithfulness to terms
72
Graafland and van de Ven (2011).
73
Musa (2011) highlights the importance of ethics in Islam by citing that classical scholars
of Islam such as Al-Ghazālı̄, in his famous encyclopedia Iḥyā’ ‘Ulūm al-Dı̄n (Revival of
Islamic Sciences) dedicates a full chapter on the ethics of earning and living (Kitāb al-Ā dāb
al-Kasb wa al-Ma‘āsh).
74
For an early historical source for the application of Islam’s ethical rules for behavior, see
Nasirean Ethics, translated into English by G.M. Wickens, George Allen, Unwin LTC,
London. Nasir al-Din Tusi who wrote in 633/1235 is primarily concerned with human
behavior and deals with concepts of rationality, reason, justice, and equilibrium and how all
creation “is called to ascend the hierarchy of grades within the limits of capacity. This ascent
is the end of all existence, and it is by reference to man’s potentially supreme elevation that
this behavior is to be determined” (p. 11) Tusi deals with individual’s behavior in relation to
the Creator and the Creation, then at the economic level and, finally, as a member of the
community. See also Nasir al-Din Tusi on Finance by M. Minovi and V. Minorsky in The
Bulleting of the School of Oriental and African Studies, Vol. X, 1940 (p. 755).
and conditions of contract, maintenance of trust, honesty, transparency,

cooperation, reciprocity, and consultation, and a number of other institu-
tional and behavioral rules. Participants internalize these rules before
entering the market, which has rules governing its operations as well.
Hence, what would be considered as moral, ethical values in contempo-
rary parlance are endogenized within the economic and financial activities
in Islam.75
Within an Islamic context, the term most closely related to ethics in
al-Qur’an is khuluq (‫ قُلُخ‬Arabic for moral character and trait, plural
akhlāq (‫ ))قالخأ‬but there are other terms to describe the concepts of morals
or positive values such as khayr (goodness), birr (righteousness), qist
(equity), ‘adl (balance and justice), haqq (truth and righteousness),
ma’ruf (known, approved), and taqwa (piety). Allah (swt)76 uses the same
word khuluq in describing the Prophet’s (saas)77 behavior and character
(al-Qur’an, 68:4).78 These virtues were fully manifested through the
character of the Prophet (saas), who is the role model to follow for
the believers. The Prophet (saas) is reported to have said that he was sent
for the purpose of perfecting the noblest of morals (‫)قالخألا مراكم‬.79
Kamali (2011) explains the relevance of ethics to the higher goals
and purposes of the Sharı̄ʿah by pointing out the objectives of Sharı̄ʿah
(maqāṣid al-Sharı̄ʿah) in relation to embedded ethical substance and
integrity, which are reflected in business rules and transactions in the
form of applied Law or fiqh. He concludes that ethics are the foundation
of business and economics because Sharı̄ʿah laws are richly endowed by
ethical content and the rules of moral propriety that govern all human
relations. For example, in the sphere of financial transactions, Sharı̄ʿah
rules on ḥalāl (permitted) and ḥarām (prohibited) are essentially aimed
at fair trading, market stability, accountability, and the public good. He
extends the argument that prohibition of interest (ribā) has an inward
ethical dimension to promote fairness and justice, and avoid financial
repression.
75
Mirakhor and Alaabed (2013).
76
Use of the term (swt) with Allah denotes “Subhanahu wa ta’ala” meaning “Glory to
Him, the Exalted” as a sign of reverence.
77
Use of the term (saas) with the mention of the Prophet denotes “SallaAllah o ‘Alayhi wa
Aalihi wa Salaam” meaning the graces of Allah (swt) be upon him, and peace as sign of
reverence.
78
See Beekun and Badawi (2005).
79
Musnad Ahmad Ibn Hanbal, No: 8595.
2.5 ISLAMIC PERSPECTIVE ON BUSINESS ETHICS 49
Ethics are embedded in expected behavior and character of a rule com-

pliant believer as long as he/she adheres to the principles prescribed by
Islam. Ethical principles established based on the primary sources of
Qura’n and sayings of the Prophet (saas) emphasize not only the action
itself but the intention, outcome, character, and the manner in which it is
executed.80 While all actions are judged by intentions irrespective of out-
come, virtues such as preservation of rights, responsibility and account-
ability to contracts, truthfulness, and striving for excellence determine the
foundation of business ethics in Islam.
Based on moral philosophy aimed at promoting economic and social
justice and to enhance solidarity among communities, internalization of
rules and virtues of Islam determine all facets of an economy ranging
from the rules of market conduct, production, consumption, distribu-
tion, and redistribution. Emphasis is placed on the ethics of work and
ethical treatment of workers and to maintain an ethical relationship
between employee and employers, business and customers, business
and stakeholders, and finally business and society at large including the
environment.
The next two chapters provide further details of the virtues underlying
business ethics and how a framework of business ethics is formed in an
economy in the Islamic perspective.
Annex I: Golden Rule Chronology
c. 1450 BC to The Jewish Bible has golden-rule like passages, including: “Don’t
450 BC oppress a foreigner, for you well know how it feels to be a foreigner,
since you were foreigners yourselves in the land of Egypt” (Exodus
23:9) and “Love your neighbor as yourself” (Leviticus 19:18)
c. 563–483 BC Buddha in India teaches compassion and shunning unhealthy desires.
His golden rule says: “There is nothing dearer to man than himself;
therefore, as it is the same thing that is dear to you and to others,
hurt not others with what pains yourself” (Dhammapada, Northern
Canon, 5:18)
c. 551–479 BC Confucius sums up his teaching as: “Don’t do to others what you don’t
want them to do to you.” (Analects 15:23)
c. 500 BC Jainism, a religion of India that promotes non-violence, compassion,
and the sacredness of life, teaches the golden rule: “A monk should treat
all beings as he himself would be treated.” (Jaina Sutras, Sutrakritanga,
bk. 1, 10:1–3)
80
Ali (2014).
c. 500 BC Taoist Laozi says: “To those who are good to me, I am good; and to
those who are not good to me, I am also good; and thus all get to
receive good.” (Tao Te Ching 49) A later work says: “Regard your
neighbor’s gain as your gain and your neighbor’s loss as your loss.”
(T’ai-Shang Kan-Ying P’ien)
c. 500 BC Zoroaster in Persia teaches the golden rule: “That character is best that
doesn’t do to another what isn’t good for itself” and “Don’t do to
others what isn’t good for you.”
c. 479–438 BC Mo Tzu in China teaches the golden rule: “Universal love is to regard
another’s state as one’s own. A person of universal love will take care of
his friend as he does of himself, and take care of his friend’s parents as
his own. So when he finds his friend hungry he will feed him, and when
he finds him cold he will clothe him.” (Book of Mozi, ch. 4)
c. 440 BC Socrates (c. 470–399 BC) and later Plato (c. 428–347 BC) begin the
classical era of Greek philosophy. The golden rule, while not prominent
in their thinking, sometimes leaves a trace. As Socrates considers
whether to escape from jail, he imagines himself in the place of the state,
who would be harmed (Crito). And Plato says: “I’d have no one touch
my property, if I can help it, or disturb it without consent on my part; if
I’m a man of reason, I must treat the property of others the same way”
(Laws). (Wattles 1996, pp. 32–6)
c. 400 BC Hinduism has positive and negative golden rules: “One who regards all
creatures as his own self, and behaves towards them as towards his own
self attains happiness. One should never do to another what one regards
as hurtful to one’s own self. This, in brief, is the rule of righteousness.
In happiness and misery, in the agreeable and the disagreeable, one
should judge effects as if they came to one’s own self.” (Mahabharata
bk. 13: Anusasana Parva, §113)
384–322 BC Aristotle says: “As the virtuous man is to himself, he is to his friend also,
for his friend is another self” (Nicomachean Ethics 9:9). Diogenes
Laertius (c. 225 AD) reports Aristotle as saying that we should behave
to our friends as we wish our friends to behave to us
c. 150 BC Various Jewish sources have golden-rule sayings. Tobit 4:16 says “See
that you never do to another what you’d hate to have done to yourself.”
Sirach 31:15 says “Judge the needs of your guest by your own.” And
the Letter of Aristeas says “Insofar as you [the king] do not wish evils to
come to you, but to partake of every blessing, [it would be wise] if you
did this with your subjects.”
c. 4 BC–27 AD Jesus proclaims love (of God and neighbor) and the golden rule to be
the basis of how to live. Luke 6:31 gives the golden rule in the context
of loving your enemies, later illustrated by the Good Samaritan parable.
Matthew 7:12 says: “Treat others as you want to be treated, for this
sums up the law and the prophets.”
ANNEX I: GOLDEN RULE CHRONOLOGY 51
c. 70 AD “The Two Ways,” a Dead Sea Scroll discovered in the 1940s, says:
“The way of life is this: First, you shall love the Lord your maker,
and secondly, your neighbor as yourself. And whatever you don’t want
to be done to you, don’t do to anyone else.” (Wattles 1996, p. 47)
c. 80 AD The Didache, summarizing early Christian teachings, begins: “There are
two paths, one of life and one of death, and a great difference between
them. The way of life is this. First, you shall love the God who made
you. Second, you shall love your neighbor as yourself. And whatever you
wouldn’t have done to you, don’t do to another.”
c. 90 AD The ex-slave Stoic Epictetus writes: “What you shun enduring yourself,
don’t impose on others. You shun slavery – beware of enslaving others!”
c. 90 AD The apocryphal gospel of Thomas attributes a negative golden rule to
Jesus (verse 6): “Don’t do what you hate.”
c. 120 AD Rabbi Akiba says: “This is the fundamental principle of the Law: Don’t
treat your neighbor how you hate to be treated yourself.” (G. King
1928, p. 268) His students support the golden rule: Rabbi Eleazar
(“Let another’s honor be as dear to you as your own”) and Rabbi Jose
(“Let another’s property be as dear to you as your own”). (Wattles
1996, p. 202)
c. 130 AD Aristides defends his fellow Christians, who “never do to others what
they would not wish to happen to themselves,” against persecution
c. 150 AD The Ethiopian version of the apocryphal Book of Thekla ascribes a
negative golden rule to Paul: “What you will not that men should
do to you, you also shall not do to another.”
c. 150–1600 Many Christians, seeing the golden rule’s wide acceptance across
religions and cultures, view the golden rule as the core of the natural
moral law that Paul saw as written on everyone’s heart (Romans 2:14f).
The golden rule is proclaimed as the central norm of the natural moral
law by Justin Martyr, Origen, Basil, Augustine, Gratian, Anselm of
Canterbury, William of Champeaux, Peter Lombard, Hugh of St.
Victor, John of Salisbury, Bonaventure, Duns Scotus, Luther, Calvin,
and Erasmus.
222–235 Roman Emperor Alexander Severus adopts the golden rule as his motto,
displays it on public buildings, and promotes peace among religions.
Some say the golden rule is called golden because Severus wrote it on
his wall in gold
c. 263–339 Eusebius of Caesarea’s golden-rule prayer begins: “May I be an enemy
to no one and the friend of what abides eternally. May I never quarrel
with those nearest me, and be reconciled quickly if I should. May
I never plot evil against others, and if anyone plot evil against me,
may I escape unharmed and without the need to hurt anyone else.”
610 Muhammad receives the Qur’an, which instructs us to do good to all

(4:36) and includes the golden-rule like saying: “Woe to those who
cheat: they demand a fair measure from others but they do not give it
themselves” (83:1–3). Several Hadiths (Bukhari 1:2:12, Muslim 1:72f,
and An-Nawawi 13) attribute this golden rule to Muhammad: “None
of you is a true believer unless he wishes for his brother what he wishes
for himself.”
c. 650 Imam Ali, Muhammad’s relative, says: “What you prefer for yourself,
prefer for others; what you find objectionable for yourself, treat as such
for others. Don’t wrong anyone, just as you would not like to be
wronged; do good to others just as you would like others to do good
to you; that which you consider immoral for others, consider immoral
for yourself.”
c. 700 Shintoism in Japan expresses the golden rule: “Be charitable to all
beings, love is God’s representative. Don’t forget that the world is one
great family. The heart of the person before you is a mirror; see there
your own form.”
c. 1093 Muslim Abu Hamid al-Ghazali in his Disciplining the Soul (the section
on discovering faults) uses the golden rule: “Were all people only to
renounce the things they dislike in others, they would not need anyone
to discipline them.”
1140 Gratian, the father of canon law, identifies natural law with the golden
rule: “By natural law, each person is commanded to do to others what
he wants done to himself and is prohibited from inflicting on others
what he does not want done to himself. Natural law is common to all
nations because it exists everywhere by natural instinct. It began with
the appearance of rational creatures and does not change over time, but
remains immutable.”
c. 1230 Muslim Sufi thinker Ibn Arabi sees the golden rule as applying to all
creatures: “All the commandments are summed up in this, that whatever
you would like the True One to do to you, that do to His creatures.”
(See my §3.1c.)
1259 Gulistan, by the Persian poet Sa’di, has these verses, which are now
displayed at the entrance of the United Nations Hall of Nations:
“Human beings are members of a whole, in creation of one essence and
soul. If one member is afflicted with pain, Other members uneasy will
remain. If you have no sympathy for human pain, The name of human
you cannot retain.”
1265–74 Thomas Aquinas’s Summa Theologica (I-II, q. 94, a. 4) says the golden
rule is common to the gospels and to human reason. He adds (I-II,
q. 99, a. 1) that “when it is said, ‘All things whatsoever you would that
men should do to you, do you also to them,’ this is an explanation of
the rule of neighborly love contained implicitly in the words, ‘You shall
love your neighbor as yourself.’”
ANNEX I: GOLDEN RULE CHRONOLOGY 53
c. 1400 Hindu Songs of Kabir (65) teach the golden rule: “One who is kind and
who practices righteousness, who considers all creatures on earth as his
own self, attains the Immortal Being; the true God is ever with him.”
c. 1400 Sikhism from India teaches: “Conquer your egotism. As you regard
yourself, regard others as well.” (Shri Guru Granth Sahib, Raag Aasaa
8:134)
1688 Four Pennsylvania Quakers sign the first public protest against slavery
in the American colonies, basing this on the golden rule: “There is a
saying, that we shall do unto others as we would have them do unto
us – making no difference in generation, descent, or color. What in the
world would be worse to do to us, than to have men steal us away and
sell us for slaves to strange countries, separating us from our wives and
children? This is not doing to others as we would be done by; therefore
we are against this slave traffic.”
1827 Joseph Smith receives the Book of Mormon, which has the golden rule:
“Therefore, all things whatsoever ye would that men should do to you,
do ye even so to them, for this is the law and the prophets” (3 Nephi
14:12)
1854 Abraham Lincoln quips: “Although volume upon volume is written to
prove slavery a very good thing, we never hear of the man who wishes
to take the good of it, by being a slave himself.”
1858 Abraham Lincoln gives this golden-rule evaluation of slavery: “As I
would not be a slave, so I would not be a master.” The next year, he
says: “He who would be no slave, must consent to have no slave.”
Source: http://www.harryhiker.com/goldrule.htm. See also Gensler (2013)
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Turco, L. 2003. Moral Sense and the Foundation of Morals. In The Cambridge
Companion to the Scottish Enlightenment, ed. Alexander Brodie, 136–156.
Cambridge: The Press Syndicate of the University of Cambridge.
Unterman, I. 1959. A Light Amid the Darkness: Medieval Jewish Philosophy.
New York: Twayne Publishers.
Von Fritz, K. 1952. Relative and Absolute Values. In Moral Principles of Action:
Wattles, J. 1996. The Golden Rule. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Weinstein, J.R. 2007. A Review Essay of Adam Smith’s Moral Philosophy by Jerry
Evensky. Research in the History of Economic Thought and Methodology 25-A:
61–69.
Zaroug, A.H. 1999. Ethics From an Islamic Perspective: Basic Issues. The
American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences 16 (3): 46–63.
CHAPTER 3
Key Virtues of Business Ethics in Islam
A framework of business ethics in Islam can be developed by identifying

key virtues that are the preferred character traits of a human being. This
chapter discusses select virtues that have direct implications on any eco-
nomic, social, business, or financial activity such that a decision taken in
light of such virtues would be ethical. By embracing and living the virtues
and avoiding vices, an ethical economic and financial system could emerge
that is just as well as efficient.
In Islam, virtues or moral character traits are termed as aḫlāq (sing.
huluq or ḫulq) meaning moral qualities and good traits.1 These virtues
were identified as preferred traits in the Qur’an and were manifested
through the practice by the Prophet (saas) who perfected these in daily
life. There are numerous references in both the Qur’an and hadith in this
respect. For example, the Qur’an (3:104) lays the broad foundation of the
preferred character of humans to (a) do what is good; (b) be righteous;
and (c) forbid and refrain from what is wrong.2 After a broad classification
of desirable behavior is prescribed, the Qur’an (49:13) states, “The noblest
1
Zilio-Grandi (2015) compiles a list of the virtues and their corresponding vices. She
reports that the use of aḫlāq in the sense of good moral qualities is based on a number of
Prophetic traditions of the kind collected by al-Tirmiḏı̄ (d. 279/892) in his famous work,
Ğ āmiʿ.
2
Qur’an (3:104), “Let there arise out of you a band of people inviting to all what is good,
enjoining what is right, and forbidding what is wrong: they are the ones to attain felicity.”

DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-66390-6_3
62 3 KEY VIRTUES OF BUSINESS ETHICS IN ISLAM
of you in the sight of God are the best of you in conduct.” This implies
that the ones practicing and living virtues that make up good character are
the successful ones. Throughout Islamic history, different scholars have
compiled sets of virtues based on various verses of the Qur’an and have
identified virtues that would constitute an ethical act.3
Furthermore, the Qur’an (68:4) makes a strong endorsement of the
character traits of the Prophet when it acknowledges the Prophet’s
character (huluq) as of an exalted standard that can be interpreted as
adherence to and practice of virtues and sacred values forming the
basis of ethical behavior.4 In addition, there are several authenticated
sayings of the Prophet that indicate the significance of possessing good
character and virtues for a successful life. Practicing these virtues is
considered a sign of having perfect faith and therefore it is highly
desirable to incorporate these in one’s life.5 In a famous saying, the
Prophet (saas) said that “I have been sent for the purpose of per-
fecting good morals.”6
Qur’an (3:110), “You are the best nation that has been raised up for mankind; You enjoin
right conduct, forbid evil and believe in Allah.”
3
For example, Ali (2014) quotes Al-Mawardi’s list of 10 virtues, which included capacity
to reason, sound faith, knowledge, forbearance, generosity, adherence to accepted custom,
righteousness, patience, thankfulness, and flexibility as virtues that could deem an act
ethical.
4
Qur’an (68:4) “thou [standest] on an exalted standard of character.” The other occur-
rence of the term ḫuluq, in the Poets sura (ḫuluq al-awwalı̄n, 26:137), can also carry the
sense of “trait,” “quality,” “way of being” as observed by Zilio-Grandi (2015). She notes
al-Rāzı̄’s observation that, according to some commentators, Muhammad’s qualities are
indicated by a passage in the Cattle sura (Chap. 2) where it is said, speaking of the antecedent
prophets: “Those are the ones whom God has guided, so take an example from their guid-
ance (hudā)” (9:90). Al-Rāzı̄ asks in what sense we should understand this “guidance” and
concludes that we are dealing with good moral qualities.
5
Interpreting the saying of Prophet, “nothing weighs on the Scales like a good quality of
character (ḥusn al-ḫuluq),” Zilio-Grandi (2015) argues that this identifies such virtues
(ḫuluq) with the interior features (awṣāf bāt ̣ina) of the individual.
Prophet said that “those with the best character traits among you are dearest to me and
will sit closest to me on the day of the resurrection.” In another version, it is stated that
“those of you that I love the best and who will be seated closest to me on the day of the
resurrection are those of you who have the best aḫlāq.” In another instance, when asked who
is the believer most perfect in his faith, the Prophet answered, “who has the best aḫlāq.” Ibn
Ḥ anbal (d. 241/855) no. 909. Cf. http://library.islamweb.net/hadith/display_hbook.
php?bk_no=13&hid=909&pid=2021
6
(Ibn Hambal, No: 8595).
3 KEY VIRTUES OF BUSINESS ETHICS IN ISLAM 63
Recognizing the importance of good character traits or virtues alone is

not sufficient unless one understands a subtle and strong relationship
between the intentions, actions, and the outcomes. In the Islamic concept
of ethics, there is an emphasis on virtue, intention, action, and the out-
come as a basis for judging whether an act is ethical or not. Although inten-
tion or niyya of an action plays a critical role in determining the legal aspect
of the action, Islam recognizes the moral significance of intention in advo-
cating sincerity of intent (iḫlās)̣ .7 Each virtue is judged in light of the inten-
tion behind in the practice of the virtue. The distinction between having
intention to serve humanity and the betterment of society as opposed to
achieve personal gain could make an action ethical or unethical.8
The nexus of virtues, intention, action, and outcome defines a framework
of ethics that goes beyond legal or juridical ethics that focus exclusively on
actions. For this reason, Kamali (2011) emphasizes that a jurist needs to go
beyond the mere legal requirement of the validity of a contract to include
discussion on the higher objectives (maqāsị d) of Shari’ah to deem the con-
tract ethical. This means going beyond the form and including the sub-
stance in evaluating the validity of any contract. Zilio- Grandi (2015)
articulates that the Islamic conception of ethics dependent on virtues covers
a much broader discipline than the restricted juridical understanding of
practice and, therefore, finds virtues behind every example of good conduct
and not merely behind behavior answerable to the Islamic law.9
7
Select sayings of Prophet emphasizing the significance of intentions are:
“Actions are according to intentions” (al-aʿmāl bi-al-niyyāt), e.g. al-Buḫārı̄, Al-ṣaḥıh̄ ̣,

bāb badʾ al-ḫalq, no. 1, after ʿUmar b. al-Ḫaṭt ̣āb“A Muslim’s intention is the best part
of his action” (niyyat al-muʾmin ḫayr min ʿamali-hi), quoted for example by
al-Ṭ abarānı̄ (d. 360/971), Al-muʿğam al-kabı̄r, after Sahl b. Saʿd (d. 91\710), no.
5803
“God does not look upon either your appearance or wealth, rather God examines
your intentions and actions” as reported by Ali (2014)
“Work is contingent upon intention and to each according to his intention” as

reported by Ali (2014)
8
Ali (2014). This is the reason that the Prophet insists that “God examines your intentions
and actions,” adding that “God does not accept any claim without action and no claim or
action without intention”.
9
She argues that so far as good qualities are attributed to the Prophet they demand as such to
be imitated, and therefore, for a “true Muslim” virtue ethics are at least as important as obser-
vance of juridical ethics, indeed more so, because the one precedes and underpins the other.
To summarize, Islamic virtue ethics are chiefly concerned with “‘good

character traits,” which may then be exemplified into actions. Being is
preferred over doing. The relationship between virtues, intentions, and
actions lays the foundation of ethical behavior such that virtue ethics have
a logical priority over juridical ethics. Actions driven by good intentions
and in the spirit of the practice of virtues would become ordinary behavior
that is not only ethical but is internally consistent in terms of intent, means,
and outcomes.
The rest of this chapter discusses key virtues that constitute good qual-
ities of moral character as envisioned by Islam. These virtues can be
divided into two categories; one category deals with philosophical virtues
having esoteric meaning and lays the ground for a way of life optimizing
human welfare. Examples of these virtues are embracing the unity of
mankind and viewing the other the same as oneself, being just to promote
economic and social justice, preservation of rights, striving for excellence,
and being truthful. The other category of virtues specifically deals with
economics and business conduct but have roots in the philosophy of the
first category. These virtues include giving right measures and being
transparent in business transactions. For example, the virtue of giving
right measure derives its moral ground from being just and preserving the
rights of others.
Discussion on distinct virtues of Islam relevant to business practices are
presented below.
3.1 Embracing the Unity of Creation

The core and fundamental axioms of Islamic ideology are the belief in the
Unity and Oneness of the Creator (Tawhid), a corollary of which is the
unity of the creation, particularly the unity of mankind. A number of
verses of the Qur’an affirm and confirm the unity of humankind. These
verses plus those recounting the provision of physical-material as well as
non-physical faculties and facilities created for all humans that empower
them economically and spiritually, form the cornerstone of the legislative
framework of rules (institutions) for the socio-economic-political behav-
ior of humans. Resources are created for all humans of all generations,
who compose one humanity, their diversity does not and should not
mean their disunity, and, by the primordial covenant,10 not only do all
10
See virtue on contracts for details on primordial covenant between the Creator and man.
3.1 EMBRACING THE UNITY OF CREATION 65
humans recognize their own unity, they also have full cognition of their
responsibility to maintain the unity and integrity of the rest of creation
through their service to humanity and to the rest of creation.11
The axiom of the Unity and Oneness of the Creation requires one to
believe that all creation has only one omniscient and omnipresent Creator
and that all His creation constitutes a unity as well. The Qur’an calls atten-
tion to the fact that despite all apparent multiplicity, human beings are
fundamentally of one kind; they were created as one being (nafs) and will
ultimately return to Allah (swt) as one (nafs) as well.12 In a series of verses,
the Qur’an exhorts humans to take collective and unified social action as
well as to preserve and protect the collectivity from all elements of
disunity.13 These and many other verses order human beings to work hard
toward social unity and cohesion, construct their societies, and preserve
and defend that unity. Unity and social cohesion are so central among the
objectives of the Qur’an for mankind that it can be argued that all con-
ducts prohibited by Islam are those that ultimately lead to disunity and
social disintegration. Conversely, all righteous conducts prescribed by
Islam are those that lead to social integration, cohesiveness and unity. As
a result, Islam is not only a call to individuals but also to the collectivity
and has given the latter an independent personality and identity, which
will be judged on its own merits or demerits separately from the individu-
als that constitute the collectivity. The final judgment on individual actions
will have two dimensions, one as the individual and the other as a member
of the collectivity.
11
“O mankind! We created from you from a single (pair) of a male and a female, and made
you into nations and tribes, that you may know each other…” (Qur’an 49:13).
“All mankind is from Adam and Eve, an Arab has no superiority over a non-Arab nor a
non-Arab has any superiority over an Arab; also a white has no superiority over black nor a
black has any superiority over white except by piety and good action.” Prophet’s last sermon.
http://www.islamicity.com/Mosque/lastserm.htm
12
See Qur’an (31:28), “Neither your creation nor your resurrection is possible other than
as one united nafs.”
13
Select verses emphasizing the principle of unity are:
“And indeed this is my straight path therefore follow it — and do not follow other
ways because that will lead to disunity amongst you” (6:153) “Grab hold of the rope
of Allah collectively and do not disunite.” (3:103)
“Cooperate with one another unto righteousness and piety and do not cooperate with
one another unto unrighteousness and enmity.” (5:2)
One implication of the virtue of embracing the unity of creation and

mankind is that it establishes the relationship of brotherhood or sister-
hood and equality among communities and societies irrespective of their
belief system. In this sense, unity is a coin with two faces: one implies that
God is the sole creator of the universe and the other implies that people
are equal partners or that each person is a brother or sister to the other.
Adoption of this virtue has far reaching implications for business ethics
such cooperation, solidarity, and equality of effort and opportunity.14
3.2 Being Just and Striving for Justice

Justice15 in Islam is a multifaceted concept, and several words or terms
exist for each aspect. The most common word in use, which refers to the
overall concept of justice, is adl. This word and its many synonyms imply
the concepts of “right,” as an equivalent of “fairness,” “putting things in
their right place,” “equality,” “equalizing,” “balance,” “temperance,” and
“moderation.” These latter concepts are more precisely expressed as the
principle of the “golden mean,” according to which believers are not only
individually urged to act in conformity with this principle, but also the
community is called upon, by the Qur’an, to be a “nation in the middle.”16
Thus, justice in Islam is the aggregation of moral and social values, which
denotes fairness, balance, and temperance. Its implication for individual
behavior is, first of all, that the individual should not transgress his bounds
and, secondly, that one should give others, as well as oneself, what is due.
14
Rice (1999).
15
Select verses from the Qur’an on justice are:
“…stand out firmly for justice, as witnesses to God, even against yourselves, or your
parents, or your kin, and whether it be (against) rich and poor”. (52:21)
“O you who have attained to faith! Be ever steadfast in your devotion to God, bearing
witness to the truth in all equity; and never let hatred of any-one lead you into the sin
of deviating from JUSTICE. Be just: this is closest to being God-conscious. And
remain conscious of God: verily, God is aware of all that you do”.(5:8)
“O you who have attained to faith! Be ever steadfast in upholding equity, bearing
witness to the truth for the sake of God, even though it be against your own selves or
your parents and kinsfolk. Whether the person concerned be rich or poor, God’s
claim takes precedence over [the claims of] either of them. Do not, then, follow your
own desires, lest you swerve from justice: for if you distort [the truth], behold, God
is indeed aware of all that you do!”. (4:135)
16
Qur’an (2:143).
3.2 BEING JUST AND STRIVING FOR JUSTICE 67
It is through the scaffolding of that the raison d’etre of the rules

overning the economic behavior of the individual and economic institu-
g
tions in Islam can be understood. What gives the behavior of a believer its
orientation, meaning, and effectiveness is acting with the knowledge that
justice evokes Allah’s (swt) pleasure; and injustice, His displeasure.
Whereas justice in Western thought is a quality of the behavior of one
individual in relation to another and his actions can be perceived as unjust
only in relation to the “other,” in Islam it has implications and conse-
quences for the first individual as well. That is, even when one does injus-
tice to someone else, there is always reciprocity, in that through injustice
to others, ultimately, one also does injustice to oneself.
A just economy is part of a just, healthy, and moral society, which is the
central objective of Islam for the human collectivity. What underpins all
the rules of behavior prescribed by Islam is its conception of justice, which
maintains that all behavior, irrespective of its content and context, must,
in its conception and commission, be based on just standards as defined by
the Shari’ah. Islam considers an economy, in which the behavior of its
agents is so conceived, as an enterprising, purposeful, prosperous, and
sharing economy in which all members of society receive their just rewards.
Such an economy is envisioned as one in which economic disparities that
lead to social segmentation and divisiveness are conspicuously absent.
The economic justice that is envisaged in Islam does not call for equal
incomes and wealth. The focus of economic justice is not solely placed on
the outcome. Again, if Allah (swt) had wanted this He would have so
designed His Creation. Instead, the focus of justice is on the available
means and opportunities to all humankind.
Thus the central framework and operation of rules concerning eco-
nomic and social life is justice. The Prophet understood the essential
objective of his selection, appointment, and message to be to encourage
and insert justice in human societies, as emphasized in the Qur’an. The
Prophet taught the responsibility of the individual, the collectivity, and the
state. He particularly emphasized the equality of individuals before the
law, and that all rules that are incumbent on individuals and their collectiv-
ity must be more strictly observed by those in positions of authority.
Thence the famous saying attributed to him: “Authority may survive dis-
belief but not injustice.” In Islam economic justice is centered on afford-
ing all humans an equitable chance (the means) to flourish while affording
the disabled a dignified life and erasing poverty everywhere.
All humans should have the same (similar) opportunity and the freedom
to achieve their economic goals (a level playing field in education, health-
care, and basic nutrition) through hard work, while preserving the rights
(not to be confused with charity) of the disabled and less privileged. After
humans have worked and received their just rewards, then they must help
the less fortunate to eradicate poverty and avoid great disparities in wealth;
this is a test for humans to show their love for their Creator and His cre-
ation as contrasted with a love of fleeting wealth. Individuals as well as the
state should remove all roadblocks, importantly including oppression,
from the path of human development. Any injustice perpetrated by indi-
viduals against other humans and against the rest of creation is ultimately
an injustice to the self.17 Allah (swt) Loves justice; it is a central part of His
Universal Love. Humans must live a life that is just and must stand up to
and eradicate injustice wherever they find it.
As mentioned earlier, a central aim of Islam is to establish a just and
moral social order through human agency. This all-embracing desidera-
tum of the Islamic system is the ruling principle from which human
thought and behavior, the substantive and regulative rules of the Shari’ah,
the formation of the community, and the behavior of polity and of politi-
cal authority derive their meaning and legitimacy. It is this emphasis on
justice that distinguishes the Islamic system from all other systems.
3.3 Preservation of Rights

Ethics in Islam can be best understood in light of principles governing
the rights of the individual, society, and state; the laws governing prop-
erty ownership; and the framework of contracts. Islam’s recognition and
protection of rights is not limited to human beings only but encompasses
all forms of life as well as the environment. Each element of Allah’s (swt)
creation has been endowed with certain rights and each is obligated to
respect and honor the rights of others. These rights are bundled with the
responsibilities for which humans are held accountable. Scholars con-
sider that the human self or soul (nafs) has “rights” as well as many
duties and responsibilities. The basis of this is the fact that when a person
17
There is the Prophetic saying that on the Day of Reckoning the oppressor, the oppressed,
and the person(s) who stood by and observed the oppression will be called upon to answer:
the oppressor for oppression, the oppressed for not resisting the oppression, and the
bystander for not assisting the oppressed.
3.3 PRESERVATION OF RIGHTS 69
violates these rights he is said to have “wronged” (zulm) his/her soul.18

Shari’ah offers a comprehensive framework to identify, recognize, respect
and protect rights of every individual in creation, community, society,
and the state. Islamic scholars and jurists have defined and codified
detailed principles identifying these rights.19 The importance of being
conscious and mindful of the rights of others20 (including stakeholders—
human or nonhuman) and the significance of discharging the responsi-
bilities associated with such rights are reflected by the following saying of
the Prophet (saas)21:
So give to everyone who possesses a right his right. (kull dhi haqin haquhu)
The term right (haq) denotes something that can be justly claimed or
the interests and claims that people may have been granted by Shari’ah.
The majority of Shari’ah scholars and jurists hold that similar to a physical
property, rights are also property (al mal) because, like physical property
that has beneficial uses and is possessable, rights have beneficial uses and
are regarded as capable of being possessed.22 Rules defining the property
rights in Islam deal with the rights of ownership, acquisition, usage, and
disposition of the property. Any violation of these rules is considered a
transgression and leads to disruption in social order.
In Islam, contrary to popular opinion, self-interest is not negated.
Islam, in fact, considers it a primary factor in its incentive-motivation
system; a necessity in any organized society if the individual is to find it
18
See for example, verses 2:231 or 37:113 of the Qur’an.
19
Imam Zayn al-Abidin’s treatise on the rights, Risalat Al-Huquq covers a full spectrum
of rights in Islam. For example, the right of one’s property (al-mal) is that one takes it only
from what is lawful and spends it only on what is proper. The right of the associate is that one
neither misleads him, nor acts dishonestly toward him, nor deceives him. The right of the
adversary (Khasm) who has a claim against one is that, if his claim is valid, one gives witness
to it against oneself Ali ibn al-Husayn (1990).
20
See below verses condemning violating property and rights.
“Do not devour one another’s property wrongfully, nor throw it before the judges in
order to devour a portion of other’s property sinfully and knowingly.” (2:188)
“Do not devour another’s property wrongfully – unless it be by trade based on mutual
consent.” (4:29)
Ali Ibn al-Husayn (1990).

21
Islam (1999). The term mal or its derivatives have been mentioned in the Qur’an in
22
more than 90 verses and in numerous sayings of the Prophet (saas).

utility maximizing to follow behavioral virtues prescribed by the system.

Provided that self-interest is defined to cover spiritual and temporal or
temporary and eternal interests, there is not a single rule in the Shari’ah
that does not carry with it its own justification in terms of individual self-
interest. It is for his own benefit, material and spiritual, in this world and
for his ultimate salvation and felicity in the next, that the individual is
invited to follow the rules of the Shari’ah. This is made clear by the Qur’an
in which all injunctions are generally coupled with the assertion that inter-
nalization of prescribed virtues by the individual is for his/her own bene-
fit. Often the incentives and the rewards for compliance and the retribution
for noncompliance, both here and in the hereafter, are enumerated. It is in
the context of the pursuit of self-interest that individual obligations and
rights as well as the limits and accountabilities to these rights are specified
by the Shari’ah.
3.4 Sanctity of Contracts

Islam forcefully anchors all social-political-economic relations on con-
tracts. More generally, the whole fabric of the Divine Law is contractual in
its conceptualization, content, and application.23 In a direct, clear, and
unambiguous verse, al-Qur’an commands: “fulfill the Covenant of Allah”
(6:152). In an equally clear verse it generalizes this imperative to all con-
tracts: “fulfill all contracts” (al-Qur’an, 5:1). A believer will only take on
contractual obligations that he or she intends to fulfill.24 Believers are said
to protect their contractual obligations as a shepherd protects his sheep.25
Muslims are constantly reminded of the importance of contractual
agreements, as they are required by their faith to honor their contracts.26
23
See Mirakhor (1989). The sanctity of contracts’ very foundation is the Primordial
Covenant between the Creator and humans—the mῑthaq—which imposes an obligation to
comply with the rules prescribed by their Supreme Creator as its Cherisher Lord (Rabb). In
Islam, faithfulness to the terms of all contracts entered into is linked to the fulfillment of
obligations incurred under the Primordial Covenant. The rule of remaining faithful to the
discharge of contractual obligations derives its power and authority from the generalization
of the responsibility of remaining faithful to the Primordial Contract.
24
See al-Qur’an, (16: 91–92; 17:34).
25
See al-Qur’an (23:8). A tradition of the Prophet (sws) states that “the Muslims are
bound by their stipulations” (Abu Da’ud, No: 3120). Another tradition condemns promise-
breaking as the hallmark or trait of a hypocrite: “If he makes a promise, he breaks it, and if
he makes a compact, he acts treacherously” (Bukhari, No: 32).
26
See, for example, al-Qu’ran (5:1; 2:282; 6:151,153; 9:4; 16:91–4; 17:34–6; 23:8).
3.4 SANCTITY OF CONTRACTS 71
As directed in al-Qur’an, Muslims put their contracts in writing in order

to reduce the possibility of any misunderstanding or ambiguity concern-
ing the responsibilities of the parties to the contract. Shari’ah scholars
often point out that one of the reasons why the Islamic system of
mu’āmalāt (transactions) is so highly articulated is that it is based on
solid principles of contracts and the rights and obligations of the parties
to the contract.27
In Sharῑa’h, the concepts of justice, faithfulness, reward, and punish-
ment are linked with the fulfillment of obligations incurred under the
stipulations of the contract. Justice links man to Allah (swt) and to his
fellow men. It is this bond that forms the contractual foundation of the
Sharῑa’h, which judges the virtue of justice in man not only by his mate-
rial performance but also by the essential attribute of his intention
(niyyah) with which he enters into every contract. This intention consists
of sincerity, truthfulness, and insistence on rigorous and loyal fulfillment
of what he has consented to do (or not to do). This faithfulness to con-
tractual obligations is so central to Islamic belief that the Prophet (saws)
defined a believer as the person from whom the people’s lives and posses-
sions are safe.28 He is also reported to have said that a person who is not
trustworthy has no faith, and a person who does not keep one’s word
(‘ahd) has no religion.29 So basic is the notion of contracts in Islam that
every public office is regarded, primarily, as a contract and an agreement
that defines the rights and obligations of the parties. The highest tempo-
ral office, that of khal ῑfah, is inaugurated by mubāya’ah, which is a con-
tract between the ruler and the community that he will be faithful in
discharging of his duties.
Preserving the sanctity of contracts and accountability to one’s com-
mitment to a contractual agreement is a key character trait and virtue.
27
In order to safeguard the interests of both the buyer and the seller, it is desirable, accord-
ing to the Islamic teachings, to clearly define all the necessary details concerning the business
deal. Each business contract should clearly specify the quality, the quantity, and the price of
the commodity in question. Thus, in a business contract, the offer and acceptance should be
made between the parties concerned on a commodity which is with the buyer and which he
is able to deliver. Any commodity that is nonexistent or not deliverable is not allowed to be
transacted. A contract must be explicit with regard to the rights and obligations of the parties
concerned so that it does not lead to disputes and disagreements between them.
28
Reference is made here to hadith from as-Sunnah of the Prophet (saws) as narrated in
Sunan an-Nasaa’i in the book on faith and its signs.
29
Reference is made to hadith in the musnad of Imam Ahmad ibn hanbal.
Having right and clear intention before entering the contract is a critical
determinant of the ethics of a contractual agreement. The contract may
meet legal requirements and be considered a valid contract but if the
intention, the means, or the outcome is in conflict with core objectives of
Sharῑa’h, the contract would be questionable on ethical grounds.
Kamali (2011) highlights the importance of the objective (maqṣad) of
a contract that is an integral part of the ethics of that contract. He empha-
sizes that “for any stipulations that amount to a distortion of the maqṣad
or purpose of a contract is likely to vitiate the contract in question. To
distort the sharı̄ʿah-ordained purpose (maqṣad) of a contract through
questionable stipulations, and worse still, through recourse to legal tricks
and stratagems (ḥiyal) becomes problematic, and if allowed unchecked
would naturally affect the ethical propriety of the contract in question.”
3.5 Truthfulness and Integrity

Being truthful and keeping one’s word are the core traits of a true human
being. This is further emphasized when a trader or a businessman is truth-
ful in his/her dealings.30 A true believer or Mu’min is expected to be hon-
est in dealings, has strong commitment to his or her word, and speaks
truth. The ultimate case of commitment to truthfulness is that one is
expected to be truthful while giving evidence, even if it is against him or
herself. An honest and truthful trader is given tidings of blessings from the
Creator while in absence of these traits, the transaction would be devoid
of any blessing.31 Truthfulness or transparency also enhances trust between
the parties and in the market and in all fairness, each party expects full
transparency and disclosure regarding the transaction.
Integrity is another key virtue that is highly appreciated in Islam. The
Prophet (saas) was known to be a truthful and trustworthy person who
always kept his word. Given the status of the Prophet (saas) as the arche-
type and a role model, each Muslim is expected to maintain truthfulness
30
A well-known saying of the Prophet is that “the truthful merchant [is rewarded by being
ranked] on the Day of Resurrection with prophets, veracious souls, martyrs and pious peo-
ple” (Tirmidhi, No: 1130).
31
The Prophet (saas) has also exhorted the believers to strictly adhere to truthfulness in
business transactions. He said, “if both the parties (seller and buyer) spoke the truth and
described the defects and qualities [of the goods], then they would be blessed in their trans-
action, and if they told lies or hid something, then the blessings of their transaction would be
lost” (Bukhari, No: 1937).
3.6 TRUSTWORTHINESS 73
and integrity. Integrity of a person or entity indicates that the person or

the entity is truthful, honest, and honors his or her word, which implies
that such person or entity is most likely to fulfill their commitments and
promises in full and in timely fashion. Honoring your word means that
you are honest and are not hiding any relevant information, and there is
no element of deception or any violation of contracts or property rights.
Integrity is important to individuals, groups, organizations, and society
because it develops valuable social capital of trust in the society. Such
behavior as an employee or as the manager or leader of an organization
would lead to the integrity of the entity, which is trusted by all economic
agents and therefore, achieves higher efficiency and performance.
3.6 Trustworthiness
Islam places a strong emphasis on trust and considers being trustworthy as
an obligatory personality trait. At a philosophical level, the role of man on
earth is to act as vicegerent or trustee of the Creator. The root of the word
for “trust” (amānah) is the same as that for “belief” (ῑmān), for al-Qur’an
insists that a strong signal of true belief is faithfulness to contracts and
promises. It makes clear that performing contractual obligations or prom-
ises is an important and mandatory characteristic of a true believer.32
The life of the Prophet (saws) is a shining illustration of the implemen-
tation of the guidance of Allah (swt) in maintaining trust and remaining
trustworthy. Regarded as eminently trustworthy even before his divine
appointment (the community conferred upon him the title of Al-Ameen—
“Trustworthy”), the Prophet (saws) expended a great deal of effort in
modifying when possible and changing when necessary the behavior of
the community in respect of trustworthiness. Numerous statements,
actions, and circumstances are attributed to him in which trust was the
preeminent concern.
Contract and trust are interdependent. Without trust, contracts
become difficult to negotiate and conclude and costly to monitor and
enforce. When trust is weak, complex and expensive administrative
devices are needed to enforce contracts. Both al-Qur’an and the tradi-
tion of the Messenger (saws) stress the importance of trustworthiness as
32
There are various verses on the virtue of being trustful. For example, al-Qur’an (8:27) states
“O you believers! Do not betray Allah and the Messenger, nor knowingly, betray your trusts.”
Also, see, al-Qur’an (2:58; 2:283; 12: 52; 23:1–8; and 42:107, 125, 143, 162, 178, 193).
the benchmark that separates belief from disbelief.33 Trustworthiness

and remaining faithful to promises and contracts are absolute, regardless
of the costs involved or whether the other party is a friend or a foe.34
There is also a network of micro-level rules that ensure transparency and
the unhindered flow of information. This includes the requirement
incumbent upon sellers that they must inform the buyers of prices,
quantities, and qualities; a body of rules governing the consumer’s
option to, under various circumstances, annul a transaction; the rule of
noninterference with market supplies; the rule against hoarding; and the
rule against collusion among market participants.
Problems are exacerbated when, in addition to lack of trust, property
rights are poorly defined and protected (Sheng 2009). Under these cir-
cumstances, it becomes difficult to specify clearly the terms of contract
since transaction costs—that is, search and information costs, bargaining
and decision costs, contract negotiations and enforcement costs—are
high. Consequently, there is less trade, fewer market participants, less
long-term investment, lower productivity, and slower economic growth.
Weakness of trust creates the problem of lack of credible commitment
which arises when parties to an exchange cannot commit themselves or do
not trust that others can commit themselves to performing contractual
obligations. Empirical research has shown that where the problem of lack
of commitment exists and is significant, it leads to disruption in economic,
political, and social interaction among people. Considering these issues,
one can appreciate the strong emphasis that the Qur’an as well as the
Prophet (saas) has placed on trust, trustworthiness (see Verse 27, Chapter
8 and 57:4), and on the need to fulfill terms and conditions of contracts,
covenants, and promises one makes. These rules solve the problem of
credible commitment and trust, thus facilitate long-term contracts. To
illustrate the importance of trust, consider the role of complete contracts
in the neoclassical theory of competitive equilibrium (Arrow 1971). A
complete contract fully specifies all future contingencies relevant to the
exchange. In the real world a vast majority of contracts are incomplete.
This requirement, therefore, is considered too stringent and unrealistic.
Not only ignorance about all future contingencies make writing complete
contracts impossible, even if all future contingencies are known, it would
33
See al-Qur’an 2:282; 4:105, 107–08; 6:152; 8:127 and 75–6.
34
See al-Qur’an 9:4.
3.7 GOODNESS AND EXCELLENCE (IHSĀN) 75
be nearly impossible to write a contract that can accommodate them all.

However, if the parties to a contract trust each other, they can agree to
enter into a simple contract and commit to revising its terms and condi-
tions as contingencies arise.
3.7 Goodness and Excellence (Ihsān)

The virtue of Ihsān, meaning benevolence, goodness, and excellence, is
recognized in the Qur’an as well as in the sayings of the Prophet.35 The
concept of Ihsān is the embodiment of goodness and excellence in interac-
tion and conduct at the personal, organizational, and societal levels. As a
projection of goodness, it practically and spiritually encompasses mercy,
justice, forgiveness, tolerance, and attentiveness. The concept of Ihsān is
much broader that simply being good to others but includes striving for
excellence in goodness so much so that one is willing to go beyond what
may be expected under norms to achieve the welfare of fellow humans, the
community, or the society.
Ihsān goes beyond legal and social requirements to include welfare of
others even if it is at the cost of personal sacrifice, and therefore it is a
necessary element to develop good intentions and virtues as prerequisite
for ethical actions. In absence of societal welfare and a disposition toward
goodness, neither good intentions nor virtues could be cultivated. The
virtue of goodness in an attempt to advance public interest, i.e. advocating
good and denouncing wrong, defines a code of conduct that exceeds what
is expected by law or the existing market ethos.36
Striving for excellence in doing good or performing a task is another
aspect of Ihsān that is suggested by a saying of the Prophet: “God likes
that when someone does anything, it must be done perfectly well.”37 This
has implications for work ethics in Islam.
35
In a famous saying of the Prophet also known as hadith of Ihsān, when asked “what is
goodness?”, He replied: “that you worship God as if you see Him, for if you see Him not,
surely He sees you” (Rahman 1996).
36
Ali (2014).
37
Sayings of Muhammad (Sallam and Hanafy 1988). Reported by Badawai (2013).
“Allah (swt) has ordained excellence in everything….”
“Allah (swt) loves, when one of you is doing something, that he/she do it in the most
excellent manner.”
3.8 Compassion and Generosity

Compassion (rahma) is a virtue that is greatly desired and admired.
Compassion is stressed in the Qur’an as the basic attribute of God and all
humans are expected to practice and exhibit it. Compassion calls for
showing mercy, kindness, and passion toward others in all economic and
social matters. One application of compassion is leniency in economic
transactions in case of hardship and feeling the pain and suffering of the
others.38 Leniency is especially encouraged with respect to debtors who
are in difficult conditions provided that they made sincere efforts to meet
their obligations.39
Generosity is a virtue that calls for giving someone’s due right beyond
normal expectations and sharing one’s time, wealth, and knowledge with
others.40 Generosity can take several forms such as generosity toward oth-
ers in redeeming their rights or generosity in voluntary social welfare con-
tributions or not taking advantage of customers. Virtues of compassion
and generosity play an important role in strengthening social bonds among
humans and bringing humans closer.
3.9 Prudence and Humility41

The role of man as vicegerent (khilāfah) of the Creator carries very heavy
responsibility to act with prudence because any violation of this trust
itself would be unethical. This responsibility demands prudent manage-
ment of an organization’s or a country’s as well as earth’s resources; care
and concern for animals; and protection of the natural environment.42
Utilization of resources whether scarce or abundant, requires careful
38
The Prophet is reported as saying, “May Allah’s (swt) mercy be on him who is lenient in
his buying, selling, and in demanding back his money [or debts]” (Bukhari, No: 1934).
39
Kamali (2011). The Prophet (saas) said, “Truly the best of people are those who are best
and most courteous in their demand for repayment.” He takes a strong position that for
those who take unfair advantage and procrastinate in their repayment of obligations, their
conduct is tantamount to oppression (ẓulm) that falls outside the scope of lenient
treatment.
40
The Prophet is reported saying, “Allah (swt) is generous, He loves generosity; He is
noble, He loves nobility” (al-Tirmidhi), and “the best amongst you is he who repays the
rights of others handsomely” (Bukhari, Vol 3, Book 038, No. 502).
41
Qur’an (4:36–37) “God loves not the arrogant, the vainglorious (nor) who are nig-
gardly, enjoin niggardliness on others…”
42
Kamali (2011).
3.9 PRUDENCE AND HUMILITY 77
management keeping in mind the well-being of the community and the

society. No one is authorized to destroy or waste God-given resources.43
Wasting of resources is strongly condemned in Islam. Several externalities
including sustainable development could follow if the vice of wasting
resources is overcome.
Whereas wasting resources is condemned, having excessive control on
resources and not spending or utilizing for good causes is equally con-
demned.44 Islam calls for moderation and to have a balance in social and
economic dealings. Prudency calls for restoring balance in managing and
utilizing resources to optimize the benefit and welfare for all. Prudence is
an essential virtue for those who are in the position of leadership or
management.
Islam links piousness with nobility and the highest form of an individual
character that appears as a role model for others. Character and personality
of a manager or leader would be expected to be above others as a role
model, as well as someone whom employees could trust and has integrity.
A manager’s approach to decision-making, solving problems, resolving
conflicts, and leading the objectives of the organization should reflect the
virtues he/she follows. A manager will not only have the responsibility of
doing the task well but also of ensuring that the actions of his team and
the organization lead to ethical outcomes.
Humility is a valuable virtue considering that a person should be fully
conscious of the state of humans with respect to the Creator. Being hum-
ble is appreciated and arrogance is considered the worst of vices. Arrogance
is particularly disliked due to it being the root cause of many other evils.
Spiritually, arrogance signifies man’s claim of having better knowledge
than the Creator and therefore, developing a sense of over-confidence
and superiority with respect to other humans. History is witness to the
destruction of civilizations or leaders due to arrogance.
43
Rice (1999). She gives the example of the 1st Caliph after the Prophet, Abu Bakr, who
instructed not to kill indiscriminately or to destroy vegetation or animal life, even in war and
on enemy territory, as an example of high ethical standards and the virtue of protecting the
environment. She argued that if these were the standards in wartime, there would be no
question of any waster or destruction during the time of peace.
44
Qur’an (6:141) “…and do not waste [God’s bounties]: verily, He does not love the
wasteful.”
Qur’an (7:31) “O children of Adam! Beautify yourselves for every act of worship, and eat
and drink [freely], but do not waste: verily, He does not love the wasteful.”
Qur’an (25:67) “…and who, whenever they spend on others, are neither wasteful nor nig-
gardly but [remember that] there is always a just mean between those [two extremes].”
Prudency calls for showing humility in making short-term and

long-term decisions and being conscious of one’s limitations and of its
potential impact on other humans and the society. Since there is a very
strong concept of accountability to the Creator of one’s acts, one needs
to be conscious of the consequences of the acts individually, and strive
for developing a culture of the organization that encourages humility.
3.10 Honesty in Business Transaction

The virtue of being honest in business transactions is the very basic char-
acter trait of a believer. The Qur’an binds faith and action through righ-
teous deeds as inseparable. The Prophet (saas) explicitly declared honesty
an article of faith as he said that there is no faith for one who lacks hones-
ty.45 Honesty does not only come from being truthful but requires avoid-
ance of vices for worldly gains. There are several vices that are discouraged
greatly when one is engaged in business transactions. Examples of such
vices are purposefully deceiving others, engaging in cheating and fraud,
and willfully holding or manipulating information pertaining to the trans-
action. One full chapter of the Qur’an is dedicated to manipulating weights
and measures, and giving short-measures such as the act of giving short-
measures while demanding full measures from others. The chapter empha-
sizes the grave consequences of such behavior.46 The Qur’an also makes
reference to the community of the Prophet Shu‘ayb (sws), which was
known for engaging in deceitful business practices, especially the manipu-
lation of weights. Consequently, the community was destroyed for its per-
sistence in deceit.
Therefore, honesty in business transactions has to be the core virtue of
any business person.
45
Badawi (2013).
46
Qur’an (83:1–3) “Woe to those that deal in fraud. Those who, when they have to receive
by measure from men, exact full measure, but when they have to give by measure or weight
to men, give less than due.”
Qur’an ((17:35) “And give full measure when you measure, and weigh with a just balance.
That is good and better in the end.”
The Prophet (saas) is reported to have said: “if both the parties (buyer and seller) have
spoken the truth and described the defects as well as the merits thereof (the goods), they
would be blessed in their deal. If they have told lies or concealed something, then blessings
of their transaction would be lost.” (Bukhari, No: 1937)
REFERENCES 79
3.11 Cooperation and Solidarity

Islam seeks to guide man to direct individual action and responsible
participation in economic affairs in a manner that commits him to com-
munity solidarity and cooperation, resulting in a dynamic and growing
economy. Thus, the individual is made accountable for the moral effects
of his social actions, including those in economic affairs, so that his own
inner personal- spiritual transformation and growth is bound to the
progress of the community.
Hence, Islam utilizes cooperation and competition in structuring the
ideal society through harmonization and reconciliation between these
two opposite, but equally primeval and useful forces at every level of
social organization. From this perspective, one can argue that one of the
greatest distinguishing characteristics of Islam is its forceful emphasis on
the integration of human society as a necessary consequence of the unity
of Allah (swt). To this end, the personality of the Prophet (saas) is insep-
arable from what the Qur’an considers as the optimal approach neces-
sary for the emergence of solidarity in human society. Every dimension
of the personality of the Prophet (saas), manifested in his various social
roles in the community, is directed toward maximum integration and
harmony in the society. Moreover, every rule of behavior, including
those in the economic area, is designed to aid the process of integration.
Conversely, all prohibited practices are those, which, one way or another,
lead to social disintegration.
References
Ali ibn al-Husayn, Imam Zayn al-Abidin. 1990. Trans. Risalat Al-Huquq, William
C. Chittick. The Treatise on Rights. Qom: Foundation of Islamic Cultural
Propagation in the World.
Arrow, K.J. 1971. Essays in the Theory of Risk-Bearing. Chicago: Markham
Publishing Company.
Badawi, Jamal. 2013. Islamic Business Ethics. Fiqh Council of North America.
http://www.fiqhcouncil.org/node/17
Islam, Muhammad W. 1999. Al-Mal: The Concept of Property in Islamic Legal
Thought. Arab Law Quarterly 14 (4): pp. 361–368.
Kamali, Mohammad Hashim. 2011. Ethics and Finance: Perspectives of the Sharı̄ʿah
and Its Higher Objectives (Maqāsị d). 8th Kuala Lumpur Islamic Finance Forum
(KLIFF). 3–6 October 2011.
Mirakhor, Abbas. 1989. General Characteristics of an Islamic Economic System.

In Essays on Iqtisad: The Islamic Approach to Economic Problems, ed. Baqir
Al-Hasani and Abbass Mirakhor, 45–80. Silver Spring: Nur Corp.
Rahman, A.R. 1996. Administrative Responsibility: An Islamic Perspective.
American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences 3 (4): 497–517.
Rice, Gillian. 1999. Islamic Ethics and the Implications for Business. Journal of
Business Ethics 18: 345–358.
Sallam, H., and A. A. Hanafy. 1988. Employee and Employer: Islamic Perception.
Proceedings of the Seminar on Islamic Principles of Organizational Behavior.
Herndon: International Institute of Islamic Thought.
Sheng, Andrew. 2009. From Asian to Global Financial Crisis. Cambridge, UK:
Cambridge University. http://csinvesting.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/08/
financial-crisis-from-asian-to-global-2009.pdf
Zilio-Grandi, Ida. 2015. What God Loves: The Qur’an and Islamic Ethics
Proceedings. QLAMA: The Qur’an Between Late Antiquity and Middle Ages:
Form, Structure, Comparative Studies, QLAMA, Siena May 22, 2015, in corso
di stampa.
CHAPTER 4
Business Ethics in Islam
Discussion on business ethics in Islam is not new; it has been dealt with
extensively since the early history of Islam. Significant discussion and anal-
ysis of the positions of the Qur’an and the Sunnah on morality and ethics
were provided by the 4th Caliph Imam Ali (AS) in his book, Nahjul
Balaghah, and by his grandson, Imam Zayn al-’Abedin (AS) in his book,
Risalah al-Huquq (Treatise on Rights), which also included the Risalah
Al Huquq (Treaties on Rights) covering moral and ethical behavior toward
others according to the Qur’an and Sunnah.1 Another important early
work on morality and ethics in Islam is by Abu Ali ibn Mohammad ibn
Ya’qub Miskawayh (born 320 AH, died 421). His work is considered to
have influenced the thinking of leading thinkers such as Al-Ghazali and
Nasiruddin Tusi on this topic.
Subsequently, the discussion mainly took place while developing prin-
ciples underlying legal axioms. For example, scholars such as Al-Ghazālı̄
(2005) dealt with the ethics of earning and living as he dedicated one full
chapter in his classical work Iḥyā’ ‘Ulūm al-Dı̄n (Revival of Islamic
Sciences).2 He identifies virtues of justice, truthfulness, and benevolence
1
See Ali Ibn Abu Talib (1973, 1988) and Zayn Al’Abidin (1988). More recently Lakhani
(2006) presented the concept of justice in light of the teaching by Imam Ali (AS).
2
He dedicated a chapter on the ethics of earning and living (Kitāb al-Ā dāb al-Kasb wa
al-Ma‘āsh), which precedes the chapter on lawful and unlawful matters (Kitāb al-Ḥ alāl wa
al-Ḥ aram). Musa (2015).

DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-66390-6_4
82 4 BUSINESS ETHICS IN ISLAM
as the main ethical values that must be internalized by agents in any

business transactions. Similar work has been carried out throughout the
history of Islam as ethics has always been considered as an integral part of
Islamic teachings and Law.3 With deteriorating values and ethics globally,
particularly in the financial markets and institutions, and the growing pres-
ence of Islamic finance, there is renewed interest in the ethics driven by
religious principles. Recently, efforts have been made to partner with other
religious groups to bring back ethics in business.4
The previous chapter discussed core virtues and character traits desir-
able in a human being in the Islamic perspective. These virtues lay the
foundation of defining business ethics, and the internalization and actual
realization of these virtues in day-to-day social and economic matters
would ensure that decisions and actions taken lead to ethical practices. For
example, internalization of core virtues such as the realization of the unity
of creation, justice, and protection of rights would lead to ethical business
practices in all cycles of business starting from production to consumption
to distribution. In addition, core virtues would determine market conduct
rules to promote transparent and just markets void of malpractices.
This chapter expands the application of virtues to business ethics and
develops a framework of ethical business that has universal appeal and could
address prevalent ethical challenges in economic and financial markets as
highlighted in earlier chapters.
4.1 Market Conduct5

In the realm of conventional economics, reliance on markets is an ideol-
ogy to some economists; this is not so in Islam. This is because markets
and competition do not by themselves guarantee that social and economic
justices will be served. In Islam, markets are seen as affording the best
3
Al-Nabahānı̄ (1990) collected verses of the Qur’ān, Prophetic Traditions and sayings of
scholars, which he felt should be given attention by those involved in business, in his treatise
that serves as a simple reference for those who would like narrations on ethical issues related
to business.
4
Prince Philip of Great Britain and Prince Hassan bin Talal of Jordan initiated consulta-
tions in 1984 with the objective to produce a common inter-religious (between Abrahamic/
monotheist faiths; Judaism, Christianity, and Islam) declaration on ethics in international
business (Dion 2002). As a result, in 1993 a Code of Ethics in International Business for
Christians, Muslims, and Jews was finalized in Amman, Jordan.
5
See Mirakhor (1989) and Askari et al. (2015).
4.1 MARKET CONDUCT 83
signaling mechanism to producers and consumers and thus the most

efficient intermediary for resource allocation, economic production, dis-
tribution, and consumption. Therefore, markets are encouraged. Even
then, markets must have rules that are just and insure their proper opera-
tion, and they must be supervised to guarantee that rules are followed and
enforced. While these rules and their supervision and enforcement are
seen as sufficient in the workings of the conventional market system, it is
not so in Islam. In Islam, market participants, both buyers and sellers,
must embrace a code of morality before they enter the market. Under such
a system, the price that emerges from markets can be considered “just” in
the sense that it is the result of proper functioning markets that are based
on just rules that are followed and enforced and with market participants
who are moral in their behavior. In the absence of morality and moral
behavior by all market participants, markets can result in allocations that
are socially unjust and even perverse—gross income inequities, opulence
alongside poverty, excessive consumption and little savings, hoarding, and
the like. Thus, markets left alone may not fulfill human material needs and
are also not equipped to address human spiritual needs.
Islam’s emphasis on moral and just conduct in the marketplace is
remarkable in its vigor. A producer or a businessman whose behavior
complies with Islamic rules is said to be like the prophets, martyrs, and
the truthful friends of Allah (swt). He is ranked with the prophets
because he, like the prophets, follows the path of justice; like martyrs
because they both fight with heavy odds in the path of honesty and vir-
tue; and like the truthful because both are steadfast in their resolves. It
asks participants to go beyond the rules of the Sharῑa’h and extend
beneficence to one another as a safeguard against injustice. Beneficence
implies helping others in ways not required by justice. It is thus different
from justice, which prescribes just limits to selfishness. While justice reg-
ulates and limits selfishness, beneficence rises above it. Moreover, par-
ticipants in the market are not only responsible for their own just
behavior, but because of the obligation of “enjoining the good and for-
bidding the evil” (Qur’an 3:104), they are also made responsible for the
behavior of their fellow participants. Islam maintains that if a man sees
another committing an injustice toward a third party and fails to attempt
to remove that injustice, he becomes a party to that injustice. If the per-
son failing to help is himself a beneficiary of this injustice, then his failure
is considered tantamount to supporting it. Although provisions are
made for coercive and corrective action by legitimate authorities, the
clear preference is for self-management of the market. Any interference

in the operations of such a market—through price controls, for example—
is considered unjust, and represents a transgression and sin.
It was in response to the rules of market behavior imposed by Islamic
tenets and laws that Muslims early in their history structured their markets
in the form of bazaars, which looked almost the same all over the Muslim
world and possessed characteristics that promoted compliance with the
rules. Physically, bazaars were structured to guarantee maximum compli-
ance with these rules. Each physical segment of the market was specialized
with respect to specific products, and the prices showed little variation
from one part of the market to the next. The institution of guilds made
self-regulation of each profession and trade possible. Additionally, markets
were inspected for compliance by a market supervisor (muhtasib) who was
appointed by local judges. Unfortunately, the institution of bazaars did
not have the opportunity to evolve to meet the requirements of an expand-
ing economy or the growing complexity in economic relations. The
bazaars that still exist in many parts of the Muslim world, while maintain-
ing their underdeveloped physical and infrastructural nature—most are
centuries-old and have not been expanded—lack many of the Islamic char-
acteristics and requirements in their operations.
The market’s institutional structure is built around five virtues: (a) pro-
tection of property rights; (b) free flow of information or transparency;
(c) trust; (d) commitments to contracts; and (e) the right not to be harmed
by others and the obligation not to harm anyone. Together, these virtues
serve to reduce uncertainty and transaction costs and to enable coopera-
tion and collective action to proceed unhindered.
Before the advent of Islam, trade had been the most important eco-
nomic activity of the Arabian Peninsula. A number of thriving markets
had developed throughout the area. Upon his arrival in Medina, the
Prophet organized a market that was structured and governed by rules
based on the Qur’an. He implemented a number of policies to encour-
age the expansion of trade and the market. The Prophet (saas) prohib-
ited the imposition of taxes on individual merchants as well as on
transactions. He also implemented policies to encourage trade among
Muslims and non-Muslims by creating incentives for non-Muslim mer-
chants in and outside of Medina. After the conquest of Mecca and the
rest of Arabia, these and other market rules were institutionalized and
generalized to all markets. These rules included, in addition to those
mentioned above:
4.1 MARKET CONDUCT 85
• No restrictions on international or interregional trade (including no

taxation of imports and exports)
• Free spatial movement of resources, goods, and services from one
market to another
• No barriers to market entry and exit
• Free and transparent information regarding the price, quality, and
quantity of goods, particularly in the case of spot trade
• Specification of the exact date for the completion of trade in instances
when trade was to take place over time
• Specification of the property and other rights of all participants in
every contract
• Guaranteed contract enforcement by the state and its legal apparatus
• The prohibition against hoarding commodities and productive
resources for the purpose of pushing up their price
• Prohibition on price controls
• A ban on sellers or buyers harming the interests of other market par-
ticipants by, for example, allowing a third party to interrupt negotia-
tions between two parties in order to influence the negotiations to
the benefit of one of the parties
• A ban on the shortchanging of buyers by, for example, not giving full
weight and measure
Moreover, sellers and buyers were given the right of annulment of a

business agreement in these seven instances:
• Before leaving the location in which it was taking place.

• In the case of a buyer who had not seen the commodity and after
seeing it found it unacceptable.
• If either the seller or the buyer discovered that the product had either
been sold for less than, or bought for higher than, it was worth.
• If the buyer discovered that the quality of the product was not as
expected.
• If side conditions were specified during the negotiations that were
left unfulfilled.
• If a delivery period was specified but the product was not delivered
on time.
• If the subject of the negotiations were pack animals, the buyer had
the right to return the animal up to three days after the deal was
finalized.
The moral-ethical foundation of market behavior prescribed by the

Qur’an and implemented by the Prophet (saas) ensured the minimization
of risk and of uncertainty for market participants and increased the effi-
ciency of exchange. Its aim was to reduce transaction costs. Moreover,
rules specified in the Qur’an regarding faith to the terms of contracts and
the knowledge of their enforcement increased certainty and reduced
transaction costs. Another important rule promulgated by the Prophet
(saas) was the prohibition of interference with supply before entrance
into the market. From the earliest period of operation of the Medina
market, the Prophet (saas) appointed market supervisors, whose job was
to ensure rule compliance, which in turn would result in markets that
were just. The Prophet (saas) advised the participants to go beyond mere
rule compliance and to treat their fellow humans with beneficence. The
Prophet (saas) strongly encouraged market participants to accept the
duty of “commanding the good and forbidding evil” by engaging in
self-regulation.
4.2 Work and Work Ethics6

The concept of work (al-amal) in Islam is far broader, and has different
characteristics and objectives, than the concept as it is understood in the
Western economic tradition. In Islam, the work ethic is defined by the
Qur’an itself, which stresses the need for work and action by human
beings.7 Nasr (2011) articulates the following moral and ethical dimen-
sions of the concept of work in Islam:
(a) Work is tightly coupled with human action and the ethical consid-
erations of Islam.
(b) The basis of all work ethics in Islam is to be found in the inescap-
able moral character of all human action and the responsibility that
6
Possumah et al. (2013) provides useful background reference reading on work ethics
in Islam.
7
See Nasr (2011) for the philosophical underpinning of the concept of work in Islam. For
example, he maintains that the term “work” (al-amal) in Arabic is not distinguished from
the word “action” in its most general sense and is treated by Shari’ah under the same cate-
gory. In fact, if one were to look for the translation of the word “work” in an English-Arabic
dictionary, one would usually find the two terms “amal” and “sun” given as its equivalents.
The first of these terms means “action” in general as contrasted with “knowledge” and the
second “making” or “producing” something in the artistic and artisanal sense of the word.
4.2 WORK AND WORK ETHICS 87
a human being bears for his or her actions, not only before the
employer or employee, but also in relation to the work itself, which
must be executed with the utmost perfection of which the “actor”
or worker is capable.
(c) There is no emphasis in Islam upon the virtue of work for the sake
of work. Work is considered a mean and necessity to establish equi-
librium in one’s individual, family, and social life but not to lead to
greed and excessive accumulation of wealth.
(d) Work considered in its economic aspect, should be carried out fol-
lowing a contract based upon justice and responsibility on the side
of the employer as well as the employee. The worker is responsible
to both the employer and to God to carry out, to the best of his or
her ability, the work which he or she has undertaken to accomplish
on terms agreed by the two sides.8
It is because of this emphasis on work that Islam is considered a reli-

gion of action. The Qur’an exalts work and raises it to the level of wor-
ship, considering work as an inseparable dimension of faith itself.
Conversely, it considers idleness—or the squandering of time in pursuit
of unproductive and non-beneficial work—as the manifestation of lack of
faith and of unbelief.
Man is called on to utilize time in pursuit of work by declaring that
Allah (swt) has made the day as a means of seeking sustenance. A person
who, through hard work, seeks the “bounty” of Allah (swt)—which
includes all appropriate means of earning one’s livelihood—is most highly
praised. All able-bodied persons are exhorted to work in order to earn
their living. No one who is physically and mentally able is allowed to
become a liability to his family or to the state through idleness and volun-
tary unemployment. The work that everyone is required to perform must
be “good” or “beneficial” (al-amal as-salih), but no work is considered
inconsequential in relation to its rewards or punishments in this world and
in the next. One will have to reap whatever rewards or retributions are due
as a result of one’s work.
8
There is a very strong element present among traditional Muslims concerning eating
“halal bread’”; that is, gaining an earning that one deserves in accordance with the accom-
plishment of an agreed piece of work. Any element of cheating on part of either employer or
employee would make it non-halal (Nasr 2011).
Work, therefore, is regarded not only as a right but also as a duty and
an obligation. Hence, based on its notion of individual rights and respon-
sibilities, Islam extends to individuals the right to choose the type of work
they desire. Along with this freedom come the obligation to consider the
needs of society and to select the type of work permitted by the Shari’ah.
Since all class distinctions are negated by Islam, no line of work permis-
sible by the Shari’ah is considered demeaning by Islam, which counte-
nances only diversification on the basis of natural talents, skills, and
technology—which are considered to be a grace or blessing (fadl) from
Allah (swt)—and which all Muslims are urged to acquire. Based on its
concepts of justice and contracts, Islam makes it an obligation for workers
to perform the tasks that they have contracted to the best of their abilities.
But since individuals are endowed with different abilities and talents, this
productivity will differ. Justice, however, demands that the return for
every individual’s work must be commensurate with his or her productiv-
ity, but not that all humans receive the same remuneration.
Virtues of unity and justice lay a bilateral working relationship and eth-
ics between an employer and an employee. Elements of fairness and soli-
darity with fellow humans irrespective of race, religion, and creed are the
corner stones of the employer-employee relationship. An employer has
moral responsibility for the overall welfare, fair treatment, fair wages, good
working conditions, suitable work, and the opportunity to have work-life
balance.9 In return, the employee is expected to deliver work according to
the best of his efforts and skills, work conscientiously and diligently,
9
Azmi (2013). Several sayings of the Prophet (saas) support just treatment of workers
emphasizing the obligations of the employer to the employee.
“Those are your brothers [workers under you] who are around you, Allah has placed
them under you. So, if anyone of you has someone under him, he should feed him out
of what he himself eats, clothe him like what he himself puts on, and let him not put
so much burden on him that he is not able to bear, [and if that be (the case], then
lend your help to him”. (Bukhari, No: 2359)
“I will be foe to three persons on the Last Day: one of them being the one who, when
he employs a person that has accomplished his duty, does not give him his due”.
(Bukhari, No: 2109)
“The wages of the laborers must be paid to him before the sweat dries upon his
body”. (Ibn Majah, No: 2434)
4.3 PRODUCTION, CONSUMPTION, AND DISTRIBUTION 89
rotect the property of the employer, and act as a trustworthy worker.

p
Finally, Islam’s concepts of work ethics and economic and social justice lay
the foundation for policy-makers in formulating policies related to dis-
crimination, minimum wages, avoidance of exploitation, facilitating ade-
quate working environments, protection from any industrial hazards, and
managing work-life balance.10
4.3 Production, Consumption, and Distribution

Islam emphasizes that one must remain fully conscious of the human part-
nership throughout the process of wealth creation and the fact that they
must redeem the rights of others in the created income and wealth. In
practical terms, the Qur’an makes clear that the objective is to create a bal-
anced society that avoids the extremes of wealth and poverty, a society in
which all understand that wealth is a blessing provided by the Creator for
the sole purpose of providing support for the lives of all. This can be
achieved if the rules and ethics of the cycles of production, consumption,
and distribution of Islam are followed.
Work ethics as described above and by which work is considered as an
act of worship especially when it is done well is the corner stone of produc-
tion. Properly understood, this concept is instrumental in motivating pro-
ductivity to gain the ultimate pleasure of the Creator through productive
work and is far beyond the mechanical concept of production and produc-
tivity. The production process itself is subject to large set of virtues such as
contracts, property rights, excellence in work, and trustworthiness. Some
examples of ethical concerns in the production processes are given below:
(a) The production of goods and services can be considered as part of

man’s trusteeship role and therefore requires that all the conditions
and obligations of that trust are met.
(b) The method of production should not cause an undue and exces-
sive harm to the Creator’s resources and bounties that are for the
benefit of all mankind.11
10
Chapra (1983) quotes hadith “God loves that when any one of you does a job, he does
it perfectly”; cited on the authority of Bayhaqi’s Shu’ab al-iman by Suyuti, v.1, p. 75.
11
The Qur’an speaks repeatedly against spreading mischief or corruption in the land
(2:60,2:205,5:46,7:56). Prophet (saas) spoke of the punishment of anyone who kills a spar-
row without a legitimate reason [e.g., for food], or one who cuts a tree for no good reason
(Badawi 2013).
(c) Productive resources are not to be left idle in the name of private
ownership, especially resources that are crucial to the lives of
people.12
(d) The production process should not cause harm to others including
to the environment. In situations where some harm is inevitable, a
careful weighting of relative harms and benefits should be made.
Furthermore, a party that may be harmed must be compensated,
based on the cardinal rule in Islamic Law that harm must be
removed or compensated if inevitable.13
(e) The production process should maintain a healthy work-life bal-
ance and ensure that the processes do not put the workers under
excessive stress. Processes should be designed to have fair opportu-
nities for workers to maintain physical, mental, and spiritual health.
An imbalance in the production cycle could lead to an imbalance in

wealth and income accumulation in any economy. The Islamic view holds
that it is not possible to have many rich and wealthy people who continue
to focus all their efforts on accumulating wealth without simultaneously
creating a mass of economically deprived and destitute. The rich consume
opulently while the poor suffer from deprivation because their rights in
the wealth of the rich and powerful are not redeemed.
To avoid this, Islam prohibits the accumulation of wealth, and imposes
limits on consumption through its rules prohibiting waste (itlaf), over-
spending, ostentatious and opulent spending (israf).14 It then ordains that
the net surplus, after moderate spending necessary to maintain a modest
living standard, must be returned to members of the community who, for
a variety of reasons, are unable to work and hence whose resources they
could have used to produce income and wealth have been utilized by the
more able. The Qur’an considers the more able as trustee-agents in using
12
Badawi (2013) quotes the following saying of the Prophet (saas) to endorse this argu-
ment and implying that resources should not be kept idle on the basis of personal preferences
or constraints:
“If one of you possesses a piece of [cultivable] land, let him cultivate it. And if he is
not able to cultivate by himself, let him give it to his brother.”
13
Badawi (2013).
14
For example, see Qur’an (7:31) “…eat and drink, but be not excessive. Indeed, He
[Allah] likes not those who commit excesses”; and Qur’an (5:87) “O believers, do not pro-
hibit the good things that Allah has made lawful to you and do not transgress. Indeed, Allah
does not like transgressors.”
4.4 COMPETITION AND COOPERATION 91
these resources on behalf of the less able. In this view, property is not a
means of exclusion but inclusion, in which the rights of those less able are
redeemed in the income and wealth of the more able. The result would be
a balanced economy without extremes of wealth and poverty.
Distribution takes place post-production and sale when all factors of
production are given what is due to them commensurate with their
contribution to production, exchange, and sale of goods and services.
Redistribution refers to the post-distribution phase when the charge due
to the less able are levied. These expenditures are essentially repatriation
and redemption of the rights of others in one’s income and wealth.
Redeeming these rights is a manifestation of belief in the Oneness of the
Creator and its corollary, the unity of the creation in general and of man-
kind in particular. It is the recognition and affirmation that Allah (swt) has
created the resources for all of mankind who must have unhindered access
to them. Even the abilities that make access to resources possible are due
to the Creator. This would mean that those who are less able or unable to
use these resources are partners of the more able.
4.4 Competition and Cooperation

The economic system designed in accordance with the fundamental prin-
ciples of Islam ensures that humans can exercise their eminent dignity,
freedom, responsibilities, and rights in the conduct of economic affairs.
The economic system must be so ordered as not to assign to man a purely
instrumental role in achieving the goals of the economy or the state.
Islam seeks to guide man to direct individual action and responsible par-
ticipation in economic affairs in a manner that commits him to commu-
nity solidarity and cooperation, resulting in a dynamic and growing
economy. Thus, the individual is made accountable for the moral effects
of his social actions, including those in economic affairs, so that his own
inner personal-spiritual transformation and growth is bound to the prog-
ress of the community.15
The Qur’an and the traditions of the Prophet (saas) make clear refer-
ences to the dual nature of competition and cooperation; that is, human
beings can cooperate and compete for good or evil. It is this that leads to
the integration or disintegration of society. The fundamental sources,
however, emphasize that competition and cooperation must be utilized in
Askari et al. (2015).

15
probity and piety rather than in evil and enmity. Thus the Qur’an declares:
“Cooperate with one another unto righteousness and piety. Do not coop-
erate with one another unto sin and enmity” (5:2). Similarly, Muslims are
urged to compete with one another in beneficial and righteous deeds.
These sources do not allow suppression of competition or cooperation in
favor of the other when they are used within the Shari’ah framework.
Rather, all of the regulatory and supervisory authority invested in the
legitimate political authority is directed toward a balanced and construc-
tive utilization of these forces. The Shari’ah rules regarding the structure
of the market and the behavior of market participants are examples of such
balance. Although the rules of the Shari’ah regarding economic affairs
demarcate limits and boundaries of desirable competitive and cooperative
behavior necessary for the provision and preservation of the solidarity of
society, the individual always remains the identifiable agent through whose
action (and on whose behalf) all economic activity takes place.
4.5 Stakeholders’ Rights

Business ethics in Islam provide recognition and protection of the rights
of stakeholders to the business under the virtues of preservation of rights,
honoring of implicit contracts, mutual trust,16 and just treatment. These
virtues define the ethical framework of bringing stakeholders their due
right and giving a say in the governance framework of businesses.17
Whereas discussion on recognizing the rights of stakeholders is one
matter, how to draw a line of distinction between a stakeholder and a
non-stakeholder is another important issue. The existence of a stake-
holder entity and its rights are easy to recognize, but the question still
remains who really qualifies as an actual stakeholder? Another issue deals
with the stakeholders’ right to influence management decision making or
to participate in governance of the firm. Questions arise why stakeholders
should be given such a right and why managers should have a fiduciary
duty to protect rights of non-investor or non-owner stakeholders if such
stakeholders have protected their rights through bargaining in the terms
16
Quddus et al. (2005), “God does command you to render back your trusts to those to
whom they are due…” (Quran 4:58).
Quddus, Munir, Henri Bailey, III, and Larry White, Business Ethics—Perspectives from
Judaism, Christianity and Islam, 2005 Proceedings of the Midwest Business Economics
Association.
17
Iqbal and Mirakhor (2004).
4.6 TRANSPARENCY 93
of the contracts. Whereas there appears to be a consensus on identifying

the rights of non-owner stakeholders and an implicit agreement to pro-
tect these rights, there is still a debate on why such stakeholders should
participate in the control and management processes of a firm. For exam-
ple, the notion that property rights are embedded in human rights and
that restrictions against harmful uses are intrinsic to the property rights
concept clearly highlights the interests of other non-owner stakeholders,
but it remains unclear which uses of property should be restricted and
which persons should count as stakeholders. Simply bringing non-owner
stakeholders into the conception of property rights does not provide by
itself a justification for assigning any specific groups of stakeholders, such
as employees and customers, managerial responsibilities.18 So far, discus-
sions of the stakeholder model have not been able to articulate a convinc-
ing argument on either theoretical, moral, or legal grounds to recognize
an active role of stakeholders in the management and control of a firm.
In considering an Islamic view of the role of stakeholders, it is noted
that two fundamental concepts of the Islamic economic system pertaining
to property rights and contracts govern the economic and social behavior
of individuals, society, and the state. These two principles also dictate the
objective function of economic agents, including legal entities like firms.
A firm in the Islamic economic system can be viewed as “nexus-of-contracts”
whose objective is to minimize transaction costs to maximize profits and
returns to investors subject to the constraints that these objectives do not
violate the property rights of any party whether it interacts with the firm
directly or indirectly. In pursuit of these goals, the firm honors its obliga-
tions to explicit and implicit contracts without impinging on the social
order. This definition incorporates the stakeholders’ role in its view of the
firm and supports the recognition and protection of their rights.19
4.6 Transparency
The virtue of truthfulness is the cornerstone of conducting ethical busi-
ness where decisions are made in a transparent fashion and full disclo-
sure is made to internal and external stakeholders. Islam encourages
truthfulness in business transactions and raises the status of a truthful
merchant so much so that he will be at par with the martyrs who give
their lives in good causes. A business transaction void of transparency or
Donaldson and Preston (1995).

18

19
willful misinformation may give the business monetary benefits but such
a transaction will not only be considered void of any blessings but also
subject to accountability on the Day of Judgment. The virtue of trust-
fulness would require both parties to a business transaction to be trans-
parent and have full disclosure on all aspects of the transaction including
the terms of the contract, quality of the product or services subject to
exchange, and the terms and the modes of payment.
Transparency is becoming more important than ever due to market-
based economies, where information is valuable and any relevant infor-
mation could have an immediate impact on the value of a business.
Corporations whose shares are traded on the stock markets are subject to
share price volatility when the market’s expectations change as result of
the arrival of new information. Hiding or delaying bad information with
potential negative impact on the share price, or creating a hype and
increasing expectations to increase share prices, would be examples of
unethical behavior.
Similarly, Islamic business ethics would expect full transparency of
financial reporting and would disapprove of any tinkering or misrepresen-
tation of information to mislead reporting, which therefore would be con-
sidered unethical. Despite efforts such as the Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002
introduced to enhance the transparency of financial statements and the
conduct of business leadership, management, and boards of directors,
unethical practices and reporting continued and led to the financial crisis.
This pattern clearly calls for complementing laws with building the char-
acter of management and leadership for transparent business practices as
advocated by Islam.
4.7 Business Leadership

Business leader or manager carries significant responsibility on his/her
shoulders. First and foremost, manager is expected to carry best of charac-
ter or virtues in conducting business and be accountable to superiors, sub-
ordinates, and stakeholders. Deteriorating values and ethics of top business
leaders witnessed during the financial crisis is testimony to the importance
of business leaders internalizing ethical behavior rather than focusing on
personal interest and greed. As stated in previous chapter, in Islam, the
character of the Prophet (saas) is the ultimate role model and his character
traits are to be emulated in all personal, social, and economic behavior.
A good business leader ought to possess virtues of truthfulness,
trustworthiness, striving for excellence, being conscious of the rights of all
4.7 BUSINESS LEADERSHIP 95
stakeholders, and acting in prudence. A business leader should be truthful

about financial statements, products being sold, and business practices.
A business leader is expected to reflect the virtue of trustfulness in his/her
conduct. Such trust has different dimensions. Whereas at one level, he/
she is entrusted with the responsibility of managing the wealth of share-
holders, at another level, internal stakeholders such as employees have put
their trust in the expectation of fair treatment. Thus it becomes the
responsibility of the leader to maintain a fair balance and be conscious of
the responsibility and accountability of this trust.
The business manager will have the responsibility of developing and
enforcing a complete code of ethics for the organization and have a com-
prehensive program to internalize these ethics by the employees and man-
agers. Having a code of ethics itself is not sufficient; a business leader has
the responsibility of ensuring that periodically training is provided to the
employees making them aware of their ethical responsibilities. Having an
incentive system in place to reward ethical behavior would be essential.20
Finally, it would be the responsibility of the leader to have an internal jus-
tice system in place to which all are answerable, irrespective of their rank
or position in the organization.
Leaders who are fully conscious of their responsibilities, limitations, and
obligations as expected in Islam could never fall into a behavior that would
promote arrogance, ignorance, greed, deceitfulness, non- transparency,
and delinquency. Islam governs the behavior of leaders at least no less
stringently than those of individuals. Although each member of society is
expected to exhibit high moral values in the observance of contracts and
covenants, many scholars are of the view that these requirements apply
with even greater force to the actions of leaders. Therefore, a breach of
faith on the part of a leader is more heinous in its nature and more serious
in its consequence than a similar breach by an ordinary individual.
Finally, a business leader is to exhibit the virtue of humility rather than
arrogance.21 Arrogance is considered a vice to be avoided because arro-
gance could lead to impairment of judgment to the point that one could
violate the virtues of justice and preserving the rights of others. Arrogance
has been known to be the cause of downfall not only of businesses but even
of civilizations. Collins (2009) observed corporate behavior of leaders in
20
Abbas et al. (2012).
21
See Quran (17: 36–37) “Do not be arrogant in one’s claims or beliefs: And pursue not
that of which thou hast no knowledge; for every act of hearing, or of seeing or of (feeling in)
the heart will be enquired into (on the Day of Reckoning). Nor walk on the earth with inso-
lence: for thou canst not rend the earth asunder, nor reach the mountains in height.”
his famous work, How the Mighty Fall, and identified different stages
through which a corporate leader might go through during the course of
his fall. He notes that in the first stage, managers become arrogant, consid-
ering success virtually as an entitlement, and lose sight of the true underly-
ing factors that created success in the first place. As a result, the leaders
overestimate their own merit and capabilities and finally succumb to hubris.
During the second phase, there is the undisciplined pursuit of more—more
scale, more growth, more acclaim, more of whatever those in power see as
“success.” Finally, in the third stage, leaders discount negative data, amplify
positive data, and put a positive spin on ambiguous data. Those in power
start to blame external factors for setbacks rather than accept responsibility.
This represents the behavior of corporate leaders of the financial industry
very accurately, as such behavior is prevalent industry-wide. In short, vices
of arrogance, greed, untruthfulness, and no sense of accountability would
destroy businesses and economies, having serious social impact.
4.8 Respecting and Protecting Environment

Islamic scholars have maintained that humans have the responsibility toward
actions that could degrade or destroy the environment. Professor Seyed
Hossein Nasr was one of the earliest scholars to warn about the environmen-
tal crisis. His seminal work The Encounter of Man and Nature: The Spiritual
Crisis of Modern Man published in 1968 remains one of the earliest writings
on the environmental crisis by any conventional or Muslim writers. He cites
gross ignorance as a leading cause of the on-going environment crisis, which
he believes can be alleviated if the global community begins to recognize the
multiple states of being that are possible within the environment.
Islam is a rules-based economic and social system with guidance for all
human behavior, and includes teachings on protecting the environment.
If for nothing else, Islam maintains that the environment was not a
byproduct of human creation, or in any way random, but rather, its cre-
ation was incontrovertibly purposeful.22 “The creation of the heavens and
the earth is far greater than the creation of mankind. But most of man-
kind do not know it,” is another Qur’anic verse that establishes the notion
that man’s ability to analyze may lead him into thinking humans are supe-
rior to other species and systems found in the environment. The Qur’an
22
The Qur’an declares that the creation of the physical universe is purposeful. “We have
not created the heavens and the earth and all that is between them for mere idle play…”
(44: 38–39).
4.8 RESPECTING AND PROTECTING ENVIRONMENT 97
specifically indicates the fact that the significance of the environment

should, in no way, be made reductive.
Unfortunately, man’s presence on earth has altered the Creation in
directions that are arguably negative when it comes to the environment and
its depletable natural resources, as well as more generally for their preserva-
tion for generations to come. This is especially ruinous for the developing
world, which relies largely on water, wood, and other commonly exploited
resources for economic survival. As a result of greed and the absence of
sharing among current generations and making provisions for future gen-
erations, some natural resources are rapidly deteriorating from waste and
exhaustion. Aside from the obvious environmental issues, the economic
stability of many regions of the world is likely to continue to be impaired by
changes in resource availability. However, conventional economic policies
for growth and development invariably ignore pertinent environmental
issues. But in Islam, the physical development of the earth is an integral
component of development that includes human and social dimensions.
The development of the physical-material world and the human col-
lectivity alike can only be achieved if the actions of humans are made in
consonance with the environment. The Islamic concept of development
includes individual human development, physical-material development,
and development of the human collectivity.23 The simple fact that the
physical world is integral to the first and third concepts makes clear its
unquestionable importance. Therefore, environmental preservation is
essential for the well-being of all humans today and for future generations.
It is in part for this reason that Islamic teachings direct humans to modest
living (avoiding opulence), limiting their wants to only their needs, and to
sharing (with current and future generations). Excessive consumption,
israf, is prohibited explicitly as it leads to the unbalancing of the earth’s
harmonies. Highlighted in this passage is the important implication of
creating a harmonious balance between the environment and man in pro-
hibiting “extravagance.” Similar explicit prohibitions against opulent con-
sumption underline the need for balance in the use of resources.
As “regents,” or trustees, humans are ordered to act preemptively and
reactively to natural resource-related environmental events. Indisputably,
enjoining environmental protection and discouraging its degradation are
covered by this capstone rule of Islamic teachings. Therefore, it is incum-
bent on business in the Islamic perspective to ensure that their actions do
not lead to degradation of the environment and all efforts are made to
See Chap. 7 on ethical and responsible economic development.

23
protect the environment either through individual business or collectively

through collaboration across the industry. Business leaders and stakehold-
ers including shareholders or owners should be pro-active in the preserva-
tion of the environment as expected by Islamic virtues.
4.9 Avoidance of Vices or Unethical Practices

Virtues and vices are two faces of the same coin. Each virtue has implicit
an opposite in the form of a vice that is a negative character trait to be
avoided as it would lead to unethical behavior. For example, whereas
truthfulness is a virtue, deceitfulness would be a vice. Whereas internaliza-
tion of virtues is to be admired, the act of avoiding vices itself would
become a virtuous act. There are several examples of vices that when prac-
ticed in a business would be considered unethical. A business practice
would be considered unethical if one or more vices exist in the practice or
in the intentions of an act.
In the Islamic perspective, corruption and bribery in any form are con-
sidered immoral and unacceptable. Corruption can take various forms
ranging from favoritism, abuse of power or position, nepotism, and having
personal gains. Corruption would violate the virtues of just behavior and
encroach upon the rights of others. Similarly, bribery is another form of
corruption that is condemned strongly by Islam. Bribery is a vice applica-
ble not only to the receiver of the bribe but the giver is equally considered
guilty and therefore subject to sanction.24
Vices of dishonesty, deceitfulness, and untruthfulness give rise to com-
mon business mal-practices of fraud, misappropriation, non-disclosure,
and cheating the stakeholders and are strongly condemned in Islamic
ethics’ teachings. In the Qur’an, one full chapter is devoted to traders and
businessmen with warning of giving short-measures and corrupting the
weights to defraud customers. The practice of giving short-measures vio-
lates the virtue of encroachment of someone’s property and the vice of
greed for personal gains. The Qur’an is strict in making the point that
24
Quddus et al. (2005). The Quran deals with bribery indirectly in the following verse
(Chapter 2; v: 188), “And do not eat up your property among yourselves for vanities, nor use
it as bait for the judges, with intent that ye may eat up wrongfully and knowingly a little of
(other) people’s property.” This verse includes the use of one’s own property for corrupting
those in power or authority to obtain material gain even under the cover and protection of
law. Definition of “other people’s property” would apply to “public property.”
4.10 CONCLUSION 99
traders and businesses who indulge in fraud are committing a grave sin in
the eye of God and therefore, will be answerable.25
The practice of giving short-measure could be extended to any business
practice where values of goods or services exchanged are not based on fair
exchange, i.e., giving too little in exchange for more than the fair value.
This core principle is therefore applicable to business dealings with not only
customers or suppliers but also to other stakeholders including employees
when they are given less than they deserve as fair remuneration.
4.10 Conclusion
Moral and ethical theory of Islam can be summarized simply as set of rules
or virtues specified by the Creator for the well-being and welfare of the
humans. This set of rules and virtues applies to all aspects of human life
without any exception. Adoption and internalization of these virtues ensure
justice. Despite what some scholars suggest and write that there is a separate
theory of Islamic justice or moral/ethical position of Islam, there is none.
Once the virtues are internalized and behavior becomes compliant with the
rules, then morality, ethics, justice all are obtained. This is why Allah (swt)
points to the role of the Messengers and Prophets as to read His book of
rules to people, cleanse them, then teach them the wisdom behind the rules
in the book and then induce them to establish interpersonal justice (qist).
Based on the set of virtues that are to be internalized by individuals,
businesses, and corporations, a framework of business ethics in Islam is
drawn. Whereas the character traits of individuals are easy to understand
and explain, the application of similar traits on businesses or legal entities
such as corporation is not straightforward. Businesses and corporates are
the sum of the character traits of the individuals managing and running
the businesses. There is a need to develop a character of business entities
that emulates the desirable moral character of individuals. Therefore, a
business entity should also strive for internalizing virtues of justice, preser-
vations of rights, commitment to contracts, transparency, and fairness.
Once businesses adopt such core virtues and avoid associated vices, their
practices and actions would be considered ethical.
25
See Chapter 83 of Quran titled, “The Dealers in Fraud,” which states “(1) Woe to those
that deal in fraud; (2) Those who, when they have to receive by measure from men, exact full
measure; (3) But when they have to give by measure or weight to men, give less than due;
(4) Do they not think that they will be called to account? (5) On a mighty day, (6) A day
when all mankind will stand before the Lord of the Worlds.”
This chapter developed the framework of business ethics based on the

virtues of Islam as explained in the previous chapter. Ethical business prac-
tices would reflect the application of single or multiple virtues and would
ensure that a business’ conduct is ethical and is devoid of any vices.
Table 4.1 lists select business practices or issues and the relevant virtue or
virtues to be applied.
Table 4.1 Virtues and business ethics
Business practice/issue Relative virtues
Financial inclusion Justice

Unity
Preservations of rights
Transparency Truthfulness
Trustful
Honesty
Predatory lending Truthfulness
Trustworthiness
Justice
Consumer protection Preservations of rights
Truthfulness
Trustworthiness
Investor protection Preservations of rights
Trustworthiness
Justice
Fair treatment of employees Justice
Preservation of rights
Compassion
Generosity and leniency
Equal opportunity and discrimination Unity
Justice
Price fixing Truthfulness
Trustful
Work-life balance Work ethics
Compassion
Fair compensation Justice
Work ethics
Bargaining Truthfulness
Trustworthiness
Generosity
Dumping Truthfulness
Sweat shops Work ethics
Justice
REFERENCES 101
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Qur’an Inc., 1988, New York.
CHAPTER 5
Ethical Dimensions of Islamic Economics

and Finance
Having developed a framework of virtues and business ethics in previous

chapters, this chapter discusses the application of the ethical framework to
Islamic economics and finance. An in-depth analysis of risk sharing, mate-
riality, social and economic justice, and governance aspects of Islamic eco-
nomics and finance are provided, arguing that such a framework provides
rich ethical standards and ensures finance that is responsible and good for
the society.1
Ethics are embedded in the core principles of Islam and each rule pre-
scribed has explicit or implicit ethical dimensions reflecting its adherence
to core values and virtues.2 The philosophical foundation underlying the
development of legal rules as well as its objectives (maqasid) is based on
Islam’s core values and virtues ensuring ethical outcomes. Following of
the rules will set the standards of an overall ethical behavior for individu-
als, firms, community, state, and the society. This defines a perimeter by
sanctioning immoral and harmful activities with the objective to achieve
the overall welfare of the society as a whole. The perimeter defined by the
rules becomes the limit beyond which ethics would be compromised. As
long as one is rule-compliant, there would not arise any question of any
unethical behavior.
1
For further details on Islamic finance and Islamic economics see Mirakhor (1989), Iqbal
and Mirakhor (2011), and Askari et al. (2015).
2
See Naqvi (1981, 1993, 2003) for earlier discussion of ethics and economics.

DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-66390-6_5
104 5 ETHICAL DIMENSIONS OF ISLAMIC ECONOMICS AND FINANCE
Similar to business ethics, rules applicable to economic and financial

transactions have a specific ethical framework that has been discussed and
debated for centuries. Two key features of Islamic finance are the prohibi-
tion of interest in any form and the prohibition of excessive risk taking
(gharar). Each prohibition has its embedded system of values and virtues
defining its ethical dimensions. For example, prohibition of interest is
characterized with virtues of preservation of property rights and condem-
nation of economic and social exploitation. In the case of prohibition of
excessive uncertainty and risk (gharar), a transaction can be declared null
and void in considerations of fairness and justice, as gharar in a transaction
may cause injustice and loss of property to one or both of the parties.3
We now discuss various features of Islamic economics and finance and
describe the ethical dimension of each.
5.1 Risk Sharing4

Islam endorses risk sharing as the preferred organizational structure for all
economic activities, and in fact the most comprehensive application of risk
sharing that goes beyond anything put forward by modern economic the-
ories. Islam prohibits, and without any exceptions, explicit and implicit
interest-based contracts of any kind and requires mandatory risk sharing
with the poor, the deprived, and the handicapped based on its principles
of property rights. Moreover, even after these rights are redeemed, the
remaining wealth is not to be accumulated, wealth is considered as the
strength of the economy and the means of support for the society.
Wealth must not be withheld from circulation through accumulation.
Noncirculation of wealth among the members of the society creates a scle-
rosis in the body-economic of the society, restricting the flow of resources
needed for the growth of its economy. To allow a healthy circulation of
wealth, the Islamic paradigm envisions a financial system based on risk and
return sharing. Within the Islamic framework, the central proposition of
Islamic finance is the prohibition of interest-based transactions in which a
3
Kamali (2011). Gharar refers to elements of uncertainty in contracts that expose one or
both of the contracting parties to risk. Gharar can also be caused by doubt or ignorance of
one or both of the parties over the existence, quality, deliverability, or other material attri-
butes of the subject matter of contract. The question whether risk taking in transactions
amounts to gharar often depends on its scale and magnitude.
4
For in-depth discussion on risk-sharing aspect of Islamic economics and finance, see
Askari et al. (2010).
5.1 RISK SHARING 105
rent is collected as a percentage of an amount of the principle loaned for a

specific time period without the full transfer of the property rights over the
money loaned to the borrower.5 One result of this type of transaction is
that the entire risk of the transaction is shifted to the borrower. Instead,
Islam proposes a mutual exchange in which one bundle of property rights
is exchanged for another, thus allowing both parties in the exchange to
share the risks of the transaction.
The ideal Islamic finance points to a full-spectrum menu of instruments
serving a financial sector imbedded in an Islamic economy in which the
institutional “scaffolding” (rules of behavior or virtues as prescribed by
Allah (swt) and operationalized or internalized by the Noble Messenger,
including rules/virtues of market behavior prescribed by Islam) is fully
operational (Iqbal and Mirakhor 2011; Chapra 2000). The essential func-
tion of that spectrum would be spreading and allocating risk among mar-
ket participants rather than allowing it to concentrate among the borrowing
class. Islam proposes three sets of risk-sharing instruments:
(a) Risk-sharing instruments in the economic and financial transac-

tions (mu’amelat);
(b) redistributive risk-sharing instruments through which the econom-
ically more able segments of society share the risks facing the less
able segment of the population6; and
5
The starting point of the risk-sharing feature of Islamic finance is verse 275 of Chapter 2
of the Qur’an, particularly the part of the verse that declares contract of Al-Bai’ permissible
and that of Al-Riba nonpermissible. Arguably, these few words can be considered as consti-
tuting the organizing principle—the fundamental theorem as it were—of the Islamic econ-
omy. Much has been written by Muslim economists about this verse. As an example, Dr.
Abdul Halim Ismail presented a comprehensive paper in this context in 1989. He chose to
rely on well-known interpreters of the Qur’an on this verse, as well as on verse 282 of
Chapter 2 and verse 29 of Chapter 4. After presenting the views of the interpreters, Dr.
Ismail then gave his own hermeneutics, i.e., his personal-professional view, of the verses
based on interpretations. The result was the following conclusions: (a) Al-Bai’ is a contract
covering all types of exchange except those prohibited by the Shari’ah; (b) in this contract “a
given quantity of a commodity or service is exchanged for a given quantity of a commodity
(including money) or service”; (c) the delivery of a commodity being exchanged can be spot
or deferred; (d) both Al-Bai’ (contract of exchange) and Al-Tijarah (contract of trade)
“connote contract of exchange” and are synonymous; (e) the spectrum of contracts of
exchange covered include cash sale at one end and mudharabah and musharakah at the
other; (f) in between are salam sale, sale on order, leasing, cost plus, and deferred sale (Ismail
1989, p. 22, 33, 38, 42).
6
Mirakhor (2004) argues that the second set of instruments is used to redeem the rights
of the less able in the income and wealth of the more able. These are not instruments of
(c) the inheritance rules specified in the Qur’an through which the
wealth of a person at the time of passing is distributed among pres-
ent and future generations of inheritors.
Several observations can be made about risk sharing in the economic

and financial transactions. First, all Islamic contractual forms, except spot
exchange, involve time. From an economic point of view, time transac-
tions involve a commitment to do something today in exchange for a
promise of a commitment to do something in the future. All transactions
involving time are subject to uncertainty, and uncertainty involves risk.
Risk exists whenever more than one outcome is possible. Consider for
example a contract in which a seller commits to deliver a product in the
future against payments today. There are a number of risks involved. There
is a price risk for both sides of the exchange; the price may be higher or
lower in the future. In that case the two sides are at risk, which they share
once they enter into the contract agreement. If the price in the future is
higher, the buyer would be better off and the price risk has been shed to
the seller. The converse is true if the price is lower. Under uncertainty, the
buyer and seller have, through the contract, shared the price risk. There
are other risks that the buyer takes including the risks of nondelivery and
quality risk. The seller, on the other hand, also faces additional risks includ-
ing the risk that the price of raw material may be higher in the future, and
transportation and delivery cost risk. These risks may also be lower. Again,
these risks have been shared through the contract. The same argument
applies to deferred payment contracts.
Second, it may appear that spot exchange or cash sale involves no risk.
But price changes post-completion of spot exchange are not unknown.
The two sides of a spot exchange share this risk. Moreover, from the
time of the classical economists it is known that specialization through
comparative advantage provides the basis for gains from trade. But in
specializing, a producer takes a risk of becoming dependent on other
producers specialized in production of what he needs. Again, through
exchange the two sides to a transaction share the risk of specialization.
Additionally, there are pre-exchange risks of production and transporta-
tion that are shared through the exchange. It is clear that the other
contracts at the other end of the spectrum of Islamic contracts, i.e.,
charity, altruism, or beneficence. They are instruments of redemption of rights and repay-
ment of obligations.
5.1 RISK SHARING 107
mudharabah and musharakah, are risk sharing transactions.7 Therefore,

it can be inferred that by mandating Al-Bai’, Allah (swt) ordained risk
sharing in all exchange activities.
Third, the reason for the prohibition of the contract of interest (al-riba)
is the fact that opportunities for risk-sharing are nonexistence in this con-
tract. It may be argued that the creditor does take risk—the risk of default.
But it is not risk taking per se that makes a transaction permissible. A gam-
bler takes risk as well but gambling is haram. Instead what seems to matter
is opportunity for risk sharing. Al-riba is a contract of risk transfer. As
Keynes emphasized in his writing, if interest rates did not exist, the finan-
cier would have to share in all the risks that the entrepreneur faces in pro-
ducing, marketing, and selling a product (see Mirakhor and Krichene
2009). But by decoupling his future gains, by loaning money today for
more money in the future, the financier transfers all risks to the entrepre-
neur. Fourth, it is clear that by declaring the contract of Al-Riba nonper-
missible, the Qur’an intends for humans to shift their focus to risk sharing
contracts of exchange.
Finally, a further implication is that finance based on risk-return
sharing means that the rate of return to finance is determined ex-post,
by the rate of return on real activity rather than the reverse, which is
the case when interest-based debt contracts finance production. This
has a further economic implication in that risk-return sharing finance
removes interest payments from the pre-production phase of an enter-
prise and places it in the post-production and after-sale distributional
phase. In turn, this has price-quantity consequences. It should be clear
that compliance with the behavioral rules prescribed by Islam reduces
risk and uncertainty, both of which are facts of human existence. When
risks to income materialize they play havoc with people’s livelihood.
It is, therefore, welfare enhancing to reduce risks to income and lower
the chances of its volatility in order to allow consumption smoothing.
By focusing on trade and exchange in commodities and assets, Islam
promotes risk sharing.
7
Borrowed from Muslims and known as commenda in Western Europe, mudharabah
became quite popular as means of financing long-term trade and investment (Mirakhor
1983; Al-Hassani and Mirakhor 2003; Udovitch 1970); Lopez (1976) suggests that there is
a consensus among medieval historians that the commenda was of the highest importance
and contributed greatly to the fast growth of trade and investment which led to economic
change and growth in Europe. Commenda’s contribution to industrial development of Ruhr
Valley in Germany and in building railroads in Europe was particularly pronounced.
5.2 Ethics of Risk Sharing

It is important to recognize—though maybe difficult, given our mind-
sets—that there is nothing magical about the recent historical prominence
of debt financing. Before the rise of debt financing, equity financing was
preeminent, but a host of factors and developments catapulted debt
financing to the forefront. Risk sharing finance is trust-intensive, and trade
financing during the Middle Ages was based on risk sharing, which, in
turn, was based on mutual trust. Upheavals of the late Middle Ages in the
fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, including the Black Death, strife within
the Church and between the Church and hereditary rulers, and general
economic decline, contributed to the breakdown of trust in communities
and among their members.
While risk-sharing techniques continued to prevail in Europe until the
mid-seventeenth century, beginning in the mid-sixteenth century, the
institution of interest-based debt financing also began to be used more
widely and extensively. The catalyst for debt financing was primarily the
breakdown of trust, in Europe and elsewhere, and the adoption of secu-
ritization in finance. Over time, government deposit insurance schemes,
tax treatments, rules, and regulations have all heavily favored debt-based
contracts over risk-sharing contracts. Thus, risk sharing is still at an early
stage of development in all countries, to say nothing of its even more
modest international practice. These developments have helped perpetu-
ate a system that a number of renowned economists, such as Keynes, have
deemed detrimental to growth, development, and equitable income and
wealth distribution.
Risk sharing in economic and financial transactions is embedded with
several virtues such as justice and is void of vices such as repression. Here
we provide select features of risk-sharing finance and argue that risk shar-
ing in economic and financial transactions when practiced by other virtues
of Islamic ethics, would lead to an ethical and responsible finance. An
important performance dimension of risk-sharing finance, in general, and
of Islamic finance in particular, is whether it is more or less vulnerable than
conventional finance (which relies heavily on debt finance) to principal–
agent and informational issues. Agency issues arise because of asymmetric
information between agents (entrepreneurs) and principals (investors) and
the possibility that the agent’s utility maximization may not maximize the
utility of the principal. The agency problem is normally addressed by
incorporating incentive structures in contracts for the complete sharing of
5.2 ETHICS OF RISK SHARING 109
information and for the agent to behave in a way to maximize rewards for
the principal. In addition, there are implications on risk transfer, coopera-
tion among economic agents, and the stability of a financial system when
risk sharing is widespread and encouraged across the system.
Let’s discuss examples of embedded ethics in risk-sharing aspects of
Islamic economics and finance in the following.
5.2.1 Avoidance of Risk Shifting and Exploitation

Islamic finance encourages risk sharing in its many forms but generally
discourages risk shifting or risk transfer, in particular, interest-based debt
financing. It is in part so designed to promote social solidarity by encour-
aging finance to play an integrating role between humankind. This form
of finance would be inclusive of all members of society and all entities,
especially the poor, in enjoying the benefits of economic growth, and to
bring humankind closer together through the sharing of risk. Since risk
sharing is the foundation and a basic activity in Islamic finance, it is gov-
erned by rules that, if and when observed, lead to lower transaction costs
than in conventional finance. Risk sharing is a contractual or societal
arrangement whereby the outcome of a random event is born collectively
by a group of individuals or entities involved in a contract, or by individu-
als or entities in a community. In a company, all shareholders share in the
risk inherent in the operations of the company. At the community level, a
family or a nation shares in the risks affecting the wellbeing of the family
or the nation. In finance, risk sharing is an essential feature of equity
financing, where risk of loss and gain are shared, as opposed to interest-
based debt financing, where the lender does not share in the risk of losses,
thus all the risk of loss is shifted to the borrower.8
8
In order to fit into this framework, financial intermediation and banking in the Islamic
financial system (and more generally in a risk-sharing system) has been proposed as having
two tiers. The first is a banking system that accepts deposits for safekeeping without accruing
any return and requiring 100 percent reserves, thus protecting the payment system of the
economy while concurrently limiting the credit-creating ability of the banking system and
thus obviating the need for a deposit guarantee, as in the conventional fractional reserve
system. The second tier is an investment component that functions as a classical financial
intermediary, channeling savings to investment projects, and where deposits in investment
banks are considered as equity investments with no guarantees for their face value at maturity
and subject to the sharing of profits and losses. Depositors are investors in the pool of assets
maintained by the bank on the assets side of its balance sheet.
Interest-rate-based debt contracts are instruments of risk shifting, risk

shedding, and risk transfer, which are considered exploitative when com-
pared to risk-sharing finance. Different rationales have been given about
the prohibition of interest but each reaching the same conclusion. Property
rights rationale of prohibition argues that in interest-based debt contracts,
the creditor acquires a property rights claim on the debtor, equivalent to
the principal plus interest and whatever collateral may be involved, with-
out losing the property rights claim to the money lent, which violates the
property rights principles of Islam (Mirakhor 1989). Other schools of
thought argue that the prohibition of interest (ribā) is to prevent eco-
nomic exploitation among the transaction parties, which is contrary to the
core values of economic and social justice (Chapra 2000; Kamali 2011).
Since in Islam, money could only be a medium of exchange or measure of
account rather than a commodity, paying rent for the use of money is not
recognized unless money is converted to capital subject to a return.
Therefore, money-lending without investment is forbidden as it involves
exploitation and violates the spirit of social justice because it shifts all the
risk from the financier to the borrowers and leads to imbalances in wealth
and income distribution in society.
5.2.2 Materiality and Financing of Real Economy

Versus Financialization
By prohibiting renting of money and encouraging trade, financial instru-
ments facilitate direct financing of the real economy and therefore pro-
mote allocation of resources to the real sector. Although debt obligations
are created in the financial system, such obligations are results of the sale
or lease of real assets through sale and lease-based modes of financing. The
objective is to impose a fiscal discipline on individuals and firms to allo-
cated financial resources to the real sector according to their capacity to
pay back. Conditions stipulated by Islamic law such as (a) the asset that is
being sold or leased must be real, and not fictitious or notional; (b) the
seller must own and possess the goods being sold or leased; (c) the
transaction must be a genuine trade transaction with full intention of giv-
ing and taking delivery; and (d) the debt obligation as result of the sale or
lease contract cannot be sold or transferred to someone else and must be
borne by the creditor himself, are put in place to encourage financing of
the real economy and to discourage uncontrolled expansion of debt.9
9
Kamali (2011).
These conditions ensure availability of financial resources for the real

sector and thus expand employment and self-employment opportunities
through the production of goods and services.
An interest-based financial system invariably creates a phenomenon
known as “financialization” that results in a divergence between the real
sector and the financial sector of the economy. This dimension of Islamic
finance is discussed at length in the next chapter. The conventional frac-
tional banking system allows multiple amounts of money to be created out
of a given amount of deposits received, facilitating and enhancing the pro-
cess of debt creation. The development of complex financial derivatives
has resulted in credit expansion outpacing the growth of the real sector of
the economy. As layer upon layer of securitization decouples the connec-
tion between the financial and real sectors, an inverted credit pyramid is
created to the extent that the liabilities of the economy become a large
multiple of real assets needed to validate them (Mirakhor 2011).
Additionally, such a system is characterized by mismatched maturity and
values of the asset and liability structure of the balance sheets of banks.
These institutions borrow short and lend long. When subjected to asset
price shocks, the liability side of the balance sheet is very slow to adjust,
while the asset side adjusts rapidly. Both mismatches create a potential for
instability that can spread rapidly through contagion. The result can be an
increase in the frequency, contagion, and severity of financial and eco-
nomic crises (Askari et al. 2012).
5.2.3 Reduced Information and Agency Problems

Informational and agency problems have generally been discussed in the
context of one risk-/reward-sharing instrument: equity. Stiglitz (1989),
for example, suggests that there are two informational problems in such
cases: (a) an adverse signaling effect, which leads good firms not to issue
as much equity as they might wish to for fear that it may signal poor qual-
ity; and (b) an adverse incentive effect, which suggests that equity finance
weakens the incentive for the entrepreneurs (agents) to exert their maxi-
mum effort for the highest maximum joint returns for themselves and
their shareholders (principals). This happens because, once the project is
financed, the entrepreneur knows that the net return will have to be shared
with the financier (the principal) and, therefore, may not have a strong
motivation to work as hard as when the return is not shared. There are also
agency and informational problems in interest-rate-based debt financing.
Stiglitz (1989) points out that there is an inherent agency conflict in debt
financing in that the entrepreneur (the agent) is interested in the high end
of the risk–return distribution. The lender (the principal) on the other
hand, interested in safety, focuses on the low end of the risk–return distri-
bution, and therefore discourages risk taking. This, Stiglitz asserts (p. 57),
has “deleterious consequences for the economy.” He further suggests that
“from a social point of view equity has a distinct advantage: because risks
are shared between the entrepreneur and the capital provider, the firm will
not cut back production as much as it would with debt financing if there
is downturn in the economy.”
The agency problem has been generalized to bank lending. Banks,
being highly leveraged institutions that borrow short (deposits) and
lend long, are exposed to an asset–liability mismatch that creates poten-
tial for liquidity shocks and instability. Stiglitz (1989) suggests that to
protect their financial resources, banks generally discourage risk taking.
Additionally, their behavior toward risk often creates informational
problems that lead to phenomena that can be classified as market failure,
such as credit rationing. By contrast, Hellwig (1998, p. 335) argues that
there is an oft-neglected informational problem in the lending behavior
of banks, which he refers to as “negative incentive effects on the choice
of risk inherent in the moral hazard of riskiness of the lending strategy
of banks.” This risk materialized dramatically in the run-up to the recent
financial crisis (see Askari et al. 2010; Sheng 2009).
Given this background, the question is whether Islamic contracting
(with risk sharing) is better suited to solving this contractual dilemma
through its reliance on risk/reward sharing under conditions where
interest-based debt financing is prohibited. In the presence of informa-
tional problems such as asymmetric information (where only one side of
the contract, usually the agent, has information not available to the other
parties) there is a transaction cost as well as a cost of monitoring the
agent’s activities and the project(s) to be taken into account. It could be
plausibly argued that in Islamic contracts, asymmetric information issues
would be minimized. This assertion is supported by the strict rules gov-
erning contracts, exchange, and trade. Such rules with the exercise of vir-
tues such as justice, truthfulness, and trust by economic agents would
reduce information asymmetry to a minimum. These include the need for
written contracts that stipulate terms and conditions fully and transpar-
ently, the direct and unequivocal admonition that commitments to the
terms and conditions of contracts must be faithfully carried out, and the
strong emphasis on trust, cooperation, and consultation. Ethics governing
market behavior also create incentives—both positive and negative—to

enforce honest, transparent, and compliant behavior on the part of partici-
pants. Hence, risk-sharing contracts designed under Islamic rules would
mitigate informational problems (Khan and Mirakhor 1987; Haque and
Mirakhor 1987; Presley and Sessions 1994) and could be better struc-
tured than interest-based debt contracts with incentives to maximize both
parties’ expected joint rewards.
5.2.4 Stability of the Financial System

While, in our opinion, Islamic finance would be inherently stable because
it is structured on a foundation of equity financing and risk sharing, con-
ventional finance, a debt-and-interest-based system, has proven to be
unstable. Minsky has dubbed the instability of conventional finance as
“endogenous instability” because conventional finance experiences a
three-phased cycle: relative calm, speculation and fictitious expansion, and
then crisis and bankruptcy. Bankruptcy in conventional finance is not lim-
ited to the private sector as governments can also face bankruptcy. Again,
recent historical analysis has demonstrated that all financial, banking, and
currency crises are, at their core, a crisis arising from debt.10 In the recent
past, the widespread bankruptcies of many developing countries have
entailed debt cancellation or forgiveness. This is often because govern-
ments that borrowed at what were considered reasonable debt levels (nor-
mally as measured by debt/GDP) later found themselves in an unsustainable
debt spiral as a result of increased debt-service obligations. Some countries
even found themselves with debt levels many times larger than the original
amount of borrowed principal.
These developments have helped the perpetuation of a system that a
number of renowned economists, such as Keynes, have deemed detrimental
to growth, development, and to equitable income and wealth distribu-
tion. Whereas many American economists saw fractional reserve banking
as a source of financial instability, Maynard Keynes saw the role of interest
and the rentiers who demanded it as the greater evil. In his renowned
book, The General Theory (1936), Keynes called for steps toward the
“euthanasia of rentier.” The issue of interest as rent on money occupied
no less than three chapters (12, 17, and 23), that is, a good part of Keynes
General Theory.11
See Reinhart and Rogoff (2009).

10
Keynes (1936). Also See Kamali (2011).

11
More recently, a growing literature and proposed reforms have argued

that the stability of a financial system can only be assured by limiting credit
expansion and leveraging; this in turn requires the elimination of subsidies
that fuel moral hazard, such as subsidized deposit insurance schemes and
guarantees that support “too large to fail” institutions, and restrictions to
limit the creation of money through the fractional reserve conventional
banking system. Islamic finance, based on risk sharing and limiting frac-
tional reserve banking, has been shown to be inherently stable and socially
more equitable. In such a system, there is a one-to-one mapping between
the growth of financial and real sector activities, meaning that credit can-
not expand or contract independently of the real sector as in the conven-
tional system. In other words, the real and the financial sectors are closely
connected and cannot be decoupled as in conventional finance.
In addition to its risk-sharing characteristics, an Islamic economic
system has the potential of greater stability than its conventional counter-
part. The main reason for this is the fact that when production is financed
entirely by risk–return sharing or equity finance, in the case of rapid
changes in the price, assets and liabilities both move in the same direction
simultaneously—thus the financial structure adjusts in tandem on both
sides of the ledger. A number of analytic models have investigated the
adjustment process and have demonstrated the stability of Islamic finance
in response to shocks as well as the growth implication of such a system in
closed and open economy situations (Khan 1987; Mirakhor and Zaidi
1988; Khan and Mirakhor 1987; Mirakhor 1990). An important feature
of these models was the assumption of 100 percent reserve banking based
on the understanding of bank deposits as a safekeeping operation fire-
walled from the risks involved in investment operations, i.e., the so-called
two window model (Khan 1987). This feature of requiring banking
depository institutions to hold 100 percent reserves against demand
deposits removes two sources of instability associated with conventional
interest-based, fractional reserve banking. Nonavailability of interest-
based financial transactions and 100 percent reserve banking eliminate the
ability of the financial system to create money out of thin air (Krichene and
Mirakhor 2008) and impairs the ability to leverage an asset base into much
larger liabilities (Mirakhor and Krichene 2009). Moreover, when risk-
return sharing replaces an interest-based debt system, a much closer rela-
tionship is forged between the financial and the real sectors of the economy.
As early as the 1930s, the negative consequence for the real activities, in
terms of income and employment, of interest-based debt financing has
been the subject of discussion by economists (Keynes 1930, 1932, 1936).

The world has witnessed repeated, periodic episodes of financial crises
originating in systems with interest-based debt financing at their core in
the last two centuries. The frequency of these crises increased in the last
decades of the twentieth century and culminated in the devastating global
crisis of 2007–2008. As unfortunate as these crises have been, they have
held lessons for Islamic finance still in its nascent stage of development,
especially since Islamic finance is presently operating in an institutional
framework that is basically that of the conventional debt-driven system.
5.2.5 Overcoming Financial Repression

It is clear that the nexus of fractional reserve banking—credit creation—
debt creation—leverage—financial instability—financial crisis is the cause
of financial instability and fragility. The evidence for this process is the
massive debt build up in the world economy estimated to be US$ 50 tril-
lion larger than the period of run up to the 2007–2008 crisis. Recently,
many books and articles (see for example, Adair Turner: Between Debt and
the Devil, 2016) have appeared focusing on the dangers of “excessive
debt” without realizing that the culprit is the mispricing of financial
resources attributable to the interest rate mechanism. If there is an eternal
proposition of economics, it is that mispricing of any resource gives rise to
disequilibrium and misallocation of that resource. Excess debt is a clear
indication that financial resources are not priced to reflect their opportu-
nity costs. By definition, the opportunity cost of a resource is the price it
could receive from its best alternative use. By this definition, the opportu-
nity cost of financial resources is what these resources could earn in the
real sector of the economy, that is, its rate of return in the production
sector. According to the data-base Morningstar, the global rate of return
to the industrial sector averaged about 14 percent in 2014. Compare this
with the negative interest rate prevailing in major economies. Is there then
a surprise that there is “excess debt?”
Financial repression, the deviation of the “administered” interest rate
from the “market” interest rate, leads to market distortions, thus discour-
aging saving, investment, and economic growth. In the succeeding
decades of the fierce application of financial liberalization, a basic question
never asked was how and in what sense did the “market” rate of interest
reflect the true opportunity cost of financial resources, and whether indeed
deviation between it and the prevailing rates of interest truly measured the
magnitude of financial repression. To the extent that neither the financial

sector nor the governments are paying the true opportunity cost of finan-
cial resources, there is financial repression. In that sense, there is nothing
new about “financial repression.” It has existed and will continue to exist
until and unless reforms force true “liberalization” of markets where prices
all reflect opportunity costs.
Islamic finance addresses this mispricing and its consequent misalloca-
tion of financial resources through its requirement of materiality that
financial resources must be used directly in production; a one-to-one cor-
respondence between the financial sector and the real sector of the econ-
omy. This means that the rate of return to finance is determined by its
productivity in the production sector rather than predetermined by policy
or the monopoly power of rentiers. Islamic finance rules out maturity,
value, and balance sheet asset–liability mismatches that create the dynam-
ics of volatility. The result would be an anti-fragile and robust financial
system by requiring risk sharing among participants in transactions each
of which will have to have “skin-in-the-game.” Consequently, financial
resources receive their true opportunity cost in a market-determined pro-
cess where these resources are priced according to their most productive
use. This process puts an end to financialization, financial repression, and
excessive reliance of financial activities on speculation.
5.2.6 Enhancing Cooperation Among Economic Agents

At the same time, it should be noted that there is an important moral
dimension to Islamic risk sharing as it strengthens social solidarity by
enhancing cooperation among all economic agents, which would also go
some way in easing the coordination problem (for detail of these and other
rules governing the economy).12 Moreover, when risk is spread by means
of risk-/reward-sharing contracts, closer coordination is forged between
the real and financial sectors of the economy. Risk transfer by means of
interest-based debt contracts, in contrast, weakens that linkage. Particularly
when risk transfer is combined with high leverage, the growth of interest-
based debt contracts and their pure financial derivatives—those with little
or no connection to real assets—outpace the growth of the real sector,
leaving the liabilities in the economy a large multiple of real assets needed
to validate them. This phenomenon is called “financial decoupling”
See Mirakhor and Askari (2010, pp. 158–170), and Mirakhor (2010, pp. 8–19).
12
(Menkoff and Tolksorf 2001) or “financialization” (Epstein 2006; Palley

2007), whereby finance is no longer anchored in the real sector. The result
is financial instability leading to frequent crises. Reinhart and Rogoff
(2009) have cataloged the high frequency of historical occurrences of cri-
ses in the conventional interest-based system and have clearly shown that
all crises, whether classified as a currency or banking crisis, have been at
their core a debt crisis.
Arguably, it can be claimed that through its rules (institutions) and eth-
ics governing resource allocation, property rights, production, exchange,
distribution and redistribution, financial transactions, and market behav-
ior, the Islamic paradigm orients all economic relations toward risk–reward
sharing. This can be said to be a logical consequence of insistence on the
unity of mankind, since through risk sharing, social solidarity is promoted
through Islamic finance. “Massive risk sharing can carry with it benefits far
beyond that of reducing poverty and diminishing income inequality. The
reduction of risk on a greater scale would provide substantial impetus to
human and economic progress” (Shiller 2003). The most meaningful
human progress is achieved when all distinctions the basis of race, color,
income, wealth, and social-political status are obliterated to the point
where humanity, in convergence with the Qur’anic declaration (Qur’an,
31:28), truly views itself as one and united. It can be argued that imple-
mentation of Islamic finance will promote maximum risk sharing, thus
create the potential for enhanced social solidarity (Mirakhor 2007; Iqbal
and Mirakhor 2011; Askari et al. 2009).
5.2.7 Government as Agent for Risk Sharing

Generally, governments do share risks with their people. They share risks
with individuals, firms and, corporations through tax and spending policies.
They are silent partners. They also share the risk of the life of the poor and
disadvantaged through social expenditure policies. They share the risk of the
financial system through monetary policy and deposit guarantees. They
could choose to finance part of their budget, at least development spending,
through risk sharing and direct ownership of development projects with their
citizens. This way they would reduce the debt burden on the budget. This
reduction in government borrowing reduces the burden on monetary policy
as well. Governments undertake public goods projects because the charac-
teristics of these goods—importantly, indivisibility and nonexclusivity—
prohibit their production by the private sector and therefore are undertaken
by governments. However, their social rate of return is substantial and much

higher than private rates of return. A recent popular proposal suggests that
these projects should be undertaken jointly with the private sector, hence the
Public Private Partnership (PPP) label. The proposal has a number of prob-
lems: market distortion, informational and governance problems being just
three of these (see Choudhry and Mirakhor 1997).
Financing a portion of the government’s budget through the stock
market has advantages, some of which are summarized here. First, it can
energize a stock market—provided that all preconditions, in terms of
human capital, legal, administrative, and regulatory framework are met—
and helps strengthen the credibility of the market. Second, it deepens and
broadens the stock market. Third, it demonstrates that stock markets can
be used as a tool of risk and financial management. Fourth, it reduces reli-
ance of the budget on borrowing, thus imparting greater stability to the
budget and mitigating the risk of “sudden stops.” Fifth, it has a positive
distributional effect in that the financial resources that would normally go
to service public debt can now be spread wider among the people as
returns to the shares of government projects. Sixth, it enhances the poten-
tial for the financing of a larger portfolio of public goods projects without
fear of creating an undue burden on the budget. Seventh, it makes the task
of monetary management simpler by limiting the amount of new money
creation and limiting the number of objectives of monetary policy. Eighth,
it promotes ownership of public goods by citizens; thus can have a salutary
effect on the maintenance of public goods as it creates an ownership
concern among the people, and to some extent mitigates “the tragedy of
commons.” Ninth, it has the potential of strengthening social solidarity.
Tenth, it also has the potential to promote better governance by involving
citizens as shareholder-owners of public projects. Eleventh, it provides an
excellent risk-sharing instrument for financing of long-term private sector
investment. Twelfth, it is also an effective instrument for firms and indi-
viduals to use to mitigate liquidity and productivity risks. Thirteenth, by
providing greater depth and breadth to the market and minimizing the
cost of market participation, governments convert the stock market into
an instrument of international risk sharing as other countries and their
people can invest in the domestic stock market. Fourteenth, it will change
the basis of monetary expansion from credit to equity as economic expan-
sion in the real sector maps onto the financial sector. Finally, it will help
demystify Islamic finance and will create an environment of cooperation
and coordination with international finance.
5.3 ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL JUSTICE 119
The design of risk sharing instruments to be issued by governments is

not difficult. These instruments can be traded in the secondary market
if the shareholders experience a liquidity shock. Their rate of return can
be structured as an index of return tied to the rate of return to the stock
market. If the domestic stock market is not deep, then an index of
regional and/or international stock market returns can be included. The
argument is that since the social rate of return to public goods is much
higher than to privately produced goods and services, the investment in
public goods should have a rate of return at least as high as the return to
the stock market to promote efficient resource allocation. Of course,
since governments are usually less risky, the rate of return to govern-
ment-issued shares has to be adjusted downward to take account of gov-
ernments’ risk premium. Depending on the country and the interest
rate its government pays on borrowed money, it is not likely that the
rate of return it would pay to holders of equity shares it issues—adjusted
for the credit rating of the government reflected in lower risk—would be
any higher than the rate interest. Even in the unlikely event that a few
basis points higher have to be paid, the trade-off is worthwhile consider-
ing the positive contributions the instrument would make to the econ-
omy and the society. (see Choudhry and Mirakhor 1997; Ul-Haque and
Mirakhor 1999).
5.3 Economic and Social Justice

The central Islamic values are the welfare of society and socioeconomic
justice. All members of an Islamic society must be given the same oppor-
tunities to advance, such as the availability of education, in other words, a
level playing field. All members of society must be afforded the minimum
required for a dignified life—shelter, food, and healthcare. The rights of
future generations must be respected and preserved. Whereas the basis of
Western economics is to accept selfish utility maximizing individuals and
profit maximizing firms, Islam does not accept such behavior but advo-
cates a behavior that conforms to Islamic teachings. Thus Islam advocates
an environment where behavior is molded to support the goals of an
Islamic society—societal welfare and socio-economic justice. In the words
of Umar Chapra13:
13
See M.U. Chapra, “What Is Islamic Economics,” Islamic Development Bank Winner’s
Lecture Series No. 9, Jeddah, Saudi Arabia (1996, pp. 25–26).
Unlike the secularist market paradigm, human well-being is not considered

to be dependent primarily on maximizing wealth and consumption; it
requires a balanced satisfaction of both the material and the spiritual needs
of the human personality. The spiritual need is not satisfied merely by offer-
ing prayers; it also requires the moulding of individual and social bahavior in
accordance with the Shari’ah (Islamic teachings), which is designed to
ensure the realization of the maqasid al-Shari’ah (the goals of the Shari’ah,
hereafter referred to as the maqasid), two of the most important of which
are socio-economic justice and the well-being of all God’s creatures.
Negligence of either the spiritual or the material needs would frustrate the
realization of true well-being and exacerbate the symptoms of anomie, such
as frustration, crime, alcoholism, drug addiction, divorce, mental illness and
suicide, all indicating lack of inner contentment in the life of individuals.
“There is a consensus among scholars of Islamic economics that social

justice is the most important objective of an Islamic economy and abstract
models have been proposed based on the desiderata of justice and benefi-
cence Even a cursory look at Islamic sources suggests a com-
prehensive conception of justice that permeates throughout individual
and community life.14 Every dimension of individual behavior affecting
individual and social interactions is subject to some conception of justice.
Each conception of justice, as applied in the Qur’an, refers to a specific
dimension of individual and collective behavior. Associated with each con-
ception are a term and a context. In case of “justice” terms such as
and others are used in various contexts. Based on the
already available literature, the conception of justice plays a major role in
the initial allocation of resources, production, exchange, market, distribu-
tion, and redistribution.
A just economy is part of a just, healthy, and moral society, which is
the central objective of Islam. What underpins all the rules of behavior
14
It is important to compare and contrast the discussion of justice in the economic disci-
pline and in Islam. Whereas the former looks at various dimensions and concepts of justice
as a systemic phenomenon, i.e., allocations, exchange, market, distribution system, the lat-
ter considers them to be first and foremost as part and parcel of an individual’s adherence
to and implementation of the “rights” of others. There is a specific right for every dimen-
sion of individual’s behavior. As a member of a family, as an employer/employee, as a
member of a community, there are rights for the individual and there are rights for all those
with whom the individual interacts. One of the earliest sources of Islam in which these
rights are systematically cataloged and defined is the of Imam Zain ul Abedeen
who lists 47 rights.
5.3 ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL JUSTICE 121
prescribed by Islam is its conception of justice, which maintains that all

behavior, irrespective of its content and context, must, in its conception
and commission, be based on just standards as defined by the Shari’ah.
Islam considers an economy, in which the behavior of its agents is so
conceived, as an enterprising, purposeful, prosperous, and sharing econ-
omy in which all members of society receive their just rewards. Such an
economy is envisioned as one in which economic disparities that lead to
social segmentation and divisiveness are conspicuously absent.
The components of economic justice in an Islamic society are (a)
equality of liberty and opportunity for all members of society with respect
to the utilization of natural resources; (b) justice in exchange; and (c) dis-
tributive justice—all accomplished within the framework of the Shari’ah.
In the Islamic conception, liberty means that others do not prevent a
person from combining his creative labor with resources, which are desig-
nated by the Shari’ah for the use of the individual members of society.
Opportunity, on the other hand, represents a favorable conjunction of
circumstances, which gives the individual the chance to try it and success
is dependent on the individual’s efforts and abilities. This equality of
opportunity must be secured deliberately by the collectivity. It not only
denotes free and equal access to physical resources, but, generally, also
extends to technology, education, and environmental resources. The basis
for this equality of access to resources and equality of opportunity to use
them is Islam’s position that natural resources are provided for all mem-
bers of society. Even if the opportunity to use these resources is not avail-
able to some, either naturally or due to some other circumstances, their
original claims to resources remain intact and are not nullified. They must
be remunerated for these claims, at some point in time, by the other mem-
bers who happen to have “or get” greater opportunity to use them.
The concept of justice in exchange and economic transactions is that, by
mixing their creative labor with resources, individuals create a claim of
equity to the possession of the assets thus produced, by virtue of which
they can participate in exchange. To allow exchange to take place on the
basis of just standards, Islam places a great deal of emphasis on the market
and its moral, just, and—based on these two factors—efficient operation.
To assure justice in exchange, the Shari’ah has provided a network of ethi-
cal and moral rules of behavior, which cover in minute detail the behavior
of all participants in the market. It requires that these norms and rules be
internalized and adhered to by all participants before they enter the m
arket.
A market that operates on the basis of these rules, which are intended to
remove all factors inimical to justice in exchange, yields prices for factors
and products that are considered “fair” and “just.” Unlike the scholastic
notion of “just price,” which lacks an operational definition, the Islamic
concept refers to the price prevailing as a result of the interaction of eco-
nomic forces operating in a market in which all rules of behavior specified
by the Shari’ah are observed and adhered to by all participants. It is an ex-
post concept, meaning that a just price has been paid and received.
While justice regulates and limits selfishness, beneficence rises above it.
Moreover, participants in the market are not only responsible for their
own just behavior, but because of the obligation of “enjoining the good
and forbidding the evil” they are also made responsible for the behavior of
their fellow participants. Islam maintains that when a man sees another
committing an injustice toward a third and fails to attempt to remove that
injustice, he becomes a party to that injustice. If the person failing to help
is himself a beneficiary of this injustice, then his failure is considered tan-
tamount to supporting it. Although provisions are made for coercive and
corrective action by legitimate authorities, the clear preference is for self-
management of the market. Any interference in the operations of such
a market—through price controls, for example—is considered unjust, and
a transgression.
5.4 Redistributive Justice

The last component of Islamic economic justice, distributive justice, is the
mechanism by which equal liberty and equity are reconciled without the
least possible infringement. Insofar as the distribution of resources—the just
and equal access to these resources, as well as equal opportunity in their
use—is guaranteed, the claim to equity on the basis of reward and effort is
just. The moral basis of property is the primacy given to equity and it is
derived directly from human efforts and achievements.15
Assuming equal liberty and opportunity, whenever work has to be per-
formed for the production of wealth, the output of humans may vary
greatly both in quality and quantity. Equity then demands that, commen-
surate with their productivity, humans receive different rewards. Hence,
starting from the equality of liberty and opportunity of access to resources,
equity may lead to inequality. Moreover, the allocation of resources arising
from the operation of the market will reflect the initial distribution of
Askari et al. (2015, 2016), Mirakhor (1989).

15
5.4 REDISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE 123
wealth as well as the structure of the market. Assuming that both the
operation and the structure of the market are just, there is no logical rea-
son to assume that the market outcome will automatically and naturally
lead to relatively equal wealth distribution. Consequently, the result may
be (and often is) that inequalities, equitably created, will have immediate
and longer-term implications. It is here that the distributive mechanisms
of Islamic economic justice attempt to modify inequalities that are equita-
bly created.
As we saw earlier, Islam recognizes claims based on equality of liberty
and opportunity, which are reflected in the degree of access to resources,
the degree and extent of the ability of persons to actualize their potential
liberty and opportunity, and the right of prior ownership. The right that
the less able have in the wealth of those who have greater ability and
opportunity to produce greater wealth is redeemed through the various
levies (zakat, khums, sadaqa, nafaqa, and so on), the payment of which is
not beneficence but a contractual obligation that must be met. Islam also
encourages beneficence over and above these obligatory dues, but these
levies are in the nature of returning to others what rightfully belongs to
them. Shirking from this obligation causes a misdistribution of wealth,
which Islam considers as the major source of poverty.
In Islam, the rules of inheritance modify the distribution of wealth to
the next generation based on the principle that the right of the owner to
his wealth ceases upon his death. The power of the person to bequeath
his wealth as he wishes is recognized, but is basically restricted to a maxi-
mum of one-third of his net assets. The Qur’an (4:11–12) clearly speci-
fies the exact manner in which the shares of heirs are to be determined
in inheritance. Among the same category of heirs there is neither prefer-
ential treatment nor discrimination, though a woman’s share is generally
one-half of a man’s share because, under the rules of the Shari’ah,
responsibility for the maintenance of the family rests upon the husband.
Even if the wife has a larger income and greater wealth (from her own
work or from inheritance), she is not required to share that wealth or
income with her husband and is under no legal obligation to make any
contribution toward her family. Considering the nature of the (extended)
family ties and mutual responsibilities exhorted by Islam, its institution
of inheritance breaks up the wealth of each generation and redistributes
it to the next in such a way that a large number should receive a modest
portion of such wealth, rather than it going to a single heir or a small
number heirs.
5.5 Role of Regulations16

The complexity of the financial system is reflective of the complexity of the
financial relations underlying its structure. Financial relations driven by
debt arrangements are characterized by risk transfers. The incompleteness
of markets places a constraint on the ability of economic agents to hedge
against risks. But it is the incompleteness of contracts that places even
stronger constraints on their ability to share risks inherent to economic
activity. The negative externalities and regulators’ capture and lack of
incentives to reduce risks, manifested by the existence of moral hazards,
are the natural result of a regulatory approach based on deposit insurance
and prudential supervision. The regulatory framework for debt-based
financial systems is thus, by necessity, complex. When financial relations
are based on risk sharing, however, economic activities are undertaken by
agents with full knowledge and awareness of systematic and unsystematic
risks and according to their ability to bear risks.
In particular, risk sharing is more conducive to information sharing and
it implies thus a reduction of agency cost problems due to information
asymmetry. As argued by Mirakhor (2014), a compelling argument can be
made that the regulation of risk sharing financial systems would be less
complicated and more effective than risk transfer—and debt-dominated
financial systems. The risk sharing financial system precludes fractional
reserve banking, which facilitates risk transfers. It excludes interest-based
transactions, which are conducive to the pro-cyclicality of the financial
system. It also operates within the confines of an institutional framework
governed by a network of rules of behavior aimed at achieving a just and
efficient distribution of financial resources to the economy.
The need for a simplified regulatory framework is also compelling in
light of the recurrence of credit crises. Brunnermeier et al. (2009) argue
that in light of the recurrent character of banking crises, it is not sufficient
to simply reinforce the basic structure of a regulatory mechanism that has
failed to prevent the formation of the cycles in the first place. Also, Drew
(2010) contends that the US financial crisis presents a direct challenge to
conventional wisdom regarding the integrity of the global financial archi-
tecture and warrants a new paradigm of financial regulation. The structural
changes should not be confined to routine reassessment of systemic risk,
reformulation of internal risk control models, or recalibration of regula-
tory agencies. The argument by Prates (2013) that prudential regulation
See Maghrebi et al. (2016).

16
5.5 ROLE OF REGULATIONS 125
cannot prevent financial crises may be understood in light of the dynamics

of the financial system and complexity of regulatory enforcement.
A paradigm shift in financial regulation may be difficult without recog-
nizing the nature and complexity of financial arrangements themselves.
These difficulties stem from the inherent instability of the financial sys-
tem, which is related to the incompleteness of contracts. The source of
financial instability does not lie in aggregate shocks related to the uncer-
tain outcomes of economic activity. When contracts are complete in the
sense that payoffs are contingent on states of nature, risk sharing can be
conducive to the alignment of incentives and reduction, if not elimina-
tion, of moral hazards associated with systemic prudential regulation and
deposit insurance. It is noted that Islamic finance has no systemic risk, as
argued by Askari et al. (2010), and this crucially implies that there is no
economic rationale for systemic regulation either. There is thus greater
clarity in the definition of the objectives of financial regulation. As argued
by Mirakhor (2014), prohibition of interest-based financing and reliance
on risk-sharing arrangements based instead on rates of return to the real
sector are not merely indicative of the adherence to a set of behavioral
norms prescribed in al-Qur’an and as-Sunnah. These conditions also pave
the way for a regulatory approach to financial stability that does away with
fractional reserve banking and deposit insurance, and focuses solely on
the structure of the balance sheets of financial intermediaries. The risk-
sharing nature of financing relations brings some clarity to financial regu-
lation and possible remedies to complexity deriving from the dominance
of debt, transfer of risk, and proliferation of moral hazards.
Whereas the primary objective of contractual arrangements in debt
financing is to protect investors against the risk of default on promised
payments, alternative financing based on equity and risk sharing pro-
mote the incentives for information sharing and reduce moral hazards.
Given the nature of risk-sharing relations, regulation of the financial sys-
tem can be guided by the following principles about the maturities of
assets and liabilities and the levels of risk and valuation. First, materiality-
matching structure implies that the nominal value of each financial
transaction is matched with the value of real assets such that the expected
payoffs to stakeholders in financial intermediaries are reflective of the
rates of return to the real sector of the economy. Second, risk-matching
structure is required to ensure that no asset is associated with a more
risky corresponding element on the liabilities side. Third, maturity-
matching structure imposes a strict correspondence of assets to liabilities
with similar maturities. Fourth, value-matching structure requires that
price fluctuations leading to asset re-evaluation are systematically offset

by appropriate changes on the liabilities side.17 Fifth, full transparency is
required about each item on both sides of balance sheets. Sixth, gover-
nance structure requires that all stakeholders in financial intermediaries
are empowered with the appropriate rights of participation in the deci-
sion-making process. These guiding principles provide greater clarity to
the debate about the objectives of financial regulation. The balance sheet
structures of financial intermediaries are fundamentally altered when
financial relations are founded on the concept of sharing rather than
transferring risks and when financial returns are completely determined
by the real sector of the economy. These conditions provide an inner
adjustment process through which any mismatch in terms of maturity,
risk, value, or linkage with the real economy is systematically corrected.
The corrective dynamics of b alance sheet structures can take place with-
out undermining the crucial functions of financial intermediaries in the
economy, which lie essentially in the provision of payment services and
conduits of savings toward real investment.
It can be also argued, as in Askari et al. (2010), that Islamic finance has
reduced systemic risk, and this implies that there is thus little rationale for
systemic regulation. Thus from the macro-prudential perspective, the
supervisory function of regulatory agencies does not rely on the identifica-
tion of “too-big-to-fail” or “too-connected-to-fail” financial institutions.
The existence of systemic risk is due to the web of interdependencies and
the interconnectedness of financial intermediaries. But, irrespective of the
degree of connectedness or size of balance sheets, the idiosyncratic event
of bank failure is not necessarily conducive to increased systemic risk.
Liquidity shocks can be absorbed through risk sharing arrangements even
in the absence of markets for Arrow securities, which would otherwise
allow for hedging against liquidity shortages. Conventional theory sug-
gests that bank panics tend to exacerbate business cycle downturns as
shown by Zarnowitz (1992), and that deposit insurance can be useful in
preventing bank crises. But it can be also argued that the need for such
insurance does not arise when interest-free deposits made for investment
purposes are state-contingent. As such, these deposits do not constitute
insured debt-like obligations, and they do not appear on the liabilities side
of balance sheets of financial intermediaries.
17
It may be argued that the concept of value-matching structure is consistent with the
marking-to-market process, which underlies the fair value accounting rules set forth by the
Financial Accounting Standards Board and the organized exchange of futures contracts.
5.5 ROLE OF REGULATIONS 127
The symbiotic nature of financing relations and the regulatory

framework aimed primarily at avoiding abuses of the financial system also
warrants the rethinking of the central bank’s monetary policy transmission
and its role as lender of last resort. Under the conditions that financing is
founded on risk sharing rather than debt, regulatory concerns about credit
risk associated with lending activities by commercial banks and shadow
banking system are rather limited. The transmission of monetary policy
through interest rate channels is also impeded in the absence of lending
and borrowing cycles, but the effects of credit distress on the real sector
are also distilled. The isolation of the credit channel of monetary policy
from other transmission channels is also useful in distinguishing between
money and bank credit, as discussed in many studies such as Brunner and
Meltzer (1972), among others. The prohibition of interest does not
impair monetary policy in an Islamic economy. There is also evidence that
monetary policy is still effective under zero-interest rates. Mishkin argues
that the notion that monetary policy would be ineffective in stimulating
the economy when short-term nominal interest rates approach their zero-
bound is “demonstrably false.” (1996, p. 22) The substitution of rates of
interest by rates of return from the real sector weakens the influence of
interest rates on financial cycles and the extent of systemic risk. It can be
thus argued that to some extent, the rationale for the central bank’s role
as lender of last resort melts away in the absence of leverage in the balance
sheets of financial intermediaries.
Thus, Islamic finance considers the role of economic uncertainty and
focuses on the completeness of markets and completeness of contracts to
manage risks in the financial system. As noted by Rocco (2012), there are
at least two dimensions to uncertainty and risk, including the temporal and
cross-sectional dimensions. There are indeed risks that derive from changes
in the prevailing state of nature over time as well as from the imperfect
knowledge of the states of nature. Thus, the occurrence of financial crises
may not be entirely predictable, and the values at risk or expected losses may
not be fully hedgeable given the incompleteness of markets. Nevertheless,
from the complementary perspectives of regulatory reform and contract
theory, there is a pressing need to ensure that the concerned parties, as
argued by Lo (2009), bear the appropriate risks. The reliance of prudential
regulation on an elusive definition of systemic risk, more transparency in the
shadow banking system, new definitions of leverage ratios, and counter
cyclical capital ratios cannot absolve from the necessity of promoting
financial systems dominated by risk-sharing arrangements.
Given its inherent instability, suggestions for regulatory reforms of the

financial system, such as those offered by Stiglitz (2010), among others,
take the form of restrictions on credit and leverage on and off balance
sheets. The controls on credit expansion can be achieved through higher
capital adequacy requirements and restrictions on proprietary-bank trad-
ing, and can tilt the balance toward more equity than debt in the financial
system.18 It may be argued that under a fractional reserve banking system
and deposit insurance, no amount of regulation can eliminate the risk of
financial crises, which are related to credit cycles. In this respect, Chamely
et al. (2012) note that deposits contracts are not essential to liquidity risk
sharing and that the elimination of fractional reserve banking would
restrict the money multiplier to unity without undermining the role of
central banks in the determination of the money supply. Convergence in
favor of equity can be also achieved through contingent convertible capital
instruments. These hybrid securities, part debt and part equity, turn auto-
matically into common shares at times of financial distress.19 This provides
a role for convertible capital, increasing the loss-absorbing capacity of
banks and thereby their degree of risk bearing as well. There is indeed a
risk-sharing function for bank capital, which provides, as argued by Allen
and Gale (2009), a cushion against loss of deposits in the event of bank
failure. It is thus clear that arguments about bearing appropriate risks are
consistent with the principle of risk sharing that underlies investment rela-
tions in Islamic finance.
5.6 Governance and Prudence20

The one thing that all economists and financial experts can surely agree
upon is the importance of institutions in all areas of economic activity. In
the case of Islamic finance, as its operational essence is risk sharing, it calls
for the promotion of the development of an institutional environment that
18
In addition to automatic recapitalization, the resolution plans according to which too-
big-to-fail financial institutions would, under certain conditions, liquidate themselves in an
organized manner without precipitating widespread panic and increasing systemic risk are
consistent with the notion of contingent claims. The so-called living wills define the terms
under which liquidation can take place and facilitate, to some extent, the convergence toward
the completeness of contracts.
19
Reference can be made to the study by Avdjiev et al. (2013) for an interesting discussion
about the structure, issuance, and pricing of contingent convertible-capital instruments.
20
For further details, see Iqbal and Mirakhor (2004, 2011).
5.6 GOVERNANCE AND PRUDENCE 129
is conducive for market participants to implement risk-sharing principles.

An enabling environment where risk and reward are shared in a fair and
systematic manner, rather than being transferred or shifted, can further
foster trustworthiness, social solidarity, cooperation, and the protection of
property rights.
The framework of the governance system in Islam can be best under-
stood in light of the virtues concerning property rights of the individual,
society, and state; the laws governing property ownership; and the frame-
work of contracts. Islam’s recognition and protection of rights is not lim-
ited to human beings only, but encompasses all forms of life as well as the
environment. Each element of creation has been endowed with certain
rights and each is obligated to respect and honor the rights of others.
These rights are bundled with the responsibilities for which humans are
held accountable. The Shari’ah offers a comprehensive framework to
identify, recognize, respect, and protect the rights of every individual,
community, society, and the state. Islamic scholars and jurists have defined
and codified detailed principles identifying these rights.
Islam demands high standards of ethical behavior from everyone in soci-
ety, but emphasizes these standards for those who govern or represent oth-
ers. Within the framework of economic justice, emphasis is placed on being
mindful to give full measure and weight in all business transactions. Taken
in conjunction with the principles of property rights, it establishes an
important rule of business that full measure and weight is not limited to
physical quantities but is equally applicable to measuring intangible rights
and obligations. In other words, it is the responsibility of those in charge of
others’ property—tangible or intangible, financial or nonfinancial, explicit
or implicit—to ensure that all obligations are accounted for with great care
and all claims and rights are returned in full to the rightful recipient.
In Islam, the behavior expected of a firm is not any different from the
behavior of any other member of the society. Since the firm itself does
not have a conscience, the behavior of its managers becomes the behav-
ior of the firm and their actions are subject to the same high standards of
moral and ethical commitment expected of a Muslim. In other words,
the firm’s economic and moral behavior is shaped by its managers acting
on behalf of the owners and it becomes their fiduciary duty to manage
the firm as a trust for all stakeholders and not for the owners alone.
Consequently, it is incumbent upon the managers to ensure that the
behavior of the firm conforms to the principles and rules of the Shari’ah.
If there is any deviation, institutional arrangements discourage it.
The framework of a corporate governance system in the Islamic eco-

nomic system, therefore, entails implementation of a rule-based incentive
system in which compliance with the rules ensures an efficient governance
system to preserve social justice and order among all members of society.
This implies institutions and rules that are designed to compel managers
to internalize the welfare of all stakeholders. The rights that are claimed
for stakeholders are not ends in themselves—which ought to be recog-
nized in any form of economic organization—but a means of protecting
constituency rights.21 In an Islamic system, the observance of the rules of
behavior guarantees the internalization of stakeholder rights (including
those of the society at large). No other institutional structure is needed. It
is the Islamic government that specifies the appropriate corporate -gover-
nance structure, “incorporating all stakeholders’ rights into fiduciary
duties of managers” of the firm on behalf of none—investors or stakehold-
ers. So no other institutional arrangement that would allow individual
noninvestor stakeholders to negotiate directly with the firm is necessary.
Incorporating all stakeholders’ rights into the fiduciary duties of managers
is counterproductive and leads to suboptimal results. The important point
is that each stakeholder is given the freedom of bargaining to protect their
rights and there are systematic institutional arrangements in place to pro-
vide protection and to mediate where disputes and disagreements arise.
Islam governs the behavior of leaders no less stringently than that of
individuals. Although each member of society is expected to exhibit high
moral values in the observance of contracts and covenants, many scholars
are of the view that these requirements apply with even greater force to the
actions of leaders. Therefore, a breach of faith on the part of a leader is
more heinous in its nature and more serious in its consequences than a
similar breach by an ordinary individual.
The current financial crisis has highlighted the role of managers and
corporate leaders in shaping the crisis: the lack of transparency, greed,
misrepresentation, fraud, and breach of trust displayed by certain finan-
cial managers and leaders all contributed to the chaos. Collins (2009) has
observed the corporate behavior of leaders and identified the different
stages they might go through during the course of a fall—from the hubris
of considering success as an entitlement, to the undisciplined pursuit of
more (more scale, more growth, more acclaim, more of whatever they see
as “success”), to putting a positive spin on ambiguous data and being
Boatright (2002).
21
REFERENCES 131
unable to accept responsibility for setbacks. Such behavior was prevalent

across the industry in the lead-up to the current financial crisis.
Leaders who are fully conscious of their responsibilities, limitations,
and obligations as expected in Islam would never fall into behavior that
would promote arrogance, ignorance, greed, deceitfulness, nontranspar-
ency, and delinquency. To assist the development of leaders with higher
moral and ethical values, integrity, introspection, and humility, the gover-
nance infrastructure needs to be strengthened.22 These principles define
the social norms in Islam that determine the behavior expected of
individuals and institutions and establish a set of socially approved values.
While the values and expectations in any given society may shift or change
with the passage of time, Islamic values are inviolable at all times. Therefore,
these values set a benchmark against which the behavior of individuals and
institutions will be judged.
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CHAPTER 6
Sacralizing Finance: Risk-Sharing

Islamic Finance
Finance can be thought of as an engine of transformation and intermediation

that bridges gaps between financial surplus and deficit units, between now
and the future, and between certainty of now and uncertainty of the
future. It transforms value through maturity and risk transformation. This
crucial function can be considered the reason for the existence of finance.
It creates incentives for surplus units to postpone the certainty of their
financial resources now to the uncertainty of, and presumably, higher
amount of these resources in the future. It also encourages the deficit units
to bring the future, uncertain plans forward to the more certain present.
Both units take risks. In other words, finance makes both units risk takers.
The surplus units risk their resources now for more in a highly uncertain
future; the deficit units risk being able to validate their obligations with a
higher income stream in an uncertain future. How can finance become
sacralized? The answer lies in paradigm governing finance. Sacralized
finance requires a paradigm that focuses on: concerns for others rather
than on pure self-interest; morality and ethics; giving instead of taking;
cooperation rather than competition; being instead of having; and sharing
the risks and uncertainties of life rather transferring or shifting them to
others. Finance is sacralized (sanctified) when all the elements of the para-
digm are based on the rules prescribed by the Creator. Risk-sharing Islamic
See also Mirakhor et al. (2017).

DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-66390-6_6
136 6 SACRALIZING FINANCE: RISK-SHARING ISLAMIC FINANCE
finance meets these conditions. The rest of this paper attempts to address
the risk-sharing paradigm.
As stated earlier, finance exists because of its ability to transform and
manage risk and uncertainty. Humans live under conditions of uncer-
tainty because the future is unknown. According to John Maynard
Keynes, our knowledge of the future is vague, fluctuating, and uncertain.
While the future is unknown, some events occur often enough that it is
possible to structure frequency distributions that provide a measure of
probability of events. In that case, uncertainty converts to risk. However,
the environment of risk and uncertainty in real life can hardly be charac-
terized as one in which risks are static and quantifiable, as commonly
assumed by the prevailing standard theories of decision making. In real-
ity, risks are not easily quantifiable by the expedient assumption of known
distributions (Taleb 2012). For most economic and financial decisions,
agents are faced with many “unknown unknowns.”1 The distribution of
payoff to an economic enterprise is not known in advance with precision.
Over time, unanticipated and unknowable changes in circumstances and
structures often defy Bayesian reduction. In the literature, such an
environment of uncertainty is characterized as Knightian uncertainty or
ambiguity (Ng et al. 2015).
The question arises as to why risk and uncertainty exist. This issue
becomes more acute for those who believe in the Creator of all things.
Since it is believed that existence of risk and uncertainty is a source of dif-
ficulty for humans, a Creator centric question also arises: why create risk
and uncertainty for humans? Bartholomeu (2008) argues that “a plausible
argument for the necessity of risk is that it serves as an important ingredient
in the recipe of full human development. It provides the fertility and diver-
sity of experience to develop our skills and personalities” (p. 230). From
the Islamic perspective, the Qur’an provides a more compelling explana-
tion: the optimum path of growth and development of humans is defined
by compliance with rules prescribed by their Creator. Humans are sub-
jected to tests throughout their lives to give them a sense of the degree to
which they, individually and collectively, are rule compliant (see for exam-
ple 2: 155; 76: 2; 29: 2–3; 9: 126; 11: 7 of the Qur’an). Without risk and
1
Many possible outcomes cannot even be clearly imagined, let alone tested against histori-
cal records. For example, how will the convergence of genetics and computer science affect
the life expectancy of future generations? Quantification of risk is no longer possible using
traditional models and tools.
6 SACRALIZING FINANCE: RISK-SHARING ISLAMIC FINANCE 137
uncertainty, testing would not be possible. To ease the anxiety in dealing

with tests and to reduce uncertainty and the demand on humans’ cognitive
ability, the Qur’an prescribes rules of behavior. Principal among these rules
is risk sharing (Mirakhor et al. 2012).
Risk can be defined in terms of changes in values of an asset between
two dates. Risk is related to the variability of future value of a position due
to market changes or more generally due to uncertain events. Uncertainty
relates to knowledge across time horizons. The longer the horizon, the
more radical uncertainty becomes. In a sense, finance exists to create coor-
dination between the known present and a radically uncertain future. That
is, finance brings together surplus fund holders who have delayed their
present consumption to the future and deficit finance units who are bring-
ing their future consumption forward in time.
Recently, the former Governor of the Bank of England, Mervyn King,
published a book called The End of Alchemy. In this book, King (2016)
argues that banking now lives in a state of radical uncertainty. King calls
the power of banks to create money out of thin air as Alchemy. To do this,
banks convert short-term deposits, which can be withdrawn upon demand,
into long-term loans through leverage, thanks to the fractional reserve
system. The former central banker argues that the risk of this arrangement
cannot possibly be measured for regulatory purposes because there are too
many unknowns and unknowable states of the world. Therefore, risk-
weighted capital requirements are misleading.2 Hence, he recommends
much higher capital in relation to all assets of the bank. Andrew Sheng,
another former central banker, thought that Basel III will not prevent the
next crisis: “The world is not short of credit. It is short of equity in both
the sense of more capital to cushion unknown risks for the 99 % and more
fairness in the system. That is something outside the remit of bankers and
bank regulators. So, I humbly submit that Basel III will fix some of the
problems of yesterday, but not the crisis of tomorrow” (Sheng 2014).
Faced with radical uncertainty and limited human cognitive capacity
(Camerer et al. 2005; Kahneman 2003), societies have three ways to man-
age risk: transfer it, shift it, or share it. Risk transfer is when, among two
2
King uses the example of Northern Rock—a big mortgage lender whose failure in 2007
tipped the UK’s financial system into crisis. According to standard regulatory measures,
Northern Rock had the highest ratio of capital to risk- weighted assets of any major bank.
The error lay in inferring that, based on decades of data, mortgages were low- risk loans.
King recommends that banks should provide the banks with a pledge of their assets as col-
lateral. See also Haldane and Madouros (2012).
parties, one party completely transfers the associated risks to the other
with the consent and acknowledgement of that party. However, in risk
shifting, these risks are shifted to a third party or parties without their
knowledge or consent, and they end up bearing all the risks and the associ-
ated adverse outcomes. A prime example could be the 2007–2008 global
financial crisis: first, the risks were transferred through mortgage securiti-
zations, and then, once the mortgage bubble busted, those risks were
eventually shifted to the general taxpayers (without their knowledge or
consent). The result is, for example, higher taxes due to government bail-
outs of financial institutions hit by the crisis.3
A financial system based on risk sharing would be more stable than one
based on risk transfer and on risk shifting. A main source of stability is the
elimination of the interest-rate- based credit system, which has evidently
created financial crises, distortions, unemployment, inflation, and unjust
wealth redistribution (Mirakhor et al. 2012). In essence, risk sharing is a
“contractual or societal arrangement whereby the outcome of a random
event is borne collectively by a group of individuals or entities participat-
ing in an exchange contract, or by individuals or entities in a community”
(Askari et al. 2011, pp. 70–71). Agents share benefits and costs in equi-
table proportions a la Arrow (1971) where efficient risk sharing means
allocation of risk according to the ability of individual to bear it. In Islamic
finance, there are different mechanisms for risk sharing, including the
muḍārabah and mushārakah financial instruments for equity partnership
initiatives. There are also other redistributive institutions for risk sharing
such as obligatory levies of zakāh, and noncompulsory benevolent loans
qarḍ ḥasan and charity ṣadaqah, and institutional endowment waqf.
Finally, the inheritance levies constitute also a form of intergenerational
redistribution of wealth and risks among the inheritors (Maghrebi and
Mirakhor 2015). The idea of risk sharing goes back to the emergence of
first agricultural and commercial human societies. Nor is it entirely foreign
to conventional financial wisdom. Nobel laureate Professor Robert Shiller,
for example, is an advocate of risk-sharing instruments, arguing that risk
sharing has much to contribute to the growth of economies and to social
solidarity. As an instrument for social integration, risk sharing enhances
human interaction and brings humanity closer to unity by requiring
3
Central banks create credit, but banks allocate it through loans, by transforming short-
term loan deposits into long-term financial and real investment multiple of the initial credit
created by the central banks through leverage.
6 SACRALIZING FINANCE: RISK-SHARING ISLAMIC FINANCE 139
humans to share the risks of life with one another. Risk sharing also eases
coordination and informational and collective action problems. Further, it
allows parties to a transaction to maximize expected joint rewards, thereby
promoting cooperation among all economic agents and facilitate collec-
tive action. This is further translated into close relationship between the
real and financial sectors of the economy where risk is distributed through
sharing contracts. The net effect of such fundamental linkage is greater
stability of the financial system; crucially important in light of the recur-
ring episodes of financial crises stemming from the phenomenon of decou-
pling of the real and financial sector, and the emergence of a “paper
economy” (Khan and Mirakhor 1987; Ng et al. 2015; Presley and Sessions
1994; Tobin 1984).
In this chapter, two myths and realities are discussed in the context of
risk sharing. The first myth is that future payoffs on contingent claims have
to be fixed because of risk and uncertainty. Therefore, contracts need to be
complete in such that debt is treated as less risky than equity. However, the
reality is that contracts are incomplete because they cannot include all
the information to ensure that the interests of both parties are served by
the contract. An interest rate based debt contract is an “impossible con-
tract,” since under the standard axioms of economics (self-interest, scarcity,
and rationality) the borrower has an incentive not to repay the loan. Debt
contracts cannot include provisions of truth-telling, speculative risk tak-
ing, malfeasance, and other actions that affect the borrower’s promise to
repay. The problem of exchanging an amount of money now for a certain
larger amount in the future is that the amount in the future is validated
(underwritten) by a supposed stream of income that is radically uncertain
(unknown unknowns). Making debt contract a complete contract with all
possible contingencies would have a detrimental impact on society.
The second myth is that risk-sharing contracts are costly and demand
more information than debt based contracts. The reality is that risk-sharing
contracts are incentive-compatible contracts because there is an incentive
structure in place to elicit truth-telling, trust, cooperation, hard work, and
efficiency in resource management; factors that could not be written into
contracts and enforced. Hence, these contracts attenuate coordination
problems and improve the efficiency of outcomes. Without this incentive
structure, there are considerable transaction, monitoring, and enforce-
ment costs involved in designing and implementing contracts. The new
realities of platform’s network effects, big data, and machine learning can
equip decision makers, contractual parties, and investors with informed
decision making tools and valuable insights that can identify new sources
of value that have never been visible before. This not only reduces the
higher risk associated with equity investment as perceived by market par-
ticipants, but also creates shared value in micro, small, and medium enter-
prises (MSMEs).
In the following section, the unsustainability of risk transfer and
shifting will be highlighted in the context of impossible contract and
inequality.
6.1 Is the Regime of Risk Transfer Sustainable?

Impossible Contract and Inequality
The axioms of economics (scarcity, self-interest, and rationality) model
man as an acquisitive, self-interest-motivated, noncooperative, nonsym-
pathetic individual with perfect foresight and full information, as well as
having perfect cognitive ability to choose among alternatives the one that
served his or her self-interest the best. Such an individual entering the
market would be highly motivated to maximize gains that serve his or her
own self-interest. Hence, a person would have incentives to violate con-
tract terms that do not give him or her maximum advantage. Since both
sides of a contract are presumed to meet the axioms of economics, there
is no incentive for them to cooperate. Contract theory developed during
the 1980s asserts that unless contracts contain an incentive structure
compelling participants to cooperate, contracts become impossible.4
Generally, all fixed-fee contracts are of this type. For example, in fixed-
wage contracts, the employees have an incentive not to be as productive
as they could since they get their wages as dictated by the self-interest
axiom. Experimental economics, however, showed that not only are
humans cooperative, they are sympathetic, other-regarding, and engage
in reciprocity (Bowles and Gintis 2011). In other words, they violate the
axiom of self-interest. Behavioral experiments provided evidence that
they not only share, even when amounts involved are high, they are will-
ing to punish unfair behavior, even if it costs them, and express social
preference of “inequality aversion” (Cameron 1999; Fehr and Gaechter
2000; Fong 2001, 2007).
4
Note the 2016 Noble prize granted Oliver Hart and Bengt Holmstrom for their work on
contract theory that began in the 1970s.
6.1 IS THE REGIME OF RISK TRANSFER SUSTAINABLE?... 141
Another set of assumptions of the analytic framework is the idea of

complete markets, complete contracts, and that all contracts are costless to
enforce. That this set of assumptions is unrealistic had already been noted
by economists in the 1970s. The economic theory of contracts suggested
that contracts are incomplete because they cannot include all the informa-
tion that participants to an exchange need to ensure that the interests of
both parties are served by the contract. Hence, contracts are incomplete.
For example, a labor contract cannot include many factors—such as the
level of effort, honesty, trust—that influence the actions of participants in
an employment contract which, in turn, impact the interest of the other
party but cannot be covered by the contract. Contract theory terms the
conflict between the two sides of a contract resulting from its incomplete-
ness as the principal–agent problem that leads to coordination failures
between the interests and actions of the parties to the contract.
Coordination failures are results of independent actions of contracting
parties and lead to sub-optimal results.
A major contention of contract theory is that the principal–agent
problem arises because the incentive structure of contracts is not effi-
cient to elicit the kind of behavior from participants that can serve the
interests of both parties. This idea gave birth to the field of incentive
economics (Leffont 2000). Incentive economics searches for contracts
where both parties have sufficient incentive to achieve efficient out-
comes to improve the gains from exchange for both as compared to
contracts without such incentives. These are referred to as incentive-
compatible contracts. Examples of such contracts are those in the labor
and financial markets where the agents become residual claimants, in
effect they become property rights owners (have “skin-in-the-game”)
and thus become principals themselves.
Performance-based contracts attempt to be “incentive-compatible”
contracts. In 1986, Martin Weitzman published a book, called The Share
Economy in which he argued that a wage contract in which a firm agreed to
share its profit with the workers would be an incentive-compatible con-
tract. It would lead to higher employment, higher output, and higher
income, thus enabling borrowers to pay back loans. Under the Weitzman
system, firms always have the incentive to employ more (productive) work-
ers because each additional work is remunerated only a fraction of the share
of the revenue he or she brings into the firm. Large corporations such as
General Motors and Eastern Airlines have taken the initiatives to imple-
ment profit and revenue sharing. An example of an incentive-compatible
contract in the financial market is a risk sharing contract where the risk and
reward of the project subject of the contract are shared between the two
sides of the contract (Askari et al. 2011). The major advantage of these
types of incentive-compatible contracts is that because agents are residual
claimants, contracts enhance productivity. There is an incentive structure in
place to elicit truth-telling, trust, cooperation, hard work, and efficiency in
resource management; factors that could not be written into contracts and
enforced. Hence, these contracts attenuate coordination problems and
improve the efficiency of outcomes. Without this incentive structure, there
are considerable transaction, monitoring, and enforcement costs involved
in designing and implementing contracts.
In risk transfer and risk shifting financial systems, an interest rate based
debt contract is an “impossible contract,” since, under the axioms of con-
ventional economics, the borrower has an incentive not to repay the loan.
Debt contracts cannot include provisions of truth-telling, speculative risk
taking, malfeasance, and other actions that affect the borrower’s promise
to repay. The problem of exchanging an amount of money now for a cer-
tain larger amount in the future is that the amount in the future is vali-
dated (underwritten) by a supposed stream of income that is radically
uncertain (unknown unknowns). As previously discussed, an interest rate
based debt contract makes this impossible contract possible, i.e., making
an uncertain future certain, by creating a virtual world of certainty through
mechanisms such as collateral requirements and an edifice of legal, admin-
istrative, policy incentive mechanisms that include positive (e.g., tax write-
offs) and negative (e.g., legal enforcement) dimensions that protect the
creditor. The society has to bear huge costs to make them possible. These
costs (plus the costs of insuring deposits) become subsidies to creditors
(banks) at the expense of the taxpayers.
Insidiously, debt compels people to work longer and consume more,
and thus generates even higher debt levels and lesser leisure time. In the
UK, the increase in the average working week over the past two decades
has coincided with a rise in household debt-to-income ratio (unfortunately,
shopping and convenience foods are serving as a relief from debt-related
overwork). In many parts of the world, mortgages have catapulted to five
to six times the household income. Historically, a mortgage was the last
resort of a landowner or farmer. Only when faced with the risk of losing a
secure means of subsistence that threatens the loss of life and well-being
would a person mortgage his or her land. Such danger of a debt treadmill
can probably be associated with the Latin origin of the word “mortgage”:
morte (death) and gage (pledge), or “grip of death.” For such reasons,
religious laws have proscribed usury—making money out of money, and
worse still, making money out of thin air in today’s context—for over
4000 years (Conaty and Lewis 2010, 2012).
In modern times, doubts about the sustainability of a system based on
interest -rate debt financing were expressed as early as the 1930s. John
Maynard Keynes argued in his book The General Theory of Employment,
Interest and Money in 1936 that market capitalism, left to itself, would cre-
ate two major problems which, if not addressed, would cause system fail-
ure. These are (a) poor income and wealth distribution; and (b) the fact
that this system is incapable of creating full employment. A major cause of
these problems, Keynes asserted, was the interest rate mechanism that
constituted “the villain of the piece” (Mirakhor and Krichene 2009).5
When debt is inflated over time through the “magic wand of compound
interest,” wealth created by people working in the productive economy is
redirected to creditors in the form of interest payments. For example, in
Germany up to 50 percent of the costs of essential goods could be linked
to compound interest. The GDP growth rates (600 percent) and net
incomes (300 percent) between 1950 and 2000 were far outweighed by
the money supply in the country (2600 percent) (Conaty and Lewis,
2010, 2012).6 Almost a decade after the global financial crisis in 2008, the
world is suffering from a debt hangover of unprecedented proportions,
and have experienced the negative ramifications of numerous sovereign
debt crises. As of 2015, public and private debt in the nonfinancial sector
alone was estimated to be US$ 152 trillion or 225 percent of the global
GDP, according to the IMF in its Fiscal Monitor report. What has emerged
from many authoritative research works on the causes of the financial cri-
ses is a toxic nexus of:
Fractional Reserves → Credit → Debt → Leverage → Financial Crisis →

Economic Downturn → Inequality and Poverty
While the concern with the twin problems of inequality and poverty
dates back to the earliest recorded history as a dimension of justice, one of
5
Keynes’ solution was the “euthanasia of the rentier” by socializing financial resources
through which financial capital would be provided for investment without the intermedia-
tion of the rent-seeking class of the money lenders.
6
See research of Margarit Kennedy and Helmut Creutz.
the most significant post-crisis phenomena has been the depth and intensity
of mainstream economics’ concern with inequality. Part of this concern can
be explained by the depth and breadth of inequality that has now become
global. The shock of the financial crisis of 2007–2008 led to the search for
its underlying causes. Aside from technical reasons, attention was also
focused on the general moral failure on the part of major financial institu-
tions. The focus now became “getting-the-values-right.” The argument
was that these institutions, in their pursuit of greed, had betrayed their
fiduciary responsibilities and had committed “economic crimes against
humanity” (Zuboff 2009). The policy implication here suggests the need
for a greater emphasis on meta-economic values by focusing on the devel-
opment of the social and moral capital of societies. The publication of the
painstaking empirical research of Thomas Piketty and his colleagues show-
ing that inequality of income and wealth was increasing and that the top
income earners were receiving the lion’s portion of income has heightened
concern with inequality and has shifted policy attention to “getting-the-
distribution-right” (Alvaredo et al. 2013; Piketty and Saez 2003, 2006).
There are other important inefficiencies of high asset concentration
in terms of lost opportunities to would-be entrepreneurs, investors, and
innovators who could well enhance the productivity of the economy
but for being asset-poor. There is considerable evidence that asset-poor
entrepreneurs are either shut out of credit markets or have to pay higher
rates than those with a higher level of wealth. Asset-poor investors are
forced to accept much lower rates of return on their meager assets than
their wealthier counterparts. Bowles (2012, p. 37) argues that
where contracts in financial markets are incomplete or unenforceable, indi-

viduals lacking in wealth are either precluded from engaging in a class of
contracts that are available to the wealthy, or enter into these contracts on
unfavourable terms.
The reason
why an individual’s amount of wealth influences the kinds of contract she

can engage in is that only those with sufficient wealth can undertake projects
on their own account, that is without borrowing. And, among those who
borrow, those with more wealth borrow on better terms. This is because
greater wealth on the part of the agent allows contracts that more closely
align the objectives of principal and agent. This is the case, for example,
when the borrower has sufficient wealth to post collateral or put her own
equity in a project, and therefore has greater incentive to supply effort, to
adopt more prudent risk levels preferred by the lender (the principal), to
reveal information to the principal, and to act in other ways that advance the
principal’s interests but that cannot be secured in a contract.
There is also evidence that the asset-poor have much higher rate of time
preference as well as higher measure of risk aversion (Banerjee and Duflo
2010; Holtz-Eakin et al. 1994; Jappeli 1990).
For most observers, the last crisis and its causes have become the refer-
ence for considering the risks of the future crises. Since 2009, a number of
explanations have emerged from post-crisis diagnostics. Among these, the
one that has achieved considerable theoretical and empirical support from
academics, practitioners, and policy-makers is the Debt-Leverage explana-
tion. The narrative of this explanation can be summarized in the following
chain of causation7:
Fractional Reserve System → Credit → Debt → Leverage → Fragility →

Crisis
Financial and economic systems based on risk transfer are basically

unstable and are prone to generating this chain of causation repeatedly.8
Risk transfer is a method of risk management whereby one side of a
transaction transfers the risks to the other side of the contact with the
latter’s knowledge and consent. An insurance contract is an example of
risk transfer. Interest rate based debt is another. A traditional bank
deposit/loan intermediation contracts is a bilateral risk transfer opera-
tion whereby a depositor transfers the risk of her/his funds to the bank
and the bank, in turn, transfers the risk to its client/borrower. In this
transaction, the depositor retains the full property rights on her/his
deposit while, at the same time, she/he has a property rights claim on the
bank for the interest on the deposit. Similarly, the bank has a property
7
See, Gregory Phelan 2016. “Financial Intermediation, Leverage, and Macroeconomic
Instability,” American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, vol. 8, No. 4; Jaromir Benes and
Michael Kumhof 2012. “The Chicago Plan Revisited,” Working Paper WP/12/202, IMF,
Washington DC.; Rami Brazilier and Jerom Hericourt 2014. “The Circular relationship
between inequality, leverage and financial crisis,” Document de Recherche, No 2015–06
<halshe-0120821>; Rafael Torres and Pavan Sukhdev 2012. “Lethal Link: A short History
of Leverage and Financial Crises,” Corporation 2020, www.corp2020.net; Michael Kumhof
et al. 2015 “Inequality, Leverage and Crisis,” American Economic Review, Vol 105, No 3.
8
As early as 2009, Reinhart and Rogoff posited that all financial crises of the past have been
“debt crises.” A debt- based system is a risk transfer system. See, Carmen Reinhart and
Kenneth Rogoff, 2009. This Time is Different. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
rights claim on the borrower for the principal amount plus accrued inter-
est without transferring the property rights of the amount to the bor-
rower, regardless of the outcome of the project for which the borrower
contracted the loan. Indeed, most bank lending contracts include a
clause that the bank has the right to call in the loan any time.
Another method of risk management is risk shifting. This method is
employed when the two parties to a contract or a transaction shift the risks
involved to a third party explicitly, as in environmental pollution, or
implicitly, as in the case of corporate managers shifting the risks of weak
balance sheets to lenders without disclosing the weakness. Another exam-
ple of risk shifting occurred during the 2007–2008 crisis when the finan-
cial institutions shifted the risk of their speculative activities to the taxpayers
(through bailout plans) without their initial knowledge or consent. More
often than not, financial risk shifting occurs during the time of stress9
when there is regime switching where individuals, corporations, and gov-
ernments switch their regime of risk management from risk transfer to risk
shifting.10 Finally, there is the regime of risk sharing in which the risk of
contracts or transactions are shared among the participants. In the 1970s,
Kenneth Arrow showed that when each economic agent is allocated the
portion of risk of contracts or transactions commensurate with its capacity
to bear it, there is optimal risk sharing.11
6.2 Risk Transfer System: Debt-Economy

Risk transfer is the dominant paradigm in the economies of the world. Often
it is not realized that adoption of this method of risk management requires
assumptions and axioms that run contrary to some of the fundamental val-
ues of many societies, including Muslim societies. Where interest rate based
debt systems dominate, all social relations become imbued with the spirit of
debt relations as the archetype of social interactions even between members
9
The current practice of Islamic finance seems to be an exception since “Islamic banks”
appear to have adopted risk shifting as a risk management tool even during normal times; see,
Alaa Alaabed et al. 2016. “Investigating risk shifting in Islamic banks in the dual banking
system of OIC countries: An application of two-stage dynamic GMM” Risk Management,
Vol. 18, No. 236.
10
See, Abbas Mirakhor et al. 2012. “Unsustainability of the Regime of Interest-Based
Debt Financing,” ISRA Journal of Islamic Finance, Vol 4, No. 2.
11
See, Kenneth Arrow 1971. Essays in the theory of risk-bearing. Chicago: Markham
Publishing Company; and, Nabil Maghrebi et al. 2016. Intermediate Islamic Finance.
Singapore: John Wiley and Sons.
6.2 RISK TRANSFER SYSTEM: DEBT-ECONOMY 147
of the same household.12 Among the axioms at the foundation of risk

transfer is that of the model of man envisioned by the underlying paradigm
as noncooperative, unsympathetic, and intensely self-interested.13 On the
contrary, research in experimental economics over the past three decades
has shown that not only humans are cooperative, they are also sympathetic,
other-regarding, and engage in reciprocity.14 Moreover, behavioral experi-
ments have provided evidence that not only humans share benefits and costs
of transactions, even when amounts involved are substantial, they punish
unfair behavior, even if it costs them. Significantly, experiments have shown
that humans have a preference for “inequality aversion.”15
During the 1980s, contract theory was born as a new field of eco-
nomic inquiry.16 One of the most important contributions of this theory17
was the assertion that if the axioms of self-interest of humans held, then
cooperation between two parties in an exchange transaction or a con-
tract, in which the interests of both parties are served efficiently, becomes
impossible due to agency problems. If both parties to a contract are self-
interested, noncooperative, unsympathetic and un-empathic, then there
is no reason to assume that they could engage in a contract that serves
both parties interests. Even if they were able to arrive at a contract, there
12
For an interesting article in this context see, Alessandro Somma 2016. “The biopolitics
of debt-economy: market order, ascetic and hedonistic morality,” in Bertram Lomfeld, et al.
(eds.), Reshaping Markets. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Please also note the rich
list of references of this paper.
13
These characteristics are clearly opposed to the model of man as envisioned in the Qur’an
and Sunnah. This does not mean that these sources ignore the fact that in life there are those
who behave very much in the spirit of the model of man as assumed in the contemporary
economics paradigm. Indeed, both sources recognize behavioral deviations in its archetypal
representation with all of its manifestations.
14
See, for example, Samuel Bowles and Herbert Gintis 2011. A Cooperative Species:
Human Reciprocity and its Evolution. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
15
See, for example, L. A. Cameron 1999. “Raising Stakes in the Ultimatum Game:
Experimental Evidence from Indonesia,” Economic Inquiry, Vol. 37, No. 1; also, Ernest Fehr
and Simon Gaechter 2000. “Fairness and Retaliation: the Economics of Reciprocity,”
Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol. 14, No. 3; Christina Fong 2007. “Evidence from an
Experiment on Charity to Welfare Recipients: Reciprocity, Altruism and Empathic
Responsiveness Hypothesis,” Economic Journal, Vol. 117. No. 522.
16
For a good survey in this context see, Joseph Stiglitz 1987. “The causes and Consequences
of Dependence of Quality on Price,” Journal of Economic Literature, Vol. 25, No. 1.
17
It was not until 2016 that the Nobel Committee recognized the contributions of con-
tract theory by awarding the Nobel Prize in Economics to two original researchers of this
field: Bengst Holstrom and Oliver Hart.
is reason to believe that self-interest would motivate nonrevelation of

characteristics of behavior that would conflict with one party’s self-inter-
ests. Hence, even if possible, these contracts would be incomplete, thus
contradicting the assumption of complete contracts of the contemporary
economics. Contracts are termed “incomplete” because they cannot
include all information that the participants to an exchange need to
ensure that the interests of both parties are served by the contract.
Contract theory terms the conflict between the interests of parties to a
contract as principal–agent problem. This leads to coordination failure
between the interests and actions of the parties to a contract. Coordination
failures are due to the independent actions of self-interested parties to a
contract that lead to suboptimal results. A labor contract, for example,
cannot include factors such as trust, honesty, or the level of effort that
influences the actions of agents (employees), which in turn impact the
interests of the principal (employer).
Another example of “impossible contracts” is as previously disucssed an
interest rate based debt contract. It is “impossible” because, given the
axiom of self-interest, the borrower has no incentive to repay the loan.
Moreover, even if such contracts were “possible,” they could not include
provisions for truth-telling, gambling, speculative risk taking, malfeasance,
and other behaviors that would affect the borrower’s promise to repay the
loan.18 Such contracts lead to waste and misallocation of resources, aside
from the fact that there is no incentive for creditors to provide loans in the
first place because such a contract would be unenforceable. In a society in
which risk transfer dominates the economy, to make an “impossible con-
tract” possible, the society has to allocate an enormous amount of resources
to make debt contracts enforceable. It has to use resources to fund a coer-
cive force that include the activities of courts, lawyers, and law enforcement
to make loan contracts possible. These costs are shifted to the tax payers.
Additionally, private loan contracts have to incur transaction costs, collat-
eral, and resources for (out of court) dispute resolutions, all of which has
to be paid by the borrower. These costs, born by taxpayers and borrowers,
are generally hidden from the view of the public that has to also bear the
costs of governments’ borrowing. All these costs, while making impossible
debt contracts possible, are, in effect, free insurance to creditors at the
18
It may be asked, as is done in conference or seminar presentations: What about interest-
free loans like the commended “Qardh Hasan?” It is clear that these types of loans contradict
the axiom of narrow self-interest.
expense of tax payers and borrowers. These are similar to the subsidies to
banks in the form of deposit insurance, the costs of which are born by the
taxpayers. These costs are necessary to create an incentive structure that
forces an alignment of the interests of the borrower with those of the
creditor.
A major contention of contract theory is that the principal–agent prob-
lem arises because, under the self-interest axiom, the incentive structure of
contracts is not efficient to elicit the kind of behavior from participants
that serves the interests of both parties. This idea gave birth to “incentive
economics.”19 This field searches for conditions and designs of contracts
in which both parties have sufficient incentives to achieve efficient out-
comes to improve gains from exchange for both as compared to contracts
without such incentives. The class of contracts that meet this criterion are
referred to as incentive-compatible contracts. Perhaps ironically, many
types of incentive-compatible contracts in finance, one way or another,
modify the risk transfer nature of transactions by moving contracts toward
risk sharing. Consider, for example, Basel III capital adequacy ratio (CAR).
To make banks behave in way to align their interests with those of the
public, their CAR has to be 10.5 percent by 2019. This means that, in
effect, banks are forced to modify their risk transfer model to share more
of the risk with the public by putting more of their own skin (more of their
own capital) in the game than they were before the crisis. Hence, banks
become more of a principal than they were before the crisis. Other exam-
ples of incentive-compatible contracts are those in the labor and credit
markets where the agents become residual claimants, in effect, becoming
property rights claimants, meaning that they now have their own “skin-in-
the-game,” thus becoming principals themselves.
An example of incentive-compatible contracts in the labor market are
those that allow labor to share in the profit of the firm.20An example of
incentive-compatible contracts in the credit market are risk-sharing con-
tracts that allow risk and rewards of a given project undertaken jointly to
be shared between the parties to the contract. The major advantage of
these types of contracts is that because agents are residual claimants, have
“skin-in-the-game,” they elicit truth-telling, trust, cooperation, hard
work, efficiency in management of resources, and other behavior that
19
See, J. J. Leffont 2000. Incentives and Political Economy. Oxford: Oxford University
Press.
20
See, for example, Martin Weitzman 1984. The Share Economy. Cambridge: Harvard
University Press.
enhance productivity. These factors could not be written into contracts or

be enforced. Hence, these contracts attenuate coordination problems and
improve efficiency of outcomes as well as save resources that would other-
wise have to be devoted to transaction, monitoring, and enforcement
costs involved in designing and implementing contracts. Productivity
gains and output expansion in risk-sharing contracts originate from
X-efficiency and allocative efficiency at the micro level and from total fac-
tor productivity at the macro level.21 A risk transfer economy (debt econ-
omy) forgoes these efficiency gains.
Not only is a debt economy inefficient, it is also fragile and subject to
frequent bouts with crises. Long before Reinhart and Rogoff’s book
(2009) that demonstrated this fragility from historical records, Keynes
argued that a risk transfer capitalist economy on its own (without govern-
ment intervention) faces price or economic growth instability. It will have
either unemployment or inflation. This instability he considered as an
“evil” of this type of capitalism. In arguing against the classical econo-
mists’ notion that a capitalist economy will always lead to full employment
equilibrium, Keynes focused his attention on the Say’s Law that “supply
creates its own demand.” According to this Law, there is a circular flow in
the economy such that what leaks out of the income stream in form of
savings, returns back to the flow in form of investment, hence, the econ-
omy is always in equilibrium. Therefore, unemployment or inflation
would be only temporary phenomena. A major argument of Keynes was
that such results would require perfect coordination between savers and
investors. This, he argued, is not possible. One reason was that savers and
investors are not necessarily the same people and save and invest for dif-
ferent reasons. Therefore, it is not likely that their independent actions
can be coordinated. Another reason, he argued, is the existence of what
he called “the rentier class” that would not release loanable funds into
investment flows unless they collect “rent” on the funds in form of inter-
ests and transferred the risk of these funds to the borrowers. This behavior
exacerbates the coordination problem. He further argued that such a sys-
tem suffered from “two evils.” One, that, left on its own, it could not
generate full employment equilibrium and, another, that it would gener-
ate massive income and wealth inequalities. But the real “villain of the
piece,” he argued, was the existence of the interest rate mechanism that
21
See, Michael Perelman 2011. “X-Efficiency,” Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol. 25,
No. 4; and Diego Comin 2008. “Total Factor Productivity,” in the New Palgrave Dictionary
of Economics, edited by Steven N. Durlauf and L. E. Blume. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
created instability.22 When his book, the General Theory, was translated
into German in 1936, he wrote a preface to the book praising the German
policy of nonreliance on interest rate mechanisms in designing fiscal and
monetary policies.23
Keynes was not the first to have noted the instability of risk transfer
capitalism. However, he was the first to have so succinctly analyzed the
causes as emerging from the financial sector. A brilliant follower of Keynes,
Hyman Minsky, went much further in detailing how the risk transfer finance
creates inherent instability and fragility in a capitalist system. Debt-leverage
drives the cyclical evolution of the economy as its firms move from being
“robust units,” as they have little or no debt, to become “hedge units,” as
they assume ever larger debt but still able to service their debt, to “Ponzi
finance units,” where these firms can no longer service their debt. At this
point the system is rendered fragile and, ultimately, leads to crisis.24
Another gifted follower of Keynes, James Tobin, Nobel Prize winner in
economics, 1981, had a different explanation of the inherent instability of
risk transfer capitalism. In a short, concise and forceful article in Lloyds
Bank Review, July, 1984, he warned that the risk transfer debt system with
new financial techniques and securitization would lead a productive econ-
omy to morph into a speculative economy; what he called “a paper econ-
omy.” By this he meant that finance, which was supposed to intermediate
between the surplus and deficit finance units in order to serve the real
economy, was in the process of decoupling from the real sector to have an
independent life of its own in which most of its activities was trading in
paper debt securities or trading in stocks that were already issued without
creating additional and new capital stock. He argued that in these
circumstances, the speculative paper economy would grow with finance
outpacing the growth of the real economy. This process was later called
“financialization.”25 His prediction saw its full validation before and dur-
ing the 2007–2008 crisis. Even years after the crisis, Tobin’s analysis has
22
For a more detailed discussion of Keynes’ arguments see, H. Askari et al. 2012. Risk
Sharing in Finance. Singapore: John Wiley and Sons.
23
See, Lynn Turgeon 1996. Bastard Keynesianism: The Evolution of Economic thinking and
Policy-Making Since WWII. Westport, CT.: Praeger Publishers.
24
For detail of Minsky’s thoughts see, Hyman Minsky 1982. Can it Happen Again?
New York: Routledge; and Hyman Minsky 1986. Stabilizing an Unstable Economy. New
Haven: Yale University Press.
25
For a good discussion of financialization, see, Thomas I. Palley 2013. Financialization.
New York: Palgrave Macmillan; and, Rana Foroohar 2016. Makers and Takers. New York:
Crown Publishing Company.
not lost its validity. In 2012, five years after the crisis, it was estimated that
of the US$ 33 trillion trade in the New York Stock Exchange, only
0.2 percent found its way into new capital formation, the rest constituted
speculation in “paper trade.”26
In addition to these problems, a risk transfer debt-economy faces other
challenges. Its financial system is pro-cyclical and exacerbates the phases of
the business cycle. It produces excess credit during the boom phase which,
combined with leverage, create pressure on prices, strengthening inflation.
In the down phase of the cycle, the system creates a credit crunch and adds
additional force to the downward movement of aggregate demand.
Moreover, the system creates massive opportunities for mismatches in the
balance sheets of its banking system, which again serve to exacerbate cycli-
cal phases. Finally, the risk transfer financial system is riddled with moral
hazards and other elements of the principal–agent problem. Much of the
moral hazard issues stem from the fact that the credit creation (central
banks) and its allocation (private financial institutions, including banks)
functions are separate. Central banks (monetary authorities) have a differ-
ent objective function (price stability) than the private financial institu-
tions (profits). This separation of creation and allocation of credit reduces
the potency of monetary policy because the dissonance between the two
objective functions makes it difficult for the monetary authorities to
achieve their aim since the financial institutions are at the core of the trans-
mission mechanism of monetary policy. This has been the experience of
nearly all countries in the post-crisis period where monetary easing aimed
at inducing higher private investment has not been very successful. Adding
to the strength of the moral hazard issue is the deposit guarantee the
banking sector of these economies need, ostensibly, to protect the econo-
my’s payment system.
To summarize, a risk transfer debt-economy is inherently unstable and
fragile. Balance sheet mismatches in the banking system combined with
leverage operations in its firms and banks are major sources of fragility. It
makes coordination between surplus and deficit financial units difficult if
not impossible (Keynes). It limits the financial inclusion of small and
medium size firms as well as that of lower income groups into the finan-
cial system difficult (credit rationing). Its financial system is prone to
pro-cyclicality (high leverage in good times, credit crunch in bad).
Moreover, the system is challenged by a variety of moral hazard issues
26
See, John Boogle 2012. The Clash of the Cultures: Investment vs. Speculation. Hoboken,
New Jersey: John Wiley and Sons.
that exacerbate the inherent fragility of the system. All this represents a
market failure of sizable magnitude, as in choosing an interest-rate-based
debt contract, creditors and debtors ignore higher payoffs to both of
them as well as to the rest of the economy.
At this juncture a question arises: with all these problems, how does the
risk transfer debt system continue to survive and dominate the world of
finance? The answer lies in the myths that surround debt. The first myth is
that of the two ways of financing, debt or equity, the former is the cheaper
of the two. It has already been pointed out that a debt-based system has
huge costs that are not considered because they are mostly hidden but do
create misallocation of resources. Just consider the costs to the taxpayers
not only from making impossible debt contracts possible—by establishing
a huge institutional edifice for administrative, legal, and enforcement
functions—but also from the loss of tax revenues to the government from
the write-off of interest rate expense of corporations.
A second myth is that corporations prefer more debt than more equity
when mobilizing resources because more equity erodes ownership. This
myth ignores risk-shifting phenomenon due to the moral hazard of the
separation of corporate management and ownership. At times, particularly
during times of financial stress, management borrows rather than issues
additional equity because it wishes to hide balance sheet vulnerabilities.
While, ostensibly, ownership has not been eroded, the first call on corpo-
rate resources has expanded.
A third myth holds that public debt is not costly. However, governments
borrow either externally or domestically. In the first case, they expose the
economy to the “sudden stop” phenomenon in which external creditors,
for variety of reasons, withdraw credit from a country even when its eco-
nomic fundamentals are sound. This occurred during the Asian crisis.27
Even when there is no sudden stop, resources leak out of the economy to
service external debt. When governments borrow domestically, they usually
issue debt securities (bonds) with very large denominations, which are then
purchased by high net asset individuals or institutions. The servicing of the
debt however is done through tax resources, generally paid by lower- and
middle-income groups, creating an income redistribution from the latter
groups to the rich. This exacerbates income and wealth concentration.
27
For an excellent analysis of the Asian crisis and the lessons that were not learned from
that experience see, Andrew Sheng 2009. From Asian to Global Financial Crisis. New York:
A second reason why the debt system continues to thrive is the fact that
governments themselves create incentive structures to promote debt con-
tracts through administrative, legal, and policy means. In addition to tax
incentives provided for debt, governments’ fiscal and monetary policies
are debt-based. A third reason is the lack of finance education among the
public as well as the lack of general knowledge and understanding about
risk and uncertainty that keeps the public at the mercy of those who ben-
efit from the operations of the debt system. A fourth reason is an almost
theological devotion to the interest rate mechanism within finance and
economics professions. It is astounding that among all the books that
have been published since the crisis about debt being a major source of
instability, none has questioned the near-sanctity of the interest rate
mechanism.28
6.3 Is Risk Sharing a Better Alternative?

To answer this question, two other essential questions need to be addressed
first: what is risk and what is finance? Regarding the first of these two
questions, when the term “risk” is used in day-to-day conversation, it
refers to two different types of statements about future events. First, there
is the risk of occurrence of an event that can be precisely defined and mea-
sured against historical records and the probabilities of its occurrence cal-
culated. Insurance does this as there are a number of events whose
occurrences have known probabilities. The second is a risk that cannot be
defined or measured because it relates to an unknown and unknowable
future. This conveys the notion of “constrained cognition,” ignorance
due to insufficient knowledge of the processes and mechanisms by which
the future is generated out of the past. Technically, this is uncertainty.
Complexities of the social-political-economic environment can convert
uncertainty into “radical uncertainty,” which makes accurate predictions
of the future impossible.
Turning to the second question, it can be argued that finance exists
because of radical uncertainty. The most important and original function
of finance is to create a bridge between the present and a radically uncer-
tain future, to intermediate between now and later as it intermediates
between financial surplus and deficit financial units. The financial resources
28
See, for example, Adair Turner 2016. Between Debt and the Devil. Princeton: Princeton
University Press.
6.3 IS RISK SHARING A BETTER ALTERNATIVE? 155
of a surplus unit come from delayed gratification, delayed consumption.

Surplus units postpone present consumption for two reasons: (a) more
consumption in the future; and/or (b) precautionary move to mitigate
their idiosyncratic risks (risks that are unique to individuals, households,
and firms for which there are no insurance markets). Deficit units bring
their consumption forward in time to the present also for two reasons:
(a) available investment opportunities; or (b) actualization of idiosyncratic
risks. Both face radical uncertainty. The surplus units take a risk that they
will have their principal plus some addition (either interest on loans they
have extended or the return on their investments) in an environment that
is radically uncertain. Deficit units take a risk that they can meet their obli-
gations from a future income stream that is subject to radical uncertainty.29
In other words, surplus units trade their presently available resources for
more in a radically uncertain future while the deficit units are trading their
uncertain future for the certainty of now while expecting that a radically
uncertain future will allow them to repay the resources they are borrowing
now. The function of finance is to manage these expectations; to manage
the risks of transforming the present expectations of the surplus units and
the risks of future repayment of the principal, with additions, by the deficit
units. This is the process of “maturity transformation”; banks are, there-
fore, transformation engines.
If any further argument is needed to strengthen the position that the
risk transfer debt-economy is unstable, fragile, and costly to human societ-
ies, one can point to the notion that it is nearly impossible to efficiently
and effectively regulate risk transfer finance in an environment of radical
uncertainty. Therefore, the system will, ultimately, shift all the risks of
financial operation to the taxpayers. In a recent book, the former governor
of the bank of England, Myrvin King,30 eloquently explains that because
of radical uncertainty there is no way one can use risk models to regulate
behavior of financial institutions in order to create an efficient and effec-
tive regulatory structure. King’s solution is to require a much larger CAR
(more “skin-in-the-game” which in effect weakens risk transfer and brings
in more risk sharing) and force banks to pledge their assets to the central
29
For an interesting discussion of the relation between finance and radical uncertainty see,
Mervyn King 2016. The End of Alchemy: Money, Banking, and the Future of the Global
Economy. W. W. Norton & Company.
30
See, Mervyn King 2016. See also, Umar Rafi et al. 2016. “Radical uncertainty, non-
predictability, antifragility and risk-sharing Islamic finance.” PSL Quarterly Review, Vol. 69,
No. 279.
bank as collateral. Similarly, Nassim Nicholas Taleb argues that to make a

fragile financial system not only stable but antifragile,31 more “skin-in-the-
game” is necessary, which means converting a risk transfer financial system
into one where the risks of contracts are shared between participants.
6.4 How Does Risk Sharing Make a Financial

System Antifragile?
The simple answer is because of four important characteristics: mutuality,
commitment, horizontal governance, and common good objective. A risk
sharing contract mutually commits the participants to share resources,
risks, and rewards. Because everyone has “skin-in-the-game,” the gover-
nance structure will, most likely, be horizontal rather than vertical provid-
ing agility, flexibility, and greater accountability in the management and
operations of the venture subject of the contract. Moreover, all partici-
pants work to gain the most out of the operations of the contract since
they all stand to gain from effective, efficient, and productive outcomes.
Due to these characteristics, risk sharing resolves the issues of moral haz-
ard associated with the principal–agent problem since the parties to the
contract are functioning as both. As well, in a risk-sharing system where
financing is being provided by shareholders, there is no incentive to with-
draw financing when there may be potential downturn as there would be
in a risk transfer system. Similarly, during the upside, financing would be
available commensurate with increased productive activities only, unlike
the risk transfer system that provides greater credit during the boom and
withdraws credit during the bust phases of the business cycle.32 Hence,
risk sharing reduces or eliminates pro-cyclicality of finance. Also important
is the fact that in the absence of a rentier class, risk-sharing finance improves
income and wealth distribution thus reducing inequality.33
31
See N. N. Taleb 2012. Antifragile. New York: Random House.
32
See, Joseph E. Stiglitz 1988. “Why Financial Structure Matters”. Journal of Economic
Perspectives, Vol. 2, No. 4.
33
For detailed discussions of the adverse impact of “rent” on income and wealth distribu-
tion, refer to the decade of painstaking work of Thomas Piketty and his colleagues in collect-
ing and analyzing data showing this impact; see, Thomas Piketty 2014. Capital in the
Twenty-First Century. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. This book may well be consid-
ered as the validation of Keynes’ assertion that risk transfer capitalism skews income and
wealth distribution in favor of the rentier class.
6.5 CONCLUSION 157
Risk sharing also reduces or eliminates the coordination problem since

in a risk sharing contract savers and investors are both involved as owners.
There is no rentier demanding a premium for providing financing. All par-
ties involved work for the objective of greatest return to be shared by all.
As mentioned earlier, risk sharing creates an opportunity for firms, at the
micro level, and the economy, at the macro level, to experience X-efficiency
and total factor productivity gains that increase output and growth.34
Another major source of output growth due to risk sharing is that the
focus of contracts shifts from creditor-borrower to investor-entrepreneur
relations and from credit rating/collateral to the viability/profitability of
the project subject of contract. Consequently, large number of projects
that in a risk transfer financial system would be rationed out of the market
due to lack of collateral or credit record would find funding in a risk-
sharing system.
The answer to the question posed in the title of this section, therefore,
is that, indeed, an economy based on risk-sharing finance would be a much
better alternative to risk transfer debt-economy.
6.5 Conclusion
Risk sharing has the potential to enhance efficiency as each party to
contracts has “skin-in-the-game,” thus eliminating or minimizing the
principal–agent problem. In doing so, it can minimize monitoring, super-
visory, and disciplinary costs leading to efficiency gains. As a result,
participants in a contract of an economic undertaking can choose higher
risk–higher return projects and thus increase the efficiency and produc-
tivity of the system. Risk sharing finance provides two powerful addi-
tional sources of economic expansion and growth. First, through
sharing contracts, micro and small enterprises that are normally credit-
constrained can expand their operations or engage in innovative activi-
ties that otherwise would not be undertaken. Asset-poor participants
become less risk-averse, allowing them to seek higher risk–higher
reward ventures. Second, households can hedge against idiosyncratic
34
See, Samuel Bowles 2012. The New Economics of Inequality and Redistribution.
New York: Cambridge University Press; see also, Michael Lewis and Pat Conaty 2012. The
Resilience Imperative: Cooperative Transition to a Steady-State Economy. Gabriola Island,
Canada: New Society Publishers.
risk by becoming asset holders or shareholders, instead of depositors,

and hence diversify their sources of income by investing in productive
activities. This increases investment in projects that are typically rationed
out of the market due to lack of collateral, no track record, no credit his-
tory, and a host of other adverse selection factors. Risk sharing can also
create a reciprocal and trusting environment that strengthens social cohe-
sion, promotes social mobility, and reduces income inequality without
perverse incentive effects and resentments that would lead to resistance to
changes in the status quo that marks income-based redistribution efforts
and without creating a conflict with proposals to improvement in the
state of “being” in a society (Rosanvallon 2013; Sen 1992).
While systematic risk cannot be eliminated, collective risk taking
reduces the intensity of individual risk aversion to promote a more effi-
cient mobilization of resources, and more equitable sharing of eco-
nomic risks. The economic rationale behind equity investment is that in
order to share prosperity, economic risks should be shared as well. The
allocation of risk commensurate to the idiosyncratic abilities to bear
losses is arguably more conducive to a socially inclusive financial system.
Economic prosperity should be pursued through risk sharing rather
than at the expense of others (Maghrebi and Mirakhor 2015). All the
factors mentioned thus far represent the growth-promoting efficiency
gains of risk sharing and perform analogous to the microeconomic
concept of “X-efficiency” (Perelman 2011) and the macroeconomic
concept of Total Factor Productivity (Comin 2008).
In addition to all the growth-enhancing benefits of risk sharing, there
is an additional factor that buttresses the growth and prosperity expansion
effects of risk-sharing Islamic finance: Barakah. Based on the Qur’an, this
factor can be defined as a positive, nonlinear, and dynamic scalar that
Allah (swt) applies to virtuous (rule-compliant) individual behavior or
contracts. The scalar can take on values from 10 to 18 to 700 and much
more depending on the nature of the behavior.35 Not only individuals
experience the positive effect of this element of the expansive incentive
structure that Islam has created for internalization of prescribed virtues,
the economies of virtuous societies too will experience Blessings (Barakah)
in terms of higher growth and prosperity as promised by Allah (swt) in
Verse 96 of Chapter 7.
35
See, for example, Qur’an (Verse 160: Chapter 7; Verse 261: Chapter 2; Verse 245:
Chapter 2; Verse 11: Chapter 57; Verse 17: Chapter 64; Verse 12: Chapter 5).
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CHAPTER 7
Ethical and Responsible Finance

for Development
A reading of various documents presented to the Spring Meetings of the

International Monetary Fund and the World Bank1 (2017), as well as a
number of empirical and theoretical books and published research,2 point
to a number of vulnerabilities and fragilities that have, collectively, led to
the warning of the emergence of a perfect storm in the global economy.
These vulnerabilities include the following: With few exceptions, econo-
mies across the world are stagnating; unemployment is widespread and
growing; private investment is sluggish; productivity is declining; com-
modity prices are low and increasingly volatile; protectionist sentiments
are growing; global trade is shrinking; there is large and growing liquidity
in search of yield with no place to go; financialization of economies is pro-
ceeding unabated; global debt is large and growing; governments have
resorted to financial repression to service their debt; income and wealth
inequality across the world is large and growing; macroeconomic policies
are impaired; international financial institutions have failed in their man-
dates to stabilize global finance and to reignite global growth; political
uncertainties across the globe have intensified; and emerging market econ-
omies, that provided a cushion for the global economy during the last
1
These include reports by the UN and its affiliated agencies, such as the IMF, World Bank,
UNDP, ILO, as well as by various regional development banks and agencies.
2
See the recent writings of Steve Keen, Mervyn King, Adair Turner, Nassim Nicholas
Taleb, as well as articles in Project Syndicate and in Real-World Economic Review.

DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-66390-6_7
164 7 ETHICAL AND RESPONSIBLE FINANCE FOR DEVELOPMENT
crisis, are themselves in search of stability and cannot provide support for
the global economy should the risks of another worldwide crisis material-
ize. This list does not include a plethora of environmental and ecological
risks on the horizon.
Growing disparity in income distribution despite healthy growth and
deteriorating opportunities for lower segments of the society has raised
awareness of the importance of ethical and responsible finance for sustain-
able development. With the failures of regulatory regimes to fully address
the imbalances in financial markets and concerns of rising indebtedness in
various countries, developmental agencies, policy-makers including G20,
global financial regulatory bodies, civil society, and the private sector
worldwide has recognized the need for ethical and responsible finance.
Whereas ethical finance calls for fundamental change in the prevailing
thinking of approaches in development, responsible finance asks how
financial services should be delivered to live up to the challenge of pro-
moting sustainable development such that the work must incorporate
social, developmental, and environmental dimensions. In other words,
how a financial sector could be made responsible for the fair treatment of
end-clients and in ways that protect clients’ social and economic welfare.
Ethical and responsible finance could play an important role in eco-
nomic development, poverty reduction, and sharing of prosperity.
Research has demonstrated a strong relationship between stable and inclu-
sive financial systems and economic development, and the link between
economic development and poverty reduction. Generally, when financial
systems are more responsible and equitable in allocating resources among
all members of the population in a way that does not create economic
imbalances, there is greater equity of opportunity for entrepreneurship,
education, and quality of life.3
The value of economic growth and prosperity is not only reflected in
the material improvements to a society but also shapes the social, political
and, ultimately, the moral character of a people. Whereas traditional think-
ing has been that practice of moral and ethics foster economic growth, an
argument could also be articulated that economic growth not only relies
upon moral impetus, it also has positive moral consequences.4 Similarly,
3
IFC, CGAP, and BMZ (2011)., Advancing Responsible Finance for Greater Development
Impact, International Finance Corporation (IFC), Washington, D.C., USA.
4
Friedman (2006). The attitude of people toward themselves, toward their fellow citizens,
and toward their society as a whole is different when their living standard is rising from when
it is stagnant or falling. When the attitudes of the broad majority of citizens are shaped by a
7.1 NEED FOR NEW PERSPECTIVE ON ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 165
the reverse could also happen when deteriorating economic conditions

and bleak prospects of the future could lead to deteriorating morals. It
is important to recognize that “laws and regulations are typically less
effective when the desired behavior requires taking initiative or action, as
opposed to refraining from unwanted action. Hard work, diligence,
patience, discipline, and a sense of obligation to fulfill our commitments
clearly make us more productive economically.”5 In other words, rules and
laws alone are not sufficient, but internalization of morals, values, and eth-
ics are key to achieving economic growth, which in turn could further
enhance strengthening of moral behavior.
7.1 Need for New Perspective

on Economic Development
Professor Thomas Piketty’s influential 2013 book, Capital in the

Twenty-First Century, highlighted the inequality in 20 countries during
the last three centuries. Income distribution is worsening around the
world, leading to widening inequality. Recent research on inequality
and growth has provided strong evidence that inequality has damaging
effects not only on economic development and growth but also on
social mobility and the social contract. The drastic deterioration in the
distribution of wealth and income between the very rich and the very
poor in the world is evident considering that almost half the world’s
wealth is now owned by just 1 percent of the population6 and the rich-
est 10 percent of the population hold 86 percent of the world’s wealth,
and the top 1 percent alone account for 46 percent of global assets.7
An extensive literature review in a 2012 report by the European
Commission (EC) finds that high inequality has adverse effects on household
well-being, criminality, health, social capital, education, political participa-
tion, and female labor market participation. In the context of the discipline
of finance, the recent literature also emphasizes how inequality intensifies
rising standard of living, over time that difference usually leads to the positive development
of a society’s moral character.
Friedman, Benjamin, M. (2006). “The Moral Consequences of Economic Growth,”
Society, January/February 2006.
5
Friedman (2006).
6
Working for the Few (2014).
7
Credit Suisse (2013).
leverage, produces financial cycle, and precipitates a crisis.8 Rajan’s (2012)

thesis is that the declining share of low-income households was compen-
sated by ever-expanding credit facilities, which in turn increased fragilities
in the economic system through high leverage ratios, creating systemic
risk.
There is also a change in the economists’ perception that there is
always a trade-off between growth and inequality and their notion that
redistributive policies are necessarily not conducive to growth (Ostry
et al. 2014). A host of political-economic factors also comes into play
through the power of the richer few (Stiglitz 2012). Rising inequality and
ways to cope with this growing problem now top the agenda of multilat-
eral development institutions and the policy-makers in both developed
and developing countries who have repeatedly warned about the dire
consequences of the increasing gap between the incomes of the very rich
and the very poor. The World Bank and the UN has given the highest
priority to poverty reduction and has listed poverty eradication as the first
Sustainable Development Goal (SDG).9
Whereas growing inequality is a global trend, the situation is alarming
in many of Muslim countries. Figure 7.1 shows the state of poverty in
Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) countries with respect to the
non-OIC countries in the world.10 It could be observed that both OIC
and non-OIC countries have managed to reduce poverty levels in recent
years however the OIC countries are lagging behind their non-OIC coun-
terparts in reducing extreme poverty.
Figure 7.2, depicts and contrasts the state of OIC countries with the
World with respect to income levels of the bottom 40 percent of the
population.11 In both categories of countries the per capita income has
increased from 2007 to 2011 but the OIC countries are lagging behind
8
Rajan (2012).
9
http://www.un.org/sustainabledevelopment/poverty/
10
Recently, the World Bank has increased its threshold for defining people living under
extreme poverty from $1.25 ($2.0) to $1.9 ($3.1). The official goal of the World Bank and
Sustainable Goals (SGD) is to reduce extreme poverty to 3 % (or less) by 2030.
11
Forty percent cutoff line is determined by the World Bank to benchmark the bottom
segment of the society, which must share in the prosperity to boast overall development of a
country. The goal of enhancing shared prosperity aims not only to increase the economic
resources of the countries, but also to maximize the share of those continuously increasing
resources going to the bottom 40 percent of the income distribution. Hence, shared pros-
perity mainly relies on enforcing a social contract where all agents in society have a fair
opportunity to realize their full potential, contribute to economic growth, and receive their
fair share of income/wealth.
7.1 NEED FOR NEW PERSPECTIVE ON ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 167
Fig. 7.1 Poverty headcount ratio at $1.90 and $3.10 a day (2011 PPP) (% of
population)
Source: World development indicators. 2011 represents the averages of available
values for the period from 2005 to 2011 while 2014 represents the average of the
available values from 2012 to 2014
the World in both waves of survey periods (2007 and 2014). Figures 7.1
and 7.2 together suggest that the issue is grave in OIC countries, which
should develop new policies in trying to catch-up with the rest of the
world in terms of economic development and increasing the welfare of
their citizens.
Providing access to finance to the lower segment of the society has also
been identified as a catalyst for economic development.12 Figure 7.3 shows
the relative state of OIC countries with respect to non-OIC countries in
different proxies that intend to capture the level of financial inclusion,
such as account ownership, credit card ownership, and saving habits at a
12
See the World Bank’s initiative UAF2020 that aims for achieving universal financial
access by 2020, which has been prioritized to be able to achieve its twin goals of eradicating
poverty and enhancing shared prosperity.
6
5.26
5
4.16
4
2005 PPP $ per day
3.13
3 2.73
2.08
2 1.63
1.47
1.26
0
OIC World
2007 (Boom 40%) 2007 Total Populaon

2014 (Boom 40%) 2014 Total Populaon
Fig. 7.2 Survey mean income per capita, bottom 40 percent and total popula-
tion (2005 PPP $ per day)
Source: World development indicators
financial institution.13 Using micro-level data, Demirguc-Kunt et al.

(2014) find that, once relevant individual characteristics are accounted for,
although Muslims are less likely to have an account or save in a formal
financial institution, they are no less likely to borrow from one, and the
greater observed religious self-exclusion of Muslims seems to arise partic-
ularly in sub-Saharan African countries. In Fig. 7.3, we see that the OIC
countries are worse off than their non-OIC counterparts in all three met-
rics. In other two categories, i.e., saving in a financial institution and use
of credit card, it is striking that the state of OIC countries has not improved
at all between 2011 and 2014.
Given the strong evidence of the negative impact of inequality on eco-
nomic growth, the social and economic costs associated with inequality,
13
The users of financial services can be distinguished from nonusers, who either cannot
access the financial system or opt out from the financial system voluntarily, i.e., due to non-
availability of finance compatible with their religious beliefs.
7.2 DEVELOPMENT APPROACHES: CONVENTIONAL VERSUS ISLAMIC 169
Fig. 7.3 Different proxies for comparing financial inclusion between OIC and
non-OIC countries
Source: Findex database
and the risks high inequality poses to any economic system, it is difficult to
argue that inequality in a society can be ignored. Inequality in a society
not only damages the growth prospects of a country but also creates social
unrest and has negative effects on mobility between different income
groups. Furthermore, the alarming situation in the majority of countries,
particularly in OIC countries, as demonstrated above, calls for new
approaches and thinking on economic development.
7.2 Development Approaches:

Conventional Versus Islamic
Thinking about development has evolved over many years producing a
galaxy of definitions and meanings of the concept. Discourse regarding
the various lines of thought and the empirical results of their application
has become intense during the last three decades, and a consensus view of
what “development” should mean and how to achieve it has yet to emerge.
The concept of economic development has progressed from a concern for

social order, the role of civil society, culture, and state to development as
material well-being, with ethics, freedom, development of the self, income
equality, environmental preservation, and sustainability factored in. It
should be stressed that Smith is the basis of Western thinking on develop-
ment, but the author of The Wealth of Nations, stressing the self-interest
motive that is the basis of utility and profit maximization for the individual
consumer and producer at any cost to society, including the impoverish-
ment and exploitation of fellow human beings, is very different from the
author of The Theory of Moral Sentiments.
Before the Great Depression, much faith was placed in the unhindered
workings of markets to achieve material development. After the Second
World War, however, development thinking went through a fundamental
change primarily influenced by the experience of the Great Depression.
Markets were no longer trusted to automatically generate full employment
of resources. This was particularly the case in policy prescriptions to devel-
oping countries. The basic idea was that the low-income countries could
duplicate the material growth performance of rich countries. To do this,
governments of these countries should take a leadership role in directing
the development process. This period coincided with the ideological cold
war period. The rich countries in the West undertook to help these gov-
ernments through development aid provided that their politics would
align with those of the West. The disappointing results of this model and
the lower availability of development aid soon paved the way for develop-
ment models in the 1980s and 1990s that focused on structural reform.
Toward the end of the last century, development professionals had to
admit that structural reforms had not fully succeeded in reducing the gap
between the rich and the poor either internationally or internally in many
developing countries. In fact, the gap had increased. Even in countries
where the structural reform policies had achieved some measure of suc-
cess, income and wealth distribution had worsened. Overall, poverty rates
had grown at an alarming rate and the burden of debt of developing coun-
tries to the rich countries, and to their “international institutions,” had
increased dramatically threatening widespread default.
During the closing decades of the last century, development thinking
went through another historic “twist and turn” as development special-
ists, intellectuals, and professionals began questioning the basic premise
of the then dominant thinking that saw development as material growth
and in the face of failure of the leading model to, at least, prevent poverty
from spreading. Professionals such as Mahbub ul Haq urged changing

the focus to “human development.”14 These efforts culminated in the
closing years of the twentieth century in the work of Amartya Sen on
Development as Freedom, arguing that the focus of development should
be expanding the capabilities of people to empower them to do things
they value.15 Concurrent with the efforts of Mahbub ul Haq, Amartya
Sen, and others, the new institutional economics (NIE) came into promi-
nence with policy implications for development.16 The NIE argued that
in order to make economic progress, developing countries had to reform
their institutional structure, i.e., “the rules of the game.” In short, high
transactions costs—that is, search and information costs, bargaining and
decision costs, contract negotiation and enforcement costs—render a
market dysfunctional. Therefore, the collection of devices that organizes
and supports transactions—channels for the flow of information; laws and
regulations that define property rights and enforce contracts; and the
informal rule, norms, and codes that help markets to self-regulate—must
provide “a workable” market design that keeps transaction costs low.17
This conclusion was reached as a result of empirical enquiries addressed
to the question of why countries differed so widely in their economic per-
formance. While differences in capital per worker, investment in human
capital and technology explain some differences in the level of per capita
income among countries, none of these can be considered the fundamen-
tal reason for the underdevelopment of many countries, especially when
capital and technology are mobile. The result of these studies confirmed
that better performing economies had better institutions. The poor per-
forming economies not only suffered from deficient institutions but also
from a “path dependency” that created an inertia making change and
reform difficult.
Systematic focus on economic issues of Islam, however, began in ear-
nest in the 1950s with availability of Sayed Qutb’s book, Social Justice in
Islam.18 The challenge of the two dominant systems—capitalism and
14
Mahbub ul Haq 1995. Reflections on Human Development. New York: Oxford University
Press.
15
Amartya Sen 1999. Development as Freedom. New York: Anchor Books.
16
See for instance, Douglas North 2005. Understanding the Process of Economic Change.
Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press.
17
John McMillan 2002. Reinventing the Bazaar: A Natural History of Markets. New York:
W.W. Norton & Company Inc.
18
The book was first published in or about 1945 in Egypt but did not become available in
the rest of the Muslim world until the 1950s. It was translated into English much later by
John B. Hardie as Social Justice in Islam (Lahore: Islamic Book Services n.d.).
socialism—and their attraction for Muslim youth during the decades of

1950s, 1960s, and 1970s made the task of articulating an Islamic response
ever more urgent. The first to respond to the challenge, positioning
Islam’s view on economic matters between capitalism and socialism, was
Sayyid Abul A’La Mawdudi.19 His writings became a major source of
thought and the standard bearer of ideas in Islamic economics.
The 1960s represent a watershed in the progress to articulating a vision
of the Islamic economic system firmly grounded on the Qur’an and the
Sunnah. The publication of Shaheed M.B. al Sadr’s book, Iqtisaduna20 or
Our Economics, initiated a new approach in articulating Islam’s vision of
an economy that serves society’s needs.21 The central focus of the book is
to identify the architecture of the Islamic economic system and then to
examine and understand the behavior of its constituent elements.22 The
renewal of Islamic economics stemmed from discussion of social justice
and social issues, and many prominent scholars of Islamic economics
focused their efforts on issues dealing with economic development. Islam’s
concepts of economic development were further articulated in seminal
works by Chapra (1993, 2000, 2008).
The emphasis on the Islamic axiological principle of Unity forms the
basis for the fundamental belief that Islam knows no distinction
between the spiritual and temporal, between the sacred and the profane,
or between the religious and the secular realms. Yet, only in the last three
decades of the twentieth century did professionals look at broader con-
ceptions of development than just growth of physical-material-producing
capacity, as the preceding outline suggests. The idea that economic
growth is only an element of the overall progress of human beings,
and that humans should be the end rather than means of development is
a relatively recent idea in mainstream development literature. Even in
the most sophisticated of conceptions—that of Sen’s development as
19
For a recent rendition of Maulana Mawdudi’s ideas on Islam and economics see Ahmad
(2011).
20
Al-Sadr (1961).
21
It is noteworthy that Iqtisaduna was written after the Shaheed had already published
Falsafatuna or Our Philosophy in 1960, a book that established the ethico-philosophical
framework in which Iqtisaduna was later envisioned. M.B. Al Sadr, Falsafatuna (Beirut, Dar
al Ta’aruf 1980). A study of Falsafatuna would provide a more complete understanding of
Iqtisaduna.
22
Monzer Kahf (2006). He suggests that the book Iqtisaduna became a shining beacon
that began a new era in Islamic studies and ushered the birth of Islamic economics.
freedom—the imperative of self-development as a prerequisite for cogni-

zance of the substantive meaning of freedom receives little attention.23 If
development should mean freedom and functioning, an exercise of capa-
bilities, what guarantee is there that capabilities and functioning, doing
what one values, will not lead to a fully self-centered, selfish outcome that
has produced massive poverty and misery for a large part of humanity
side-by-side with such astonishing opulence and colossal wealth accumu-
lation for a few? Without a doubt some minimum level of income is nec-
essary to avoid destitution and absolute poverty before one is able to
think, reflect, and meditate upon one’s action-decision choices. But
beyond that, embarking on a phenomenological process of self-develop-
ment becomes an imperative for humans to cognize the responsibilities of
the human state from an Islamic point of view.
The Islamic concept of development therefore contains three organi-
cally interrelated dimensions:
(a) individual self-development;

(b) physical development of the earth; and
(c) development of the human collectivity, which includes both.24
The first dimension specifies a dynamic process of the growth of the

human person toward the realization of Allah-given potentiality,25 alluded
to in previous chapters in the context of theological anthropology.26 The
second dimension specifies the utilization of natural resources to develop
the earth to provide for the material needs of the human individual and
collectivity. The third dimension refers to progress of the collectivity
toward full integration and unity. Self-development is the all-important
anchor, for without it, progress in the other two dimensions is not possible
23
For example, Giri suggests that Sen’s idea of development as freedom lacks a treatment
of the self necessary for human freedom and well-being, and needs to be improved in several
areas to make it a more complete view of freedom. Ananta Kumar Giri 2000. “Rethinking
Human Well-being: A Dialogue with Amartya Sen,” Journal of International Development,
vol. 12, pp. 1003–1018.
24
For a detailed analysis of each dimension, see Abbas Mirakhor and Idris Samawi Hamid,
Islam and Development, chapter 4.
25
One who is making progress on the path to perfection is called rashı̄d. The opposite of
self-development is ghayy, meaning deep ignorance (Q 2:256).
26
See Iqbal and Mirakhor (2011). Also, see especially the chapters by Seyyed Hossein Nasr
and Ibrahim Kalin in the same volume.
in a balanced and appropriate manner; any forward movement in them

without self-development leads to harmful distortions, such as the envi-
ronmental crisis discussed in preceding chapters. All three dimensions
must therefore proceed in tandem to achieve the desired balance, i.e.,
progress must be accompanied by justice both in its general (‘adl) and
interpersonal (qist) conceptions.
The most crucial and central to Islam’s concept of development is the
progress humans make in developing the self.27 Without this, balanced
and appropriate progress in the other two dimensions of development is
not possible; any forward movement in them without self-development
leads to harmful distortions. Compliance with the rules prescribed by the
Law Giver prevents distortions. The rules constitute a network that regu-
lates all dimensions of the human experience, individually and collectively,
on this plane of existence.
The process of the physical development of the earth by humans who
are aware of themselves, of the responsibilities of trusteeship-agency, and
who are ever conscious of their Creator renders sacred all economic activi-
ties. With regard to the physical development of the earth, the Islamic
view would suggest that the Almighty would not leave humans without
sufficient resources to perform the duties expected of them. Indeed, the
Qur’an makes it clear that the Creator has created sufficient resources to
meet the needs of all humans at any time and He has done so dynamically,
meaning that this sufficiency holds regardless of timeframe and popula-
tion.28 Consequently, the assumption that at a cosmic, universal, and gen-
eral level humanity (macro) faces scarcity would be untenable. This,
however, may not be the case at the micro level.29 As one of the important
tests of human experience on this plane of existence, individuals, and
groups of humanity experience conditions of plenty as well as conditions
of scarcity [15–18: 89; 37–42: 30; 34–36: 34]. The rules prescribed by
the Cherisher Lord specify the appropriate response to these tests. The
27
The process of self-development requires self-purification, which begins with self-aware-
ness, the first sign that the self does not have an independent existence without its Creator
and His Creation. This awareness starts an interactive process in which Allah (swt) empowers
the self along the path to perfection. Progress indicates further advancement in the recogni-
tion and knowledge of the Unity of the Creator and His Creation. For example, the degree
of sensitivity the person experiences in feeling the pain and suffering of the “other” is an
indication of the progress of purification.
28
See Qur’an (49: 54; 8: 13; 3: 65; 21: 15).
29
Zaman (2005), Barrera (2005), Marglin (1998).
7.3 ETHICS OF ISLAMIC PERSPECTIVE OF DEVELOPMENT 175
wealthy and the opulent are those who are most susceptible to responding
inappropriately. The Islamic view of scarcity is thus in contrast to conven-
tional economics, where there is never enough to go around. According
to Islam, there are sufficient resources at the global level as long as indi-
viduals share. With regard to exhaustible resources, Islam teaches that
these are the heritage of all generations and current generations must pre-
serve the right of future generations—for every individual in each genera-
tion to reap the same benefit.
The Islamic concept of development places great emphasis on the need
to focus human energy on the achievement of social solidarity and unity.
Islam’s emphasis on the social dimension is so great that there is not one
act of adoration and worship that is devoid of societal implications. The
success of each human, on this plane of existence and beyond, is made
dependent on patient and tolerant interaction and cooperation with other
humans (Qur’an 20:3). The idea is that mutual support and social solidar-
ity bring about a more tolerant and patient response to individual and
collective difficulties. It is the interconnectedness of humanity that calls
forth the order from the Supreme Creator for cooperation in good deeds
(Qur’an 2:5).
The fundamental objective of creation is to create a society in which
individuals become cognizant of all their capabilities, including the spiri-
tual. When humans are able to actualize these capabilities, it makes possi-
ble a life the Qur’an refers to as Hayat Tayyibah, the good life, a life free
of anxiety, fear, and regrets; a life of full awareness of the beauty of cre-
ation and Creator; a life of solidarity with other humans and the rest of
creation; and a life lived in the full Grace of Allah (swt). The final objective
of such a society is to ensure the actualization of the capabilities of humans
to progress along the path to perfection toward their Creator. This is the
common objective of society as well as of individuals.
7.3 Ethics of Islamic Perspective of Development

Smith makes clear in his less cited book (The Theory of Moral Sentiments)
that while compliance with the rules prescribed by the Creator is a must,
compliance with the market, an instrument for achieving the greatest
good, is also a necessity. Smith succinctly and clearly shares some of the
foundational scaffolding of Islam: belief in the one and only Creator;
belief in the accountability of the Day of Judgment; belief in the necessity
of compliance with the rules prescribed by the Creator; and belief that
justice is achieved with full compliance with rules. To paraphrase Sen, no

space need be made artificially for justice and fairness; it already exists in
the rules prescribed by the Law Giver. Smith considers the internalization
of rules (virtues)—being consciously aware of the ever-presence of the
Creator and acting accordingly—as crucial to all human conduct, includ-
ing economics. Economists have ignored this Smith and have focused on
the champion of self-interest—the basis for utility and profit maximization
for the individual consumer and producer, whatever the cost to society,
even if it means the impoverishment and exploitation of fellow humans.
An important insight of the new institutional economics (NIE) is that
rules reduce uncertainty and transaction costs, promote coordination, and
make collective action possible, and that rule-compliance promotes social
solidarity. Rules reduce uncertainty and transaction costs and promote
coordination, making collective action possible and promoting social soli-
darity. All of these elements have been directly emphasized or strongly
implied in Islam. Thus today, the Western concept of development is
focused on efficient institutions; a political system that nurtures institu-
tions and prohibits rent-seeking activities and the confiscation of legiti-
mate wealth; and a social outlook that embraces human development,
including education, healthcare, poverty eradication, a more even income
distribution, sustainability, and freedom. This is akin to the Islamic view—
with one big difference and one small one. Islamic teachings (not neces-
sarily the practice in Muslim societies) embrace heavier doses of social and
economic justice, morality, humanity, compassion, generosity, and charity;
and Islam places more emphasis on rules (virtues) and rule compliance
(internalization of virtues).
Islam’s perspective on development has three distinct features that dis-
tinguish this perspective from the prevailing conventional one. Ethics are
considered as the source of material as well as spiritual development. The
Prophet’s (saas) saying “Good ethics and being good to one’s neighbors
contributes to the prosperity of cities and increases development” sums up
the nexus of ethics, development, and prosperity.30 The set of virtues and
the rules prescribed in Islam advocate ethical and responsible finance
through (a) social and economic justice; (b) equitable and fair distribu-
tion; and (c) redistribution to enhance inclusion, as discussed below.
30
Ali (2014) based on quote by Al-Mawardi who also reported the Prophet’s (saas) saying
that “He who displays bad ethics, his earnings will be severely curtailed.”
7.3.1 Social and Economic Justice

As discussed in earlier chapters, economic and social justice is at the core
of Islamic virtues. The central goals of Islam for the society are the welfare
of all its members and socioeconomic justice. All members of an Islamic
society must be given the same opportunities to advance; in other words,
a level playing field, including access to the natural resources provided by
Allah (swt). For those for whom there is no work and for those that can-
not work, society must afford the minimum required for a dignified life:
shelter, food, healthcare, and education.31 The rights of future generations
must be preserved. Thus Islam advocates an environment where behavior
is molded to support the goals of an Islamic society: societal welfare and
socioeconomic justice, with the goal of making humankind one, confirm-
ing the Unity of Allah’s (swt) creation. If the rules prescribed by The
Creator are followed, then the outcome will be a just and unified creation.
It is with the Unity of Creation as the goal that the Qur’an advocates risk
sharing as the foundation of finance.
The most important economic institution that operationalizes the
objective of achieving social justice in Islam is that of the distribution-
redistribution rule of the Islamic economic paradigm. Distribution takes
place post-production and sale when all factors of production are given
what is due to them commensurate with their contribution to production,
exchange, and sale of goods and services. Redistribution refers to the post-
distribution phase when the charge due to the less able are levied. These
expenditures are essentially repatriation and redemption of the rights of
others in one’s income and wealth. Redeeming these rights is a manifesta-
tion of belief in the Oneness of the Creator and its corollary, the unity of
the creation in general and of mankind in particular. It is the recognition
and affirmation that Allah (swt) has created the resources for all of man-
kind who must have unhindered access to them. Even the abilities that
make access to resources possible are due to the Creator. This would mean
that those who are less able or unable to use these resources are partners
of the more able.
31
Chapra (1983) concludes that a Muslim society that fails to provide welfare of its mem-
bers is really not worthy of the name as the Prophet (saas) declared: “He is not a true Muslim
who eats his fill when his next-door neighbor is hungry.”
7.3.2 Equitable and Fair Distribution

Throughout the ages, one of the most important questions confronting
humankind has been: What criterion should determine the distribution of
economic resources? The answer depends on the underlying concept of
justice and fairness, which, in turn, depends on the belief system. Islam
considers justice an important attribute of the Creator manifested in His
creation. The concept of justice for humans is simple and unambiguous:
Justice is obtained when all things are placed where intended by the
Creator. How are humans to know where the right (just) place is for
everything? The answer is: Follow the rules prescribed by the Creator.
Rule compliance assures justice. In turn, justice ensures balance for indi-
viduals and for their collectivity. Compliance with rules, however, does
more than create balance; it guarantees that humans draw near to their
ultimate objective, namely, their Creator. Morality is a result of just behav-
ior. In contrast, non-theocentric thought considers justice “an important
subclass of morality in general, a subclass which generally involves appeals
to the overlapping notions of right, fairness, equality, and deserts.” These
systems must find ways in which a consensual agreement is reached on the
concept of justice and fairness according to which goods and services pro-
duced can be distributed. To do so, they must first devise moral theories
that provide reason to justify a particular distributional system.
The Qur’an makes clear that all property belongs to the Creator who
has made all the created resources available for humans to empower them
to perform what their Creator expects of them. This ultimate ownership
will remain preserved for the Creator, with all this implies for social justice.
Humans are allowed to combine their physical labor with the created
resources to produce the means of sustenance for themselves and others of
mankind. This right of access to resources created by the Cherisher Lord
belongs universally to all of mankind (Q 2:29). There are only two ways
in which individuals can gain legitimate property rights in the limited
sense of the previous two rules governing property. Individuals can gain
property rights through a combination of their own creative labor and
other resources or through transfer—via exchange, contracts, grants, or
inheritance—from others who have gained property right title to an asset
through their own labor. Fundamentally, therefore, work is the basis of
acquiring rights to property. Work is considered a duty; its importance is
reflected in the fact that it is mentioned in a large number of verses in the
Qur’an. Work is a foundation of “belief”: “Indeed there is nothing for the
human other than (what is achieved through) effort and that (the results
of) his effort will be seen and then he will be repaid fullest payment”
(Q 53:39–41). The next rule governing property forbids gaining instanta-
neous property rights claim without commensurate work. The exception is
transfer via gifts from others who have gained legitimate property rights
claim on the asset transferred. The prohibition covers theft, bribery,
gambling, interest from money lent, or, generally, income from unlawful
sources.
Resources are created for all of mankind; therefore, if a person is unable
to access these resources, her/his claim to resources (as an extension of
the invariant ownership of the Creator) cannot be violated. All individuals
have a property right claim in resources even if they are unable to partake
in the act of production. These rights must be redeemed, in kind or in
monetary equivalence. In short, the Qur’an considers the more able as
trustee-agents in using these resources on behalf of the less able. In this
view, property is not a means of exclusion but inclusion in which the rights
of those less able in the income and wealth of the more able are redeemed.
The result would be a balanced economy without extremes of wealth and
poverty. The operational mechanism for redeeming the right of the less
able in the income and wealth of the more able are the network of manda-
tory and voluntary payments such as zakāt (2.5 percent on wealth), khums
(20 percent of income), and payments referred to as sadaqāt. This is the
foundation of the rule of sharing ordained by the Creator, who also threat-
ens those who shirk in meeting this obligation and violate the rule of shar-
ing (Q 24:33; 3:180; 4:36–37; 92:5–11).
The next rule governing property imposes limitations on disposing a
property over which legitimate rights are claimed. Property owners have a
severely mandated obligation not to waste, squander, or destroy (itlāf and
isrāf), use property opulently (itrāf), or as means of attaining unlawful
(harām) purposes. Once the rules governing property rights claims are
observed and related obligations, including sharing, are discharged, prop-
erty rights on the remaining part of income, wealth, and assets are held
sacred and no one has the right to force appropriations or expropriation.
Finally, distribution takes place post-production and sale when all fac-
tors of production are given what is due to them commensurate with their
contribution to production, exchange, and sale of goods and services.
Redistribution refers to the post-distribution phase when the charge due
to the less able are levied. Followers of all religions must remain fully con-
scious of their partnership with those who are less fortunate throughout
the process of wealth creation and the fact that they must redeem the
rights of others in the created income and wealth. Being unable to access
resources to which they have the right does not negate the share of the
poor in income and wealth of the more able. Moreover, even after these
rights are redeemed, the remaining wealth is not to be accumulated, since
wealth is considered as the life blood of the economy. Accordingly, Islam
incorporates other philanthropic institutions such as awqāf, or endow-
ments, to play a key role in fostering all three dimensions of develop-
ment—further discussed under redistribution.
These ideas on distributive justice afford a perspective on Islamic
notions of just distribution. An important central difference between
Islam’s position and those discussed earlier is the role of the market. All
these ideas apply to market economies. Markets also play a crucial role in
Islam, but with one major difference. Epistemologically, the difference is
one of the concept of the market as an ideology and the concept of the
market as an instrument. This difference is profound. In societies known
widely as market economies, market norms are central to social relations.
In turn, market norms are determined by self-interest, which dictate
“rational” behavior as maximizing what interests the self, narrowly labeled
as satisfaction (utility or profit). Market norms, in turn, determine the pat-
tern of preferences of individuals. As Gomberg argues, market norms and
preference patterns are individualist, not communal. They have self-
seeking orientations.
In Islam, by contrast, the market is an instrument. It is not an organism
that determines the rules and norms of behavior, not even those of its own
operation. Rules that shape the pattern of preferences of participants are
determined outside the market. Participants internalize them before enter-
ing the market. The behavior of consumers, producers, and traders,
informed by their preferences, are subject to rules determined outside the
market. In a market where there is full rule compliance, the price that
prevails for goods, services, and factors of production is considered just.
The resulting incomes are considered justly earned. Therefore, the result-
ing distribution is just. However, participants will not be allowed to keep
their full earnings simply because their income was justly earned. There are
rights and entitlements of others in the resulting post-market distribution
of income and wealth that must be redeemed. This is the function of
post-market redistribution, which is governed by its own set of rules. Any
remaining wealth that is accumulated is broken up at the end of the per-
son’s life and distributed among a large number of beneficiaries spanning
at least four generations, according to rules specified in the Qur’an to

avoid the concentration of income and wealth in the hands of a few.
Of the two main approaches to redistribution, (a) income-based or
(b) asset-based, Islamic finance provides a comprehensive approach to
asset-based redistribution through risk sharing, which is at the core of
Islamic finance. Whereas the income-based redistribution approach takes
the current income distribution as given and aims at fairer distribution of
future GDP, the asset-based redistribution is basically a risk sharing
approach and converges to Islamic finance’s contractual framework in
terms of empowering equity participation by the lower income groups in
the society. Analytically, by making the poor direct real-asset holders in the
real sector of the economy, the approach reduces their empirically observed
high risk aversion, it creates positive incentives for actualizations of behav-
ioral factors that are productivity enhancing (such as trust, truth-telling,
hard work, etc.) through design of contracts that reduce or eliminate the
difference between principals and agents and are conducive to achieve-
ment of interests of all parties to a contract (Ng et al. 2015).
7.3.3 Redistribution (Inclusion)
Modern development theories analyzing the evolution of growth, relative
income inequalities, and economic development offer two tracks of think-
ing. One track attributes imbalances in redistribution of wealth and income
in the economy as an impediment to growth while the other track identi-
fies financial market imperfections as the key obstacle.32 Many poor fami-
lies in the developing world have limited access to formal financial services,
including credit, savings, and insurance. They instead rely on a variety of
informal credit relationships with moneylenders, relatives, friends, or mer-
chants. Traditionally, banks and other formal financial service providers
including insurance companies have not considered the poor a viable mar-
ket, and penetration rates for formal financial services in developing coun-
tries are extremely low. Increasing access to financial services holds the
promise to help reduce poverty and improve development outcomes, by
enabling the poor to smooth consumption, start or expand a business,
cope with risk, and increase or diversify household income.
There is growing evidence identifying the linkage between the eco-
nomic development and financial inclusion. Galor and Zeira (1993) and
Demirguc-Kunt et al. (2007).

32
Banerjee and Newman (1993) imply that financial exclusion not only
holds back investment, but results in persistent income inequality, as it
adds to negative incentives to save and work and encourages repeated
distribution in a society. Further evidence is supporting the significance of
financial inclusion and economic development prompting multilateral
institutions such as the World Bank to initiate Universal Financial Access
(UFA) 2020 goals. Conventional finance has developed mechanisms such
as microfinance, SME finance, and micro-insurance to enhance financial
inclusion, but these interventions are not without challenges. Key chal-
lenges include (a) high rather than affordable interest rates that have led
to distress for poor borrowers without conclusive evidence of alleviating
poverty; (b) not every micro-borrower is an entrepreneur; (c) shortage of
low-cost funding; and finally, (d) absence of market-driven funding due to
high risk perceptions.33
Islam emphasizes financial inclusion more explicitly, but two distinct
features of Islamic finance—the notions of risk sharing and redistribution
of wealth—differentiate its path of development significantly from the
conventional financial model. According to the Islamic perspective, risks
are mitigated in various ways. First, the economic system is a rule-based
system, which has provided rules of behavior and a taxonomy of decisions:
actions and their commensurate payoffs based on the principles of risk
sharing. Complying with these rules reduces uncertainty. Second, Islam
has provided ways and means to mitigate uncertainty by sharing the risks
by engaging in economic activities with fellow human beings through
exchange. Sharing allows risk to be spread and thus lowered for individual
participants. However, if a person is unable to use any of the market means
of risk sharing because of poverty, Allah (swt) has ordered a solution here
as well: the rich are commanded to share the risks of the life of the poor by
redeeming their rights derived from the Islamic principles of property
rights (Mirakhor 1989; Iqbal and Mirakhor 2011). Islam ordains risk
sharing through three main venues:
(a) contracts of exchange and risk-sharing instruments in the financial

sector
(b) redistributive risk-sharing instruments through which the econom-
ically more able segment of the society share the risks facing the less
able segment of the population

33
(c) inheritance rules specified in the Qur’an, through which the wealth
of a person at the time of death is distributed among current and
future generations of inheritors
The Islamic system advocates risk sharing in financial transactions, and

a financial system based on risk sharing offers various advantages over the
conventional system based on risk shifting. Use of risk-sharing instru-
ments could encourage investors to invest in sectors such as micro, small,
and medium enterprises (MSMEs), which are perceived as high-risk sec-
tors. Given an enabling environment, investors with an appetite for taking
on such higher risk will be attracted to providing capital for these sectors.
This argument can be supported by growing the market for the private
equity. If funds for these sectors become more available, financial inclusion
in the system could be expected to increase.
The second set of instruments meant for redistribution are used to
redeem the rights of the less able in the income and wealth of the more
able. Rules of redistribution ensure that those unable to benefit by partici-
pating directly in production and consumption in the market, through a
combination of their labor and their right of access to resources provided
by the Supreme Creator for all humans, are redeemed their rights through
zakah,34 khums, sadaqat, waqf, and other redistributive mechanisms. Once
these rights have been redeemed out of the income and wealth of the
more economically able, the latter’s property rights to the remaining
income and wealth are held inviolable. These rights, however, expire at the
point of passing of a person. At death, the person loses the right to allocate
his/her wealth as he/she pleases except on one-third of income, which
believers can use to make waqf, sadaqat, or other transfer contributions as
the person wishes. The remainder is broken up and must be distributed
among a large number of persons and categories according to strict rules
of allocation specified in the Qur’an (see 4:1–13).
Contrary to common belief, these are not instruments of charity, altru-
ism, or beneficence, but instruments of redemption of rights and repay-
ment of obligations. The Qur’an considers the more able as trustee-agents
34
Moheildin et al. (2011) estimate the resource shortfall to fill the poverty gap through
zakah collection based on domestic and remittance contributions to determine whether the
zakah collection is sufficient to cover the estimated shortfall. Using this estimation, they find
supporting evidence that 20 out of 39 OIC countries can actually alleviate the economic
hardships of the poorest, those living with income under $1.25 per day, out of the poverty
line simply with adequate zakah collection and disbursements.
in using these resources on behalf of the less able. In this view, property is
not a means of exclusion but inclusion, in which the rights of those less
able to the income and wealth of the more able are redeemed. The result
would be a balanced economy without extremes of wealth and poverty.
Instruments meant for redistribution are used to redeem the rights of
the less able in the income and wealth of the more able. Contrary to com-
mon belief, these are not instruments of charity, altruism or beneficence
but these are instruments of redemption of rights and repayment of obli-
gations. In practical terms, the Qur’an makes clear that creating a balanced
society that avoids extreme of wealth and poverty, a society in which all
understand that wealth is a blessing provided by the Creator for the sole
purpose of providing support for the lives of all of mankind is desirable.
The Islamic view holds that it is not possible to have many rich and wealthy
people who continue to focus all their efforts on accumulating wealth
without simultaneously creating a mass of economically deprived and des-
titute. The rich consume opulently while the poor suffer from deprivation
because their rights in the wealth of the rich and powerful is not redeemed.
To avoid this, Islam prohibits wealth concentration, imposes limits on
consumption through its rules prohibiting overspending (israf), waste
(itlaf), ostentatious and opulent spending (itraf). It then ordains that the
net surplus, after moderate spending necessary to maintain modest living
standard, must be returned to the members of the society who, for a vari-
ety of reasons, are unable to work, hence the resources they could have
used to produce income and wealth were utilized by the more able.
The third dimension—after risk sharing and redistributive instruments—
of distributive justice in the institutional scaffolding of an Islamic society
is the institution of inheritance crucial in the intergenerational justice
framework envisioned by the Law Giver. Rules governing production,
consumption, and distribution assure conservation of resources for the
next generations. Rules of redistribution ensure that those unable to ben-
efit by participating directly in production and consumption in the mar-
ket, through the combination of their labor and their right of access to
resources provided by the Supreme Creator for all humans, are redeemed
their rights through zakah, khums, sadaqat, waqf and other redistributive
mechanisms. Once these rights have been redeemed out of the income
and wealth of the more economically able, the latter’s property rights on
the remaining income and wealth are held inviolable. These rights, how-
ever, cease at the point of passing of a person. At the time of passing, the
person loses the right to allocate his/her wealth as he/she pleases except
7.4 CONCLUSION 185
on a third of income that believers can use to make waqf, sadaqat, or other
transfer contributions as the person wishes. The remainder is broken up
and has to be distributed among a large number of persons and categories
according to strict rules of allocation specified in the Qur’an (see Verses
11–13, Chapter 4).
7.4 Conclusion
Thus, a true Islamic economic system is a market-based system, but with
entrenched Islamic behavior and goals (objectives/rules/institutions)
attributed to consumers, producers, and to government (authorities), and
with institutions as outlined above. For economic analysis, some of these
Islamic values and goals can be introduced into the conventional behavioral
functions of consumers and producers and others can be added as con-
straints in the maximization of consumer utility and producer profit. Based
on the Islamic vision elaborated in this paper, we expect the Islamic solu-
tion to differ in the following important ways from the conventional:
greater degree of justice in all aspects of economic management, higher
moral standard, honesty and trust exhibited in the marketplace and in all
economic transactions, poverty eradication, a more even distribution of
wealth and income, no hoarding of wealth, less opulence in consumption,
no exploitive speculation, risk sharing as opposed to debt contracts, better
social infrastructure and provision of social services, better treatment of
workers, higher education expenditures relative to GDP, higher savings
and investment rates, higher trade/GDP, higher foreign aid/GDP, higher
degree of environmental preservation, and vigilantly supervised markets. It
would be expected that these differences would be reflected in higher
quantitative and qualitative economic growth if the Islamic rules and objec-
tives were adopted. One would expect to achieve higher rate of growth
because of higher investment rate, higher educational expenditures, higher
social awareness, better functioning markets, higher level of trust, and insti-
tutions that have empirically been shown to be critical for growth.
Given the virtues governing property rights, work, production,
exchange, markets, distribution, and redistribution, it is reasonable to
conclude that in an Islamic society—a rule complying and Allah (swt)-
conscious society—absolute poverty could not exist. It can be argued that
there is no topic more emphasized in Islam than poverty and the respon-
sibility of individuals and society to eradicate it. The Prophet (sawa) said
that poverty is near disbelief and that poverty is worse than murder. It is
almost axiomatic that in any society in which there is poverty, Islamic rules
are not being observed. It means that the rich and wealthy have not
redeemed the rights of others to their income and wealth and that the
state has failed to take corrective action.
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Index1
A compatible contracts, 139, 141,

accountability, 94–6 142, 149
asymmetric information, complexity, 124, 125
108, 112 compliance, 174–6, 178, 180
contract, 70–2
contract theory, 140, 141, 147–9
B contracts, 63, 68, 71, 71n27, 72, 74,
banking system, 146n9, 152 75, 104, 104n3, 105n5, 106–10,
being just, 64, 66–8 112–14, 116, 124, 125, 126n17,
being truthful, 64, 72, 78 127–30
benevolence, 27, 34, 46, 47 contractual obligations, 70, 70n23,
business ethics, 26, 42–9, 61 71, 73, 74
business leaders, 94, 98 cooperation, 4, 20, 21
business leadership, 94–6 core virtues, 82, 99
corporate governance, 5, 9, 19, 22
crimes, 30, 41, 42
C
capitalism, 1, 2, 4, 11–14
character, 61–4, 71, 77, 78 D
character traits, 82, 94, 99 debt, 6, 13–16
charity, 176, 183, 184 debt contract, 107, 110, 113, 116,
compassion, 47, 49, 76, 100 139, 142, 148, 153, 154
Note: Page numbers followed by “n” refer to notes.

1

DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-66390-6
190 INDEX
debt financing, 108, 109, 111, 112, 127, 128, 130, 131, 131n22,
114, 115, 125 138, 143, 144, 145n7
debt system, 146, 151, 153, 154 financial ethics, 6
decoupling, 107, 116 financial inclusion, 167, 169, 181–3
deposit insurance, 108, 114, 124–6 financial instability, 113, 115,
development, 1, 26, 36, 163–70, 117, 125
172–6, 180–2 financial institutions, 1, 7, 9, 10, 138,
dignity, 38–40, 42, 43 144, 146, 152, 155
disclosure, 93, 98 financial intermediaries, 125–7
distribution, 82, 83, 89–91, 164, 165, financialization, 110, 111, 116, 117
166n11, 170, 176–82, 184, 185 financial regulation, 124–6
financial repression, 115, 116
financial scandals, 1, 2, 5, 10
E financial sector, 10, 15, 16, 139,
economic crime(s), 7, 16–21, 42 143, 151
economic development, 164–70, 172, financial systems, 104, 109–11,
181, 182 113–17, 124, 125, 127, 128
economic growth, 164, 165, 166n11, fractional reserve, 109n8, 113–15,
168, 172, 185 124, 125, 128
economic justice, 67, 103, 119–23,
129, 176, 177
economic system, 91, 93 G
environmental, 96, 97 generic rights, 37, 42
environmental issues, 97 generosity, 76
equilibrium, 150 globalization, 1, 12, 17, 20
equity, 108, 109, 111–14, 118, 119, governance, 1, 2, 5, 6, 9, 19, 20, 22
121, 122, 125, 128, 164,
181, 183
equity financing, 108, 109, 113 H
ethical business, 81–101 honesty, 78
ethics, 25–53, 61–79 human development, 171, 176
excessive consumption, 83, 97 human dignity, 30, 38–40, 42
excessive risk, 5, 6, 9, 10 human goods, 37, 39–41
expropriation, 8 humility, 76–8
F I
fair treatment, 88, 95, 100 income distribution, 164, 165,
financial crimes, 1, 2, 17, 19–21, 30, 176, 181
41, 42 inequality, 12–14, 40, 41, 140, 143,
financial crisis, 1–3, 6–11, 13, 15, 17, 144, 145n7, 147, 150, 156, 158,
18, 21, 94, 112, 115, 124, 125, 163, 165, 166, 168, 169, 182
INDEX
191
information asymmetries, 5, 10 moral sense, 11, 20, 25

inheritance, 178, 183, 184 moral sentiments, 170, 175
injustice, 67, 68 morality, 1, 3, 4, 11, 14, 17, 20, 21,
instability, 150, 151, 154 81, 83, 99, 176, 178
institutional economics, 3–5, 171, 176 morals, 164, 165, 165n4, 178, 185
integrity, 4, 8, 18, 65, 72, 73, 77
intention, 63–5, 71, 72, 75
interest rate, 107, 115, 119, 127 N
Islamic economics, 93, 103–31, natural resources, 97
172, 172n22 normative, 26
Islamic finance, 82 normative ethics, 26
Islamic society, 177, 184, 185
O
J obligations, 70, 70n23, 71, 71n27,
juridical ethics, 63, 63n9, 64 73, 74, 76, 76n39
justice, 15, 35, 44, 47–9, 47n74, 64, OIC countries, 166–9
66–8, 71, 75, 81–3, 87, 88, 95,
99, 100, 172, 174, 176–8, 180,
184, 185 P
paper economy, 14, 16, 139, 151
poverty, 67, 68, 164, 166, 166n9,
L 166n10, 167, 167n12, 170, 173,
leverage, 114–16, 127, 128 176, 179, 181, 182, 183n34,
184–6
poverty reduction, 164, 166
M price controls, 84, 85
market(s), 1, 2, 4–6, 8, 12, 14–18, production process, 89, 90
27, 45–50, 82–6, 92, 94 profit maximization, 170, 176
market behavior, 84, 86 property, 68, 69, 69n19, 69n20,
market conduct, 82–6 73, 74
market norms, 180 property rights, 69, 84, 89, 93, 104,
monetary policy, 117, 118, 127 105, 110, 117, 129, 141, 145,
moral character, 44, 45, 48, 61, 64 146, 149, 171, 178, 179, 182–5
moral consequences, 164 prosperity, 164, 166n11, 167n12, 176
moral failure, 5, 11, 14, 20 prudence, 46, 47
moral foundation, 39, 42
moral hazard, 5, 6n8, 112, 114, 124,
125, 152, 153, 156 R
moral norms, 26, 37–41 real economy, 109n8, 110, 126
moral philosophy, 45, 49 real sector, 16
moral principle, 25, 26, 30, 31, 34, redistribution, 138, 153, 158, 176,
38, 39, 42, 45 177, 179–85
192 INDEX
redistributive, 105, 122, 123 trust, 4, 6, 9, 14, 19, 72–4, 76, 77

regulation, 108, 124–8 trustee, 90, 97
repression, 1, 15, 16, 21, 108, 115, 116 trustworthiness, 73, 74, 89, 94, 100
reserve banking, 114, 128 trustworthy, 71–3
responsibility, 25, 49, 65, 67–9, truthful, 64, 72, 72n30, 73, 78
70n23, 71, 76, 77 truthfulness, 71, 72, 72n31, 81, 93,
responsible finance, 163–86 94, 98, 100
righteousness, 48, 50, 53
rights, 64, 68–71, 73, 74, 76, 76n40
risk management, 145, 146, 146n9 U
risks, 135–8, 145, 146, 155, 156, 158 uncertainty, 135–7, 139, 154, 155,
risk sharing, 103–19, 124–8, 135–58 155n29, 155n30
risk shifting, 138, 142, 146, 146n9 unity, 64–6, 79
risk taking, 104, 104n3, 107, 112
risk transfer, 107, 109, 110, 116, 124,
137, 138, 140–57 V
valuation, 5, 6, 8, 9, 15, 26,
31, 32
S values, 26, 31–3, 37, 40, 42–5, 47–9,
sharing finance, 107, 108, 110 82, 94, 95, 99
Smith, A., 4, 12 vices, 61, 61n1, 77, 78
social, 61, 64–70, 73–7, 79 virtue ethics, 44–50
social justice, 110, 119, 120, 130, virtues, 28, 43–7, 61, 78, 81–4, 87–9,
171, 171n18, 172, 177, 178 92–5, 98–100
social order, 68, 69 virtue theory, 45–7
social solidarity, 109, 116–18, 129,
175, 176
stakeholders, 43, 46, 49, 92–5, 98, 99 W
sustainable development, 164, 166 wealth, 163, 165, 166n11, 170, 173,
sympathy, 27, 28, 30, 40, 46, 52 175–7, 179–86
wealth distribution, 108, 113, 123
welfare, 64, 75–7
T work ethics, 86, 86n6, 89, 100
transaction costs, 84, 86, 93
transparency, 10, 11, 46, 48, 72, 74,
84, 93, 95, 99, 100, 126, 127, Z
130, 131 Zoroastrian, 33, 38, 39

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PALGRAVE STUDIES IN

Zamir Iqbal &

More information about this series at

Palgrave Studies in Islamic Banking, Finance, and Economics

Library of Congress Control Number: 2017955052

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s) 2017

Cover design by Will Speed

Printed on acid-free paper

This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by Springer Nature

Wa’Llāhu a‘lamu bi’l- ṣawāb Seyyed Hossein Nasr

2 Moral Sense and Ethics in Economics and Finance 25

3 Key Virtues of Business Ethics in Islam 61

4 Business Ethics in Islam 81

5 Ethical Dimensions of Islamic Economics and Finance103

5.3 Economic and Social Justice119

6 Sacralizing Finance: Risk-Sharing Islamic Finance135

7 Ethical and Responsible Finance for Development163

Fig. 7.1 Poverty headcount ratio at $1.90 and $3.10 a day

Table 2.1 Select variation on the golden rule 35

© The Author(s) 2017 1

Box 1.1: (continued)

Whereas mainstream economics have strong views on keeping the

Finally, Institutional Economics takes things yet another step farther by

1.1 Ethics and Economics and Finance

Most economists who discuss the relationship between ethics and

informational asymmetries are flawed, as witnessed by financial crisis. Thus

1.1.1 Frequent Financial Crises and Crimes

1.1.2 Expropriation of Value and Fair Valuation

Porter and Kramer (2011).

In a recent article, Professor Pablo Fernandez questions his fellow

1.1.5 Due Care, Honesty, and Transparency

1.2 Moral Failure of Capitalism

Stiglitz (2010a, b).

Karstedt and Farrall (2006).

to ignore unethical finance and business practices that do enormous harm,

Capitalism was unrestrained up until the emergence of the Great

Reinhart and Rogoff (2009).

exchange crisis” or “banking crisis.” The incentive structure in place

1.3 Financial Repression

problem of temporary disequilibrium. The central problem of major

1.4 Case of Economic Crimes

2007–2008 financial crisis. Criminal economic activities that used to be

unpunished with no loss of status, and stock price manipulators continue

proposed by Holloway: it would have to be based on the “consent” of all

remedial, restorative action to assist the victims, there is a need for a

(a) a bewildering array of international initiatives without an anchor

Moral Sense and Ethics in Economics

The discussion in the previous chapter suggests two major explanations

© The Author(s) 2017 25

2.1 Perspectives on Moral Sense4

happiness of others.”13 Indeed, Hutcheson argued that human nature

In spite of (or perhaps because of) the evolution of the conception of

principle advocated by Kateb, Holloway, and others is to prevent harm,

2.2 Search for a Universal Moral Principle

2.2.1 Golden Rule in Historical Context

Table 2.1 Select variation on the golden rule

Source: Maxwell (2003)

the ­adequacy of the knowledge of and understanding of the golden rule

these assumptions. A volunteer soliciting contributions for an e­ nvironmental

Wa’Llāhu a‘lamu bi’l- ṣawāb Seyyed Hossein Nasr

2 Moral Sense and Ethics in Economics and Finance 25

3 Key Virtues of Business Ethics in Islam 61

4 Business Ethics in Islam 81

5 Ethical Dimensions of Islamic Economics and Finance103

5.3 Economic and Social Justice119

6 Sacralizing Finance: Risk-Sharing Islamic Finance135

7 Ethical and Responsible Finance for Development163

the adequacy of the knowledge of and understanding of the golden rule

these assumptions. A volunteer soliciting contributions for an e nvironmental

judgment. This means that by prescribing to themselves, individuals

clear preference is for self-management of the market. Any interference

rotect the property of the employer, and act as a trustworthy worker.