003 DIGESTED People's Lumber Vs IAC - G.R. No. 70493

TOGUAY, Paul Jeffrey U.
2019-80129
Block 4
WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment of the Intermediate Appellate Court is hereby REVERSED, and
the complaint against herein petitioners in Civil Case No. 3283 of the Court of First Instance of Bohol,
Branch IV, is DISMISSED.
No pronouncement as to costs.
Citation G.R. No. 70493
Date May 18, 1989
Petitioner GLAN PEOPLE'S LUMBER AND HARDWARE, GEORGE LIM, FABIO S. AGAD, FELIX
LIM and PAUL ZACARIAS y INFANTE
Respondent INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, CECILIA ALFEREZ VDA. DE CALIBO,

Minors ROYCE STEPHEN, JOYCE JOAN, JANISE MARIE, JACQUELINE BRIGITTE
JOCELINE CORAZON, JULIET GERALDINE, JENNIFER JILL, all surnamed CALIBO,
represented by their mother, CECILIA A. VDA. DE CALIBO,
PRINCIPLES/ 1. the truck was already at a full stop when the jeep plowed into it. And they have
DOCTRINES not seen fit to deny or impugn petitioners' imputation that they also admitted the
truck had been brought to a stop while the jeep was still thirty meters away.
From these facts the logical conclusion emerges that the driver of the jeep had what
judicial doctrine has appropriately called the last clear chance to avoid the accident,
while still at that distance of thirty meters from the truck, by stopping in his turn or
swerving his jeep away from the truck, either of which he had sufficient time to do
while running at a speed of only thirty kilometers per hour. In those circumstances,
his duty was to seize that opportunity of avoidance, not merely rely on a supposed
right to expect, as the Appellate Court would have it, the truck to swerve and leave
him a clear path.
NARVASA, J.:
FACTS:
Orlando Caboldo was driving a jeep owned by Bacnotan Consolidated Industries, approaching a
bridge and going towards the direction of Davao City. On the other hand, Paul Zacarias was driving a
cargo track loaded with construction materials, coming from the opposite direction of Davao City. At
about 59 yards after crossing the bridge, the cargo truck and the jeep collided as a consequence of
which Engineer Calibo died while his passengers sustained physical injuries.
Zacarias was unhurt. As a result of the impact, the left side of the truck was slightly damaged
while the left side of the jeep, including its fender and hood, was extensively damaged.
The heirs of Cabildo filed an action for damages against Zacarias and the owners of the cargo
truck. For failure to file its answer to the third party complaint, third party defendant, which insured
the cargo truck involved, was declared in default.
The Court of First Instance of Bohol dismissed the complaint on the ground that reached the
conclusion "that the plaintiffs failed to establish by preponderance of evidence the negligence, and
thus the liability, of the defendants."
1. The jeep of the deceased Calibo was "zigzagging."

2. This, plus Roranes' waiver of the right to institute criminal proceedings against Zacarias, and
the fact that indeed no criminal case was ever instituted in Court against Zacarias, were "telling
indications that they did not attribute the happening to defendant Zacarias' negligence or
fault."
3. That there were skid marks left by the truck's tires at the scene, and none by the jeep,
demonstrates that the driver of the truck had applied the brakes and the jeep's driver had not.
The respondents filed an appeal before the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals reversed and
set aside the CFI decision, opining that Zacarias is negligent and Zacarias' negligence "gave rise to the
presumption of negligence on the part of his employer, and their liability is both primary and
solidary." It therefore ordered "the defendants jointly and solidarily to indemnify the plaintiffs.
1. "the truck driven by defendant Zacarias occupied the lane of the jeep when the collision
occurred,'
2. Zacarias had no license at the time
3. the waiver of the right to file criminal charges against Zacarias should not be taken against
"plaintiffs" Roranes and Patos who had the right, under the law, to opt merely to bring a civil
suit.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not Paul Zacarias was negligent in the case.
2. Whether or not Cabildo was negligent in the case.
RULING:
1. NO. Paul Zacarias was not negligent as he was supposed to act as any reasonable and prudent man
would have done in the same situation given the circumstance.
In the case at bar, it was still at least eleven (11) centimeters away from its side of the true center
line of the road and well inside its own lane when the accident occurred. By this same reckoning, since
it was unquestionably the jeep that rammed into the stopped truck, it may also be deduced that it (the
jeep) was at the time travelling beyond its own lane and intruding into the lane of the truck by at least
the same 11-centimeter width of space.
The truck's lane as erroneously demarcated by the center stripe gave said vehicle barely half a
meter of clearance from the edge of the road and the dangerous shoulder and little room for
maneuver, in case this was made necessary by traffic contingencies or road conditions, if it always kept
to said lane.
Being well within his own lane, as has already been explained, he had no duty to swerve out of
the jeep's way as said Court would have had him do. And even supposing that he was in fact partly
inside the opposite lane, coming to a full stop with the jeep still thirty (30) meters away cannot be
considered an unsafe or imprudent action, there also being uncontradicted evidence that the jeep was
"zigzagging"and hence no way of telling in which direction it would go as it approached the truck.
The traffic accident report attests to the proven fact that Zacarias voluntarily surrendered to the
investigating officers his driver's license, valid for 1979, that had been renewed just the day before the
accident, on July 3, 1979.
The evidence not only acquits Zacarias of any negligence in the matter.
2. YES. Cabildo was negligent in the case which was the proximate cause of the accident BECAUSE the
jeep driver Cabildo had the last clearance chance to avoid the accident as the truck came to a full stop
30 meters away.
In the case at bar, the jeep that Cabildo was driving was zigzagging which is to say that it was
travelling or being driven erratically at the time as confirmed by the eye witnesses. Calibo had been
drinking shortly before the accident. "Sabi na huag nang mag drive . . . . pumipilit,". It was Calibo
whose driver's license could not be found on his person at the scene of the accident, and was reported
by his companions in the jeep as having been lost with his wallet at said scene, according to the traffic
accident. Zacarias readily submitted to interrogation and gave a detailed statement while comanions
and supposed eyewitnesses refused to give statement.
The private respondents have admitted that the truck was already at a full stop when the jeep
plowed into it. And they have not seen fit to deny or impugn petitioners' imputation that they also
admitted the truck had been brought to a stop while the jeep was still thirty meters away. From
these facts the logical conclusion emerges that the driver of the jeep had what judicial doctrine has
appropriately called the last clear chance to avoid the accident, while still at that distance of thirty
meters from the truck, by stopping in his turn or swerving his jeep away from the truck, either of
which he had sufficient time to do while running at a speed of only thirty kilometers per hour. In those
circumstances, his duty was to seize that opportunity of avoidance, not merely rely on a supposed right
to expect, as the Appellate Court would have it, the truck to swerve and leave him a clear path.
The doctrine of the last clear chance provides as valid and complete a defense to
accident liability today as it did when invoked and applied in the 1918 case of Picart vs. Smith,
supra, which involved a similar state of facts.
CONCLUSION:
Since said ruling clearly applies to exonerate petitioner Zacarias and his employer (and co-petitioner)
George Lim, an inquiry into whether or not the evidence supports the latter's additional defense of due
diligence in the selection and supervision of said driver is no longer necessary and wig not be
undertaken.

003 DIGESTED People's Lumber Vs IAC - G.R. No. 70493

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

003 DIGESTED People's Lumber Vs IAC - G.R. No. 70493

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Title

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

003 DIGESTED People's Lumber Vs IAC - G.R. No. 70493

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

TOGUAY, Paul Jeffrey U.

Citation G.R. No. 70493

Date May 18, 1989

Respondent INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, CECILIA ALFEREZ VDA. DE CALIBO,

1. The jeep of the deceased Calibo was "zigzagging."

2. Whether or not Cabildo was negligent in the case.

You might also like