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THE PROFESSIONAL JOURNAL OF THE U.S. ARMY JANUARY-FEBRUARY 2020

Field Manual 4-0

Lundy, Fogg, Creed, and Latham, p6
Russian Success in Syria
Sinclair, p12
U.S.-Israeli Institutional
Army Cooperation
Orwin, p45
Evaluating Evaluations
Evans and Robinson, p89
 THE PROFESSIONAL JOURNAL OF THE U.S. ARMY

January-February 2020, Vol. 100, No. 1

Professional Bulletin 100-20-01/02
Commander, USACAC; Commandant, CGSC; DCG for Combined Arms,
TRADOC: Lt. Gen. James E. Rainey, U.S. Army

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

6 Field Manual 4-0 29 Leadership during Large-Scale

Driving Sustainment Change Combat Operations
Maj. Jeremy Smith, U.S. Marine Corps
Lt. Gen. Michael D. Lundy, U.S. Army
Maj. Gen. Rodney D. Fogg, U.S. Army A Marine Corps officer opines that mission command is a philosophy
and a principle, not a warfighting function, and argues that Army
Col. Richard D. Creed Jr., U.S. Army leaders should study history and embrace command and control to
Lt. Col. William C. Latham Jr., U.S. Army, Retired prepare for large-scale combat operations. This article won third place
in the 2019 MacArthur Writing Contest.
The commander of the U.S. Army Combined Arms Center and his
fellow authors discuss the importance of doctrine; specifically, how
Field Manual 4-0, Sustainment Operations, provides the doctrinal
framework for sustainment operations necessary to fight and win
in large-scale combat operations in a multi-domain environment.
36 Developing Readiness to Trust
Artificial Intelligence within
Warfighting Teams
12 A Logic All Its Own Chaplain (Maj.) Marlon W. Brown, U.S. Army

Russian Operational Art According to an Army chaplain, by using current doctrinal concepts
in the Syrian Campaign of trust and understanding the factors that lead to an individual
decision to trust, the Army can achieve a high level of readiness to
Lt. Col. Nicholas Sinclair, U.S. Army trust artificial intelligence in cohesive warfighting teams.
The author describes the unique logic of Russian military thought
and how Russia successfully implemented operational art during
its campaign in Syria.
45 Not an Intellectual Exercise
Lessons from U.S.-Israeli Institutional
Army Cooperation, 1973–1982
22 The Small-Team Maj. Ethan Orwin, U.S. Army
Replacement System
The author recounts the high-level personal contact between U.S. and
Wartime Replacement Systems Israeli military leaders after the end of the Yom Kippur War and examines its
in Large-Scale Combat Operations implications for present-day cooperation between the two armies.

Maj. R. Smith Griggs, U.S. Army

Capt. Jacob Haider, U.S. Army
Luke Flatebo
56 Air Supremacy
The authors posit that building and maintaining combat power in the
face of high-intensity combat casualty rates requires an effective per- Are the Chinese Ready?
sonnel replacement system. They propose a small-team replacement
system to meet the challenges of large-scale combat operations. Maj. Jonathan G. McPhilamy, U.S. Air Force
An Air Force officer explains that while China has invested heavily in its
defensive air capabilities, it still lags significantly behind the West in three
areas important for offensive airpower projection: air integration in the
joint fight, aerial refueling, and aircraft production and sustainment.

2 January-February 2020  MILITARY REVIEW

 January-February 2020
Volume 100 ◆ Number 1

62 Information on the Twenty-First 100 Option 17

Century Battlefield Military Law and Vigilante Justice in Prisoner
Proposing the Army’s Seventh of War Camps during World War II
Warfighting Function Mark M. Hull, PhD, JD, FRHistS
Capt. Charles M. Kelly, U.S. Army A criminal law and history professor provides World War II vignettes
to illustrate that the Code of Conduct should be rewritten in accord
The author proposes that the Army should adopt information as the
with the controlling language of the Geneva Convention, and other
seventh warfighting function to enable the adequate integration of
language in the code should be changed to reflect the ideal that
information in operational planning and execution and provide an
prisoners do not have disciplinary power over other prisoners,
improved ability to apply force below the threshold of lethal effects.
regardless of circumstances.

70 The Army’s Gap in Operational-
Level Intelligence for Space as 108 Key Ingredient in Army
Part of Multi-Domain Operations Leader Development
Maj. Jerry V. Drew II, U.S. Army Graduate School
Maj. George Fust, U.S. Army
An operations officer in the 1st Space Brigade believes that to
become an effective multi-domain force, the operational-level The author analyzes the levels of education achieved by Army senior
Army must begin linking both strategic- and tactical-level space officers to better understand the results of the Army’s current graduate
intelligence to plan the operational-level fight, to convey the Army’s school policy and to identify how to better leverage graduate school to
intelligence needs to the joint force, and to provide meaningful develop leaders who can then be more effective in strategic-level positions.
analysis to tactical echelons.

120 The Reemergence of Gray-Zone
80 Great Power Collaboration?
Warfare in Modern Conflicts
A Possible Model for Arctic Governance
Israel’s Struggle against Hamas’s
Maj. Dai Jing, Singapore Armed Forces Indirect Approach
Master Sgt. Raymond Huff, U.S. Army
Omer Dostri
The authors assert that as the environmental, economic, and
The author presents a case study of the conflict between Hamas and
security impacts of the Arctic are global in nature, its governance
Israel to show how gray-zone warfare is neither an innovative nor
should also be correspondingly global, and the United States, as
old phenomenon. The case study describes trends in the geopolitical
both an Arctic state and the largest economy in the world, should
and strategic environments and a renewed phenomenon applied by
take the lead in fostering international cooperation in the Arctic.
modern technologies and tools.

89 Evaluating Our Evaluations
Recognizing and Countering
REVIEW ESSAY
Performance Evaluation Pitfalls
Lt. Col. Lee A. Evans, PhD, U.S. Army 128 Admiral Bill Halsey
Lt. Col. G. Lee Robinson, PhD, U.S. Army A Naval Life
The authors explain the structural and cognitive biases inherent in the
Lt. Col. John H. Modinger, PhD, U.S. Air Force, Retired
Army’s performance evaluation system and provide recommenda- The author critiques a book by Thomas Alexander Hughes that
tions to help senior raters more objectively evaluate their subordinates. profiles the life of Fleet Adm. William “Bull” Halsey, arguably the most
famous naval officer of World War II.

MILITARY REVIEW  January-February 2020
3
 Suggested Themes
and Topics
Large-Scale Combat Operations • Regarding sustainment and mobilization for LSCO, how should
• How do we foster deep institutional focus on large-scale combat the industrial base change to support LSCO? How does the
operations (LSCO)? Army communicate its requirements to industry?
• What is the relationship between multi-domain operations • What rapid training and mobilization is required for
and mission command in LSCO? How can they be integrated COMPO2 and COMPO3 units to "join the fight" and meet
and synchronized? deployment requirements?
• What specific impacts on the Army’s renewed emphasis on • Brigade combat teams have the training centers, division head-
LSCO training, readiness, and doctrine are to be expected? quarters have warfighters, and sustainment brigades sometimes
How does one measure the effectiveness of adjustments in rotate smaller elements to training centers, but how does a divi-
those areas? sion exercise the sustainment function on a large scale?
• First strike: discuss how hypersonic weapons and other means
would be employed by Russia to neutralize/devastate U.S. capa-
bilities in the first stage of a conflict.
• Hypersonic weapons: What is the real threat? How do we de- General Topics
fend against them? How do we use them? • What training gaps is the U.S. Army facing (e.g., mechanic training,
• Specifically, what new kinetic threats can we expect to see in talent management, and retention; large-scale casualty training
LSCO? How do we defend against them? How do we use them? [medical and G1 functions], etc.)?
• How do we survive in hyperlethal engagements where “if you • Is there a capability gap in air defense and rocket artillery at
can see it, you can kill it; if you can be seen, you can be killed" lower echelons? Do we need to become a more artillery- and
(including attacks using weapons of mass destruction)? air-defense-centric army?
• How does one perceive and seize fleeting opportunities in • Do we need to increase security cooperation exercises in Europe
LSCO? What examples are there of fleeting opportunities and or the Middle East?
temporary advantages that were exploited? Are there repeat- • What lessons have we learned from National Guard, Army
ing characteristics of such events to guide cultivation of future Reserve, and interagency responses to natural disasters in
perception training? California or the recent hurricanes?
• How do we offset “one-off” dependencies and contested • How does China’s “New Silk Road” initiative compare with the pre-
domains? WWII Japanese "Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere?"
• How do we continually present multiple dilemmas to a peer • Is Russian doctrine changing regarding use of humanitarian assis-
enemy? tance as a weapon?
• What must be done to adjust junior leader development to suc- • What are the security threats, concerns, and events resulting from
ceed in a modern operational environment? illegal immigration/refugee movements globally?
• What changes are required to the professional development • What is the role for the Army in homeland security operations
models for officers and noncommissioned officers? especially along our borders? What must the Army be prepared
• What logistical challenges are foreseen in LSCO due to infra- to do in support of internal security?
structure limitations in potential foreign areas of operation and
how can we mitigate them?

A cavalry scout assigned to 1st Squadron, 108th Cavalry Regiment, 48th Infantry Brigade Combat Team, provides security 30 April 2019 during a key leader engagement
with military and government officials in Parwan Province, Afghanistan. (Photo by Sgt. Jordan Trent, U.S. Army)
Field Manual 4-0
Driving Sustainment Change
Lt. Gen. Michael D. Lundy, U.S. Army
Maj. Gen. Rodney D. Fogg, U.S. Army
Col. Richard D. Creed Jr., U.S. Army
Lt. Col. William C. Latham Jr., U.S. Army, Retired

A rmies that do not adapt to the changing

circumstances of their operational environ-
ments often suffer serious consequences in
the next war their country requires them to fight.
The U.S. Army has been no different throughout
it had capabilities essential for large-scale ground
combat against peer threats like those it faced in the
two world wars and Korea. Preparing for large-scale
ground combat, and ensuring that adversaries under-
stand that the United States is prepared for that scale
its history, particularly when it neglected to ensure of conflict, is essential for the kind of conventional
 FIELD MANUAL 4-0

deterrence that helped ensure the Cold War stayed unified land operations in a combatant command-
cold in Europe and the armistice held for more than er’s area of responsibility, and how it would conduct
sixty years in Korea. large-scale combat operations (LSCO) against peer
The recognition that great-power competition de- threats. It emphasizes the roles of corps and divisions
fines the current operational environment brings with during LSCO while providing fundamental tactics for
it the realization that the U.S. Army needs to adapt the conduct of offensive and defensive operations in a
once again if it is going to be prepared enough to deter highly contested multi-domain operational environ-
adversaries willing to risk conventional conflict in an ment. FM 3-0 codifies a dramatic shift in the Army’s
increasingly multipolar world. Effective adaptation re- focus toward its responsibilities during great-power

Doctrine establishes the logical foundation for the

adjustments that the Army makes, providing leaders
at every echelon with a common frame of reference
and language.

quires change based upon a realistic view of ourselves competition and conflict, requiring senior leaders to
and the threats as they are, not how we want them to reexamine current Army capabilities and adjust sup-
be. Understanding what the Army needs to be able to porting tactics, techniques, and procedures to meet
do if it is going to prevail in large-scale ground combat the challenge of preparing for and conducting LSCO.2
is the first step. The next step is ensuring that the The publication of FM 3-0, with its emphasis on
Army has the doctrine necessary to defeat the threats the Army’s strategic roles and focus on preparation
it faces. Without adequate doctrine, the Army cannot for and execution of LSCO, required an in-depth re-
adapt its organizations, training, and priorities in the view of sustainment doctrine to determine what was
most effective fashion that available resources allow. missing or needed to be added to support the conduct
Doctrine establishes the logical foundation for of operations during great-power competition and
the adjustments that the Army makes, providing conflict. FM 4-0, Sustainment Operations, released
leaders at every echelon with a common frame of in July 2019, was the first result of that analysis. It
reference and language. Doctrine allows leaders to provides the doctrinal framework for synchronizing
describe and visualize their roles and responsibili- Army sustainment with the combined-arms approach
ties while preparing to accomplish missions and win to large-scale ground combat in a multi-domain
the wars they are asked to fight.1 In the U.S. Army, environment described in FM 3-0. FM 4-0 provides
doctrine drives change. the blueprint to support necessary changes in sustain-
Doctrine-driven change has been happening for a ment organizations, training, leader development,
while, and it is gaining momentum. The October 2017 materiel development, and downtrace sustainment
publication of Field Manual (FM) 3-0, Operations, doctrine. It specifically articulates how the U.S. Army
initiated the changes in readiness focus that are must organize, train, and deploy sustainment forma-
reverberating throughout the Army. It describes the tions at each echelon to provide commanders with the
Army’s strategic roles, how the Army will execute freedom of action, operational reach, and prolonged
endurance required to fight and win during LSCO.3

The Enduring Necessity of Change

Equipment of the 3rd Armored Brigade Combat Team, 4th Infantry
Armies that do not rapidly adapt and pace the
Division, arrives 27 February 2019 at Shuaiba Port, Kuwait, for the
unit’s rotation in support of Operation Spartan Shield. (Photo by changes in the operational environment quickly be-
Staff Sgt. Veronica McNabb, U.S. Army National Guard) come irrelevant. Beginning soon after the invasion of

MILITARY REVIEW  January-February 2020 7

Iraq in 2003, the U.S. Army adapted to the emerging Soldiers in the 1st Cavalry Division Sustainment Brigade’s combined
challenge of counterterrorism, stability, and counter- operations and intelligence center process current operations up-
dates during Warfighter Exercise 18-05 at Fort Hood, Texas. (Photo
insurgency (COIN) operations. Shifting our priorities courtesy of the U.S. Army)
from the large-scale ground combat focus central
to AirLand Battle and the full-spectrum operations
described in the 2001 FM 3-0 to limited contingency
operations (COIN, counterterrorism, and stability) adversaries, and they were distributed across wide
was both logical and prudent given the scale and scope areas to secure populations and key infrastructure.
of Army commitments in both Afghanistan and Iraq. The mission’s duration and complexity required a
However, the almost myopic focus over the decade steady flow of ground units into and out of theater.
that followed swung the Army’s adaptation too far, To meet this high deployment tempo and adapt to the
resulting in a force that was optimized for COIN and demands of COIN, the Army changed its doctrine, its
stability missions instead of the full range of military training, and its organizational structure.5 The organi-
operations. The characteristics of COIN operations zational changes that were part of the modular trans-
differ greatly from those of large-scale ground combat formation process had a particularly heavy impact on
operations for which the Army sustainment organi- sustainment doctrine, capacity, and capability.
zations of the time were originally designed. In the The new, modularized force gave more flexibility
U.S. Central Command area of responsibility, Army to brigade combat team commanders while gener-
sustainers provided centralized support from fixed ating a host of new challenges for Army sustainers.
forward operating bases while relying heavily on The requirement to support multiple, geographically
contractors for construction, commodities, and a wide dispersed brigade- and battalion-sized formations
array of services.4 Army formations rarely engaged in caused the Army to heavily revise its capstone sus-
prolonged direct combat against their lightly armed tainment doctrine. In 2009, U.S. Army Training and

8 January-February 2020  MILITARY REVIEW

 FIELD MANUAL 4-0

Doctrine Command (TRADOC) published FM 4-0, FM 3-0 represents a change to how we think, talk,
Sustainment. It described independent human resource organize, train, and equip for the next fight, and it
operations, integrated financial management and requires military professionals from every warfight-
resource management capabilities, modularized Army ing function to consider their readiness to prevail in
Health System support, and changed distribution and the no-longer-unthinkable possibility of large-scale
materiel management at echelons above brigade. These ground combat against enemies with capabilities
innovations enabled deployment of hundreds of units that rival our own.7
and thousands of soldiers into and out of the U.S. FM 4-0, Sustainment Operations, complements
Central Command area of responsibility while pro- this effort by describing how we will meet the mas-
viding continuous, exceptional support to a myriad of sive sustainment demands required to prevail in a
complex operations throughout the region.6 LSCO environment that puts a premium on speed,
The changes were appropriate for the missions in mobility, and redundancy. For example, it describes
Afghanistan, Iraq, and other similarly limited contingen- new force structures and command relationships that
cies. However, the Army’s renewed focus on large-scale provide division and corps commanders with more
combat against peer threats, where the joint force is capacity and endurance. These changes include the
contested in all domains, reflected a realization that the shift from single logistics command and control (C2)
near-term operational environment was likely to gener- to maneuver commanders providing C2 over corps-
ate very different requirements for the Army than the aligned expeditionary sustainment commands and
ones of the previous decade. Starting in 2016, TRADOC division-aligned sustainment brigades. The Army is
began some significant doctrinal changes to support the redesignating the latter as division sustainment bri-
focus on LSCO. The primary catalyst for change was the gades (DSBs) and enhancing its capabilities by adding
reissue of FM 3-0, Operations, in October 2017. division sustainment support battalions.8
In the LSCO environment, corps and divisions
Why FM 4-0? are no longer simply C2 headquarters that require
FM 3-0 describes how Army echelon-above-bri- external support. They operate as tactical forma-
gade formations, fighting as part of a joint force, tions that integrate sustainment as part of a com-
support the Army’s bined-arms approach to warfighting at every ech-
Lt. Gen. Michael D. Lundy, four strategic roles: elon. FM 4-0, therefore, clarifies issues concerning
U.S. Army, is the former to shape operation- the prioritization of support and provides corps and
commanding general of the al environments, to divisions with a senior sustainment commander to
U.S. Army Combined Arms prevent conflict, to execute the concept of support.
Center and the former com- prevail in large-scale FM 4-0 addresses all four elements of the sus-
mandant of the Command ground combat, and tainment warfighting function—logistics, financial
and General Staff College to consolidate gains. management, personnel services, and health service
on Fort Leavenworth,
Kansas. He holds an MS in Lt. Col. William C.
strategic studies and is a Maj. Gen. Rodney Col. Richard Creed, Latham Jr., U.S. Army,
graduate of the Command D. Fogg, U.S. Army, U.S. Army, is the director retired, is chief of the
and General Staff College commands the U.S. Army of the Combined Arms Doctrine Division within
and the Army War College. Combined Arms Support Doctrine Directorate at the G-3/5/7, US Army
He previously served as Command at Fort Lee, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. Combined Arms Support
the commanding general Virginia. He holds a BA He holds a BS from the U.S. Command, at Fort Lee,
of the U.S. Army Aviation from King College and Military Academy and mas- Virginia. He holds a
Center of Excellence at Fort master’s degrees from ter’s degrees from the U.S. BA from Georgetown
Rucker, Alabama, and he has the Florida Institute of Army School of Advanced University and an MA from
deployed to Haiti, Bosnia, Technology and the U.S. Military Studies and the U.S. the University of Alaska,
Iraq, and Afghanistan. Army War College. Army War College. Fairbanks.

MILITARY REVIEW  January-February 2020 9

support—and illustrates these elements arrayed at many sustainment challenges that commanders over-
echelon on a multi-domain battlefield. Division sup- came during the Korean War.11
port area graphics, for example, include both the DSB At the same time, FM 4-0 is driving the restructur-
and the human resources company, the financial man- ing of Army sustainment formations to support the
agement support unit, and a number of medical units.9 central warfighting principles established in doctrine.

Field Manual 4-0 [Sustainment Operations] provides

the doctrinal basis for prioritizing sustainment capabili-
ties within the Army’s modernization strategy, which will
give Army formations the equipment necessary to sup-
port the demands of large-scale combat operations.

FM 4-0 further reinforces the critical importance The development of new units such as the DSB,
of sustainment integration and synchronization division sustainment support battalions, and lettered,
within Army formations, as well as with joint and organic companies within these formations provide
other unified action partners. The speed and vio- commanders with more sustainment capacity, thus
lence of LSCO impose unprecedented demands on extending the endurance of the division formation
Army sustainers. In this environment, sustainers during combat operations. The restructuring also
must fight for situational awareness when commu- increases readiness—instead of deploying piecemeal
nications are intermittent. They coordinate with and fighting as a pickup team, sustainment units will
neighboring units as well as their senior and subor- now train, deploy, and fight as organic elements of a
dinate headquarters while anticipating requirements larger team.12
and preparing for rapid transitions. Sustainment re- FM 4-0 provides the doctrinal basis for prioritizing
hearsals are a critical aspect of success during LSCO, sustainment capabilities within the Army’s modern-
enabling commanders to synchronize sustainment ization strategy, which will give Army formations
with other warfighting functions while ensuring the equipment necessary to support the demands of
that both the maneuver and sustainment plans are LSCO. New tactical and bulk fuel distribution sys-
clearly understood.10 tems, for example, significantly expand the Army’s
FM 4-0 is driving other changes as well. ability to distribute Class III at the corps and division
Sustainment is a fundamental consideration as the levels. New testing and diagnostic equipment will
Army rewrites training programs and develops tasks, accelerate troubleshooting and reduce repair times.
conditions, and standards to prepare the Total Army Autonomous and semiautonomous delivery systems
for LSCO. Sustainment has become central to dis- will increase transportation capacity to units operat-
cussions about operational art and is more explicitly ing dispersed along multiple axes of advance. Additive
addressed in the keystone doctrinal publications of manufacturing will reduce wait time by producing
other warfighting functions. The combat training critical items, such as medical devices and repair parts,
centers now challenge units with the same threats we at the point of need. All of these capabilities will
anticipate in LSCO, and the Army has reemphasized significantly increase the speed, responsiveness, and
sustainment in the warfighting tactics, techniques, and survivability of sustainment units in the next war.13
procedures in every training and professional military In the meantime, Army doctrine continues to evolve.
education course from advanced individual training Having just completed the difficult work of develop-
to the Army War College. As an example, TRADOC’s ing capstone doctrine for sustainment, the U.S. Army
Army Strategic Education Program–Command Combined Arms Support Command and others are
(ASEP-C) incorporates a vignette examining the rewriting all of the downtrace doctrinal publications

10 January-February 2020  MILITARY REVIEW

 FIELD MANUAL 4-0

that support it. The publication of FM 4-0 has reshaped less.”15 Today’s Army sustainers find themselves in
how we sustain LSCO at every echelon, as well as how the midst of wholesale changes in how we envision,
sustainment formations themselves operate and fight. think, and talk about the next war. Those changes
While the Army updates its sustainment doctrine, the reflect enormous efforts by the thousands of soldiers
Combined Arms Center has begun work on a future and civilians across the sustainment enterprise who
update to FM 3-0, which will continue the emphasis on have shared lessons learned and provided thoughtful
sustainment considerations during LSCO.14 analysis. Operationalizing these changes, however, re-
quires Army leaders at every level to read and apply
Conclusion this doctrine within their training and leader devel-
Gen. Eric Shinseki reminded audiences that “If opment programs. FM 4-0 provides the blueprint.
you don’t like change, you will like irrelevance even Leaders will make it reality.

Notes
1. Army Doctrine Publication 1-01, Doctrinal Primer (Wash- this and other field manuals in 2012 and replaced them with a
ington DC: U.S. Government Publishing Office [GPO], 2019), series of Army doctrinal publications.
accessed 25 November 2019, https://armypubs.army.mil/ 7. Lundy and Creed, “The Return of U.S. Army Field Manual
epubs/DR_pubs/DR_a/pdf/web/ARN18138_ADP%201-01%20 3-0, Operations,” 16.
FINAL%20WEB.pdf. 8. FM 4-0, Sustainment Operations, 2-48–2-50.
2. Field Manual (FM) 3-0, Operations (Washington, DC: U.S. 9. Ibid., fig. 5-7.
GPO, 2017), accessed 18 November 2019, https://armypubs.army. 10. Ibid., 5-23 and 5-24.
mil/epubs/DR_pubs/DR_a/pdf/web/ARN6687_FM%203-0%20 11. ASEP-C [Army Strategic Education Program–Command]
C1%20Inc%20FINAL%20WEB.pdf; Michael Lundy and Richard Operations Block, a Primer with Professional Readings (Fort Leaven-
Creed, “The Return of U.S. Army Field Manual 3-0, Operations,” worth, KS: Combined Arms Center, 11 April 2019).
Military Review 97, no. 6 (November-December 2017): 14–21. 12. “Operational Concept, Division Sustainment Brigade,” Fort
3. FM 4-0, Sustainment Operations (Washington, DC: U.S. Lee, VA, 1 August 2019.
GPO, 2019), accessed 18 November 2019, https://armypubs.army. 13. “Tactical Fuel Distribution System, Increment II” (draft
mil/epubs/DR_pubs/DR_a/pdf/web/ARN19602_FM%204-0%20 capability development document, Fort Lee, VA, 28 March 2019);
FINAL%20WEB%20v2.pdf. James C. McConville, Memorandum for Commander, U.S. Army
4. Adrian Gamez and Matthew A. Price, “Developing Sus- Training and Doctrine Command, Army Capabilities Integration
tainment Leaders for the Future Fight,” Army Sustainment, 28 Center, “Approval of the Bulk Fuel Distribution System, Capabil-
February 2017, accessed 18 November 2019, https://www.army. ities Production Document,” 30 November 2017; Annex J (FFME
mil/article/182928/developing_sustainment_leaders_for_the_fu- Activities) to U.S. Army Futures Command OPORD 003-19 (Future
ture_fight. Force Modernization Enterprise Annual Modernization Guidance
5. Stuart E. Johnson et al., “A Review of the Army’s Modular 20-25), Austin, TX, 21 June 2019; Army Additive Manufacturing
Force Structure” (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2012), Campaign Plan, Washington, DC, 25 July 2018.
accessed 18 November 2019, https://www.rand.org/pubs/ 14. Michael Lundy, Richard Creed, and Scott Pence, “Feeding
technical_reports/TR927-2.html; see also FM 3-24, Counterinsur- the Forge: Sustaining Large-Scale Combat Operations,” Army.mil,
gency (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2006 accessed 25 November 2019, https://www.army.mil/article/223833/
[obsolete]); Joel Rayburn and Frank Sobchak, eds., The U.S. Army feeding_the_forge_sustaining_large_scale_combat_operations.
in the Iraq War: Volume 2, Surge and Withdrawal, 2007–2011 15. James Dao and Thom Shanker, “No Longer a Soldier,
(Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College Press, 2019), 615–18, 622–23, Shinseki Has a New Mission,” New York Times (website), A21, 11
accessed 18 November 2019, https://publications.armywarcollege. November 2009, accessed 18 November 2019, https://www.
edu/pubs/3668.pdf. nytimes.com/2009/11/11/us/politics/11vets.html.
6. FM 4-0, Sustainment (Washington, DC: U.S. Government
Printing Office, 2009 [obsolete]). The Army subsequently revoked

MILITARY REVIEW  January-February 2020 11

Members of Russian and Syrian forces stand guard near posters of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad and his Russian counterpart President
Vladimir Putin 20 August 2018 at the Abu Duhur crossing on the eastern edge of Idlib Province in Syria. Civilians used the crossing to enter
regime-held territory from rebel-controlled areas in the province, some of them returning to their villages that were recaptured by the regime
forces earlier that year. (Photo by George Ourfalian, Agence France-Presse)

A Logic All Its Own

Russian Operational Art in
the Syrian Campaign
Lt. Col. Nicholas Sinclair, U.S. Army
The plan should be based exclusively on reality.
—Alexandr Svechin
R ussia’s campaign in Syria appears to have
succeeded beyond all expectations. At its
outset, many in the West thought Russia
was “doomed to fail.”1 To the shock of conventional

12 January-February 2020  MILITARY REVIEW

 OPERATIONAL ART

wisdom, the Russians achieved their strategic objec- Islamic fundamentalism, which find support in Russia’s
tives at a relatively low cost in just three and a half Caucasus region. Supporting the Assad regime meant
years. How did the Russians pull this off ? The answer Russia provided stability to the region, which prevented
lies in the skillful application of operational art. The a failed-state scenario like Libya and denied sanctuary
Russians planned for Syria by using five elements of for up to five thousand Russian-born Islamic fighters.5
the Russian military thought process: (1) historic National pride is the second strategic goal of Russian
analysis, (2) trends, (3) foresight and forecasting, (4) intervention in Syria. By keeping the Assad regime
forms and methods, and (5) correlation of forces and in power and stabilizing the country, Russia would
means. This dialectical thought process produced a be seen as a respected global power that could count-
feasible, realistic plan that achieved their strategic er America’s disruptive global objectives, creating a
goals of stabilizing Syrian President Bashar al-Assad’s “polycentric” world order. Recovering Russian prestige
regime and boosting its international prestige. The is a consistent theme for Russian President Vladimir
purpose of this article is to describe the unique logic of Putin. In 2005, he remarked that the fall of the Soviet
Russian military thought and deduce how the Russians Union was “the greatest geopolitical catastrophe of the
applied those five elements of their thought process century.”6 This perspective highlights the importance of
to the Syrian campaign. Understanding this thought national pride considering the twentieth century also
process provides clarity to Russian military strategic witnessed both world wars and the tens of millions of
planning and the execution of military campaigns. The people who were brutalized by communism.
article describes Russian inputs into military thought These two strategic objectives, security and
and examines Syria from a primarily tactical position. national pride, serve as the foundation upon which
The term “operational art” used throughout the article the Russian general staff created its operational art
refers to the U.S. military’s definition of the term; it to support the Syrian campaign. Russian planning
provides context and infers that the Syrian experience demands planners make a sober assessment of the un-
is part of Russian military systems analysis.2 derlying situation of the operational environment. In
other words, Russians see the potential future battle-
Strategic Objectives and field as it is, not how they would like it to be.
Operational Art Russian strategic thought is steeped in the early
Russia’s strategic objectives provide the starting point twentieth-century deep-battle theorists, particular-
for understanding its campaign design in Syria. Russia’s ly Aleksandr Svechin.7 Svechin argued that historical
2015 National Security Strategy lists two specific strategic understanding, realistic goals, and intense preparation
objectives applicable to Syria—the first is security by for a particular military campaign were required prior to
“strengthening the country’s defense,” and the second is the opening of hostilities.8 Russian General Staff Chief
focused on international recognition and national dignity Valery Gerasimov praised the Soviet theorist’s unique
by “consolidating the Russian Federation’s status as a lead- approach to understanding
ing world power, whose actions are aimed at maintaining the operating environment Lt. Col. Nicholas Sinclair,
strategic stability … in a polycentric world.”3 by quoting him directly, U.S. Army, is an armor
The first strategic objective, security, is deeply writing: “The outstanding officer assigned to the 1st
embedded in the minds of Russian leadership. Thomas Soviet military scholar Cavalry Division head-
Wilhelm, director of Fort Leavenworth’s Foreign A. Svechin wrote: ‘It is quarters at Fort Hood,
Military Studies Office (FMSO), observed that this unusually difficult … to Texas. He is a graduate of
national characteristic results in the Russian govern- predict a war situation. the School of Advanced
ment favoring a controlled approach to countering For each war it is neces- Military Studies and he
chaos.4 Instability spreading from the color revolu- sary to work out a special received his undergradu-
tions caused specific concern to Russian leadership, line of strategic behavior, ate degree from The
who typically blame the West for instigating uprisings each war represents a Citadel. He has multiple
and deliberately leaving chaos in their wake. These specific case that requires deployments to Europe
uprisings often lead to regional turmoil and foster the establishment of its and the Middle East.

MILITARY REVIEW  January-February 2020 13

own logic and not the application of some stereotypical Russian President Vladimir Putin (left) toasts with Defence Minister
pattern.’”9 Gerasimov’s command philosophy was clearly Sergei Shoigu 28 December 2017 at the Kremlin in Moscow after a
ceremony to present state awards to military personnel who fought in
influenced by Svechin when he stated, “Each war is a Syria. (Photo by Kirill Kudryavtsev, Agence France-Presse)
unique case, demanding the establishment of a partic-
ular logic and not the application of some template.”10
Wilhelm observed that Russian military planners want
to deal with the uncertainty of war and arrive at a plan that combining the political and military spheres was
that is calculable and consistent.11 FMSO’s model of this necessary to develop a comprehensive understanding
process inputs the strategic objectives from the national of the environment. He wrote, “Readers interested in
command authority to produce a plan in accordance with strategy will find more thought-provoking observations
five cognitive building blocks of operational art: histori- in the political history of past wars than in militaries
cal analysis, trends, foresight and forecasting, forms and treatises, particularly so-called ‘strategic essays.’”14
methods, and correlation of forces and means (COFM). Russian strategic thinkers contextualize events in
Analyzing each of these mechanisms produces a founda- a political and historical, Russo-centric worldview.
tional understanding for Russia’s intervention in Syria. George Kennan, an ambassador to the Soviet Union
during the Cold War and author of “Sources of Soviet
Historical Analysis Conduct,” advanced the idea that Russia’s geographic
Svechin stressed the importance of historical vulnerabilities and history of violent invasions created
study, writing, “Isolation from an historical basis is a paranoid, zero-sum attitude in the minds of its rul-
dangerous both for the strategist and the politician.”12 ers.15 Russians place security and stability above all else.
Former Deputy Defense Minister Andrei Kokoshin This might explain why Russian leaders feel threat-
emphasized this point, writing, “All of Svechin’s work is ened by Western-supported regime change efforts and
penetrated by the idea of the necessity of the strategist’s color revolutions, particularly in countries that were
continuous deliberation on history.”13 Svechin believed once part of the Soviet Union. Russian leaders see the

14 January-February 2020  MILITARY REVIEW

 OPERATIONAL ART

Western-backed regime changes in Kosovo, Serbia, the region. Consequently, in a real sense, Russia viewed
Iraq, Libya, and Venezuela as destabilizing efforts involvement in Syria to some extent as something of a
contributing to a world of human suffering, which is religious crusade aimed at protecting the Syrian church
ultimately oriented toward Moscow itself. and the Orthodox culture it fostered. However, from
The 1999 U.S.-led Kosovo War deeply impacted a realist perspective, the prospect of military basing
Russian thinking about contemporary war. Up to that in Syria with easy access to the Mediterranean was
point, Russia was a reluctant junior member of the viewed as an opportunity to some extent for overcoming
U.S.-led peacekeeping force in the Balkans. Russia, the limitations imposed by Russia’s harsh geography,
still loyal to its Slavic brethren in Serbia, looked after which leaves it trapped in icy Arctic ports or behind
Serbian interests despite Russia’s relative military the Turkish Straits. As a result, part of the impetus for
and economic weakness. The rules changed when the Russian involvement stemmed from anticipated long-
United States supported the Islamic Kosovars’ break- term agreements for use of the Khmeimim Air Base and
away republics with NATO-led airstrikes and without the naval port in Tartus in Syria, which would extend
a United Nations mandate. Russia maintained that Russia’s operational reach into Eastern Mediterranean,
the United States fomented a populist revolt, which it southern Europe, and North Africa.
sponsored under the guise of humanitarian operations,
provided military support in the form of weapons and Foresight and Forecasting
training, controlled the information domain through With the broad Russian objectives in mind, its
media dominance, and avoided direct ground force Syrian campaign provides valuable insight into the
involvement using multinational, joint airstrikes.16 Russian leadership’s views regarding the conduct of
Using historical analysis, Russian leaders looked modern warfare. Doctrinal emphasis on foresight
at the civil war raging in Syria and believed it was a and forecasting describe how the Russian operational
foregone conclusion that the Syrian government would artists think about future war given the contemporary
collapse without Russian intervention. A humanitarian contexts. The Russian military defines foresight as
disaster would likely follow, similar to Iraq and Libya, “the process of cognition regarding possible changes
flooding the region with displaced people and endless in military affairs, the determination of the perspec-
internecine conflicts. In their calculation, a successful tives of its future deployment.”18 In the Soviet-era
campaign in Syria, however, would prevent this insta- book Forecasting in Military Affairs: A Soviet View, Yu.
bility while simultaneously boosting Russia’s interna- V. Chuyev and Yu. B. Mikhaylov state that the “aim
tional prestige and neutralizing America’s interests. By of forecasting, which establishes what may occur in
coming to the defense of its former client, Russia would the future and under what conditions, is to minimize
both stabilize the region as well as demonstrate to the the effect of uncertainties on the results of decisions
world that it honors its commitments to its allies. being undertaken at the present time.”19 In their
Russia also saw successful intervention in the region Military Thought article, authors V. V. Kruglov and V.
as an opportunity to expand its southern buffer region. I. Yakupov capture the essential nature of forecasting
Syria is a logical anchor point extending through trading by writing, “In this day and age, unleashing or getting
partners, Collective Security Treaty Organization mem- involved in a conflict without making sure that one
bers, and other treaty partners in a loose cooperative will be ultimately victorious or at least get out of it on
effort.17 If Syria were to fall, Russian leaders reckoned, acceptable terms is something that only shortsighted
then Turkey would certainly be at risk, placing the people or adventurers can risk doing.”20 Foresight and
problem at Russia’s doorstep. Additionally, impetus for forecasting describe the nature of the conflict.
involvement also stemmed in part from reputed ances- With regard to Syria, aspects of consideration in
tral Russian ties to the region that are a combination of the process of conducting foresight consideration and
folklore and realpolitik. Russia sees itself as the natural forecasting likely included assessment of the multisided
inheritor of the Byzantine Empire and its Orthodox civil war raging within the country. Actors included the
Christian religious legacy, very much linked to the Syrian Assad regime and supporting militias like Hezbollah,
Orthodox Christian Church, which once encompassed U.S.-backed fighters like the Kurds and the Free Syrian

MILITARY REVIEW  January-February 2020 15

Army, and Islamic fundamentalist actors like the Islamic precision-guided munitions.22 Therefore, Russian trends
State (IS). The Syrian campaign brought the challenge of can be identified as the counteractions to U.S. actions.
distance and power projection into consideration. Russian Since the United States is the perceived instigator of
adversaries spanned the spectrum of primitive IS militia indirect and asymmetric methods, the Russian plan
forces to highly advanced Western militaries hosting a in Syria involved countering what Russia perceived as
complement of advanced technological weapons. American hybrid warfare trends. A. A. Bartosh’s article
The strength of Russian military planning lays in who in Military Thought affirms this line of thinking: “The
Russia supports. For example, Russia supported Syria, brilliant operation of joining the Crimea to Russia and
an established, legitimate, internationally recognized the Syrian campaign display the efficiency of Russian
government that enjoyed the support of a plurality of its nonlinear strategies of countering hybrid warfare.”23
population. Assad not only enjoyed legitimacy, despite In Syria, there were five prevailing trends that ran
poor press in the West, but he also maintained a stand- counter to Russian objectives and influenced Russian
ing army and functioning government in the regions operational art. The first trend to be countered was
he controlled. Thus, Russia supported a suit-wearing, regime change. Western leaders assumed the Assad
clean-shaven, English-speaking, Western-educated ruler. regime would fall. President Barack Obama called
Contrast this to the U.S. campaigns in Iraq and for Assad’s resignation in August 2011, saying, “For
Afghanistan that overthrew governments and attempted the sake of the Syria people, the time has come for
to nurture Western-style democratic republics in regions President Assad to step aside.”24 Putin, however,
violently divorced from the principles of Western civiliza- sought to stop the spread of color revolutions by
tion. As a result, the United States supported an assort- assisting his beleaguered Middle Eastern ally with
ment of militias whose ultimately questionable affiliations direct military support in the fall of 2015.25 In 2018,
with Islamic fundamentalism and destabilizing effects on Russian writer and military expert Ye. O. Savchenko
other Middle Eastern countries, such as Turkey and Iraq, wrote that the “United States failed to achieve its
further handicapped America’s regional goals. goals in Syria, not less because the state of affairs
made a U-turn in the second half of 2015, when
Trends Russia started rendering lawful military support to
Trends are the ways a country achieves a military ob- the Syrian government.”26
jective. For instance, eighteenth-century warfare leaned The second trend countered by Russia was the
toward small, professional, maneuver armies that relied influence of nonstate actors. Russians distrust nongov-
on depots for support, sparing the civilian countryside. ernmental organizations (NGOs), whose operations
Nineteenth-century warfare trends were mass armies, are seen as clandestine proxies supporting Western
wars of annihilation, and destruction of the countryside. aims.27 The Obama administration spent nearly $10
Trends of early twentieth-century warfare were mecha- billion in Syria (much of it funneled through regional
nization and combined-arms warfare. A current trend is NGOs).28 These NGOs were delegitimized by Russian
commonly referred to in the West as hybrid warfare or media and regularly denied access to territory under
new-generation warfare (NGW). Initially, NGW was Syrian control. Savchenko wrote that “the dynamics of
misinterpreted as a new, unique way of warfare concoct- fighting in Syria in September-December 2017 suggest
ed by the Russians. However, Bartles demonstrates that that the United States is rendering at least indirect
NGW is a term Russian thinkers used to describe indi- support to the Islamic State terrorist organization.”29
rect and asymmetric Western military methods in the The third trend Russia countered was an inter-
late 1990s and early 2000s.21 In an article republished national coalition against Syria. The United States
by Military Review, Gerasimov describes the trends attempted to bring regional allies to its side to strength-
of contemporary war as undeclared, regime-change en the U.S. position and isolate Assad.30 Russia thwart-
oriented, nonmilitary in nature, destructive of civilian ed U.S. attempts to receive approval from the United
infrastructure, of short duration, occurring in all phys- Nations and neutralized U.S. alliances in the region by
ical environments, and characterized by high maneu- expanding diplomatic and military partnerships with
verability, simultaneity, unified action, and the use of Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, and Israel.31

16 January-February 2020  MILITARY REVIEW

 OPERATIONAL ART

The fourth trend countered by Russia was sup- A Tu-22M3 long-range bomber from the Russian Aerospace Forces
port to proxy forces. As early as 2012, the Obama carries out an air strike on Islamic State targets 1 November 2017 near
Abu Kamal, Deir ez-Zor Province, Syria, after flying over Iraq and Iran.
administration recognized a coalition of Syrian The aircraft targeted strongholds and ammunition and armament de-
opposition groups that received military and finan- pots of insurgents as Su-30SM fighters (not shown) covered the bomb-
cial support.32 As a countermeasure, Russia’s first ers. (Photo courtesy of the Russian Ministry of Defence)
airstrikes in support of the Assad regime were aimed
mainly against U.S.-backed rebels.33
The fifth and final trend Russia countered was the
avoidance of large ground forces. Russia’s economy hypersonic weapons, unmanned aircraft systems,
of force operation in Syria relies on sea, air, special electronic warfare [EW], and hybrid warfare).36
forces, and independent contractors, which left the In Russia Military Strategy: Impacting 21st Century
bulk of the ground fighting to the Syrian Arab Army Reform and Geopolitics, FMSO senior analyst Timothy
and its Iranian-backed Hezbollah allies.34 Russia made Thomas wrote that forms and methods “have direct
up for this lack of manpower on the ground with ro- relevance as to how the military takes advantage
bust command-and-control support. In March 2018, of war’s changing nature, as well as how future war
Gerasimov stated, “All troop commanders of military might be conducted.”37 According to prevailing forms
districts, combined arms armies, and Air Force and and methods, Russians determined what they would
Air Defense armies, almost all division commanders send to Syria and how they would fight.
and more than half of the combined arms brigade and The principal form (organization) Russia sent to
regimental commanders, together with their staffs, Syria was the Russian Aerospace Forces, a combined
have acquired combat experience [in Syria].”35 joint, interagency task force. Although common to
the U.S. military, this type of operation is unique
Forms and Methods for the Russian Federation. The specialized nature
Forms are generally thought of as types of orga- of the Russian Aerospace Forces to Russian think-
nizations (e.g., whole-of-government, multinational, ers is observed by V. A. Kiselyov’s passage: “A new
joint), while methods include techniques applied to element in operational formation for a cross-service
contemporary weapons and principles of war (e.g., battle can eventually be the aerospace strike echelon,

MILITARY REVIEW  January-February 2020 17

which will help solve the problem of combat support Russia’s use of air defense is an obvious response
of ground troop groupings’ actions from aerospace.”38 to Western airpower as Syrian rebels and IS lack any
The use of joint fires was of particular interest and sort of air contingent. Russian air defense systems have
demanded significant thought for Russian planners. the immediate task of not only supporting the Syrian
O. V. Sayapin, O. V. Tikhanychev, and N. A. Chernov campaign but also serve to extend Russia’s anti-access
wrote in a Military Thought article, “The analysis of and area denial in a region where the United States
local wars and armed conflicts (LW&AC) practices has enjoyed air supremacy for the last three decades.41
of the latter half of the 20th-early 21st centuries Russia’s vast EW and cyber networks attack Western
has demonstrated the enhanced role of the adver- systems daily. As stated by Gen. Richard D. Clarke,
sary destruction by fire (ADF).” Techniques include commander of the U.S. Special Operations Command,

Unlike the U.S. contractor groups Blackwater or Triple

Canopy that principally provided fixed-site or convoy
security, private military companies are equipped as
combined-arms task forces and maintain an extensive
role in Russia’s ground combat.

reconnaissance and striking and reconnaissance and “We are operating in the most aggressive EW environ-
firing, similar to the U.S. targeting methodology. The ment on the planet from our adversaries.”42
form to execute adversary destruction by fire is a
cross-service strike and fire-capable reconnaissance Correlation of Forces and Means
system, which the authors admitted was difficult Correlation of forces and means speaks to the
for the joint task force to implement in Syria due to scientific and mathematical nature that Russians use
a highly mobile enemy, nonstandard structure, and to seek certainty and predictability. Although Russians
taking sanctuary in built-up, noncombatant areas.39 are well aware of the element of chance that accom-
In a similar fashion, Russian methods appear to panies any military endeavor, they reduce as many
embrace their technological prowess by mimicking uncertainties as possible to reach a manageable level of
the U.S.-Kosovo model. Most of Russia’s kinetic risk. COFM is a subjective/objective approach to mea-
involvement has been from the sky, either through air sure two or more sides’ relative combat power. It takes
or naval forces. Although the results were question- into account variables such as type of unit, equipment,
able, the Syrian campaign allowed testing of precision training, strength, and morale.
strike weapons to include a volley of rockets from the Russia’s COFM likely took into account Assad’s
Caspian Sea as a demonstration of Russian capability. Syrian forces, Hezbollah, U.S.-backed rebel forces, and
Special operations forces and mercenary troops military contingents from the United States, Turkey,
are also key components of the Russian military. Israel, and Iraq. Russian force composition suggests
Their special forces provide on-ground targeting different missions for different forces. For instance,
solutions to air and sea assets while the private Russian forces provided airstrikes in support of
military companies provide a credible, yet plausibly Syrian/Hezbollah ground forces to defeat U.S.-backed
deniable, Russian land force. Unlike the U.S. con- rebel forces and IS but neutralized U.S., Turkish,
tractor groups Blackwater or Triple Canopy that and Israeli forces with air defense and EW systems.
principally provided fixed-site or convoy security, Diplomatically, through the use of foreign military
private military companies are equipped as com- sales, Russia is fracturing the NATO alliance with sales
bined-arms task forces and maintain an extensive of its S-400 missile defense system to Turkey, a move
role in Russia’s ground combat.40 the United States declared would jeopardize the sales

18 January-February 2020  MILITARY REVIEW

 OPERATIONAL ART

of the fifth generation F-35 fighter jets.43 Russia coun- Russian soldiers on armored vehicles patrol a street on 2 February
tered the United States by offering Turkey its own fifth 2017 in Aleppo, Syria. Russian operational planners ostensibly re-
stricted the requirement for Russian ground forces and focused in-
generation fighter, the Su-57, a clear demonstration of stead on preparing and supporting Syrian government and Iranian
how Russia’s military presence alone forces the West to forces for use as the main maneuver and assault forces. Russian in-
recalibrate its approach to the Middle East.44 volvement in actual combat operations mainly involved aerial bom-
By inserting themselves into the competition space, bardment, close air support, transportation, and indirect fires from
ground and naval elements, in addition to providing communications
Russian leaders knew the West must respect their pres- and logistical support. (Photo by Omar Sanadiki, Reuters)
ence (assuming no side wants to risk escalation over Syria).
Two events indicate Russia’s delicate military position in
Syria: the 2015 downing of one of Russia’s Su-24 aircrafts
by Turkish F-16s near the Turkey-Syria border and the This relatively small force—compared to the American
2018 defeat of Russian mercenary forces by the United experience in the region—demonstrates a precise estimate
States, resulting in as many as three hundred casualties.45 of forces required to achieve campaign objectives.
The Russians were careful not to escalate tensions because
the force they sent to Syria was not configured to con- Analysis of Russian
duct large-scale ground combat with either the Turkish Operational Art in Syria
or U.S. military. The Royal United Services Institute, an The application of operational art linked tactical tasks
independent think tank located in Britain, maintains one to strategic objectives according to the “logic” appropriate
of the most detailed estimates on Russian forces deployed to Syria. Operational art gave the Russians a consistent,
to Syria early in the campaign.46 Not counting mercenary predictable, and reliable plan to successfully intervene
forces, the Russians maintained fewer than 2,500 per- in and change the course of the war. Operational art
sonnel in support of ground operations, approximately achieved strategic objectives with greater success than
fifty-five aircraft and twenty helicopters in support of anticipated, resulting in IS being largely defeated; Assad
air operations, and roughly forty-one naval vessels at sea. remaining in power and consolidating gains; Russian

MILITARY REVIEW  January-February 2020 19

operational reach extending into the Middle East, relative combat power in the long term by defeating
southern Europe, and North Africa; the NATO alliance rebel forces and neutralizing U.S. forces.
fracturing; U.S. objectives are stymied; and Russia emerg-
ing as a force to be reckoned with in world affairs. The full Conclusion
history of Russia’s intervention is to be determined, but Successful implementation of operational art in
the initial success that Russia and Syria relished led Putin Syria will undoubtedly lead to further practice along
to announce victory for the initial campaign in late 2017.47 Russia’s periphery such as in Ukraine and the Baltics
Historical analysis led the Russians to believe that and in global regions such as the Middle East and
the color revolutions would overthrow their ally in Latin America. The shrewd application of military
the region and spread instability to Russia’s borders. forces in support of strategic objectives are based on
Foresight and forecasting allowed Russians to see to a clear-eyed assessments and achievable goals. This
degree the nature of the conflict of a multisided civil does not mean that Russia is unstoppable. In addition
war and how supporting Assad would be the deci- to having a smaller economy than the United States
sive strategic move in the theater of operations. The and a military that is not designed to be projected
prevailing trends Russia considered were commonly and sustained beyond its borders, the public approval
associated with NGW and took into account infor- of the Syrian operation appears to be waning. What
mation operations, paramilitary forces, humanitarian must be respected is that when Russia commits com-
organizations, and a whole-of-government approach bat forces to an operation, it is in accordance with
to influence the military campaign. Analysis of forms a well-thought-out plan specific to the logic of the
and methods provided the correct joint force to the campaign. As a result, upsetting a Russian campaign,
Syrian theater. By using an economy of force, Russia once it has been initiated, requires Russia to change
avoided protracted land force involvement in favor the variables it based its planning assumptions upon.
of enablers to support Syrian/Hezbollah infantry. This can be a delicate move with a nuclear capable
The COFM accurately predicted Russian success of and culturally neurotic adversary.

Notes
Epigraph. Aleksandr A. Svechin, Strategy, ed. Kent D. Lee 6. Associated Press, “Putin: Soviet Collapse a ‘Genuine Tragedy,’”
(Minneapolis: East View Press, 2004), 111. NBC News, last modified 25 April 2005, accessed 22 July 2019,
http://www.nbcnews.com/id/7632057/ns/world_news/t/putin-sovi-
et-collapse-genuine-tragedy/#.XN_zJ0xFzzw.
1. Lisa Ferdinando, “Carter: Russia ‘Doomed to Fail’ in Syria; ISIL Must 7. Timothy L. Thomas, Russia Military Strategy: Impacting 21st
be Defeated,” U.S. Department of Defense, 31 October 2015, accessed Century Reform and Geopolitics (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Foreign
22 July 2019, https://dod.defense.gov/News/Article/Article/626828/car- Military Studies Office [FMSO], 2015).
ter-russia-doomed-to-fail-in-syria-isil-must-be-defeated/. 8. Svechin, Strategy, 111.
2. Joint Publication 3-0, Joint Operations (Washington, DC: U.S. 9. Valery Gerasimov, “Principal Trends in the Development of
Government Publishing Office, 17 January 2017), xii. Operational the Forms and Methods of Employing Armed Forces and Current
art is the use of creative thinking by commanders and staffs “to Tasks of Military Science Regarding Their Improvement,” Vestnik Ak-
develop strategies, campaigns, and operations to organize and ademii Voennykh Nauk [ Journal of the academy of military science]
employ military forces.” 1 (2013): 29.
3. The Russian Federation’s National Security Strategy, 10. Valery Gerasimov, “The Value of Science is in the Foresight:
Presidential Edict 683 (Moscow: The Kremlin, December 2015), New Challenges Demand Rethinking the Forms and Methods
accessed 25 September 2019, https://www.russiamatters.org/sites/ of Carrying Out Combat Operations,” Military Review 96, no. 1
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gy%20ENG_0.pdf. usacac.army.mil/CAC2/MilitaryReview/Archives/English/MilitaryRe-
4. Thomas Wilhelm, in discussion with the author, 3 April 2019, view_20160228_art008.pdf.
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. 11. Wilhelm, discussion.
5. Callum Paton, “Russia Spy Chief Warns 5,000 ISIS Foreign Fight- 12. Svechin, Strategy, 23.
ers Threaten Borders of Former Soviet Union,” Newsweek (website), 13. A. A. Kokoshin and V. V. Larionov, “Origins of the Intellectual
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russia-spy-chief-warns-5000-isis-foreign-fighters-threaten-borders- 14. Svechin, Strategy, 78.
former-1431576.

20 January-February 2020  MILITARY REVIEW

 OPERATIONAL ART

15. George F. Kennan, “The Sources of Soviet Conduct,” 32. “US Recognises Syria Opposition Coalition Says Obama,”
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Kremlin’s Worldview (Washington, DC: Institute for the Study of 30 September 2015, accessed 22 July 2019, https://www.bbc.com/
War, March 2019), accessed 22 July 2019, http://www.understand- news/world-middle-east-34399164.
ingwar.org/report/how-we-got-here-russia-kremlins-worldview. 34. Westall and Evans, “Russia Backs Syrian Forces.”
17. Lester Grau, in discussion with the author, 24 May 2019, 35. Valery Gerasimov, “Russian General Staff Chief Valery Gera-
Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. simov’s 2018 Presentation to the General Staff Academy: Thoughts
18. Military Encyclopedic Dictionary (Moscow: Voyenizdat, on Future Military Conflict—March 2018,” trans. Harold Orenstein,
1983), 585, s.v. “foresight.” Military Review 99, no. 1 ( January-February 2019): 135, accessed 5
19. Yu. V. Chuyev and Yu. B. Mikhaylov, Forecasting in Military June 2019, https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Portals/7/military-re-
Affairs: A Soviet View (Moscow, 1975), trans. DGIS Multilingual view/Archives/English/JF-19/JF19-Book-2.PDF.
Section, Secretary of State, Ottawa, Canada (Washington, DC: 36. V. A. Zolotarev, ed., Istoriya Voennoy Strategii Rossii [The
Government Printing Office, 1980), 6. history of military strategy in Russia] (Moscow: Kuchkovo Pole,
20. V. V. Kruglov and V. I. Yakupov, “Methodology of Prog- 2000), 497–501.
nosticating Armed Struggle,” Military Thought 26, no. 2 ( June 37. Timothy L. Thomas, Kremlin Kontrol: Russia’s Political Military
2017): 54. Reality (Fort Leavenworth, KS: FMSO, 2017), 100.
21. Bartles, “Getting Gerasimov Right,” 32. 38. V. A. Kiselyov, “What Kind of Warfare Should the Russian
22. Gerasimov, “The Value of Science is in the Foresight,” 25. Armed Forces be Prepared for?,” Military Thought 26, no. 2 ( June
23. A. A. Bartosh, “Hybrid Warfare: ‘Friction’ and ‘Wear and 2017): 8.
Tear,’” Military Thought 27, no. 1 (March 2018): 1–10. 39. O. V. Sayapin, O. V. Tikhanychev, and N. A. Chernov, “Russia:
24. Scott Wilson and Joby Warrick, “Assad Must Go, Obama Developing a Cross-Service Strike-and Fire-Capable Reconnaissance
Says,” Washington Post (website), 18 August 2011, assessed 22 July System for Fire Efficiency,” Military Thought 26, no. 1 (2017).
2019, https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/assad-must-go- 40. Laurence Peter, “Syria War: Who Are Russia’s Shadowy Mer-
obama-says/2011/08/18/gIQAelheOJ_story.html. cenaries?,” BBC, 23 February 2018, accessed 22 July 2019, https://
25. Nikolay Kozhanov, “What’s at Stake for Russia in Syria?,” www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-43167697.
BBC, 21 September 2015, accessed 22 July 2019, https://www.bbc. 41. Thomas Grove, “The New Iron Curtain: Russian Missile
com/news/world-middle-east-34290965. Defense Challenges U.S. Air Power,” Wall Street Journal (website),
26. Ye. O. Savchenko, “How the U.S.A. is Using Foreign Policy last modified 23 January 2019, accessed 22 July 2019, https://www.
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(December 2018): 32–45. against-u-s-military-11548255438.
27. “White Helmets Plot New False-Flag Chemical Attack in 42. Colin Clark, “Russia Widens EW War, ‘Disabling’ EC-
Syria’s Idlib – Russia’s UN Envoy,” RT, 24 April 2019, accessed 22 130S OR AC-130s in Syria,” Breaking Defense, 24 April 2018,
July 2019, https://www.rt.com/news/457467-white-helmets-chem- accessed 22 July 2019, https://breakingdefense.com/2018/04/
ical-provocation/. russia-widens-ew-war-disabling-ec-130s-in-syria/.
28. “Fact Sheet: President Obama Increases Humanitarian 43. Patricia Zengerle, “U.S. Congressional Committee Leaders
Assistance to Syrians,” The White House, 17 June 2013, accessed Warn Turkey on F-35, S-400,” Reuters, 9 April 2019, accessed 22 July
22 July 2019, https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press- 2019, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-turkey-f35-congress/u-
office/2013/06/17/fact-sheet-president-obama-increases-human- s-congressional-committee-leaders-warn-turkey-on-f-35-s-400-
itarian-assistance-syrians; Yasmeen Serhan, “The United States’s idUSKCN1RL2DC.
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27 September 2016, accessed 22 July 2019, https://www. Jet if F-35 Deal With US Collapses,” Defense News, 6 May 2019,
theatlantic.com/news/archive/2016/09/united-states-364-mil- accessed 22 July 2019, https://www.defensenews.com/global/eu-
lion-pledge-syrian-refugees/501890/; “Syria Complex Emergency rope/2019/05/06/russia-pitches-turkey-the-su-57-fighter-jet-if-f-35-
- Fact Sheet #4 FY19,” U.S. Agency for International Develop- deal-with-us-collapses/.
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www.usaid.gov/crisis/syria/fy19/fs4. BBC, 1 December 2015, accessed 24 July 2019, https://www.bbc.
29. Ye. O. Savchenko, “How US Military Leaders Have Changed com/news/world-middle-east-34912581; Maria Tsvetkova, “Russian
Their Views on AF Development in Today’s Geopolitical Condi- Toll in Syria Battle was 300 Killed and Wounded: Sources,” Reuters,
tions,” Military Thought 27, no. 1 (March 2018): 147–61. 15 February 2018, accessed 22 July 2019, https://www.reuters.com/
30. Jay Newton-Small, “Obama Seeks a ‘Coalition of article/us-mideast-crisis-syria-russia-casualtie/russian-toll-in-syria-
the Willing’ on Syria,” TIME (website), 26 August 2013, ac- battle-was-300-killed-and-wounded-sources-idUSKCN1FZ2DZ.
cessed 22 July 2019, http://swampland.time.com/2013/08/26/ 46. Igor Sutyagin, “Detailing Russian Forces in Syria,” Roy-
obama-seeks-a-coalition-of-the-willing-on-syria/. al United Services Institute, 13 November 2015, accessed 22
31. Sylvia Westall and Dominic Evans, “Russia Backs Syrian July 2019, https://rusi.org/publication/rusi-defence-systems/
Forces in Major Assault on Insurgents,” Reuters, 7 October 2015, detailing-russian-forces-syria.
accessed 22 July 2019, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast- 47. Steven Rosenberg, “Syria War: Putin’s Russian Mission
crisis-syria-strikes/russia-backs-syrian-forces-in-major-assault-on-in- Accomplished,” BBC, 13 December 2017, accessed 5 June 2019,
surgents-idUSKCN0S10BI20151008. https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-42330551.

MILITARY REVIEW  January-February 2020 21

The Small-Team
Replacement System
Wartime Replacement Systems in
Large-Scale Combat Operations
Maj. R. Smith Griggs, U.S. Army
Capt. Jacob Haider, U.S. Army
Luke Flatebo
 WARTIME REPLACEMENT SYSTEMS

T he 2017 revision of Field Manual 3-0, Operations,

and the 2018 National Defense Strategy direct
the Army and joint forces to prepare for large-
scale combat operations (LSCO) against major regional
powers such as China and Russia. To prevail in these
This section demonstrates how IRSs more effectively meet
these criteria than unit-based solutions.
Unit cohesion and effectiveness. Multiple histor-
ical examples demonstrate that the cohesion and unit
effectiveness built during predeployment training are
conflicts, the Army must be able to build and maintain quickly lost to the high casualty rates of LSCO unless
the combat power required to enable operational reach, replacements are rapidly integrated into the unit by
freedom of action, and prolonged endurance for the joint its veteran soldiers.1 During the American Civil War,
force. Historical evidence and contemporary assess- Gen. Ulysses S. Grant forwarded a letter to President
ments suggest that casualty rates during these operations Abraham Lincoln stating,
will be significantly higher than the rates experienced A recruit added to them [old regiments] would
during lower-intensity contingency operations such become an old soldier, from the very contact,
as the Vietnam War or the Global War on Terrorism before he was aware of it. … Taken in an eco-
(GWOT). Building and maintaining combat power in nomic point of view, one drafted man in an old
the face of high-intensity combat casualty rates requires regiment is worth three in a new one.2
an effective personnel replacement system. Similarly, during World War I, Gen. Fox Conner
While many criticize the concept of individual re- remarked,
placement systems (IRSs) in favor of unit replacement With replacements promptly assigned to fill
systems (URSs), historical lessons learned and current the blank files and with casualties not crushing,
mission analysis indicate that a properly planned, ad- odds are the veterans talked up their unit and
ministered, and executed IRS is the most effective, and its exploits. However, when replacements did
only feasible, wartime replacement system for LSCO. not arrive and the veterans watched their group
The following sections provide historical case stud- grow smaller and smaller, every man’s thoughts
ies and evidence demonstrating the effectiveness and turn to the hardship suffered and the buddy
feasibility of an IRS over a URS and provide examples killed alongside him. Morale crumbles.3
of best practices for the execution and administration of During World War II, one of Gen. Omar Bradley’s staff
an IRS in a theater of war. The last section presents the officers observed,
authors’ proposal for a small-team replacement system When the strength of an outfit in the line drops
to meet the needs of the Army in LSCO. below a certain point, something very bad
happens to it and its effectiveness drops away
Wartime Replacement sharply. What happens to it is there are not
System Effectiveness enough experienced men left in it to make the
An effective personnel replacement system for LSCO replacements—the reinforcements—savvy.4
satisfies several criteria at the tactical, operational, and Each of these observations demonstrates the impor-
strategic levels of war. At the tactical level, the system tance of sustaining unit manning above critical levels and
avoids undermining the cohesion and effectiveness of each the importance of veteran experience in maintaining unit
unit. At the operational level, the system prolongs unit cohesion and combat effectiveness.
endurance to sustain momentum and campaign conti- Unit endurance. Rather than allowing combat
nuity. Finally, at the strategic level, resourcing the system attrition to bleed strength and experience away, an
must be feasible during a prolonged, multiyear LSCO. IRS sustains units’ strength while allowing veterans to
pass along lessons learned to soldiers. In a case study
of the Battle of the Hürtgen Forest, Dr. Robert Rush
describes how continuous assimilation preserved unit
Previous page: Replacements for the 90th Infantry Division ready cohesion and effectiveness:
their packs for life on the front lines July 1944 in Prétot-Sainte-Su-
American infantry organizations remained
zanne, France. Inexperienced replacements had difficulty assimilat-
ing into battle-hardened World War II units. (Photo courtesy of the effective because of organizational cohesion,
National Archives) while the German units they faced collapsed.

MILITARY REVIEW  January-February 2020 23

 Contrary to some conventional wisdom, it A soldier from the 18th Replacement Company of the 90th Replace-
was the American system of keeping units in ment Battalion processes newly arrived Army troops January 1970
at the Long Binh Processing Center in Vietnam. (Photo by David Lin-
the line and progressively integrating replace- scott/Alamy Stock Photo)
ments in the middle of combat that sustained
combat-effective infantry units at the battalion
level and below, because these units stayed large
enough to function as designed. The Germans, cohesion … only when combat declined and
constantly whittled by attrition, became a disengagement became the American goal did
jumbled group of individuals with much less cohesion deteriorate.6
organizational endurance.5 Resourcing the system. Resourcing the number of
Proponents of a URS primarily have their opinions units required for a URS during LSCO is infeasible. World
shaped by negative coverage of the IRS during World War II casualty figures from the European theater of
War II and the Vietnam War, and personal familiarity operations (ETO) demonstrate that without individual
with URS during the GWOT. This narrow approach ne- replacements, all fifteen infantry divisions that landed
glects two major considerations. First, as Robert Kaplan at Normandy would have ceased to exist within two
illustrates, cohesion in Vietnam resulted from necessity months.7 Some divisions in the ETO experienced nearly
and purpose. He observed that 250 percent casualties during eleven months of combat,
cohesion did exist through most of the nearly 90 percent of which were infantrymen.8 World
Vietnam War … cohesion was the product War II infantrymen had only a 30 percent chance of being
of necessity and group dynamics, the same in their unit after six months.9 The significant casualty
factors that bolstered unit cohesion in WWII rates associated with LSCO impose a requirement to
and Korea. Soldiers understood that the unit recruit, train, and field units at a rate in excess of what our
represented survival and instinctively built its current systems and processes can support.

24 January-February 2020  MILITARY REVIEW

 WARTIME REPLACEMENT SYSTEMS

Ineffectiveness of Relief in Place learned the wrong lessons from Vietnam and discarded
The constant relief in place of veteran units with new the advantages of the IRS that enabled units to maintain
units causes reductions in the operational effectiveness of hard-won knowledge of the local operating environment,
land forces. Initially, units entering combat have higher ca- including enemies, terrain, and relationships with civilian
sualty rates due to a lack of experiential knowledge of the and military partners.15 Instead of increasing operational
enemy, terrain, and the localized nature of combat.10 Units effectiveness, the friction and turbulence caused by unit
anticipating rotational relief again experience heightened rotations every nine to fifteen months directly resulted
casualties due to complacency and overconfidence that in increased casualties, a shallow understanding of the
stem from a premature perception of having “made it.” operational environment, and an inability to generate
Additionally, the constant intertheater transport of units campaign-level momentum.
increased the strain on overburdened logistical systems
and decreased operational tempo, forcing units to conduct Infeasibility of Resourcing
complex passage of lines operations while in contact with a Unit Replacement System
the enemy. For these reasons, many World War II com- Proponents of URS fail to consider the infeasibility
manders opposed a URS because “replacing divisions on of resourcing unit rotations during LSCO, conflating
the line would have wasted time, slowed momentum, and it with forecasted low-intensity operations such as the
nullified any combat experience.”11 GWOT. In order to resource a URS, the Army must
A URS significantly increases requirements for relief have additional units to rotate. While resourcing the
in place. This results in lower tactical and operational URS system used during the GWOT, the Army utilized
effectiveness than would be experienced with an IRS. As a a three-brigade rotation system, thus requiring three bri-
pertinent historical example, the largest surrender of U.S. gades for each brigade-level mission: one brigade in com-
forces during World War II occurred in the ETO when bat, one brigade returning to refit and rebuild, and one
two regiments of the 106th Infantry Division surrendered brigade preparing to deploy. However, in a modern-day
in the Schnee Eifel during the first week of the Battle of LSCO, all current planning assumptions to defeat peer
the Bulge—“another case of an untested division getting or near-peer adversaries require employing substan-
battered in its first introduction to combat.”12 tial portions of the Total Army at one time. Therefore,
Another reinforcing example comes from the German without a substantial increase to the Total Army’s end
perspective during the Battle of the Hürtgen Forest. The strength and the rapid building of new units, it would be
German army chief of staff attributed the German forces’ infeasible to resource any kind of unit rotation plan.
high casualties and overall failure in the battle to inexpe- The Army encountered a similar situation during
rienced commanders and World War II. The Victory Plan called for over two
units that were not familiar Maj. R. Smith Griggs, hundred Army divisions in order to support a URS,
with the terrain of the West U.S. Army, is transitioning but the Army was only able to resource eighty-nine
and the fighting tactics of from aviation to become an
the Americans. 13
Army strategist. He holds Capt. Jacob Haider, Luke Flatebo serves in the
Proponents of a URS a BS from West Point and U.S. Army, is transitioning plans and exercises team
often point to its supposed an MBA from Webster from armor to become a at Army Human Resources
effectiveness during the University, and he is a foreign area officer. He re- Command. He holds a BA
GWOT. However, various fellow at the University of ceived a BA from Saint John’s from American Military
studies repudiate this. An Washington. Griggs served University and an MA from University and an MS from
Iraq War study, released with the 1st Cavalry Division, Columbus State University. the University of Louisville.
in January 2019 by the the 1st Infantry Division, and Haider served with the 4th During his time in service,
U.S. Army War College the 4th Infantry Division. Infantry Division and the Flatebo served in the U.S.
Press, identifies frequent He deployed in support 25th Infantry Division, and Marine Corps and the
unit transitions as det- of Operations Enduring he has deployed in support U.S. Army, deploying in
rimental to operational Freedom and of Operations New Dawn support of Operation Iraqi
effectiveness. The Army
14
Iraqi Freedom. and Enduring Freedom. Freedom.

MILITARY REVIEW  January-February 2020 25

 divisions for the ETO due to the necessity of executing the Army has conducted has concluded that resourcing
an IRS to maintain the strength of units suffering sub- the URS is infeasible during LSCO.
stantial casualties in combat.16 As a result, World War
II infantry units in the ETO Best Practices for a
suffered casualties equal to their total per- Replacement System
sonnel authorizations every 85 to 100 days in This section briefly introduces two best practices
combat! That meant that the typical infantry for the execution and administration of a replacement
unit was ‘destroyed’ at least twice a year … system in a theater of war: intratheater unit rotation
Thus there was no point to rotating units to enable reconstitution operations, and replacement
because the originals had long ceased to exist integration and training.
even after one year.17 Intratheater unit rotation. The intratheater rota-
From World War II until present day, the Army has tion of forces is the practice of changing the units with-
conducted several studies on the feasibility of a URS. held from combat as a reserve force. This provides three
Studies during both World War II (commissioned by Gen. primary benefits to land forces. First, it provides the land
George Marshall Jr.) and the Korean War (commissioned component commander with a method of maintaining a
by the Department of the Army G-1) concluded that a ready and experienced theater reserve. Second, it reduces
URS was not feasible due to the enormous manpower additional casualties due to “carelessness, fatigue, and over-
requirements, the timeline needed to generate additional long exposure to hardship and danger.”21 Finally, it allows
a period for units to
reorganize and assimilate
As the Army shifts its focus to large-scale combat operations (LSCO), individual replacements.
keeping the maneuver force adequately manned stands out as a key is- Without an intratheater
sue. For those interested in ensuring the efficiency of personnel replace- rotation plan, overall
ment systems to support LSCO, the lecture “Replacements” given in 1922 unit and individual re-
at the U.S. Army War College by Lt. Col. Parker Hitt provides a historical placement effectiveness
perspective that highlights recurring and enduring issues related to per- decreased in World War
sonnel replacement system administration. We express our appreciation II. As Lt. Gen. Jacob L.
to Dr. Conrad Crane and Shane Reilly at the U.S. Army War College and Devers observed,
Russell Rafferty, archivist at the Ike Skelton Combined Arms Center Library, “It has been
for assistance in locating the lecture manuscript. To view the manuscript, demonstrated
visit https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Portals/7/Hot-Spots/docs/LSCO/RE- here that divisions
PLACEMENT-1922.pdf. should not be left
in the line longer
than 30 to 40 days
in an active the-
divisions, and the logistical requirements of transporting ater. If you do this, as has been done in this theater,
and supporting additional divisions.18 U.S. Army Europe’s everybody gets tired, then they get careless, and
tests on replacement systems during the 1950s and 1960s there are tremendous sick rates and casualty rates.
revalidated the IRS as the most effective method of Everybody should know this. The result is that
sustaining units in combat. From 1954 to 1962, the Army you feed replacements into a machine in the line,
experimented with five different unit replacement con- and it is like throwing good money after bad. Your
cepts but ultimately abandoned each of them due to cost replacement system is bound to break down, as it
and inflexibility.19 Lt. Gen. Richard Trefry analyzed unit has done in this theater.”22
rotation during the COHORT (Cohesion, Operational Planning for the integration and training of indi-
Readiness, and Training) program from 1989 to 1998 and vidual replacements while a unit is part of the reserve
concluded that the Army required three units in order to force is a way to maximize the effectiveness of in-the-
create one deployable unit of the same size.20 Every study ater rotation systems.

26 January-February 2020  MILITARY REVIEW

 WARTIME REPLACEMENT SYSTEMS

Replacement integration and training. Prolonged and sustain the ground component for the duration of
LSCO necessitates replacement operations. However, LSCO. An STR utilizes team- to squad-size elements
“numerical strength does not equal combat strength.”23 of four to nine personnel as the foundation of personnel
Replacements sent directly into combat without integra- replacement operations. This process best preserves the
tion add minimal combat effectiveness to their units and morale and fighting spirit of the replacements, which
are at a greater risk of becoming casualties.24 Translating accelerates their assimilation into new units and ultimate-
personnel replacements into combat power requires time ly increases combat effectiveness. Though STR is optimal
and disciplined adherence
to the integration process at
the unit level. Without unit For those interested in learning more about U.S. Army personnel replace-
rest through in-theater rota- ment systems prior to 1954, Military Review recommends The Personnel
tion and proper integration Replacement System in the United States Army. This Department of the
of replacements, units risk Army pamphlet was prepared in order to examine historical issues related
remaining at degraded com- to recurring problems with mobilization, demobilization, and the replace-
bat effectiveness or becom- ment system during armed conflict. Published immediately after the Korean
ing combat ineffective.25 As armistice and prior to U.S. involvement in the Vietnam War, it examines
stated by Maj. Jeffrey Holt, lessons learned from replacement systems from colonial times through the
The greatest failure end of the Korean conflict. To view this pamphlet, visit https://history.army.
of the entire system mil/html/books/104/104-9/CMH_Pub_104-9.pdf.
occurred when the
replacement arrived at
the tactical unit … all
the conditions leading
up to a soldier’s arrival in a division were of for the bulk of replacements, it is necessary to augment
small importance to the replacement’s first days small teams with the individual assignment of experienced
in combat. If he entered combat as a member leaders and low-density military occupational specialty
of a cohesive organization, then his chances soldiers, whose management as teams is impractical based
for survival rose dramatically. If he entered the on current organization and availability.
fight as a stranger, without the benefits of moral A historical analysis of the U.S. Army personnel re-
support from his comrades, then he was very placement system from the American Civil War through
likely to become a casualty.26 the GWOT heavily influenced the STR proposal. This
During World War II, the best U.S. divisions used a analysis revealed that the best replacements are those with
small cadre of experienced combat veterans to reinforce recent collective-level training experience in similar units.
the combat training of new arrivals. This occurred behind The corollary is also true. Soldiers sent directly from initial
the lines to better psychologically prepare replacements military training without seasoning in operational units
for integration into combat units.27 As a result, post- assimilate and perform poorly. Additionally, the quantity
World War II general officer review boards repeatedly of the replacements matters. Individual soldiers (except ex-
concluded that replacement training units have a substan- perienced leaders) are less effective as replacements, and in
tial impact on unit combat effectiveness and recommend- large groups, they do not assimilate well into gaining units.
ed their standardization across the Army.28 The effectiveness and speed of replacement assimi-
lation are dependent on soldier morale and the number
Optimized Personnel Replacement of soldiers assimilated at a time. Historical observations
with Small-Team Replacements indicate that resourcing teams, crews, or squads rang-
The purpose of personnel replacement operations is ing in size from four to nine personnel best achieve the
to maintain unit combat power in the face of attrition. social dynamics conducive to maintaining individual
Incorporating small-team replacements (STRs) is a prov- morale and effective assimilation into gaining units.
en method to execute personnel replacement operations Small-unit commanders can break these replacement

MILITARY REVIEW  January-February 2020 27

teams down to a buddy-team level within their organi- are optimal for assimilation by gaining units at the tactical
zations without impeding effectiveness. level due to the social bonds that exist within the arriving
team and the prevention of culture clash between two large
Conclusion populations. From the strategic to the tactical level, utiliza-
Using a replacement system built upon small-team tion of a small-team-based replacement system overcomes
assimilation best meets the needs of the Army in LSCO. numerous sources of historical friction, while adapting best
Resourcing is feasible, the operational effects are suitable, practices from the Army’s lessons learned.
and the ability to manage risk across the Total Army
makes it acceptable. A properly planned and administered The authors worked at Army Human Resources
small-team replacement system is conducive to sustained Command as the plans and exercises team. They collabo-
resourcing by the Army enterprise. At the operational rated with Headquarters, Department of the Army; Army
level, reliance upon small teams reduces the number of service component commands; and the human resource
units required and prevents growth of a theater’s sustain- enterprise to modernize human resource sustainment for
ment tail to support additional units. Finally, small teams large-scale combat operations.

Notes
1. Richard G. Trefry, “World War II: The Shadows Lengthen,” Pa- 18. Robert R. Palmer, Bell I. Wiley, and William R. Keast, The Procurement
rameters (Summer 1998): 134; Patrick M. Rice, Transforming the Army’s and Training of Ground Combat Troops (Washington, DC: Center of Military
Wartime Replacement System (Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College, History, 2003), 229; T. N. Dupuy Associates, Inc., “Analytic Survey of Personnel
2008), 1. Replacement Systems in Modern War,” 141–43.
2. Fred C. Ainsworth and Joseph W. Kirkley, The War of the Rebellion: A 19. Rice, Transforming the Army’s Wartime Replacement System, 13–14.
Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies (Wash- 20. Ibid., 8, 33.
ington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1899), 386. 21. Palmer, Wiley, and Keast, The Procurement and Training of Ground
3. Fox Conner, “Replacements: Lifeblood of a Fighting Army,” Infantry Combat Troops, 227.
Journal 21, no. 5 (May 1941): 8. 22. Ibid.
4. T. N. Dupuy Associates, Inc., “Analytic Survey of Personnel Replacement 23. Peter Mansoor, The GI Offensive in Europe: The Triumph of American
Systems in Modern War” (White Sands Missile Range, NM: U.S. Army Training Infantry Division, 1941-1945 (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 1999),
and Doctrine Command Systems Analysis Activity, April 1981), 15. 190; Peter Mansoor, email messages to authors, 8 June 2018; Rush, Battle of the
5. Robert Sterling Rush, “The Individual Replacement System: Good, Hürtgen Forest, 559–62.
Bad, or Indifferent? Army Replacement Policy, Cold War and Before” (paper 24. Jeffrey P. Holt, “Operational Performance of the U.S. 28th Infantry
presentation, Inter-University Seminar on Armed Forces and Society, Chicago, Division September to December 1944” (master’s thesis, U.S. Army Com-
IL, October 2003), 14. mand and General Staff College, 1994), 102. According to Holt, “withholding
6. Roger Kaplan, “Army Unit Cohesion in Vietnam: A Bum Rap,” Parameters replacements until after the fighting was over and then ensuring that they
17, no. 3 (September 1987): 66. received a minimum standard of training was not a common practice in the
7. Army Battle Casualties and Nonbattle Deaths in World War II (Washing- ETO. This policy was particularly rare during the last four months of 1944.
ton, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1953), 80–82; Rush, “The Individual During both the Siegfried Line and Hurtgen Forest battles, the 28th resorted
Replacement,” 5. to sending replacements straight into battle without training. In both battles
8. Rice, Transforming the Army’s Wartime Replacement System, 10. the employment of replacements contributed little to the combat power of
9. Robert Sterling Rush, Hell in Hürtgen Forest: The Ordeal and Triumph the line companies and resulted in excessive casualties among replacements.”
of an American Infantry Regiment (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 25. Rush, Hell in Hürtgen Forest, 559–62. According to Rush, “com-
2001), 319–20. manders, possessing greater vision and knowledge of the human element,
10. Rush, “The Individual Replacement,” 25. steadfastly refused to put replacements into battle before they received
11. Eric William Klinek, “The Army’s Orphans: The United States Army Re- at a least a minimal opportunity for training and assimilation. In these units,
placement System in the European Campaign, 1944-1945” (PhD diss., Temple the sacrifice in short-term combat strength was definitely offset by the
University, May 2014), 75. greater long-term combat efficiency of replacements. While policies such
12. Peter Mansoor, email messages to authors, August 2018. as these were worthy of emulation, they still fell short of the ideal condition
13. Rush, “The Individual Replacement,” 25. for receiving replacements. Only a greater number of infantry units and
14. Joel D. Rayburn and Frank K. Sobchak, eds., The U.S. Army in The Iraq an effective unit rotation plan could ensure that replacements were fully
War, vol. 2, Surge and Withdrawal, 2007-2011 (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies integrated and trained before battle.”
Institute/U.S. Army War College Press, January 2019), 629. 26. Holt, “Operational Performance of the U.S. 28th Infantry Division
15. Joel D. Rayburn and Frank K. Sobchak, eds., The U.S. Army in The Iraq September to December 1944,” 155.
War, vol. 1, Invasion, Insurgency, Civil War, 2003-2006 (Carlisle, PA: Strategic 27. Mansoor, The GI Offensive in Europe, 13, 194; Ambrose, Citizen
Studies Institute/U.S. Army War College Press, January 2019), 629. Soldiers, 277.
16. Charles E. Kirkpatrick, An Unknown Future and a Doubtful Present: 28. The General Board, U.S. Forces, European Theater, “Reinforcement Sys-
Writing The Victory Plan of 1941 (Washington DC: U.S. Army Center of Military tem and Reinforcement Procedures in the European Theater of Operations”
History, 1992), 103–4. (Washington, DC: Center of Military History, 1945), 33; Klinek, “The Army’s
17. Kaplan, “Army Unit Cohesion in Vietnam,” 63. Orphans,” 48.

28 January-February 2020  MILITARY REVIEW

Marines with Company B, 1st Battalion, 1st Marine Regiment, attack an objective 10 August 2016 during a live-fire exercise at Bradshaw Field
Training Area, Northern Territory, Australia. Exercise Koolendong is an amphibious and live-fire exercise designed to increase interoperability
between the U.S. Marine Corps and the Australian Defence Force. (Photo by Sgt. Sarah Anderson, U.S. Marine Corps)

Leadership during
Large-Scale Combat
PUY CO
DE
NT
2015

EST

Operations AC
ARTHUR A
DE
PUY CO
NT
M

WA

2015
2019

EST
RD

Maj. Jeremy Smith, U.S. Marine Corps AC

ARTHUR A
M

WA
2017

RD

MILITARY REVIEW  January-February 2020 29

 It is the year 2025. Russia is pressuring a country in We should not be ready for one or the other; we
Eastern Europe to rejoin the former Soviet motherland. As should be ready for both.
tensions rise, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization requests Second, mission command as a warfighting function
that the United States deploy an Army corps and a Marine needs to be abandoned by the Army. It is confusing.
expeditionary force to join a newly formed coalition in U.S. Command and control is what a staff should be focused
European Command, sending the message that it will not on in order to give the commander an accurate visualiza-
tolerate further intimidation or aggression from Russia. The tion so he can command his unit. Mission command is a
United States has been drawn into a large-scale conflict. philosophy and a basic fundamental method for how we
lead in combat, not a warfighting function.

F or the past twenty-five years, the United States

had invested all of its defense spending into coun-
terterrorism and counterinsurgency operations all
over the world, with a focus on U.S. Central Command,
U.S. Africa Command, and U.S. Pacific Command.
Third, leaders must be scholars of history in order to
ensure they are ready for large-scale combat operations.
We learn from those who came before us and those les-
sons can be applied to all types of warfare.
Military officers will be ready to lead during large-
While this deployment to Eastern Europe came as a scale combat operations in 2025 because leadership
surprise, vast communication and logistical resources during large-scale combat operations will be no different
allowed the United States to send troops overseas quickly, than it has been for limited contingency operations. We
with no outside interference. Once the combined joint must be ready for all types of conflict on the continuum.
task force entered the “dominate phase” of operations, di-
vision and brigade commanders started relying heavily on Large-Scale Combat and Limited
the only combat experience they had: limited contingen- Contingency Operations
cy operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. Were they ready As military professionals, we need to stop put-
to lead in large-scale combat operations? ting war into separate “bins.” Large-scale combat
The scenario above summarizes a very realistic pos- operations and limited contingency operations
sibility based on the current national security strategy, are interlinked, and we should train for the entire
which will require a force that can fight in all types of spectrum of war. According to Joint Publication
warfare. When 2025 ( JP) 3-0, Joint Operations, the entire range of mili-
Maj. Jeremy Smith, comes, will our military tary operations—which includes large-scale combat
U.S. Marine Corps, leaders be ready to lead operations; crisis response and limited contingency
recently graduated from in large-scale combat operations; and military engagement, security co-
the Command and operations? Of course operation, and deterrence operations—flows along
General Staff College and they will. However, a conflict continuum between peace and war.1 We
is a student at the School to be ready to lead in need to understand the differences along the range
of Advanced Military this type of warfare, of military operations, but we cannot pretend to be-
Studies. He has deployed we must adopt a few lieve that leadership will be vastly different during
in support of Operations strategies. each of the three types of conflict.
Iraqi Freedom, Enduring First, we need to While JP 3-0 puts large-scale combat operations
Freedom, and Inherent understand that while along the entire spectrum of the conflict continuum,
Resolve. Smith has served large-scale combat Field Manual (FM) 3-0, Operations, actually describes
in billets both at the tactical operations and limited it as situated “at the far right of the conflict contin-
and strategic levels. His contingency opera- uum and associated with war.”2 A comparison of
most recent experience tions are different, each publication’s version displays obvious differing
was as a battalion executive they should not be viewpoints on the topic (see figure 1, page 31). While
officer and as a planner viewed as completely neither publication strictly defines large-scale combat
on the staff of I Marine separate and distinct. operations, they both provide many examples and
Expeditionary Force, Camp They are on the same factors to describe it. JP 3-0 delineates Operation
Pendleton, California. spectrum of conflict. Iraqi Freedom as an example of large-scale combat

30 January-February 2020  MILITARY REVIEW

 LEADERSHIP IN LSCO

Notional operations across the conflict continuum (one time) that a limited
contingency operation
Peace Conflict continuum War could occur simultane-
ously with large-scale
combat operations.4
Large-scale combat operations
By comparing these
Range of viewpoints, military
Crisis response and limited contingency operations military officers have the tools
operations they need to understand
Military engagement, security cooperation, and deterrence that although conflict
is classified into certain
categories in doctrinal
Our national leaders can use the military instrument of national power across the conflict continuum in a wide variety of
operations and activities that are commonly characterized in three groups as this figure depicts.
descriptions, it bleeds
across the entire conflict
Joint Publication 3-0 continuum. Much like
the three levels of war
overlap, so do the types
Notional operations across the conflict continuum of conflict. This is one of
Peace Conflict continuum War many reasons why lead-
ership during any type
of conflict is not vastly
Large-scale combat operations
different from another
(large-scale versus limited
Crisis response and limited Range of
military contingency).
contingency operations
operations According to Army
Doctrine Reference
Military engagement, security Publication (ADRP)
cooperation, and deterrence
6-22, Army Leadership,
leadership is “the process
Field Manual 3-0 of influencing people
by providing purpose,
(Figures from JP 3-0, Joint Operations, V-4; FM 3-0, Operations, 1-1)
direction, and motivation
to accomplish the mission
Figure 1. Comparison Between Joint and Army Doctrine and improve an organi-
Regarding the Conflict Continuum zation.”5 Marine Corps
Warfighting Publication
6-10, Leading Marines,
operations because it had multiple phases.3 It goes on says that leaders must be “of good character as defined
further to say that major operations and campaigns by our core values,” which are honor, courage, and com-
such as humanitarian assistance could fall just shy of, mitment.6 However, neither publication distinguishes
or also be considered, large-scale combat operations, between different types of leadership during different
depending on the strategic situation. types of conflict, such as large-scale combat or limit-
However, the focus of FM 3-0 is on much larger ed contingency operations. No matter the situation,
conflicts such as World War II and the Arab-Israeli a true leader will balance both the art and science of
War of 1973. The theme of FM 3-0 clearly insinuates leadership when making decisions, based on the needs
that large-scale combat operations are distinct from of the unit, the service, and the nation. In any conflict,
limited contingency operations, though it does mention mission command as a philosophy rests on a backbone

MILITARY REVIEW  January-February 2020 31

of character, and gives subordinates the freedom to act Mission command is not a warfighting function. It is
intuitively within the commander’s intent. a basic principle of leadership that is exercised to one de-
gree or another within the framework of command and
Mission Command versus control. “Develop a sense of responsibility among your
Command and Control subordinates” is a leadership principle that simply means
Command and control and mission command are we should delegate tasks to the lowest level possible and at
interlinked, but the relationship can be better under- the point of friction.8 This is mission command.
stood by viewing the two concepts through different ADRP 6-0, Mission Command, defines mission
lenses. Mission command is the reason why our na- command as “the exercise of authority and direction
tion wins battles. It is not a joint function and should by the commander using mission orders to enable
not be an Army warfighting function. It is a philoso- disciplined initiative within the commander’s intent
phy. It is a principle. Mission command is one of the to empower agile and adaptive leaders in the conduct
most basic leadership principles that the Marines of unified land operations.”9 The key takeaway here
have executed for years. Conversely, Marine Corps is disciplined initiative, which implies mutual trust
Doctrinal Publication (MCDP) 6, Command and
Control, says that “no single activity in war is more im-
portant than command and control.”7 In other words, Capt. Andrew Roberts, commander of Battery C, 2nd Battalion, 319th
Airborne Field Artillery Regiment, 82nd Airborne Division, directs
command and control is the most important joint
newly arrived paratroopers where to go 5 February 2017 during
function because it links all of the other functions to Combined Joint Task Force-Operation Inherent Resolve near Mosul,
ensure unity of effort and unity of command. Iraq. (Photo by Spc. Craig Jensen, U.S. Army)
 LEADERSHIP IN LSCO

among leaders and subordinates. Mission-type orders are inher-

Commander
ent to every task that is executed by a subordinate unit, both in
large-scale combat operations and limited contingency oper-
ations. As a result, it should be second nature to give a lower
unit all of the support and authority it needs to accomplish the
mission, and simply say “go forth and do great things” or “carry
out the plan of the day.” This highlights that the Army should

Command
focus completely on mission command as a philosophy rather
than also retaining it as a warfighting function.

Control
The Army needs to go back to adopting the joint function of
good old-fashioned command and control. The fact that ADRP
6-0 has to put mission command into two separate categories
(philosophy and warfighting function) is enough to confuse
anyone. It makes no sense. Keeping things simple is what will
continue to make the U.S. military successful, especially when
issuing orders during the chaos of large-scale combat operations
and the complexities of limited contingency operations.

Commander
According to JP 3-0, command and control “encompasses the
exercise of authority and direction by a commander over assigned
and attached forces to accomplish the mission.”10 MCDP 6 says
the commander commands by making decisions and influenc-
ing the action of subordinates, and control is exercised based (Figure from Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication 6, Command and Control, 41)
on feedback from those subordinates through the commander’s
staff, which then allows the commander to adjust and make
new decisions based on previous action (see figure 2).11 Mission Figure 2. Command and
command occurs within command and control, but it is not Control Viewed as Reciprocal
what defines command and control. It is rather a very dynamic Influence—Command as
cycle that drives all of the other warfighting functions. Command
Initiation of Action and
and control relies heavily on the staff to give the commander an
accurate visualization of the battlefield based on feedback from Control as Feedback
subordinate units. Based on historical perspectives, many would
agree that command is the art while control is the science.

History
True military professionals are humble. They know that there is no such thing as a perfect plan. They
understand that their own learning occurs because of the actions of others that served before them. The art of
war exists because of the human element. The principles of war are scientific, but absolutely require human
application. While experience is what shapes a leader’s character, education provides a foundation on which to
build that character. The study of military history should inform the long-term education of military profes-
sionals by positively influencing how they lead and how they conduct military planning during all types of
conflict. To do this, one must understand that education through the study of history is never complete, nor is
it useful without proper application.
The art of leadership is developed by studying the methods of historical leaders and applying those methods to
individual style. In 1921, Marine Corps Commandant John A. Lejeune said that the relationship between offi-
cers and enlisted marines should not be “superior and inferior, nor that of master and servant, but rather that of
teacher and scholar.”12 Leadership is effectively taught through constant mentorship from truly caring leaders. Case
studies of historical events have the most influence when teaching leadership to groups of subordinates. Many

MILITARY REVIEW  January-February 2020 33

individuals can read a case study and have differing military professionals should learn as much as possible
views on what happened and how they would have through the study of primary sources and reputable sec-
personally handled the situation. Over time, themes ondary sources. Though nothing can substitute for first-
emerge from the study of historical events that contrib- hand experience, history sometimes repeats itself and the
ute to the military professional’s lifelong development. detailed study of history can allow us to apply methods
Successful military professionals are constant that were successful in the past.
learners. Education is never complete, which is why The ability to lead effectively is influenced by expe-
resident attendance at military schools is accorded to rience, but its foundation is set in the study of mili-
those who demonstrate strong potential to succeed tary history. It is the very foundation of our doctrine,
at the next higher grade. These scholars understand which is sprinkled with case studies of both large-scale
what it means to have a three thousand-year-old combat and limited contingency operations. True ded-
mind. The human mind is generally infinite in ca- ication to the military institution is manifest in those
pacity and can recall learned items that have impact. individuals who never stop learning about their craft.
Reading books of all types is what shapes how we Education is never complete. Moreover, the credibility
think and is a major contributor to self-development. of leaders in the eyes of their peers and subordinates is
It gives us an edge over our competitors and a refer- often built and maintained by a knowledge of histo-
ence point for certain topics of interest. Additionally, ry. The long-term education of military professionals
technological advances of today allow for immedi- and their study of military history influence how they
ate access to academic journals, research projects, lead and conduct planning. If we want to positively
and databases, which gives the military professional affect future wars through leadership in all domains,
unprecedented potential to study all types of mate- we must learn about and apply what we have learned
rial. Humans are not perfect but can strive to gain from those who have gone before us.
as much knowledge as possible while also remaining The U.S. military should not limit itself to only the
humble. Everything we study can be discussed, ana- study and preparation for large-scale combat opera-
lyzed, and applied to future war. tions, despite the fact that our near-peer adversaries
Studying military history might seem somewhat have advanced their conventional capabilities while
worthless and anachronistic to some when attempt- we have been bogged down with limited contingency
ing to apply what one has learned from past conflicts operations in Iraq and Afghanistan. A counterinsur-
to current and future conflicts. But while the tech- gency fight has the potential to creep up during any
nical means of executing war continues to change large-scale conflict just as it did during Operation
war’s character, the nature of war will likely never Iraqi Freedom. Large-scale and limited contingency
change. The way we lead has been influenced by the operations will always overlap on the conflict continu-
character of war more than by the type of war on the um. We must be ready for all types of warfare.
conflict continuum.
For example, World War I and the current conflict Conclusion
in Syria are separated by many years and a disparity of Mission command is a philosophy and a principle.
technology, but the nature of those wars have many sim- It is not a warfighting function. Command and con-
ilarities. Both were started by actions of the people and trol is a joint function that relies on both the com-
eventually evolved into very complicated environments mander and staff to provide a clear picture of the fight
that involved multiple nation-states. Similarly, activities based on action and feedback from subordinates. If we
reminiscent of Cold War competition are recurring in are to understand the wars of today and tomorrow, we
similar patterns in proxy wars sponsored by today’s great must continue studying the past. The most accurate
powers between nations all over the world. way to predict the future is to simply study history,
From the study of history, we can temper our own which is a basic requirement for all leaders.
involvement in such conflicts by learning from our past Leadership must be focused on mutual understand-
to avoid mistakes and sustain our successes if we apply ing and trust within a unit, which will result in the abil-
what have learned. Because of generational separations, ity to adjust to any type of fight. Leadership philosophy

34 January-February 2020  MILITARY REVIEW

 LEADERSHIP IN LSCO

should not change drastically during large-scale combat ready for 2025, whether it will be large-scale or contin-
operations. By training specifically for one type of war- ued limited contingency operations.
fare, the Army risks missing out on preparing for truly Editor’s note: This article was written prior to the July
hybrid wars. As we intensively study the history of past 2019 update to Army Doctrine Publication 6-0, Mission
conflict to help us understand the evolving relationship Command, which changed mission command to command
of mission command to command and control in present and control as a warfighting function and reinvigorated
and future conflicts and apply its lessons, we will be the Army’s approach to command and control.

Notes
1. Joint Publication ( JP) 3-0, Joint Operations (Washington, DC: 7. Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication (MCDP) 6, Command
U.S. Government Publishing Office [GPO], 2017), V-4. and Control (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office,
2. Field Manual (FM) 3-0, Operations (Washington, DC: U.S. GPO, 1996), 35.
2017), 1-1. 8. MCWP 6-10, Leading Marines, 2-6.
3. JP 3-0, Joint Operations, VIII-1. 9. ADRP 6-0, Mission Command (Washington, DC: U.S. Govern-
4. FM 3-0, Operations, 4-19. ment Printing Office, 2012 [obsolete]), 1-1.
5. Army Doctrine Reference Publication (ADRP) 6-22, Army 10. JP 3-0, Joint Operations, III-2.
Leadership (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2012 11. MCDP 6, Command and Control, 40–41.
[obsolete]), 1-1. 12. Marine Corps Order No. 29, Relations between Officers
6. Marine Corps Warfighting Publication (MCWP) 6-10, Leading and Men (Washington, DC: Headquarters, United States Marine
Marines (Washington, DC: U.S. GPO, 2018), 2-3. Corps, 1920).

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MILITARY REVIEW  January-February 2020 35

Developing Readiness
to Trust Artificial
Intelligence within
Warfighting Teams
Chaplain (Maj.) Marlon W. Brown, U.S. Army

W e are at the beginning of a rapid

integration of artificial intelligence
(AI) into military operations. The
National Security Strategy of the United States
lists the rapid progression in the field of AI as
addresses the need to “invest broadly in military ap-
plication of autonomy, artificial intelligence, and ma-
chine learning, including rapid application of com-
mercial breakthroughs, to gain competitive military
advantages” as part of modernizing key capabilities to
one of several emerging technologies critical build a more lethal force.2
to national security.1 The Summary of the The Joint Artificial Intelligence Center is charged
2018 National Defense Strategy of the United with carrying out the newly developed Summary of
States of America echoes the concern and the 2018 Department of Defense Artificial Intelligence
Strategy. The strategy includes the collaboration of defense assets with academic and commercial partners to
develop and implement technology.3 A component to this modernization approach is the Defense Advanced
Research Projects Agency, for which the president has requested a $3.556 billion budget for fiscal year 2020.
The named project “Artificial Intelligence and Human-Machine Symbiosis” is expected to cost more than
$161 million in 2020, a 233 percent increase from the 2018 budget.4
Currently, AI integration is limited and has yet to alter warfighting significantly, especially at the tactical
level. Humans are still in full control. Because civilian and military leaders are cautious about entrusting
any AI analysis and decision-making that may directly affect human life, many expect this norm to contin-
ue. However, this type of human and technology partnership is likely to change because adversaries will
challenge the United States with their own robust use of AI. No matter how many prominent science and
technology heavyweights propose banning autonomous weapons or how reasonable arguments against
AI development may be, the “AI genie of innovation is out of the bottle: it cannot be stuffed back in-
side.”5 Adversaries are investing highly in the technology and so is the United States.
Since future wars will be characterized by the use of rapidly developing AI systems, the mili-
tary force must be ready to accept this new technology. Readiness is not simply an issue of devel-
oping and fielding the right AI systems. Readiness will include solutions to ethical and moral
questions like, “Will soldiers be willing to go to battle alongside robots?”6 When answering
this type of question, one must consider the ability of human warfighters to trust artificial
systems within the team. By leveraging our current doctrinal concept of trust in cohesive
teams and evaluating factors that can lead to an individual decision to trust, soldiers can
develop a readiness to trust the AI systems soon to be integrated with warfighting teams.

What Is AI?
Before considering the issue of trust in AI, it is important to understand the varied
nature of the technology. AI technology is not static, and rapid developments continue
to move the goalposts for understanding the technology and how the issue of trust with
AI systems should be treated. One can find numerous terms to differentiate types and
examples of AI in a quick internet search. A useful means of categorization of AI
types and the one used throughout this article is artifi- ANI and future AGI systems may have robotic com-
cial narrow intelligence (ANI) and artificial generalized ponents or audiovisual projections, or they may exist in
intelligence (AGI). All current AI systems operate in cyberspace without human-like interfaces. Trust in ANI
the realm of ANI, in which the system focuses only on and trust in AGI will have different natures based on the
narrow tasks. Apple’s Siri is one of the most well-known definitions and experiences of trust within the military.7
AI systems and is capable of only a narrow set of tasks
related to Apple products. ANI systems can only do what Doctrinal Trust
they have been designed to do. within Military Teams
AGI, on the other hand, is the future of AI, where- Army doctrine recognizes the importance of trust
by machines possess intention and self-awareness. AGI in military teams. Mutual trust is basic to the practice
systems, like humans, will be generalists and will be able of mission command. “Trust is gained or lost through
to apply learned information to a wide variety of tasks everyday actions more than grand or occasional ges-
and experiences. Philosophical terms are often applied tures. It comes from successful shared experiences and
in discussions about AGI. In addition to intention and training, usually gained incidental to operations but
self-awareness, terms like sentience (the capacity for feel- also deliberately developed by the commander.”8 The
ing) and agency (individual power to act) are commonly Army considers trust among soldiers as “reliance on
encountered descriptors for the kinds of AI we catego- the character, competence, and commitment of Army
rize as AGI. To put it simply, AGI will be human-like professionals to live by and uphold the Army Ethic.”9
in terms of higher-level thought and emotion. Fictional The overall level of trust necessary to build an effective
characters like the Terminator, Wall-E, and Star Trek: The warfighting team is hard to overstate.
Next Generation’s Data are all AGI systems. While many War is a human endeavor, but the integration of AI
fictional AGI systems have humanoid forms, developing complicates the historical understandings of the nature
of war by threatening to replace at least some flesh and
blood of military teams with hardware and software.
Even if the nature of war is ultimately unaffected by
Previous page: Composite graphic by Arin Burgess, Military Review.
Original graphics courtesy of Harryarts, ddraw, and Freepik via www. AI (an unlikely proposition), the character of war is
freepik.com. Above: Graphic courtesy of Army AL&T Magazine. expected to be wholly affected by its full integration.

38 January-February 2020  MILITARY REVIEW

 DEVELOPING READINESS

Inventor and author Amir Husain suggests that one of was only a piece of leather and rubber. It was a tool for
the most significant changes to the character of war due maintaining the castaway’s sanity. Although ANI may be
to the growing capabilities of AI is the speed of battle at able to act autonomously, autonomy does not equate to
the tactical level.10 What happens when human minds agency. Human warfighters must be careful to distinguish
and decision systems can no longer keep pace with the their trust in an ANI system within the team from their
autonomous machine actions of the enemy? While trust in the human and future AGI members of the team.
decisions to go to war and how to conduct an operation AGI will be different. It will have a form of “person-
may allow time and space for human contemplation hood” that will enable treatment as a trusted member
and analysis, tactical units may find it existentially of military teams. To ascribe to it a form of personhood
necessary to depend upon AI to make and execute is in no way an attempt to posit whether a sentient
lethal decisions on the battlefield. In such a scenario, machine is a form of life or whether it deserves legal
AI would clearly be a member of a cohesive warfighting protections as such. Those ethical questions should
team requiring trust. Therefore, a conversation about receive adequate attention elsewhere. Considering AGI
trust between man and machine is warranted. as a form of personhood is to not only recognize that it
A shift to consider trust with nonhuman actors may have competency like ANI but also character and
does not seem alien when we realize that trust with commitment. It will be able to set and accomplish tasks
nonhuman actors is already present in military opera- apart from those directed by the commander or agreed
tions. Perhaps the best modern example of mutual trust upon by the team. Some tasks will be unrelated to the
between humans and nonhuman actors is the relation- military mission. AGI will have “personal” goals and act
ship of working dogs to their handlers. Very close rela- to pursue them. This may be understood as creativity.
tionships are made between dogs and handlers, closer An important part of AGI’s ability to act creatively
than that of most common pet owners. What makes and with the character prized by the military will be its
the working dog unit unique is the level of trust that ability to act in opposition to its own set goals, especial-
handlers build with their dogs. Working dogs are trust- ly goals related to self-preservation.
ed to not only accomplish the routine tasks for which
they are trained but also to protect their partners in the Understanding the Decision to Trust AI
face of danger, including existential danger. Since trust in, and possible mutual trust with, AI
The trust a human can have in ANI, not having systems as part of a cohesive team is necessary, how can
character or commitment, is only a trust in the com- warfighting team mem-
petence of the system. ANI is expected to demonstrate bers develop individual Chaplain (Maj.) Marlon
competency in a wide variety of responsibilities like ac- readiness to trust? Robert W. Brown, U.S. Army, is
curately identifying threats to critical assets and deter- F. Hurley developed a the brigade chaplain for
mining mitigations. It will also likely accurately target model that enables the the 2nd Armored Brigade
enemy actors on the battlefield. Additionally, it may be understanding of trust Combat Team, 1st Infantry
able to recognize symptoms of depression among team and how it can be built. 11
Division, at Fort Riley,
members and recommend a treatment. His Decision to Trust Kansas. He holds a BS from
Trust in ANI is closer on a spectrum to the kind of Model (DTM) looks at East Central University and
trust warfighters can have in a weapon system or a plan- the issue of trust from both an MDiv from Southwestern
ning tool than to the trust in one another. Tools, whether the trustor and trustee Baptist Theological
made of steel or algorithms, should not be treated as true perspectives. Although the Seminary. He has served as
“members” of a team, even when an emotional attach- model is of greatest use for a chaplain in operational
ment develops. The level of attachment to an ANI system interpersonal relationships aviation, sustainment, field
does not change the nature of the system. It is clear that between and among hu- artillery, and psychological
Tom Hanks’s character in Cast Away felt an attachment mans, it can be applied to operations units in addition
to a volleyball he lovingly named “Wilson.” He may have more impersonal relation- to previous assignments
even felt “trust” in Wilson, confiding in it his intimate ships such as an individual’s as an infantry and military
thoughts. No matter the level of attachment, Wilson trust in an organization or intelligence officer.

MILITARY REVIEW  January-February 2020 39

a system like AI. Ambiguities and inconsistencies inher- educational and experiential opportunities for improved
ent in the broad scope of human trust in AI systems make adjustment among its members. Training results in great-
the application of the model significantly more complex er self-confidence. Uniformity helps to diminish racial
than when applied to the trust relationship between and socioeconomic insecurities, issues that may hamper
individual humans. Nevertheless, an attempt will be made positive adjustment apart from the organization. Quick
here to consider the decision to trust through DTM. acceptance and adoption of new missions, equipment,
Hurley splits ten essential elements of trust into two and team members is valued. All of these things work to-
categories. The first category is made of three trustor ward improved individual psychological adjustment that
factors that relate to an individual’s foundational dis- will be helpful for the integration of AI.
position to trust: risk tolerance, psychological adjust- While the psychological adjustment of members of
ment, and relative power. These are factors that exist the newest generation is as varied as it was for members
for a person without concern for a particular situation of previous generations, it is apparent that near-term
or trustee. His or her disposition to trust based on this prospective soldiers have a greater overall comfort
category would apply to a romantic relationship just as with the integration of technology. This is because
it would to a business relationship. of the technology creep that has become part of the
A person’s risk tolerance strongly influences that indi- fabric of human experience in the twenty-first century.
vidual’s willingness to trust. Generally, when risk is high, Generation Z’s affinity for technology is well docu-
then trust is limited; however, practitioners of mission mented.12 They were born into a world of technology
command are accustomed to providing trust even in and have embraced it throughout their development.
high-risk situations. When commanders trust their sub- Because AI will become more ubiquitous in civil appli-
ordinates to execute disciplined initiative based on mis- cations, future soldiers are more likely to enter the force
sion orders, they do so in part because they understand with the necessary psychological adjustment to trust
how leaders make decisions. Leaders are trained in certain AI. Their experiences and level of trust with military
methodologies, like the military decision-making process applications of AI will be predicated on their experi-
and rapid decision-making, both of which aid in mak- ences with it as civilians. It is conceivable that a gener-
ing decisions and explaining to outsiders how the leader ation from now the issue of human warfighter trust in
arrived at the decision. Common language and common AI will essentially be a societally resolved one.
processes aid warfighters in trusting one another because The final individual factor, relative power, helps deter-
they can imagine the steps that were likely taken to arrive mine an individual’s disposition to trust based on the indi-
at any one decision. This kind of insider knowledge is vidual’s power, or lack thereof, over a trustee. Individuals
needed in the human-machine relationship. who carry significant power based on their position in
Of course, AI presents various risks along a spectrum a group are more likely to offer trust to others as they
of severity depending on its application. Possible risks have the ability to punish transgressors of that trust or to
include benign malfunction, system infiltration by adver- modify, and even end, the relationship with trustees. If
saries, and rogue action with lethal consequences. Any regulations and policies related to AI codify the universal
one high risk or the aggregate of risks may not be a barrier supremacy of human warfighters over AI systems, then
to a soldier who has a high-risk tolerance. On the flip side, a member of the military will be assured relative power
even a minor risk could be enough to prevent a soldier that may enable greater trust in AI. If AI is granted the
with low-risk tolerance from deciding to trust AI. ability to operate or act in any circumstance that over-
The second individual factor, psychological adjust- rides the desires of a human team member, relative power
ment, concerns how well adjusted an individual may be. is situational and trust becomes more difficult.
Well-adjusted individuals tend to have a greater comfort As stated in the introduction, there is general agree-
level with themselves and the world around them. This ment about the subordination of AI to human warfighters
leads to a greater capacity to trust and for such trust to and great caution about substituting AI for humans in deci-
come quickly. Though the military consists of individ- sions that have lethal effects. This is a comforting position
uals along the spectrum of psychological adjustment, to have as the military wades into the future. It is a position
the military as an institution promotes and provides the that offers individual service members an immediate win

40 January-February 2020  MILITARY REVIEW

 DEVELOPING READINESS

for the relative power trust factor. Yet, as AI integration Team Kaist’s winning robot, DRC-Hubo, uses a tool to cut a hole in
increases, there will be unforeseen consequences that a wall 4 June 2015 during the Defense Advanced Research Projects
Agency (DARPA) Robotics Challenge Finals in Pomona, California.
may change the relative power dynamic. For example, if (Photo courtesy of DARPA)
a human override of an AI effort results in fratricide or
collateral damage that would not have occurred if the AI
effort had been permitted, will there be a reexamination
of the power dynamic between humanity and machine? makers influencing implementation. This is because ANI,
Perhaps the successful use of AI in warfighting teams will lacking intention and self-awareness, may be restricted by
earn AI a greater position of relative power that is refused design from behaving outside the parameters established
it in early stages of integration. There could be a time when by the system developers. When considering interests, for
the capability value of AI exceeds the humanitarian con- example, as a situational factor in the decision to trust,
cerns of human warfighters, thereby disrupting the relative such interests may be mostly a reflection of what the
power factor for a decision to trust. system developers have designed.
Hurley’s second category in the DTM consists of sev- Situational security, capability, and predictability are
en situational factors that can be influenced by the trustee all common expectations of any machine augmentation.
to earn the trust of the trustor: situational security, simi- Situational security is closely connected to the disposi-
larities, interests, benevolent concern, capability, predict- tional trust factor of risk tolerance. Because there is risk
ability/integrity, and communication. It may be helpful to to the use of AI in military applications, it is important
have the flexibility to evaluate these factors by identifying for AI to present situational security, the opposite of
the trustee to be AI alone or at times a combination of risk. Some risk exists simply because researchers, and
the AI system, the system developers, and the policy therefore, users do not understand how AI processes

MILITARY REVIEW  January-February 2020 41

information and comes to a conclusion. This fascinating machines that look and behave like humans.14 In the
reality has gained considerable attention. In partner- study, some participants interacted with a robot in a
ships within the science and technology ecosystem, social way, and others interacted with it in a functional
the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency is way. At the end of some interactions the robot begged
investing highly in Explainable AI (XAI). Such “third- not to be turned off. Participants who heard the plea
wave” AI technology “aims to create a suite of machine tended to treat the robot as if it were another person.
learning techniques that produce explainable models The study concluded that people are likely to treat a ma-
while maintaining a high level of prediction accuracy so chine that has autonomous attributes more like a human
human users understand, appropriately trust, and ef- and less like a machine or system that lacks autonomous
fectively manage the emerging generation of artificially attributes. AI systems developed with some anthropo-
intelligent partners.”13 It is an attempt to bridge the gap morphic capability are more likely to promote trust.
between the decisions or recommendations made by an It is possible that similarity and aligned interests can
AI system and the ability of that human user to under- be achieved through ANI’s design for and application
stand why the AI came to such a conclusion. Success in to warfighting tasks, its inherent purpose. If soldiers
the field of XAI will significantly improve the situation- utilize an AI system at the tactical level that was
al security offered by AI to human trustors. created for or modified for tactical applications, then
The factors of capability and predictability go hand the system is demonstrating similarity to the warfight-
in hand in the realm of technology and are quite simple ers operating in tactical environments. A future AGI
to understand in the relationship with AI. It is an issue system could experience a self-awareness that it exists,
of system competence. Can AI do what it is advertised and even desires, to fight and win our nation’s wars.
to do? Does it, in fact, surpass human capability in This would be a clear demonstration of similarity and
areas of information analysis, course of action develop- alignment of interests with human warfighters.
ment, or target identification? Experience with AI will Perhaps training environments can be developed that
likely lead to trustors recognizing that AI can do what produce bonds between AI and human team members.
it is designed to do with predictability demonstrated The Army is accustomed to taking dissimilar people and
through rare failure or deviations from a norm. Society turning them into uniformed personnel. Similarity and
is generally convinced of the superiority of machines alignment of interests are commonly achieved through
over humans in innumerable tasks. Essentially nobody initial entry training. Diverse trainees from numerous
questions or checks by hand the results of a compu- “tribes” bond through training experiences to become
tation made on a calculator because it has been used part of a new “tribe.” Though diversity is still present,
trillions of times to calculate mathematical problems soldiers hold significant similarities with one another and
without fail. Systems testing prior to implementation share interests. Trust is an important by-product of such
can ensure capability and predictability. Once fielded, if formative training and experiences. Humans who train
AI can demonstrate itself to operate in the same ways alongside AI systems may enjoy the same byproduct.
without error according to its defined functions, then it The factor of benevolent concern is the ability of AI to
is influencing the trustor’s ability to trust. put the needs of humans above that of itself. It is absolutely
The remaining factors—similarity, interests, benev- necessary that AI demonstrate the understanding that
olent concern, and communication—are much more human warfighters are more valuable than any nonhu-
difficult to examine in the relationship between a human man parts of a team. Will AI destroy itself if it learns that
warfighter and an AI system. Similarity and interests it has been hacked by an adversary? Will AI sacrifice its
between man and machine are difficult to establish. existence to preserve human teammates? Even humans
This may be where attempts to create AI systems with often opt to care more about themselves than those around
anthropomorphic interface greatly benefit the decision them, and we often accept such selfishness in a dog-eat-dog
to trust. Bonding with AI will likely be easier if it has environment. However, selfless service is a hallmark of mil-
a similar appearance or similarity in the way it com- itary service and should, therefore, be required of AI. Like
municates. A 2018 study of human interactions with a military working dogs, AI should be able to act courageous-
robot demonstrates the ability of humans to bond with ly in defense of other warfighters and the mission.

42 January-February 2020  MILITARY REVIEW

 DEVELOPING READINESS

Future AGI systems, sentient machines, will likely

have the capacity for the kind of courage that humans
display. Courage, physical and moral, is an essential
value for military members and an enabler to accom-
plish violent actions in support of strategic, operation-
al, and tactical objectives. Although cohesive teams
are built on mutual trust developed primarily from
everyday actions, grand gestures like acts of bravery
bolster trust and uniquely endear members to one
another.15 During combat actions, service members
are routinely inspired by the courageous acts of their
comrades to accomplish more on the battlefield than Defense Department Chief Information Officer Dana Deasy (cen-
would otherwise be possible. Bravery can become the ter) and Air Force Lt. Gen. John N. T. Shanahan, the director of the
instrument to break a stalemate, overcome impending Joint Artificial Intelligence Center (not pictured), hold a roundta-
ble meeting on the Department of Defense’s artificial intelligence
defeat, and overwhelm an enemy force with violence
strategy 12 February 2019 at the Pentagon in Arlington, Virginia.
of action. AGI that can behave in such a way will truly (Photo by Sgt. Amber I. Smith, U.S. Army)
earn full trust from human teammates.
Finally, the communication factor impacts most The Summary of the 2018 Department of the Defense
other situational factors. Good and frequent communi- Artificial Intelligence Strategy: Harnessing AI to Advance
cation is necessary for building trust. Communication Our Security and Prosperity, released by the Joint Artificial
with AI will certainly be situational. As previously Intelligence Center, articulates the department’s approach
covered, AI’s decision-making process is difficult to and methodology for accelerating the adoption of AI-
communicate to humans, a problem XAI seeks to enabled capabilities to strengthen our military, increase the
resolve. AI systems will need an intuitive interface that effectiveness and efficiency of our operations, and enhance
promotes communication between it and the users. If the security of the Nation. To view this publication, visit
there is ever a moment when AI is perceived to avoid https://media.defense.gov/2019/Feb/12/2002088963/-1/-
communication or withhold information from human 1/1/SUMMARY-OF-DOD-AI-STRATEGY.PDF.
warfighters, trust will be harmed and possibly irrepara-
bly so. Frequent and transparent communication by AI
systems with soldiers will help to foster trust develop-
ment and trust maintenance.

Recommendations
The recently established Army AI Task Force (A-AI
TF) under Army Futures Command was an important
step related to the military development and imple-
mentation of AI.16 It is unknown what, if any, ethical
issues are being studied in depth as part of A-AI TF
projects. In cooperation with A-AI TF activities, the
Army can accelerate the readiness of human warfight-
ers to trust AI in four ways. First, the force must be “AI is coming.” A-AI TF and other related organizations
better educated on the types of systems in development should pursue ways to communicate their activities to the
and their expected applications at strategic, operational, broad audience of the U.S. Army.
and tactical levels. The inherent secrecy of AI develop- Second, A-AI TF should study the trust factors that
ment in the military context complicates this endeavor, enable the individual decision to trust as they pertain to
but there should be a means of promoting some of the AI systems. It should seek to answer, through psycho-
planned applications of AI. It is not enough to proclaim, logical assessments, whether the current force possesses

MILITARY REVIEW  January-February 2020 43

the necessary disposition to trust AI as tools or members Conclusion
of warfighting teams. Findings should be published and Future military operations will be characterized by
recommendations made as to how to form trust with AI. the pervasive integration of AI with human warfight-
Third, mission command doctrine must include the ers. Some may argue that integration will be gradual,
concept of trust between humans and systems, espe- and that trust in AI will come naturally as an out-
cially autonomous artificially intelligent systems. Just growth of the current and common technology affinity
as doctrine details the human trust necessary to build and bias that society already possesses. Even if such an
cohesive teams, it must detail the necessary trust of AI argument proves true, it will be important to under-
as partners in such teams. stand the mechanics of such trust. It could also be the
Finally, every soldier should begin to evaluate his or case that a large-scale combat operations will require
her own readiness to trust the AI systems that will soon rapid fielding of AI systems that will disturb the hu-
change the way we fight our nation’s wars. AI integration man warfighting-team cohesion. In such a case, even a
will change future warfighting teams, in some ways similar basic awareness of the issue of trust in AI will aid the
to the social and operating impacts made by the integration force to overcome the new challenges quickly. Using
of women to combat arms military occupational special- current doctrinal concepts of trust and an understand-
ties. Soldiers and leaders had to internalize the impacts of ing of factors that lead to an individual decision to
integration and make individual decisions and adjustments trust, the force can achieve a basic readiness to trust,
for new policies on combat arms training and operations. and with the help of continued study by technologists,
For AI integration, soldiers at every level should be provid- ethicists, behavioral scientists, and other interested
ed time, space, and adequate information to ask themselves professionals who serve the military community, the
if they are ready and able to trust a system to accomplish Army can achieve a high level of readiness to trust AI
important tasks in their warfighting team. in cohesive warfighting teams.

Notes
1. The White House, National Security Strategy of the United States 9. ADRP 1, The Army Profession (Washington, DC: U.S. GPO, June
of America (Washington, DC: The White House, December 2017), 2015 [obsolete]), para. 3-3.
accessed 5 August 2019, https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/up- 10. Husain, The Sentient Machine, 89.
loads/2017/12/NSS-Final-12-18-2017-0905-2.pdf. 11. Robert F. Hurley, The Decision to Trust: How Leaders Create
2. Department of Defense, Summary of the 2018 National Defense High-Trust Organizations (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 2012), ProQuest
Strategy of the United States of America (Washington, DC: U.S. Gov- Ebook Central.
ernment Publishing Office [GPO], 2018), accessed 5 August 2019, 12. “How Generation Z Is Shaping Digital Technology,” BBC Future,
https://dod.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2018-National-De- accessed 5 August 2019, http://www.bbc.com/future/sponsored/
fense-Strategy-Summary.pdf. story/20160309-youth-connection.
3. Department of Defense, Summary of the 2018 Department of De- 13. A Review and Assessment of the Fiscal Year 2019 Budget Request
fense Artificial Intelligence Strategy: Harnessing AI to Advance Our Security for Department of Defense Science and Technology Programs Before
and Prosperity (Washington, DC: U.S. GPO, 2018), accessed 5 August the Subcommittee on Emerging Threats and Capabilities Armed Services
2019, https://media.defense.gov/2019/Feb/12/2002088963/-1/-1/1/ Committee, U.S. House of Representatives, 115th Cong. (14 March 2018)
SUMMARY-OF-DOD-AI-STRATEGY.PDF. (statement of Steven Walker, Director, Defense Advanced Research
4. Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency, Department of Projects Agency), 5–6, accessed on 5 August 2019, https://docs.house.
Defense Fiscal Year (FY) 2020 Budget Estimates (Washington, DC: Depart- gov/meetings/AS/AS26/20180314/107978/HHRG-115-AS26-Wstate-
ment of Defense, March 2019), accessed 5 August 2019, https://www. WalkerS-20180314.pdf.
darpa.mil/attachments/DARPA_FY20_Presidents_Budget_Request.pdf. 14. Aike C. Horstmann et al., “Do a Robot’s Social Skills and Its Objec-
5. Amir Husain, The Sentient Machine: The Coming Age of Artificial tion Discourage Interactants from Switching the Robot Off?,” PLOS ONE
Intelligence (New York: Scribner, 2017), 107. 13, no. 7 (18 July 2018), accessed 5 August 2019, https://doi.org/10.1371/
6. Andrew Ilachinski, Artificial Intelligence & Autonomy Opportunities journal.pone.0201581.
and Challenges (Arlington, VA: Center for Naval Analyses, October 15. ADRP 6-0, Mission Command, para. 2-5.
2017), 16–17, accessed 5 August 2019, https://www.cna.org/CNA_files/ 16. Mark T. Esper, Memorandum for Principal Officials of Headquar-
PDF/DIS-2017-U-016388-Final.pdf. ters, Department of the Army, “Army Directive 2018-18 (Army Artificial
7. Husain, The Sentient Machine, 9–48. Intelligence Task Force in Support of the Department of Defense Joint
8. Army Doctrine Reference Publication (ADRP) 6-0, Mission Com- Artificial Intelligence Center),” 2 October 2018, accessed 5 August 2019,
mand (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, May 2012 https://armypubs.army.mil/epubs/DR_pubs/DR_a/pdf/web/ARN13011_
[obsolete]), para. 2-5. AD2018_18_Final.pdf.

44 January-February 2020  MILITARY REVIEW

Not an Intellectual Exercise
Lessons from U.S.-Israeli Institutional
Army Cooperation, 1973–1982
Maj. Ethan Orwin, U.S. Army

W hen the Yom Kippur War broke out in

October 1973, the U.S. Army Training and
Doctrine Command (TRADOC) had ex-
isted for a mere three months. The TRADOC command-
er, Gen. William DePuy, sent his armor commandant,
While there is some debate among historians about
whether the Yom Kippur War changed or merely
confirmed the doctrinal views of these Army leaders,
there is no doubt that the conflict’s lessons contributed
to the development of the Active Defense doctrine in
Maj. Gen. Donn Starry, and the XM1 tank program 1976, which evolved into the AirLand Battle doctrine,
director, Brig. Gen. Bob Baer, to visit Israel and report published in 1982. Beyond the doctrinal impact, the
on the war’s implications. This marked the beginning of a IDF’s initial setbacks and ultimate victories in the
long and in-depth series of U.S. Army visits intended to
extract lessons from the war and the start of personal re-
lationships between Starry and some of his Israel Defense
An Israeli tank unit forms for a counterattack 8 October 1973 against
Forces (IDF) colleagues, which would have a great impact Syrian armor on the Golan Heights. (Photo by David Rubinger, Israel
on the U.S. Army in the coming years. Government Press Office)
Golan Heights and the Sinai Peninsula captured the devotes considerable resources to this effort, and Army
interest of a generation of U.S. Army officers emerging senior leaders have made it clear that collaboration
from Vietnam with a renewed focus on conventional with allies and partners is a priority.3 The headquarters
warfare and the Soviet threat in Europe. Furthermore, of geographic combatant commands and Army service
the lessons of the Yom Kippur War are clearly visible in component commands maintain robust staffs of mili-
the “Big Five” weapons systems that emerged during a tary and civilian professionals who focus on exercises,
golden age of effective U.S. Army modernization. combined training, and military-to-military engage-

As field units and headquarters assimilate increasingly

advanced technology, “interoperability”—the ability
of allied armies to connect their systems and fight to-
gether—has become a key goal in the Army’s interna-
tional engagement.

All of this is well known; Army leaders today often ment. The Army headquarters holds staff talks with
stress the foundational importance of TRADOC’s rela- partner armies around the world, resulting in “agreed-
tions with the IDF (and rightly so) at bilateral events, and to-actions” that meet both sides’ priorities.
both professional historians and Command and General In addition, the Army maintains a regionally
Staff College students have written much about DePuy specialized foreign area officer corps, which officers
and Starry and the development of AirLand Battle.1 But enter as senior captains or junior majors and serve
less has been said about what this period of relations in for the remainder of their careers. These officers
between the U.S. Army and the IDF represents as an ex- receive language education, regional experience, and
ample of military diplomacy. This article seeks to explore relevant postgraduate education before embarking on
that topic and to examine its implications for present-day assignments, both in region and on staffs, that focus on
cooperation between the two armies. cooperation with military partners. As field units and
The flurry of institutional and high-level personal headquarters assimilate increasingly advanced technol-
contact between the two armies after the end of the ogy, “interoperability”—the ability of allied armies to
Yom Kippur War was something unique, falling outside connect their systems and fight together—has become
the usual categories of U.S. Army relations with allies a key goal in the Army’s international engagement.
and partners. Furthermore, the conditions of the mid- All of these aspects of military cooperation serve
1970s have much in common with those of 2019, not the U.S. Army-IDF relationship well. Army forces in
only in the challenges that both armies face but also in Europe conduct a number of joint events or exer-
their comparative strategic and institutional require- cises with the IDF, particularly in the realm of air
ments. Present conditions call for a form of sustained, and missile defense, and annual IDF participation
balanced collaboration focused on modernization, in multilateral exercises has been expanding from
individual and collective training methods, and rapid company to battalion size in the past two years. Senior
exchange of battlefield lessons learned (as epitomized by leaders from both armies interact frequently, and
the Starry Report and its aftermath).2 working-level delegations conduct routine reciprocal
visits to share tactics, techniques, and procedures in
Context: U.S. Army International numerous fields. In addition to planned Army staff
Engagement and the IDF talks, which will open up opportunities with addition-
Before delving into U.S. military relations with al Army commands, the Future Battlefield Annual
Israel, a general look at how the U.S. Army conducts Talks provide a framework for annual cooperation
international engagement is in order. The Army between the IDF ground forces and TRADOC. Army

46 January-February 2020  MILITARY REVIEW

 U.S.-IDF COOPERATION

special operations and National Guard cooperation Gen. Israel Tal, founder of the Merkava tank pro-
with Israeli partners is equally comprehensive. gram. Starry spent several days with Tal with a focus
Yet, even in comparison with today’s robust engage- on the nascent Merkava, which was a Frankenstein’s
ment, the scope and depth of U.S.-Israeli institutional monster-like prototype thrown together from parts
army cooperation from 1973 to 1982 stands apart. This of various tanks at the time, as it fired test rounds
is due in part to the historical conditions in which both into the Mediterranean Sea from Palmachim. Starry
armies found themselves. Both, whether they knew it then spent several more days with Peled and the IDF
or not, were at the end of an era and the dawn of a new Armor Corps before using the rest of the visit to walk
one. The U.S. Army was emerging from a decade of the battlefields of the Golan Heights and the Sinai
counterinsurgency in Vietnam and thirty-three years of Peninsula with the battalion- to division-level com-
compulsory service. As its senior officers tried to build a manders who had fought there.6
new all-volunteer force in an environment of low public It is worth emphasizing that the level of access
esteem for the military, they also had to reorient them- was extraordinary, even in light of Israeli gratitude
selves to conventional warfare and the potential battle- for critical American assistance during the war. The
fields of Central Europe. For this fight, they had only IDF was presumably very busy consolidating its gains,
their experience as junior officers in World War II to rebuilding damaged units and equipment stocks, and
guide them, while field grade officers and below had little reckoning with internal and national soul-searching
relevant experience at all. Their Warsaw Pact adversar- about the war’s lessons. Yet, with no immediate tangi-
ies, in the meantime, presented a formidable threat in ble benefit for them or their country, IDF command-
mid-intensity conflict.4 As aforementioned, TRADOC ers at every level found the time to present two rela-
was established in the summer of 1973 to meet these tively junior American generals with a cross-section
challenges, and DePuy was its first commander. of capability development, lessons learned, training
The IDF, for its part, was coming to the end of its ex- methods, and battlefield analysis.
istential, mid-intensity wars with Arab armies, though The many visits that followed, not only those of
that was not yet clear at the time. While the initial Starry and Baer, were also characterized by surprising
failures of the Yom Kippur War were obviously a shock depth and breadth of engagement. For example, when
to the IDF and Israeli society, the IDF’s position as the the U.S. Army Infantry School commandant and his
most experienced of all Western-style armies in conven- deputy visited in December 1976 and February 1977,
tional warfare was beyond dispute. respectively, both met with IDF Chief of Staff Lt. Gen.
Mordechai “Motta” Gur.7 Gur’s willingness to meet
Unprecedented Access: Starry’s with one- and two-star
First Visits and Initial Lessons generals and to discuss Maj. Ethan Orwin,
The impetus for Starry and Baer’s initial visit to antitank weapon systems, U.S. Army, is the U.S. Army
Israel came from Chief of Staff of the Army Gen. mechanized infantry Training and Doctrine
Creighton Abrams, who thought the Yom Kippur War’s training methods, and Command liaison officer to
lessons urgent enough that he redirected the two sub- the appropriate number the Israel Defense Forces.
ordinate generals in the middle of a visit to the United of soldiers in an infan- He holds a BS from the
Kingdom. As Starry recalled in an interview, Abrams try squad demonstrated United States Military
not only requested the general lessons of the war but the priority that the two Academy, an MLitt from the
also specifically tied the visit to the war’s potential armies placed on both in- University of St. Andrews,
impact on tank procurement decisions at senior levels stitutional army concerns and an MA from King’s
in Washington, D.C.—not the last time that Israeli op- and bilateral cooperation. College London. His assign-
erational lessons would be employed to support endan- The IDF offered not ments include deployments
gered Army capability development efforts.5 only the highest levels of in Afghanistan and Iraq and
The visit provided Starry his first encounters with engagement but also sur- tours in Oman and Israel as
Gen. Moshe “Musa” Peled, hero of the Golan Heights prisingly low ones, such a Middle East/North Africa
front and commander of the IDF Armor Corps, and as inviting the U.S. Army foreign area officer.

MILITARY REVIEW  January-February 2020 47

Infantry School deputy commandant to observe an U.S.-Israeli Institutional Army
armor company’s live-fire exercise in its entirety.8 Cooperation after 1973:
Visits to brigade-level exercises featured engagement Impact on the U.S. Army
at every level during tactical operations, allowing U.S. Historians have debated whether the lessons of the
Army visitors to write exhaustive reports on IDF war really transformed Starry and DePuy’s understand-
tactics, techniques, and procedures. The level of detail ing of modern warfare or simply served as ammunition
recorded says much about the U.S. Army’s appetite to support conclusions they had already reached.11 Starry
for reforming its own training methods, equipment, himself wrote that he felt the war’s lessons confirmed the
and doctrine, and its enthusiasm for those of an allied path he was already on in developing the Army’s new
army that had recently fought a mid-intensity war. doctrine.12 But for those examining the post-Yom Kippur
Starry, in his TRADOC analysis of the Yom War relationship from a security cooperation standpoint,
Kippur War, was somewhat dismissive of the reports this is beside the point. One measures the significance
on IDF tactics, techniques, and procedures and wrote, of cooperation between friendly institutional armies by
“The height and breadth of information … could be the degree of actual impact on how each army trains and
measured in kilometers, the depth of analysis in mil- fights, not by the extent of the shift in generals’ opinions.
limeters.”9 He believed that the main doctrinal lessons What exactly was unique about all of this exchange
were already clear in his report to Abrams after his and its influence on U.S. Army doctrine? The Army,
first trip, but that many further trips and conversa- after all, has been in continuous doctrinal dialogue with
tions with friends like Peled and Tal were necessary to its NATO allies throughout the history of that alliance,
elaborate on them and answer questions they raised.10 and unlike its relations with the IDF, the U.S. Army
This included the density and lethality of the modern actually writes and abides by combined doctrine with the
ground and air battlefields, the necessity of combined German and British armies, which Starry also personally
arms warfare, and the need for commanders to ob- visited during his time.13 But, unlike the IDF, NATO al-
serve and disrupt the enemy’s rear and deep echelons. lies lacked conventional combat experience, and they had
 U.S.-IDF COOPERATION

few lessons learned from conflicts relevant to the Soviet Starry was not alone in this view. Brig. Gen. Paul F.
threat in Europe to impart to one another. It was the very Gorman, who served as TRADOC deputy chief of staff
difference between the U.S. Army and the IDF that made for training and later as commandant of the U.S. Army
their collaboration from 1973 to 1982 so useful. In today’s Infantry School, took part in intense engagement with
era of focus on interoperability, the IDF’s status as a close the IDF in the mid-1970s and determined that training
ally standing somewhat apart from the U.S. Army’s likely was the variable that had won the war. He studied the
operational scenarios is again apparent. detailed data that the Israelis had on tank battles and
For the U.S. Army, the impact of the Yom Kippur examined Israeli tank commander and gunnery train-
War was particularly crucial for capstone doctrine. Starry ing. However, the level of detail went beyond mere ex-
described this succinctly in a 1976 letter: “It may interest changes of expertise and included TRADOC obtaining
you to know that most of the recent TRADOC literature translations of Israeli training manuals, gunnery qual-
was stimulated by my visit to Israel shortly after the war ification tables, and armor exercise plans from crew to
and subsequent work with the Israeli leaders.”14 By the battalion level.18 (This is more akin to what partner na-
time DePuy presented his report, “Implications of the tions receive today from the U.S. Army during foreign
Middle East War on U.S. Army Tactics, Doctrine, and military sales—except that these exchanges were free
Systems,” TRADOC had divided the actionable lessons between trusting partners.)
into 162 recommendations, twenty of which were classi- With this information, Gorman concluded that IDF
fied as “completed.”15 The detail of this effort matched its armor training had not only been the decisive factor in
scale, with DePuy emphasizing topics as diverse as non- those battles but also invalidated then fashionable theo-
flammable hydraulic fluid, ammunition storage below the ries about the overriding importance of numbers on the
turret, and battlefield cannibalization. It is unlikely that battlefield.19 This approach clearly linked operational suc-
the modern U.S. Army has ever attempted to implement cess on the battlefield with institutional Army reforms,
foreign lessons learned on a similar scale. which were the ultimate objective of the Army generals’
DePuy concluded his summary by reminding Army engagement with their IDF partners. DePuy wrote that
leaders that this effort was not a mere “intellectual ex- when equally advanced weapons systems clashed on the
ercise.”16 He stressed that all of the Army’s concepts and battlefield, “courage, imagination, and the training of the
doctrine, capability development, and training efforts commanders made the difference.”20
must link to the war’s lessons. Again, for an Army not
always known for studying its own campaigns (let alone Influence on U.S. Army
those of others), this requirement to “crosswalk” force Materiel Modernization
buildup efforts with lessons from a foreign war seems DePuy and Starry’s efforts in the early days of
unique in the history of U.S. Army foreign relations. TRADOC encompassed materiel modernization in
The resulting capstone doctrine was Active addition to training and doctrine, and here as well,
Defense, followed by AirLand Battle, which became engagement with Israel had a unique influence. Both
well known. But Starry and DePuy did not intend generals believed that concerns about the tank’s obsoles-
for the war’s lessons to solely or even primarily in- cence were overwrought and that the tank simply needed
fluence doctrine.17 Israeli techniques for individual adequate combined arms support to enable its continued
and collective training, which U.S. generals viewed as preeminence in ground combat. DePuy’s “Implications
having been decisive in the IDF’s victory while fighting of the Middle East War on U.S. Army Tactics, Doctrine,
outnumbered, were equally important. and Systems,” a report on the ramifications of the Yom

Previous page: A destroyed Israeli (U.S.-made) M60 tank sits amongst the debris of other armor after an Israeli counterattack in the Sinai
near the Suez Canal during the 1973 Yom Kippur War. In the initial crossing of the Suez by Egyptian forces, Israeli leaders assumed Egyptian
soldiers would flee at the first sight of Israeli armor as they had in the 1967 war. However, Egyptian forces had studied Israeli tactics from the
1967 war and were well prepared to defend against the anticipated initial use of Israeli armor. This resulted in near catastrophe for Israeli
forces in the early stages of the conflict, although Israel was eventually able to regain the initiative. (Photo courtesy of Military Battles on the
Egyptian Front by Gammal Hammad via Wikimedia Commons)

MILITARY REVIEW  January-February 2020 49

Kippur War, included a chart
depicting the tank’s continued
centrality, with air defense,
mechanized infantry, close
air support, and field artillery
in support (see figure).21 This
represented four of what
would become the “Big Five”:
the Abrams main battle tank,
the Bradley Fighting Vehicle,
the Apache attack helicopter,
and the Patriot air defense sys-
tem. The unmentioned fifth
capability, the Black Hawk
helicopter, reflected Starry’s
views about rapid transport
of troops around and between
close and deep areas.22
Beyond the Big Five,
Starry explicitly linked the
(Figure from William E. DePuy, “Implications of the Middle East War on U.S. Army Tactics, Doctrine, and Systems”)
lessons of the war to the
requirements that spurred
the development of the
Figure. Tank’s Continued Centrality Representing
Joint Surveillance and Four of the “Big Five”
Target Attack Radar System
and the Army Tactical Missile System as well.23 The In any case, Israeli failures were not entirely ignored.
Army’s simultaneous development of the Multiple DePuy’s “Implications of the Middle East War on U.S.
Launch Rocket System transformed its capabilities in Army Tactics, Doctrine, and Systems” described in detail
the fifth field listed on DePuy’s chart: field artillery. the disastrous early counterattack in the northern Sinai
This employment of a foreign ally’s military lessons, Peninsula and used it to concede that unsupported armor
as opposed to intelligence regarding foreign adversary was no longer viable on the modern battlefield.25 It is
capabilities, to win Pentagon procurement battles has no surprise that Starry and DePuy, like others, used the
few parallels in the Army’s history. lessons of the war to push their own agenda for procure-
Historians have criticized Starry and other officers ment and doctrine (as that is what military and bureau-
for a selective and overly rosy portrayal of the IDF’s cratic leaders do). U.S. military leaders today are similarly
performance in the war. For one thing, Starry focused selective in their approach to IDF doctrine and lessons.
heavily on the theater of war in the Golan Heights while Counterinsurgency in the West Bank, for example, is
paying less attention to the decisive front in the Sinai simply of less interest to the U.S. Army’s current and fu-
Peninsula. More broadly, the American generals’ reports ture concepts than what a “Gideon” brigade combat team
on the war’s lessons paid scant attention to the IDF’s might do in a campaign against Hezbollah and other
many errors, including suffering surprise at its outset. 24
Iranian proxies on the Lebanese and Syrian fronts.
But this was a strategic failure, and TRADOC’s inter-
est in the war was not about strategy but rather tactics, The (Genuine) Importance
campaigning, and modernization. What may look like a of Relationships
selective or dishonest analysis to a trained historian was, An important characteristic of Starry’s long collabo-
from Starry’s perspective, a focus on what was important ration with the IDF was his development of personal re-
to the U.S. Army of the 1970s. lationships. These are difficult to achieve between leaders

50 January-February 2020  MILITARY REVIEW

 U.S.-IDF COOPERATION

who change positions every two years. However, Starry Absent from Starry’s commentary on the visit was
managed to retain intense collaboration with Israel as a any acknowledgment that the nature of Israel’s wars was
common thread throughout his years at the U.S. Army changing. It seems that he expected the First Lebanon
Armor School, V Corps, and as the head of TRADOC. War’s lessons to stem from the initial mid-intensity com-
Gens. Israel Tal and Moshe “Musa” Peled in particular bat with Palestinian and Syrian forces and to center on
became personal friends. Starry even shared internal frus- tank design, the role of close air support, and so on—much
trations with his Israeli counterparts, once writing to Col. like the Yom Kippur War. In reality, the IDF was facing
Bruce Williams, the U.S. Army attaché in Israel, to con- a shift toward asymmetric warfare that would continue
vey his disappointment to Peled about the U.S. decision to to this day.31 The U.S. Army would not face a similar shift
cut funding for a new infantry fighting vehicle.26 Thanks until 2003, when twenty years of IDF lessons from Beirut,
to these personal ties, the visits flowed in both directions. Nablus, and Jenin would suddenly become significant.
In one instance, in 1977, Peled happened to be touring
the border line in Germany with Starry when a Soviet Lessons for U.S.-Israeli Institutional
division-sized movement eluded U.S./NATO observa- Army Cooperation Today
tion. This prompted Peled to lead a visit for U.S. Army V What does post-1973 U.S.-Israeli institutional army
Corps staff to the Golan Heights battlefields focused on cooperation teach us today? There are a number of
division/corps commander situational awareness.27 These differences in the circumstances. Most importantly, the
friendships not only had strategic impacts for Starry and two armies are no longer preparing for the same type
the U.S. Army but also for Israel in the political realm, of enemy. As described in the “Land on the Horizon”
as in the case of Starry’s intervention with Secretary of concept for 2028, the IDF’s reference threat is a hy-
State Alexander Haig regarding Israel’s worries about brid, nonstate adversary, although a capable one with a
the warming U.S.-Egypt relationship.28 Conversely, number of high-level capabilities. TRADOC Pamphlet
relationships greased the wheels of tactical-level coop- 525-3-1, The U.S. Army in Multi-Domain Operations 2028,
eration when political considerations interfered. When names near-peer state militaries as its reference threat.32
American political sensitivities prevented U.S. Army In addition, there is no similar experience gap between
visits to the Lebanon front in 1982, Starry’s friends in the the two armies. Both have nearly twenty years of combat
IDF ensured that he received IDF primary sources on the experience behind them in similar forms of warfare,
war, which were even translated for him.29 While vague although the IDF’s campaigns (with the exception of the
praise for the importance of relationships is ubiquitous Second Intifada) have been short and intense rather than
in international cooperation, the Starry era of IDF-U.S. drawn-out counterinsurgencies. This differs from 1973,
Army cooperation laid bare its practical significance. when the IDF possessed unique experience in the type
The beginning of the First Lebanon War marked an of war that the U.S. Army was preparing for. Finally, the
interesting end to this era of intensive cooperation related U.S. Army is not undergoing changes as fundamental as
to mid-intensity conflict. When the war broke out, Starry those of the 1970s. There is no change to its accessions
was again the first U.S. military leader to rush to Israel, model, and levels of morale and professionalism bear no
where his many longtime Israeli friends received him resemblance to those of the post-Vietnam Army.
with the customary openness. However, U.S. political That said, there is much in common between the
considerations prevented him from visiting the battle- two eras that is relevant to cooperation. The U.S. Army
fields themselves, so IDF Chief of Staff Lt. Gen. Rafael is again shifting its focus from asymmetric warfare to
“Raful” Eitan brought IDF ground forces, air force, and near-peer threats, and again senses that it has allowed
intelligence senior leaders from the front to brief Starry peer adversaries to narrow capability gaps over the past
on the key developments. In a letter to Chief of Staff of ten to fifteen years. As in the mid-1970s, both armies
the Army Gen. E. C. Meyer, Starry complained that the believe they are on the brink of an increase in battle-
Army was “fumbling” to mount an effective mission to field lethality, at least in the case of a major campaign
gather lessons learned, just as it had in 1973–1974.30 He against their respective reference threats. The IDF is
recommended establishing a standing mechanism for again the first Western-style army with operational
lessons-learned missions to Israel. lessons learned from a number of technologies essential

MILITARY REVIEW  January-February 2020 51

to both armies’ concepts, such as active protection and Protection System and Iron Dome missile defense sys-
integrated air defense systems. tem is likely a sign of more to come.
One thing that has changed is the speed and sophis- The post-Yom Kippur War cooperation—which
tication of the Israeli capability development process. occurred at a time when Israeli technology was far less
Israel’s development of the Iron Dome missile defense advanced and was mainly noteworthy for its ingenious
system or the Namer Infantry Fighting Vehicle in five field expedient improvisations—teaches us the impor-
years or fewer after the operational need became ap- tance of exchanging lessons learned, and this must not
parent would be unthinkable in the U.S. Army, which is be forgotten through overemphasis on materiel. Starry
why it has reorganized its modernization enterprise un- and his contemporaries learned much during their
der the new Army Futures Command.33 While Israel’s exchanges about battlefield lethality and the technical
small size and limited diversity of adversaries contribute capabilities of Sagger antitank missiles and surface-to-
to this phenomenon, the Army would do well to apply air missiles, but they were equally interested in how
Starry-style rigor to how the IDF modernizes and not the IDF Ground Forces Corps adjusted their doctrine,
just to the resulting capabilities themselves. training, and tactics to confront those weapon systems.
There are additional striking parallels between the re- The IDF armor school and air defense school can play
quired capabilities that Starry and his colleagues gleaned equally critical roles for the U.S. Army in the integra-
from their Israeli counterparts in the 1970s and those tion of the Trophy Active Protection System and Iron
that both sides are discussing today. DePuy’s account Dome missile defense system today.
of the overall challenge of combined arms lethality that Another lesson of the Starry era in regard to
the Yom Kippur War battlefield presented—including IDF-U.S. Army cooperation is the importance of an
increasingly effective air-ground and ground-air fires— “on-demand” lessons-learned mechanism. As deep
have a strong echo in the multi-domain “layers of stand- and fruitful as the cooperation was, Starry always felt
off” that the U.S. Army sees as its chief challenge today.34 that inertia and standard defense cooperation policies
There were also specific mid-intensity sustainment hindered rapid progress in integrating lessons learned.
capabilities that the U.S. Army had lost during its focus His complaints to Meyer during the First Lebanon War
on Vietnam, such as battlefield cannibalization in an indicate that he considered even ten years of his own
environment of high lethality for combat vehicles.35 The efforts to improve this problem ineffective.37
parallel today is reconstitution and force regeneration, The two armies have continued to pass lessons
which the U.S. Army is reexamining for a multi-domain learned in both directions in the decades since.
environment, and would likely be of interest to Israeli Recent examples include the IDF ground forces del-
logistics officers in planning for another war in the north. egation that visited TRADOC centers of excellence
In other cases, U.S. Army visitors to Israel in the 1970s in 2014 after Operation Protective Edge and U.S.
actually witnessed the birth pangs of technologies, such briefings on the lessons of the Battles for Mosul and
as remotely controlled and autonomous systems, that Raqqa at the Future Battlefield Annual Talks. Lessons
are still central to the capability development discussions learned from exercises, particularly those that test
between the two allies today.36 In reexamining this era of new concepts and capabilities, are another welcome
close cooperation, we see that what each side demanded topic during bilateral engagements. But Starry (as
of the other was not so different from today. well as Peled and Tal) understood that while post-
conflict briefings are valuable, walking the battlefields
Conclusion: Armies that and engaging with combat leaders immediately after,
Learn Together or even during, the battles are more so. One option
Few on either side of the relationship doubt that is a formal, agreed-upon rapid exchange of lessons
Israeli technology will be at the center of coopera- learned. As much as neither side would like to see it,
tion between the two militaries in the near future. another Israeli campaign in the North would inevita-
Visits from U.S. Army senior leaders always include bly generate crucial lessons related to multi-domain
demonstrations of emerging technologies of interest, operations and current U.S. Army gaps. Any escala-
and the Army’s acquisition of the IDF’s Trophy Active tion beyond the usual competition against U.S. forces

52 January-February 2020  MILITARY REVIEW

 U.S.-IDF COOPERATION

by adversaries in Europe, the Middle East, or the Israeli Lt. Col. Nir Yogev, movement control battalion commander
Pacific would hold similar interest for the IDF. (right), greets U.S. service members 7 February 2019 during exercise
Juniper Falcon 19 at Hatzor Air Force Base in Israel. Juniper Falcon 19
As for personal relationships, few officers possess the is a bilateral exercise between U.S. European Command and the Israel
charisma of Starry or Peled. However, Starry’s ability to Defense Forces that is designed to improve military relationships and
maintain those links across various positions is a good increase interoperability between both nations’ militaries. (Photo by
Mass Communication Specialist 2nd Class Cody Hendrix, U.S. Navy)
model for others to follow. Longer duration and more
thoughtful collaboration must overcome the reset caused
by job rotations every one to two years. This is already
visible in fields where the two armies cooperate on an long-duration relations between institutional armies can
extended basis (e.g., air defense). Thanks to combined provide—the chance to watch another army fight, learn
exercises, many U.S. Army air defense officers acquire lessons, change, fight again, and learn again.
copious experience and contacts in Israel throughout Those interested in determining what is most import-
their careers. When they visit as senior leaders, they often ant in the U.S. Army-IDF relationship should look first
have years of close association with their Israeli Air Force at what is most unique. The United States is blessed with
counterparts and can address larger issues in a way that is many close allies, including some who it expects to fight
immediately apparent. An increase in course attendance alongside it in any significant campaign, hence the focus on
in both directions, which has been limited in recent years, interoperability. It has partners who purchase American
would produce more of these relationships, as would the weapons systems, seek U.S. assistance in training officers
introduction of more opportunities for combined exercis- and soldiers, and are eager to participate in combined ex-
es, which is already underway. Starry’s decade-long rela- ercises with the United States to promote regional security.
tionship with the IDF, which brought him from the Yom The existing constructs for cooperation work well for such
Kippur War to the First Lebanon War, exemplified what relationships. The unique, defining characteristic of the

MILITARY REVIEW  January-February 2020 53

U.S. Army-IDF partnership is two armies that learn to- two armies innately trust one another to innovate while
gether. They are unlikely to fight the same wars, and com- fighting, acknowledge mistakes, and put the whole weight
plicated regional dynamics make it a challenge to conduct of their genius and professionalism toward improvement
large combined ground exercises relevant to both sides. before the next conflict strikes. The resulting exchange of
But both armies have been uniquely open to the other’s knowledge is something neither army can expect in quite
need to absorb lessons in preparation for the future. The the same way from any other.

Notes
1. See Aaron J. Kaufman, “Continuity and Evolution: General Donn A. Starry 16. Ibid., 65.
and Doctrinal Change in the U.S. Army, 1974-1982” (monograph, Fort Leaven- 17. For a detailed account of the development of both doctrines, see
worth, KS: School of Advanced Military Studies, 2012). Aaron J. Kaufman, “Continuity and Evolution: General Donn A. Starry and Doc-
2. For Starry’s central conclusions from his visit to Israel, see Donn Starry, trinal Change in the U.S. Army, 1974-1982” (monograph, School of Advanced
“TRADOC’s Analysis of the Yom Kippur War, Jaffee Center Military Doctrine Military Studies, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 2012).
Joint Conference, Caesarea, Israel, 16 March 1999,” in Press On! Selected Works 18. Brig. Gen. Paul F. Gorman also recommended that the Army should
of General Donn A. Starry, ed. Lewis Sorley, vol. I (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat train a cadre of “master gunners,” senior noncommissioned officers as experts
Studies Institute, 2009). on tank gunnery who would go out to every armor battalion and establish the
3. Sydney J. Freedberg Jr., “Trump’s Pick for Joint Chiefs Praises Allies, highest standards. The program has since expanded to mechanized infantry
Kurds & Mattis Strategy,” Breaking Defense, 16 January 2019, accessed 19 gunnery for Bradleys and Strykers, and, in recent years, master gunners have
August 2019, https://breakingdefense.com/2019/01/trumps-pick-for-joint- traveled to Israel to test various advanced Israel Defense Forces (IDF) capabili-
chiefs-praises-allies-kurds-mattis-strategy/. ties from a U.S. Army perspective.
4. The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), Albania, East Ger- 19. Paul F. Gorman, “How to Win Outnumbered,” sent as an enclosure to a
many, Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary, Poland, and Czechoslovakia. At the time, letter to Donn A. Starry, 8 January 1974, box 2, folder 7, Donn A. Starry Collec-
Ukraine was part of the USSR. See Donn Starry, “Sergeants’ Business: U.S. Army tion, U.S. Army Heritage and Education Center.
Sergeants Major Academy, Fort Bliss, Texas, 3 November 1977,” in Sorley, Press 20. DePuy, “Implications of the Middle East War on U.S. Army Tactics,
On!, 1:489. Doctrine, and Systems,” 50.
5. Donn Starry, “Desert Storm Lessons Learned: US Army Military History 21. Ibid., Chart 15.
Institute Oral History Interview, Conducted by Lieutenant Colonel Douglas 22. Starry, “TRADOC’s Analysis of the Yom Kippur War,” in Sorley, Press
V. Johnson, Colonel Thomas Sweeney, and Colonel Douglas W. Craft, 18 Sep- On!, 1:223.
tember 1991,” in Press On! Selected Works of General Donn A. Starry, ed. Lewis 23. Starry, “Reflections,” in Sorley, Press On!, 1:28.
Sorley, vol. II (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Combat Studies Institute, 2009), 1225. 24. Bronfeld, “Fighting Outnumbered,” 481–82.
6. Ibid. 25. DePuy, “Implications of the Middle East War on U.S. Army Tactics,
7. Willard Latham, memorandum, “Trip Report by the Commandant, U.S. Doctrine, and Systems,” 20–21.
Army Infantry School, 6-13 December 1976” (Washington, DC: Department of 26. Starry, “Infantry Fighting Vehicles: Message to Colonel Bruce Williams,
the Army, 15 February 1977), retrieved from U.S. Army Training and Doctrine United States Defense Attaché Office, Tel Aviv, Israel, 19 January 1978,” in
Command (TRADOC) Historian Archives; Fred Mahaffey, memorandum, “Israel Sorley, Press On!, 1:242.
Visit by Assistant Commandant, USAIS, 5 to 11 February 1977” (Washington, 27. Starry, “Air Force: AirLand Battle: United States Air Force Oral History
DC: Department of the Army, 31 March 1977), retrieved from TRADOC Program Interview Conducted by Dr. Harold R. Winton, 13 May 1995,” Sorley,
Historian Archives. Press On!, 2:1285.
8. Mahaffey, “Israel Visit,” Appendix on Visit to Sinai, 2. 28. Starry, “Relations with Israel: Letter to Secretary of State Alexander M.
9. Donn Starry, “TRADOC’s Analysis of the Yom Kippur War, Jaffee Center Haig, Jr., 28 September 1981,” in Sorley, Press On!, 2:933.
Military Doctrine Joint Conference, Caesarea, Israel, 16 March 1999,” in Sorley, 29. Starry, “Desert Storm Lessons Learned,” 2:1224.
Press On!, 1:223. 30. Starry, “Situations in Germany and Israel: Message to General E. C.
10. Ibid. Meyer, Army Chief of Staff, 30 November 1982,” in Sorley, Press On!, 2:945.
11. Saul Bronfeld, “Fighting Outnumbered: The Impact of the Yom Kippur 31. Pierre Razoux, Tsahal: Nouvelle histoire de l’armée israélienne (Paris:
War on the U.S. Army,” The Journal of Military History 71, no. 2 (April 2007): Editions Perrin, 2006), 369–459.
465–98. 32. U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) Pamphlet 525-
12. Interview with Donn Starry, in Sorley, Press On!, 2:1109. 3-1, The U.S. Army in Multi-Domain Operations, 2028 (Fort Eustis, VA: TRADOC,
13. Starry, “German-American Coordination: Letter to Lieutenant Col- December 2018), 6–7; “Land on the Horizon” is not publicly available, and the
onel Samuel D. Wilder, Fort Monroe, Virginia, 23 August 1976,” in Sorley, author has drawn information from multiple unclassified IDF briefings in 2018.
Press On!, 1:282; Starry, “US and Federal Republic of Germany Doctrine: 33. Israel Ministry of Defense’s Tank Directorate and Directorate of Defense
Letter to Lieutenant General John R. Thurman, Deputy Commanding Research and Development, in discussions with author, 2018–2019.
General, US Army Training and Doctrine Command, 27 September 1978,” 34. DePuy, “Implications of the Middle East War on U.S. Army Tactics,
in Sorley, Press On!, 1:335. Doctrine, and Systems,” 25–28.
14. Donn Starry, “Israeli Relationships: Letter to Lieutenant Colonel Michael 35. Ibid., 54–57.
D. Mahler, Fairfax, Virginia, 28 April 1976,” in Sorley, Press On!, 1:280. 36. David Stefanye, memorandum, “Trip Report, Visit to Israel on 18–21
15. William DePuy, “Implications of the Middle East War on U.S. Army Tac- October 1976” (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 2 November
tics, Doctrine, and Systems” (military presentation, February 1975), 53, retrieved 1976), 13, retrieved from TRADOC Historian.
from TRADOC Archives. 37. Starry, “Situations in Germany and Israel,” in Sorley, Press On!, 2:945.

54 January-February 2020  MILITARY REVIEW

Have I Ever Been to War?
by Ryan Hill

Generations have voiced through pen and art, the glorious horrors of war
Stories are told, some without words, of men changed down to their core

I’ve been and seen and felt and feared, but my story is not the same
With a different view of the battlefield, I’m wary of what I claim

I have dented the earth and bent the air inside the enemy’s door
But I cannot help but ask myself, Have I ever been to war?

I’ve topped the heights and flung my craft into valleys in the black of night
But the intimate pain and guilt in death remained outside my sights

I’ve squeezed the trigger that ended men’s lives but did not witness the gore
So again I have to ask myself, Have I ever been to war?

I’ve seen the ghost of my imminent end

but never the face of a dying friend

I’ve seen the hopeless green smoke rise

but never the suffering it disguised

I’ve heard the whistling rounds drop in,

without a clue of where they’d land

But I’ve never felt their sting before,

And so I ask, Have I been to war?

I don’t carry a load, nor am I lost between the darkness and the light
I’m the same as the man who left to go, but I question if that’s right

To all those who there remain, and to those who’ve gone before
I joined you in that hellish place, but I’m still not sure I’ve been to war.

Lt. Col. Ryan “Rhino” Hill, U.S. Air Force, is a military professor at the Naval War College. He is a command pilot with over 2,600 hours in the A-10 and
A-29. He has seen combat on the ground in Afghanistan in 2003 with the 82nd Airborne Division as a battalion air liaison officer and in the air in 2007 with
the 354th Fighter Squadron flying an A-10. (A 354th Expeditionary Fighter Squadron patch is displayed on the headset of an A-10 Thunderbolt II attack
aircraft crew chief 13 July 2015 during a theater security package deployment to Lask Air Base, Poland. Photo by Staff Sgt. Christopher Ruano, U.S. Air Force)
An undated photo of an Su-30MKK in midair refueling with a Russian-made Il-78 Midas tanker. Chinese capability to conduct midair refueling
lags significantly behind that of the United States. (Photo courtesy of the China Military Network)

Air Supremacy
Are the Chinese Ready?
Maj. Jonathan G. McPhilamy, U.S. Air Force

T he Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA)

has invested in defensive air capabilities such as
anti-access/area denial assets and fifth-gener-
ation fighter aircraft. Yet, it is still significantly behind
Western airpower capabilities; it is unable to demonstrate
apparent in three areas: air integration in the joint fight,
aerial refueling, and aircraft production and sustain-
ment. These make the difference right now between the
Chinese achieving regional dominance in the air domain
and having an air force with global reach.
offensive power projection in the air domain. This calls
into question China’s ability to establish air superiority People’s Liberation Army Air Force
against the U.S. military if a conflict were to arise between The People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF) is
the two. This lack of Chinese airpower capacity is most the air component of the Chinese military; it has been

56 January-February 2020  MILITARY REVIEW

 AIR SUPREMACY

charged with a largely supportive role from its time of con- was put to the test against an adversary’s counter air
ception.1 Cristina L. Garafola’s “The Evolution of PLAAF defenses and USAF pilots gained valuable experience—
Mission, Roles and Requirements” highlights the “PLAAF’s the kind only achieved under actual combat conditions.
development in three separate phases since the PLAAF While the USAF refined tactics, techniques, and pro-
was established on November 11, 1949.”2 The three sep- cedures, the PLAAF’s two main missions were “homeland
arate phases show the maturation of the PLAAF and the air defense and supporting Army and Navy operations.”11
strains on the organization during its development. The supportive nature of the PLAAF is not uncommon
The first period (1949–1955) is defined by broad for a country trying to figure out how best to employ
goals of “building an Air Force on the Army’s foundation, air assets; yet, given the PLAAF’s rapid growth during
figuring out how to employ the PLAAF in combat during the early 1950s, this stranglehold on the air component
the Korean War, and establishing an aviation industry.”3 dramatically set Chinese capabilities behind that of near-
Founded in 1949, the air component was “equipped with peer competitors. Additionally, the most troubling aspect
captured Nationalist and Japanese aircraft.”4 This was of this time period was the loss of leadership within the
in stark contrast to the United States and most NATO organization due to rampant purges. Such coup-proofing
members at the time, which had robust production ca- undermined PLAAF effectiveness, where political loyalty
pabilities and assembly apparatuses, and had maintained was valued over meritocratic abilities. Toward the end
a well-trained crew force with expertise in conducting of this period, new Chinese leaders reversed course and
air combat and aerial operations. While infantile at its sought to “develop a more self-reliant aviation industry.”12
inception, the Chinese air component received assistance As the Cold War came to a close, two events shaped
from neighboring countries. This first period was marked China and the PLAAF: the collapse of the Soviet Union
by incredible growth within a short period of four years, and the Persian Gulf War. These events brought the
where the PLAAF became the “third largest air force in PLAAF into the third period (1990–present), changing
the world” with “three thousand fighters and bombers.”5 the dynamics of regional power balances. Additionally,
Such progression was attributed to Soviet assis- the Persian Gulf War highlighted how the nature of
tance caused by the outbreak of war on the Korean warfare had changed: airpower was now emphasized
peninsula where “Chinese People’s Volunteers flowed over land power.13 While the fall of the Soviet Union
into the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea.”6 erased the threat of a neighboring state, the spectacular
Astonishingly, by the time the 1953 Korean Armistice American military success against Iraq’s military forced
was signed, China had built up a military with about the Chinese to adapt to the new nature of warfare, where
sixty thousand soldiers and eight hundred pilots.7 The power projection and technology, specifically from the air,
Chinese were quick learners; they studied air combat dominated contemporary battlefields.
and employed that knowledge over the next two years.
They developed the airpower capacity to launch strike, Air Integration into the Joint Fight
reconnaissance, fighter escort, and air defense missions Dean Cheng’s piece
off the coast near Taiwan.8 The Chinese were rapidly “Chinese Lessons from the Maj. Jon McPhilamy,
developing a formidable air force, yet the second phase Gulf Wars” highlights how U.S. Air Force, is the
would dramatically alter their trajectory. the conflict was “very in- director of the Air Warfare
The second period (1956–1990) illustrates the fluential, affecting Chinese Laboratory and an instruc-
dangers of quickly developing airpower without a tactical, operational, tor in the Department
long-term strategy as “the PLAAF suffered both in and strategic thinking.”14 of Military and Strategic
terms of its warfighting capability and also politically.”9 While much was made Studies at the U.S. Air Force
The intermediate period was heavily impacted by the of the overwhelming Academy. He is a senior pi-
Cultural Revolution, leading to purges of key PLAAF demonstration of military lot with over eight hundred
leaders stemming from “deep suspicion regarding the technology to employ combat hours flying KC-
political reliability of PLAAF forces.”10 During this massive firepower, it was 135 refueling aircraft and
time, the U.S. Air Force (USAF) had over a decade of the tactical, operational, six years of flying special
air combat experience in Vietnam, where equipment and strategic employment operations aircraft.

MILITARY REVIEW  January-February 2020 57

of the American air component that was revolutionary.15 environment is a fluid and dynamic battlespace where
The PLA and PLAAF learned several lessons from this an inability to make simple decisions such as changes to
new American way of fighting in Iraq in 1991. One of the a flight plan would prove catastrophic in actual combat.
most important lessons was that “weapon systems do not
operate in isolation, but instead are integrated with each In-Flight Air Refueling
other.”16 Such integration is best defined as “joint warfare.” While integration into the joint fight remains a
Joint Publication (JP) 3-0, Joint Operations, defines challenge for the Chinese PLAAF, the ability to conduct
joint warfare as “team warfare.”17 Highlighting the air refueling remains another limitation in the quest for
difficult nature of joint operations, JP 3-0 further states power projection. The Chinese are attempting to over-

The People’s Liberation Army Air Force is starting to

realize that to effectively conduct joint operations ac-
tually requires an extensive amount of joint training.

that “joint functions reinforce and complement one come this problem in a variety of ways. One of these
another, and integration across the functions is essential ways is by building up airbases on islands in the South
to mission accomplishment.”18 Joint doctrine further China Sea. Andrew S. Erickson and Austin Strange’s
divides joint functions into “C2 [command and control], Foreign Affairs article “Pandora’s Sandbox: China’s Island-
information, intelligence, fires, movement and maneu- Building Strategy in the South China Sea” highlights how
ver, protection, and sustainment.”19 What enables the the effort to construct islands containing “radars, satellite
USAF to integrate into the joint fight starts with how communication equipment, anti-aircraft and naval guns,
“integration [is] necessary for effective joint operations” a helipad, a dock, and even a wind turbine” indicates a
and “will require training, technical and technological substantial investment in coastal defense and offensive
interoperability, liaison, and planning.”20 capabilities.24 Such new Chinese capabilities are present-
The PLAAF is starting to realize that effectively ing a nightmare scenario, where the U.S. military might
conducting joint operations actually requires an exten- lose its ability to freely operate throughout the region.25
sive amount of joint training. This is at odds with Cold This makes many wonder if the rise of China will be as a
War-era traditional structures of command and control bellicose dragon or a pacific panda.26
that developed around Chinese coup-proofing, where Currently, China’s message to the international
“jointness” and other forms of military collaboration community is one of peaceful intentions. In their article
were perceived as threats to the Communist regime. “China’s Airfield Construction at Fiery Cross Reef in
Lyle Morris’s article “China’s Air Force is Fixing Its Context: Catch-Up or Coercion?,” Michael S. Chase and
Shortcomings” states that Chinese military leaders are Benjamin Purser note that “although China is not the
introducing reforms to train their fighter pilots under first state to build an airstrip in the South China Sea, it
“actual combat conditions.”21 The need for change stems is the first state to employ island-building technologies
largely from the inability of their pilots to make any to transform a contested maritime feature into a mil-
decision due to “strict control from a commander in the itary base that extends the reach of offensive military
control tower.”22 Morris notes that changes such as the capabilities.”27 The buildup of austere Chinese airstrips
ability to change “navigation routes and flying tactics in represents a challenge to U.S. interests both in the sea and
the air … represent [a] significant departure from past air domains, yet there appears to be little slowing of the
practice.”23 While these changes are noteworthy, they Chinese desire to project power.
are hardly groundbreaking and they are far from where When compared to how the USAF views the effect
a country would want its air component to be with of air refueling, it is possible to gain insight into another
respect to joint warfighting. This is because the joint potential reason for the China’s artificial island chains.

58 January-February 2020  MILITARY REVIEW

 AIR SUPREMACY

JP 3-17, Air Mobility Operations, states that air refueling An Air Force B-2 Spirit bomber approaches a KC-135 Stratotanker
“allows air assets to rapidly reach any trouble spot around for refueling 29 August 2019 during a training exercise over England.
(Photo by Staff Sgt. Jordan Castelan, U.S. Air Force)
the world with less dependence on forward staging bases
… [and] significantly expands the force options available
to a commander by increasing the range, payload, loiter
time, and flexibility of other aircraft.”28 However, in projection appears to be a goal of Chinese leadership
China’s view, building islands with airports extends the throughout the PLAAF, the employment of one of
range of aircraft without investing in air assets capable of the world’s largest air forces gets exponentially more
conducting sustained in-flight air refueling. difficult when it only has a handful of air assets capable
Air refueling remains one of the cornerstones of of providing in-flight refueling.
strategic air support. Garafola identified that China’s
2013 edition of Science of Military Strategy discusses a Aircraft Production
“need for the development of a strategic air transport and Sustainment
system [which] is an important mark of a strategic air A country that is trying to develop an air compo-
force.”29 Air refueling is seen as a “critical force multi- nent will often acquire various assets through purchase,
plier across the full range of global and theater employ- yet this places the PLAAF in a perplexing situation. A
ment scenarios,” thus making it a necessity to project starting point for examination is military spending. In
power throughout the globe.30 Bill Carey’s article “Pentagon: China is ‘Closing the Gap’
What is most remarkable is that the “PLAAF is the in Air Power,” he notes that in 2016 “China announced a
largest air force in Asia and third largest in the world, 7 percent increase in military spending, to $144.3 billion,
with more than 2,700 total aircraft,” yet it has only sustaining its position as the second largest military
purchased “a small number of IL-78 MIDAS … from spender after the U.S.”32 While spending totals can paint a
Ukraine to conduct aerial refueling.”31 While power dramatic picture, further examination reveals a different

MILITARY REVIEW  January-February 2020 59

explanation. Carey goes on to note that “China’s aircraft to start production of all its aircraft organically, this could
industry still relies on foreign-sourced components for possibly signal the ability to maintain or even increase
high-performance aircraft engines.”33 Such reliance on for- production should hostilities break out. Such organic pro-
eign-produced parts incurs a risk should a conflict break duction would demonstrate self-reliance that negates the
out and outside production or sustainment is cut off. risks associated with dependence on foreign production

While the Chinese are at risk relying on outside pro-

curement, some believe that it is an obstacle that can
easily be overcome.

While the Chinese are at risk relying on outside pro- and procurement. This is the crucial ingredient for the rise
curement, some believe that it is an obstacle that can easily of Chinese military might, as the U.S. Navy with its eleven
be overcome. Sebastien Roblin’s National Interest article carrier groups could easily impose a blockade that would
“China’s Air Force: 1,700 Combat Aircraft Ready for War” eventually exhaust the ability of the Chinese military to
states that “most Chinese military aircraft are inspired by conduct and sustain military operations.
or copied from Russian or American designs, so it’s not too
hard to grasp their capabilities if you know their origins.”34 Conclusion
Roblin infers that if China can copy the design, it can man- At this time, the PLAAF is not capable of demonstrat-
ufacture the design in bulk. This remains a counterpoint ing global reach or air superiority due to three distinct
to the challenge of relying heavily on borrowed or stolen factors: an inability to successfully integrate into the joint
technology and does not validate the ability of a country fight, minimal aerial refueling capabilities, and a lack of
to mass produce aircraft during a conflict. military-industrial infrastructure to support aviation
production and procurement. Any one of these three
Future Considerations areas would take a vast amount of time and resources to
The Chinese military, specifically the PLAAF, is in a overcome, and all three together represent a monumental
time of transformation, and the United States, nota- challenge to Chinese leadership. The significant organi-
bly the USAF, needs to consider three indicators as a zational challenge for the PLAAF is to transition from a
change in comparative advantage in the air domain. supportive role to a strategic role. While all three of these
The first indicator would be a successful air campaign shortcomings are not insurmountable, the odds of over-
launched against a formidable air defense. While un- coming them are not favorable. Joint warfare requires the
likely, the USAF should closely study how the PLAAF ability to make decisions at the lowest level possible, with
would respond to an adversarial threat. More simply, commanders understanding their specific roles and re-
how would it conduct an air campaign? sponsibilities and conducting operations accordingly. This
A second indicator would be increased joint training fluidity would be challenged by the construct currently
exercises with land and naval forces. The United States employed by the PLA and PLAAF, whereas Western
needs to proceed with caution in concluding that if the militaries rely on centralized command of air forces but
PLAAF’s integration does not mirror that of the USAF, with decentralized execution.36
it is a failure. Rather, any attempts at integration need Second, while the PLAAF has a significantly high
to be studied to see what progress has been made in the number of aircraft in its inventory, there is a great dis-
complex formation of joint operations. proportionality with respect to aerial refueling assets.
A third indicator would be Chinese production of Air refueling is a vital part of not only projecting regional
aircraft across a broad spectrum. This would include power but also global power. While artificial islands are a
infrastructure dedicated to all types of aircraft, which are stopgap for a lack of air refueling capabilities, they remain
needed to effectively project joint forces through multi-do- a temporary solution for regional power projection and
main airpower operations.35 Should the Chinese decide will not contribute to global Chinese power projection.

60 January-February 2020  MILITARY REVIEW

 AIR SUPREMACY

Finally, aircraft production and sustainment is a will be one with clipped wings. The PLAAF lacks the
vital part of any country’s air force. While simplistic in capability to achieve (or sustain) air superiority should
nature, it is important to remember that aircraft break, a conflict break out against the U.S. military. The USAF
and reliance on foreign manufacturers and suppliers to retains the competitive advantages of air integration
produce replacement parts incurs a risk to long-term into the joint fight, the ability to conduct robust air
operational capability. Production is also a vital part refueling, and an established production and procure-
of a country’s ability to maintain a reputable air force. ment process necessary to sustain an air force during a
Should a conflict break out, there is the potential to conflict. These competitive advantages cannot be taken
lose aircraft, and without a robust production process for granted. Rather, time and resources need to be
in place, a country will again be at risk by depending devoted toward their enhancement to maintain domi-
on another country to produce aircraft for combat and nance in a potentially contested future domain.
other aspects of air operations.
In closing, if we are to assume that the rise of China These views do not reflect the views of the U.S. Air Force, the
will be that of a dragon, for the foreseeable future, it Department of Defense, or the U.S. government.

Notes
1. Cristina L. Garafola, “The Evolution of PLAAF Mission, 24. Andrew S. Erickson and Austin Strange, “Pandora’s Sandbox:
Roles and Requirements,” in China’s Evolving Military Strategy, ed. China’s Island-Building Strategy in the South China Sea,” Foreign Affairs 13
Joe McReynolds (Washington, DC: The Jamestown Foundation, (13 July 2014).
2017), 75. 25. Stephen Biddle and Ivan Oelrich, “Future Warfare in the Western
2. Ibid., 76. Pacific: Chinese Antiaccess/Area Denial, US AirSea Battle, and Command
3. Ibid. of the Commons in East Asia,” International Security 41, no. 1 (2016): 7–48.
4. Dennis J. Blasko, “Always Faithful: The PLA from 1949 to 1989,” 26. Randall Peerenboom, “The Fire-Breathing Dragon and the Cute,
in A Military History of China, ed. David A. Graff and Robin Higham Cuddly Panda: The Implication of China’s Rise for Developing Countries,
(Lexington, KY: University Press of Kentucky, 2012), 250. Human Rights, and Geopolitical Stability,” Chinese Journal of International
5. Larry M Wortzel, The Dragon Extends Its Reach: Chinese Military Law 7 (2006): 17.
Power Goes Global (Lincoln, NE: Potomac Books, 2013), 65. 27. Michael S. Chase and Ben Purser, “China’s Airfield Construction
6. Ibid. at Fiery Cross Reef in Context: Catch-Up or Coercion?,” Asia Maritime
7. Ibid. Transparency Initiative, 29 July 2015, accessed 30 September 2019,
8. Ibid. https://amti.csis.org/chinas-airfield-construction-at-fiery-cross-reef-in-
9. Garafola, “The Evolution of PLAAF,” 76. context-catch-up-or-coercion/.
10. Ibid. 28. JP 3-17, Air Mobility Operations (Washington, DC: U.S. GPO,
11. Ibid., 76–77. 2019), VI-1, accessed 30 September 2019, http://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/
12. Ibid., 77. Documents/Doctrine/pubs/jp3_17.pdf.
13. Ibid. 29. Garafola, “The Evolution of PLAAF,” 91.
14. Dean Cheng, “Chinese Lessons from the Gulf Wars,” in Chinese 30. JP 3-17, Air Mobility Operations, VI-4.
Lessons from Other Peoples’ Wars, ed. Andrew Scobell, David Lai, and 31. Office of the Secretary of Defense, Annual Report to Congress:
Roy Kamphausen (Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College Strategic Studies Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of
Institute, 2011), 153. China 2017, 15 May 2017, 28, accessed 30 September 2019, https://dod.
15. Max Boot, “The New American Way of War,” Foreign Affairs 82, no. defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/2017_China_Military_Power_Re-
4 (2003): 41–58. port.PDF.
16. Cheng, “Chinese Lessons,” 159. 32. Bill Carey, “Pentagon: China Is ‘Closing the Gap’ in Air Power with
17. Joint Publication ( JP) 3-0, Joint Operations (Washington, DC: U.S. U.S.,” AIN Online, 8 June 2017, accessed 30 September 2019, https://
Government Publishing Office [GPO], 2017), I-2, accessed 30 Septem- www.ainonline.com/aviation-news/defense/2017-06-08/pentagon-china-
ber 2019, http://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/pubs/ closing-gap-air-power-us.
jp3_0_20170117.pdf. 33. Ibid.
18. Ibid., III-1. 34. Sebastien Roblin, “China’s Air Force: 1,700 Combat Aircraft
19. Ibid. Ready for War,” The National Interest (blog), 28 October 2017, ac-
20. Ibid., III-6. cessed 30 September 2019, http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/
21. Lyle J. Morris, “China’s Air Force Is Fixing Its Shortcomings,” chinas-air-force-1700-combat-aircraft-ready-war-22940.
The RAND Blog, Rand Corporation, 14 October 2016, accessed 30 35. Jahara Matisek, “Multidomain Airpower Strategy: Integrating
September 2019, https://www.rand.org/blog/2016/10/chinas-air-force- Air, Space, and Cyber Assets” in Military Strategy, Joint Operations, and Air-
is-fixing-its-shortcomings.html. power: An Introduction, ed. Ryan Burke, Michael W. Fowler, and Kevin Mc-
22. Ibid. Caskey (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2018), 89–103.
23. Ibid. 36. Kevin McCaskey, “Rapid Global Mobility and Agile Combat Sup-
port,” in Burke, Fowler, and McCaskey, Military Strategy, 131–40.

MILITARY REVIEW  January-February 2020 61

Information on the Twenty-
First Century Battlefield
Proposing the Army’s Seventh
Warfighting Function
Capt. Charles M. Kelly, U.S. Army

I n May 2013, Ukrainian artillery officer Yaroslav

Sherstuk designed a smartphone application to
decrease the artillery targeting process from min-
utes to less than fifteen seconds.1 The application expe-
rienced initial success with upward of nine thousand
Ukrainian soldiers using it to conduct fire missions against
Russian forces.2 However, the independent security firm
CrowdStrike reported a Russian information attack on the
application via malware offered Russian forces “the poten-
tial ability to map out a unit’s composition and hierarchy,
 TWENTY-FIRST-CENTURY BATTLEFIELD

determine their plans, and even triangulate their ap- warfighting functions.9 However, IO is rapidly exceeding
proximate location.”3 Russian forces presumably used the the bounds of tasks already required of these two func-
malware to target Ukrainian artillery units employing the tions. The rapid developments in information technology
application. This example aptly demonstrates the charac- have induced newfound importance and relevance of
ter of war confronting modern militaries in the informa- information on the twenty-first-century battlefield. This
tion age. The U.S. Army’s current warfighting model does article demonstrates the increasingly important role of
not adequately reflect the reality of this evolution. The information in warfare and the subsequent necessity of
Army should adopt information as the seventh warfight- elevating information to a warfighting function.
ing function because the rapid change in the character of
war brought about by the advent of the internet enables Information’s Explosive Rise
the weaponization of information. Furthermore, the infor- The Army’s current warfighting doctrine presents
mation warfighting function would enable the adequate an antiquated view of the role of information in combat.
integration of information in operational planning and History is replete with examples of the successful use of
execution and provide an improved ability to apply force information in conflicts. During World War II, for exam-
below the threshold of lethal effects. ple, the U.S. Army famously employed military deception
using inflatable tanks and airplanes to deceive German
Current Model: The Elements forces in France. The rise in information technology in-
of Combat Power creases the relevance and consequences of information in
Prior to discussing the information warfighting func- warfighting and offers opportunities for increased applica-
tion in detail, some background on the Army’s current tion. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s Strategic
paradigm is necessary. The Army uses the term “combat Communications Centre of Excellence recently conduct-
power” to describe the “total means of destruction, con- ed an experiment in support of a large-scale military exer-
structive, and information capabilities that a military unit cise using a simulated cyber red cell, “the opposing force in
… can apply at a given time.”4 Combat power is comprised a war game,” in order to evaluate friendly forces’ signature
of eight elements: the six warfighting functions (com- in the online information environment.10 Using only open-
mand and control, movement and maneuver, intelligence, source information, social media, and sixty dollars, the red
fires, sustainment, and protection) with the addition of cell identified 150 soldiers, found the locations of several
information and leadership (see figure, page 64).5 The battalions, tracked troop
warfighting functions provide structure for commanders movements, and compelled Capt. Charles Kelly,
and staffs to plan and execute operations. Army Doctrine service members to engage U.S. Army, is the com-
Publication (ADP) 5-0, The Operations Process, states, in illicit behavior such mander of Company C,
“The staff … integrates forces and warfighting functions as leaving their positions 2nd Battalion, 3rd Infantry
to accomplish the mission.”6 In the current model, com- against orders. The lack of
11
Regiment, 1st Stryker
manders achieve battlefield effects using the warfighting institutional awareness of Brigade Combat Team, 2nd
functions, while information and leadership simply aid in the effects and capabilities Infantry Division, at Joint
the optimal application of these functions. Field Manual of information demonstrat- Base Lewis-McChord. He
3-13, Information Operations, defines information opera- ed by this example indi- holds a BS in economics and
tions (IO) as “the integrated employment … of informa- cates the Army’s current a BS in Mandarin Chinese
tion-related capabilities (IRCs) in concert with other lines archaic model does not from the United States
of operation to influence, disrupt, corrupt, or usurp the fully grasp the ramifications Military Academy. He previ-
decision-making of adversaries and potential adversaries of information on today’s ously served in 1st Battalion,
while protecting our own.”7 Examples of some of these battlefield. 75th Ranger Regiment and
IRCs are military deception, civil affairs operations, and 4th Brigade, 25th Infantry
cyberspace operations.8 Information operations are cur- Maintaining Division. He has deployed
rently listed as staff tasks under the intelligence and fires Supremacy three times to Afghanistan
In order to maintain in support of Operation
Previous page: Photo illustration by Justin Rakowski, U.S. Army a competitive advantage Freedom’s Sentinel.

MILITARY REVIEW  January-February 2020 63

 Movement
and maneuver
Competence Shared
understanding
Mutual trust
Protection Command Intelligence
Leadership
Risk Mission
command
acceptance Commander’s
I n fo r m a t i o n intent
Disciplined
initiative Co n tr o l

Sustainment Mission orders Fires

(Figure from Army Doctrine Publication 3-0, Operations)

Figure. Elements of Combat Power

over our peer and near-peer adversaries, the Army In a 2013 article, Russian Chief of the General Staff
must place a larger emphasis on the use of information Valery Gerasimov outlined what he believed to be the
as an instrument of war. Two decades of low-intensity necessary approaches for twenty-first-century war. From
conflict characterized by combating violent extremist his perspective, future conflicts must include an infor-
organizations in the Middle East justifiably consumed mation element. He avers information asymmetrically
much of the focus of the U.S. military. The relatively low lowers an adversary’s combat potential and creates “a
sophistication level of the enemy enabled U.S. forces to permanently operating front through the entire territory
become complacent on many of the tasks required to of an enemy state.”13 The ongoing Russian-Ukrainian con-
fight conventionally outfitted militaries in the twen- flict displays the practical application of his sentiments.
ty-first century. Former chairman of the Joint Chiefs When Russian forces entered the Crimean Peninsula on
of Staff Gen. Joseph Dunford stated, “The challenges 2 March 2014, they preemptively shut down Crimea’s
of a decades-long campaign against violent extremism telecommunications infrastructure, disabled major
adversely affected our own modernization and capa- Ukrainian websites, and jammed the mobile phones
bility development efforts.”12 Accordingly, participation of key Ukrainian officials.14 Russian forces effectively
in these wars presented America’s peer and near-peer isolated Crimea in the information environment, which
adversaries the opportunity to aim their force-mod- contributed to setting the necessary conditions for the
ernization efforts on defeating U.S. tactics, techniques, rapid physical attack.15 While many factors contribut-
and procedures. To further exacerbate this challenge, ed to Russia’s ability to successfully annex Crimea, this
the concurrent meteoric rise in information technology example demonstrates how adversaries are leveraging
enabled adversaries to integrate many of these advance- the capabilities offered by information technology and
ments into their force-modernization efforts. meticulously integrating these capabilities in the planning

64 January-February 2020  MILITARY REVIEW

 TWENTY-FIRST-CENTURY BATTLEFIELD

and execution of operations. Elevating information to a the doctrinal means to sufficiently integrate information
warfighting function enables the Army to exploit infor- into operational planning and execution.
mation capabilities to the degree that technology allows
and that maintaining a competitive advantage requires. Beyond Physical: Expanding
the Concept of War
The Adequate Integration The Army’s narrow definition of tactical and opera-
of Information in Planning tional conflict subverts attempts at strategic victory. In
and Execution his seminal work, The American Way of War: A History of
The absence of information from the warfighting United States Military Strategy and Policy, Russell Weigley
functions inhibits the complete and adequate integra- famously argues that with few exceptions, America’s ap-
tion of IO into planning and execution. In America’s proach to war is aggressive, direct, and with an eye toward
most recent conflicts, resource and technological total annihilation.22 Antulio J. Echevarria II argues this
overmatch against relatively unsophisticated enemies as proof that America only demonstrates a way of battle
allowed the Army to sideline IO without perceived that has not yet matured into a complete and holistic way
negative consequences. In future fights against peer of war.23 Although the American military touts the use of
adversaries, this approach is likely to produce devas- Clausewitzian principles, it seems the “American style of
tating effects. Contemporary examples demonstrate warfare failed to internalize Clausewitz’s contention that
the Army’s challenges with IO integration. In a re- war was the continuation of politics by other means.”24
view of IO in “Information Operations in Operations The Army’s failure to recognize the value of information
Enduring Freedom and Iraqi Freedom – What Went further serves to support this point. The perception of
Wrong?,” Joseph Cox identified three factors inhibiting war characterized by simply winning the physical battles,
the effects of IO: (1) Army doctrine does not provide which overwhelmingly occupies the focus of the current
commanders adequate guidance for integrating IO, (2) warfighting functions, is not enough to win wars.
intelligence doctrine and resourcing do not allow intel-
ligence support to IO to be effective, and (3) the Army A Tool for “Gray Zone” Conflict
has not resourced itself to conduct IO effectively.16 The Army’s warfighting structure does not offer suffi-
Early IO against the Taliban and al-Qaida focused on cient capabilities in the phases of conflict before and after
the employment of kinetic engagements and “only later the highly kinetic and lethal fight. “Gray zone conflict”
did commanders work to convince Afghans that attacks and “hybrid warfare” are in-vogue terms frequently used
on Taliban fighters were not attacks on the Afghan pop- to describe low-intensity conflicts or conflicts employing
ulace.”17 Failure to adequately integrate IO into the plan- methods short of conventional war. Echevarria contends
ning with the early kinetic operations negatively impact- that this “new” form of war is, in fact, historically the
ed the U.S. military’s ability to garner the local Afghan norm and more common than the romanticized World
support required to secure long-term peace.18 A 2012 War II style of fighting.25 Failing to realize this phenom-
RAND Corporation report on the use of information enon exposes America’s unrealistic and self-limiting
and psychological operations in Afghanistan stated, “The concept of war.26 This style of warfare is also increasingly
current disconnect between official IO doctrine and how likely because it occurs below the North Atlantic Treaty
it is practiced in the field is counterproductive” to effec- Organization Article 5 threshold and below the level of
tive and efficient operations.19 Three years later, RAND violence necessary to prompt a United Nations Security
Corporation published a follow-up perspective on the re- Council resolution.27 The near-exclusive orientation of
port and concluded, “It is evident that there is still a great the Army’s warfighting functions toward lethal actions is
deal of work that must be done to integrate and harmo- an accurate reflection of this flawed concept.
nize doctrine [with IO practice] to achieve the greatest This era of renewed great power competition ne-
results.”20 As noted in ADP 3-0 and ADP 5-0, warfighting cessitates a mechanism for employing nonlethal force.
functions are the mechanisms used to synchronize and Adversaries seek to win battles below the threshold of
integrate all available capabilities in an operational plan.21 America’s narrow definition of war in order to score
Without a warfighting function, the Army does not have victory before the United States even realizes the conflict

MILITARY REVIEW  January-February 2020 65

has begun. The elevation of information to a warfighting creates a vulnerability that can be exploited, along with
function provides the Army with the practical flexibility ‘theoretical blind spots’ and ‘thought errors,’ such as the
and means to employ capabilities and address adversarial absence of a comprehensive theory in DOD doctrine that
actions occurring below the threshold for lethal force. The combines all elements of information warfare.”34 These are
Army must “account for more than just the use of kinetic exactly the sort of asymmetries Mao referred to nearly
military force during wartime, and it must accommo- nine decades ago. The Army uses the warfighting func-
date more than just the goal of dominating an adversary tions to not only structure friendly planning and execu-
through decisive operations.”28 The Army needs to develop tion but also to assess the capabilities of the enemy. Failing
its warfighting style to reflect the reality of war’s political to include information as a warfighting function hinders
context as opposed to a struggle for domination of wills de- the Army’s ability to comprehensively understand our
void of broader implications.29 The information warfighting adversaries’ capabilities and mentality.
function would provide the capabilities to influence adver-
sarial actions outside of lethality and would help to serve as Embracing the Burdens of Change
a catalyst for the required institutional mindset change. Some may argue the addition of the information war-
fighting function is an unnecessary institutional burden.
Evaluating Adversaries Making a change of this nature has complex implications
Analysis of the Chinese People’s Liberation Army across doctrine, organization, training, materiel, leader-
(PLA) indicates an astute understanding of the asymmet- ship and education, personnel, and facilities. Information
ric potential of information. Long before the information is already an element of combat power, and Field Manual
age and the advent of the internet, Mao Tse-tung worked 3-13 and Army Techniques Publication 3-13.1, The
to instill the notion of the military as a body to carry out Conduct of Information Operations, give specific guidance
the political will, not solely a physical fighting entity. In on applying and using information.35 Therefore, the focus
his 1929 resolution, titled “On Correcting Mistaken Ideas should be on better applying information as it current-
in the Party,” Mao stated that members of the party who ly exists in the Army’s lexicon. However, based on the
held a purely military view “think the task of the Red evolving technology and the adversarial capabilities, it is
Army … is merely to fight. They do not understand that clear that the status quo is not adequate. In its current
the Chinese Red Army is an armed body for carrying form, “many continue to skeptically view it [IO] as a
out the political tasks of the revolution … The Red Army marginal military activity or as a failing enterprise.”36 This
fights not merely for the sake of fighting but in order to mindset must change if the United States is to maintain
… help establish revolutionary political power.”30 Mao’s supremacy on future battlefields. Military professionals
expression also seems to closely follow Sun Tzu’s famous have a responsibility to achieve an objective reality of war
maxim: “Supreme excellence consists in breaking the en- and adapt accordingly. Imagine if the U.S. military did not
emy’s resistance without fighting.”31 This idea was further institute the Air Force after World War II due to institu-
codified into Chinese military doctrine in 2003 when tional inconveniences. The burdens of change and incon-
the Communist Party’s Central Committee and Central venience outweigh the consequences of strategic defeat.
Military Commission approved a new warfare concept for
the PLA titled “three warfares.” These are public opinion Information Beyond the Joint Level
warfare (media), psychological warfare, and legal warfare.32 In September 2017, then Secretary of Defense James
The Chinese information strategy focuses on using Mattis signed a memorandum elevating information to
stratagems to build and maintain information superiority a warfighting function at the joint-force level.37 Critics
in order to compensate for its deficiencies in technolo- may argue against the idea of an information warfight-
gy-based weapons.33 According to a report to the U.S. ing function at the service level because information is
Congress, the PLA views the United States as a militarily viewed as a strategic capability that belongs centralized
superior foe whose advantages can be overcome through at the Department of Defense. It is certainly useful for
strategy and information operations. The report, which the joint force to integrate information into operational
cites Unrestricted Warfare: China’s Master Plan to Destroy and strategic plans, and some of the decisions germane
America, states, “The U.S. reliance on technology … to IRCs belong at that level. However, as evident by the

66 January-February 2020  MILITARY REVIEW

 TWENTY-FIRST-CENTURY BATTLEFIELD

examples above, information is already proving useful An inflatable OH-58C Kiowa helicopter and inflatable fuel blivets sim-
in tactical scenarios. Additionally, as technology con- ulate a forward arming and refueling point during a deception oper-
ation on 10 November 1990 carried out by the XVIII Airborne Corps
tinues to improve, the tactical solutions will continue to Deception Cell in the Eastern Province of Saudi Arabia approximately
emerge. The information warfighting function provides forty-five kilometers northwest of An Nuariya. (Photo by Pfc. Randall
the Army with a method to integrate these critical R. Anderson, XVIII Airborne Corps)
capabilities and help drive a change in the self-limiting
centralization of IRCs when able.
The role of information in future conflicts is be-
coming exceedingly important given the explosive rise these rising technological advances and offers the flex-
of information technology. Our adversaries are using ibility to apply force in conflicts occurring below the
information to achieve effects and secure their political appetite for lethality. The last eighteen years of conflict
objectives. Russian military sources even go so far as to characterized by extreme technological overmatch
claim the “role of nonmilitary means of achieving po- lulled the American military into a sense of compla-
litical and strategic goals has grown, and, in many cases, cency and hubris, which precipitated the marginal-
they have exceeded the power of force or weapons in ization of information capabilities.39 If the U.S. Army
their effectiveness.”38 While the elevation of informa- wants to maintain supremacy in this era of renewed
tion is not a panacea for all the Army’s warfighting great power competition, it must adapt to the challeng-
challenges, it provides a method to better integrate es brought on by the changing character of war.

Notes
1. CrowdStrike Global Intelligence Team, “Use of Fancy Bear An- crowdstrike.com/resources/reports/idc-vendor-profile-crowdstrike-2/.
droid Malware in Tracking of Ukrainian Field Artillery Units,” Crowd- 2. Ibid.
Strike, updated 23 March 2017, accessed 31 July 2019, https://www. 3. Ibid.

MILITARY REVIEW  January-February 2020 67

 4. Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) 3-0, Operations (Wash- 23. Antulio J. Echevarria II, Toward an American Way of War (Carlisle,
ington, DC: U.S. Government Publishing Office [GPO], 6 October PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2004), 1, accessed 31 July 2019, https://ssi.
2017), 5-1, accessed 3 October 2019, https://armypubs.army.mil/ armywarcollege.edu/pubs/display.cfm?pubID=374.
epubs/DR_pubs/DR_a/pdf/web/ARN18010_ADP%203-0%20 24. Antulio J. Echevarria II, Reconsidering the American Way of War:
FINAL%20WEB.pdf. US Military Practice from the Revolution to Afghanistan (Washington, DC:
5. Ibid. Georgetown University Press, May 2014), 46.
6. ADP 5-0, The Operations Process (Washington, DC: U.S. GPO, 25. Antulio J. Echevarria II, Operating in the Gray Zone: An Alternative
31 July 2019), 4-5, accessed 3 October 2019, https://armypubs.army. Paradigm for U.S. Military Strategy (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute,
mil/epubs/DR_pubs/DR_a/pdf/web/ARN18323_ADP%205-0%20 April 2016), xi, accessed 31 July 2019, https://ssi.armywarcollege.edu/
FINAL%20WEB.pdf. pubs/display.cfm?pubID=1318.
7. Field Manual (FM) 13-3, Information Operations (Washington, 26. Ibid., 40.
DC: U.S. GPO, 6 December 2016), 1-2, accessed 31 July 2019, https:// 27. Charles T. Cleveland, Shaw S. Pick, and Stuart L. Farris,
armypubs.army.mil/epubs/DR_pubs/DR_a/pdf/web/FM%203-13%20 “Shedding Light on the Gray Zone: A New Approach to Hu-
FINAL%20WEB.pdf. man-Centric Warfare,” Association of the United States Army, 17
8. Ibid., 1-3. August 2015, accessed 31 July 2019, https://www.ausa.org/articles/
9. ADP 3-0, Operations, 5-3–5-4. shedding-light-gray-zone-new-approach-human-centric-warfare.
10. “A Guide to Red Teaming: DCDC Guidance Note” (Shrivenham, 28. Ibid., xii.
UK: The Development, Concepts and Doctrine Centre, February 2010), 29. Echevarria, Operating in the Gray Zone, 41.
lexicon-2, accessed 5 August 2019, https://www.act.nato.int/images/sto- 30. Mao Tse-tung, “On Correcting Mistaken Ideas in the Party,” in
ries/events/2011/cde/rr_ukdcdc.pdf. Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung, vol. 1 (Beijing: Foreign Languages Press,
11. Sebastian Bay et al., Responding to Cognitive Security Challenges 1965), accessed 31 July 2019, https://www.marxists.org/reference/archive/
(Riga, Latvia: NATO Strategic Communications Centre of Excellence, mao/selected-works/volume-1/mswv1_5.htm#s1.
January 2019), 13–14, accessed 31 July 2019, https://www.stratcomcoe. 31. Sun Tzu, The Art of War, trans. Lionel Giles, Project Gutenberg,
org/responding-cognitive-security-challenges. updated 14 January 2012, accessed 24 September 2019, http://brainab.
12. Joseph Dunford, “The Character of War and Strategic Landscape com/site_images/files_books/war_sun.pdf.
have Changed,” Joint Force Quarterly 89 (2018): 2, accessed 5 August 32. Larry M. Wortzel, The Chinese People’s Liberation Army and
2019, https://ufdc.ufl.edu/AA00061587/00089. Information Warfare (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2014),
13. Valery Gerasimov, “The ‘Gerasimov Doctrine’ and Russian 29, accessed 31 July 2019, https://publications.armywarcollege.edu/
Non-Linear War,” In Moscow’s Shadows (blog), 6 July 2014, accessed 31 pubs/2263.pdf.
July 2019, https://inmoscowsshadows.wordpress.com/2014/07/06/the- 33. Catherine A. Theohary, Information Warfare: Issues for Congress,
gerasimov-doctrine-and-russian-non-linear-war/. Congressional Research Service (CRS) Report No. R45142 (Washington,
14. Azhar Unwala and Shaheen Ghori, “Brandishing the Cybered DC: CRS, 5 March 2018), 11, accessed 31 July 2019, https://fas.org/sgp/
Bear: Information War and the Russia-Ukraine Conflict,” The Journal of crs/natsec/R45142.pdf.
the Military Cyber Professionals Association 1, no. 1 (2015): 1, ac- 34. Ibid.
cessed 31 July 2019, https://scholarcommons.usf.edu/cgi/viewcontent. 35. FM 3-13, Information Operations, iv; Army Techniques Publica-
cgi?article=1001&context=mca. tion (ATP) 3-13.1, The Conduct of Information Operations (Washington,
15. “Little Green Men”: A Primer on Modern Russian Unconven- DC: U.S. GPO, 4 October 2018), v, accessed 31 July 2019, https://army-
tional Warfare, Ukraine 2013-2014 (Fort Bragg, NC: U.S. Army Special pubs.army.mil/epubs/DR_pubs/DR_a/pdf/web/ARN13138_ATP%20
Operations Command, n.d.), 51, accessed 31 July 2019, https://per- 3-13x1%20FINAL%20Web%201.pdf.
manent.access.gpo.gov/gpo107669/14-02984_LittleGreenMen-UN- 36. Scott Thompson and Christopher Paul, “Paradigm Change:
CLASS-hi-res.pdf. Operational Art and the Information Joint Function,” Joint Force Quarterly
16. Joseph L. Cox, Information Operations in Operations Enduring 89 (2nd Quarter, 2018): 11.
Freedom and Iraqi Freedom - What Went Wrong? (Fort Leavenworth, 37. Secretary of Defense Memorandum, “Information as a Joint
KS: United States Army Command and General Staff College, 2006), iii, Function,” 15 September 2017, accessed 31 July 2019, https://www.rmda.
accessed 31 July 2019, https://fas.org/irp/eprint/cox.pdf. army.mil/records-management/docs/SECDEF-Endorsement_Informa-
17. Walter E. Richter, “The Future of Information Operations,” Military tion_Joint%20Function_Clean.pdf.
Review 89, no. 1 ( January-February 2009): 106–7, accessed 31 July 2019, 38. Ben Sohl, “Influence Campaigns and the Future of International
https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Portals/7/military-review/Archives/En- Competition,” The Strategy Bridge, 12 September 2017, accessed 31 July
glish/MilitaryReview_20090228_art001.pdf. 2019, https://thestrategybridge.org/the-bridge/2017/9/12/influence-cam-
18. Ibid., 107. paigns-and-the-future-of-international-competition?rq=Gerasimov.
19. Arturo Muñoz, “U.S. Military Information Operations in Afghan- 39. Nick Brunetti-Lihach, “Information Warfare Past, Present, and
istan: Effectiveness of Psychological Operations 2001–2010” (Santa Future,” The Strategy Bridge, 14 November 2018, accessed 31 July
Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2012), xx, accessed 23 September 2019, https://thestrategybridge.org/the-bridge/2018/11/14/informa-
2019, https://www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/MG1060.html. tion-warfare-past-present-and-future.
20. Arturo Muñoz and Erin Dick, “Information Operations: The Im-
perative of Doctrine Harmonization and Measures of Effectiveness (Santa
Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2015), 3, accessed 23 September
2019, https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/perspectives/
PE100/PE128/RAND_PE128.pdf. Next page: Chinese Defense Minister Wei Fenghe salutes 21 October 2019
21. Ibid., 5-2; ADP 5-0, The Operations Process, 4-5. after delivering his opening speech for the Xiangshan Forum, a gathering of
22. Russell F. Weigley, The American Way of War: A History of United the region’s security officials, in Beijing. Wei issued a stinging rebuke of the
States Military Strategy and Policy (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University United States at the defense forum, saying China was not fazed by sanctions,
Press, 1973), xxii. pressure, and military intimidation. (Photo by Andy Wong, Associated Press)

68 January-February 2020  MILITARY REVIEW

 CALL FOR PA P E R S
“The China-Taiwan Reunification Conundrum”
T he Peoples’ Republic of China has made it clear that it intends to annex Tai-
wan, and, if necessary, will seize the island by force. Military Review is solic-
iting articles regarding this potentially volatile situation between China, Taiwan,
· How might the conflict unfold? What kind of forces would China likely
use and where? How long would China calculate the conflict lasting?
· What would China need to accomplish annexation without letting
and the international community, and how the United States should respond. the situation expand into a larger conflict?
Papers could address, but are not limited to, the following topics: · What is the likelihood of the United States and Taiwan’s few global
· What domestic and international conditions must emerge to pres- allies coming to Taiwan’s assistance?
ent China with its best opportunity to attempt a forced annexation Accepted papers will either be published immediately as a Military Review online
of Taiwan? What other impetus might trigger such an attempt? exclusive article or in a future 2020 edition of Military Review. For information re-
· How has China been preparing diplomatically, informationally, and garding submission criteria and guidelines, please visit https://www.armyupress.
economically to foster the conditions for such an attempt? army.mil/Journals/Military-Review/MR-Article-Submission-Guide/.

Call for papers submission deadline is 4 May 2020

“
No one and no force will be able to stop the course” of China’s annexation of Tai-
wan, Wei said at the security conference in Beijing, which featured a theme this
year of “Maintaining International Order and Promoting Peace in the Asia-Pa-
cific” [said, Wei Fenghe]. China “will never allow the separatists for Taiwan in-
dependence to take their chances or any external forces to interfere into the
“
Taiwan affairs,” he added. “Reunification of the motherland is a justified course
and separatist activities are doomed to failure.

Chinese Defense Minister Wei Fenghe,

The 9th Beijing Xiangshan Forum,
21 October 2019
The Army’s Gap in Operational-
Level Intelligence for Space
as Part of Multi-Domain
Operations
Maj. Jerry V. Drew II, U.S. Army

A s the Army moves toward its strategic vision of

a multi-domain force by 2028, it faces no short-
age of challenges. Equipment modernization,
maintaining a global presence, and training for large-scale
combat operations are just a few of the most pressing
collecting, processing, exploiting, and disseminating
(TCPED) process. Operational-level intelligence profes-
sionals use this process to leverage intelligence, surveil-
lance, and reconnaissance assets to inform the command-
er’s decision-making for a ground campaign.1 This process
challenges. In the midst of these efforts, the Army con- is certainly an important one, but it addresses only one
tinues to support the establishment of a new combatant aspect of space capabilities—the collection aspect—and it
command for space operations while reevaluating its own does not mirror the way in which intelligence profession-
roles and responsibilities vis-à-vis the space domain. als consider other domain capabilities in the intelligence
In this effort, there are many ideas for making space preparation of the battlefield (IPB) process. In simplest
operations more effective for the ground force, but the terms, “space intelligence” should not be a separate effort
need to reframe operational-level intelligence through but an institutionalized part of the overall intelligence
the lens of space operations is one area that demands effort for operational-level formations.
immediate consideration. Specifically, the gap exists in A more holistic view of operational-level IPB—one
applying space domain considerations to operation- that includes the space domain—provides the oppor-
al-level intelligence processes. To become an effective tunity to consider what expertise is necessary within
multi-domain force, the operational-level Army must an operational-level command and how the Army
begin linking both strategic- and tactical-level space as an institution might begin to think about a clearly
intelligence to plan the operational-level fight, to convey defined space operational environment, potential gaps
the Army’s intelligence needs to the joint force, and to in the understanding of the space environment’s ef-
provide meaningful analysis to tactical echelons—as is fects, and the enemy’s multi-domain capabilities. This
currently done for ground and air threats. discussion is necessary to scope the current gap in the
For the operational-level Army today, the mental Army’s operational-level intelligence, especially if the
model of space intelligence largely equates to the tasking, Army (and the joint force) is to become an effective
multi-domain force capable of defeating enemies with
space and counterspace capabilities.

Soldiers with 2nd Platoon, Company A, 1st Battalion, 503rd In- IPB Process
fantry Regiment, 173rd Airborne Brigade Combat Team, set up
All Army commanders employ the IPB process that
a tactical satellite communication system 9 August 2010 in Shek-
habad Valley, Wardak Province, Afghanistan. (Photo by Sgt. Rus- consists of four doctrinal steps: (1) define the opera-
sell Gilchrest, U.S. Army) tional environment, (2) describe the environmental

MILITARY REVIEW  January-February 2020 71

 Medium earth orbit (MEO) Geosynchronous orbit (GEO)
–Satellites are transient –Satellites are nearly stationary relative to the Earth’s surface
–Satellites traverse the area of responsibility (AOR) –Satellites remain generally over the equator but provide services to the entire hemisphere
in hours –Examples: wideband global satellite communication (WGS), ultra-high frequency follow-on (UFO) constellations
–Example: GPS, global navigation satellite system
(GLONASS) constellations

Low earth orbit (LEO)

–Satellites are highly transient
–Satellites traverse the AOR in minutes
–Examples: imagery satellites, the Iridium
constellation

(Figure by author. This graphic depicts the three primary orbital regimes and provides the salient characteristics and typical mission types/constellations found in each.)

Figure 1. Initial Considerations for Defining the Orbital

Aspects of the Operational Environment

effects on operations, (3) evaluate the threat, and (4) of the AOI has multiple layers that all interact differ-
determine the threat courses of action.2 For the extend- ently with the ground force.
ed, multi-domain battlefield, these steps take on new To begin understanding these layers, a deep/close/
meanings uncodified in doctrine as yet. support operational framework may be a useful point of
Step 1: Define the operational environment. Since departure if adapted vertically. In the case of space op-
space operations encompass both on-orbit assets and erations, the framework translates into geosynchronous
globally positioned assets, the first problem that arises orbits (GEOs, ~23,000 miles from Earth) as the deep
is attempting to define the operational environment in area and low-Earth orbits (LEOs, up to 1,000 miles from
a meaningful way. In Army doctrine, the first step of Earth) and medium-Earth orbits (MEOs, ~12,000 miles
defining the operational environment requires defining from Earth) as the close area.4 This close area could be
the commander’s area of operations and area of interest further subdivided into close-LEOs and close-MEOs.
(AOI). Importantly, the AOI is the area that is of Figure 1 depicts these orbital regimes and provides
concern to the commander and “from which informa- the salient characteristics and typical mission types/
tion is required to facilitate planning and the successful constellations found in each. Importantly, GEO satellites
conduct of the command’s operation.”3 By this defini- (e.g., many communications satellites) remain relatively
tion, the AOI of every operational-level commander stationary over their equatorial orbital slots, but satellites
includes portions of orbital space and possibly terres- in the other two orbital regimes become more transient
trial locations of space assets in the AOR of a different as their altitudes decrease. As a result, LEO satellites
combatant command. In addition, the orbital portion may traverse over an AOR within minutes and require

72 January-February 2020  MILITARY REVIEW

 OPERATIONAL-LEVEL INTELLIGENCE

different considerations in the IPB process (e.g., shorter through space, or indirectly, by causing charging of the
uplink or collection windows) than the GEO satellites. ionosphere—which degrades space-to-ground commu-
The ground stations that control these satellites or chan- nications. Since disruptions related to solar activity are as
nel data from them constitute the “support area,” but hard to predict in advance as solar activity itself, it is best
this support area will be noncontiguous; ground stations to develop robust communications plans, especially for
may be in the corps’ consolidation area, the theater those systems whose signals may be affected.5
army’s joint security area, or the strategic support area. Orbital debris routinely puts satellites at risk.
Following this line of thinking, the operational-level To protect on-orbit assets, maintaining situational
commander now has a horizontal deep/close/support/ awareness in space, largely through ground-based
consolidation construct and a vertical deep/close/sup- radars, is an essential support mission for successful
port construct to frame the operating area. space operations, and intelligence planners should
Step 2: Describe the environmental effects on oper- keep in mind the Combined Force Space Component
ations. Broadly, space operations require consideration of Command (CFSCC), the unit responsible for space
space environmental effects and terrestrial environmen- situational awareness, as a source of intelligence.
tal effects. The space environment may affect the space Inside the atmosphere,
and link segments of space systems, and the terrestrial the assessment of environ-
environment may affect the link and ground segments mental effects must also Maj. Jerry Drew,
of space systems. Intelligence professionals will likely be include terrain and weath- U.S. Army, is the battalion
more familiar with terrestrial environmental effects, but er effects on both the link operations officer (S3) for
as with the terrestrial environment, the space environ- and the ground segments 1st Space Battalion, 1st
ment can and does affect military operations. of space systems. For these Space Brigade. He holds
Gravity itself is the dominant physical force within segments, terrain may a BS in art, philosophy,
the space environment. Because of gravity, the orbit- block GPS or satellite com- and literature from the
al patterns of satellites are repetitive and are there- munications (SATCOM) U.S. Military Academy
fore predictable for both friendly and enemy assets. signals—effects that organ- and an MS in astronau-
Furthermore, it is because of their gravitational prop- ic, operational-level space tical engineering from
erties that GEO locations are highly valuable. Planners staff can model throughout the Naval Postgraduate
should consider the orbital slots themselves for desig- planning and execution. School. Additionally, he is
nation as key terrain; the satellites in those slots may Terrestrial weather, of a 2017 Art of War Scholar
qualify as critical/defended assets. course, brings its own and a 2018 graduate of
If gravity was the only consideration, the space effects. For space systems, the School of Advanced
environment would be fairly benign, but three other rainstorms may limit Military Studies. In his previ-
factors contribute to the space environment’s general SATCOM connectivity ous assignment as a planner
harshness: extreme temperatures, solar and galactic on certain frequencies, for the U.S. Army Space and
radiation, and sixty years of orbital debris. Because of employment options for Missile Defense Command
these factors, satellites may fail in orbit at any time, mobile space or counter- G5, he led the planning
and it is thus important for intelligence and operation- space assets, and launch team that transitioned
al planners to address contingencies for the potential timetables. Furthermore, Army Service Component
loss of space systems that bear directly on the mission. cloud cover or periods of Command support to
Thankfully, the temperatures a satellite will experience limited visibility may hin- U.S. Space Command
are fairly predictable, and engineers build satellites to der imagery collection and (USSPACECOM) and
withstand these anticipated temperatures. delay satellites’ warnings of served as an original
Solar activity, however, is largely unpredictable. Such missile launches. As with a member of the planning
activity may disrupt normal function of the satellite by communications plan, the teams that established
causing errant electrical discharges within the space- intelligence collection plan USSPACECOM and con-
craft. Solar activity may also affect the link segment and the theater missile ducted initial planning for
either directly, by interfering with the signal as it travels warning/defense plan the U.S. Space Force.

MILITARY REVIEW  January-February 2020 73

must consider the limitations of available assets and the
possibility of employing alternate means. Furthermore, 1. Due to gravitational effects, orbital patterns repeat and
friendly key terrain (on the ground) may demand mea-
are therefore predictable. Geosynchronous orbits are
sures designed to protect them from space-based surveil-
highly valuable and should be considered for designation
lance (e.g., camouflage, radio silence procedures, military
deception, or counterspace operations). as key terrain; the systems in those slots are likely
Finally, civil considerations come into play with space candidates for critical/defended asset designation.
operations just as they do with traditional fire and ma- 2. The harshness of the environment may cause spacecraft
neuver. Does the civilian population get its information
failure at any time; robust alternate, contingency, and
from government-controlled satellite broadcasts? Are
there local television or radio stations that ground forces emergency plans are necessary for all systems.
could commandeer? How vulnerable are ground stations 3. Orbital debris may put satellites at risk; space situational
to peering locals or projected refugee flow patterns? awareness is essential for protection of on-orbit assets.
How will the local use of electromagnetic radiation affect 4. Solar activity may disrupt normal satellite operations/
the ability of friendly forces to operate in the way that
signal propagation, causing perception of intentional
it wants (green-on-blue interference)? For that matter,
how will the use of friendly systems interfere with other interference.
friendly systems (blue-on-blue interference)? All of these 5. Terrestrial weather may interfere with certain
questions require consideration to holistically assess the transmission frequencies; employment of mobile
environmental effects. Figure 2 provides a synopsis of
space/counterspace assets; and conduct of
general battlefield effects of the space environment and of
reconnaissance, early warning, and launch missions.
the terrestrial environment on space systems.
Step 3: Evaluate the threat. Doctrinally, space sys- 6. A crowded electromagnetic spectrum may cause
tems consist of three segments: the space segment (sat- interference with space-based signals.
ellites), the ground segment (control and data processing 7. Civil populations may depend upon satellite systems
stations), and the link segment (the electromagnetic radi-
for information/entertainment; ground stations may
ation that connects the two and allows for the passage of
data). Closely tied to—but not part of—the space system be vulnerable to negative public opinion, hostile
are the servers, networks, and software programs that observation, or refugee flow.
allow for the transfer of data from ground site to ground
site; these elements are within the cyber domain but bear (Figure by author)
consideration in both the conduct of space operations
and in multi-domain IPB. Figure 2. Initial Considerations for
Just as with ground operations, a space-centric Defining Space Domain Environmental
evaluation of the threat requires extensive knowledge of Effects on Operations
the enemy’s order of battle (OOB) for all segments and
the manner in which the enemy typically employs their
forces. Thus, just as large-scale combat operations require An enemy satellite OOB may take on many forms.
OOBs, doctrinal templates, and situational templates for A satellite OOB may group satellites by orbital regime,
the enemy ground force, multi-domain operations require ownership, function, or some combination thereof. An
the same basic products for the enemy’s space forces. At orbital regime grouping would divide capabilities along
present, the most significant limitation to holistic analysis the lines of orbits described above (GEO, MEO, LEO)
is the development of the four constituent OOBs for en- with the addition of a fourth type of orbit, the highly
emy space forces: satellite, link segment, ground segment, elliptical orbit, which is particularly useful for polar
and cyber segment. As the cyber segment falls outside surveillance or communications.
of the space domain, it is not herein addressed in detail. An ownership grouping would divide satellites
However, each of the other OOBs bears explanation. by who operates them. Typically, satellites belong to

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 OPERATIONAL-LEVEL INTELLIGENCE

Satellites Ground segment

–Missile warning –Satellite communication
Enemy order –Communications (SATCOM) jammers
of battle –Positioning, navigation, –PNT jammers
and timing (PNT) –Laser weapons
Satellites
–Signals intelligence –Ground stations
–Imagery intelligence –Ground terminals
Link segment
–Civil/scientific
Ground
segment Architectural
Cyber
analysis
Link segment Cyber
–Frequencies –Ground station
–Channels connectivity
–Transponders –Ground terminal
–Signal characteristics connectivity
–Encryption

*A comprehensive order of battle will drive intelligence collection, the targeting process, force protection measures, development of options for the joint force commander, and
an appreciation for the options available to the enemy.

(Figure by author. The graphic outlines a framework of the products and analysis that emerge from step 3 of the intelligence preparation of the battlefield process. Though not a
constituent part of the space order of battle analysis, the cyber order of battle is necessary for a complete architectural analysis.)

Figure 3. Evaluate the Threat Products and Analysis Framework

four types of owners: militaries, intelligence commu- Scientists, approximately two thousand operational
nities, civil-government agencies (e.g., the National satellites currently orbit Earth.7 Simply maintaining situa-
Aeronautics and Space Administration or the National tional awareness of all these satellites (not to mention
Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration), or com- other orbital debris that require tracking) is a full-time
mercial entities (e.g., Intelsat, Iridium, and Eutelsat). In endeavor; translating what this information means to
large-scale combat operations, all government satellites an operational-level commander is an entirely different
of the enemy may be legitimate targets, and it may be effort that requires a significant dedication of resources.
possible to target commercial assets, depending on If the prospect of compiling and analyzing a com-
circumstances. It may, however, not be wise to target all prehensive satellite OOB is daunting, doing the same
types. A Cold War norm, for example, holds that the for a comprehensive link segment OOB may be nearly
targeting of an enemy’s strategic missile warning satel- impossible. Satellite links come in two broad types:
lites may be viewed as a prelude to a nuclear strike. command-and-control links to manage satellite op-
The third type of grouping is by function. Satellites erations (uplinks) and data links that provide the
that support joint operations include communications; data that fulfills the satellite’s purpose (downlinks).
missile warning; position, navigation, and timing; intel- Communications satellites, for example, operate through
ligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance; and environ- a command-and-control uplink. To fulfill its downlink
mental monitoring. Satellites with an attack function, function, a satellite may use multiple beams, chan-
so-called kamikaze or “kidnapper” satellites, form nels, frequencies, waveforms, and types of encryption.
another category.6 According to the Union of Concerned Furthermore, controllers switch users from channel

MILITARY REVIEW  January-February 2020 75

to channel or from frequency to frequency as the mis- their orders, fixed and mobile SATCOM jammers, GPS
sion requires. Again, building the catalog is only part of jammers, and ground-based lasers or antisatellite mis-
the problem. Determining which part of the catalog is siles. Also included in the ground segment are radar and
relevant to the operation at hand and how to make it optical sensors that track satellites in order to maintain
operationally useful is a problem that requires a full-time the orbital catalog. For the ground segment, the discipline
commitment and expansive employment of signals intel- of navigation warfare (NAVWAR) becomes particularly
ligence assets and experts. important. NAVWAR deals with understanding how
friendly and enemy forces use position, navigation, and
timing data to enhance operations. For example, the
The results of step 3 will reveal options: enemy may use GPS or a variety of GPS-like systems to
employ precision-guided munitions, to achieve accurate
timing for their encryption systems, or to command and
1. On-orbit options may include repositioning satellites
control ground forces (as U.S. forces do through Blue
to optimize the constellation or employing an on- Force Tracking systems). A detailed investigation of
orbit space situational awareness satellite to observe NAVWAR capabilities often involves the study of specif-
a particular satellite of an adversary. ic types of warheads, radios, receivers, or other hardware.
2. Within the link segment, the enemy may reprioritize
With comprehensive space, link, and ground-seg-
ment OOBs available, the next step is to piece together
user traffic, reduce the size of their beams to focus
the enemy’s space systems architectures. Each con-
support and reduce vulnerability to jammer attack, or stellation—sometimes each individual satellite—will
update encryption protocols. have its own architecture for command and control
3. Ground-based options may involve the employment of and for data dissemination. With a complementary
cyber OOB, the architecture becomes more complete.
jammers, the displacement of ground-station operators
These architectures become part of the threat mod-
to more secure facilities, or preparations for the launch els that are the output of step 3 of the IPB process.8
of a new satellite to provide additional capability. A second type of threat model that emerges is the
concept of how enemy operations might employ their
Consideration of these options by phase/effort allows ground-segment forces, particularly mobile counter-
space systems. Figure 3 (on page 75) depicts a schemat-
planners to develop holistic, multi-domain enemy courses
ic of the products and analysis that emerge from this
of action, which will, in turn, drive comprehensive friendly process, which feed into step 4 of the IPB process.
courses of action. Step 4: Determine the threat courses of action.
With an agreed-upon definition of the expanded battle-
(Figure by author; a synopsis of general threat options that may combine with other
field, an understanding of its effects, and a comprehensive
domain options to form a holistic threat course of action.) threat evaluation, the next step is to determine the threat
courses of action. These courses of action, of course, are
Figure 4. Determine Threat situationally dependent, so a general discussion of possible
Courses of Action enemy options must suffice. On-orbit options may include
repositioning satellites to optimize a constellation of satel-
lites or employing an on-orbit space situational awareness
Finally, the ground segment bears consideration, and satellite to observe an enemy satellite. Ground-based
for this analysis, the operational-level Army is better options may involve the employment of jammers, the
postured. While numbers of enemy infantry divisions, displacement of ground-station operators to more secure
armored brigades, and bridging assets are important, so facilities, or preparations for the launch of a new satellite
too are the enemy’s ground-based space assets. This OOB to provide additional capability. Within the link segment,
includes ground stations for satellite control and data the enemy may reprioritize user traffic, reduce the size of
processing, the headquarters that give the ground stations their beams to focus support and reduce vulnerability to

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 OPERATIONAL-LEVEL INTELLIGENCE

jammer attacks, update encryption protocols, or offload space-based capabilities that bear consideration in
military traffic onto commercial systems. the regional analysis, the North Koreans have little to
At the operational-level, integrating these space-do- speak of, except counterspace systems.
main options into a wider course of action that considers According to Field Manual 3-94, Theater Army,
all domains is essential. Very often, the traditional ma- Corps, and Division Operations, “a corps headquarters is
neuver and fires plan emerges with concepts for the other the Army’s predominant operational-level formation,”
warfighting functions, and space and cyber aspects are but it can also serve as a tactical-level formation as part
“bolted on” near the end of the process. Without courses of a joint or combined force land component com-
of action that include enemy space options, however, mand.9 In either role, it prepares for combat operations
operational-level intelligence planners cannot develop that control multiple divisions and support assets based

At the operational-level, integrating these space-

domain options into a wider course of action that con-
siders all domains is essential.

holistic courses of action that force the ground formation on its theater planning priorities. I Corps, for example,
to anticipate the enemy across all domains. Figure 4 (on aligns to U.S. Indo-Pacific Command planning priori-
page 76) provides a synopsis of the discussion on step 4. ties and is currently leading the Army in its multi-do-
main task force (MDTF) experimentation. Although
Who Is Responsible and for What? a tactical element, the MDTF, with its organic intel-
By function, strategic-level organizations like com- ligence, information, cyber, electronic warfare, and
batant commands focus on joint processes, which are space (I2CEWS) battalions, seems a likely candidate
more holistic; as a consequence, they are less detailed. to contribute to operational-level intelligence for space
Tactical-level organizations, like Army divisions, focus operations, but it will require significant support from
primarily on their domain-specific segment with its corps headquarters and possibly from ASCCs with
consideration of the most relevant capabilities of the which its corps headquarters will be in coordination.
other domains (e.g., air support capacity throughout the It is important to note that ASCCs currently come
operation). As one might expect, Army divisions dedi- in two types: ASCCs to functional combatant com-
cate significant effort to detailed understanding of the mands and ASCCs to geographic combatant com-
battlefield and the enemy’s potential within it. Linking mands (or theater armies). The functional ASCCs are
the strategic level and the tactical level, however, are presently U.S. Army Special Operations Command,
the operational-level commands, and this is where the Surface Deployment and Distribution Command,
connective tissue in the intelligence picture of the space and U.S. Army Space and Missile Defense Command
domain is lacking across the Army. (USASMDC). The rest of the Army’s ASCCs (in-
Presumably, three types of Army formations bear cluding the U.S. Army Cyber Command) are desig-
the responsibility for conducting operational-level nated theater armies, though the U.S. Army Cyber
IPB: the field army, Army corps headquarters, and Command, in its organizational structure and mission
the Army service component command (ASCC). sets, exhibits a functional flavor.10
Among these, the United States currently only fields Among these ASCCs, USASMDC retains the
one field army, the Eighth Army in South Korea. preponderance of the Army’s space operations person-
Given the proximity and nature of the threat this field nel and significant intelligence production capabilities
army faces, its IPB is singularly focused. On the other and seems to have the greatest responsibility for linking
hand, while the Chinese and Russians field significant strategic intelligence of the space domain to tactical

MILITARY REVIEW  January-February 2020 77

action. As a peer organization to the theater armies, It is apparent that a part of the solution is institu-
USASMDC formally serves as a force provider of allo- tional change. The military intelligence community
cated forces and a supporting organization for things like should reevaluate its training programs for space- and
satellite communication management. Informally, how- cyber-specific skills, and the Defense Intelligence
ever, USASMDC often provides modeling and analysis, Agency should reevaluate its distribution of responsi-
opines on tactics and techniques for the employment of bilities through a revised Defense Intelligence Analysis
low-density assets, and incorporates feedback from the Program—one that probably shifts significant space-re-
field for capability development. Additionally, it enjoys lated TCPED responsibilities to U.S. Space Command.
a close working relationship with the CFSCC, which is But traditional notions of space operations and a revised
currently an operational-level space organization under Defense Intelligence Analysis Program will not be suf-
U.S. Space Command (USSPACECOM). While import- ficient for the operational-level Army. Effective incor-
ant resources in the quest for comprehensive operation- poration of space systems requires a reconception of the
al-level space intelligence, neither USASMDC nor the extended battlefield and how to divide responsibilities
CFSCC currently have the capacity or the mandate to within it. It further requires a holistic approach to or-
answer the operational-level space intelligence needs of der-of-battle development—the space, link, and ground
the Army; and despite the formal establishment of the segments—and an understanding of the architectures
U.S. Space Command, it will likely require multiple years that allow them to operate. Such an understanding is
to achieve full operational capability. essential for friendly as well as enemy forces. With this
work done—which is essentially the first three steps of
Conclusion the IPB process—planners can incorporate space opera-
Given the current organization of the operation- tions options into multi-domain courses of action.
al-level Army, the designated need for a holistic ap- The operational level of the Army must be among
proach to multi-domain IPB, and a shortage of institu- the first to adopt these changes and must strive to
tional expertise and capacity, the Army faces a gap that incorporate them into its routine processes. While
may prohibit it from achieving a multi-domain force by each of these formations contain both military intelli-
2028. The roadblocks to operational-level space intelli- gence and space operations personnel, the intelligence
gence practices result from the institutionalization of a personnel are not typically space experienced, and the
faulty model on what space intelligence is, namely the space personnel do not typically have an intelligence
TCPED process. While strategic-level organizations background. Thus, in cases where space support ele-
(the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National Security ments enjoy better-than-average integration with their
Agency, and others) provide some of the pieces to the intelligence partners, the results seem to be in spite of
space intelligence puzzle (and tactical-level organiza- institutional norms not because of them. USASMDC
tions provide others), the connective tissue between the and CFSCC provide valuable resources but neither
strategic and tactical is missing. The establishment of their structure, capacity, nor designated missions allow
USSPACECOM has created a military-strategic organi- them to fulfill the needs of the Eighth Army, the three
zation responsible for space, and it seems highly possible Army corps, or the eight other ASCCs.
that USSPACECOM—at some future date—will be the Moving forward, theater armies should insist upon
keeper of the master order of battle and the majority of conceptual clarity on the definition of the extended
the Department of Defense’s military space expertise. battlefield, including the space portion, within their
Furthermore, it will coordinate with other combatant combatant commands. These concepts are not yet
commands through formal integrated planning ele- doctrinally defined (a problem for USASMDC to
ments, which will augment combatant command staffs address), and no battlefield frameworks seem quite ad-
throughout the operations process. At tactical echelons, equate for the task, although the deep/close/support/
the MDTF with its intelligence, information, cyber, consolidation framework may provide a useful starting
and electronic warfare and space battalions will execute point. Theater armies should continue to focus on the
space activities and will likely aid in intelligence collec- ground threat and demand support for more exten-
tion. But what is in the middle? sive space (and cyber) orders of battle. In this effort,

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 OPERATIONAL-LEVEL INTELLIGENCE

national agencies, USSPACECOM (potentially with a the Army will continue to move toward its vision
dedicated military intelligence formation organic to it), of a 2028 multi-domain force. Space operations are
USASMDC, and CFSCC have parts to play. As global essential to that vision, but gaps that exist in current
commands, however, these organizations will not have models and processes may preclude their effective in-
an appreciation for the theater-specific problem sets of corporation into the multi-domain fight. It is certain-
the other operational-level commands. Albeit with sup- ly true that intelligence gained from strategic space
port through integrated planning elements, allocated systems is essential to the manner in which the joint
forces, and reach-back support, it remains the respon- force wages military operations, but viewing space
sibility of the theater armies to map the intelligence to systems simply as process enablers causes them to
their particular problem sets and to determine what it be overlooked as critical pieces of the multi-domain
means to their projected courses of action. operations puzzle. Thus, the Army, as an institution,
Regardless of any changes that may or may not must address this shortfall to prepare ground combat
occur within the intelligence and space enterprises, commands for an uncertain future.

Notes
1. The Defense Intelligence Agency manages this process AORs may disappear as a construct altogether. In any event, as a
through the Defense Intelligence Analysis Program, which allocates practical matter, an operational-level commander has to consider an
and prioritizes resources across the intelligence community. For AOI for space that is physically and psychologically removed from
example, if U.S. Transportation Command requires geospatial traditional notions of AOIs. The March 2019 revision of ATP 2-01.3
intelligence products, the Defense Intelligence Analysis Program aids greatly in fostering such a mindset.
provides for the command to have an external intelligence node 4. For additional details on these orbital regimes, see figure I-1,
that conducts tasking, collecting, processing, exploiting, and “Orbit Type and Characteristics,” in Joint Publication 3-14, Space
disseminating on behalf of the U.S. Transportation Command and Operations (Washington, DC: U.S. GPO, 10 April 2018), I-11.
provides the command with the desired finished product. This 5. Although difficult to predict in advance, the Air Force
model assumes that space-based intelligence formations do not Weather Agency is able to monitor and assess solar activity after
need to be organic to a particular formation, effectively allowing it happens. This function is important because it can rule out the
the Defense Intelligence Agency to outsource this capability on possibility of intentional interference, an enemy activity that drives
behalf of combatant commands. the decision cycle.
2. Army Techniques Publication (ATP) 2-01.3, Intelligence Prepa- 6. Jim Sciutto and Jennifer Rizzo, “War in Space: Kamikazes,
ration of the Battlefield (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Publishing Kidnapper Satellites and Lasers,” CNN, updated 29 November 2016,
Office [GPO], 2019), 1-3. Within the context of multi-domain oper- accessed 1 June 2019, http://www.cnn.com/2016/11/29/politics/
ations, the word “battlefield” itself may imply a false limitation. The space-war-lasers-satellites-russia-china/.
Marine Corps’ use of “battlespace” or the joint force’s use of “opera- 7. “UCS Satellite Database,” Union of Concerned Scientists,
tional environment” are more precise terms. The March 2019 version updated 31 March 2019, accessed 1 October 2019, https://www.
of ATP 2-01.3 retains “battlefield” in the process name but considers ucsusa.org/nuclear-weapons/space-weapons/satellite-database#.
the entire operational environment; this is a significant change from XES1xvZFxYc.
the 2014 version of the same publication. The analytical planner or 8. See ATP 2-03.1, Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield,
operator must be willing to consider an extended battlefield—one para. 5-20. It is worth noting that the previous version of ATP
that potentially extends into outer space. 2-03.1, Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield/Battlespace (2014),
3. Ibid., 3-4. To add to the confusion, areas of operations and the Marines adopted the term “adversary model” instead of “threat
areas of interests (AOIs) are operating areas within the area of re- model,” which lends itself toward a more expansive application of
sponsibility (AOR). The commander of the U.S. European Command, the intelligence preparation of the battlefield process across the
for example, is responsible for an AOR as defined in the Unified continuum of conflict.
Command Plan. Prior to the most recent update to the Unified 9. Field Manual (FM) 3-94, Theater Army, Corps, and Division Op-
Command Plan, the commander of U.S. European Command was erations (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2014),
notionally responsible for everything within those defined boundar- 1-2; FM 3-0, Operations (Washington, DC: U.S. GPO, 2017), 2-11.
ies—from the bottom of the ocean to the furthest reaches of space. 10. For outlines of the specific roles and responsibilities of each
In the most recent update to the Unified Command Plan, the U.S. of these Army service component commands, see Army Regulation
Space Command AOR was defined as orbital space with altitudes 10-87, Army Commands, Army Service Component Commands, and
greater than one hundred kilometers. In the future, it is possible that Direct Reporting Units (Washington, DC: U.S. GPO, 2017).

MILITARY REVIEW  January-February 2020 79

Pfc. Gatwech Both of Company B, 1st Battalion, 297th Infantry Regiment, Alaska National Guard, provides suppressive fire with his team 2 March
2018 during Arctic Eagle 2018 at the Donnelly Training Area outside of Fort Greely, Alaska. The Alaska National Guard has successfully operated
in the Arctic and defended Alaska for more than seventy-six years. (Photo by Spc. Michael Risinger, U.S. Army National Guard)

Great Power Collaboration?

A Possible Model for Arctic Governance
Maj. Dai Jing, Singapore Armed Forces
Master Sgt. Raymond Huff, U.S. Army

P reviously thought of as a frozen landscape

of interest only to scientists, the Arctic has
increasingly garnered the attention of the
international community. Climate change has seen
an average rise in global temperatures of 0.9 degrees
Celsius in the past 140 years. In the Arctic, however,
temperatures have risen twice that of the global aver-
age due to a reinforcing feedback loop called “Arctic

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 ARCTIC GOVERNANCE

amplification,” where more dark-colored seawater ab- the environmental, economic, and security impacts
sorbs heat, and in turn, melts more ice.1 In the past fifty of the Arctic are global in nature, its governance
years, Arctic sea ice has shrunk to about half its original should be correspondingly global. Hence, as both an
size.2 While scientists do not yet agree on the exact Arctic state and the largest economy in the world,
timeline of the melt, it is estimated that within fifteen the United States should take the lead in fostering
to thirty years, parts of the Arctic will be ice-free for international cooperation in the Arctic.
significant durations annually.3
For the littoral Arctic states—Canada, Finland, Collaboration, Competition,
Iceland, the Kingdom of Denmark, Norway, Russia, and Conflict
Sweden, and the United States—this melt brings the At a casual glance, it appears that the trend in the
potential of accessing previously inaccessible resources. Arctic is one of cooperation rather than conflict, lead-
It is estimated that a fifth of the world’s hydrocarbons ing to claims that the tensions in the South China Sea
is locked under the Arctic ice.4 Beyond hydrocarbons, a can be solved by learning how the Arctic states resolve
melted Arctic would also bring additional sources of fish; and manage their conflicts.12 For example, since its
minerals; metals; and hydro, wind, geothermal, tidal, formation in 1996 as part of the Ottawa Declaration,
and solar power.5 On the other hand, the reduction of the Arctic Council has established three legally bind-
the natural barrier formed by the ice is a security threat. ing agreements on search and rescue, oil pollution
The Arctic states, therefore, all have distinct interests in preparedness, and scientific research.13 In addition,
maintaining trade routes, resource development, sea ice countries in the Arctic region and the European Union
claims, and regional stability (see figure 1, page 82).6 (EU) have collectively agreed to not increase fishing
Other non-Arctic states—China, France, Germany, activities in Arctic waters for at least sixteen years so
India, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, Poland, Singapore, the scientific community can study the long-term eco-
South Korea, Spain, Switzerland, and the United logical impacts of melting sea ice.14 Thus far, conflicting
Kingdom—have all declared interest in the region and territorial disputes in the region are largely arbitrated
joined the Arctic Council as permanent observers.7 For by United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
them, the most important development is arguably the (UNCLOS) submissions or bilateral agreements.15
potential viability of new waterways through the Arctic Look below the surface, however, and one can dis-
as the ice melts. If fully opened, the Transpolar Sea cover a variety of diplomatic, informational, economic,
Route, Northern Sea Route, and the Northwest Passage and military posturing by countries with Arctic inter-
can significantly cut shipping times from Europe to ests. The official posi-
Asia.8 Furthermore, without the canal limitations of tra- Maj. Dai Jing, Singapore tion of most of these
ditional shipping routes, bigger cargo ships can provide Armed Forces, is a countries is primarily
greater economies of scale each trip.9 Underwater, the combat engineer officer.
access to more ocean floor means more fiber-optic cables She previously attend- Master Sgt. Raymond
can be laid, making telecommunications more efficient ed the Engineer Basic Huff, U.S. Army, is the
and reliable.10 As many of these non-Arctic states are Officer Leader Course deputy commandant
beneficiaries of the traditional trade routes, the potential and the Regional Leader of the Sgt. First Class
disruption in trade caused by the melting Arctic is pos- Development Program- Christopher R. Brevard
sibly an existential threat. Beyond trade routes, many of Pacific with the U.S. Armed Noncommissioned Officers
these states are also highly keen on gaining access to the Forces. She is currently Academy. Previously, he
potential resources in the Arctic.11 attending the Battalion served as a platoon ser-
Against this backdrop, multiple Arctic and Commander’s Course geant in 4th Brigade, 25th
non-Arctic states are making moves to gain an edge, in Singapore and has Infantry Division, and as an
or even hegemony, before the ice fully melts. Thus, served in the Singapore instructor at the Aviation
the question of whether the regional governance Combat Engineers and the Center of Excellence
should be restricted locally or expanded globally is an National Service Affairs Noncommissioned Officers
important one. To this end, the authors argue that as Department. Academy.

MILITARY REVIEW  January-February 2020 81

 (Figure courtesy of Arctic Portal. Sources: Arctic Monitoring & Assessment Programme, Northern Sea Route Information Office, National Snow and Ice Data Center, and International Maritime Organization)

Figure 1. Arctic Shipping Routes and Economic Exclusion Zones

that of adhering to an international rules-based order in the Far North.19 Antiship missile sites and ports have
and cooperation between states. However, a number of been established along the northern sea border of Russia,
competing claims have not been resolved, and coun- including sites on islands that pose a threat to any vessels
tries are defending their claims with military buildup. that have an interest in the Arctic. Although not directly
Of the Arctic states, Russia appears to be making related to the Arctic, withdrawal from the Intermediate-
the most aggressive moves. With $300 billion in Arctic Range Nuclear Forces Treaty by both Russia and the
infrastructure investments, Russia is sending a clear United States is a cause for concern as it is a sign of hos-
signal about its hegemonic Arctic ambitions.16 Russian tility.20 In its defense, the Arctic ice was traditionally seen
President Vladimir Putin openly declared the Northern as a natural barrier between Russia and NATO states.21
Sea Route as an international shipping artery rivaling tra- With that natural barrier melting, Russia feels the pres-
ditional routes and claimed parts of it as Russia’s internal sure to bolster its northern defenses.
waters, meaning the country can decide who can transit Uncharacteristically, Canada makes similar claims
through it, effectively monopolizing the waterway.17 that parts of the Northwest Passage are its internal
Beyond rhetoric, Russia looks prepared to defend its waters. Consequently, it protested the 1969 voyage
claims militarily. Alarm bells first rang in 2007, when a of the USS Manhattan as an intrusion by the United
Russian submarine expedition planted a titanium Russian States into Canadian sovereignty. To defend its
flag under the North Pole.18 Since then, it has built up an claims, Canada plans to upgrade its Arctic military
extensive collection of forty icebreakers, naval ships, land- capabilities with icebreaker ships, offshore patrol
based military deployments and military infrastructure ships, snowmobiles, surveillance equipment, and

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 ARCTIC GOVERNANCE

satellite communications.22 As a show of deterrence, Despite these developments, some scholars believe
the Canadian Armed Forces have also conducted that hostile competition in the Arctic is a remote
annual sovereignty defense exercises in the Arctic scenario due to its current harsh conditions, poor
under Operation Nunalivit since 2007.23 In another infrastructure, and the relatively peaceful stability
display of sovereignty, Canada prevented the sale of the Arctic states.34 However, this view may be too
of Canadian radar technology to the United States temporally and geographically myopic. First, unlike
on grounds of national security in 2008.24 That said, the South China Sea, the resources promised by the
Canada is taking care not to appear too aggressive Arctic are not ready for exploitation yet. Thus, while
with permanent Arctic deployments.25 there is little benefit currently for overt conflict, many
The newest big player in the arena is China. In the countries are preparing the theater using diplomatic,
2018 Arctic Policy, China declared itself as a “near-Arc- informational, and economic campaigns while simul-
tic State” and expressed the desire to build a “Polar taneously building their militaries. Second, China’s
Silk Road” through the Arctic.26 Unlike its hegemon- military developments are running in tandem with
ic posturing in the South China Sea, China’s Arctic its demonstrated ambitions under its global Belt and
rhetoric has been about trade freedom and respect for Road Initiative.35 Thus, once conditions are ripe, it may
UNCLOS.27 Overtly, China’s moves in the Arctic are well resort to the hard power tactics it is pursuing in
largely an exercise of soft power via research, invest- the South China Sea to achieve its economic aims.36
ments, and infrastructure development with multiple Therefore, to avoid escalation into another Cold War
Arctic states.28 It currently spends $60 million annually or armed conflict, the priority in the Arctic must be to
on research in the region.29 Economically, China en- establish an inclusive governance model to ensure all
gaged with many Arctic states to fund projects in a bid stakeholders’ interests are addressed, wherever their
for influence in the region. In 2013, it established a free geographical locations may be.
trade agreement with Iceland, the first with a European
country. In 2014, it supplied $12 billion to the Yamal An Ideal Arctic Governance Model
LNG project—a Russian liquefied natural gas (LNG) Despite the heavy global influence of the region, the
company—to complete a project when funding fell as Arctic Council only allows the eight Arctic states to be
a result of U.S. sanctions on Russia. China also engaged full members while non-Arctic states can only become
with the United States and signed a deal to provide permanent observers. With no binding legal powers
funding for the Alaska LNG project in 2017. Most re- and mandate to discuss military topics, the Arctic
cently, in late 2018, China is in talks with Greenland on Council, in its current form, is a weak institution to
infrastructure projects. However, some government of- guard against aggressive geopolitical posturing in the
ficials fear it may come at a price of Greenland’s control Arctic.37 A stronger governance model based upon
over its raw materials.30 Despite the focus on economy, sound principles needs to be established.
military buildup is still relevant here, as China recently With such potential for economic growth, it is easy
launched its first domestically produced icebreaker, the to forget that the Arctic melt poses severe environ-
Snow Dragon II.31 Furthermore, it is making plans for mental impacts that will far outweigh the economic
naval and submarine operations in the Arctic.32 gains discussed above. First, temperature increases in
Apart from the countries mentioned above, other the Arctic will in turn increase global temperatures
non-Arctic littoral entities are also putting more focus and could result in rising sea levels.38 Irresponsible
on the Arctic. The EU is looking to build icebreakers and development and ice breaking in the region may very
announced its own Arctic policy. NATO has likewise well add to these temperature increases. Second, native
studied into its future involvements in the Arctic. Asian food security is reduced due to the loss of whaling and
countries like South Korea and Singapore have also built sealing from the warmer waters, leading to potential
large icebreakers to access the Arctic shipping routes.33 relocations of whole communities in the Arctic.39 To
All these actions suggest that the attention on the Arctic minimize these negative impacts, the primary principle
is global in nature and countries are willing to invest of Arctic governance must be environmental sustain-
significant capital to get ahead in the Arctic game. ability and climate change prevention.

MILITARY REVIEW  January-February 2020 83

 Given current predictions, however, the Arctic melt strong international leadership and advocacy for collabo-
is probably more a matter of when than if.40 As such, ration rather than competition, a similar system could be
development governance and territorial conflicts need to achieved in the Arctic.
be addressed early. On economy and resources, the most
globally equitable position is to treat the Arctic as a global Implications for U.S. Policy
common that is free and open for international trade and While it appears to the general American public
resource exploration while maintaining way-of-life safe- that Arctic developments only impact the remote
guards for the four-million-person indigenous Arctic pop- Arctic state of Alaska, these developments, in fact,

Given the global impacts of the Arctic, governance of

the Arctic’s developments and enforcement of the safe-
guards should be done by a truly international body.

ulation.41 This position is aligned with that of the United have serious implications on the United States’
States, the EU, and most non-Arctic states, suggesting a national security. First, if competition in the Arctic
strong potential for enforcement collaboration.42 Thus, leads to militarization, the consequences of conflict
freedom of trade anchored by an international rules-based will affect the overall U.S. military and economy.
order must be a key principle in Arctic governance. Thus, the U.S. Arctic Region Policy states that “U.S.
Given the global impacts of the Arctic, governance national security interests [in the Arctic] include
of the Arctic’s developments and enforcement of the such matters as missile defense and early warning;
safeguards should be done by a truly international body. deployment of sea and air systems for strategic
Membership of the Arctic Council should be expand- sealift, strategic deterrence, maritime presence, and
ed to all countries with Arctic interests. In addition, maritime security operations; and ensuring free-
all aspects of Arctic development, including military dom of navigation and overflight.”45 Second, beyond
ones, should be up for debate in the council. A possible militarization, the U.S. Department of Energy states
model to follow is that of the Antarctic Treaty System that the definition of national security with regards
that governs resource extraction and scientific explo- to the Arctic must be broad in nature and include
ration in Antarctica. Under the legally binding treaty, security in freedom to conduct economic, resource
all signatories suspended territorial claims and military extraction, and scientific research activities as well.46
activities. Instead, they collaborated to jointly facilitate As an Arctic state and an international leader, the
the stipulations of the treaty. The Antarctic Treaty United States must take steps to ensure its national
Consultative Meetings are open to all countries as long security interests in the Arctic are protected.
as they conduct “substantial research activity” as proof In line with the Department of Defense’s desired
of commitment to the region.43 end state for the Arctic as “a secure and stable region
Of course, there are significant differences between where U.S. national interests are safeguarded, the
the Arctic and Antarctica. First, there is little great U.S. homeland is defended, and nations work cooper-
power competition between the littoral Antarctic states. atively to address challenges,” the United States’ best
Second, because it is an actual landmass, the melt in strategy in the Arctic is to be a leading voice in advo-
Antarctica will not change trade routes but will instead cating for international collaboration in establishing
have a significant impact on global sea levels. As such, the global governance model described in the pre-
the economic and strategic gains in the Antarctic are ceding section.47 To do so, the United States will need
seemingly less significant, making it easier for countries to utilize its instruments of national power, with
to focus on environmental factors and be more altruistic particular emphasis on the twin pillars of diplomacy
in their approaches to the region.44 Nevertheless, with and military deterrence.

84 January-February 2020  MILITARY REVIEW

 ARCTIC GOVERNANCE

With just one heavy-class icebreaker and minimal A Russian soldier stands guard by a Pansyr-S1 air defense system 3
troops in Alaska, the United States’ deterrent is not April 2019 on Kotelny Island, part of the New Siberian Islands archi-
pelago, located between the Laptev Sea and the East Siberian Sea in
credible on its own.48 Diplomatically, the United States Russia. Russia has made reaffirming its military presence in the Arctic a
needs to work out its conflicts with Canada first and top priority amid intensifying international rivalry over the region that
then capitalize on its special relationship with the is believed to hold up to one-quarter of the planet’s undiscovered oil
country to convince its leadership to relinquish its and gas. (Photo by Vladimir Isachenkov, Associated Press)
internal waters claim on the Northwest Passage and
respect the provisions of UNCLOS.49 Thereafter, the
United States should champion international collabo-
ration in lobbying for a more inclusive governance body especially so if China and Russia collaborate not just
for Arctic development. This push for global Arctic economically but also militarily. It is neither cost
governance should also be underpinned by multilateral effective nor timely for the United States to attempt
military cooperation with interested nations. In a key to catch up to Russia’s, and potentially China’s, over
demonstration of good faith to rally the nations, the forty icebreakers. However, if it can pair its own
United States should ratify UNCLOS. Given all other icebreaker build up with the twenty-nine icebreak-
Arctic states are abiding by UNCLOS and the United ers and other naval assets of the NATO countries
States abides by it in action already, the ratification and friendly non-Arctic states like Japan and South
should be little more than a formality.50 Establishing Korea, it can send a dual message of deterrence and
multilateral cooperation will also alleviate perceptions international unity against any country trying to
of hegemonic Arctic ambitions by the United States. assert hegemony over the Arctic.51
The twin pillars of deterrence and diploma- Beyond deterrence, there are plenty of other
cy only work if the deterrence is credible. This is benefits of military collaboration in the Arctic. First,

MILITARY REVIEW  January-February 2020 85

 (Source: U.S. Coast Guard, https://www.pacificarea.uscg.mil/Our-Organization/District-17/)

Figure 2. U.S. Coast Guard District 17 Area of Operations

partner nations can gain much from jointly devel- For the U.S. military, a number of changes need
oping the poor communications infrastructure and to be made. Currently, command of operations in the
navigational data in the region so all vessels can pass Arctic is split amongst the U.S. North Command, the
through safely.52 Due to the harsh conditions, cost U.S. European Command, and the U.S. Indo-Pacific
sharing to develop Arctic-hardy unmanned systems Command. This could prove confusing should a large-
will be of special value. Second, the possibility of scale operation be required. Hence, contingency plans
oil spills as more oil tankers traverse the Arctic will for an ad hoc single command structure for Arctic
undoubtedly increase. In the difficult conditions of operations must be in place. In terms of deployments,
the Arctic, clean-up operations for spills will likely be it is paramount that the United States bolsters Coast
even more complex than those of the Exxon Valdez Guard and Navy presence in the Arctic, namely in
spill in 1989. Thus, joint emergency response plans Alaska and around the Bering Strait. Maintaining a
for this scenario need to be well developed and con- continued presence of U.S. Coast Guard District 17
stantly rehearsed. Finally, search-and-rescue opera- assets would support any diplomatic solution with
tions in the region will also be fraught with difficulty Canada without escalation to conflict (see figure 2).
and would provide a good platform for all nations to With these changes and the international collabora-
collaborate militarily.53 tion mentioned above, the United States will be in a

86 January-February 2020  MILITARY REVIEW

 ARCTIC GOVERNANCE

good position to ensure developments in the Arctic are As an Arctic state and the currently recognized
beneficial to the global community. global leader, the United States is in a unique position
to shift the current Arctic paradigm. With effective
Conclusion diplomacy and military collaboration, it can be the
The potential economic gains from the melt are leading voice for establishing a more inclusive global
tantalizing. If fully realized, global trade currents governance model for the Arctic that will overcome
could shift, threatening countries half a world away the current weak mandate of the Arctic Council on
while invigorating regions previously frozen out of military issues. The governance model should be based
the international economic community. Perhaps on the three key principles of free and open trade, a
even more than the South China Sea, impacts of rules-based order, and environmental conservation.
developments in the Arctic are global in nature. With current climate observations, the Arctic melt
Thus, the key priority must be in keeping the peace shows no signs of stopping, even if its rate of progress
and stability of the region by promoting interna- may not always be linear. Hence, the United States
tional collaboration and reducing counterproduc- needs to make the above preparations for the melt
tive competition. While the current geopolitical early. Establishing multilateral cooperation will allevi-
situation in the region seems to be generally col- ate perceptions that the United States is trying to assert
laborative, most Arctic states and other interested hegemony over the Arctic. With interests of more
non-Arctic states are making diplomatic, economic, groups considered, Arctic development is likely to be
and military moves in preparation for future com- more sustainable and equitable, leading to the creation
petition as the melt progresses. of a true global common with benefits for all.

Notes
1. E. Osborne, J. Richter-Menge, and M. Jeffries, eds., “Arc- accessed 12 August 2019, https://dod.defense.gov/Portals/1/
tic Report Card,” National Oceanic and Atmospheric Admin- Documents/pubs/2016-Arctic-Strategy-UNCLAS-cleared-
istration Arctic Program, accessed 12 August 2019, https:// for-release.pdf; “Maps: Shipping,” Arctic Portal, last updated
www.arctic.noaa.gov/Report-Card; Scott G. Borgerson, “Arctic April 2016, accessed 12 August 2019, https://arcticportal.org/
Meltdown: The Economic and Security Implications of Global maps-shipping.
Warming,” Foreign Affairs 87, no. 2 (March/April 2008), ac- 7. DOD, “Report to Congress on Strategy to Protect United
cessed 12 August 2019, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/ States National Security Interests in the Arctic Region.”
arctic-antarctic/2008-03-02/arctic-meltdown. 8. Paul Waldie, “A Reality Check on the Northwest Passage
2. William Booth and Amie Ferris-Rotman, “Russia’s Suez ‘Boom,’” The Globe and Mail (website), last updated 11 May
Canal? Ships Start Plying a Less-Icy Arctic, Thanks to Climate 2018, accessed 12 August 2019, https://www.theglobeandmail.
Change,” Washington Post (website), 8 September 2018, accessed com/report-on-business/breakthrough/will-cold-dark-northwest-
12 August 2019, https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/europe/ passage-see-more-ships/article16231502/. The trade route for
russias-suez-canal-ships-start-plying-an-ice-free-arctic-thanks- Panama Canal is navigable year-round: 25,588 km from Rotterdam
to-climate-change/2018/09/08/59d50986-ac5a-11e8-9a7d- to Shanghai. The Suez Canal is navigable year-round: 19,550 km.
cd30504ff902_story.html. The Northern Sea Route is currently navigable July-October:
3. Scott G. Borgerson, “The Coming Arctic Boom: As the Ice 15,793 km. The Northwest Passage is currently not yet navigable:
Melts, the Region Heats Up,” Foreign Affairs 92, no. 4 ( July/August 16,100 km. The Transpolar Sea Route is currently not yet naviga-
2013), accessed 12 August 2019, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/ ble: 13,630 km.
articles/global-commons/2013-06-11/coming-arctic-boom. 9. Roston, “How a Melting Arctic Changes Everything—Part III.”
4. Eric Roston, “How a Melting Arctic Changes Everything—Part 10. Dillow, “Russia and China Vie to Beat the US.”
III: The Economic Arctic,” Bloomberg, 29 December 2017, accessed 11. Roston, “How a Melting Arctic Changes Everything—Part III.”
12 August 2019, https://www.bloomberg.com/graphics/2017-arctic/ 12. Ian Storey, Arctic Lessons: What the South China Sea
the-economic-arctic/. Claimants can Learn from Cooperation in the High North (Singa-
5. Clay Dillow, “Russia and China Vie to Beat the US in the pore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 16 December 2013), 1,
Trillion-Dollar Race to Control the Arctic,” CNBC, 6 February 2018, accessed 12 August 2019, https://www.academia.edu/5435334/
accessed 12 August 2019, https://www.cnbc.com/2018/02/06/russia- Arctic_Lessons_What_the_South_China_Sea_Claimants_Can_
and-china-battle-us-in-race-to-control-arctic.html. Learn_from_Cooperation_in_the_High_North.
6. Department of Defense (DOD), “Report to Congress on 13. “The Arctic Council: A Backgrounder,” The Arctic Council,
Strategy to Protect United States National Security Interests in last updated 13 September 2018, accessed 12 August 2019, https://
the Arctic Region” (Washington, DC: DOD, December 2016), arctic-council.org/index.php/en/about-us.

MILITARY REVIEW  January-February 2020 87

 14. Jessica Brown, “Thaw in Accord: As Arctic Ice Melts, Territorial 32. Andrew Tate, “China Planning for Arctic Operations,” Jane’s
Disputes are Hotting Up, Too,” The Independent (website), 1 March Defence Weekly, 18 July 2018, accessed 8 December 2018, https://
2018, accessed 13 August 2019, https://www.independent.co.uk/envi- www.janes.com/article/81520/china-planning-for-arctic-operations
ronment/geopolitical-consequences-of-melting-arctic-ice-russia-cana- (site discontinued).
da-us-northern-sea-route-shipping-natural-a8229306.html. 33. Climate Change and the Arctic.
15. Eric Roston and Blacki Migliozzi, “How a Melting Arctic 34. Gary Roughead, “Getting Serious about the Arctic: US
Changes Everything—Part II: The Political Arctic,” Bloomberg, 16 Interests in the North,” Harvard International Review 36, no. 3 (14
May 2017, accessed 13 August 2019, https://www.bloomberg.com/ April 2015), accessed 4 February 2019, http://hir.harvard.edu/arti-
graphics/2017-arctic/the-political-arctic/. cle/?a=11048 (site discontinued).
16. Dillow, “Russia and China Vie to Beat the US.” 35. While the Chinese government has changed its English trans-
17. “The Emerging Arctic,” Council on Foreign Relations, lation of this initiative into the Belt and Road Initiative, its Mandarin
accessed 13 August 2019, https://www.cfr.org/interactives/emerg- name in official documents is still 带一路 (One Belt One Road).
ing-arctic?cid=otr_marketing_use-arctic_Infoguide%2523!#!/ 36. Despite the United Nations Convention on the Law of the
emerging-arctic?cid=otr_marketing_use-arctic_Infoguide%2523. Sea’s rulings against China, the country has still continued building up
18. Pavel Devyatkin, “Russia’s Arctic Strategy: Aimed at Con- military installations on disputed territory in the South China Sea.
flict or Cooperation? (Part 1),” The Arctic Institute, 6 February 37. Roston and Migliozzi, “How a Melting Arctic Changes Every-
2018, accessed 13 August 2019, https://www.thearcticinstitute. thing—Part II.”
org/russias-arctic-strategy-aimed-conflict-cooperation-part-one/. 38. Eric Roston and Blacki Migliozzi, “How a Melting Arctic
19. Ibid. Changes Everything—Part I: The Bare Arctic,” Bloomberg, 19 April
20. “INF Nuclear Treaty: Russia Follows US in Suspending Pact,” 2017, accessed 13 August 2019, https://www.bloomberg.com/
BBC News, 2 February 2019, accessed 13 August 2019, https://www. graphics/2017-arctic/.
bbc.com/news/world-europe-47101429. 39. “Ocean Action Agenda: Supporting Regional Ocean Econo-
21. Devyatkin, “Russia’s Arctic Strategy.” mies and Ecosystems: Ocean Priorities for the Trump Administration
22. Adam Lajeunesse, “What Canada’s New Defense Policy Means and Congress” (Washington, DC: Joint Ocean Commission Initiative,
for the Arctic,” Arctic Deeply, 16 June 2017, accessed 13 August 2019, March 2017), accessed 13 August 2019, https://oceanactionagenda.
https://www.newsdeeply.com/arctic/community/2017/06/16/what- org/wp-content/uploads/2017/04/OceanActionAgenda.pdf.
canadas-new-defense-policy-means-for-the-arctic. 40. Borgerson, “Arctic Meltdown.”
23. “Operation NUNALIVUT 2018 Begins in the High Arctic,” 41. “Arctic Peoples,” The Arctic Council, last updated 3 Novem-
Department of National Defence/Canadian Armed Forces, 23 ber 2016, accessed 13 August 2019, https://arctic-council.org/index.
February 2018, accessed 13 August 2019, https://www.canada.ca/en/ php/en/our-work/arctic-peoples.
department-national-defence/news/2018/02/operation-nunalivut- 42. Hong, “China’s New Arctic Policy.”
2018-begins-in-the-high-arctic.html. 43. Trevelyan Wing, “Poles Apart? The Antarctic Treaty
24. Climate Change and the Arctic: New Frontiers of National System as a Model for Arctic Governance” (Washington, DC: The
Security Hearing Before the House Comm. on Foreign Affairs, 111th Climate Institute, October 2017), accessed 13 August 2019, http://
Cong. (25 March 2009) (statement of Scott G. Borgerson, Visiting climate.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/11/Trevelyan_Wing_10-
Fellow for Ocean Governance at the Council of Foreign Relations), 2017_Poles_Apart.pdf.
accessed 13 August 2019, https://www.cfr.org/report/us-nation- 44. Roughead, “Getting Serious About the Arctic.”
al-security-interests-arctic. 45. DOD, “Report to Congress on Strategy to Protect United
25. Adam MacDonald, “The Canadian Armed Forces and the States National Security Interests in the Arctic Region.”
Arctic: Maintaining a Suitable and Sustainable Role” (Ottawa, Canada: 46. Denali Daniels and Associates, “National Strategy for the
Conference of Defence Associations Institute, May 2016), accessed Arctic Region (NSAR) – Ten Year Renewable Energy Plan” (Wash-
13 August 2019, https://cdainstitute.ca/wp-content/uploads/Analysis/ ington, DC: U.S. Department of Energy, April 2015), accessed 13
MacDonald_Analysis_May_2016.pdf. August 2019, https://www.energy.gov/sites/prod/files/2015/04/f21/
26. “China’s Arctic Policy,” 1st ed. (white paper, Beijing: State NSARDraftPlan_v6.pdf.
Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China, 26 Jan- 47. DOD, “Report to Congress on Strategy to Protect United
uary 2018), accessed 13 August 2019, http://english.gov.cn/archive/ States National Security Interests in the Arctic Region.”
white_paper/2018/01/26/content_281476026660336.htm. 48. Dillow, “Russia and China Vie to Beat the US.”
27. Nong Hong, “China’s New Arctic Policy: Legal Questions and 49. Carolyn Beeler, “Who Controls the Northwest Passage?
Practical Challenges,” The National Bureau of Asian Research, 16 March It’s Up for Debate,” PRI’s The World, 4 September 2017, ac-
2018, accessed 13 August 2019, https://www.nbr.org/publication/chi- cessed 13 August 2019, https://www.pri.org/stories/2017-09-04/
nas-new-arctic-policy-legal-questions-and-practical-challenges/. who-controls-northwest-passage-its-debate.
28. “The Emerging Arctic.” 50. Brian Finneran, ed., “U.S. Policy in the Arctic: The Implications
29. Ibid. of the South China Sea Arbitration Award on American Policy and
30. John Simpson, “How Greenland Could Become China’s Arctic UNCLOS,” Penn State Journal of Law & International Affairs 6, no. 1
Base,” BBC News, 18 December 2018, accessed 13 August 2019, ( June 2018), accessed 13 August 2019, https://elibrary.law.psu.edu/
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-46386867. cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1184&context=jlia.
31. Liu Zhen, “China Breaks the Arctic Ice with Launch of New 51. Roston, “How a Melting Arctic Changes Everything—Part III.”
Research Vessel Snow Dragon II,” South China Morning Post (web- 52. Roughead, “Getting Serious About the Arctic.”
site), 12 September 2018, accessed 13 August 2019, https://www. 53. DOD, “Report to Congress on Strategy to Protect United
scmp.com/news/china/military/article/2163784/china-breaks-arctic- States National Security Interests in the Arctic Region.”
ice-launch-new-research-vessel.

88 January-February 2020  MILITARY REVIEW

Evaluating Our Evaluations
Recognizing and Countering
Performance Evaluation Pitfalls
Lt. Col. Lee A. Evans, PhD, U.S. Army
Lt. Col. G. Lee Robinson, PhD, U.S. Army

S electing the right person for the right job at the

right time is a persistent challenge faced by orga-
nizations. Performance evaluations are a funda-
mental component of selection processes, and their use
in the Army is nearly as old as the service itself. Some
rater. Although the evaluation forms include assess-
ments from raters and sometimes intermediate raters,
the senior rater comments are widely acknowledged
to carry the most weight for promotion and selection
decisions due to the small amount of time available to
early evaluation systems consisted of a list of officers in evaluate a soldier’s file.3 Most positions involve work
a regiment with observations noted for each ranging that is highly interdependent on other members of the
from “a good-natured man” to “merely good—nothing organization, which places a considerable demand on
promising” to “a man of whom all unite in speaking ill.”1 raters to assess and articulate how much an individual
While our current evaluation form adds a bit more contributed to the output of the group.4
science to the art of performance evaluation, a constant While the performance of an officer is undoubtedly
in the Army’s performance evaluation system is the reli- important to his or her chances for promotion or selec-
ance on raters to render their judgment on the potential tion, the abilities of the officer’s senior rater to convey the
of a subordinate for service at higher levels. level of this performance through an evaluation is also
Raters need to be better equipped to exercise these vital to talent management. Previous studies demon-
judgments. While we recognize the calls for personnel strate that exposure to a high-quality mentor increases
management reform and the initiatives underway to bet-
ter manage the Army’s talent, our purpose is not to add Lt. Col. Lee A. Evans, PhD,
another voice to these suggestions for structural changes U.S. Army, is an assistant Lt. Col. G. Lee Robinson,
to the Army’s evaluation system.2 Instead, we focus on professor and associate PhD, U.S. Army, is
the process of discretionary judgment exercised by raters program director in the commander of the 603rd
that is and will continue to be an integral part of perfor- Department of Mathematical Aviation Support Battalion
mance evaluation. Our aim is to recognize the structural Sciences at the United States at Hunter Army Airfield
and cognitive biases inherent in our evaluation system Military Academy (USMA). in Savannah, Georgia. He
and provide recommendations to help senior raters more He holds a BS in engineering holds a BS in international
objectively evaluate their subordinates. management from USMA, relations from the United
While we think the importance of this topic is an MS in operations research States Military Academy,
self-evident, educating raters on the potential for bias from the Georgia Institute an MPA from Cornell
in their evaluations is especially important in the type of Technology, and a PhD in University, and a PhD in
of rating system used by the Army. This system places industrial engineering from public administration from
great emphasis on the person serving as the senior the University of Louisville. the University of Georgia.

MILITARY REVIEW  January-February 2020 89

an officer’s likelihood of an early promotion to major argument that forced distribution systems should be
by 29 percent, perhaps because high-quality mentors applied to large enough groups of employees, specifically
are skilled at communicating their protégé’s potential over fifty.10 While he failed to provide mathematical
in their performance evaluations.5 Equipping raters to support for this number, his argument relies on the
make their best possible judgments of subordinates and statistical qualities of large sample sizes. For example,
clearly articulating these judgments is vital to fostering a if a reasonably large sample, typically n > 30, is drawn
meritocratic Army talent management system. from a population with a normal distribution, the sam-
ple mean and the standard deviation of the sample are
Evaluating the Performance nearly indistinguishable from that of the population.11
Evaluation Tool: Structural Biases in In the context of officer performance and potential, as-
the Department of the Army Form 67 suming both are normally distributed, this suggests that
In 1922, the Army introduced a formalized perfor- larger samples of officers will provide a more accurate
mance appraisal system, the War Department Adjutant representation of performance levels across the force.
General's Office (WD AGO) Form 711, Efficiency Report, While larger samples are typically a good representation
rebranded two years later as the WD AGO Form 67, of performance level distribution, they are in direct con-
to assess officers in the domains of physical qualities, flict with the concept of pooling introduced by Army
intelligence, leadership, personal qualities, and general Regulation (AR) 623-3, Evaluation Reporting System.
value to the service.6 Since 1922, the Army modified DA AR 623-3 defines pooling as “elevating the rating
Form 67 ten times; the most recent iteration was the DA chain beyond the senior rater’s ability to have adequate
Form 67-10 series (hereafter referred to collectively as knowledge of each Soldier’s performance and potential,
DA Form 67-10).7 Each iteration of the officer evalua- in order to provide an elevated assessment protection for
tion form contained nuanced approaches to segment the a specific group.”12 The word “pooling” appears more than
population in order to accurately represent the spectrum ten times in the most recent version of AR 623-3, which
of officer performances from the highest performing of- states that pooling runs counter to the intent of the
ficers to those who should not be retained in the service. evaluation system and erodes soldiers’ confidence in the
DA Form 67-10 uses a forced distribution technique fairness and impartiality of their leaders.13
where senior raters of lieutenant colonels and below can Creating a rating scheme that minimizes the number
award “most qualified” evaluations to fewer than half of of subordinates under each rater ideally allows raters to
their subordinates. (For comparison, an example of the have an intimate knowledge of the strengths and weak-
1934 efficiency report format is shown on pages 94–95 nesses of the soldiers they rate. The idea of an organiza-
to highlight the perennial challenges the Army has faced tional structure that limits the number of subordinates
over time in capturing and expressing an effective and under a rater’s span of control is also a common practice
fair means of comparing the performances of officers.) in the civilian sector. The manager-to-employee ratio
Forced distribution rating systems have been common across industries worldwide is approximately 1:4 for com-
in the Department of Defense and the civilian sector panies with five hundred or fewer employees and 1:9 for
because of the problem of appraisal distortion in the companies with greater than five hundred employees.14
absence of forced distribution.8 For example, prior to im- While there are many sound reasons that the Army
plementing a forced distribution performance appraisal seeks to decrease a rater’s span of control, an often over-
system, the U.S. Navy saw the majority of its officers looked downside of this practice is the presence of errors
rated in the top 1 percent.9 In theory, forced distribution resulting from a forced distribution system, especially
decreases ratings inflation and provides the means for a in small rating pools. According to AR 623-3, a senior
variety of human resources decisions, including promo- rater should award “most qualified” evaluations to the top
tion, training, and assignment of personnel. one-third of officers, and the number of “most qualified”
However, even under a best-case scenario (with the evaluations they award must be less than 50 percent of
absence of cognitive biases), system structure induces the total number of evaluations he or she writes.
error in a forced distribution performance appraisal With a few simplifying assumptions, such as
system. Allan Mohrman alluded to this problem in his officers distributed randomly into rating pools of five

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 PERFORMANCE EVALUATIONS

and the raters having perfect clarity on whether a at least one rated officer will receive an inaccurate
subordinate is a top one-third officer, the hypergeo- evaluation due to the rater’s profile constraint. We can
metric distribution (as explained below) provides calculate this expected annual error with E[Annual
insight into the mathematical pitfalls of a forced Error]. Notationally, for a rating pool of five officers,
distribution performance appraisal system. this is represented by E[Annual Error] = (i – 2)
The hypergeometric distribution has three parame- P(X = i) = P(X = 3) + 2P(X = 4) + 3P(X = 5). That is,
ters: N, R, and n. The parameter N represents the num- when there are three top one-third officers in a rating
ber of items in the population, R represents the number pool of five, one officer is adversely affected by the

Creating a rating scheme that minimizes the number of

subordinates under each rater ideally allows raters to
have an intimate knowledge of the strengths and weak-
nesses of the soldiers they rate.

of “successes,” and n is the sample size drawn from the profile constraint. When there are four top one-third
population. Using this nomenclature, we can determine officers, two officers are affected by the profile con-
that the random variable is X~Hypergeometric(N, R, n) straint. When all five officers are top one-third officers,
and calculate the probability that X (in our case, the three officers are affected by the profile constraint.
number of “most qualified” officers in a rating pool) An E[Annual Error] = 0.259 means that for each
takes on particular, discrete values. rating pool of five officers, 0.259 (or about one officer
For example, if there are five thousand officers of per rating pool every four years) would not receive the
a particular rank, 1,667 of them would be consid- top evaluation they deserved. If five thousand officers
ered the top one-third based on established criteria. are randomly placed into pools of five, even under
We can calculate the probability of receiving ex- conditions of perfect clarity of the rater to discern
actly x top one-third officers in a group of n size. If performance level and follow the guidance in AR 623-3
we assume a pool size of five officers, we would use to reserve “most qualified” evaluations for the top one-
X~Hypergeometric(5000, 1667, 5) to calculate the third officers, we would expect that 259 officers per
probability that we receive exactly x top one-third year do not receive the evaluation they deserve.
officers in our rating pool, notationally P(X = x). That
is, P(X = 2) represents the probability that exactly two Addressing Structural Biases
top one-third officers were assigned to a rating pool We suggest three ways to counter structural biases.
of five. In fact, P(X = 2) = 0.329, meaning there is a First, senior raters should follow the guidance in AR
32.9 percent chance that there would be exactly two 623-3 and reserve “most qualified” evaluations for the
top one-third officers in a rating pool of five, assuming top one-third officers. This requires a discerning eye,
officers are randomly distributed into ratings pools. and as previously mentioned, will result in an expected
Thus, given the current profile constraint of less than annual error of about one officer per rating pool every
50 percent, raters could only award two “most quali- four years for a rating pool of five officers. According to
fied” evaluations to a pool of five officers. the U.S. Army Human Resources Command, “the lim-
The rater’s ability to discern the two top one-third itation of less than 50% translates to an average use of
performers is affected by cognitive biases, but math- 37–42% depending on the grade (of the rated officer).”15
ematically, the rater may be obligated to award an Within this relatively small range, there is a significant
evaluation that is not commensurate with a subordi- difference in the expected annual error.
nate’s level of performance due to forced distribution If a senior rater uses the top 37 percent of officers
requirements. For example, if a rater has a pool size of as the cutoff for most “qualified” evaluations, it would
five, but has more than two top one-third performers, result in an expected annual error of 0.340 whereas a 42

MILITARY REVIEW  January-February 2020 91

 0.8

0.7

0.6
Expected annual error

0.5

0.4

0.3

0.2

0.1

0
0 10 20 30 40 50

Senior rater most-qualified threshold (Figure by authors)

Figure 1. Expected Annual Error as a Function of a Senior

Rater’s “Most Qualified” Threshold

percent threshold increases the expected annual error maximum allowable percentage of “most qualified”
to 0.469. As seen in figure 1, higher thresholds for what evaluations does not remain above 42 percent until
percentage of officers should receive a “most qualified” a senior rater completes twenty-five evaluations. For
evaluation result in monotonically higher than expected example, if a senior rater completes eight evaluations,
annual errors. However, senior raters who place these at most, three of them can be “most qualified” eval-
thresholds below those of other raters disadvantage some uations, putting the senior rater profile usage at 37.5
of their subordinates who would have received “most percent. If the senior rater kept a buffer of just one
qualified” evaluations in other rating pools. Therefore, a evaluation, the profile usage drops to 25 percent.
senior rater would want to award a similar percentage of Maximizing the number of “most qualified” evalu-
“most qualified” evaluations as other senior raters across ations awarded often results in either a Type I or Type
the Army to ensure his or her subordinates are not dis- II error. In the context of performance appraisals, a
advantaged but low enough to prevent instances where Type I error is incorrectly identifying an officer as
the number of “most qualified” officers within their most qualified, whereas Type II error is not identify-
rating pools exceeds the profile constraint. ing a most qualified officer as such. If a senior rater
Second, we recommend senior raters have a has a rating pool of five officers and is predetermined
multiyear focus and refrain from maximizing the to award the maximum of two top evaluations, there
number of “most qualified” evaluations awarded each is only a 34.6 percent chance that there are exactly
year. The U.S. Human Resources Command stated two top 40 percent officers in a pool of randomly dis-
that the 37–42 percent use of “most qualified” eval- tributed officers. There is a 33.7 percent chance that
uations by senior raters is “indicative of senior raters there are fewer than two top 40 percent officers, lead-
correctly retaining a buffer.”16 This guidance assumes ing to a Type I error, and a 31.7 percent chance there
that anything less than 50 percent constitutes a are more than two top 40 percent officers, leading to
buffer. However, figure 2 (on page 93) shows that the a Type II error. A senior rater’s profile constraint can

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 PERFORMANCE EVALUATIONS

induce a Type II error, but a Type I error is caused by Third, consistent with AR 623-3, we recommend
either cognitive biases or conscious decisions. that senior raters structure rating schemes to provide
A conscious decision to award a “most qualified” flexibility to reward the best subordinates. When dis-
evaluation to an undeserving officer can have com- cussing the establishment of rating chains, AR 623-3
pounding effects
since rating profiles 60
are cumulative. We
analyze this effect by 50
calculating the expect- Maximum allowable percent of
ed two-year error. If most-qualified evaluations
a senior rater plans to 40
maximize the number
of “most qualified” 30 Maximum
evaluations awarded,
presumably off of a
20 Buffer of one
top 40 percent stan-
dard, it will result in
an expected annual 10
error of 0.415 and an
expected two-year er- 0
ror of 0.830 for a pool
size of five. However,
0 5 10 15 20 25 30
if a senior rater can Number of rated subordinates
use the top one-third
standard for award- (Figure by authors)
ing “most qualified”
evaluations, there will Figure 2. Profile Usage for Senior Raters Who Maximize
be an expected annual Their “Most Qualified” Evaluations and Those Who
error of 0.259 and an
expected two-year
Keep a Buffer of One
error of 0.416.
The reason that
the expected two-year error is not double that of the provides general guidance, such as commanders rating
expected annual error is that if there is only one top commanders, and prohibits the practice of pooling.
one-third officer in the rating pool the first year, the However, it gives organizations the latitude to estab-
senior rater can award up to three “most qualified” lish and publish their rating scheme at the beginning
evaluations the second year. Similarly, if there are no of each period. While the recommended size of rating
top one-third officers in the rating pool the first year, pools cannot be generalized across nonhomogeneous
a senior rater can award up to four “most qualified” units, organizations should establish rating chains that
evaluations the second year. In summary, by resisting do not disadvantage officers at each grade level.
the urge to award the maximum allowable number of For example, increasing our sample rating pool of
top evaluations each year and maintaining a top one- five officers to ten officers decreases both the expected
third standard, senior raters can reduce Type II errors annual error and the expected annual two-year error.
by nearly 50 percent. Consequently, coaching officers As previously stated, using the criteria of top one-third
to have a multiyear focus is especially important since officers deserving “most qualified” evaluations, the
recent research shows how an officer’s seniority affects expected annual error for a pool size of five is 0.259 and
the evaluations they receive in the evaluation process. 17
the expected two-year error is 0.416. Doubling the size

MILITARY REVIEW  January-February 2020 93

 (Form published in Technical Manual 12-250, Administration, 10 February 1942)

Sample of U.S. Army Efficiency Report from 1936

94 January-February 2020  MILITARY REVIEW

 (Form published in Technical Manual 12-250, Administration, 10 February 1942)

Sample of U.S. Army Efficiency Report from 1936 (continued)

MILITARY REVIEW  January-February 2020 95

of the rating pool to ten officers while maintaining the of cognitive bias can make a difference in the iden-
top one-third most qualified officer threshold drops tification and selection of officers with the greatest
the expected two-year error to 0.364. Since the expect- potential for service at higher levels.19 Stated differ-
ed two-year error is for two years of officers in a pool ently, the more bias we can divest from evaluations,
size of ten, we can compare it to the expected two-year the better positioned selection boards will be to make

The more bias we can divest from evaluations, the

better positioned selection boards will be to make
the difficult choices inherent in talent management of
a large pool of candidates.

error for a pool size of five by dividing by two. Doubling the difficult choices inherent in talent management of
the rating pool size from five to ten thus results in a 56 a large pool of candidates.
percent decrease in Type II errors. A key point on cognitive bias is that it is uninten-
tional. Evaluating a person’s performance is undoubt-
Evaluating the Evaluator: edly complex. How much of performance is due to a
Cognitive Biases person’s talent versus the interactive effects from the
As evidenced in the previous section, there are group? And how does their performance compare to
structural biases introduced by the DA Form 67-10 that their peers who faced similar tasks but did so un-
make it difficult for raters to consistently reward the best der different conditions with different teammates?
officers. In addition to these structural biases, because of Psychologist Daniel Kahneman shaped much of
the discretionary nature of performance evaluation, there what we understand about complex decision-making
are also cognitive biases that may affect the judgment of with his insights on System 1 and System 2 thinking.
senior raters. We focus on five cognitive biases that may System 1 thinking normally guides our decisions as it
lead to a difference between the performance of an officer operates automatically and enables us to make most
and how this performance translates to the potential decisions with little or no effort. When faced with
described by a senior rater in an evaluation report. more complex tasks, System 2 thinking enables us to
A cognitive bias occurs when a rater unknowingly focus our attention on more complex computations.
renders judgments that are unrelated to an officer’s While we like to think we can put System 2 in control
performance. Because raters have great discretion when needed, Kahneman suggests that System 1 often
in how they articulate the potential of an officer in takes over in the face of complexity.20
an evaluation, cognitive biases have the potential to For instance, if asked what you think the president’s
influence the enthusiasm they use to describe a soldier popularity will be six months from now, what system
in the narrative portion of the report. would you use? Kahneman claims this is a System 2
These choices are especially important because task since an accurate answer would require a person to
there is likely a small talent differential between offi- consider the events between present time and six months
cers just above and just below the cutline in promo- in the future that would potentially affect the presi-
tion and selection boards. There is anecdotal evidence dent’s popularity and render judgment on the likelihood
to support this point from officers who served on of these events. Instead of performing these complex
promotion boards, but we also see empirical support calculations, we rely on System 1 thinking, which would
for small differences between primary and alternate use the president’s current popularity to gauge what his
selectees in other fields.18 Since selection boards have popularity will be six months from now.
little time to review files and consider a relatively A similar process unfolds for performance evalua-
minimal amount of information, reducing the effects tion. To complete the difficult task of assessing someone’s

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 PERFORMANCE EVALUATIONS

performance, we use shortcuts that rely on information A characteristic of people with low scores on openness
that is already stored in memory. The benefit of System is that they prefer familiarity over novelty; thus, lower
1 thinking is that it enables us to rely on intuition to scores for openness may be associated with less favorable
perform such complex tasks, but the downside is that judgments of ratees who are significantly different than
this process invites bias. Our System 1 thinking may the raters. Other studies indicate service academy cadets
succumb to the following five sources of bias when faced score lower on innovative cognitive style (which is posi-
with the complexity of performance evaluation. The tively correlated with a willingness to adopt new ideas)
more we are aware of these biases, the better equipped than students at comparable civilian universities, and
we are to slow down our System 1 thinking and engage those who left the academy after their first year scored
some System 2 functions to counter these biases. higher on innovation than those who remained.26
Halo effects. As the name implies, halo effects occur A study of the relationship between cognitive abil-
when we use performance in one dimension to influence ity and promotion/selection found that officers with
our evaluation of a person in all other dimensions. The significantly higher cognitive abilities had 29 percent
primary problem of halo effects is that they decrease the lower odds of selection below the zone (ahead of peers) to
number of opportunities for a person to demonstrate his major, 18 percent lower odds for selection below the zone
proficiency, thereby precluding the rater from evaluat- to lieutenant colonel, and 32 percent lower odds for selec-
ing the ratee accurately across different dimensions of tion to battalion command.27 One explanation for these
performance.21 Raters are especially susceptible to halo results is that officers with high cognitive abilities may
effects in systems where a single evaluator rates a person make “worse” junior officers since they may be less likely
on multiple dimensions—as is the case with our eval- to be hypercompliant in comparison to those of average
uation system and the Army leadership requirements or lower cognitive ability. By this reasoning, the “similar to
model with its core competencies and attributes.22 me effect” may contribute to these results.
The halo effect can be positive or negative. For Central tendency error. The central tendency error
example, an officer who performs well in the attri- occurs when raters score most ratees as average or slight-
bute of competence by projecting self-confidence and ly above average.28 Although there are four blocks on the
a commanding presence may enjoy a positive halo officer evaluation report, raters rarely use the “qualified”
effect across the other competencies and attributes. or “not qualified” box. While there are consequences for
Conversely, an officer who shows a lack of self-confi- a rater to “bust their profile” by scoring too many officers
dence and commanding presence may suffer a negative as “most qualified,” there are no consequences for placing
halo effect across the other competencies and attributes. too many officers in the “highly qualified” category.
First impression error. This bias stems from ini- In situations where there are no consequences for
tial impressions, either favorable or unfavorable, that too many average ratings, there is a greater potential
influence a rater’s evaluation. Similar to halo effects, the for ratings inflation.29 Qualified or not qualified ratings
primary problem of initial impression error is that a involve additional work for the rater in terms of greater
rater may suppress or discount subsequent information potential for interpersonal conflict with the ratee or the
about a ratee if it is counter to their initial impression.23 requirement for performance counseling documents if
This effect can be especially prevalent when a senior rat- the rated officer appeals the evaluation. Since no conse-
er rates a large pool of a particular position or rank and quences exist for establishing gradations in the quality
has few interactions with each individual. of performance for those who are not “most qualified,” it
Similar to me effect. This bias stems from a tendency is easier to rate someone as “highly qualified” than to use
of some raters to judge a person favorably when he or she the lower two rankings. While our professional ethos is
resembles the rater along dimensions such as his or her a check against this bias, we include it in this discussion
attitude or background.24 Some recent studies indicate since the potential exists for this bias.
that the military may be especially susceptible to this bias Duration neglect. The essence of duration
in comparison to other professions. A study of Army neglect is the tendency to place greater emphasis
War College students found that this population scored on peak time periods and recency when recalling
lower on openness than the general U.S. population.25 events. To illustrate this effect, Kahneman discussed

MILITARY REVIEW  January-February 2020 97

a study of how patients recalled a colonoscopy. After submitting the feedback, the author compared
While the duration of the procedure had no effect his recommendations with those of the operations
on the patients’ ratings of total pain, the average level officer and found that his ratings were the opposite
of pain at the worst moment of the procedure and at for the six commanders. While differences of opinion
the end of the procedure were strong predictors of will probably not always be this stark, there is value
the overall evaluation of pain. in raters receiving a diversity of opinions to counter
Hopefully, pain is not an emotion that raters recall possible sources of cognitive bias.
during an evaluation, but the general principle applies Third, frequent feedback to subordinates can
for how this bias may influence evaluations. Instead of help counter bias, especially if a rater is aware of the
engaging System 2 processes to consider the performance potential biases discussed above. Frequent feedback
of a ratee over a series of events, it is easier to use a key can foster agreement on performance standards and
event such as an inspection, a training exercise, or the increase acceptance of feedback by subordinates.30
most recent training event to shape the impression a This is an area that many leaders struggle with. In
senior rater wishes to convey in an evaluation. the 2016 Center for Army Leadership Annual Survey
of Army Leadership, over one-third of respondents
Addressing Cognitive Biases reported their supervisors rarely or never took time
We suggest three ways to counter these cognitive to discuss how they were doing with their work and
biases. Reading this article and becoming aware of coun- what they could do to improve their performance.31
tering sources of cognitive bias is the first step. While we
hope that readers will find this information helpful, we Conclusion
think it is especially important to include education on In reality, the Army’s performance appraisal
these biases as part of professional military education. system is a multiyear assessment that is prone to
While professional military education courses often disparities between senior raters and the profiles
cover board processes and trends, they do not currently they maintain. As this article demonstrates, there
include training on these biases. We think that just as fu- are structural and cognitive biases that may affect
ture battalion and brigade commanders receive training the rating an officer receives. These biases under-
on managing their profile, they should receive training mine the meritocratic principles that we seek in our
on rater biases to become better evaluators. performance evaluation system. The more that we are
Second, since the source of these biases is a system aware of these biases, the better position we will be in
that relies on evaluations by a single rater, we recom- to counter their effects.
mend that raters seek input from different sources
to help form their judgment of a ratee. One of the Editor's note: We wish to express our appreciation to library
authors has experience with this technique while research archivists Russell Rafferty and Elizabeth Dubuisson
serving as a battalion executive officer. The battalion of the Ike Skelton Combined Arms Research Library, Fort
commander asked the operations officer, command Leavenworth, Kansas, for their support in locating early ver-
sergeant major, senior chief warrant officer, and sions of Army efficiency reports and references to them in period
the author to rank the six company commanders. official technical manuals.

Notes
1. David P. Kite, “The U.S. Army Officer Evaluation Report: accessed 17 September 2019, https://bluestarfam.org/wp-con-
Why are We Writing to Someone Who Isn’t Reading?” (master’s tent/uploads/2017/04/BPC-Defense-Building-A-FAST-Force.
thesis, Air Command and Staff College, 1998), 8, accessed 17 Sep- pdf; Susan Bryant and Heidi A. Urben, “Reconnecting Athens
tember 2019, https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a398598.pdf. and Sparta: A Review of OPMS XXI at 20 Years” (Arlington,
2. For examples of reform efforts, see Building a F.A.S.T. VA: The Institute of Land Warfare, Association of the Unit-
Force: A Flexible Personnel System for a Modern Military ed States Army, October 2017), accessed 17 September
Recommendations from the Task Force on Defense Personnel 2019, https://www.ausa.org/publications/reconnecting-ath-
(Washington, DC: Bipartisan Policy Center, March 2017), ens-and-sparta-review-opms-xxi-20-years; for an example

98 January-February 2020  MILITARY REVIEW

 PERFORMANCE EVALUATIONS

of the efforts of the U.S. Army Talent Management Task 19. Adam L. Taliaferro, “Understanding the Army Selec-
Force, see Brian Hamilton, “Talent Management Enhances tion-Board Process,” eARMOR (April-June 2015), accessed 17
Total Force Readiness,” U.S. Army Talent Management Task September 2019, http://www.benning.army.mil/armor/eARMOR/
Force, accessed 17 September 2019, https://talent.army.mil/ content/issues/2015/APR_JUN/2ArmorBranchUpdate15.pdf.
talent-management-enhances-total-force-readiness/. 20. Daniel Kahneman, Thinking, Fast and Slow, 1st ed. (New
3. Officer Mock Board Video, YouTube video, 47:06, posted York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 2011).
by “ARMYHRC,” 15 Febuary 2017, accessed 17 September 2019, 21. Timo M. Bechger, Gunter Maris, and Ya Ping Hsiao, “De-
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zeqGrAUMMiY. tecting Halo Effects in Performance-Based Examinations,” Applied
4. Kevin R. Murphy and Jeanette N. Cleveland, Understanding Psychological Measurement 34, no. 8 (2010): 607–19.
Performance Appraisal: Social, Organizational, and Goal-Based 22. Emily R. Lai, Edward W. Wolfe, and Daisy H. Vickers,
Perspectives (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 1995). “Differentiation of Illusory and True Halo in Writing Scores,”
5. David S. Lyle and John Z. Smith, “The Effect of High-Perform- Educational and Psychological Measurement 75, no. 1 (2015):
ing Mentors on Junior Officer Promotion in the US Army,” Journal 102–25. For a description of the core competencies and attri-
of Labor Economics 32, no. 2 (April 2004): 229–58. butes of the leader development model, see Army Doctrine
6. Allan C. Hardy and Keith B. Harker, “U.S. Army Officer Per- Reference Publication 6-22, Army Leadership (Washington, DC:
ceptions of the New OER (DA Form 67-8)” (master’s thesis, Naval U.S. Government Printing Office, August 2012 [obsolete]), 1-5,
Postgraduate School, 1982), 20–21, accessed 2 October 2019, accessed 17 September 2019, http://data.cape.army.mil/web/
https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a126773.pdf. repository/doctrine/adrp6-22.pdf.
7. Army Regulation (AR) 623-3, Evaluation Reporting System 23. J. Edward Kellough, “Managing Human Resources to
(Washington, DC: U.S. Government Publishing Office, 2019), Improve Organizational Productivity: The Role of Performance
accessed 17 September 2019, https://www.cs.amedd.army.mil/ Evaluation,” in Public Personnel Management: Current Concerns, Fu-
FileDownloadpublic.aspx?docid=4ab544f9-841b-45df-9650- ture Challenges, ed. Norma M. Riccucci, 5th ed. (Boston: Longman,
2b2751187003. 2012), 173–85.
8. E. Donald Sisson, “Forced Choice—The New Army Rating,” 24. Gary P. Latham and Kenneth N. Wexley, Increasing Pro-
Personnel Psychology 1, no. 3 (September 1948): 365–81. ductivity Through Performance Appraisal, 2nd ed. (Reading, MA:
9. David G. Bjerke et al., Officer Fitness Report Evaluation Study Addison-Wesley, 1994).
(San Diego: Navy Personnel Research and Development Center, 25. Stephen J. Gerras and Leonard Wong, Changing Minds in
1987), accessed 17 September 2019, https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/ the Army: Why Is It so Difficult and What to Do about It (Carlisle,
fulltext/u2/a189377.pdf. PA: U.S. Army War College Press, October 2013), accessed
10. Allan M. Mohrman Jr. et al., Designing Performance Apprais- 17 September 2019, https://ssi.armywarcollege.edu/pdffiles/
al Systems: Aligning Appraisals and Organizational Realities (San PUB1179.pdf.
Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1989). 26. Tom Mitchell and Alice M. Cahill, “Cognitive Style and
11. William C. Navidi, Statistics for Scientists and Engineers Plebe Turnover at the U.S. Naval Academy,” Perceptual and Motor
(New York: McGraw-Hill, 2014). Skills 101, no. 1 (August 2005): 55–62.
12. AR 623-3, Evaluation Reporting System, 7. 27. Everett S. P. Spain, J. D. Mohundro, and Bernard B. Banks,
13. Ibid. “Intellectual Capital: A Case for Culture Change,” Parameters 45,
14. Barbara Davison, “Management Span of Control: How no. 2 (Summer 2015): 77–92.
Wide is too Wide?,” Journal of Business Strategy 24, no. 4 (1 August 28. Kellough, “Managing Human Resources to Improve Organi-
2003): 22–29. zational Productivity.”
15. “OER FAQs,” The Adjutant General Directorate (TAGD), 29. Murphy and Cleveland, Understanding Performance
United States Human Resources Command, 6 June 2019, ac- Appraisal.
cessed 17 September 2019, https://www.hrc.army.mil/content/ 30. Ibid.
OER%20FAQs. 31. Ryan P. Riley et al., 2016 Center for Army Leadership Annual
16. Ibid. Survey of Army Leadership (CASAL): Military Leader Findings (Fort
17. Lee A. Evans and Ki-Hwan G. Bae, “Simulation-Based Analy- Leavenworth, KS: The Center for Army Leadership, U.S. Army
sis of a Forced Distribution Performance Appraisal System,” Journal Combined Arms Center, August 2017), accessed 17 September
of Defense Analytics and Logistics 1, no. 2 (2017): 120–36. 2019, https://usacac.army.mil/sites/default/files/documents/cal/
18. Richard A. DeVaul et al., “Medical School Performance 2016CASALMilitaryLeaderTechnicalReport.pdf.
of Initially Rejected Students,” JAMA 257, no. 1 ( January 1987):
47–51.

MILITARY REVIEW  January-February 2020 99

German prisoners of war line a funeral procession for one of their own at a POW camp in Fort Bend County, Texas, during the Second World
War. (Photo courtesy of Fort Bend County Libraries/University of North Texas Libraries)

Option 17
Military Law and Vigilante Justice
in Prisoner of War Camps during
World War II
Mark M. Hull, PhD, JD, FRHistS
100 January-February 2020  MILITARY REVIEW
 MILITARY JUSTICE

I n the movie Stalag 17, American prisoners in

wartime Germany suspect a traitor in their midst.
Having no recourse to the normal systems of
military justice, the prisoners themselves conduct-
ed an investigation. The evidence was collected and
a comrade. In March 1944, Drechsler was abruptly
transferred to Army control and sent to the intern-
ment camp at Papago Park, Arizona. There is some
speculation that this was done with full knowledge of
the danger to Drechsler, who had outlived his useful-
compared, the guilty party was identified, and justice ness as an informant. The Navy said later that they
took its course when the collaborator—Peter Graves specifically stamped his file with the notation, “Do not
in a most un-Mission Impossible role—was sent to his intern with U-boat men.”3 If that were the case, the
death.1 It would be understandable if most people be- Army disregarded it; Papago Park was the primary
lieve that if and when this situation arises, as it has on POW camp for U-boat crews. Drechsler was recog-
numerous occasions in modern wars, the result is simi- nized immediately by some of his former cellmates,
lar: the senior officer among the prisoners convenes an each of whom knew the same man by different names.
ad hoc trial, witnesses are heard, the accused has some He lived for six hours after his arrival. Prisoners found
sort of representation and the right to both speak and him the next morning badly beaten and hanging from
question the witnesses, and then judgment is rendered. a makeshift noose in the shower room.
The American military’s Code of Conduct might lay Army investigators focused their attention on the
the foundation for such a course of action. In the close 125 men in Drechsler’s barracks, particularly those in
confinement of a prisoner-of-war (POW) camp, there the immediate vicinity of his bunk, where the assault
may as well be no other choice than to silence the in- seemed to have started. Some crewmembers of the
formant and to protect the lives of other prisoners and U-615 and the U-352 had bruises they could not
families back home. But is it legal? explain. Suspects were polygraphed, interrogated at
As it happens, the answer to the question is a length, and subjected to other “enhanced” techniques.
surprising “no”—it is not legal, but the reasoning is con- Once Otto Stengel broke and gave names to the inter-
flicted and contradictory and goes against the obvious rogators, other confessions followed.
exigent circumstances of captivity in enemy territory The defendants maintained that they were German
during wartime. There are several cases during World sailors following German military law, which they be-
War II and afterward that serve as precedents for self- lieved to be in force during captivity, and that the kill-
help among prisoners. They may or may not clarify the ing of Drechsler was a matter of self-defense. Drechsler
central questions: What was (and is) the law in such was a proven traitor and
extreme situations? Can, or should, prisoners punish collaborator; his presence Mark Hull, PhD, JD,
other prisoners for treason and collaboration? Is there a at Papago Park could only FRHistS, is a professor at
meaningful difference between what is necessary, what be interpreted by the the U.S. Army Command
is legal, and what is done? sailors as another attempt and General Staff
to adduce treason, and College (CGSC) at Fort
Machinist Werner Drechsler he had to be stopped. Leavenworth, Kansas, where
In 1943, German submarine U-118 was attacked Reporting Drechsler’s he teaches both criminal law
and sunk off the U.S. coast.2 There were but a few sur- past actions on behalf and history. He earned his
vivors, one of whom was machinist Werner Drechsler. of the Americans to doctorate from University
Unlike his other shipmates, Drechsler repudiated American camp authori- College Cork in Ireland
his allegiance to Germany and quickly indicated a ties was obviously absurd and his juris doctorate from
willingness to help U.S. Naval Intelligence. For seven (he had been spying for the Cumberland School
months, Drechsler “worked” at the Joint Interrogation the Americans after of Law. Prior to teaching at
Center in Fort Hunt, Virginia, where he had many all), and the Germans CGSC, Hull was a criminal
aliases as he bounced from cell to cell, telling incom- concluded they had no prosecutor and an Army
ing German submarine crewmembers that he was one other way to handle the intelligence officer. He
of them and encouraging them to reveal the kind of situation. Drechsler had is a Fellow of the Royal
sensitive information that they might only share with committed the capital Historical Society.

MILITARY REVIEW  January-February 2020 101

crime of treason, and the U-boat crews merely applied Junior members of U-118’s crew arrive 20 June 1943 for physical ex-
the just penalty to one of their own. There was some amination and initial POW processing at Naval Operating Base Nor-
folk Hospital in Norfolk, Virginia. The POWs are (front row, left to right)
evidence suggesting that the U-boat men had presented Herman Polowzyk, Gustav Behlke, Walter Schiller, and Wilhelm Bort,
their proof to the senior noncommissioned officer and and (back row, seated left to right) Werner Drechsler, Paul Reum, Erhard
that this was a “sanctioned” operation. Lenk, and Klaus Preuss. (Photo courtesy of the U.S. Navy)
The court-martial panel rejected these assertions.
Drechsler was murdered, not executed by the legal
authority of National Socialist Germany, which, in probative physical evidence against any of the defen-
any case, did not apply in captivity. The panel found dants—the only evidence of any kind was their own
that Drechsler’s past was irrelevant and sustained statements—the panel sentenced all defendants to
prosecution motions to exclude most of that evidence. hang for murder. The sentence was kept secret from
The court applied the 1929 Geneva Convention, then them, and they only learned of it a year later when
in force, which permitted the detaining power to try they were informed of their upcoming execution.
prisoners for offenses that, if committed by their own
forces, were punishable by death.4 Nothing in the Cpl. Johannes Kunze
convention recognized the right of prisoners to stand Drechsler’s case was not unique. In 1943, German
as judge, jury, and executioner, regardless of what prisoners at Camp Tonkawa, Oklahoma, found
the victim did or did not do. Although there was no themselves in a similar quandary.5 One of their

102 January-February 2020  MILITARY REVIEW

 MILITARY JUSTICE

fellow detainees, Cpl. Johannes Kunze, who had from a previous blow or was struck by an object once
long expressed his antipathy toward the German outside. Americans would find his body the next day.
army (he was captured while involuntarily serving Just as with Papago Park, the homicide investigation
with 999th Light Afrika Division in Tunisia) and focused on those prisoners who had traces of blood on
National Socialist Germany, visited the camp infir- their clothing, and they were pressured and encour-
mary and presented the aged to make statements
American doctor with a implicating others. While
note in German; Kunze this worked well at
spoke no English. The Papago Park, none of the
doctor could not make Camp Tonkawa witnesses
sense of it and gave it implicated Beyer beyond
to a German orderly to stating that he had called
return to Kunze. The the prisoners’ meeting.
orderly read the note Beyer freely admitted this
that described places and added that he had
in Hamburg, Germany, tried to regain control
and suggested targets once the crowd started
that the Allies should after Kunze; this was
bomb. The prisoners corroborated by other tes-
were aware that the city timony. Despite the fact
was almost obliterated that the cause of death
in a series of Royal Air could not be conclusively
Force (RAF) firestorm established by the Army
raids in July 1943, which pathologist, Beyer and
caused more than forty four other prisoners were
thousand civilian deaths. arrested and put on trial
At Papago Park and for felony murder—that
Camp Tonkawa, and at Werner Drechsler (left), recovering from a bullet wound to his right is, for a death that occurs
most other internment knee, disembarks USS Osmond Ingram 20 June 1943 at Naval Op- in connection with a felo-
erating Base Norfolk, Virginia, assisted by Herman Polowzyk. (Photo
camps, lackadaisical courtesy of the U.S. Navy)
ny crime. The Army’s case
American standard was that the felony (incit-
practice allowed the ing a riot) directly led to
Germans to run the the death (from whatever
interior camp themselves, and they efficiently took cause), and that the death was a murder because it was
care of all administrative and health/welfare func- the direct result of the riot (that Beyer caused). Under
tions for their fellow prisoners. When shown the the Articles of War, the penalty was death.
incriminating note, the senior German prisoner in
the Tonkawa subcamp, Sgt. Walther Beyer, launched Geneva Convention
an investigation, compared the writing on the note The 1929 Geneva Convention states in article 46
with handwriting on outgoing mail, and then called that “prisoners of war shall not be subjected by the mil-
a prisoners-only meeting in the mess hall to pres- itary authorities or the tribunals of the detaining Power
ent the evidence. He first read aloud the “Hamburg to penalties other than those which are prescribed for
letter.” Realizing that his identity was about to be similar acts by members of the national forces,” and
revealed, Kunze became frightened and started run- article 66 allows for the prisoners to face the death pen-
ning from the building. German prisoners followed alty, if other aspects of article 46 (and others) have been
and started beating and kicking him. He made it a complied with.6 By the same token, the Germans under-
short distance outside and fell, and he either died stood that they were still subject to their own military

MILITARY REVIEW  January-February 2020 103

laws, particularly the Militärstrafgesetz (Military Penal of some 150,000 German troops in Holland in 1945,
Code) § 7 of 1940, which (1) provides the death penalty the victorious Canadians thought it necessary for
for treason and (2) explicitly allows soldiers to assume many thousands of German forces to continue with
disciplinary enforcement functions in the absence of a their normal duties, as per the surrender agreement,
commissioned officer in the chain of command.7 In the and the German commanding general, Johannes von
German view, everyone is a safety officer when it comes Blaskowitz, was charged to be “responsible for the
to soldiers committing treason. maintenance and discipline of all German troops
Is it legal for soldiers to assume special functions when in Western Holland.”12 The Canadians classified
they are separated from their normal, recognized chain German prisoners as “surrendered enemy personnel,”
of command? Yes, sometimes they can, as American law rather than POWs, to allow more flexibility vis-à-vis
recognizes. Title 32 of the Code of Federal Regulations the new arrangement. Blaskowitz continued to give
(which also existed in this form during World War II) orders to subordinate formations, with the formality
states, “It is conceivable that most unusual and extraor- of first routing those communications through the I
dinary circumstances may arise in which the relief from Canadian Corps. When two German navy deserters
duty of a commanding officer by a subordinate becomes (Bruno Dorfer and Rainer Beck) were returned—via
necessary … but such action shall never be taken without the Dutch Resistance and the Seaforth Highlanders
[Senior Command] approval, except when reference to such of Canada—to German custody on 13 May 1945, the
higher authority is undoubtedly impractical because of the senior German camp officer notified the Allies that he
delay involved or for other clearly obvious reasons [emphasis intended trying the returned fugitives, with the expec-
added].”8 While the U.S. Code (and Navy Regulations, in tation of a death sentence if convicted.
this instance) certainly does not green-light vigilante jus- The accused were represented by German military
tice or drumhead court martial, it does at least recognize lawyers and the trial, all fifteen minutes of it, was held
that exigent circumstances in war can sometimes mean before an audience of almost two thousand prisoners.
playing by a different set of rules. Under questioning from the presiding judge—who was,
It follows what the Germans might consider the fair in fact, a military judge (Marineoberstabsrichter)—the
administration of justice against a traitor who would defendants did not attempt to deny their actions and
be viewed quite differently by his American captors. both were sentenced to death. The German com-
Contemporary political pressure undoubtedly played mandant then asked the Canadians for weapons and
a role in the American decision to investigate, try, and ammunition to carry out the executions.
sentence the German prisoners to hang. Several national Previous instructions from the 21st Army Group
newspapers focused unwelcome attention on rampant advised that German field courts remained responsible
“Nazification” in the German POW camps, and that dis- for “internal discipline within their own forces under
cipline (at least the United States-administered kind) was the supervision and control of the Allied Military
breaking down. When twenty-five prisoners escaped from Authorities,” with the stipulation that any sentence
Papago Park in December 1944, the Army was forced to over two years required confirmation by the Canadian
reimpose discipline on German prisoners who, the public authorities.13 Messages sent by 2nd Canadian Infantry
and politicians believed, had gone wild.9 Newspaper stories Brigade to higher headquarters (1st Canadian Infantry
claimed as many as two hundred extrajudicial murders Division) about the Beck and Dorfer case went unan-
among German prisoners suspected of collaboration; the swered. The Canadian brigade thereupon issued the
actual number was five.10 Perhaps out of sympathy with Germans eight captured rifles and sixteen rounds of
the internees’ predicament, Americans often chose to look ammunition, and the prisoners were shot.
the other way, accepting that the camps ran smoother Perhaps feeling uneasy at their conduct, the
when the Germans governed themselves. Canadians afterward adopted a more strict policy
of classifying German deserters as POWs and not
Holland returning them to unsupervised German control.
The Allied position on prisoner-administered Nevertheless, the Canadians acknowledged that within
justice was inconsistent.11 Following the surrender certain limits, what happened in the German camp

104 January-February 2020  MILITARY REVIEW

stayed in the German camp, including lethal punish-
ment of those who violated German law.

Geneva Revisited
Further exploration of these inconsistent re-
sults—forbidding prisoner-administered judicial
action on the one hand and allowing it on the oth-
er—came to an end with World War II. The next
significant event was the creation of the 1949 Geneva
Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of
War. Whereas the 1929 Convention was silent on the
subject of command and discipline among the pris-
oners, it allowed that “the senior officer prisoner of
the highest rank shall be recognized as intermediary
between the camp authorities and [the prisoners].”14
By contrast, the 1949 Convention showed awareness
of at least some of what happened behind prison wire
during World War II and showed an equal determina-
tion to limit future occurrences. In a commentary to
the articles, the drafters specifically state, “During the
Second World War, some camp commanders permit-
ted disciplinary powers to be exercised [in cases of Prisoner of War Medal. (Photo by Jim Varhegyi, U.S. Air Force)
offenses committed by one prisoner of war against his
fellow prisoners of war] by the prisoners’ representa-
tives or even by a tribunal composed of prisoners of no information nor take part in any action which
war. This practice is now forbidden.”15 might be harmful to my comrades. If I am senior, I will
That determination creates certain real-world diffi- take command. If not I will obey the lawful orders of
culties. In the only scholarly examination of this ques- those appointed over me [emphasis added].”17 Further,
tion, the Military Law Review concludes that “there is no “Informing or any other action to the detriment of a
means for the Senior to punish PWs who refuse to obey fellow prisoner is despicable and is expressly forbidden
his lawful orders; punishment, if appropriate, must … the responsibility of subordinates to obey the lawful
await repatriation.”16 Several articles of the Uniform orders of ranking American personnel remains unchanged
Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) are applicable, to wit: in captivity [emphasis added].”18
article 92 (Failure to Obey Order or Regulation), article In a nod to the previously discussed provisions in
104 (Aiding the Enemy), article 105 (Misconduct as Navy Regulations, the Code of Conduct goes on to
Prisoner), and article 134 (General Article). During say, “As with other provisions of this code, common
time of war, article 104 carries the death penalty. sense and the conditions of captivity will affect the way
in which the senior person and the other POWs organize
The Code to carry out their responsibilities. [emphasis added].”19
This makes it all the more curious when, in 1955, The Code of Conduct acquired quasi-legal signifi-
President Dwight D. Eisenhower promulgated the cance when it was issued as Department of Defense
Code of Conduct, which is specifically designed to (DOD) Directive No. 1300.7 and was further
prescribe acceptable conduct by American servicemen strengthened by Executive Order 12633.20 While it
when captured by enemy forces—a direct response to is not a federal law recognized under the U.S. Code,
prisoner misconduct during the Korean War. Article failure to follow the DOD directive would be a
IV of the Code states, “If I become a prisoner of war, prima facie violation of UCMJ article 92 (Failure to
I will keep faith with my fellow prisoners. I will give Obey Order or Regulation).21

MILITARY REVIEW  January-February 2020 105

 What then of the obvious conflict between the offer information about his hometown to the Allies to
Geneva Convention and the Code of Conduct? destroy it constituted a more insidious and immediate
The Convention (which became federal law once threat. Ostracism would not suffice to stop it, and it
ratified by the United States in 1955) specifically constituted an exigent and existential threat to both
forbids the notion of command in a POW setting, German soldiers in Camp Tonkawa and to German
while the Code of Conduct mandates “I will take civilians back home. Even if, as seems likely, Kunze’s
command.”22 The distinction is vital. If a command information was of little practical use, the leak had to
relationship exists among prisoners, the wording of be sealed, and there was only one way to do that.
the Code of Conduct implies that prisoners may be Neither the Drechsler nor Kunze cases are text-
subject to discipline for infractions during captivity, book and are distinguishable from the case in liber-
rather than having to wait for an end to hostilities ated Holland. There was no court, no judge, no law
and delayed justice after the war; it would effectively books, no defense and prosecution, and no impartial
encourage “self-help” inside a POW camp in a way jury in the POW camps in the United States. The
that is quite apart from the captor/captive relation- Drechsler and Kunze cases were less about the law of
ship set out in the Geneva Convention. nations and more about the law of survival in the jun-
gle. Drechsler was assaulted and murdered, and an ad
Conclusion hoc determination that he deserved it does not lessen
In the complete absence of any case in U.S. law the crime. It is unclear how and when Kunze died or
that touches on prisoner-administered justice, there who might have delivered the fatal blow, if there even
is an uncertain road map for future conflicts. Prisoner was a single causation. In that case, spontaneous anger
misconduct (as defined by the Code of Conduct and and fear were ignited and events took on a life of their
UCMJ article 105 [Misconduct as Prisoner]) is a own, seemingly without intent or plan. The first is a
constant, with allegations of it as recent as the Iraq War case of vigilantism and the second a case of a group
in 2003, and can reasonably be expected to resurface. reacting spontaneously to the worst provocation
The legal supremacy of the 1949 Geneva Convention imaginable—and with a deadly result.
trumping DOD Directive 1300.7 as it relates to disci- Is there a balancing point between the calming rules
pline in captivity should, in theory, make the answer of the Geneva Convention, the imperative that soldiers
plain—that there is no contemporary recourse when in captivity are answerable for crimes they commit
prisoners collaborate with the enemy. while prisoners, and the simple need for self-preser-
This answer is unsatisfactory. A review of the two vation? At the very least, the Code of Conduct should
cases of German POWs highlights why. Drechsler was be rewritten in accord with the controlling language
an informant and a traitor, but the damage he could of the Geneva Convention, and other language in
have caused was limited and based exclusively on what the code should be changed to reflect the ideal that
he could have learned from other prisoners. While it prisoners do not have disciplinary power over other
is understandable that fellow U-boat sailors would prisoners, regardless of circumstances.23 Whether that
want him punished, he could instead be ostracized and is sufficient to deter and regulate future prisoner mis-
kept away from sensitive information. This might push conduct or criminal behavior in captivity remains to be
him closer to the American enemy but at little cost to seen. At the very least, we should make it clear up and
Germany; the Geneva Convention rules would work down the force that the Code of Conduct is not what it
just fine. Kunze is a different story. His willingness to at first glance appears to be.

Notes
1. Stalag 17 (Los Angeles: Paramount, 1953), DVD. 3. Kenneth Knox Collection, D-547, University of California
2. Meredith Adams, Murder and Martial Justice: Spying and at Davis, General Library, Department of Special Collections.
Retribution in World War II America (Kent, OH: Kent State Universi- The crime scene is today subsumed by the Phoenix Zoo and
ty Press, 2011), 23. Botanical Garden.

106 January-February 2020  MILITARY REVIEW

 MILITARY JUSTICE

4. “Geneva Convention of 27 July 1929 Relative to the Treat- 14. 118 L.N.T.S. 343 (1929), art. 43.
ment of Prisoners of War,” International Committee of the Red 15. Jean S. Pictet, ed., The Geneva Convention of 12 August
Cross, 6 April 1988, accessed 12 July 2019, https://www.icrc.org/ 1949, Commentary III, Geneva Convention Relative to the Treat-
eng/resources/documents/misc/57jnws.htm. ment of Prisoners of War (Geneva: International Committee of the
5. Adams, Murder and Martial Justice, 13. Red Cross, 1960), 460.
6. “Geneva Convention of 27 July 1929 Relative to the Treat- 16. Elizabeth Smith, “The Code of Conduct in Relation to In-
ment of Prisoners of War”; Convention Relative to the Treatment ternational Law,” Military Law Review 31 (Department of the Army
of Prisoners of War, 27 July 1929, 118 L.N.T.S. 343 (entered into Pamphlet 27-100-31, January 1966): 117.
force 19 June 1931). Article 61 of this convention states that 17. Proclamation No. 10,631, 20 Fed. Reg. 6057 (17 August 1955).
“no prisoner shall be compelled to admit that he is guilty of the 18. Ibid.
offence of which he is accused,” a provision that was, arguably, not 19. Code of the U.S. Fighting Forces (Washington, DC: Depart-
followed either at Camp Tonkawa, Oklahoma, or Papago Park, ment of Defense, 1988), § IV.
Arizona, following interrogation by Army intelligence. 20. Department of Defense Directive 1300.7, Training and
7. Militärstrafgesetz (Military Penal Code) § 7 (Berlin: E. G. Education to Support the Code of Conduct (CoC) (Washington,
Mittler and Sohn, 1940), 13. DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 8 December 2000, certified
8. United States Navy Regulations, 32 C.F.R. § 700.867 (1974). This current 21 November 2003); Proclamation No. 12,633, 53 Fed.
section figured prominently in the book and movie, The Caine Mutiny. Reg. 11355 (30 March 1988).
9. It took over a month to recapture the escapees. The senior 21. Following the Korean War, five Americans were charged
escaped German, Capt. Jürgen Wattenberg of the Kriegsma- and convicted under article 104 for unauthorized communication
rine—who had previously escaped Uruguayan captivity in 1939 with the enemy. See U.S. v. Batchelor, 22 C.M.R. 144, 7 USCMA
and returned to Germany—finally walked into Phoenix and was 354 (1956). Cpl. Claude Batchelor, in addition to even worse
apprehended when a street sweeper detected his accent and outrages against U.S. prisoners, participated in the trial of a fellow
called the police. prisoner, conducted by Chinese captors and American prisoner
10. Adams, Murder and Martial Justice, 156–57. collaborators. Batchelor was sentenced to life, but that sentence
11. Chris Madsen, “Victims of Circumstance: The Execution was reduced to twenty years, and he served three years.
of German Deserters by Surrendered German Troops under 22. Proclamation No. 10,631.
Canadian Control in Amsterdam, May 1945,” Canadian Military 23. The Code of Conduct has never been used as the basis of
History 2, no. 1 (1993). a criminal prosecution under any Uniform Code of Military Justice
12. Ibid. article, although it is technically possible to do so.
13. Ibid.

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MILITARY REVIEW  January-February 2020 107

Key Ingredient in Army
Leader Development
Graduate School
Maj. George Fust, U.S. Army

D eveloping adaptive leaders is the bridge to

overcoming readiness shortfalls and the
unpredictability of future conflicts, and the
increasingly ambiguous nature of threats in the con-
temporary operating environment coupled with finite
U.S. Army feedback to better understand the results of
its current graduate school policy. A secondary purpose
of this study is to identify how to better leverage gradu-
ate school to develop strategic leaders who can then be
more effective in strategic-level positions.
resources makes leader development a reasonable goal.1
However, leader development as employed by the Army The Current Leader
is ambiguous and vague. What type of leader is the Development Process
Army striving to develop? Strategic leaders? Operational A review of the Army’s current leader development
leaders? What evaluation mechanisms are in place to process will help us understand where graduate school
determine if a leader has become more developed in can be leveraged to improve strategic thinking. The
responding to ambiguity?2 These questions deserve Army defines strategic leaders as representing “a finely
continued debate and understanding but will not be balanced combination of high-level thinkers, accom-
the focus here. Instead, this article will tackle one small plished warfighters, and geopolitical military experts.”6
piece of the larger puzzle: graduate-level education. If we accept that advanced education “fosters breadth
Rigorous advanced education is a bridge between of view, diverse perspectives, critical and reflective
strategic and operational leadership.3 It provides indi- analysis, abstract reasoning, comfort with ambiguity
viduals a greater intellectual tool set for dealing with and uncertainty, and innovative thinking, particularly
complexity, and it is arguably one of the best institu- with respect to complex, ill-structured or non-linear
tional opportunities to build strategic thinkers.4 Further, problems,” then we can conclude it is a necessary step
advanced education opportunities can “help shape to develop strategic leaders.7 The logic follows that any
strategic leaders” by cultivating a foundation for critical shortcomings in the Army’s graduate school application
thinking.5 The best place to begin this research project will likely result in shortcomings in leader development
is by examining the education of the Army’s current and thus a suboptimal force.8
strategic leaders, those at the three- and four-star level. The Army has made great strides recently to better
These individuals embody the culture and values of the prepare leaders for the changing international environ-
organization. A systematic analysis of one component ment. The prioritization of leader development was a
of their career path, graduate school, can provide insight necessary first step in the process. The visionary insight
into the value placed on it and identify potential short- of Gen. Ray Odierno, the thirty-eighth chief of staff
comings. Utilizing a robust resume dataset of senior of the Army, culminated in Army Leader Development
officer education contextualizes the data within trends Strategy 2013 (ALDS 2013).9 The document explains the
in scholarship and Army strategy in order to provide the importance of leader development and outlines a plan

108 January-February 2020  MILITARY REVIEW

 GRADUATE SCHOOL

Maj. Gen. Robin Fontes (right), then commander of Combined Security Transition Command-Afghanistan (CSTC-A), meets with Maj. Gen.
Monawari (far left), commanding general of Afghan Logistics Command, and Brig. Gen. Fahim (second from left), commander of the Afghan
National Army Material Management Center-Afghanistan on 9 August 2017. Fontes is a 1986 graduate of the U.S. Military Academy. She then
graduated from the University of Washington with a master’s degree in international relations and from the George C. Marshall European Center
for Security Studies. She speaks Russian, Dari, and Farsi. (Photo courtesy of Sgt. 1st Class E. L. Craig, U.S. Army/CSTC-A)

for the Army to achieve its stated goals. The strategy is nested with other mutually supporting strategies in-
suggests ends, ways, and means alignment and specific cluding the Army Education Strategy, which is visually
tools to aid in the process. ALDS 2013 is a great starting represented in figure 1 (on page 110).10
point for assessing and promoting leader development, As figure 1 indicates, the Army places increasing em-
but it does not go far enough in capturing the impor- phasis on education as a career progresses. Therefore, any
tance of advanced education. Annex E of the document education opportunity has increasing returns on invest-
does highlight strategic leader ends and ways; however, ment. One can conclude that the sooner an Army leader
it stops short in institutionalizing strategic thinking attends graduate school and the more such opportunities
across the entire force. ALDS 2013 also does not offer exist, the better it will be for the Army. The next section
enough specific details for measuring its effectiveness, evaluates the degree to which the Army’s renewed em-
likely because the document is not intended as a stand- phasis on leader development translates to more grad-
alone product. The overarching strategy of ALDS 2013 uate school opportunities. But before reviewing those

MILITARY REVIEW  January-February 2020 109

results, a look at the larger conversation on strategic they had the appropriate development for the their time
leader development plans is helpful. period. The paper also fails to adequately differentiate
Where the ALDS 2013 falls short, there does exist a varying levels of leadership (operational versus strategic)
growing body of literature related specifically to de- or the subcategories of leader development.
veloping strategic thinkers in the Army. This body of The subcategory of graduate school within the larger
research offers insight into why it is important for the strategic leader development genre is routinely addressed
Army to specify the process and expected outcomes for by academics and the military alike. Countless quanti-
development of strategic leadership. The large volume of tative and qualitative articles have been published with
literature available in the “developing strategic leaders” varying degrees of effectiveness.14 This article serves as a
genre is a favorite topic among attendees at the Army’s contemporary update that seeks to leverage a new dataset
Command and General Staff College (CGSC) and in and method of identifying senior leader trends. The
military-related publications.11 The key theme among larger body of strategic leader development literature will
these publications is
that the Army can
be better at develop-
As Army experience is gained
ing strategic leaders.
The recommenda- Emphasis on training decreases
tions suggest that the
Army should iden- While emphasis on education increases
tify strategic leaders
earlier in their career Entry Exit
timeline and that the
Officer Personnel Career progression
Management
Directorate (OPMD) (Figure from TRADOC Regulation 350-70, Army Learning Policy and Systems, 2017)

should be adjusted to
better develop strategic Figure 1. Relationship of Experience,
leadership skills. The Training, and Education
arguments center on
the idea that the in-
creasing complexity and interconnectedness of the inter- be used to highlight schools of thought related to better
national environment is outpacing the antiquated Army integrating or reforming how graduate school should be
leader development model. This theme is not unique to employed in the development of Army officers.
today’s generation. Articles have been routinely published Before continuing, it is useful to formally outline the
for the past fifty years extolling the inability of the Army definition of the term “strategic leader” as it will be used
to keep leader development on pace with contemporary throughout this article. A summary of how the Army
affairs. In short, what worked in the past will not work
12
defines a strategic leader is “a leader who is an expert, not
today. We cannot rely on luck but must instead design a only in his own domain of war fighting and leading large
system to develop the strategic leaders the Army needs. military organizations, but also in the bureaucratic and
An outlier to this plethora of publications argues that political environment of the nation’s decision-making
the Army system is good enough. The outlier’s dis-
13
process.”15 Further, it is important to differentiate a per-
sertation employs three case studies, only one from the son in a “strategic leadership position” from someone who
modern era, and it lacks empirical evidence. The lack of is an actual “strategic leader.”16
robustness and potential bias of this outlier diminishes
the potential findings. Of more concern, the paper fails Training versus Education
to consider that the case studies selected could have been The resounding theme of literature published on the
lucky (exactly what the larger community argues) or that topic of Army strategic leader development is clear: the

110 January-February 2020  MILITARY REVIEW

 GRADUATE SCHOOL

Army needs strategic leaders but is not doing enough mechanisms for developing strategic thinking. So where
to develop them. Arthur T. Coumbe argues in Army does the Army currently stand?
Officer Development: Historical Context that “the apogee
of graduate education in the Army took place in 1972,” Senior Leader Trends
and that “the Army’s commitment to, and emphasis The logical starting point for a discussion fo-
upon, fully funded graduate education for officers cused on leader development is with those who
gradually eroded after 1973.”17 A shift in priority by have achieved the senior leadership positions of the
Gen. William DePuy in 1973, “one that subordinates organization. Within the Army, those positions are
intellectual and strategic astuteness to tactical and op- at the three- and four-star level. The Army’s officer
erational expertise,” is what led to the cultural shift and management system is a closed hierarchy whereby
decline in graduate school attendance.18 Are we still the institution selects those its deems most qualified
operating under the same culture despite rhetoric de- to advance. While the president, and ultimately the
claring leader development is the priority? If the leader Senate, have final approval, the Army has great discre-
development focus is tactical and operational leader- tion in selecting its senior leaders.22 Therefore, those
ship, then the Army is on the right track. If, however, it selects for promotion “reflect the character traits
the shift is toward education, then steps must be taken and leadership qualities that the organization seeks to
to increase graduate school opportunities. sustain” and thus the “character traits the Army pre-
Jeffrey McCausland and Gregg Martin argued in fers within the institution.”23 By reviewing the gradu-
a 2001 Parameters article that there is a “significant ate school trends of the Army’s three- and four-star
qualitative difference” between “training” and “edu- officers, we can get a glimpse of what the Army values
cation.”19 They go on to explain that “education is all and if changes have occurred. The database used for
about teaching how to think and what the questions the study includes all three- and four-star officers who
ought to be …. Training is most frequently used retired or served after 1986, including officers who
when the goal is to prepare a leader or an organiza- commissioned as far back as year group 1943.24 The
tion to execute specified tasks. It often includes repe- database uses standardized resume data that includes
tition of task, not unlike an athletic team learning to graduate degrees attained and the institution confer-
execute plays.”20 If we agree with the Army’s newest ring the degree. With approximately 500 observable
operating concept, then it is even more critical to datapoints (102 four-star and 391 three-star officers),
invest in graduate school as a method to educate and the database offers a sizable basis for understanding
develop strategic thinkers: the Army’s senior
This concept, for the first time, focuses on leader graduate school Maj. George Fust,
all three levels of war; tactical, operational, experience. U.S. Army, is a military
and strategic. The environment the Army intelligence officer who
will operate in is unknown. The enemy is Degrees Earned teaches American politics
unknown, the location is unknown, and by Generals and civil-military relations
the coalitions involved are unknown. The Over time, a mas- in the Department of Social
problem we are focusing on is how to “Win ter’s degree has become Sciences at the U.S. Military
in a Complex World.”21 necessary for advance- Academy, West Point, New
In an unknown environment, leaders will not know ment, though it is not York. He holds a BA from
what play to execute. They must be prepared to think a formal requirement. McKendree University and
through problems and respond to dynamic situations. While some career an MA in political science
Merely promoting the vague concept of leader develop- paths in the Army such from Duke University. He
ment is not enough. The Army must leverage all broad- as those of lawyers and previously served in the
ening opportunities of its members to maximize the doctors require a specific 173rd Infantry Brigade
benefit to their strategic development. One such broad- advanced degree, most Combat Team (A), the 207th
ening assignment is graduate school. As previously ar- do not. Where an officer Military Intelligence Brigade,
gued, advanced education is one of the best institutional acquires a degree is not and the 1st Infantry Division.

MILITARY REVIEW  January-February 2020 111

Table 1. Number and Percentage of Degrees considered important. The Army considers a
by Type Earned by Four-Star Officers degree from Duke University in political sci-
ence to be equivalent to an online degree in any
Degree type Number of Percent of subject. There is no institutional mechanism
degrees earned degrees earned in place to incentivize attaining a degree from
Administration (public) 13 10% a challenging program. Nor is there a require-
Administrative/personnel management 2 2% ment or incentive to attain a degree with rele-
Administrative education 3 2% vance to strategic leadership. All that matters is
Advanced military studies 1 1% that an officer gets a graduate degree, preferably
Applied mechanics 1 1% around the midcareer mark. Of the ninety-sev-
Area studies 1 1% en four-star officers in the dataset used for this
Business 1 1% study, forty different graduate degree types
Business administration 8 6% have been attained out of a total of 130 earned
Business management 1 1% graduate degrees (see table 1).25
Civil engineer 1 1% Given the diversity of degrees at the
Civil government 1 1% senior-most level, it can be inferred that
Electronic warfare 1 1% even greater diversity exists at lower ranks.
English 5 4% If one accepts the universal benefit of grad-
History 6 5% uate school as the development of critical
Human resources 1 1% thinking, then the recommendation would
Information technology 2 2% simply be to expand the number of graduate
Instructional technology 1 1% school slots available for in-resident programs
International relations 12 9% to maximize program benefits. If, however,
International relations and economics 1 1% the Army maintains or decreases its cur-
Law 1 1% rent number of slots, then it must maximize
Logistics management 4 3% utility. One method is to dictate specific
Management 5 4% degree programs. There is ample precedent
Master of arts 1 1% in the Army’s history to support this course
Mathematics 1 1% of action.26 In 1966, the Army commissioned
Mechanical engineering 3 2% a study titled “Report of the Department of
Military arts and science 9 7% the Army Board to Review Army Officer
National resource strategy 1 1% Schools” (later known as the Haines Board)
National security/strategic studies 20 15% that “stipulated that such training [graduate
Nuclear engineering 1 1% school] must be for recognized and specific
Operations research 3 2% Army requirements.”27 Today’s requirements
Philosophy 2 2% (if enacted) should dictate that these pro-
Philosophy, politics, economics 2 2% grams be related to national security, interna-
Physical education 1 1% tional relations, political science, or strategic
Physics 1 1% studies.28 Of the degrees earned by the ob-
Politics, economics, government 1 1% served four-star generals, 33 percent fall into
Political science 6 5% the national security/strategic studies cate-
Psychology 3 2% gory. The remaining 67 percent do not. This
Public and international affairs 1 1% lends evidence to the importance of graduate
Sociology 1 1% school’s ability to develop strategic thinking
Systems management 1 1% skills regardless of degree program. A closer
Total 130 100% look at the Army’s current graduate programs
(Table by author) will help illuminate a way forward.29

112 January-February 2020  MILITARY REVIEW

 GRADUATE SCHOOL

Current Graduate Programs groups or top performers. All the groupings within
The U.S. Army’s current graduate studies program the three categories are fully funded by the Army.
is composed of three major categories: Advanced Civil The other primary option for acquiring a graduate
Schooling (ACS), Broadening Opportunity Program degree is tuition assistance. This option is utilized
(BOP), and Retention Incentive. ACS has seven sub- while the officer is working full-time and at his own
groupings: Acquisition, Basic Branch, Functional Area, expense. As such, it falls outside the scope of the
Professor Army War College, PhD, Special Branch, research presented here.

Advanced civil schooling Broadening opportunity program Retention incentive

600

500
Program slots available

400

300

200

100

0
97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17
Year
(Figure by author; data from U.S. Army Human Resources Command, 2017)

Figure 2. Army Graduate Program Slots Available by Year and Category

and U.S. Military Academy.30 The groupings indicate Figure 2 is a visual representation of the Army’s
the specific use of the degree and are mostly generated three categories for officers to acquire a graduate degree
by funding allotments. For example, the U.S. Military paid for by the Army. This figure demonstrates trends
Academy grouping provides a master’s degree to those over the last twenty years. The information is helpful
who are en route to teach at the U.S. Military Academy for two reasons: it shows the trajectory and the total
at West Point, New York. Another major category is number of slots over time.
BOP. The four subgroupings under the BOP category The key takeaway from figure 2 is the stagnant nature
include congressional fellow, Harvard strategist, Joint of graduate school slots over the past twenty years. This
Chiefs of Staff intern, and scholarship. Much like the is especially true if one considers the new directive to pri-
groupings under ACS, the BOP groupings indicate the oritize Army strategic leader development, ALDS 2013,
intended use of the degree following completion. was published in 2013. The year following the publica-
Finally, the Retention Incentive category has three tion had a net decline in ACS slots. In other words, the
subgroupings. These include Expanded Graduate rhetoric does not match the execution. Another point
School Program, Graduate School for Active Duty that stands out is the relatively low total number of pro-
Service Obligation, and Performance-Based Graduate gram slots. There have been on average fewer than five
School Incentive Program for Top-Performing Basic hundred ACS slots available per year since 1997. Figure
Branch Captain. The Retention Incentive groupings 3 (on page 114) highlights how this compares to the
are intended as incentives to retain specific year total officer population across the same time frame. This

MILITARY REVIEW  January-February 2020 113

 Graduate slots (advanced civil
schooling, broadening opportunity Total Army officers
program combined)
700 90,000
600 80,000
70,000
500

Total Army officers

60,000
Graduate slots

400 50,000
300 40,000
30,000
200
20,000
100 10,000
0 0
97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15
Year
(Figure by author, data from http://www.cna.org/research/pop-rep)

Figure 3. Army Officer Total and Graduate Program Slots Available by Year

figure also suggests a stagnant trajectory for program page 113). There are even fewer slots when the catego-
slots over the past eighteen years in the two primary ries that will not reach the four-star level (such as special
strategic degree-producing categories: ACS and BOP. branch, functional area, and acquisition) are removed.
The number of graduate program slots is largely depen- In 2015, this would have generated 484 graduate school
dent on the total officer end strength. slots for a population of 29,166 (45,738 if you include
If the Army assumes that more strategic leadership those eligible at the O-4 pay grade).
will be required to face an increasingly ambiguous threat This number of slots is simply too low when account-
environment in the future, then the graduate slots avail- ing for attrition, nonadvancement, and the increasing
able trend line should be increasing at a faster rate than complexity of the threat environment. Junior leaders are
the total officer population. The Army’s closed personnel increasingly asked to make decisions with potentially
system requires a “long time horizon to observe change strategic-level impacts. Where a senior leader can rely on
in senior army leadership.”31 For example, officers who years of experience, a junior leader must rely on his ability
complete a graduate degree in 2017 are not eligible for to think critically. In-resident graduate programs provide
senior leadership positions for at least a decade or more. officers the best environment to develop as critical think-
It is thus imperative that the Army provide more gradu- ers because such programs allow officers to set aside other
ate school opportunities at a faster rate. Figure 3 clearly tasks to focus entirely on building the skills of strategic
shows that the graduate school slots available are in leadership. To guarantee a greater likelihood of success at
proportion to the number of available candidates. The the strategic level, the Army must provide more in-resi-
percentage of slots available to the total population has dent graduate school opportunities.
averaged .64 percent since 1997.32 In 2015, that rate was
.61 percent, slightly lower than the average. Civilian versus Military Degree-
An alternate demonstration of this data also sug- Producing Programs
gests that the total numbers of slots are too low. Table How important is the difference between civilian and
2 (on page 115) shows the number of active duty military degree-producing programs? Does it matter if an
officers in the Army in 2015 by pay grade. officer receives his only graduate degree from a military
Those primarily eligible to attend graduate school are school? At set points in an officer’s career he will attend
at the O-3 (captain) and O-4 (major) pay grade. Taking military schools. Examples include CGSC and the Army
just the O-3 pay grade into consideration, the Army War College. Over time, these schools have become
has around 29,000 officers and fewer than 600 graduate accredited and are capable of conferring graduate degrees.
school slots available as demonstrated in figure 2 (on Officers attending military schools have the option of

114 January-February 2020  MILITARY REVIEW

 GRADUATE SCHOOL

Table 2. Active Component Commissioned Officer

Corps by Pay Grade for Fiscal Year 2015

Pay grade O-1 O-2 O-3 O-4 O-5 O-6 O-7 O-8 O-9 O-10 Total

Total 8,132 12,181 29,166 16,572 9,302 4,201 139 126 48 11 79,878

(Table by author, data from http://www.cna.org/research/pop-rep)

increasing their workload in order to pursue an advanced group 1982. Therefore, the data will drop because only
degree. In short, they are not mandated to complete the three-star generals are represented after 1982.
requirements for a graduate degree but have the option. The results of the data show that there is a decreasing
Recently, the Army determined that all officers would at- trend in attaining a degree only from a civilian institu-
tend intermediate level education in some capacity with tion, with a corresponding increase in acquiring a degree
the top 50 percent of majors attending CGSC as resi- from a military institution. There is also an increasing
dents.33 This increase in students resulted in a subsequent trend in attaining a degree from both a civilian and mil-
increase in faculty and capability for the school to confer itary institution. Army senior leaders are still obtaining
graduate degrees. Many officers with limited flexibility degrees from civilian institutions but are also more likely
in their career timeline will take advantage of the degree to get a degree from a military institution.
offering while foregoing an opportunity to complete an The results of figure 4 show a positive trend toward
advanced degree at a civilian institution. Recall that the the central goal of this research: to provide the U.S.
source and type of the master’s degree is not institution- Army feedback to better understand the results of its cur-
ally important if critical thinking is the most import- rent graduate school policy. Military institutions control
ant goal. If, however, the Army seeks to maximize the their curriculum and can tailor it to precisely develop
graduate school experience to develop strategic leaders, strategic leaders. However, the benefits of allowing
these leaders “must be schooled in matters both military military officers to broaden themselves at civilian
and political” in order to become “masters of the geopolit- institutions cannot be overstated. Thus, a combination
ical realm.”34 Military officers will receive other forms of of attending both is optimal. Current trends indicate
professional military education throughout their careers progress in this regard. The follow-up question then
that will make them experts in the warfighting domain.35 becomes whether this was intentional. The Army can
Graduate education is the best opportunity to train them benefit from a holistic approach to generating strategic
in the geopolitical context necessary for strategic leaders. leaders by encouraging attendance at civilian institu-
If degree-producing military schools balance their curric- tions through an increase in the total number of slots
ulum to include a healthy dose of international relations, available. Additionally, other structural changes in the
political science, security studies, etc., then any trends Army’s OPMD would be necessary to institutionally
toward officers only obtaining their degree from military incentivize attending a civilian graduate school. This
schools will not be inherently negative. would ensure a larger pool of officers with a formal
The resume dataset highlights degree trends among critical-thinking foundation is available to draw on.
Army senior leaders. The data is divided into three
categories: officers who obtained a degree only from Options for the Future
military schools, officers who obtained a degree only The Army has always striven to develop leaders.
from civilian schools, and officers who have obtained Various programs and structural changes have been
a degree from both a military and a civilian school. A implemented to adjust training to reflect contemporary
simple time-series line graph represents the data shown threats. Today’s ambiguous threat environment requires
in figure 4 (on page 116). It should be noted that the another shift focused on developing strategic leaders.
youngest active duty four-star generals are from year The above research has identified several weaknesses in

MILITARY REVIEW  January-February 2020 115

 25

20
Number of officers

15

10

0
43 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88

Year group
Military degree only Military and civilian degree Civilian degree only
(Figure by author)

Figure 4. Graduate Degrees Awarded by Year Group

and Type for Three- and Four-Star Officers

the Army’s use of graduate school to maximize strategic and promote the seriousness of the Army with respect
leader competency. There are, however, three approach- to developing strategic leaders. This approach will
es that can help maximize the Army’s strategic leader also overcome the deficiencies of program slots tied to
development process: the Junior Officer Strategic Leader population density by forcing officers to focus exten-
Development Program (JOSLDP), Scales’s 350 method, sively on strategy-related degrees. Finally, the approach
and a culture shift toward education.36 intentionally builds on the success identified by sending
Option 1: JOSLDP. In 2007, Maj. Larry Burris officers to both a military and civilian institution for
published a paper on how to best develop strategic graduate degree completion.
leaders. His central finding was that a centrally se- Option 2: Scales’s 350 method. A more recent
lected, four-year program focused on a small group of approach, published in 2016 by retired Maj. Gen.
officers (twenty to thirty per year) would be the best Robert Scales, “seeks to guarantee that only those
approach to identify and develop the Army’s future gifted with strategic genius become strategic deci-
strategic leaders. The JOSLDP approach would select sionmakers and commanders.”38 To accomplish this,
the best strategic candidates from across the Army. Scales’s method counsels selecting about 350 young
The candidates would then complete their military officers to attend a civilian graduate school “to study
education (possibly attaining a graduate degree from a the art of war.”39 After graduate school, they would
military institution) in their first year of the program. attend the School of Advanced Military Studies in
Year two would be spent in a civilian graduate school residency for two years in order to meet the “require-
“resulting in a master’s level degree in strategy, national ments for a PhD in strategic studies.”40 Later in their
security studies or foreign affairs,” whereby the thesis career, the cohort would attend another version of
project would “have to address a strategic issue cur- the School of Advanced Military Studies at the U.S.
rently being faced.”37 Year three would consist of service Army War College. The program should be rigorous
as an intern on the joint or Army staff, and year four and supervised by the highest levels of the Army
would be in a non-Department of Defense agency. staff. Additionally, Scales argues that there should
The JOSLDP approach coincides with the research be a set number of duty position quotas to ensure
presented here in several aspects. Hand-selecting the members of the program are placed into strategic
best officers for the program will generate an incentive positions. Attrition, resignations, and retirements

116 January-February 2020  MILITARY REVIEW

 GRADUATE SCHOOL

Lt. Gen. Paul E. Funk II (left), then commanding general of Combined Joint Task Force-Operation Inherent Resolve, and Iraqi Maj. Gen. Najm
Abdullah al-Jibouri (right), commander of Nineveh Liberation Operation, walk through a busy market 4 October 2017 near the University
of Mosul. Funk attended Montana State University where he received a bachelor’s degree in speech communications and earned a Reserve
Officers’ Training Corps commission as an armor officer. Later, Funk earned a master’s degree in administration from Central Michigan
University, and his most recent educational experience was as a War College Fellow at the University of Texas Institute for Advanced Tech-
nologies. (Photo by Spc. Avery Howard, U.S. Army)

would winnow out all but the best and justifies 350 students to meet future demand. Finally, the approach
officers as the starting number. seeks to maximize the benefits of both civilian and
Scales’s 350 method differs from the JOSLDP in military graduate degree institutions.
several ways. The Scales method places officers in Option 3: Culture shift toward education. The
positions to utilize their strategic expertise between goal of this option is to formally recognize civilian
schooling, whereas the JOSLDP is a continuous four- graduate education as critical to developing strategic
year program. Scales’s approach seeks to groom strat- leaders capable of winning in a complex world. To
egists over the length of a career and therefore many execute this plan, additional resources need to be
more initial applicants would need to be accepted to allocated to increase the number of officers attending
account for attrition. The method ensures strategic fully funded, in-resident graduate schools. The num-
thinkers will reach the senior-leader level because of ber of slots should not be tied to population density
the size of the candidate pool. Similar to the JOSLDP but rather the needs of the force. To accommodate an
approach, Scales’s 350 method seeks to dictate the increase in midcareer officers rotating out of tactical
graduate degree program into a strategic studies units, the OPMD should be restructured. These up-
field. It also seeks to expand the number of graduate dates would include an increase in the total number of

MILITARY REVIEW  January-February 2020 117

officers at the O-3 and O-4 pay grade, incentives for This research article focused on the graduate
promotion for officers who attain degrees from both school aspect of developing strategic leaders and
civilian and military schools, incentives for advance- determined three key areas of improvement. First,
ment for degrees attained in specific fields deemed the Army must provide more graduate school op-
critical to strategic leadership, and the removal of year portunities.42 An increase in the pool of officers with
groups to allow officers a utilization tour following a graduate degree in strategic studies increases the
graduate school completion. These structural changes probability of promoting to the senior-leader level
will incentivize advanced education and influence a someone with a related degree. Secondly, careful
culture shift toward education. consideration should be given to maximize the utili-
ty of graduate school degrees earned by officers. This
Final Thoughts may include dictating the degree earned. Finally, the
There is inherent tension between preparing for Army must take a deliberate approach to encourage
the tactical fight (training) and dedicating time to and incentivize graduate degree completion at both
learning how to think critically (education). If leader military and civilian schools.
development is the Army’s priority, then the organi- Three approaches were outlined that would
zation has a responsibility to clearly articulate how facilitate a solution to this article’s central research
much of each category is desired. This article has goal of providing the U.S. Army feedback to better
demonstrated the Army’s consistent commitment understand the results of its current graduate school
to graduate school opportunities. It has also revealed policy. The approaches can be integrated with various
trends among its senior leaders. The Army can use this structural and budgetary changes.
data to fine-tune its policies to meet emerging needs. Because leader development is a central goal of the
The periodic cycles of tactical versus critical thinking Army to address future national security issues, every
skills is again at the forefront of conversation because aspect of the process must be analyzed. This article was
of the changing threat environment.41 Army doctrine an effort to analyze the graduate school portion of that
and rhetoric from senior leaders is pointing toward process for senior officers. Graduate school can deliver the
critical-thinking skills rather than tactical. foundation necessary to win today and tomorrow.

Notes
1. Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) Pamphlet (TP) 6. Army Doctrine Reference Publication 6-22, Army Leadership
525-3-1, The U.S. Army Operating Concept, Win in a Complex World (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 2012 [obso-
2020-2040 (Fort Eustis, VA: TRADOC, 7 October 2014 [obsolete]). lete]), 11-1.
2. Daniel H. McCauley, “Rediscovering the Art of Strategic Think- 7. TRADOC Regulation 350-70, Training Development Man-
ing,” Joint Force Quarterly 81 (2nd Quarter, 2016): 26–33, accessed 2 agement, Processes, and Products (Fort Eustis, VA: TRADOC, 1995
October 2019, https://ndupress.ndu.edu/JFQ/Joint-Force-Quarterly-81/ [obsolete]), 21.
Article/702006/rediscovering-the-art-of-strategic-thinking-develop- 8. Henry H. Shelton, “Professional Education: The Key to Transfor-
ing-21st-century-strategic-l/. See also James M. Hardaway, “Strategic mation,” Parameters 31, no. 3 (Autumn 2001): 4–16.
Leader Development for a 21st Century Army” (monograph, Fort 9. Army Leader Development Strategy 2013 (Washington, DC:
Leavenworth, KS: School of Advanced Military Studies, 2008), 33–37. Department of the Army, 2013), accessed 4 October 2019, https://
3. Jeffrey D. McCausland and Gregg F. Martin, “Transforming Stra- usacac.army.mil/sites/default/files/documents/cal/ALDS5June%20
tegic Leader Education for the 21st-Century Army,” Parameters 31, no. 2013Record.pdf.
3 (Autumn 2001): 17–33. 10. Ibid., Annex H.
4. Anna L. Sackett et al., “Enhancing the Strategic Capability of 11. See Michael Flowers, “Improving Strategic Leadership,”
the Army: An Investigation of Strategic Thinking Tasks, Skills, and Military Review 84, no. 2 (March-April 2004): 40; Gordon B. Davis
Development,” Research Report 1995 (Fort Belvoir, VA: U.S. Army Jr. and James B. Martin, “CGSC: Developing Leaders to Adapt and
Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences, February Dominate for the Army of Today and Tomorrow,” Military Review
2016), 20–21, accessed 2 October 2019, https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/ 92, no. 5 (September-October 2012): 63–74; Volney J. Warner,
tr/fulltext/u2/1006147.pdf. “Preparing Field Grade Leaders for Today Tomorrow,” Military
5. George B. Forsythe, “The Preparation of Strategic Leaders,” Pa- Review 86, no. 1 ( January/February 2006): 104; McCauley, “Redis-
rameters 22, no. 1 (Spring 1992): 45, accessed 2 October 2019, https:// covering the Art of Strategic Thinking,” 26–33.
apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a528179.pdf.

118 January-February 2020  MILITARY REVIEW

 GRADUATE SCHOOL

12. See Amos A. Jordan and William J. Taylor Jr., “The Military Man 28. Burris, “Strategic Leadership,” 3.
in Academia,” The Annals of the American Academy of Political and 29. Fust, “Grading the Army’s Choice of Senior Leaders,” database.
Social Science 406, no. 1 (1973): 129–45. 30. “Fully Funded Graduate Programs Policy and Procedures Fiscal
13. Jonathan L. Hawkins, “Is the Army Developing Strategic Lead- Year 2018” (Fort Knox, KY: U.S. Army Human Resources Command, July
ers?” (master’s thesis, Command and General Staff College, 2015). 2017), 9.
14. Jordan and Taylor, “The Military Man.” For a thorough history, 31. Michael J. Meese, “The Army Officer Corps in the All-Volunteer
see also Arthur T. Coumbe, Army Officer Development: Historical Con- Force,” Contemporary Economic Policy 20, no. 2 (2002): 107.
text (report, Fort Monroe, VA: U.S. Army Cadet Command, 2010). 32. This percentage was determined by dividing the number of
15. Larry Burris, “Strategic Leadership: A Recommendation for graduate slots in a particular year by the corresponding number of
Identifying and Developing the United States Army’s Future Strategic total active duty officers in the same year. All years from 1997 to 2015
Leaders” (Fort Leavenworth, KS: U.S. Army Command and General were then averaged. The highest percentage was .73 percent in 2012.
Staff College, January 2007), 2, accessed 4 October 2019, https://usa- The lowest, .58 percent in 2009.
cac.army.mil/sites/default/files/documents/cace/DCL/dcl_First_Place_Es- 33. Davis and Martin, “CGSC.”
say_2006_2007.pdf. 34. Shelton, “Professional Education,” 4.
16. Stephen J. Gerras, ed., Strategic leadership Primer, 3rd ed. 35. Reference is to “management of violence” as described by
(Carlisle, PA: U.S. Army War College, 2010), 3. Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics
17. Coumbe, Army Officer Development: Historical Context, 11. of Civil–Military Relations (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press,
18. Ibid., 14. 1957), 11.
19. McCausland and Martin, “Transforming Strategic Leader 36. Burris, “Strategic Leadership,” 17–19; Robert Scales, “Are
Education,” 22. You a Strategic Genius?: Not Likely, Given Army’s System for Se-
20. Ibid. lecting, Educating Leaders,” Army Magazine 66, no. 11 (November
21. TP 525-3-1, U.S. Army Operating Concept, iii. 2016), accessed 2 October 2019, https://www.ausa.org/articles/
22. David Barno et al., “Building Better Generals” (Washington, DC: army-system-selecting-educating-leaders.
Center for a New American Security, October 2013). 37. Burris, “Strategic Leadership,” 18.
23. George Fust, “Grading the Army’s Choice of Senior Leaders” 38. Scales, “Are You a Strategic Genius?”
(master’s thesis, Duke University, 2018), 37. 39. Ibid.
24. Ibid, 6. 40. Ibid.
25. A total of 102 four-star officers are in Fust’s database. One 41. Coumbe, “Army Officer Development: Historical Context,” 10.
officer does not have degree information available and four only have 42. A 2015 article suggest this will occur. See Andrew Tilghman,
a BS degree. “DoD Plans to Send More Officers to Civilian Grad Schools,” Military
26. Coumbe, Army Officer Development: Historical Context, 7–13. Times (website), 20 August 2015, accessed 2 October 2019, http://
27. Report of the Department of the Army Board [Haines Board] to www.militarytimes.com/story/military/benefits/education/2015/08/20/
Review Army Officer Schools: Vol. II, Description of Current Educational graduate-school-proposals/32063579/.
and Training Materials (Washington, DC: Department of the Army,
February 1966), 263.

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should be submitted to usarmy.leavenworth.tradoc.mbx.journal-of-military-learn-
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ported by research, evident through the citation of sources. For detailed author
submission guidelines, visit the JML page on the Army University Press website at
https://www.armyupress.army.mil/Journals/Journal-of-Military-Learning/April-2017-
Edition/Author-Submission-Guidelines/.
For additional information call 913-684-9329 or send an email to the ad-
dress above.

MILITARY REVIEW  January-February 2020 119

Palestinian protesters participate in a violent demonstration 1 June 2018 against Israel’s eleven-year blockade of Gaza and its refusal to allow
refugees to return to their villages inside the zone. From March to June 2018, estimates of approximately one hundred thousand protesters
fired weapons and threw rocks at Israeli soldiers and sent balloon-transported firebombs and explosives into Israel, resulting in burnt forests and
farmland, numerous Israeli injuries, and the death of at least one Israeli soldier. Israel’s strong response to the protest over the period resulted
in approximately two hundred Palestinian deaths (many were from organized militias) and several thousand injuries. Hamas leaders inside Gaza
stoke domestic instability and resentment against Israel and use the resulting violence to recruit and organize militia groups to conduct asymmetric
insurgent warfare against Israel. (Photo courtesy of the Israel Defense Forces)

The Reemergence of Gray-Zone

Warfare in Modern Conflicts
Israel’s Struggle against Hamas’s
Indirect Approach
Omer Dostri
120 January-February 2020  MILITARY REVIEW
 GRAY-ZONE WARFARE

O ver the last decade, the use of gray-zone war-

fare—part of a coercive strategy—has increased.
Various actors in the international system use
this kind of warfare to achieve political, economic, and
military advantages while minimizing risks and the reac-
gas), cyber activity, and lawfare. Russia also manipulates
public opinion at home and abroad by using information
warfare and disseminating “fake news” as a means of
creating confusion and skepticism.4

tions of their opponents. The means of gray-zone warfare Gray-Zone Warfare

are based on ambiguity and low signature that provide as a Renewed Phenomenon
politicians and decision-makers with a strategic capacity While some researchers see gray-zone warfare as
of plausible deniability. These include surgical, restrained, a new phenomenon, others believe it has been used in
and limited use of kinetic forces—mainly the use of the past. According to Antulio Echevarria, what is now
special operations forces or irregular forces; cyber ​​warfare known as the gray zone is actually a version of coercive
by governments or nonstate actors; information warfare; strategies that have been reinforced by technological
and other nonviolent means of coercive diplomacy such development.5 Michael Mazarr stresses that countries
as economic sanctions and the use of trade to impose an have used such approaches for centuries—in some ways,
actor’s will on its opponent (see figure, page 122). for thousands of years. However, Mazarr continues
In 2015, the U.S. Special Operations Command issued Echevarria’s line and argues that there are at least three
a white paper defining the “challenges” of gray-zone war- innovations in the gray-zone phenomenon. First, an
fare as “competitive interactions among and within state increasing number of aggressive nations—mainly China,
and non-state actors that fall between the traditional war Russia, and Iran—are making extensive use of gray-zone
and peace duality. They are characterized by ambiguity strategies. Second, the cost of significant aggression has
about the nature of the conflict, opacity of the parties grown enormously, and the economic and social interde-
involved, or uncertainty about the relevant policy and pendence of the world has grown so much that countries
legal frameworks.”1 Gray-zone threats are defined as “ac- with aggressive intent are looking for alternative ways to
tions of a state or non-state actor that challenge or violate achieve their goals. Finally, while some tools of gray-zone
international customs, norms, and laws for the purpose of warfare have been used since antiquity, others (e.g., cyber
pursuing one or more broadly defined national security warfare, advanced forms of information warfare, and the
interests without provoking direct military response.”2 processing and refinement of civilian tools for policy and
An April 2017 panel discussion in Crystal City, Virginia, strategic purposes) are relatively new phenomena.6
by the U.S. Department of Defense’s Strategic Multilayer According to James Wirtz, revisionism, which he
Assessment team—published later as a special document sees as characteristic of gray-zone warfare, occurred
in June 2017—defined the gray zone as “conceptual space during the Cold War but was limited by the desire of
between peace and war, where activities are typically the great powers to avoid changes in the status quo that
ambiguous or cloud attribution and exceed the threshold could lead to nuclear conflict.7 Wirtz, in effect, states
of ordinary competition, yet intentionally fall below the that the gray zone is indeed similar in its characteristics
level of large-scale direct military conflict.”3 to the Cold War, but the scale and scope of the opera-
The study of gray-zone warfare intensified after tions are more intense, aggressive, and varied.
Russia took control of the Crimean Peninsula in February In contrast, Joseph Votel et al. view the Cold War
2014. Russian involvement in the Ukrainian civil war as a forty-five-year struggle for the gray zone during
began with the apparent intent to provide internal and which the West coped with the spread of communism.
international legitimacy and legality for its actions in To avoid confrontations
the international arena. Moscow clearly articulated its of superpowers that might Omer Dostri is a PhD can-
intention to rely more on an integrated strategy of using escalate into nuclear war, didate in the Department
military and nonmilitary tools that took advantage of the Cold War was largely of Political Studies at Bar-Ilan
significantly vague legal concepts. a proxy war where the University in Ramat Gan,
Among other things, Russia places great emphasis on United States and the Israel, and a research fellow
psychological and political warfare, economic manipu- Soviet Union supported at the Jerusalem Institute for
lations (e.g., disruption of access to the supply of natural various state and nonstate Strategy and Security.

MILITARY REVIEW  January-February 2020 121

actors in small regional conflicts and intervened directly innovations have made it difficult to discern and un-
in countries around the world. Votel et al. argue that equivocally distinguish where modern conflicts rest along
U.S. operations in Korea and Vietnam were under con- the continuum of war or peace.11
straints that made a total victory by the United States Isaiah Wilson and Scott Smitson mention in their
or its allies almost impossible for fear of an American study the territorial dimension in the arguments of the
escalation with the Soviet Union.8 strategic historian Walter Russell Mead. The latter de-
Philip Kapusta supports Wirtz’s approach. For him, scribed the changes in the nature of geopolitical compe-
the relative certainty the world experienced during the tition and defined the current and future global security
Cold War was simpler than today’s global environment. environments in the context of geography. He believed
Whereas during the current struggle
the Cold War, between state actors
nation-states Cyber activity Kinetic forces on the world stage is
mainly faced oth- over control of ter-
er nation-states, ritory rather than
state actors are Gray-zone ideology. However,
now forced to warfare he then claimed
deal with hybrid that territorial
phenomena and struggles are unique
Information warfare Coercive diplomacy
nonstate and in their character to
substate actors the various actors
such as powerful (Figure by author) and focus on certain
and institution- historical places.12
alized terrorist Figure. Nonstate Actors’ Involvement While some
organizations. in the Gray Zone researchers agree
The challenges that the gray zone
of today are that is an existing or ad-
actors and nonstate actors do not respect the norms and ditional phenomenon, other researchers point out that
rules of the international law. According to Kapusta, this is a phenomenon with new features expressed in
even when nation-states made a deliberate choice to modern tools and a means developed by the advance-
engage in activities in the gray zone during the Cold War, ment of technology and the expansion of globalization.
their actions were still subject to the rules and norms The strategies, tactics, and means of gray-zone warfare
that characterized international relations. Other dif- have been used in the past and by different actors.
ferences that Kapusta finds between the Cold War and Hence, it is neither an innovative phenomenon nor an
the geopolitical reality today are the growing number of old one. Instead, gray-zone warfare is a description of
potential gray-zone actors, the tools available to them, trends in the geopolitical and strategic environment,
and the rapid changes in the world.9 and in fact is a renewed phenomenon applied by mod-
Maren Leed also mentions the changes and develop- ern technologies and tools.
ments in the various tools of warfare regarding the gray Gray-zone warfare is not limited to use by state
zone. He argues that the roots of gray-zone warfare may actors only. Various nonstate actors who develop into
be found in technological advances, especially in infor- substate actors (e.g., Hezbollah and Hamas) and hybrid
mation technology, which allows an unprecedented level actors (e.g., the Islamic State) also use this kind of war-
of globalization.10 Miroslaw Banasik, who served in the fare. The political transformation and changes that occur
Polish army, follows Leed and mentions in his study that within various nonstate actors—in the form of de facto
the innovations of warfare in the gray zone include new control of territories and populations—led to the devel-
technological means, development and dissemination opment of political institutions and semi-institutional
of information, and the transfer of the spheres of state structures, and to the responsibility of substate actors
functioning and citizens’ lives to the virtual world. These over territory and population, through which the actors

122 January-February 2020  MILITARY REVIEW

 GRAY-ZONE WARFARE

derive their popular power and legitimacy. The fear of Gray-Zone Warfare: A Case Study
damaging the economic and political assets of substate of the Conflict between Hamas and
actors has led to a reduction in the use of conventional Israel in 2018-2019
forces and classic terrorist acts as well as an increased Five years have gone by since the end of Operation
use of gray-zone warfare to continue achieving these Protective Edge—a military operation launched by Israel
substate actors’ goals while avoiding a strong military on 8 July 2014 in the Hamas-ruled Gaza Strip after
response to their actions by state actors. nearly 250 rockets were fired at civilian-populated areas
While many nonstate actors operate primarily in in southern Israel—of which three-and-a-half were
the military and economic sphere, Hezbollah has had relatively quiet, and Israel’s deterrence vis-à-vis Hamas
some success in diplomatic and information warfare. was maintained.18 However, since March 2018, there
Al-Qaida and the Islamic State have placed great em- has been a significant escalation in aggressive activity
phasis on information warfare, and the Islamic State in on the Gaza Strip due to Hamas’s decision to organize
particular exploited social networks on the internet to and lead mass violence demonstrations near Gaza’s
gain broader support for its organization. The decision perimeter fence with Israel. According to the Palestinian
of these actors to adopt the tactics of the gray zone Ministry of Health, by the end of a year, more than 260
makes the security challenge of actors who confronted Palestinian rioters were killed, with tens of thousands
them even more difficult to deal with. more injured during demonstrations.19 The escalation
stemmed from the change in Hamas’s strategy; Hamas is
Israel’s Gray-Zone Warfare trying to recover from the difficult economic and politi-
Israel is one of the significant actors who use cal situation it has experienced in recent years, especially
gray-zone warfare. In recent decades, Israel has been after Operation Protective Edge.
secretly working to prevent the acquisition, reinforce- On the political level, Hamas is isolated. Even
ment, and military buildup of its regional rivals in the before Operation Protective Edge in 2013, Egypt had
Middle East. Thus, in June 1981, Israel launched a outlawed the Muslim Brotherhood—Hamas’s mother
military strike to destroy a nuclear reactor in Iraq, de- movement—and declared war on it.20 In addition, in
stroyed Syria’s nuclear reactor in September 2007, and June 2017, Qatar demanded that Hamas representa-
launched a series of covert cyber operations and tar- tives leave the country in an attempt to avoid the Arab
geted assassinations of Iranian scientists with the aim boycott imposed on it by Saudi Arabia, the United Arab
of delaying an Iranian military nuclear project. During Emirates, Bahrain, Libya, Yemen, and Egypt.21 On the
the Syrian Civil War, which broke out in March 2011, economic level, neutralizing the tunnels on the Egyptian
Israel carried out hundreds of attacks and extensive co- side of the border with the Gaza Strip caused severe
vert military operations to prevent the transfer of stra- damage to Hamas’s economy that was based, inter
tegic weapons from Syria to Hezbollah in Lebanon.13 alia, on the collection of taxes from smuggling through
Israel also attacked Iranian assets and forces in Syria to tunnels to Sinai.22 Likewise, the expulsion of Hamas
thwart Iran’s entrenchment in the country.14 representatives from Qatar limited Doha’s ability to
This unofficial policy, called the “Campaign between transfer funds to the organization. On the military level,
the Wars,” has become a strategy for the Israel Defense the ability of Hamas to smuggle weapons from Sinai
Forces (IDF).15 This military strategy expresses the idea was damaged after the neutralization of its tunnels by
of​​ unified strategic logic—the management of cam- the IDF and the Egyptian army. In addition, Operation
paigns that are carried out in multiple domains (mili- Protective Edge led to severe losses in infrastructure and
tary, economic, law, information, and diplomacy). The assets for Hamas in the Gaza Strip.
modus operandi of the “Campaign between the Wars” Despite its difficult situation, Hamas understood
is to be offensive and proactive without crossing the that another military operation against Israel would not
threshold of war and in an ambiguous manner.16 This serve it well since the cost of war would exceed the ben-
ambiguity allows Israel to achieve its coercive strategy efits of the current situation, its assets and infrastruc-
by reducing the capabilities of the enemy in the event ture most likely would be damaged, and its political
of a future war while avoiding war now.17 and economic situation would not be improved. In this

MILITARY REVIEW  January-February 2020 123

reality, Hamas’s policy has shifted from one based solely and the fires inflicted by blowing incendiary balloons
on the use of kinetic measures against Israel and its into Israeli territories, Israeli media is playing into
citizens (from the launching of high-trajectory weapons Hamas’s hands and putting pressure on public opinion
on the civilian population and the use of terrorist tun- and on Israeli decision-makers. In addition, during the
nels) to a policy designed to undermine and erode (by past decade, Hamas has invested in establishing and
attrition) Israel’s deterrence strategy using varied tactics upgrading its cyber capabilities, mainly in improving
that include vague terrorist actions, diplomacy, and the intelligence gathering effort against the IDF and
propaganda. This policy can be characterized as gray- attempting to carry out a number of cyber activities
zone warfare carried out by a weak actor who wants to aimed primarily at IDF soldiers.27
change the status quo on the one hand while avoiding a The common denominator of Hamas’s policy of
military confrontation on the other because of the gap attrition from March 2018 to March 2019 is ambiguity
in the balance of power between the two parties. and uncharacteristic actions to erode Israeli deterrence
As part of its gray-zone fight, Hamas has indirectly and gradually change the status quo that was set after
organized and led, through the use of ostensibly civilian Operation Protective Edge. Thus, Hamas correctly esti-
organizations, violent demonstrations near the Gaza mated that the actions it carried out below the threshold
perimeter fence. Similarly, it has established units that fly of war would not lead Israel to decide on a broad military
burning kites and incendiary balloons as well as osten- operation, while at the same time, the organization could
sibly independent civilian elements whose purpose is to achieve advantages. In contrast to Hamas’s gray-zone
ignite fires in Israel to harm its economy and citizens.23 In warfare, Israel has responded with relative restraint, al-
addition, the organization has refused to take responsi- lowing Hamas to gradually erode its deterrence strategy.
bility in most cases in which it used kinetic force against Although there have been nine rounds of limited opera-
Israel by launching rockets targeting Israeli settlements, tions in the Gaza Strip, which included hundreds of IDF
hiding under a new overall apparatus established in the attacks against Hamas’s targets (such as the organization’s
Gaza Strip—the Joint Operations Room—or arguing strategic infrastructure and assets), the IDF’s activity
that rockets launches at Israel were fired by mistake.24 was not strong enough, and as a result, deterrence was
The Joint Operations Room in Gaza is an organization not restored. Hamas continued its gray-zone warfare
formed in the summer of 2017 by Hamas and Islamic and even sprayed hundreds of rockets at Israeli com-
Jihad. Its aim is to coordinate militant operations and munities during limited rounds of fighting as part of the
political goals between the terrorist functions in Gaza. Joint Operations Room in the Gaza Strip (working hand-
It consists of thirteen militant factions, run by the “Al- in-hand with other local terrorist organizations).
Qassam Brigades” (Hamas’s armed wing) and the “Saraya
al-Quds Brigades” (Islamic jihad’s armed wing).25 Israel’s Options Responses to
Hamas has also used diplomatic means in its gray- Fighting Hamas’s Gray-Zone Warfare
zone fight. In every limited military operation between Israel has four options in dealing with the Hamas’s
March 2018 and March 2019, it used an Egyptian del- gray-zone warfare: (1) preserve the status quo and
egation to mediate a truce between Israel and itself to maintain the strategy of the limited military operations,
put pressure on Israel to end military actions at a time (2) intensify the quality and quantity of Hamas targets
convenient to Hamas, despite Hamas’s initiating these during limited military operations, (3) engage in large-
restricted escalations itself.26 And in the information scale military operations, or (4) occupy the Gaza Strip.
domain, Hamas has used psychological warfare by pub- Preservation of the status quo and the strategy of
lishing well-edited images on social media of the Israeli the limited military operations. In this option, Israel
air force’s strike in Gaza to falsely and manipulatively will be able to continue its current policy vis-à-vis
claim that the attacks allegedly did not significantly Hamas, with the aim to contain Hamas’s gray-zone
harm the organization. Hamas also used the Israeli warfare as a viable and cheap option relative to the pos-
media as a tool for negotiations on a cease-fire with the sibility of a broad military operation. The advantages of
Israeli government. By broadly broadcasting Hamas’s this option are the low-intensity fighting that the IDF
recordings from the mass riots near the perimeter fence could contend with, the relatively large periods between

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 GRAY-ZONE WARFARE

one operation of fighting to the next, and the relatively Palestinian Hamas militants attend a military drill 25 March 2018 in
short time of each round of combat. preparation for any upcoming confrontation with Israeli forces in the
southern Gaza Strip. (Photo by Ibraheem Abu Mustafa, Reuters)
The drawback to this option stems from the gradual
erosion of Israel’s deterrence strategy and the creep-
ing change in the status quo. This, in turn, will allow
Hamas to be more daring and harmful to Israel’s citi- more aggressive military operations may lead Hamas and
zens, especially residents of the southern communities other terrorist organizations into Gaza to drag Israel into
surrounding the Gaza Strip, and to erode the national a broad military confrontation or a number of large-scale
resilience of the Israeli people. military operations in a relatively short period of time.
Intensify the quality and quantity of targets during Large-scale military operations. In this option,
limited military operations. This course of action is Israel will engage in broader military operations in the
actually a counterreaction to Hamas’s attempt to under- Gaza Strip, including the use of air, armor, artillery, and
mine Israel’s deterrence strategy. In this option, Israel engineering forces in areas close to the perimeter fence.
chooses to not only continue its current conduct vis-à-vis The advantage of a large-scale military operation is the
Hamas but also to increase military responses against the significant restoration and strengthening of the Israeli
terrorist organizations in the Gaza Strip. The advantage deterrence and the return to the end point of Operation
to this is that by intensifying responses and attacking Protective Edge, which included an Egyptian-mediated
more targets in numbers and quality (e.g., a greater and truce agreement and years of military and civilian reha-
more rapid impact on terrorist tunnels and Hamas gov- bilitation for Hamas. For its part, Israel will gain a two-
ernment buildings), there is a greater chance that Israel’s to-three-year period of relative calm that could be used
deterrence vis-à-vis Hamas will become stronger, and for economic and military development. The disadvan-
Hamas may reduce or even halt its attempts to change tage of this course of action stems from the high cost of
the status quo. The disadvantage of this policy is that a large-scale military operation, the possible destruction

MILITARY REVIEW  January-February 2020 125

of civilian infrastructure in Israel, and the damage to identify, locate, and thwart terrorist tunnels from the
tourism and the economy. In addition, it may be possi- Gaza Strip into its territory, as well as to store weap-
ble to achieve this kind of result in significantly less cost- ons inside the Gaza Strip to significantly improve the
ly ways, whether through military means, diplomacy, or IDF’s preparedness for a military operation in Gaza. In
a combination of both. The most significant drawback addition, Israel must now divert most of its civilian and
comes from the endpoint of such a military operation, security resources and means to counter the threats
which is unlikely to be different from previous military from the Iranian military’s establishment in Syria and
operations in the last decade and will probably not im- from Hezbollah’s nuclear and ballistic missile programs’
prove the situation in the long term. attempts to improve the accuracy of its missiles.
Occupying the Gaza Strip. In this option, Israel will In the diplomacy sphere, Israel is cooperating behind
decide to launch a large-scale military operation into the the scenes with Sunni Arab countries, primarily Saudi
Gaza Strip with the goal of defeating Hamas and over- Arabia, on a range of issues including the Iranian threat.
throwing its regime. The IDF will have to use air strikes This cooperation is likely to be adversely affected to the
to soften some areas in ​​the Gaza Strip and then use extent that Israel will be manipulatively portrayed by
infantry, armor, or special operations forces to maneuver Hamas as having significantly harmed many potential-
deep into Gaza to break it up into various parts and to ly innocent Palestinians during a military operation in
control the territories after Hamas and other various Gaza. In addition, Israel’s “divide and conquer” de-facto
terrorist organizations are defeated. The advantage strategy leaves the Palestinians split between the Gaza
gained from an extensive military operation to conquer Strip and the Palestinian Authority territories in Judea
the Gaza Strip is the elimination of the main terrorist and Samaria so that their overall strength is weakened.
elements. Israel will be able to decide whether it wants to Thus, the occupation of the Gaza Strip and the transfer
hold the territory and impose a military regime there or of powers to the chairman of the Palestinian Authority
transfer it to the Palestinian Authority. would undermine Israeli interests.
The disadvantage of this situation stems from the very In the economic sphere, Israel is interested in a long
high economical cost of such an operation and the loss peaceful period for as long as possible, which can contrib-
of dozens of Israeli fighters. In addition, there may be a ute to the economic development of the country. Since
situation in which the IDF will be drawn into a low-in- Operation Protective Edge, Israeli communities around
tensity conflict that will last many years against remnants the Gaza Strip have experienced significant development,
of Hamas and other terrorist organizations. This would including an increase in population.
entail high costs and the use of a large amount of resourc-
es for routine security purposes. Moreover, in the case of Conclusion
handing over the Gaza Strip to the Palestinian Authority, From March 2018 to March 2019, Hamas has
this does not necessarily mean that IDF will be able to been involved in gray-zone warfare against Israel. The
maintain peace and security against the new terror ele- purpose of this kind of warfare is to achieve political,
ments that could emerge from the destruction. economic, and security advantages by acting below
the threshold of war with vague military, diplomatic,
Importance of National Security cybernetic, and information tools (thereby trying to
Policy to Confront the Threat prevent the rival from responding with force). The
of Gray-Zone Warfare strategies, tactics, and means of gray-zone warfare have
To decide the wisest course of action for Israel to con- been used in the past during different periods by dif-
tend with Hamas’s gray-zone warfare, it is not enough to ferent actors. Accordingly, gray-zone warfare is neither
focus only on military aspects; Israel must also consider an innovative or old phenomenon. Instead, gray-zone
the variety of power variables within a framework based warfare is a description of trends in the geopolitical and
on security, diplomacy, and economic means. strategic environments and a renewed phenomenon
Regarding security, Israel is interested in com- applied by modern technologies and tools.
pleting the underground barrier along the Gaza Strip Israel must balance the preservation of its de-
border to significantly improve its ability to monitor, terrent strategy with the need to respond to the

126 January-February 2020  MILITARY REVIEW

 GRAY-ZONE WARFARE

challenge of Hamas’s gray-zone warfare. However, deterrence and creeping change in the status quo
this need for balance leads to a contradiction be- in favor of Hamas. Therefore, a coherent and com-
tween the two interests, as an ill-advised and simplis- plex national security policy is needed to find a
tic response to Hamas’s gray-zone warfare could lead balance between Israel’s deterrence—in the attempt
to a broad military operation, and thus to the failure to not use disproportionate force that could lead to
of the Israeli deterrence strategy. On the other hand, an undesirable escalation in contrast to the Israeli
the continued containment of Hamas’s gray-zone interest—and a competent strategy using forceful
warfare and the continuation of the Israeli military responses in terms of both quality and quality against
response is not sufficiently strong in its quality and the targets of Hamas and the other terrorist organi-
quantity. It may lead to the continued erosion of zations in the Gaza Strip, when necessary.

Notes
1. Philip Kapusta, “The Gray Zone,” U.S. Special Operations 19. “Health Ministry: 270 Killed, Including 52 Children, 16,556
Command (USSOCOM) white paper (MacDill Air Force Base, FL: Injured in 1st Year of March of Return Protests,” Wafa News Agency,
USSOCOM, 9 September 2015), 1. 2 April 2019, accessed 1 July 2019, http://english.wafa.ps/page.
2. Sarah Canna and George Popp, “Strategic Multi-Layer aspx?id=i8expva108992850054ai8expv.
Assessment (SMA) Panel Discussion on the Gray Zone in Support of 20. David Kirkpatrick, “Egyptian Court Shuts down the Mus-
USSOCOM” (Crystal City, VA: NSI Inc., 27 April 2017), 7. lim Brotherhood and Seizes Its Assets,” New York Times (website),
3. Ibid., 12. 23 September 2013, accessed 1 July 2019, https://www.nytimes.
4. Maren Leed, “Square Pegs, Round Holes, and Gray Zone Con- com/2013/09/24/world/middleeast/egyptian-court-bans-mus-
flicts: Time to Step Back,” Georgetown Journal of International Affairs lim-brotherhood.html.
16, no. 2 (2015): 133–43. 21. Jack Khoury, “Palestinians Confirm: Top Hamas Officials Have
5. Antulio Echevarria, Operating in the Gray Zone: An Alternative Left Qatar at Country’s Request,” Haaretz (website), 5 June 2017,
Paradigm for U.S. Military Strategy (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies accessed 1 July 2019, https://www.haaretz.com/middle-east-news/
Institute and U.S. Army War College Press, April 2016): xi. palestinians/palestinians-confirm-hamas-officials-left-qatar-at-coun-
6. Michael Mazarr, Mastering the Gray Zone: Understanding a try-s-request-1.5480301.
Changing Era of Conflict (Carlisle, PA: Studies Institute and U.S. Army 22. Shaul Shay, “Egypt’s War against the Gaza Tunnels,” Israel
War College Press, December 2015): 57. Defense (website), 4 February 2014, accessed 1 July 2019, https://
7. James Wirtz, “Life in the Gray Zone: Observations for www.israeldefense.co.il/en/node/32925.
Contemporary Strategists,” Defense & Security Analysis 33, no. 2 23. “Arson Terrorism: A New Method Devised by Hamas during
(2017): 110. the ‘Return Marches’ to Attack the Communities near the Gaza Strip
8. Joseph Votel et al., “Unconventional Warfare in the Gray Zone,” and Disrupt Their Daily Lives,” The Meir Amit Intelligence and Terror-
Joint Force Quarterly 80 ( January 2016): 102. ism Information Center, 19 June 2018.
9. Kapusta, “The Gray Zone,” 20. 24. Joe Truzman, “Palestinian Joint Operations Room,” Ground-
10. Leed, “Square Pegs,” 135. Brief, 28 April 2019, accessed 2 August 2019, https://groundbrief.
11. Miroslaw Banasik, “Unconventional War and Warfare in substack.com/p/groundbrief-palestinian-joint-operations.
the Gray Zone. The New Spectrum of Modern Conflicts,” Journal of 25. Entsar Abu Jahal, “Why Were Rockets Fired toward Tel Aviv?,”
Defense Resources Management 7, no. 12 (2016): 44. Al-Monitor (website), 21 March 2019, accessed 1 July 2019, https://
12. Isaiah Wilson III and Scott Smitson, “Solving America’s Gray- www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2019/03/gaza-interior-minis-
Zone Puzzle,” Parameters 46, no. 4 (2017): 58. try-warn-operatives-rockets-fired-israel.html; Pinhas Inbari, “A ‘Joint
13. Dan Shuftan, “The Strategic Logic of the Campaign between Operations Room’ in Gaza–the New Factor in the Balance of Power
Wars,” Dado Center Journal 15 (March 2018). in Gaza,” The Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs, 15 November 2018,
14. “Netanyahu Confirms Air Strikes on Iranian Targets in Syria,” accessed 1 July 2019, http://jcpa.org/a-joint-operations-room-in-gaza-
France 24, 13 January 2019, accessed 1 July 2019, https://www. the-new-factor-in-the-balance-of-power-in-gaza/; TOI Staff, “Hamas
france24.com/en/20190113-israel-claims-air-strike-iran-target-syria. Chief Says Rocket Fire at Tel Aviv Due to ‘Malfunction,’” Times of Israel
15. Graham Allison, “English Translation of the Official Strategy of (website), 2 April 2019, accessed 1 July 2019, https://www.timesofis-
the Israel Defense Forces,” Belfer Center for Science and International rael.com/hamas-chief-says-rocket-fire-at-tel-aviv-due-to-malfunction/.
Affairs (August 2016). 26. “Hamas: Egypt Reaffirms Its Role as Mediator Pushing Israel
16. “Netanyahu Confirms Air Strikes on Iranian Targets in Syria.” to Sign Truce,” Middle East Monitor, 4 March 2019, accessed 1 July
17. Avi Jager, “The No Comment Policy: Israel’s Conflict Man- 2019, https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20190304-hamas-egypt-
agement Policy in an Uncertain Middle East,” Infinity Journal 6, no. 3 reaffirms-its-role-as-mediator-pushing-israel-to-sign-truce/.
(2019): 23–27. 27. Omer Dostri, “Hamas’ Cyber Activity against Israel,” The
18. “Operation Protective Edge,” Israel Defense Forces, July/Au- Jerusalem Institute for Strategy and Security, 15 October 2018,
gust 2014, accessed 2 August 2019, https://www.idf.il/en/minisites/ accessed 1 July 2019, https://jiss.org.il/en/dostri-hamas-cyber-activi-
wars-and-operations/operation-protective-edge-julyaugust-2014/. ty-against-israel/.

MILITARY REVIEW  January-February 2020 127

 REVIEW ESSAY

Admiral Bill
Halsey
A Naval Life
Thomas Alexander Hughes, Harvard University Press,
Cambridge, Massachusetts, 2016, 544 pages

Lt. Col. John H. Modinger, PhD, U.S. Air Force, Retired

W hat do most of us know about Fleet Adm.

William “Bull” Halsey? Generally, very
little. While there is no shortage of works
about celebrated World War II figures like Gen. Dwight
Eisenhower, Gen. Douglas MacArthur, and Gen.
he had been accustomed to his contentious and ruinous
attempts to amend his legacy, which led to his increasing
obscurity. Near the end of his life, Halsey was honestly “a
fish out of water” without the stability that Navy life had
always given him and without the full embrace the Navy
George Patton, there is surprisingly little about Halsey. had, until relatively recently, afforded him.
It is surprising because he was arguably the most famous Hughes’s research is first-rate, offering vivid
naval officer of World War II and was sometimes called details. In some ways, the setting of Halsey’s death is
the “Patton of the Pacific.”1 But here, author Thomas emblematic of his life; or rather, his life outside the
Alexander Hughes gives us Admiral Bill Halsey: A Naval glare of the four years covering World War II that
Life, which is a wonderful exposé about a naval figure were both a capstone and façade.
who, until now, was more caricature than real. It is quite Hughes begins the book at the end of Halsey’s life,
amazing how much of an enigma Halsey remains. with the now elderly man relaxing where he was most
Hughes’s writing is crisp and immensely satisfying at ease, Fishers Island. It was his regular vacation
to read. He paints a captivating portrait, covering the haunt; it was a sleepy little island near Connecticut
entirety of Halsey’s life—from his earliest days in New with not much to attract big crowds, but it was just
Jersey to his tranquil but lonely death at Fishers Island, right—surrounded by the sea. Halsey would die of a
New York; from Annapolis to his splash-into-active heart attack, alone in his room, at age seventy-six.
service with the Great White Fleet; and from where he The ensuing eulogies captured the myth of the
struggled to find himself outside the Navy life to which man much more than they did the complicated

128 January-February 2020  MILITARY REVIEW

 REVIEW ESSAY

man that lay somewhere beneath the image he and super ambitious, self-promoting, prickly MacArthur
others had crafted during the war. To some, he when seemingly no one else could, while simultane-
was “a sailor’s sailor.” To others, a skillful operator ously juggling his responsibilities to Nimitz and Fleet
whose formula for winning was as blunt as it was Adm. Ernest King.
simple—“Kill Japs, kill Japs, and kill more Japs.”2 But no discussion of the man can escape delving
And still, others saw him, as the Washington Post into his irrepressible zeal, once back at sea as com-
described, “A seadog of the old school. Known since mander of Third Fleet to scratch more Japanese flattops
his football days at Annapolis as ‘Bull,’ he was square at the Battle of Leyte Gulf in 1944 and to the detriment
of jaw, pungent of speech, audacious in combat, and of other considerations.9 His subsequent abandonment
original in his approach to naval tactics.”3 of the then-exposed invasion force on the beaches mars
Halsey was not a Navy intellectual, but he was a an otherwise mostly splendid naval career.
“fighting admiral without peer.”4 While that may be Nimitz, Halsey’s boss, was keen to leave opera-
true, it may also obscure reality. Consider Halsey’s tional fighting to his commanders afloat. As such,
frequent comparisons to Adm. Raymond Spruance. he often pitched horseshoes to occupy his mind as
In those comparisons, Halsey is regularly portrayed as battles raged over the horizon. But as communiques
more daring, while Spruance is more tentative; howev- from the Leyte operations began flooding into his
er, at times, the opposite was true. It is safe to say that headquarters, particularly the pleas for help from
“Halsey was a better thinker and Spruance more of a Adm. Thomas Kinkaid to Halsey, Nimitz became
fighter than their respective reputations allowed.”5 increasingly alarmed by the unfolding situation. With
As Hughes points out, “The Halsey of history is no communications from Halsey, he exasperatingly
a cartoon, but there, in the South Pacific, he was a radioed Halsey himself: “Where is Task Force 34? The
man.”6 Not surprisingly, the caricature Halsey (and World Wonders.”10 At the time, Nimitz meant this
several all-too-chummy members of his personal staff) as more of a prompt, but Halsey took it as a genuine
created and embellished over time became the pop- swipe at his leadership. After the war he remembered,
ular image of him in both life and death. But “[t]here “I was stunned as if I had been struck in the face.”11 In
was so much more to him. Halsey never spent a day the heat of the moment, on the deck of his flagship,
outside the cocoon of the American military, a trait he he threw his cap down and swore, “What right does
shared only with General Douglas MacArthur out of Chester [Nimitz] have to send me a God-damned
all the officers in the nation’s history.”7 message like that?”12 At that point, one of his trusted
Without a present father to guide him, the Navy confidantes grabbed him and said, “Stop it. What the
became, very early on, Halsey’s de facto family, if hell’s the matter with you? Pull yourself together!”13
not his surrogate father. He would prove to be a Once the overall situation at Leyte became clearer,
bold and inspiring leader to his men, who met the Halsey grudgingly took much of his force back south
operational hurdles presented by war at sea against to alleviate the emerging crisis; however, he was quite
Japan by delivering successes when almost no other far away by then. He was agitated by that necessity
commanders in the Pacific were able to do so. Yet, and later exclaimed, “It was not my job to protect the
Hughes compellingly argues that Halsey’s “greatest Seventh Fleet. My job was offensive, to strike with
contribution to the Allied victory was as command- the Third Fleet.”14 In a
er of the combined sea, air, and land forces in the moment of reflection, he Lt. Col. John H. Modinger,
South Pacific during the long slog up the Solomon mumbled to no one in PhD, U.S. Air Force,
Islands chain … turn[ing] a bruising slugfest with the particular, “When I get retired, is an associate pro-
Japanese Navy into a rout.”8 He also does not receive my teeth into something, fessor with the Department
due credit for his able management of the constant I hate to let go.” 15
of Joint, Interagency, and
bickering between Army and Navy leaders—person- In the after-action Multinational Operations
ified by the clash of egos between MacArthur and reflective period, many at the U.S. Army Command
Fleet Adm. Chester Nimitz. Somewhat inexplicably, came to believe Halsey and General Staff College,
he could get along and thrive while working for the had been baited and Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.

MILITARY REVIEW  January-February 2020 129

fooled by the enemy, subsequently imperiling the gave the widely respected admiral a pass, citing the
American landings at Leyte Gulf. In the estimation fickleness of weather forecasting and the inexperience
of many in the know, it was only the unexpected of many destroyer skippers.
retreat of the Japanese force that had come through Roughly six months later, the weather struck
the straits to savage the landings and “the definite Halsey’s fleet again. This time, possibly remembering
partiality of Almighty God,” which saved the day the unreliable weather forecasting from six months ear-
for the United States. Hughes does a stellar job of lier, Halsey dismissed the forecast and turned abruptly
teasing out the details of this near disaster turned into the direction of the approaching storm; his fleet
epic success.16 His sage analysis illuminates the paid dearly. This time, the board of inquiry, confronted
various story lines and perspectives. Convincingly, with Halsey’s “combative, contradictory, and evasive”
he uses Halsey’s own well-worn maxims concerning testimony, was not inclined to forgive him.20 It conclud-
violating rules and doing the unexpected to seize and ed Halsey was primarily responsible for the disaster.
maintain the initiative to show that Halsey essential- The similarities between the two incidents deeply
ly violated his own credo at this battle. He concludes troubled the court, which recommended relieving him
that Halsey’s basic mistake at Leyte was rooted not of command. In this finding, the secretary of the Navy
in audacity but orthodoxy. He could have protected agreed. But Halsey’s status as a national hero gave him
the invasion force and gone after Vice Adm. Jisaburo a layer of protection. Eventually, it was decided that
Ozawa’s decoy fleet by splitting his enormous naval he should remain at his post as the war was ending,
force. However, he rigidly clung to the notion of and it would not play well at home or do any favors
concentration despite the overall strategic context for the Navy. Through these events, one can clearly see
and overwhelming operational imbalance of forces that Halsey’s judgment was sometimes dubious at best,
favoring the United States by late 1944. Despite his possibly a result of being at sea too long.
mistakes, his bosses (Nimitz at Pearl Harbor and At war’s end, Halsey struggled to settle into retire-
King in Washington) were willing to overlook the ment. It was an alien existence for him. And, of course,
incident in light of all his other accomplishments in he was no spring chicken by then. Undeniably, Halsey
the end. They also came to realize the near debacle was a powerful and effective leader. But after dissecting
had many fathers, not just Halsey. And that might his career, it is easy to see that his time as fleet admiral
have been the end of it, if not for Halsey’s retelling of overshadows all else. He served in the role for a mere
the story after the war in a way that incited antago- two years, and those two years leading a battle fleet
nisms by attempting to shift blame. represented less than half his total service time in World
Hughes also sheds light on other command blemishes War II. Outside of that time frame, Hughes believes that
in the wake of the Leyte Gulf incident, such as Halsey’s “he was hesitant in his judgments and uncertain in his
ill-fated decisions, on two separate occasions, to try and relationships.”21 His celebrated audacity was a profes-
either outrun or to circumnavigate huge storms at sea. sional skill practiced over decades at sea, which could
Those poor decisions wreaked havoc, causing tremendous be summoned in that military environment; however,
damage and significant loss of life—arguably much more it was not a personal trait he could tap into outside that
than the Japanese were capable of inflicting. semicontrolled environment. This explains much about
The first weather-related incident proved “an his strained family relationships, strained Navy relation-
inglorious hour for our admiral.”17 To some who ships after the war, and strained relationships with book
knew Halsey well, his mistakes laid bare “just plain authors and filmmakers. In short, his “signature” audacity
goddam stubbornness and stupidity.”18 Underscoring was situationally dependent, rather than a instinctual at-
that sentiment, Hughes concludes “throughout the tribute he could effortlessly tap into in any circumstance.
force, rumblings of a bumbling admiral wafted from Hughes deserves high marks for this overdue profile,
bluejacket corridors where before mostly admiration for the quality of the research and for his astute insights
had reigned.”19 In the aftermath, a court of inquiry into the man’s complicated persona. This is a wonderful
convened to review the matter. It found Halsey largely addition to the field of military history and ranks as possi-
responsible for the disaster, but the court ultimately bly the finest Halsey biography available today.

130 January-February 2020  MILITARY REVIEW

 REVIEW ESSAY

Notes
1. Thomas Alexander Hughes, Admiral Bill Halsey: A
Naval Life (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press,
2016), jacket.
2. Ibid., 1.
3. Ibid.
4. James Merrill, A Sailor’s Admiral: A Biography of Wil-
liam F. Halsey (Springfield, OH: Crowell, 1976), as quoted in
Hughes, Admiral Bill Halsey, 3.
5. Ibid., 381.
6. Ibid., 5.
7. Ibid., 4.
8. Ibid., jacket.
9. Ibid., 328. When Halsey was in charge of the opera-
BOOK REVIEW PROGRAM
tional Pacific Fleet, it was named Third Fleet; once handed
over to Adm. Raymond Spruance for a six-month rotating
interval, essentially the same fleet was then called the
Fifth Fleet; in effect, the commander and some of the staff The Military Review book review program allows re-
changed, but the ships were the same. It was, as Halsey ex-
plained, “a sort of pony express in reverse, where the riders viewers to read books of interest to military profes-
and not the horses changed at predetermined moments.”
10. Thomas Cutler, The Battle of Leyte Gulf (New York: sionals—often before book publication—and then
HarperCollins, 1994), 249, quoted in Hughes, Admiral Bill
Halsey, 370. present their thoughts on the Army University Press
11. William Halsey and Joseph Bryan, Admiral Halsey’s
Story (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1947), 220; Carl Solberg, De- website. The reviewer then retains the book. Read our
cision and Dissent: With Halsey at Leyte Gulf (Annapolis, MD:
Naval Institute Press, 1995), 154; Thomas Cutler, The Battle latest book reviews at https://www.armyupress.army.
of Leyte Gulf (New York: HarperCollins, 1994), 251, quoted
in Hughes, Admiral Bill Halsey, 370.
12. Ibid.
mil/Journals/Military-Review/MR-Book-Reviews/.
13. Ibid.
14. Ibid., 368–69.
15. Solberg, Decision and Dissent, 70, quoted in Hughes,
Books for review are available only through the Mil-
Admiral Bill Halsey, 369.
16. Ibid., 372–73. itary Review book review editor. If you are interested
17. Ibid., 383.
18. E. B. Potter, Bull Halsey (Annapolis, MD: Naval in becoming a reviewer, see our Book Review Sub-
Institute, 1985), 35; Samuel Eliot Morison, The Liberation of
the Philippines, Luzon, Mindanao, and the Visayas, 1944-1945 mission Guide at https://www.armyupress.army.mil/
(Boston: Little, Brown, 1959), 63; Gerald Bogan, interview by
Etta-Belle Kitchen, Oral History (Annapolis, MD: U.S. Naval Journals/Military-Review/MR-Book-Review-Submis-
Institute Press, 1970), 125–26; Bob Drury and Tom Clavin,
Halsey’s Typhoon (New York: Atlantic Monthly Press, 2007), sion-Guide/.
270-271, quoted in Hughes, Admiral Bill Halsey, 384.
19. Ibid.
20. Ibid., 389.
21. Ibid., 6.

Army University
Press

MILITARY REVIEW  January-February 2020

P resident Donald Trump awarded the Medal
of Honor to former Staff Sgt. Ronald J. Shurer
on 1 October 2018 at the White House in
Washington, D.C. The award was an upgrade from
the Silver Star that Shurer previously received for his
repeatedly to enemy fire and was shot in the helmet
and wounded in the arm. However, the arm injury
and close call to the head did not deter him from as-
sisting with casualty evacuation down a near-vertical,
sixty-foot cliff. Shurer’s actions helped save the lives of
actions on 6 April 2008 while serving as a medical ser- all the wounded casualties under his care.
geant in Shok Valley, Afghanistan, during Operation The president described the situation in Shok Valley
Commando Wrath. on that day as “a tough, tough situation to be in.”
While on a mission to capture or kill high-value “Ron climbed the rocky mountain, all the while
targets associated with Hizb-e-Islami Gulbuddin, fighting back against the enemy and dodging gunfire
an anticoalition extremist group, Shurer’s unit began left and right,” said Trump. “Rockets were shot at him.
receiving heavy fire, forcing it into a defensive pos- Everything was shot at him.”
ture. When he heard that the unit’s forward assault Trump described Shurer as “an inspiration to everyone
element was pinned down and taking casualties, in this room and to every citizen all across our great land.”
Shurer disregarded the enemy fire and moved quickly Shurer was inducted into the Pentagon’s Hall of
to reach the forward element. Heroes the day after the Medal of Honor ceremony. He
For over six hours, he rendered medical aid to now serves in the U.S. Secret Service.
wounded U.S. and Afghan soldiers while helping You can read more about this great American on the
keep the large insurgent force from overrunning Army’s Medal of Honor website at https://www.army.
friendly positions. In the process, he exposed himself mil/medalofhonor/shurer/?from=hp_spotlight.
I n the words of President Donald Trump, as he
awarded the Medal of Honor to Master Sgt.
Matthew Williams on 30 October 2019 at a
White House ceremony in Washington, D.C., “Your
spirit keeps our flag waving high, our families safe at
lead portion sustained several casualties and was in
danger of being overrun.
Demonstrating extreme courage and leadership,
Williams took charge of the Afghans around him and led
them under fire up the mountain to a position where they
home, and our hearts beating with American pride. On could suppress the enemy and protect the lead element.
behalf of the entire nation—our great USA, our incred- Battling for several hours, Williams repeatedly exposed
ible United States of America—we are forever grateful himself to enemy fire, directing the commandos as they
for your life of service and your outstanding courage.” counterattacked and laid down suppressive fire. He con-
Williams received the award for his actions on tinued to face withering enemy fire as he moved the unit’s
6 April 2008 in Shok Valley, Afghanistan, during satellite radio to reestablish communications, moved
Operation Commando Wrath. His unit’s mission was to wounded soldiers to the casualty evacuation point, and
capture or kill high-value targets associated with Hizb- loaded them onto medevac helicopters.
e-Islami Gulbuddin, an anticoalition extremist group. Williams is credited with saving numerous lives and
Then-Sgt. Williams, a Special Forces weapons ser- preventing his unit from being overrun.
geant, was moving up a mountain as part of an assault On 31 October, Williams was again honored during
force comprised of U.S. soldiers and Afghan com- his induction into the Pentagon’s Hall of Heroes.
mandos when the force suddenly came under intense You can read more about this great American on the
machine gun and rocket-propelled grenade fire. The Army’s Medal of Honor website at https://www.army.
entire force was pinned down by the ambush, and the mil/medalofhonor/williams/.

MILITARY REVIEW  September-October 2019 133