American Economics: The Character of The Transformation: Mary S. Morgan and Malcolm Rutherford
American Economics: The Character of The Transformation: Mary S. Morgan and Malcolm Rutherford
American Economics: The Character of The Transformation: Mary S. Morgan and Malcolm Rutherford
of the Transformation
Mary S. Morgan and Malcolm Rutherford
This introductory essay draws directly on the stimulating discussions and papers presented at
the special HOPE conference on the subject of our volume held at Duke University in April
1997 and on the subsequent comments of conference participants in their capacity as refer-
ees for the essays submitted for the volume. Unfortunately, we were unable to include all the
conference papers in this volume, but we thank all the participants for their help and apolo-
gize if we have unwittingly quoted them without acknowledgment. We thank the HOPE edi-
tors for their invitation to edit this special issue and the HOPE office for their help and advice
during the conference and in the preparation of this volume. We thank the Lynde and Harry
Bradley Foundation for its generous support of the conference.
timing of the transformation. We use this essay to lay out the borders
of such an account and to sketch a general picture of how these com-
ponents fit together in a particular way.1 We are all too aware that we
still lack knowledge of many of the elements we need to understand the
full process of transformation: our account remains speculative and
incomplete.
Pluralism
The first two elements for late-twentieth-century historians to under-
stand are the extent and dimensions of the pluralism within American
economics in the interwar period. One strong indication is provided by
the practical difficulty of characterizing interwar economics or econo-
mists in any convincing way. It is common to think of interwar Ameri-
can economics in terms of institutionalists versus neoclassicals, but
when one probes more closely, the picture becomes much less clear.
Although its roots extend back to the 1880s, institutionalism became
a self-identified movement only in 1918 (Rutherford 1997). In the inter-
war period, institutionalism made strong claims for itself as a school
and succeeded in becoming the most visible, if not the dominant, group
in American economics. The movement cohered not around a tight the-
oretical agenda but around a particular view of science and a conviction
of the inadequacy of the unregulated market. It cannot be said that
institutionalists such as Thorstein Veblen, Wesley C. Mitchell, Walton
H. Hamilton, John R. Commons, J. M. Clark, Rexford Tugwell, and
M. A. Copeland all pursued exactly the same research program or uti-
lized the same techniques of investigation. Institutionalism included
Mitchell’s quantitative methods, Commons’s documentary histories
and interviewing, Hamilton’s case studies of firms and industries, and
Clark’s applied theorizing. Institutionalism consisted of a number of
loosely related research programs, one cluster centering on business
cycles and unemployment, with a reform agenda involving some notion
of overall planning, and another cluster centering on the legal dimen-
sions of markets, with a reform agenda focusing on labor law and busi-
ness regulation. Institutionalism also shaded off into more “orthodox”
1. Landreth and Colander (1997) offer another account of the transformation in their broad
survey paper. Samuels (forthcoming) offers an account, as well as a survey of all the confer-
ence papers and a report of the discussion that followed the presentation of each paper.
could profess mutual respect for each other and join forces in the
Stable Money League. However, the nature of scientific economics, the
nature of the reforms indicated, and the place of advocacy were all
actively contested. The profession as a whole was very much in the
process of defining itself and its social roles.
As we have said, pluralism is not to be understood as a code word for
“institutionalism.” It was a genuine pluralism, to be taken in a positive
sense. Pluralism meant variety, and that variety was evident in beliefs,
in ideology, in methods, and in policy advice. We are used to thinking
about the institutionalists as difficult to pin down because of their var-
ied interests and practical approaches. But variety appears to be true in
general, for there are no clean lines separating schools; indeed, it is not
even clear that one can specify schools. And it is no easier to provide
simple, accurate labels for many other economists active in the inter-
war period. Economists felt at liberty to pursue their own individual
combinations of ideas. Pluralism, as Warren Samuels remarked at
our conference, describes not only the difference between individuals;
pluralism was in each economist. Coats (1992), in a wide-ranging sur-
vey of the period, suggests that the most “influential” economist of
the period was Mitchell, an institutionalist renowned for quantita-
tive analysis, whereas the most “representative” economist was J. M.
Clark, who bridged the divide between institutionalist and neoclassical
thinking. Clearly, then, in the interwar period it was possible to hold a
number of different economic beliefs and to do economics in many dif-
ferent ways without being out of place or necessarily forfeiting the
respect of one’s peers. The major institutionalists and noninstitutional-
ists alike published in the major journals, held professorships at leading
universities, and became presidents of the American Economic Asso-
ciation (AEA).
This variety, along with a certain tolerance, was a feature not only of
the interwar period, but also, as Bradley W. Bateman shows in this vol-
ume, of the period before the First World War. Admittedly, the origi-
nal AEA statement of principles had excluded a number of “old school”
economists, but the association dropped its statement to effect a con-
ciliation and become a more catholic organization. It is worth noting
that this was done out of a feeling of strength and that the laissez-faire
economists were a small and fading minority. This was a time when a
very wide range of economists, from marginalist to historical, shared
a commitment to economic justice. This commitment was supported by
ployment reached a level of 25 percent and did not return to its 1929
level until 1942 (despite the demand stimulus from wartime allies).
Even the most laissez-faire economists would have doubts about the
efficacy of the market solution. But this was not the only depression of
the interwar period. A very sudden and severe depression occurred in
1921 – 22. And during the war years, most economists were convinced
that after the war ended, the economy would return to the 1930s
depression or else would fall into a sudden slump, as after the First
World War. In wartime itself, of course, the economy required consid-
erable planning. In these circumstances, it comes as less of a surprise to
find that, on the whole, economists remained pro-interventionist into
the 1940s.
These historical problems in the economy not only turned econo-
mists toward intervention but also created the demand for their services
to make concrete plans and suggestions for which the new technical
tools of simple mathematical models and statistical techniques were
well adapted. It was not that the old tools could not provide answers or
that they were not technical tools. Economists were accustomed to pro-
viding specific answers to concrete questions. Railroad regulation had
long depended on economic analysis of rates, and agricultural econo-
mists were used to measuring and manipulating the agricultural sector.
It was not even that the Great Depression was immediately regarded as
something different, requiring new solutions. The problem was seen as
massive but not new. It was only in the New Deal that the demand for
economic solutions widened: Every aspect of the economy became
open to economic attack. American economists of every stripe responded.
Charles Roos, one of the active econometricians in the early years of
the Cowles Commission, became chief research economist at the
National Recovery Administration (NRA), building mathematical and
statistical models of industrial competition. Mordecai Ezekiel, agri-
cultural econometrician, and Tugwell, institutionalist, both became
involved in general planning. But by and large, economists did not find
the New Deal a successful experience; it did not improve their reputa-
tions. And to the extent that institutional economists were involved in
these schemes, they, along with the other economists, shared in the
failure.
Only in the war years, and only after the United States entered the
war, did the economy regain its old strength. The war, as Goodwin’s
essay discusses, was a watershed in several ways. Economists not only
ily lost because of the nationalist turn taken by the churches in response
to the First World War. Not until the New Deal did economists again
have an opportunity to talk with conviction, and a similar plurality
occurred then because the ideas and approaches were those of the pre-
1920 period, brought forward partly by a new generation. It is one of
the ironies of our tale that just as something close to the Social Creed
of the churches became politically well supported and official economic
policy at the end of the Second World War, a new form of nationalism
appeared. (A comparison of the episodes revealed in Bateman’s and
Balisciano’s essays is instructive.) At this second moment, the nation-
alism of the cold war pushed society’s commitment to economic free-
dom well ahead of that of the main body of American economists. In
the climate of those times economists found it safer to conform, and the
developing neoclassical economics, which incorporated similar values,
was given a big boost.
The effects of McCarthyism surely cannot be ignored in any account
of the transformation of American economics. Although we have
records of émigré economists who arrived in America to escape fas-
cism in the 1930s (see Hagemann and Krohn 1991, Craver 1986), we
have little more than anecdotes of economists who left America to
avoid anticommunist persecution. Some of these, of course, held views
that might be communist, or prosocialist, but even Keynesianism was
a suspect heterodoxy, and those who had espoused planning for the
postwar economy a few years before, let alone staunch New Dealers,
might well have found themselves outcasts. Some of these economists
returned, others did not, but their absence was certainly one of the fac-
tors that made for a narrowing from the earlier pluralism of American
economics in the postwar period.
The result of these pressures on those who remained was both to
narrow the range of beliefs and to restrict the acceptable ways of
expressing them. Goodwin’s essay suggests that this narrowing was
achieved partly through a turn toward greater technicality and toward
the apparently “neutral” languages of mathematics. As we have noted,
this post – Second World War technical defense by itself does not nec-
essarily imply neoclassical economics. Although Keynesianism might
have been thought dangerously close to Marxism, an IS/LM diagram
probably looked innocuous to an outsider, and statistical numbers such
as those of Mitchell had long held their own neutral status as “data.”
Economics expressed in geometry, algebra, or numbers could be a good
self-defense in the cold war days and pass muster in the classroom as
well as in the government. Indeed, in our more general framework, this
move to technical methods was precisely the move that Porter (1995)
suggests made economics defensible against democratic power, who-
ever wielded it on whichever side. The cold war enforced, if it did not
create, the trend toward economists offering professionally neutral,
objective expertise, which contrasted strongly with the ethical, and
strongly held, advocacy of the late-nineteenth-century professional
economist. Even in their “evenhanded” mode, public statements of the
late nineteenth century offered considerable political ammunition com-
pared to the expert jargon and tool-kit style of postwar economics,
which could be used to disguise theoretical content and ideology to the
outside world.
Although this move to mathematics was partly a self-imposed defense
undertaken by individuals (see Johnson 1977), it was also encouraged by
academic institutions seeking “safe” teachers and research institutes
seeking “acceptable” researchers. As Goodwin’s essay suggests, patrons
of economic research exacted an obligation of political correctness in
line with the cold war that had the effect of narrowing the views that
could be expressed and count within the mainstreams of economics, be
they academic or governmental. There is some suggestion that patrons
and economists colluded in hiding radical ideas from the public, for
institutions, as much as individuals, sought safety in the climate of
political repression. Elsewhere there was open warfare. One of the few
case studies of the academic effects of the cold war, by Solberg and
Tomilson (1997), describes events in the Economics Department at the
University of Illinois. There, “academic McCarthyism” drove out both
nascent Keynesians and those advocating modern tool-based econom-
ics, a combination that included Margaret Reid, Leonid Hurwicz,
Dorothy Brady, Robert Eisner, Don Patinkin, and finally Franco
Modigliani. Regardless of the process, the effect was the same: Both
open persecution and closet correctness led to the narrowing of per-
missible economic opinion.
The retreat was not total, for although being a follower of Keynes
was a dubious label for American economists in the 1950s, Keynesian-
ism could be made compatible with market economics in the American
environment. This was accomplished both by persuading businesspeo-
ple that they could do better under a government that took the macro-
economy seriously (as Balisciano suggests) and by translating Keynes-
Conclusion
Implicit in this account of the transformation of American economics is
that the decline of pluralism in American economics was neither a sim-
ple nor an obvious result of the development of neoclassical economics
and vice versa. No logical relation says that this must have been so, nor
does the evidence support such a direct causal story. We have also tried
to avoid basing our account of the transformation on two other polar
positions.
One is the Whiggish progress account. It is not clear that the evi-
dence can support a history that neoclassicism won out because it
offered better theory and better explanations. To argue that such an out-
come was inevitable, that neoclassical economics offered “better sci-
ence,” clashes with our claim that the changing notions of science and
scientific objectivity were part of the transformatory process. As we
have argued, neoclassical economics grew in dominance as the notion
of science changed and the two developments were connected. This
being the case, there were no stable internal criteria on which to offer
a historical judgment about “progress.”
The other account we have eschewed is the conspiracy theory, in
which neoclassical economists in positions of power ganged up on the
heterodox. Since this view assumes that heterodox science might have
won the battle but for the social power of neoclassical economists, the
account similarly implies that one group has historically measurable
claims to be a “better science.” This is as problematic as before.
Furthermore, both of these polar positions are premised on some
recognizable duality of institutionalist (or heterodox) and neoclassical
groups that we believe cannot be identified in the interwar period. This
is not to deny that one can point out individual institutionalist and neo-
classical economists or that they had differences of opinion but to sug-
gest that it is difficult to make either the progress or the conspiracy the-
ory work, because the pluralism of the interwar period cuts across
individual beliefs. The war was a watershed in which the transforma-
tion process suddenly resolved itself, so that after that time we can sen-
sibly begin to talk in terms of such groups.
Nor do we wish to deny either that there were individual battles or
that institutional power mattered to the outcomes. But such power
plays took place within structures involving patrons and hierarchies
operating within the context of a political and economic society that
supported calls for economic intervention in the interwar period and for
free markets in the postwar period. These wider economic and political
beliefs are never just backgrounds against which individuals (and insti-
tutions) fight science wars; they provide content for the debate and are
integral elements in any power struggle.
In seeking to provide a general account of the transformation in
American economics, we have concentrated on explanatory factors
within which the individual substories could be placed. Our primary
References
Coats, A. W. 1992. Economics in the United States, 1920 – 70. In On the History of
Economic Thought: British and American Economic Essays. Edited by A. W.
Coats. Vol. 1. London: Routledge.
Craver, E. 1986. The Emigration of the Austrian Economists. HOPE 18.1:1 – 32.
Daston, L. J. 1995. The Moral Economy of Science. Osiris 10:3 – 24.
Furner, M. O. 1975. Advocacy and Objectivity: A Crisis in the Professionalization of
American Social Science, 1865–1905. Lexington: University Press of Kentucky.
Gigerenzer, G., et al. 1989. The Empire of Chance: How Probability Changed Sci-
ence and Everyday Life. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Hagemann, H., and C. D. Krohn, eds. 1991. Die Emigration deutschsprachiger
Wirtschaftswissenschaftler nach 1933. Stuttgart: Universität Hohenheim.
Johnson, H. G. 1977. The American Tradition in Economics. Nebraska Journal of
Economics and Business 16:17 – 26.
Landreth, H., and D. Colander. 1997. The Formalist Revolution in American Eco-
nomics. Paper presented at HOPE Annual Conference.
Lee, F. S. 1997. Administered Price Hypothesis and the Dominance of Neoclassical
Price Theory: The Case of the Industrial Prices Dispute. Paper presented at
HOPE Annual Conference.
Naples, M. I., and N. Aslanbeigui. 1997. The Cost Controversy: Interplay between
History and Ideas, 1920s – 1950s. HOPE conference paper.
Porter, T. H. 1995. Trust in Numbers: The Pursuit of Objectivity in Science and Pub-
lic Life. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.
Ross, D. 1991. The Origins of American Social Science. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.