Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-36662-63 July 30, 1982

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
FILOMENO CAMANO, defendant-appellant.

The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

Deogracias Eufemio for defendant-appellant.

CONCEPCION JR., J.:

MANDATORY REVIEW of the death sentence imposed upon the accused Filomeno Camano by the Court of First
Instance of Camarines Sur, in Criminal Case Nos. T-20 and T-21, for the killing of Godofredo Pascual and Mariano
Buenaflor.

The inculpatory facts as stated by the trial court show that:

On February 17, 1970, in the barrio of Nato, Municipality of Sagñay, Province of Camarines Sur, between
the hours of four and five o'clock in the afternoon, after the accused had been drinking liquor, he stabbed
twice the victim Godofredo Pascua with a bolo, called in the vernacular Bicol "palas" which is a sharp
bladed and pointed instrument about two feet long including the black handle, tapering to the end, about
one and one-half inches in width, (Exhibit "C") while the latter was walking alone along the barrio street
almost infront of the store of one Socorro Buates. The victim, Godofredo Pascua, sustained two mortal
wounds for which he died instantaneously, described by Dr. Constancio A. Tan, Municipal Health Officer,
of Sagñay Camarines Sur, in his Autopsy Report (Exhibit "A", pp. 5, Record Crim. Case No. T-21) as
follows:

NATURE OF WOUNDS UPON AUTOPSY:

1. WOUND STAB - three (3) inches long at left side, three (3) inches below left axilla, a
little bit posteriorly, cutting the skin, subcutaneous tissues, muscles one (1) rib, pleura of
left lung, pericardium, penetrating the ventricles of the heart, Media stinum, the right lung
and exit to the right chest. One inch opening.

2. WOUND INCISED, one inch long at the left arm

CAUSE OF DEATH - Wound No. 1 causing instant death due to severe hemorrhage.

After hacking and stabbing to death Godofredo Pascua, the accused proceeded to the seashore of the
barrio, and on finding Mariano Buenaflor leaning at the gate of the fence of his house, in a kneeling
position, with both arms on top of the fence, and his head stooping down hacked the latter with the same
bolo, first on the head, and after the victim fell and rolled to the ground, after said blow, he continued
hacking him, until he lay prostrate on the ground, face up, when the accused gave him a final thrust of the
bolo at the left side of the chest above the nipple running and penetrating to the right side a little
posteriorly and superiorly with an exit at the back, of one (1) inch opening, (Exhibit B) causing instant
death. The victim, Mariano Buenaflor sustained eight wounds, which were specifically described by Dr.
Tan in his Autopsy Report (Exhibit "B" dated February 17, 1970, as follows:

NATURE OF WOUNDS UPON AUTOPSY:

 1. WOUND STAB, Two (2) inches long at the left side of chest above the nipple, running
to the right side a little posteriorly and superiorly with an exit at the back of one (1) inch
opening. Penetrating the skin, subcutaneous tissues, pericardium the auricles of the
heart, the left lung towards the right side of back.

2. WOUND STAB at sternum one and one-half (1-1/2) inches deep three-fourth (3/4) inch
long penetrating the skin and the sternum.

3. WOUND STAB left side of neck three-fourth (3/4) inch long one and one-half (1-1/2)
inches deep.

4. WOUND HACKED, cutting left ear and bone four (4) inches long.

5. WOUND HACKED, left leg three (3) inches long cutting skin and bone of anterior side.

6. WOUND INCISED left palm two (2) inches long.

7. WOUND STAB, one (1) inch long two (2) inches deep at the back near spinal column.

8. WOUND HACKED, two (2) inches long at dome of head cutting skin and bone.

CAUSE OF DEATH — Wound number one (1) causing instant death due to severe hemorrhage from the
heart." Out of the eight (8) wounds, two (2) are mortal wounds, namely wound Number one (1) and
wound Number Three (3), (Exhibit "B") (t.s.n., pp. 18-20, Session November 22, 1971). The two victims
Godofredo Pascua and Mariano Buenaflor, together with the accused are neighbors, residing at the same
street of Barrio Nato, Sagñay, Camarines Sur (t.s.n., pp. 31, Session Nov. 22, 1971). The bloody incident
was not preceded or precipitated by any altercation between the victims and the accused (t.s.n. p. 60,
Nov. 22, 1971).

Likewise, it is an undisputed fact that three years prior to this incident, the two victims had a
misunderstanding with the accused while fishing along Sagnay River. During this occasion it appears that
the accused requested Godofredo Pascua to tow his fishing boat with the motor boat owned by Mariano
Buenaflor but the request was refused by both. This refusal greatly offended and embittered the accused
against the victims. From this time on, the accused begrudged the two, and entertained personal
resentment against them. And although on several occasions, the accused was seen at the game table
with Godofredo Pascual drinking liquor, the friendly attitude towards Pascua, seems to be merely artificial
than real, more so, with respect to Mariano Buenaflor whom he openly detested. He consistently refused
to associate since then with the two victim especially, Mariano Buenaflor. In fact, no less than ten
attempts were made by Amado Payago, a neighbor, inviting the accused for reconciliation with the victims
but were refused. Instead, defendant when intoxicated or drunk, used to challenge Mariano Buenaflor to a
fight and announce his evil intention to kill them. (t.s.n., pp. 50-53, session November 22, 1971.)

Also proved beyond dispute, the fact that the bolo or "palas" belongs to the accused. That after killing the
two victims, he returned to his house, where he subsequently surrendered to Policemen Adolfo Avila,
Juan Chavez, Erasmo Valencia, upon demand by laid peace officers for him to surrender. When brought
to the Police headquarters of the town for investigation he revealed that the bolo he used in the killing was
hidden by him under the table of his house. Following this tip, Patrolman Jose Baluyot was dispatched,
and recovered the weapon at the place indicated, which when presented to he Chief of Police was still
stained with human blood from the base of the handle to the point of the blade. And when asked as to
who was he owner of said bolo, the accused admitted it as his. He also admitted the killing of Godofredo
Pascua and Mariano Buenaflor. however, when he was asked to sign a statement, he refused. 1

For the killing of Godofredo Pascua and Mariano Buenaflor, Filomeno Camano was charged, under two (2) separate
informations, with the crime of murder attended by evident premeditation and treachery. By agreement of the parties, the
two cases were tried jointly.

The accused admitted killing Mariano Buenaflor, but claims that he did so in self-defense. He denied killing Godofredo
Pascua. He also denied holding a grudge against Godofredo Pascua and Mariano Buenaflor and belittled the fist fight he
had with Mariano Buenaflor. He said that while they were drinking, they had a heated discussion, and because they were
drunk, it resulted in a fist fight, which they had soon forgotten. 2
His version of the incident is that in the early morning of February 17, 1970, he was fishing in the open sea. He went
ashore at about 7:00 o'clock in the morning and was met by Mariano Buenaflor who, upon seeing that he had a big catch,
demanded a percentage. for the fishery commission. When he refused to give what was asked, Buenaflor remarked that
he was hard-headed. He went home, taking his things along with him. After eating breakfast, he went to sleep and awoke
at about 3:30 o'clock in the afternoon. 3 He ate his dinner 4 and prepared to go out to sea again. While he was standing in
the yard of his house, Mariano Buenaflor, Godofredo Pascua, Gorio Carable, Jesus Carable, Tomas Carable, Abelardo
Bolaye, Amado Payago, and Loreto Payago, who were drinking at the store of Socorro Buates, went to him and
Godofredo Pascua, without any provocation whatsoever, boxed him. He recounted what happened next: "I defend myself
but inspite of that I was hit on my upper arm. Then after that I was again boxed by Mariano Buenaflor and I was hit on my
lower jaw. (Witness pointing to the bolo marked Exhibit C.) And I was able to grab that bolo from him."

"When I met Godofredo Pascua he was on the act of boloing me but I was able to take hold of his hands and I was able to
grab the bolo. After I have taken the bolo from Godofredo Pascua, all I know is that he fell on the ground and the rest of
the group except Mariano Buenaflor run away after seeing that Godofredo Pascua fell already on the ground. Mariano
Buenaflor approached me having also a bolo then immediately when we meet each other I boloed him and when he has
wounded he run away and when he was running away I run after him. After I have boloed Mariano Buenaflor he run away
so I run after him because I know that he has a gun and if he reach home he will get that gun and he might shoot
me." 5 Mariano Buenaflor was hit on the head.

The trial court, however, rejected the defense of the accused, saying:

Coming to the evidence for the defense, the Court, much to its regret cannot give credence to the
testimony and story of the accused, and his lone witness, Nemesio Camano, who is his first cousin. The
claim of self-defense does not find support in the evidence presented. The claim, that a group of eight (8)
men headed by Godofredo Pascua and Mariano Buenaflor ganged up on him by boxing him one after
another while others were throwing stones at him; that he was attacked by Godofredo Pascua with a bolo
which he succeeded in wresting from him; that he did not know Godofredo Pascua was killed; that he
killed said Mariano Buenaflor after a bolo duel, are mere fictions of a desperate man without evidentiary
support. His testimony on these points, and that of his cousin Nemesio Camano are simply incredible not
only because they are inherently improbable in themselves, but also because of their clear
inconsistencies on contradictions against each other. For, conceding in gratia argumenti that he was
really ganged up by eight (8) persons, some boxing him while others throwing stones at him, and two of
whom were armed with a bolo, and that he was all alone fighting them and yet he did not suffer any
physical injury, is indeed incredible and beyond belief. With eight (8) persons to contend with, two armed
with bolos, it is simply unbelievable that he should come out of the melee unscathed.

The Court has carefully examined and verified very carefully each and every piece of evidence presented
by the defense and has relaxed all technical rules of evidence in favor of the accused in search for
evidentiary support of his claim of self-defense in vain. Conscious of the enormity of the offense and the
bitterness attached to an adverse decision, the Court has earnestly searched in vain for facts upon which
to lay the basis at least of a finding of reasonable doubt in favor of the accused at least just to avoid the
ugly and unpleasant task of signing an adverse court decision. But, the falsity of their concocted story is
so apparent and self-evident to need further elucidation. This is demonstrated by the record. They simply
cannot stand, as basis of belief. Moreover, the Court feels very much intrigued by the fact that
notwithstanding that many people witnessed the incidents, having occurred in broad daylight, and that the
accused had more sufficient time to look for witnesses among his friends, relatives, and neighbors in the
barrio, during the long period that this case has been pending trial since February 17, 1970, that he could
not get any witness to testify in his favor, other than his lone witness, Nemesio Camano, whose
testimony, coming as it is from a very close relative is naturally very vulnerable to grave doubt and
suspicion for coming from a biased source. Could this mean lack of public sympathy because the horrible
act was in truth committed by the accused? Is this a sign of public condemnation? Be it as it may, this
unpleasant circumstance has no bearing or influence in the painful decision of this case. What impelled
and compelled this Court in making this painful decision, much to his dislike, are the bare and
incontrovertible facts of the case born out by the evidence presented indicating beyond per adventure of
doubt the stark reality which shows that there exist that moral certainty that convinces and satisfies the
reason and conscience of those who are to act upon it. (People v. Lavarios, L-24339, June 29, 1968, 22
SCRA 1321) For the bitter conclusions herein reached, is based on the compelling and irresistible facts
born out by the evidence of record found after sleepless night of study that the accused is guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime charged committed with the aggravating circumstances of evident
premeditation, treachery, abuse of superior strength, and intoxication with no mitigating circumstance.
The accused and his only witness, Nemesio Camano changed their declarations not only once, twice, or
 thrice, but many times, placing the Court in quandary and confused what theory or testimony is to be
believed and considered among the mess of contradictory, inconsistent, and diametrically opposed
statements. Considering the manner and tenor they were given, - the accused and his only witness
changing stand in every turn, leaves no room for doubt than that said testimonies are merely concocted
and fabricated as a desperate attempt to salvage a hopeless case. 6

In this appeal, the fact of death of Godofredo Pascua and Mariano Buenaflor and the cause of their deaths are not
disputed. Counsel de oficio merely claims that the accused is guilty of homicide only in each case, and not murder, as
charged; and prays for the modification of the judgment and the consequent reduction of the penalty imposed upon the
accused Filomeno Camano.

(1) Counsel contends that there is no evident premeditation since the acts of the accused, as testified to by the
prosecution witnesses, are all indicative of E, "spur-of-the-moment" decision and action.

The contention is well taken. There is evident premeditation when the killing had been carefully Planned by the offender,
when he prepared beforehand the means which he deemed suitable for carrying it into execution, and when he had
sufficient time dispassionately to consider and accept the consequences, and when there has been a concerted plan. 7 It
has also been held that evident premeditation requires proof of the following: (1) the time when the offender determined to
commit the crime; (2) an act manifestly indicating that the culprit had clung to his determination; and (3) a sufficient lapse
of time between the determination and the execution of the crime to allow him to reflect upon the consequences of his act
and to allow his conscience to overcome the resolution of his will. 8 In the instant case, it cannot be stated that the killing
of Pascua and Buenaflor was a preconceived plan. There is no proof as to how and when the plan to kill Pascua and
Buenaflor was hatched or what time had elapsed before the plan was carried out. The trial court merely concluded that
the killing of Pascua and Buenaflor was premeditated because "the accused has been nursing the evil design to kill both
the victims since three years prior to the occurrence of the incident on February 18, 1970, when both of them refused the
request of the accused to have his boat towed by the motor boat belonging to Mariano Buenaflor while fishing along
Sañgay River," and "from that time on, to the fatal killings, said accused refused consistently to join his neighbors in their
drinking spree where both the victims especially Mariano Buenaflor were present;" "in fact, no less than ten attempts
made by witness Amado Payago inviting the accused to be reconciled with the victims were rejected;" and that "on the
contrary, it has been established that whenever the accused was drunk, he announces his intention to kill the victims, and
as a matter of fact he challenged several times Mariano Buenaflor to a fight."

The incident referred to, however, does not establish the tune when the appellant decided to commit the crime. If ever, the
aforementioned incident merely established the motive for the killing of the two victims. 9

The fact that the accused had challenged Mariano Buenaflor to a fight whenever he was drunk and announces his
intention to kill the latter does not reveal a persistence of a criminal design since there is no showing that in between the
utterances of the threats and the consummation of the crime, the appellant made plans or sought the deceased to
accomplish the killing.

As there is no direct evidence of the planning or preparation in the killing of Pascua and Buenaflor and of the marked
persistence to accomplish that plan, the trial court's conclusion cannot be sustained.

(2) Counsel for the accused also claims that treachery is not present in the commission of the crime.

The contention is without merit. Amado Payago categorically declared that Filomeno Camano attacked Godofredo Pascua
from behind, a method which has ensured the accomplishment of the criminal act without any risk to the perpetrator
arising from the defense that his victim may put up. His testimony reads, as follows:

Q At that time and date while you were in front of your house did you notice whether
there is anything unusual incident that happened?

A Yes, sir.

Q Can you relate before this Honorable Court?

A Yes, sir.

Q Please relate it?

 A I saw Filomeno Camano run towards his house and took a bolo and run after
Godofredo Pascua and immediately stabbed him.

Q How far more or less were you when Godofredo Pascua was stabbed by Filomeno
Camano?

A More or less 12 to 15 meters.

Q What was Godofredo Pascua doing when he was stabbed by Filomeno Camano?

A He was walking to his house.

Q In relation to Godofredo Pascua where was Filomeno Camano at the time that
Filomeno Camano stabbed Godofredo Pascua?

A From behind sir.

Q After Godofredo Pascua was stabbed by Filomeno Camano what happened to

Godofredo Pascua?

A He fell down and keep on turning.

Q What about Filomeno Camano, what did he do after Godofredo Pascua fell down?

A He run towards the seashore looking after Mariano Buenaflor. 10

His testimony is corroborated by the nature and location of the wounds sustained by the deceased Godofredo Pascua.
The autopsy report, 11 showed that the point of entry of the stab wound inflicted upon Pascua was three (3) inches long
and three (3) inches below the left armpit, a little bit posteriorly or toward the hinder end of the body; and the point of exit
was the right chest, one (1) inch Iateral to the right nipple with a one (1) inch opening. If the deceased was stabbed while
he was facing his assailant, as claimed by counsel for the accused, the entrance wound would have been in the front part
of the body, and its exit wound, if any, would be at the back. The trial court, therefore, did not commit an error in finding
that the deceased Godofredo Pascua was assaulted from behind.

With respect to Mariano Buenaflor, the evidence shows that he was attacked while in a kneeling position, with his arms on
top of the gate of the fence surrounding his hut and his head was "stooping down." 12 He was hacked on the head,
causing him to fall to the ground, and then successively hacked and stabbed without respite, as he lay on the ground, until
he died. The attack was also sudden, unexpected, and lethal, such as to disable and incapacitate the victim from putting
up any defense.

(3) Counsel de oficio further claims that the aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior strength, which the lower court
appreciated in fixing the penalty, is absorbed in treachery.

This contention is likewise correct. The rule is already settled that abuse of superiority is absorbed in treachery. 13

(4) Counsel next contends that the alternative circumstance of intoxication was erroneously appreciated as an
aggravating circumstance. Counsel argues thusly:

As to the alternative circumstance of intoxication, it is respectfully submitted that there was no proof that
the accused was intoxicated at the time of the killing other than the bare testimony of Payago that from
his house he allegedly saw the accused drinking in his house which is about 30 meters away. The
prosecution did not present any police report or doctor's certification that accused was found to be
intoxicated at the time of the killing. Moreover, it was not shown by competent evidence that accused
purposedly became drunk to facilitate the commission of the offense.

If at all, intoxication should be properly appreciated as a mitigating circumstance because it affected

accused's mental facilities such that it diminished his capacity to know the injustice of his acts and to
comprehend fully the consequences of his acts. 14
There is merit in the contention. Drunkenness or intoxication is mitigating if accidental, not habitual nor intentional, that is,
not subsequent to the plan to commit the crime. It is aggravating if habitual or intentional. 15 To be mitigating, it must be
indubitably proved. 16 A habitual drunkard is one given to intoxication by excessive use of intoxicating drinks. The habit
should be actual and confirmed. It is unnecessary that it be a matter of daily occurrence. It lessens individual resistance to
evil thought and undermines will-power making its victim a potential evildoer. 17

The records of these cases do not show that the appellant was given to excessive use of intoxicating drinks although he
used to get drunk every now and then. The testimony of Amado Payago to this effect, reads as follows:

Q But after that incident Godofredo Pascua and Filomeno Camano are already in good
terms because they even go on drinking spree, is it not?

A Yes, sir, that is true but Filomeno Camano has an evil plan against Godofredo Pascua.

Q And how did you come to know about this plan?

A He talk(s) (about) that very openly specially when he is drunk.

Q During the three years that the incident where Camano's boat was not towed, could
you remember how many times more or less did you hear him speak about his plan
before the stabbing incident?

A Whenever he is drunk.

Q Can you not remember more or less how many times have you heard him?

A I cannot remember, sir.

Q About five times?

FISCAL CLEDERA:

Already answered.

A Whenever he is drunk.

ATTY. TRIA:

Q How often does he drunk (sic), if you know?

A I cannot estimate, sir.

Q What about Mariano Buenaflor, could you also state that there had been an altercation
between him and Filomeno Camano prior to the incident, is it not?

A Yes, sir.

Q What was this altercation about?

A It started when the request of Filomeno Camano to tow his boat was refused by
Godofredo Pascua because that boat used by Godofredo Pascua is owned by Mariano
Buenaflor.

Q How did you also know that Camano resented against (sic) this Buenaflor?

A Everytime he is drunk he keep(s) on challenging Mariano Buenaflor.

 xxx xxx xxx

Q Have you ever seen the accused Filomeno Camano drink liquor immediately prior to
the incident?

A Yes, sir.

Q Where?

A In his house.

Q When you saw him where were you?

A I was also in my house because I can just see his house from our window.

Q About how far is your house from the house of Filomeno Camano so that you can see
from your house?

A More or less 30 meters.

Q With whom was Filomeno Camano drinking?

A Bienvenido Pascua, Leopoldo Balaye and this (sic) persons (who) are arriving far from
our house.

Q According to your personal knowledge do you know whether or not the accused was
drunk when this incident happened?

A Yes, sir.

Q But the truth is that, you still affirm that you don't know of any incident immediately prior
that has precipitated this stabbing incident between the accused and the victim

A None, sir.

ATTY. TRIA:

Q How about you, did you now drink that time?

No, sir. 18

The intoxication of the appellant not being habitual, and considering that the said appellant was in a state of intoxication at
the time of the commission of the felony, the alternative circumstance of intoxication should be considered as a mitigating
circumstance.

5. Finally, counsel claims that death is a cruel and unusual penalty and not proper in the cases at bar, citing Art. IV, Sec.
21 of the Constitution which provides that: "Excessive fines shag not be imposed, nor cruel or unusual punishment
inflicted."

The contention is without merit. The death penalty is not cruel, unjust or excessive. In the case of Harden vs. Director of
Prisons, 19 the Court said:

The penalty complained of is neither cruel, unjust nor excessive. In Ex-Parte Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436, the
United States Supreme Court said that "punishments are cruel when they involve torture or a lingering
death, but the punishment of death is not cruel, within the meaning of that word as used in the
Constitution." It implies there something inhuman and barbarous, something more than the mere
extinguishment of life."
The trial court, therefore, did not err in finding the accused Filomeno Camano guilty of Murder in each of the two cases.
The offense being attended by the mitigating circumstance of intoxication, without any aggravating circumstance to offset
it, the imposable penalty is the minimum of that provided by law or 17 years, 4 months and 1 day to 20 years of reclusion
temporal. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the appellant should be, as he is hereby, sentenced to suffer an
indeterminate penalty ranging from 10 years and 1 day of prision mayor, as minimum, to 17 years, 4 months and 1 day
of reclusion temporal, as maximum, in each case.

WHEREFORE, with the modification of the penalty imposed upon the appellant, as above indicated, the judgment
appealed from should be, as it is hereby, AFFIRMED in all other respects. With costs against the said appellant.

SO ORDERED.

Fernando, C.J., Teehankee, Barredo, Guerrero, Abad Santos, De Castro, Melencio-Herrera, Plana, Escolin, Vasquez,
Relova and Gutierrez, Jr., JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions

AQUINO, J.,  dissenting:

I dissent. Premeditation is aggravating. The accused should be sentenced to two reclusion perpetuas.

MAKASIAR, J.,  concurring:

Besides intoxication, voluntary surrender shall also mitigate the guilt of appellant, who had the choice to surrender or not
when demanded by the policemen, who did not place him under arrest nor had an arrest warrant.

Separate Opinions

AQUINO, J.,  dissenting:

I dissent. Premeditation is aggravating. The accused should be sentenced to two reclusion perpetuas.

MAKASIAR, J.,  concurring:

Besides intoxication, voluntary surrender shall also mitigate the guilt of appellant, who had the choice to surrender or not
when demanded by the policemen, who did not place him under arrest nor had an arrest warrant.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 34917           September 7, 1931

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
LUA CHU and UY SE TIENG, defendants-appellants.

Gibbs and McDonough, Gullas, Lopez and Tuaño, H. Alo and Manuel G. Briones for appellants.
Attorney-General Jaranilla for appellee.

VILLA-REAL, J.:

The defendants Lua Chu and Uy Se Tieng appeal from the judgment of the Court of First Instance of Cebu convicting
them of the illegal importation of opium, and sentencing them each to four years' imprisonment, a fine of P10,000, with
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency not to exceed one-third of the principal penalty, and to pay the proportional
costs.

In support of their appeal, the appellants assigned the following alleged errors as committed by the court below in its
judgment to wit:

The lower court erred:

1. In refusing to compel the Hon. Secretary of Finance of the Insular Collector of Customs to exhibit in court the
record of the administrative investigation against Joaquin Natividad, collector of customs of Cebu, and Juan
Samson, supervising customs secret service agent of Cebu, both of whom have since been dismissed from
service.

2. In holding it as a fact that "no doubt many times opium consignments have passed thru the customhouse
without the knowledge of the customs secret service."

3. In rejecting the defendants' theory that the said Juan Samson in denouncing the accused was actuated by a
desire to protect himself and to injure ex-collector Joaquin Natividad, his bitter enemy, who was partly
instrumental in the dismissal of Samson from the service.

4. In finding that the conduct of Juan Samson, dismissed chief customs secret service agent of Cebu, is above
reproach and utterly irreconcilable with the corrupt motives attributed to him by the accused.

5. In permitting Juan Samson, prosecution star witness, to remain in the court room while other prosecution
witnesses were testifying, despite the previous order of the court excluding the Government witnesses from the
court room, and in refusing to allow the defense to inquire from Insular Collector of Customs Aldanese regarding
the official conduct of Juan Samson as supervising customs secret service agent of Cebu.

6. In giving full credit to the testimony of said Juan Samson.

7. In refusing to hold that Juan Samson induced the defendant Uy Se Tieng to order the opium from Hongkong.

8. In accepting Exhibits E and E-1 as the true and correct transcript of the conversation between Juan Samson
and the appellant Uy Se Tieng.

9. In accepting Exhibit F as the true and correct transcript of the conversation between Juan Samson and the
appellant Lua Chu.
 10. In finding each of the appellants Uy Se Tieng and Lua Chu guilty of the crime of illegal importation of opium,
and in sentencing each to suffer four years' imprisonment and to pay a fine of P10,000 and the costs, despite the
presumption of innocence which has not been overcome, despite the unlawful inducement, despite the inherent
weakness of the evidence presented by the prosecution, emanating from a spirit of revenge and from a
contaminated, polluted source.

The following are uncontradicted facts proved beyond a reasonable doubt at the trial:

About the middle of the month of November, 1929, the accused Uy Se Tieng wrote to his correspondent in Hongkong to
send him a shipment of opium.

About November 4, 1929, after the chief of the customs secret service of Cebu, Juan Samson, had returned from a
vacation in Europe, he called upon the then collector of customs for the Port of Cebu, Joaquin Natividad, at his office, and
the latter, after a short conversation, asked him how much his trip had cost him. When the chief of the secret service told
him he had spent P2,500, the said collector of customs took from a drawer in his table, the amount of P300, in paper
money, and handed it to him, saying: "This is for you, and a shipment will arrive shortly, and you will soon be able to
recoup your travelling expenses." Juan Samson took the money, left, and put it into the safe in his office to be kept until he
delivered it to the provincial treasurer of Cebu. A week later, Natividad called Samson and told him that the shipment he
had referred to consisted of opium, that it was not about to arrive, and that the owner would go to Samson's house to see
him. That very night Uy Se Tieng went to Samson's house and told him he had come by order of Natividad to talk to him
about the opium. The said accused informed Samson that the opium shipment consisted of 3,000 tins, and that he had
agreed to pay Natividad P6,000 or a P2 a tin, and that the opium had been in Hongkong since the beginning of October
awaiting a ship that would go direct to Cebu.

At about 6 o'clock in the afternoon of November 22, 1929, one Nam Tai loaded on the steamship Kolambugan, which
the Naviera Filipina — a shipping company in Cebu had had built in Hongkong, 38 cases consigned to Uy Seheng and
marked "U.L.H." About the same date Natividad informed Samson that the opium had already been put on board the
steamship Kolambugan, and it was agreed between them that Samson would receive P2,000, Natividad P2,000, and the
remaining P2,000 would be distributed among certain employees in the customhouse.

Meanwhile, Uy Se Tieng continued his interviews with Samson. Towards the end of November, Natividad informed the
latter that the Kolambugan had returned to Hongkong on account of certain engine trouble, and remained there until
December 7th. In view of this, the shipper several times attempted to unload the shipment, but he was told each time by
the captain, who needed the cargo for ballast, that the ship was about to sail, and the 30 cases remained on board.

The Kolambugan arrived at Cebu on the morning of December 14, 1929. While he was examining the manifests, Samson
detailed one of his men to watch the ship. After conferring with Natividad, the latter instructed him to do everything
possible to have the cargo unloaded, and to require Uy Se Tieng to pay over the P6,000. On the morning of November
16, 1929, Natividad told Samson that Uy Se Tieng already had the papers ready to withdraw the cases marked "U.L.H."
from the customhouse. Samson then told Natividad it would be better for Uy Se Tieng to go to his house to have a talk
with him. Uy Se Tieng went to Samson's house that night and was told that he must pay over the P6,000 before taking the
opium out of the customhouse. Uy Se Tieng showed Samson the bill of lading and on leaving said: "I will tell the owner,
and we see whether we can take the money to you tomorrow." The following day Samson informed Colonel Francisco of
the Constabulary, of all that had taken place, and the said colonel instructed the provincial commander, Captain
Buenconsejo, to discuss the capture of the opium owners with Samson. Buenconsejo and Samson agreed to meet at the
latter's house that same night. That afternoon Samson went to the office of the provincial fiscal, reported the case to the
fiscal, and asked for a stenographer to take down the conversation he would have with Uy Se Tieng that night in the
presence of Captain Buenconsejo. As the fiscal did not have a good stenographer available, Samson got one Jumapao,
of the law firm of Rodriguez & Zacarias, on the recommendation of the court stenographer. On the evening of December
17, 1929, as agreed, Captain Buenconsejo, Lieutenant Fernando; and the stenographer went to Samson's house and
concealed themselves behind a curtain made of strips of wood which hung from the window overlooking the entrance to
the house on the ground floor. As soon as the accused Uy Se Tieng arrived, Samson asked him if he had brought the
money. He replied that he had not, saying that the owner of the opium, who was Lua Chu, was afraid of him. Samson then
hold him to tell Lua Chu not to be afraid, and that he might come to Samson's house. After pointing out to Uy Se Tieng a
back door entrance into the garden, he asked him where the opium was, and Uy Se Tieng answered that it was in the
cases numbered 11 to 18, and that there were 3,252 tins. Uy Se Tieng returned at about 10 o'clock that night
accompanied by his codefendant Lua Chu, who said he was not the sole owner of the opium, but that a man from Manila,
named Tan, and another in Amoy were also owners. Samson then asked Lua Chu when he was going to get the opium,
and the latter answered that Uy Se Tieng would take charge of that. On being asked if he had brought the P6,000, Lua
Chu answered, no, but promised to deliver it when the opium was in Uy Se Tieng's warehouse. After this conversation,
which was taken down in shorthand, Samson took the accused Lua Chu aside and asked him: "I say, old fellow, why
didn't you tell me about this before bringing the opium here?" Lua Chu answered: "Impossible, sir; you were not here, you
were in Spain on vacation." On being asked by Samson how he had come to bring in the opium, Lua Chu answered: "I
was in a cockpit one Sunday when the collector called me aside and said there was good business, because opium
brought a good price, and he needed money." All this conversation was overheard by Captain Buenconsejo. It was then
agreed that Uy Se Tieng should take the papers with him at 10 o'clock next morning. At the appointed hour, Uy Se Tieng
and one Uy Ay arrived at Samson's house, and as Uy Se Tieng was handing certain papers over to his companion, Uy
Ay, Captain Buenconsejo, who had been hiding, appeared and arrested the two Chinamen, taking the aforementioned
papers, which consisted of bills of lading (Exhibits B and B-1), and in invoice written in Chinese characters, and relating to
the articles described in Exhibit B. After having taken Uy Se Tieng and Uy Ay to the Constabulary headquarters, and
notified the fiscal, Captain Buenconsejo and Samson went to Lua Chu's home to search it and arrest him. In the pocket of
a coat hanging on a wall, which Lua Chu said belonged to him, they found five letters written in Chinese characters
relating to the opium (Exhibits G to K). Captain Buenconsejo and Samson also took Lua Chu to the Constabulary
headquarters, and then went to the customhouse to examine the cases marked "U.L.H." In the cases marked Nos. 11 to
18, they found 3,252 opium tins hidden away in a quantity to dry fish. The value of the opium confiscated amounted to
P50,000.

In the afternoon of December 18, 1929, Captain Buenconsejo approached Lua Chu and asked him to tell the truth as to
who was the owner of the opium. Lua Chu answered as follows: "Captain, it is useless to ask me any questions, for I am
not going to answer to them. The only thing I will say is that whoever the owner of this contraband may be, he is not such
a fool as to bring it in here without the knowledge of those — " pointing towards the customhouse.

The defense attempted to show that after Juan Samson had obtained a loan of P200 from Uy Se Tieng, he induced him to
order the opium from Hongkong saying that it only cost from P2 to P3 a tin there, while in Cebu it cost from P18 to P20,
and that he could make a good deal of money by bringing in a shipment of that drug; that Samson told Uy Se Tieng,
furthermore, that there would be no danger, because he and the collector of customs would protect him; that Uy Se Tieng
went to see Natividad, who told him he had no objection, if Samson agreed; that Uy Se Tieng then wrote to his
correspondent in Hongkong to forward the opium; that after he had ordered it, Samson went to Uy Se Tieng's store, in the
name of Natividad, and demanded the payment of P6,000; that Uy Se Tieng then wrote to his Hongkong correspondent
cancelling the order, but the latter answered that the opium had already been loaded and the captain of
the Kolambugan refused to let him unload it; that when the opium arrived, Samson insisted upon the payment of the
P6,000; that as Uy Se Tieng did not have that amount, he went to Lua Chu on the night of December 14th, and proposed
that he participate; that at first Lua Chu was unwilling to accept Uy Se Tieng's proposition, but he finally agreed to pay
P6,000 when the opium had passed the customhouse; that Lua Chu went to Samson's house on the night of December
17th, because Samson at last agreed to deliver the opium without first receiving the P6,000, provided Lua Chu personally
promised to pay him that amount.

The appellants make ten assignments of error as committed by the trial court in its judgment. Some refer to the refusal of
the trial judge to permit the presentation of certain documentary evidence, and to the exclusion of Juan Samson, the
principal witness for the Government, from the court room during the hearing; others refer to the admission of the alleged
statements of the accused taken in shorthand; and the others to the sufficiency of the evidence of the prosecution to
establish the guilt of the defendants beyond a reasonable doubt.

With respect to the presentation of the record of the administrative proceedings against Joaquin Natividad, collector of
customs of Cebu, and Juan Samson, supervising customs secret service agent of Cebu, who were dismissed from the
service, the trial court did not err in not permitting it, for, whatever the result of those proceedings, they cannot serve to
impeach the witness Juan Samson, for it is not one of the means prescribed in section 342 of the Code of Civil Procedure
to that end.

With regard to the trial judge's refusal to order the exclusion of Juan Samson, the principal witness of the Government,
from the court room during the hearing, it is within the power of said judge to do so or not, and it does not appear that he
has abused his discretion (16 Corpus Juris, 842).

Neither did the trial judge err when he admitted in evidence the transcript of stenographic notes of the defendants'
statements, since they contain admissions made by themselves, and the person who took them in shorthand attested at
the trial that they were faithfully taken down. Besides the contents are corroborated by unimpeached witnesses who heard
the statements.

As to whether the probatory facts are sufficient to establish the facts alleged in the information, we find that the testimony
given by the witnesses for the prosecution should be believed, because the officers of the Constabulary and the chief of
the customs secret service, who gave it, only did their duty. Aside from this, the defendants do not deny their participation
in the illegal importation of the opium, though the accused Lua Chu pretends that he was only a guarantor to secure the
payment of the gratuity which the former collector of customs, Joaquin Natividad, had asked of him for Juan Samson and
certain customs employees. This assertion, however, is contradicted by his own statement made to Juan Samson and
overheard by Captain Buenconsejo, that he was one of the owners of the opium that had been unlawfully imported.

But the defendants' principal defense is that they were induced by Juan Samson to import the opium in question. Juan
Samson denies this, and his conduct in connection with the introduction of the prohibited drug into the port of Cebu, bears
him out. A public official who induces a person to commit a crime for purposes of gain, does not take the steps necessary
to seize the instruments of the crime and to arrest the offender, before having obtained the profit he had in mind. It is true
that Juan Samson smoothed the way for the introduction of the prohibited drug, but that was after the accused had
already planned its importation and ordered said drug, leaving only its introduction into the country through the Cebu
customhouse to be managed, and he did not do so to help them carry their plan to a successful issue, but rather to assure
the seizure of the imported drug and the arrest of the smugglers.

The doctrines referring to the entrapment of offenders and instigation to commit crime, as laid down by the courts of the
United States, are summarized in 16 Corpus Juris, page 88, section 57, as follows:

ENTRAPMENT AND INSTIGATION. — While it has been said that the practice of entrapping persons into crime
for the purpose of instituting criminal prosecutions is to be deplored, and while instigation, as distinguished from
mere entrapment, has often been condemned and has sometimes been held to prevent the act from being
criminal or punishable, the general rule is that it is no defense to the perpetrator of a crime that facilitates for its
commission were purposely placed in his way, or that the criminal act was done at the "decoy solicitation" of
persons seeking to expose the criminal, or that detectives feigning complicity in the act were present and
apparently assisting in its commission. Especially is this true in that class of cases where the offense is one of a
kind habitually committed, and the solicitation merely furnishes evidence of a course of conduct. Mere deception
by the detective will not shield defendant, if the offense was committed by him free from the influence or the
instigation of the detective. The fact that an agent of an owner acts as supposed confederate of a thief is no
defense to the latter in a prosecution for larceny, provided the original design was formed independently of such
agent; and where a person approached by the thief as his confederate notifies the owner or the public authorities,
and, being authorized by them to do so, assists the thief in carrying out the plan, the larceny is nevertheless
committed. It is generally held that it is no defense to a prosecution for an illegal sale of liquor that the purchase
was made by a "spotter," detective, or hired informer; but there are cases holding the contrary.

As we have seen, Juan Samson neither induced nor instigated the herein defendants-appellants to import the opium in
question, as the latter contend, but pretended to have an understanding with the collector of customs, Joaquin Natividad
— who had promised them that he would remove all the difficulties in the way of their enterprise so far as the
customhouse was concerned — not to gain the P2,000 intended for him out of the transaction, but in order the better to
assure the seizure of the prohibited drug and the arrest of the surreptitious importers. There is certainly nothing immoral in
this or against the public good which should prevent the Government from prosecuting and punishing the culprits, for this
is not a case where an innocent person is induced to commit a crime merely to prosecute him, but it simply a trap set to
catch a criminal.

Wherefore, we are of opinion and so hold, that the mere fact that the chief of the customs secret service pretended to
agree a plan for smuggling illegally imported opium through the customhouse, in order the better to assure the seizure of
said opium and the arrest of its importers, is no bar to the prosecution and conviction of the latter.

By virtue whereof, finding no error in the judgment appealed from, the same is hereby affirmed, with costs against the
appellants. So ordered.

Avanceña, C.J., Johnson, Street, Malcolm, Villamor, Romualdez, and Imperial, JJ., concur.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-5728            August 11, 1910

THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
JAMES O. PHELPS (alias PHILIPS), defendant-appellant.

P. J. Moore and W. H. Bishop, for appellant.

Attorney-General Villamor, for appellee.

TRENT, J.:

The defendant, James O. Phelps, was charged in the Court of First Instance of Jolo, Moro Province, with having violated
the provisions of Act No. 1761. He was tried, found guilty as charged, and sentenced to one month's imprisonment and to
pay a fine of P250, Philippine currency, and in case of insolvency to suffer the corresponding subsidiary imprisonment at
the rate of P2.50 a day, and to pay the costs. He appealed.

The prosecution presented but one witness in this case, Homer G. Smith, an employee of the Bureau of Internal Revenue.
This witness testified that the first time he ever saw the accused was in the international Saloon in Jolo in the month of
April, 1909; that at the time, while two or three men were sitting together in the said salon, he heard the accused say that
he on some occasions like to smoke opium; that a few hours after leaving the saloon he asked the accused if he smoked
opium, and the accused answered "yes," that he smoked sometimes; that he knew then that it was his duty to watch the
accused, that he then asked the accused what opportunities he had for smoking opium, and the accused replied, "good
opportunities;" he then said to the accused, "I wish to smoke opium." On the invitation of the accused he looked him up
that night and was told that he (the accused) was not able to prepare a room for smoking, as the Chinamen were afraid,
and asked the witness to see him the following night; that he saw him the following night, and accused again said that he
could not find a suitable place; that they made another agreement to meet and at that time they went together to a certain
house in the barrio of Tulay, where a certain Chinaman (this Chinaman was charged in criminal case No. 292 in said
court) had prepared the opium and pipe for smoking; that the accused gave the Chinaman P2, and he (the witness) gave
him P1 in payment for the preparation of the pipe which was prepared for smoking he took the pipe and the pan
containing the opium and went directly to the justice of the peace and swore out a warrant for the arrest of the accused
and the said Chinaman.

The defendant, J. O. Phelps, a man 30 years of age, testified that Smith, who was then going under the name of
Lockwood, came to his house one night in Jolo and said that he was accustomed to smoking opium and asked him (the
accused) if he knew of any Chinaman in the town who could assist him in obtaining opium to smoke; that he answered
Smith that he did not; that Smith then asked him if the Chinaman (the one charged in criminal case No. 292), who was the
accused's servant, could look for someone to furnish him (Smith) with a pipe until he became acquainted in town; that on
the following night the witness Smith came again to his house, and after being there about twenty minutes became very
nervous, saying that it was necessary for him to have some opium; that he told him (Smith) to go to the hospital, and
received the reply that he (Smith) was working for the quartermaster and was looking for a position as clerk, and that they
probably would not give him this position if they learned that he was an opium smoker that he again asked to have the
Chinaman assist him, and he (the accused) believing that he (Smith) was acting in good faith and was really sick, told the
Chinaman to do so; that by agreement and the witness Smith went to the house of the Chinaman in Tulay, where the
Chinaman prepared the pipe and gave it to Smith, he (Smith) giving the Chinaman P2, and that he (Smith) then left,
without the accused noticing whether he smoked or not, and that he (the accused) was arrested about forty minutes later,
and that he called for the doctor to examine him about one and half hours after he left the Chinaman's house.

The Chinaman corroborated the testimony of the accused on every material point, stating that he, after repeated demands
made by Smith, did prepare some opium in a pipe and give it to Smith.

The chief of police of Jolo, a sergeant in the United States Cavalry, who arrested the accused and the Chinaman, testified
that when he made these arrests the Chinaman and the accused did not have an opportunity to talk together before they
went to the justice of the peace where the preliminary investigation was held.
Doctor De Kraft, of the United States Army, was called by the accused himself and made an examination of the accused
about an hour and a half or two hours after he left the Chinaman's house. The doctor testified that the accused was
strong, robust man, and a man presenting no appearance of an opium smoker. On being asked by the court whether or
not he could state positively if the accused had used any opium on that day, the witness answered, "I as sure that he did
not use any opium on that day."

The court below in its decision said:

I agree with him (the doctor) that the accused does not appear to be a person who uses daily a large amount of
opium. The accused is a strong, robust man, in good physical condition, and from a casual examination of his
person no one would accuse him of being a habitual user of opium.

The prosecution does not contend that the appellant sold or had in his possession any opium, neither does it contend that
he had in his possession any of the prohibited paraphernalia used in smoking this drug. He is only charged with having
smoked opium this one time in the house of the Chinaman, and the prosecution rests its case solely upon the testimony of
the witness Smith, who was an employee of the Bureau of Internal Revenue, secretly acting in that capacity in Jolo.

On arriving in Jolo, Smith obtained employment in order to hide his true mission. He assumed the name of Lockwood for
the same purpose, engaged in gambling, and admits having visited the house of the appellant three times for the purpose
of making arrangements for himself and the accused to smoke opium. He urged the accused to have the Chinaman make
arrangements so they both could smoke. He went to the house of the Chinaman with the accused and paid the said
Chinaman, according to his own statement, P1 for the preparation of the opium. If he had, by these means, induced the
appellant to sell opium or to exhibit in his possession either opium or any of the prohibited paraphernalia, his testimony
would be more reasonable, since the mere possession of the drug or any of the prohibited paraphernalia is a violation of
the law within itself.

But, as we have said, it is not contended that the accused had in his possession any of these things. According to the
statements made by the witness Smith, he not only suggested the commission of this crime, but he (Smith) also states
that he desired to commit the same offense and would pay his part of the expense necessary for the commission of the
prohibited act. Such conduct on the part of a man who is employed by the Government for the purpose of taking such
steps as are necessary to prevent the commission of the offense and which would tend to the elevation and improvement
of the defendant, as a would-be criminal, rather than further his debasement, should be rebuked rather than encouraged
by the courts; and when such acts as those committed by the witness Smith are placed beside the positive testimony of
the defendant, corroborated by the Chinaman and the doctor, the testimony of such witness sinks into insignificance and
certainly does not deserve credit. When an employee of the Government, as in this case, and according to his own
testimony, encourages or induces persons to commit a crime in order to prosecute them, such conduct is most
reprehensible. We desire to be understood that we base our conclusions as to the conduct of the witness Smith and the
incredibility of his testimony on his own acts according to his own testimony.

We are, therefore, of the opinion and so hold, that the appellant is not guilty of this crime. The judgment of the lower court
is reversed and the appellant acquitted, with costs de oficio.

Arellano, C.J., Torres, Johnson and Moreland, JJ., concur.

 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 183652               February 25, 2015

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and AAA, Petitioner,

vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, 21st DIVISION, MINDANAO STATION, RAYMUND CARAMPATANA, JOEFHEL OPORTO,
and MOISES ALQUIZOLA, Respondents.

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

Before the Court is a Petition for Certiorari questioning the Decision 1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated June 6, 2008 in
CA-G.R. CR HC No. 00422-MIN. The CA reversed and set aside the Decision 2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Kapatagan, Lanao del Norte, Branch 21, dated February 28, 2006 in Criminal Case No. 21-1211, and acquitted private
respondents Raymund Carampatana, Joefhel Oporto, and Moises Alquizola of the crime of rape for the prosecution's
failure to prove their guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

In a Second Amended Information dated June 23, 2004, private respondents Carampatana, Oporto and Alquizola
werecharged, together with Christian John Lim, Emmanuel dela Cruz, Samuel Rudinas, Jansen Roda, Harold Batoctoy,
and Joseph Villame, for allegedly raping AAA,3 to wit:

That on or about 10:30 o’clock in the evening of March 25, 2004 at Alson’s Palace, Maranding, Lala, Lanao del Norte,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this HonorableCourt, the above-named accused conspiring, confederating and
mutually helping one another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with lewd designs forcefully drunk
AAA, a 16-year-old minor, with an intoxicating liquor and once intoxicated, brought said AAA at about dawn of March 26,
2004 at Alquizola Lodging house, Maranding, Lala, Lanao del Norte and also within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, and once inside said lodging house, accused RAYMUND CARAMPATANA and JOEPHEL OPORTO took turns in
having carnal knowledge against the will of AAA while accused MOISES ALQUIZOLA, with lewd designs, kissed her
against her will and consent.

CONTRARY TO LAW.4

Upon arraignment, accused, assisted by their respective counsels, entered a plea of not guilty to the offense charged. 5

Following pre-trial,6 trial on the merits ensued. Accused Christian John Lim, however, remains at-large.

The factual antecedents follow:

On March 25, 2004, around 8:00 a.m., AAA attended her high school graduation ceremony. Afterwards, they had a
luncheon party at their house in Maranding, Lala, Lanao del Norte. AAA then asked permission from her mother to go to
the Maranding Stage Plaza because she and her bandmates had to perform for an election campaign. She went home at
around 4:00 p.m. from the plaza. At about 7:00 p.m., AAA told her father that she would be attending a graduation dinner
party with her friends. AAA, together with Lim, Oporto, and Carampatana, ate dinner at the house of one Mark Gemeno at
Purok, Bulahan, Maranding. After eating, Lim invited them to go to Alson’s Palace, which was merely a walking distance
away from Gemeno’s house. Outside the Alson’s Palace, they were greeted by Aldrin Montesco, Junver Alquizola, and
Cherry Mae Fiel. After a while, they went inside and proceeded to a bedroom on the second floor where they again saw
Montesco with Harold Batoctoy, Jansen Roda, Emmanuel dela Cruz, Samuel Rudinas, a certain Diego, and one Angelo.
Rudinas suggested that they have a drinking session to celebrate their graduation, to which the rest agreed.

They all contributed and it was Joseph Villame who bought the drinks – two (2) bottles of Emperador Brandy. Then they
arranged themselves in a circle for the drinking spree. Two (2) glasses were being passed around: one glass containing
the sweetener (Pepsi) and the other glass containing the liquor. At first, AAA refused to drink because she had never tried
hard liquor before. During the session, they shared their problems with each other. When it was AAA’s turn, she became
emotional and started crying. It was then that she took her first shot. The glasses were passed around and she consumed
more or less five (5) glasses of Emperador Brandy. Thereafter, she felt dizzy so she laid her head down on Oporto’s lap.
Oporto then started kissing her head and they would remove her baseball cap. This angered her so she told them to stop,
and simply tried to hide her face with the cap. But they just laughed at her. Then, Roda also kissed her. At that time, AAA
was already sleepy, but they still forced her to take another shot. They helped her stand up and make her drink. She even
heard Lim say, "Hubuga na, hubuga na," (You make her drunk, you make her drunk). She likewise heard someone say,
"You drink it, you drink it." She leaned on Oporto’s lap again, then she fell asleep. They woke her up and Lim gave her the
Emperador Brandy bottle to drink the remaining liquor inside. She tried to refuse but they insisted, so she drank directly
from the bottle. Again, she fell asleep.

The next thing she knew, Roda and Batoctoy were carrying her down the stairs, and then she was asleep again. When
she regained consciousness, she saw that she was already at the Alquizola Lodging House. She recognized that place
because she had been there before. She would thereafter fall back asleep and wake up again. And during one of the
times that she was conscious, she saw Oporto on top of her, kissing her on different parts of her body, and having
intercourse with her. She started crying. She tried to resist when she felt pain in her genitals. She also saw Carampatana
and Moises Alquizola inside the room, watching as Oporto abused her. At one point, AAA woke up while Carampatana
was inserting his penis into her private organ. She cried and told him to stop. Alquizola then joined and started to kiss her.
For the last time, she fell unconscious.

When she woke up, it was already 7:00a.m. of the next day. She was all alone. Her body felt heavy and exhausted. She
found herself with her shirt on but without her lower garments. The upper half of her body was on top of the bed but her
feet were on the floor. There were also red stains on her shirt. After dressing up, she hailed a trisikad and went home.
When AAA reached their house, her father was waiting for her and was already furious. When she told them that she was
raped, her mother started hitting her. They brought her to the Lala Police Station to make a report. Thereafter, they
proceeded to the district hospital for her medical examination.

Dr. Cyrus Acusta of the Kapatagan District Hospital examined AAA in the morning of March 26, 2004, and found an old
hymenal laceration at 5 o’clock position and hyperemia or redness at the posterior fornices. The vaginal smear likewise
revealed the presence of sperm.

On the other hand, accused denied that they raped AAA. According to the defense witnesses, in the evening of March 25,
2004, Oporto, Carampatana, Lim, and AAA had dinner at Gemeno’s house. Gemeno then invited Oporto to attend the
graduation party hosted by Montesco at Alson’s Palace, owned by the latter’s family. When they reached the place,
Oporto told Montesco that they had to leave for Barangay Tenazas to fetch one Arcie Ariola. At about 11:30 p.m., Oporto
and Carampatana returned to Alson’s Palace but could not find AAA and Lim. The party subsequently ended, but the
group agreed to celebrate further. AAA, Rudinas, Dela Cruz, Lim, and Oporto contributed for two (2) bottles of Emperador
Brandy and one (1) liter of Pepsi. Several persons were in the room at that time: AAA, Carampatana, Oporto, Dela Cruz,
Rudinas, Roda, Batoctoy, Villame, and Lim. Also present but did not join the drinking were Gemeno, Montesco, Angelo
Ugnabia, Al Jalil Diego, Mohamad Janisah Manalao, one Caga, and a certain Bantulan. Gemeno told AAA not to drink but
the latter did not listen and instead told him not to tell her aunt. During the drinking session, AAA rested on Oporto’s lap.
She even showed her scorpion tattoo on her buttocks. And when her legs grazed Batoctoy’s crotch, she remarked, "What
was that, penis?" Roda then approached AAA to kiss her, and the latter kissed him back. Oporto did the sameand AAA
also kissed him. After Oporto, Roda and AAA kissed each other again.

Meanwhile, earlier that evening, at around 9:00 p.m., Moises Alquizola was at the Alquizola Lodging House drinking beer
with his cousin, Junver, and Fiel. They stopped drinking at around midnight. Fiel then requested Alquizola to accompany
her to Alson’s Palace to see her friends there. They proceeded to the second floor and there they saw AAA lying on
Oporto’s lap. Fiel told AAA to go home because her mother might get angry. AAA could not look her in the eye, just shook
her head, and said, "I just stay here." Alquizola and Fiel then went back to the lodging house. After thirty minutes, they
went to Alson’s Palace again,and saw AAA and Oporto kissing each other. AAA was lying on his lap while holding his
neck. Subsequently, they went back to the lodging house to resume drinking.

After drinking, Batoctoy offered to bring AAA home. But she refused and instead instructed them to take her to the
Alquizola Lodging House because she has a big problem. AAA, Lim, and Carampatana rode a motorcycle to the lodging
house. When they arrived, AAA approached Alquizola and told him, "Kuya, I want to sleep here for the meantime."
Alquizola then opened Room No. 4 where AAA, Oporto, and Carampatana stayed. There were two beds inside, a single
bed and a double-sized bed. AAA lay down on the single bed and looked at Carampatana. The latter approached her and
they kissed. He then removed her shirt and AAA voluntarily raised her hands to give way. Carampatana likewise removed
her brassiere. All the while, Oporto was at the foot of the bed. Thereafter, Oporto also removed her pants. AAA even lifted
her buttocks to make it easier for him to pull her underwear down. Oporto then went to AAA and kissed her on the lips.
Carampatana, on the other hand, placed himself in between AAA’s legs and had intercourse with her. When he finished,
he put on his shorts and went back to Alson’s Palace to get some sleep. When he left, Oporto and AAA were still kissing.
Alquizola then entered the room. When AAA saw him, she said, "Come Kuya, embrace me because I have a problem."
Alquizola thus started kissing AAA’s breasts. Oporto stood up and opened his pants. AAA held his penis and performed
fellatio on him. Then Oporto and Alquizola changed positions. Oporto proceeded to have sexual intercourse with AAA.
During that time, AAA was moaning and calling his name. Afterwards, Oporto went outside and slept with Alquizola on the
carpet. Oporto then had intercourse with AAA two more times. At 3:00 a.m., he went back to Alson’s Palace to sleep. At
around 6:00 a.m., Oporto and Carampatana went back to the lodging house. They tried to wake AAA up, but she did not
move so they just left and went home. Alquizola had gone outside but he came back before 7:00 a.m. However, AAA was
no longer there when he arrived.

On February 28, 2006, the RTC found private respondents Carampatana, Oporto and Alquizola guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of rape. It, however, acquitted Dela Cruz, Rudinas, Roda, Batoctoy, and Villame for failure of the
prosecution to prove their guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The dispositive portion of the Decision reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing considerations, judgment is hereby rendered:

a) Finding accused Raymund Carampatana GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged, and the
Court hereby sentences him to suffer the indivisible prison term of reclusion perpetua; to pay AAA the amount of
₱50,000.00 for and by way of civil indemnity;

b) Finding accused Joefhel Oporto GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged, and the court hereby
sentences him to suffer a prison term of six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum to twelve (12)
years also of prision mayor as maximum; to pay AAA the sum of ₱50,000.00 as moral damages and another
amount of ₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity;

c) Finding accused Moises Alquizola GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt as ACCOMPLICE in the commission of
the crime charged, and the court hereby sentences him to suffer an indeterminate prison term of six (6) years and
one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum to twelve (12) years and one (1) day of reclusion temporal as maximum;
to pay AAA the amount of ₱30,000.00 as moral damages and another sum of ₱30,000.00 for and by way of civil
indemnity;

d) Finding accused Emmanuel dela Cruz, Samuel Rudinas, Jansen Roda, Harold Batoctoy and Joseph Villame
NOT GUILTY of the crime charged for failure of the prosecution to prove their guilt therefor beyond reasonable
doubt. Accordingly, the Court acquits them of said charge; and e) Ordering accused Carampatana, Oporto and
Alquizola to pay, jointly and severally, the amount of ₱50,000.00 as attorney’s fees and expenses of litigations;
and the costs of suit.

The full period of the preventive imprisonment of accused Carampatana, Oporto and Alquizola shall be credited to them
and deducted from their prison terms provided they comply with the requirements of Article 29 of the Revised Penal Code.

Accused Raymund Carampatana surrendered voluntarily on 26 March 2004 and detained since then up to the present.
Accused Alquizola also surrendered voluntarily on 26 March 2004 and detained since then up to this time, while accused
Joefhel Oporto who likewise surrendered voluntarily on 26 March 2004 was ordered released to the custody of the
DSWD, Lala, Lanao del Norte on 31 March 2004, and subsequently posted cash bond for his provisional liberty on 17
September 2004 duly approved by this court, thus resulted to an order of even date for his release from the custody of the
DSWD.

Let the records of this case be sent to the archive files without prejudice on the prosecution to prosecute the case against
accused Christian John Lim as soon as he is apprehended.

SO ORDERED.7

Aggrieved by the RTC Decision, private respondents brought the case to the CA. On June 6, 2008, the appellate court
rendered the assailed Decision reversing the trial court’s ruling and, consequently, acquitted private respondents. The
decretal portion of said decision reads:

WHEREFORE, finding reversible errors therefrom, the Decision on appeal is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. For
lack of proof beyond reasonable doubt, accused-appellants RAYMUND CARAMPATANA, JOEFHEL OPORTO and
MOISES ALQUIZOLA are instead ACQUITTED of the crime charged.
SO ORDERED.8

In sum, the CA found that the prosecution failed to prove private respondents’ guilt beyond reasonable doubt. It gave
more credence to the version of the defense and ruled that AAA consented to the sexual congress. She was wide awake
and aware of what private respondents were doing before the intercourse. She never showed any physical resistance,
never shouted for help, and never fought against her alleged ravishers. The appellate court further relied on the medical
report which showed the presence of an old hymenal laceration on AAA’s genitalia, giving the impression that she has
had some carnal knowledge with a man before. The CA also stressed that AAA’s mother’s unusual reaction of hitting her
when she discovered what happened to her daughter was more consistent with that of a parent who found out that her
child just had premarital sex rather than one who was sexually assaulted.

On July 29, 2008, AAA, through her private counsel, filed a Petition for Certiorari 9 under Rule 65, questioning the CA
Decision which reversed private respondents’ conviction and ardently contending that the same was made with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

Thus, AAA raises this lone issue in her petition:

THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION IN ACQUITTING THE
PRIVATE RESPONDENTS.10

The private respondents present the following arguments in their Comment dated November 7, 2008 to assail the petition:

I.

A JUDGMENT OF ACQUITTAL IS IMMEDIATELY FINAL AND EXECUTORY AND THE PROSECUTION CANNOT
APPEAL THE ACQUITTAL BECAUSE OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROHIBITION AGAINST DOUBLE JEOPARDY.

II.

THE PETITIONER FAILED TO PROVE THAT THERE IS GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR
EXCESS OF JURISDICTION ON THE PART OF PUBLIC RESPONDENT.

III.

CERTIORARI WILL NOT LIE UNLESS A MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION IS FIRST FILED. IV. THE OFFICE OF
THE SOLICITOR GENERAL IS THE APPELLATE COUNSEL OF THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES IN ALL
CRIMINAL CASES.11

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed its own Comment on April 1, 2009. It assigns the following errors:

I.

THE PRIVATE COMPLAINANT MAY VALIDLY APPEAL AN ORDER OF ACQUITTAL AS TO THE CIVIL ASPECT OF
THE CRIME.

II.

THE APPELLATE DECISION OF ACQUITTAL IS NULL AND VOID FOR HAVING BEEN RENDERED WITH GRAVE
ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION, AN EXCEPTION TO THE
PRINCIPLE OF DOUBLE JEOPARDY.12

The Court will first resolve the procedural issues.

At the onset, the Court stresses that rules of procedure are meant to be tools to facilitate a fair and orderly conduct of
proceedings. Strict adherence thereto must not get in the way of achieving substantial justice. As long as their purpose is
sufficiently met and no violation of due process and fair play takes place, the rules should be liberally construed. 13 Liberal
construction of the rules is the controlling principle to effect substantial justice. The relaxation or suspension of procedural
rules, or the exemption of a case from their operation, is warranted when compelling reasons exist or when the purpose of
justice requires it. Thus, litigations should, as much as possible, be decided on their merits and not on sheer
technicalities.14

As a general rule, the prosecution cannot appeal or bring error proceedings from a judgment rendered in favor of the
defendant in a criminal case. The reason is that a judgment of acquittal is immediately final and executory, and the
prosecution is barred from appealing lest the constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy be violated. 15 Section 21,
Article III of the Constitution provides:

Section 21. No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. If an act is punished by a law
and an ordinance, conviction or acquittal under either shall constitute a bar to another prosecution for the same act.

Despite acquittal, however, either the offended party or the accused may appeal, but only with respect to the civil aspect
of the decision. Or, said judgment of acquittal may be assailed through a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules
of Court showing that the lower court, in acquitting the accused, committed not merely reversible errors of judgment, but
also exercised grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, or a denial of due process, thereby
rendering the assailed judgment null and void.16 If there is grave abuse of discretion, granting petitioner’s prayer is not
tantamount to putting private respondents in double jeopardy. 17

As to the party with the proper legal standing to bring the action, the Court said in People v. Santiago: 18

It is well-settled that in criminal cases where the offended party is the State, the interest of the private complainant or the
private offended party is limited to the civil liability. Thus, in the prosecution of the offense, the complainant's role is limited
to that of a witness for the prosecution. If a criminal case is dismissed by the trial court or if there is an acquittal, an appeal
therefrom on the criminal aspect may be undertaken only by the State through the Solicitor General. Only the Solicitor
General may represent the People of the Philippines on appeal. The private offended party or complainant may not take
such appeal. However, the said offended party or complainant may appeal the civil aspect despite the acquittal of the
accused.

In a special civil action for certiorari filed under Section 1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court wherein it is alleged that the trial
court committed a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction or on other jurisdictional grounds, the rules
state that the petition may be filed by the person aggrieved. In such case, the aggrieved parties are the State and the
private offended party or complainant. The complainant has an interest in the civil aspect of the case so he may file such
special civil action questioning the decision or action of the respondent court on jurisdictional grounds. In so doing,
complainant should not bring the action in the name of the People of the Philippines. The action may be prosecuted in
[the] name of said complainant.19 Private respondents argue that the action should have been filed by the State through
the OSG. True, in criminal cases, the acquittal of the accused or the dismissal of the case against him can only be
appealed by the Solicitor General, acting on behalf of the State. This is because the authority to represent the State in
appeals of criminal cases before the Supreme Court and the CA is solely vested in the OSG. 20

Here, AAA filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, albeit at the instance of her private counsel, primarily imputing
grave abuse of discretion on the part of the CA when it acquitted private respondents. As the aggrieved party, AAA clearly
has the right to bring the action in her name and maintain the criminal prosecution. She has an immense interest in
obtaining justice in the case precisely because she is the subject of the violation. Further, as held in Dela Rosa v.
CA,21 where the Court sustained the private offended party’s right in a criminal case to file a special civil action for
certiorari to question the validity of the judgment of dismissal and ruled that the Solicitor General’s intervention was not
necessary, the recourse of the complainant to the Court is proper since it was brought in her own name and not in that of
the People of the Philippines. In any event, the OSG joins petitioner’s cause in its Comment, 22 thereby fulfilling the
requirement that all criminal actions shall be prosecuted under the direction and control of the public prosecutor. 23

Private respondents further claim that even assuming, merely for the sake of argument, that AAA can file the special civil
action for certiorari without violating their right against double jeopardy, still, it must be dismissed for petitioner’s failure to
previously file a motion for reconsideration. True, a motion for reconsideration is a condicio sine qua non for the filing of a
petition for certiorari. Its purpose is for the court to have an opportunity to correct any actual or perceived error attributed
to it by reexamination of the legal and factual circumstances of the case. This rule, however, is not absolute and admits
well-defined exceptions, such as: (a) where the order is a patent nullity, as where the court a quo has no jurisdiction; (b)
where the questions raised in the certiorari proceedings have been duly raised and passed upon by the lower court, or are
the same as those raised and passed upon in the lower court; (c) where there is an urgent necessity for the resolution of
the question and any further delay would prejudice the interests of the Government or of the petitioner or the subject
matter of the action is perishable; (d) where, under the circumstances, a motion for reconsideration would be useless; (e)
where petitioner was deprived of due process and there is extreme urgency for relief; (f) where, in a criminal case, relief
from an order of arrest is urgent and the granting of such relief by the trial court is improbable; (g) where the proceedings
in the lower court are a nullity for lack of due process; (h) where the proceedings were ex parte or in which the petitioner
had no opportunity to object; and (i) where the issue raised is one purely of law or where public interest is involved. 24

Here, petitioner’s case amply falls within the exception. AAA raises the same questions as those raised and passed upon
in the lower court, essentially revolving on the guilt of the private respondents. There is also an urgent necessity to resolve
the issues, for any further delay would prejudice the interests, not only of the petitioner, but likewise that of the
Government. And, as will soon be discussed, the CA decision is a patent nullity for lack of due process and for having
been rendered with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.

For the writ of certiorari to issue, the respondent court must be shown to have acted with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. An acquittal is considered tainted with grave abuse of discretion when it is
shown that the prosecution’s right to due process was violated or that the trial conducted was a sham. The burden is on
the petitioner to clearly demonstrate and establish that the respondent court blatantly abused its authority such as to
deprive itself of its very power to dispense justice.25

AAA claims in her petition that the CA, in evident display of grave abuse of judicial discretion, totally disregarded her
testimony as well as the trial court’s findings of fact, thereby adopting hook, line, and sinker, the private respondents’
narration of facts.

The term "grave abuse of discretion" has a specific meaning. An act of a court or tribunal can only be considered as with
grave abuse of discretion when such act is done in a capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack
of jurisdiction. It must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to
perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in an arbitrary and
despotic manner by reason of passion and hostility.26 There is grave abuse of discretion when the disputed act of the
lower court goes beyond the limits of discretion thus effecting an injustice. 27

The Court finds that the petitioner has sufficiently discharged the burden of proving that the respondent appellate court
committed grave abuse of discretion in acquitting private respondents.

It appears that in reaching its judgment, the CA merely relied on the evidence presented by the defense and utterly
disregarded that of the prosecution. At first, it may seem that its narration of the facts 28 of the case was meticulously culled
from the evidence of both parties. But a more careful perusal will reveal that it was simply lifted, if not altogether parroted,
from the testimonies of the accused, especially that of Oporto, 29 Carampatana,30 and Alquizola,31 the accused-appellants
in the case before it. The appellate court merely echoed the private respondents’ testimonies, particularly those as to the
specific events that transpired during the crucial period - from the dinner at Gemeno’s house to the following morning at
the Alquizola Lodging House. As a result, it presented the private respondents’ account and allegations as though these
were the established facts of the case, which it later conveniently utilized to support its ruling of acquittal.

Due process requires that, in reaching a decision, a tribunal must consider the entire evidence presented, regardless of
the party who offered the same.32 It simply cannot acknowledge that of one party and turn a blind eye to that of the other.
It cannot appreciate one party’s cause and brush the other aside. This rule becomes particularly significant in this case
because the parties tendered contradicting versions of the incident. The victim is crying rape but the accused are saying it
was a consensual sexual rendezvous. Thus, the CA’s blatant disregard of material prosecution evidence and outward bias
in favor of that of the defense constitutes grave abuse of discretion resulting in violation of petitioner’s right to due
process.33

Moreover, the CA likewise easily swept under the rug the observations of the RTC and made its own flimsy findings to
justify its decision of acquittal.

First, the appellate court held that AAA was, in fact, conscious during the whole ordeal. The fact that she never showed
any physical resistance, never cried out for help, and never fought against the private respondents, bolsters the claim of
the latter that the sexual acts were indeed consensual.

But the CA seemed to forget that AAA was heavily intoxicated at the time of the assault. Article 266-A of the Revised
Penal Code (RPC) provides:

Art. 266-A. Rape, When and How Committed. – Rape is committed–

1. By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the following circumstances:
 a. Through force, threat or intimidation;

b. When the offended party is deprived of reason or is otherwise unconscious;

c. By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of authority;

d. When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even though none of the
circumstances mentioned above be present;

2. By any person who, under any of the circumstances mentioned in paragraph 1 hereof, shall commit an act of
sexual assault by inserting his penis into another person’s mouth or anal orifice, or any instrument or object, into
the genital or anal orifice of another person.

Under the aforecited provision, the elements of rape are: (1) the offender had carnal knowledge of the victim; and (2) such
act was accomplished through force or intimidation; or when the victim is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; or
when the victim is under twelve years of age.34 Here, the accused intentionally made AAA consume hard liquor more than
she could handle. They still forced her to drink even when she was already obviously inebriated. They never denied
having sexual intercourse with AAA, but the latter was clearly deprived of reason or unconscious at the time the private
respondents ravished her. The CA, however, readily concluded that she agreed to the sexual act simply because she did
not shout or offer any physical resistance, disregarding her testimony that she was rendered weak and dizzy by
intoxication, thereby facilitating the commission of the crime. 35 The appellate court never provided any reason why AAA’s
testimony should deserve scant or no weight at all, or why it cannot be accorded any credence. In reviewing rape cases,
the lone testimony of the victim is and should be, by itself, sufficient to warrant a judgment of conviction if found to be
credible. Also, it has been established that when a woman declares that she has been raped, she says in effect all that is
necessary to mean that she has been raped, and where her testimony passes the test of credibility, the accused can be
convicted on that basis alone. This is because from the nature of the offense, the sole evidence that can usually be
offered to establish the guilt of the accused is the complainant’s testimony itself. 36 The trial court correctly ruled that if AAA
was not truthful to her accusation, she would not have opened herself to the rough and tumble of a public trial. AAA was
certainly not enjoying the prying eyes of those who were listening as she narrated her harrowing experience. 37

AAA positively identified the private respondents as the ones who violated her. She tried to resist, but because of the
presence of alcohol, her assaulters still prevailed. The RTC found AAA’s testimony simple and candid, indicating that she
was telling the truth. The trial court likewise observed that her answers to the lengthy and humiliating questions were
simple and straightforward, negating the possibility of a rehearsed testimony. 38 Thus:

Atty. Jesus M. Generalao (on direct):

xxxx

Q: Now, you said also when the Court asked you that you went asleep, when did you regain your consciousness?

A: They woke me up and wanted me to drink the remaining wine inside the bottle of Emperador Brandy.

xxxx

Q: What do you mean that they hide you (sic) to drink the remaining contained (sic) of the bottle of Emperador
Brandy?

A: They gave me the bottle, sir, and I was trying to refuse but they insisted.

Q: Who handed over to you that bottle, if you can remember?

A: It was Christian John Lim, sir.

Q: Did you drink that Emperador directly from the bottle?

A: Yes, sir.
Q: What happened after that?

A: I fell asleep again, sir.

Q: When did you regain your consciousness?

A: When somebody was carrying me down to the spiral stairs.

Q: Can you remember the person or persons who was or who were carrying you?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: Who?

A: They were Jansen Roda and Harold Batoctoy.

Q: If you can still remember, how did Jansen Roda and Harold Batoctoy carry you?

A: I placed my hands to their shoulder (sic), sir:

xxxx

Q: After that, what happened, if any?

A: I was already asleep, sir, when we went downstairs.

Q: You mean to say that you cannot remember anymore?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: Now, when again did you regain your consciousness?

A: When we entered the room and the light was switch (sic) on, I was awakened by the flash of light.

Q: Do you have any idea, where were you when you were awakened that (sic) flash of light.

A: Yes, sir.

Q: Where?

A: Alquizola Lodging House, sir.

xxxx

Q: When you regained your consciousness from the flash of light, what happened?

A: I loss (sic) my consciousness again, sir.

Q: So, you fell asleep again?

A: Yes, sir.

xxxx

Q: When did you wake-up (sic) again?

A: When I feel (sic) heavy on top of me, sir.

Q: So you wake-up (sic) again, whom did you see?

A: It was Joefhel Oporto, sir.

Q: He was on top of you?

A: Yes, sir. (Witness is crying while answering)

Q: What was you (sic) reaction when you found that Joefhel Oporto was on top of you?

A: I was starting to cry, sir.

Q: Aside from starting to cry, what else is (sic) your reaction?

A: I was saying don’t because I feel pain my private organ (sic).

Q: What did Joefhel Oporto do, when you (sic) those words?

A: He was kissing on the different part (sic) of my body then he sexually abused me.

ATTY. GENERALAO: We want to make it on record, Your Honor, that the witness is crying.

xxxx

ATTY. GENERALAO: May I continue, Your Honor.

COURT: Continue.

ATTY. GENERALAO: Aside from Joefhel Oporto was found (sic) on top of you, who else was there inside that
room?

A: Moises Alquizola and Raymund Carampatana, sir.

Q: With respect to Raymund Carampatana, what was he doing?

A: He was at my feet while looking at us.

Q: Was it dress (sic) up or undressed?

A: Dressed up, sir.

Q: What about Moises Alquizola, what was he doing?

A: He was beside us standing and looking at me, sir.

Q: Was he dressed up or undressed?

A: I could not remember, sir.

xxxx

Q: After that, what happened?

A: I went asleep again, sir.

 Q: Then, when again did you or when again did you wake up?

A: When I feel (sic)pain something inside my private part (sic), I saw Raymund Carampatana, sir.

Q: On top of you?

A: No, sir, because he was in between my legs, sir.

Q: What was your reaction?

A: I was starting to cry again, sir, and told him don’t.

Q: At that point, who else was inside that room when you found Raymund Carampatana?

A: Only the three of them, sir.

Q: Including Moises Alquizola?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: What was he doing?

A: He was started (sic) to kiss me.

Q: Where in particular?

A: In my face, sir.

Q: Then after that, what happened?

A: I fell asleep again, sir.

Q: Now, before you went asleep again (sic), what did you feel when you said that you feel (sic) something in your
private part when you saw Raymund Carampatana?

A: He inserted his penis in my private organ, sir.

Q: Then after that you fell asleep again?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: When did you wake-up (sic)?

A: I woke up at about 7:00 o’clock a.m in the next (sic) day, sir. 39

On the other hand, the RTC was not convinced with the explanation of the defense. It noted that their account of the
events was seemingly unusual and incredible.40 Besides, the defense of consensual copulation was belatedly invoked and
seemed to have been a last ditch effort to avoid culpability. The accused never mentioned about the same at the pre-trial
stage. The trial court only came to know about it when it was their turn to take the witness stand, catching the court by
surprise.41 More importantly, it must be emphasized that when the accused in a rape case claims that the sexual
intercourse between him and the complainant was consensual, as in this case, the burden of evidence shifts to him, such
that he is now enjoined to adduce sufficient evidence to prove the relationship. Being an affirmative defense that needs
convincing proof, it must be established with sufficient evidence that the intercourse was indeed consensual. 42 Generally,
the burden of proof is upon the prosecution to establish each and every element of the crime and that it is the accused
who is responsible for its commission. This is because in criminal cases, conviction must rest on a moral certainty of
guilt.43 Burden of evidence is that logical necessity which rests on a party at any particular time during the trial to create a
prima facie case in his favor or to overthrow one when created against him. A prima facie case arises when the party
having the burden of proof has produced evidence sufficient to support a finding and adjudication for him of the issue in
litigation.44 However, when the accused alleges consensual sexual congress, he needs convincing proof such as love
notes, mementos, and credible witnesses attesting to the romantic or sexual relationship between the offender and his
supposed victim. Having admitted to carnal knowledge of the complainant, the burden now shifts to the accused to prove
his defense by substantial evidence.45

Here, the accused themselves admitted to having carnal knowledge of AAA but unfortunately failed to discharge the
burden required of them. Carampatana narrated that upon reaching the room at the lodging house, AAA lay down on the
bed and looked at him. He then approached her and they kissed. He removed her shirt and brassiere. Thereafter, Oporto
also removed AAA’s lower garments and then went to kiss AAA. Carampatana then placed himself in between AAA’s legs
and had intercourse with her.46 On the other hand, Oporto himself testified that he had sexual intercourse with AAA three
times. While Carampatana was removing AAA’s shirt and brassiere, Oporto was watching at the foot of the bed. Then he
removed her pants and underwear, and AAA even lifted her buttocks to make it easier for him to pull the clothes down.
When Carampatana left after having sexual intercourse with AAA, according to Oporto, he then stood up, opened his
pants, and took out his penis so that AAA could perform fellatio on him. Then he proceeded to have sexual intercourse
with AAA. Afterwards, Oporto went outside and slept with Alquizola on the carpet. After a few minutes, he woke up and
went back to the room and again had intercourse with AAA. He went back to sleep and after some time, he woke up to the
sound of AAA vomitting. Shortly thereafter, he made love with AAA for the third and last time. 47 Despite said shameless
admission, however, the accused failed to sufficiently prove that the lack of any physical resistance on AAA’s part
amounts to approval or permission. They failed to show that AAA had sexual intercourse with them out of her own volition,
and not simply because she was seriously intoxicated at that time, and therefore could not have given a valid and
intelligent consent to the sexual act.

The RTC also noticed that Fiel, one of the defense witnesses, was showy and exaggerated when testifying, even flashing
a thumbs-up to some of the accused after her testimony, an indication of a rehearsed witness. 48 To be believed, the
testimony must not only proceed from the mouth of a credible witness; it must be credible in itself such as the common
experience and observation of mankind can approve as probable under the attending circumstances. 49

When it comes to credibility, the trial court's assessment deserves great weight, and is even conclusive and binding, if not
tainted with arbitrariness or oversight of some fact or circumstance of weight and influence. The reason is obvious. Having
the full opportunity to observe directly the witnesses’ deportment and manner of testifying, the trial court is in a better
position than the appellate court to properly evaluate testimonial evidence. 50 Matters of credibility are addressed basically
to the trial judge who is in a better position than the appellate court to appreciate the weight and evidentiary value of the
testimonies of witnesses who have personally appeared before him. 51 The appellate courts are far detached from the
details and drama during trial and have to rely solely on the records of the case in its review. On the matter of credence
and credibility of witnesses, therefore, the Court acknowledges said limitations and recognizes the advantage of the trial
court whose findings must be given due deference.52 Since the CA and the private respondents failed to show any
palpable error, arbitrariness, or capriciousness on the findings of fact of the trial court, these findings deserve great weight
and are deemed conclusive and binding.53

The CA continued, belaboring on the fact that the examining physician found old hymenal laceration on AAA’s private
organ. The lack of a fresh hymenal laceration, which is expected to be present when the alleged sexual encounter is
involuntary, could mean that AAA actually consented to the fornication. According to Dr. Acusta, when sex is consensual,
the vagina becomes lubricated and the insertion of the penis will not cause any laceration. It presumed that complainant,
therefore, was no longer innocent considering the presence of old hymenal laceration that could have resulted from her
previous sexual encounters. The defense, however, failed to show that AAA was sexually promiscuous and known for
organizing or even joining sex orgies. It must be noted that AAA was a minor, barely 17 years old at the time of the
incident, having just graduated from high school on that same day. In a similar case, 54 the Court held: x x x Indeed, no
woman would have consented to have sexual intercourse with two men — or three, according to Antonio Gallardo — in
the presence of each other, unless she were a prostitute or as morally debased as one. Certainly, the record before Us
contains no indication that Farmacita, a 14-year old, first-year high school student, can be so characterized. On the
contrary, her testimony in court evinced the simplicity and candor peculiar to her youth. In fact, appellants could not even
suggest any reason why Farmacita would falsely impute to them the commission of the crime charged. 55

No woman, especially one of tender age, would concoct a story of defloration, allow an examination of her private parts,
and be subjected to public trial and humiliation if her claim were not true. 56 And even if she were indeed highly
promiscuous at such a young age, the same could still not prove that no rape was actually committed. Even a
complainant who was a woman of loose morals could still be the victim of rape. Even a prostitute may be a victim of rape.
The victim’s moral character in rape is immaterial where, as in this case, it is shown that the victim was deprived of reason
or was rendered unconscious through intoxication to enable the private respondents to have sex with her. Moreover, the
essence of rape is the carnal knowledge of a woman against her consent. 57 A freshly broken hymen is not one of its
essential elements. Even if the hymen of the victim was still intact, the possibility of rape cannot be ruled out. Penetration
of the penis by entry into the lips of the vagina, even without rupture or laceration of the hymen, is enough to justify a
conviction for rape. To repeat, rupture of the hymen or laceration of any part of the woman’s genitalia is not indispensable
to a conviction for rape.58 Neither does AAA’s mother’s act of hitting her after learning about the rape prove anything. It is
a truism that "the workings of the human mind when placed under emotional stress are unpredictable, and the people
react differently."59 Different people react differently to a given type of situation, and there is no standard form of
behavioral response when one is confronted with a strange, startling or frightful experience. 60 At most, it merely indicates
the frustration and dismay of a mother upon learning that her daughter had been defiled after partying late the night
before. It is a settled rule that when there is no showing that private complainant was impelled by improper motive in
making the accusation against the accused, her complaint is entitled to full faith and credence. 61 So if AAA in fact
consented to the sexual act, why did she still need to immediately tell her parents about it when she could have just kept it
to herself? Why did she ever have to shout rape? She was not caught in the act of making love with any of the private
respondents,62 nor was she shown to have been in a relationship with any of them of which her family disapproved. 63 She
never became pregnant as a result of the deed. And if AAA cried rape to save her reputation, why would she have to drag
the private respondents into the case and identify them as her rapists? Absent any circumstance indicating the contrary,
she brought the charge against the private respondents simply because she was, in fact, violated and she wants to obtain
justice. Her zeal in prosecuting the case, even after the CA had already acquitted the private respondents, evinces the
truth that she merely seeks justice for her honor that has been debased. 64 Unfortunately, the CA chose to ignore these
telling pieces of evidence. Its findings are against the logic and effect of the facts as presented by AAA in support of her
complaint,65 contrary to common human experience, and in utter disregard of the relevant laws and jurisprudence on the
crime of rape.

Lastly, the trial court pronounced that Alquizola was not part of the conspiracy because his participation in the crime was
uncertain,66 citing People v. Lobrigo.67 It found that his participation was not in furtherance of the plan, if any, to commit the
crime of rape.68 The Court, however, finds that the RTC erred in ruling that Alquizola’s liability is not of a conspirator, but
that of a mere accomplice. To establish conspiracy, it is not essential that there be proof as to previous agreement to
commit a crime, it being sufficient that the malefactors shall have acted in concert pursuant to the same objective.
Conspiracy is proved if there is convincing evidence to sustain a finding that the malefactors committed an offense in
furtherance of a common objective pursued in concert. 69 Proof of conspiracy need not even rest on direct evidence, as the
same may be inferred from the collective conduct of the parties before, during or after the commission of the crime
indicating a common understanding among them with respect to the commission of the offense. 70

In Lobrigo, the Court declared:

We note that the testimonies of witnesses with respect to Gregorio's and Dominador's participation in the crime conflict on
material points.

Doubt exists as to whether Gregorio and Dominador were carrying weapons during the mauling and whether they
participated in the mauling by more than just boxing the victim. Noel stated that they did not, Domingo stated that they did.

In conspiracy, evidence as to who administered the fatal blow is not necessary.1âwphi1 In this case, the rule is not
applicable because conspiracy with respect to Gregorio and Dominador is not proven. Their exact participation in the
crime is uncertain.71 (Emphasis Supplied)

In People v. Dela Torre,72 the Court upheld the findings of the lower courts that there was conspiracy:

The RTC held that:

While [it] is true that it was only Leo Amoroso who actually ravished the victim based on the testimony of the private
complainant that Amoroso succeeded in inserting his penis to her private parts and that Reynaldo dela Torre and Ritchie
Bisaya merely kissed her and fondled her private parts, accused [D]ela Torre can likewise be held liable for the bestial
acts of Amoroso as it is quite apparent that the three of them conspired and mutually helped one another in raping the
young victim.

The Court of Appeals held that:

[W]hile [Dela Torre] did not have carnal knowledge with [AAA], his tacit and spontaneous participation and cooperation of
pulling her towards the parked jeep, molesting her and doing nothing to prevent the commission of the rape, made him a
co-conspirator. As such, he was properly adjudged as a principal in the commission of the crime. 73
Here, unlike in the foregoing case of Lobrigo, Alquizola’s participation in the crime is not at all uncertain. As the caretaker
of the Alquizola Lodging House, he provided a room so the rape could be accomplished with ease and furtiveness. He
was likewise inside the room, intently watching, while Oporto and Carampatana sexually abused AAA. He did not do
anything to stop the bestial acts of his companions. He even admitted to kissing AAA’s lips, breasts, and other parts of her
body. Indubitably, there was conspiracy among Carampatana, Oporto, and Alquizola to sexually abuse AAA. Hence, the
act of any one was the act of all, and each of them, Alquizola including, is equally guilty of the crime of rape. While it is
true that the RTC found Alquizola guilty as mere accomplice, when he appealed from the decision of the trial court, 74 he
waived the constitutional safeguard against double jeopardy and threw the whole case open to the review of the appellate
court, which is then called upon to render such judgment as law and justice dictate, whether favorable or unfavorable to
the accused-appellant.75

Finally, the Court notes that although the prosecution filed only a single Information, it, however, actually charged the
accused of several rapes. As a general rule, a complaint or information must charge only one offense, otherwise, the
same is defective.76 The rationale behind this rule prohibiting duplicitous complaints or informations is to give the accused
the necessary knowledge of the charge against him and enable him to sufficiently prepare for his defense. The State
should not heap upon the accused two or more charges which might confuse him in his defense. 77 Non-compliance with
this rule is a ground78 for quashing the duplicitous complaint or information under Rule117 of the Rules on Criminal
Procedure and the accused may raise the same in a motion to quash before he enters his plea, 79 otherwise, the defect is
deemed waived.80 The accused herein, however, cannot avail of this defense simply because they did not file a motion to
quash questioning the validity of the Information during their arraignment. Thus, they are deemed to have waived their
right to question the same. Also, where the allegations of the acts imputed to the accused are merely different counts
specifying the acts of perpetration of the same crime, as in the instant case, there is no duplicity to speak of. 81 There is
likewise no violation of the right of the accused to be informed of the charges against them because the Information, in
fact, stated that they "took turns in having carnal knowledge against the will of AAA" on March 25, 2004. 82 Further,
allegations made and the evidence presented to support the same reveal that AAA was indeed raped and defiled several
times. Here, according to the accused themselves, after undressing AAA, Carampatana positioned himself in between her
legs and had intercourse with her. On the other hand, Oporto admitted that he had sexual intercourse with AAA three
times. When two or more offenses are charged in a single complaint or information but the accused fails to object to it
before trial, the court may convict him of as many offenses as are charged and proved, and impose upon him the proper
penalty for each offense.83 Carampatana, Oporto, and Alquizola can then be held liable for more than one crime of rape,
or a total of four (4) counts in all, with conspiracy extant among the three of them during the commission of each of the
four violations. Each of the accused shall thus be held liable for every act of rape committed by the other. But while
Oporto himself testified that he inserted his sexual organ into AAA’s mouth, the Court cannot convict him of rape through
sexual assault therefor because the same was not included in the Information. This is, however, without prejudice to the
filing of a case of rape through sexual assault as long as prescription has not yet set in.

Anent the appropriate penalty to be imposed, rape committed by two or more persons is punishable by reclusion perpetua
to death under Article 266-B of the RPC. But in view of the presence of the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender
and the absence of an aggravating circumstance to offset the same, the lighter penalty of reclusion perpetua shall be
imposed upon them,84 for each count. With regard to Oporto, appreciating in his favor the privileged mitigating
circumstance of minority, the proper imposable penalty upon him is reclusion temporal, being the penalty next lower to
reclusion perpetua to death. Being a divisible penalty, the Indeterminate Sentence Law is applicable. Applying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, Oporto can be sentenced to an indeterminate penalty the minimum of which shall be within
the range of prision mayor(the penalty next lower in degree to reclusion temporal) and the maximum of which shall be
within the range of reclusion temporal in its minimum period, there being the ordinary mitigating circumstance of voluntary
surrender, and there being no aggravating circumstance. 85 With that, the Court shall impose the indeterminate penalty of
imprisonment from six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum to twelve (12) years and one (1) day of
reclusion temporal as maximum, for each count of rape committed. 86 However, Oporto shall be entitled to appropriate
disposition under Section 51, R.A. No. 9344,87which extends even to one who has exceeded the age limit of twenty-one
(21) years, so long as he committed the crime when he was still a child, 88 and provides for the confinement of convicted
children as follows:89

Sec. 51. Confinement of Convicted Children in Agricultural Camps and Other Training Facilities. – A child in conflict with
the law may, after conviction and upon order of the court, be made to serve his/her sentence, in lieu of confinement in a
regular penal institution, in an agricultural camp and other training facilities that may be established, maintained,
supervised and controlled by the BUCOR, in coordination with the DSWD.

Hence, in the proper execution of judgment by the lower court, the foregoing provision should be taken into consideration
by the judge in order to accord children in conflict with the law, who have already gone beyond twenty-one (21) years of
age, the proper treatment envisioned by law.
As to their civil liability, all of them shall pay AAA the amount of ₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity and another ₱50,000.00 as
moral damages, in each case. Exemplary damages of ₱30,000.00 shall likewise be imposed by way of an example and to
deter others from committing the same bestial acts.

WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision dated June 6, 2008 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR HC No. 00422-MIN is REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. The Court hereby renders
judgment:

a) Finding accused-respondent Raymund Carampatana GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of four (4) counts of
rape, and the Court hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua in each case;

b) Finding accused-respondent Joefhel Oporto GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of four ( 4) counts of rape, and
the Court hereby sentences him to suffer the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment from six ( 6) years and one
( 1) day of prision mayor as minimum to twelve (12) years and one (1) day of reclusion temporal as maximum, in
each case; and

c) Finding accused-respondent Moises Alquizola GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of four ( 4) counts of rape,
and the Court hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua in each case.

The Court hereby ORDERS the accused-respondents to pay AAA, jointly and severally, the amounts of ₱50,000.00 as
civil indemnity, ₱50,000.00 as moral damages, and ₱30,000.00 as exemplary damages, for each of the four (4) counts of
rape. The case is REMANDED to the court of origin for its appropriate action in accordance with Section 51 of Republic
Act No. 9344. Let the records of this case be forwarded to the court of origin for the execution of judgment.

SO ORDERED.

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice
Chairperson

MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO* MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.

Associate Justice Associate Justice

BIENVENIDO L. REYES
Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the
writer of the opinion of the Court's Division.

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice
Chairperson, Third Division

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution and the Division Chairperson's Attestation, I certify that the
conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the
opinion of the Court's Division.
MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO
Chief Justice
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-8578            November 17, 1913

THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
ANSELMO DIRIS, EUSTAQUIO SIAGA, and TOMAS OLEA, defendants.
ANSELMO DIRIS and EUSTAQUIO SIAGA, appellants.

Godofredo Reyes, for appellants.

Attorney-General Villamor, for appellee.

CARSON, J.:

This is an appeal from the judgment of the Court of First Instance of Tayabas convicting the defendants of the crime of
robbery.

During the pendency of the proceedings in this court the defendant Tomas Olea withdrew his appeal and the judgment of
the lower court is therefore final as to him. The only question now presented for our consideration is the appeal of the
defendants Anselmo Diris and Eustaquio Siaga.

We are of opinion that the evidence of record fully sustains the contentions of the prosecution and the findings of the
lower court as to the facts. It will not therefore be necessary to review the evidence in detail.

It appears that Fulgencio Seal, who lived in the pueblo of Calauag, Province of Tayabas, received from the railroad
company on July 7, 1912, more than P400 in payment of certain land expropriated by that company, and that the
defendant Tomas Olea, a nephew of Fugencio Seal, was present when the money was counted and paid over to his
uncle. The record shows that the money was deposited in a trunk and that this fact was also known to Olea, who had free
access to his uncle's house and was accustomed to come and go at will.

On the morning of July 12, following the date of the receipt of the money from the railroad company, Fulgencio Seal left
the house between 8 and 9 o'clock in the morning, leaving his wife in charge of their tienda. A short time thereafter the
three defendants appeared at the tienda and Eustaquio Siaga engaged the woman in conversation while the other two
defendants went upstairs, broke open the trunk, and took the money, amounting to P353, and a receipt for P100. The
record shows that at the time of the robbery part of the money received from the railroad company had been paid out and
that the balance in the trunk was only P353.

The woman was somewhat deaf and had no knowledge of what was taking place upstairs. She stated that she saw the
two defendants go up into the house, but as Tomas Olea was her husband's nephew and accustomed to come to the
house she thought nothing of it. Upon the return of Fulgencio Seal later in the morning the robbery was discovered, and
when his wife reported who had been there he immediately went in search of his nephew. The nephew when found
admitted the theft of the money and promised that if the uncle would not make any trouble about it he would try and
recover it from the other defendants. Together with Olea the uncle then went in search of Diris. The uncle was told to wait
at a certain place until the nephew should return, and when he failed to come back the uncle went in search of him and
after found him and Diris in a barber shop in the municipality of Lopez. The matter was reported to the justice of the peace
of that municipality and the two defendants were arrested. On the person of Tomas Olea were found two bank notes of
the denomination of P10 each, P3 in half-peso denominations, and P4 in 10-centavo pieces.

Fulgencio Seal testified that the money in the trunk consisted of one bank notes of the value of P200, P100 in the bank
note of the value of 10 pesos each, and the remainder in currency in P1, 50-centavo, and 10-centavo denominations,
there being P23 in 10-centavo pieces. It appears that by some error on the part of the justice of the peace the money was
returned to Olea; however, there can hardly be any doubt that it was a part of the money which his uncle had in the trunk.
At the trial the defendants denied that they were the authors of the crime; Olea and Diris denied that they were present at
the house on the morning in question; and Eustaquio Siaga, while admitting that he was at the tienda stated that he went
there alone. The presence of the defendants at the house on the morning in question is not only established by the wife of
Fulgencio Seal, but her testimony on this point is corroborated by that of Conrado Fernandez, a neighbor. In view of all
the facts of record the statements of the defendants cannot be credited. Their guilt is conclusively established.

Olea having withdrawn his appeal and the other evidence of record being sufficient in itself to sustain the conviction of all
the appellants, it is not necessary for us to discuss the objections set forth in their brief as to the admission of the alleged
confession of guilt of Olea.lawph!1.net

It has been suggested by counsel, that the defendant Eustaquio Siaga, who remained below in the tienda and engaged
the woman in conversation while the other defendants went up into the house, should only be held as
a complice  (accessary before the fact) as defined in the Penal Code, and not as a principal. In support of this view we are
cited to Viada (Vol. I, p. 370), as follows: "The persons who entertains the owner of a house while robbers are assaulting
it, so that he will not return thereto until after the robbery has been consummated, is also an accomplice in the crime,
inasmuch as he cooperated therein by a simultaneous act, although not an indispensable one for its accomplishment."

It will be seen however that the case supposed by the noted commentator clearly implies that the owner of the house was
entertained at some distance from the place where the robbery was committed; it does not appear how far away, but
apparently not anywhere in the immediate neighborhood. The present case offers a different situation. The defendant
Siaga acted concurrently with the other defendants, and must be held to have been present with them aiding and abetting
them in the commission of the crime by remaining below and talking with the woman in order to distract her attention from
what was going on upstairs. In doing so he was evidently serving as a guard to warn his companions in case there should
arise any necessity for giving an alarm. When the other defendants came down out of the house he went away with them.

This court has repeatedly held that one who shares the guilty purpose and aids and abets the commission of a crime by
his presence at the time of its perpetration, even though he may not have taken an active part in its material execution, is
guilty as a principal. We have also held that one who stands as guard near the place where a crime is committed to keep
others away or to warn his companions and fellow conspirators of danger of discovery, takes a direct part in the
commission of the crime and is therefore guilty as a principal under article 13 of the Penal Code (U. S. vs. Reogilon and
Dingle, 22 Phil. Rep., 127; U. S. vs. Balisacan, 4 Phil. Rep., 545; U. S. vs. Ramos, 4 Phil. Rep., 555.)

Under all the circumstances of the case we are satisfied that Siaga was properly convicted as a principal.

It appears that the trial court treated the stolen receipts for P100 as being of that value. The actual money stolen
amounted to only P353.

While we have held that checks, warrants and similar instrument, payable to order an evidencing an obligation to pay
money, may under certain circumstances be treated as worth their face value in fixing the value of the stolen property for
the purpose of grading the crime and the penalty to be imposed on conviction, in cases wherein the penalty prescribed in
the Code is made to depend on the value of the property taken (U. S. vs. Raboy, 25 Phil. Rep., 1; U. S. vs. Wickersham,
20 Phil. Rep., 440), we are of opinion that a mere receipt such as that under consideration, especially in the absence of
any proof as to its value, cannot be held to have anything more than a mere nominal value in fixing the penalty and
assessing the civil indemnity to be imposed on one convicted of its theft.

The record further shows that Anselmo Diris is a recidivist, having been previously convicted of the crime of robbery by
the Court of First Instance of Tayabas in the case of the United States vs. Anselmo Diris, on April 12, 1904, which
judgment of conviction was affirmed by this Court on May 9, 1905 (4 Phil. Rep., 498).

The judgment of the trial court should be modified, in so far as it affects these appellants, by reducing the amount of the
civil indemnification from P453 to P353 and by substituting the words  presidio mayor for the words  prision mayor in the
dispositive part thereof, and thus modified the judgment convicting and sentencing the appellants Diris and Siaga should
be and is hereby affirmed, with a proportionate share of the costs of this instance against each of the appellants.

Arellano, C.J., Torres, Johnson, Moreland and Trent, JJ., concur.

 EN BANC

G.R. No. L-39086             October 26, 1934

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. ONG CHIAT LAY, ET AL., defendants.

ONG CHIAT LAY, Appellant.

Juan S. Alano, T. de los Santos, Eduardo D. Enriquez and Gibbs ad McDough for appellant.
Solicitor-General Hilado for appellee.

 chanrobles virtual law library

ABAD SANTOS, J.: chanrobles virtual law library

Appellant and two others, Ong Ban Hua and Kua Sing, were jointly informed against by the provincial fiscal of
Zamboanga, charging them with having feloniously burned a building in which was located a store belonging to the
appellant. Upon a plea of "not guilty," appellant and his codefendants were tried jointly upon said information; and, after
trial, while Ong Ban Hua and Kua Sing were acquitted, appellant was found guilty of the crime of arson and sentenced to
suffer sixteen years and one day of reclusion temporal, with the accessory penalties provided by law, to indemnify
Francisco Barrios and Mariano Atienza in the sums of P16,000 and P5,000, respectively, and to pay one-third of the
costs.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

In support of this appeal, appellant has signed the following errors:

First. The lower court erred in holding that evidence presented against the accused Ong Chiat Lay is sufficient to establish
the corpus delicti, namely, that the crime of arson had been committed.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law
library

Second. The lower court erred in holding that the evidence presented against the accused Ong Chiat Lay is sufficient to
establish his guilt of the crime charged beyond reasonable doubt.

In order to convict a defendant as principal in the commission of a crime, it must be shown either (1) that he took a direct
part in the execution of the criminal act; (2) that he directly forced or induced another or others to commit it; or (3) that he
cooperated in the commission of the offense by an act without which it would not have been accomplished. (Revised
Penal Code, article 17.) They take direct part in the execution of a criminal act who, participating in the criminal design,
proceed to carry out their plan and personally take part in its execution by acts which directly tend to the same end.
(Viada, Codigo Penal, 5th ed., vol. 1, p. 341; Albert's Revised Penal Code Ann., 144.)chanrobles virtual law library

In the instant case, it is not claimed that appellant had taken a direct part in the burning of the building. In fact, the
prosecution lays stress on appellant's absence from the scene of the fire as one of the suspicious circumstances
indicating his guilt. Appellant was prosecuted on the theory that he induced his said codefendants to set fire to the
building. Hence the three were charged jointly on an information alleging conspiracy among them. This allegation of
conspiracy, however, has been negatived by the acquittal of appellant's codefendants. The same may be said with regard
to the theory that appellant had induced his codefendants to perpetrate the unlawful deed; for it seems clear that one can
not be held guilty of having instigated the commission of a crime without its first being shown that the crime has been
actually committed by another.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

In acquitting Ong Ban Hua and Kua Sing, the lower court said: "Pero las prueblas de la acusacion, a juicio del Juzgado,
no establecen que los acusados Ong Ban Hua y Kua Sing hayan cooperado directa o indirectamente a su coacusado
Ong Chiat Lay en la comision del delito. Las pruebas indiciarias presentadas contra los referidos acusados Ong Ban Hua
y Kua Sing no pueden producir mas que mera sospecha de que dichos acusados tuvieron conocimiento de lo que habia
realizado Ong Chiat Lay, pero esta sospecha no puede servirse de base para una sentencia condenatoria, y por ende se
debe absolver a los mismos acusados Ong Ban Hua y Kua Sing de la querella."chanrobles virtual law library

While not exactly in point, the principle discussed in State vs. Tom (13 N. C. [2 Dev. L., 569), is pertinent to the question
now under consideration. In that case, the court held that although more than two persons are charged with conspiracy,
the acquittal of all but one of those charged amounts to the acquittal of that one, since there can be no conspiracy unless
at least two unite. Ruffin, J., therein said: "Conspiracy being a crime, requiring the guilty cooperation of two, at least, to
constitute it, in which there is a mutual dependence of the guilt of each person upon that of the other, principle would
seem to demand that all the accused should be jointly tried and convicted, or acquitted. In other cases of dependent
crimes, that upon which the rest depends must be first established. Such is the law between principal and accessory. The
reason is that there may be as full defense as possible upon the very point of the principal's guilt, by that principal himself
who is best able to make it. To make that rule effectual, it became necessary to establish another that, but by the
accessory's own consent, no proof of the principal's guilt should be heard against him until it was first established against
the principal himself. The rule arises out of the nature of dependent criminality. Now conspirators may be said to be co-
principals. The guilt of both must concur to constitute that of either; and it must consists of a joint act, and it makes one
crime in both. As the trial of one need not precede ha of the other, the trial of both ought to be concurrent. I think it more
than probable that anciently such was the course. But, clearly, now it is otherwise. There are many precedents of the
separate trial of person indicted for offences that could not be committed by less than two. (. . . Rex vs. Kinnersly [1719], 1
Strange, 193; Rex vs. Niccolls [1745], 2 Strange, 1227.) It is too late now to question it. But it can never follow from those
cases that where one of the persons, the establishment of whose guilt is essential to the conviction of the other, has been
legally acquitted, the other does no hereby become discharged. It cannot be that a man can be held guilty to any purpose
who has, in due course of law, been found not guilty. The analogy between this case and that of the accessory is strict.
The acquittal of the principal is an immediate and absolute discharge of the accessory. For there can be no aid given to a
deed when the deed itself was never perpetrated. So, where guilt consists in the joint act or intent of two, and it is found
that one of them did not join in the act or intent, it is conclusive as to both. For A could not conspire with B if the latter did
not conspire at all. In all the cases, therefore, a verdict affirming the guilt of fewer persons than could commit the crime,
and affirming the innocence of all others charged, has been held to be an acquittal of all." (4 B. R. C., 930.)chanrobles
virtual law library

While the crime charged in the present case is not conspiracy as a distinct offense, it is clear from the nature of the
evidence presented that appellant alone could not have committed the unlawful act. As already stated, the theory of the
prosecution was that he conspired with or induced his codefendants to commit the crime. The gravamen of the charge
was conspiracy, and the acquittal of his codefendants is clearly inconsistent with appellant's
guilt.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

This leads us to the consideration of another aspect of this case. Appellant was convicted wholly on circumstancial
evidence. As stated in the decision of the trial court: "Las pruebas de la acusacion son todas indiciarias, que son las que
siempre se presentan para probar esta clase de delito, porque su autor o autores ordinariamente no lo practican en
presencia de un trercero." Continuing, the court further said: "El traslado de los muebles del acusado Ong Chiat Lay a
varios sitios antes de occurrir este incendio, su indiferencia a todo lo que ocurria en la madrugada de autos, su ausencia
del lugar donde estaba instalado su bazar mientras ardia el edificio ocupado por este, y el hecho de no haberse negado
que fuera el el autor del incendio ante el teniente Piccio, son pruebas indiciaras muy fuertes contra este acusado. El
hecho de que se olia a gasolina dentro de la casa ocupada por el establecimiento "China Bazaar" en la ocasion en que el
repetido Ong Chiat Lay transladaba sus muebles y su residencia a otro sitio, y el haber sido encontradas varias latas de
petroleo o gasolina vacias en el mismo terreno donde estuvo levantada dicha casa inmediatamente despues de occurrir
el incendio de esta, son tambien pruebas indiciarias muy fuertes contra el susodicho acusado Ong Chiat Lay. Todas
estas pruebas apreciadas en su conjunto constituyen una evidencia clara de la culpabilidad del acusado Ong Chiat
Lay."chanrobles virtual law library

It is a well-settled principle of criminal law that a conviction for crime can not be had unless the corpus delicti  is first
established. (State vs. Sullivan, 17 L. R. A., 902.) To establish the corpus delicti in arson the proof of two elements is
required, namely, (1) the burning of the house or other thing, and (2) the criminal agency in causing it. (Spears vs. State,
16 L.R.A. [N. S.}, 285.) The corpus delicti may be proved by circumstancial evidence. (State vs. Sullivan, supra.)
However: "Before a conviction can be had upon circumstancial evidence, the circumstances proven should constitute an
unbroken chain which leads to one fair and reasonable conclusion, which points to the defendant, to the exclusion of all
others, as the guilty person. It is indispensable that the evidence be derived from interrelated facts and duly proven in a
manner that will lead to a logical and rational conclusion, beyond all reasonable doubt, that the accused is the author of
the crime. In other words, there must be from all the circumstances, a combination of evidence which, in the ordinary and
natural course of things, leaves no room for reasonable doubt as to the guilt of the accused." (Moran, The Law of
Evidence, 453; numerous cases cited in support of the text.)chanrobles virtual law library
While the facts proved in the present case are sufficient to raise grave suspicions against the appellant, they fall far short
of establishing his guilt clearly and satisfactorily, as required by the well-settled rules of evidence. This court held in United
States vs. Levente (18 Phil., 439), that to warrant a conviction upon circumstancial evidence, all the circumstances proved
must be consistent with each other, consistent with the hypothesis that the accused is guilty, and at the same time
inconsistent with the hypothesis that he is innocent, and with every other rational hypothesis except that of guilt. The chain
of circumstances which would have pointed to the appellant as the guilty person was broken by the acquittal of Ong Ban
Hua and Kua Sing. As already explained, the acquittal of his said codefendants is not only consistent with the hypothesis
that the appellant is innocent, but is inconsistent with the hypothesis that he is guilty.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
virtual law library

It results that the judgment appealed from must be reversed and the appellant acquitted, with costs de oficio. So
ordered.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library

Avanceña, C.J., Street and Vickers,  JJ., concur.

Butte, J., concur in the result.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-8187            January 29, 1913

THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
PANGLIMA INDANAN, defendant-appellant.

Leo T. Gibbons, for appellant.

Office of the Solicitor-General Harvey, for appellee.

MORELAND, J.:

An appeal from a judgment convicting the appellant of the crime of murder, and sentencing him to be hanged.

The accused was at the time of the commission of the crime, the headman of Parang. He is alleged to have committed
the murder by inducement. The proofs tend to demonstrate that on the 24th day of March, 1912, the accused sent Induk
to bring to the house of the accused one Sariol. The following day, Induk, in obedience to the orders, brought Sariol to the
house, whereupon the accused ordered the witnesses, Akiran and Suhuri, to tie Sariol. They obeyed the order in the
presence of the accused, who was at the time lying upon a bed in the room. This was about 4:30 in the afternoon. Sariol
remained there with his hands tied behind his back until night, when the accused, in the presence of several witnesses,
ordered Sariol to be taken to the Chinese cemetery and there killed, the accused asserting at the time that he had an
order to that effect from the governor. He gave strict orders to Akiran that he should be present at the time that Sariol was
killed, and that he should aid in killing him. To make sure of the work being well done, the accused ordered Akiran to take
his (the accused's) bolo with which to assist in the killing. Sariol was taken to the cemetery, in an isolated spot a
considerable distance from the road and about 200 yards from the nearest house, and there killed. Kalyakan struck the
first blow with his bolo, while Akiran joined in and assisted thereafter. The deceased at the time he was killed had his
hands tied behind his back. On returning to the house of the accused after the death of Sariol, Unding told the accused
that Sariol had been killed, whereupon the accused said that it was all right and appeared to be very much pleased.

The proofs demonstrate beyond question that the accused was the recognized headman of Parang, and it appears from
the testimony of the witnesses, Kalyakan, Suhuri, and Akiran, that he had a very powerful influence over them, hence this
power over them was such that any order issued by him had the force and efficacy of physical coercion. One of the
witnesses testified: "He (the accused) knows what is good and what is bad, and he is the headman of the governor. He is
headman of Parang." And in answer to the question, "He is the biggest chief in the Parang ward?" replied: "There is none,
only himself." He further said: "The people do not hesitate to take his orders because he is the headman of the governor."
Later, in reply to the question, "If he were to get angry with the people, what would he do to them?" this witnesses
answered: "I do not know; might kill them." Another witness, answering the question as to why he did not run away instead
of going to the Chinese cemetery as the accused ordered him, answered: "The reason why I did not run away, well, take
the same thing as the Government soldiers. They are told to do a thing and they do it." Prior to this time the same witness
had said: "If a chief says anything to a man like me and tells me it is by order of the governor and that he has a warrant
there, well, a man like me does what he tells me." Another witness declared: "I am afraid of him. I did not believe that he
would make me do anything unjust." The same witness afterwards testified in answer to the question: "Would you have
killed this man if any other person besides Panglima, the headman, had ordered you to ?" "I would not." Another witness
declared: "Well, he was the headman. It was the headman's orders, and if we did not do it, he would get angry with us."
This witness, answering the question, "Did Panglima make you think that he was acting under the orders of the
Government in causing this man to be killed?" testified: "He said, 'I have a warrant here.' To the question, "And you
thought that it was a legal execution, did you?" answered, "Yes, because he (the accused) is not afraid of the governor."

We are of the opinion that the domination of the accused over the persons who, at his orders, killed the deceased was
such as to make him responsible for whatever they did in obedience to such orders.

Article 13, paragraph 2, of the Penal Code declares those to be principals in a crime "who directly force or induce others
to commit it."
Commenting upon this paragraph, Viada says:

They force another to commit a crime who physically by actual force or grave fear, for example, with a pistol in
hand or by any other threatening means, oblige another to commit the crime. In our commentary on paragraph 9
of article 8 (page 28), we have already said that he who suffers violence acts without will and against his will, is no
more than an instrument, and therefore is guilty of no wrong. The real culprits in such case, the only guilty
persons, are those who use the violence, those who force the other to commit the crime.

One is induced directly to commit a crime either by command, or for a consideration, or by any other similar act
which constitutes the real and moving cause of the crime and which was done for the purpose of inducing such
criminal act and was sufficient for that purpose. We have already seen in our commentary on paragraph 12 of
article 8 that the one who physically commits the crime may escape criminal responsibility by showing that he
acted with due obedience to an order; in such case the criminal responsibility falls entirely upon the one who
orders, that is, upon him who by his commands has directly induced the other to commit the act. But in case the
obedience of the inferior is not due to the superior and therefore not necessary, and does not, therefore, exempt
him from criminal responsibility as the physical author of the crime, he who thus, by his command, directly
induced him to the criminal act is considered by the law also as principal in the crime.

The pacto by virtue of which one purchases for a consideration the hand which commits the crime makes him
who gives, promises, or offers the consideration the principal in the crime by direct inducement, because without
such offer or promise the criminal act would never have been committed. But this does not mean that the one who
actually commits the crime by reason of such promise, remuneration or reward is exempted from criminal
responsibility; on the contrary, we have already seen in our comments on paragraph 3 of article 10 that such
circumstance constitutes an aggravation of his crime.

We have heretofore said that in addition to the  precepto and the  pacto there are similar means by which another
may be induced to commit a crime which also make the one who offers the inducement the principal in the crime
by virtue of the provisions of article 13, paragraph 2. But it must be borne in mind that these acts of inducement
do not consist in simple advice or counsel given before the act is committed, or in simple words uttered at the time
the act was committed. Such advice and such words constitute undoubtedly an evil act, an inducement
condemned by the moral law; but in order that, under the provisions of the Code, such act can be considered
direct inducement, it is necessary that such advice or such words have a great dominance and great influence
over the person who acts; it is necessary that they be as direct, as efficacious, as powerful as physical or moral
coercion or as violence itself.

The following decisions of the supreme court of Spain illustrate the principles involved and their application to particular
cases:

It was held by that court on the 14th day of April, 1871, that one who, during a riot in which a person was killed, said to
one of the combatants, "Stab him! Stab him!", it not appearing that he did anything more than say these words except to
be present at the fight, was not guilty of the crime of homicide by inducement, the court saying that, "considering that,
although the phrases pronounced were imprudent and even culpable, they were not so to the extent that they may be
considered the principal and moving cause of the effect produced; direct inducement cannot be inferred from such
phrases, as inducement must precede the act induced and must be so influential in producing the criminal act that without
it the act would not have been performed."

In a decision rendered on the 10th of July, 1877, the principle was laid down that "a person who advised a married woman
whose husband was very stingy and treated her badly that the only thing for her to do was to rob him, was not guilty of the
crime of robbery by inducement, for the reason that imprudent and ill-conceived advice is not sufficient."

In a decision of the 22nd of December, 1883, it was held that a father who simply said to his son who was at the time
engaged in combat with another, "Hit him! Hit him!", was not responsible for the injuries committed after such advice was
given, under the facts presented. The court said: "It being held in mind that the inducement to the commission of the crime
by means of which a person may be considered a principal in the same manner as he who executes the act itself can only
be founded in commands, sometimes in advice, in considerations, or by inducement so powerful that it alone produces
the criminal act. None of these characteristics pertain to the words of Miguel Perez, inasmuch as the circumstances which
surrounded the event at the time do not appear in sufficient detail to show with clearness the effects which the words
produced, or the relative situation of the deceased and of the one who killed him, or the point to which the fight had
progressed at the time the words were spoken. Moreover, the decision of the court below does not show sufficient facts
upon which to affirm that Miguel foresaw the use of the firearm on the part of his son when he spoke the words referred
to, or, for that reason, that he thereby induced him to use said weapon."

In a decision of the 19th of December, 1896, the court held that the fact "of having proposed to other persons the
abstraction of the tickets which were the subject matter of the robbery, at the same time telling them the place where they
were to be found, does not constitute inducement to commit the robbery because the proposal to commit the robbery was
not sufficiently efficacious to be the cause of the crime, as the crime, under the facts, could have been committed without
it; nor was the indication of the place where the money was to be found a sufficient motive to induce the robbery."

The foregoing decisions have been presented for the purpose of showing concrete cases in which the acts of the accused
were not sufficient, as a matter of law, to constitute inducement. They not only lay down the legal principles which govern
in prosecutions of this character, but they also illustrate in the most valuable way the application of those principles to
actual cases.

The following decisions of the same court present instances in which the acts of the accused constitute inducement under
the law and illustrate the application of the principles to concrete cases.

In a decision of the 14th of April, 1871, the facts as stated by the court were: "It appeared that Lulu, who was living with
Joe and Zozo (a married couple) in the town of X, gave birth to a child on the morning of the 28th of March, the offspring
of her illicit relations with William. It had been previously agreed upon by the first three named to deliver the child to
William as soon as it was born, with instructions to deposit it in some frequented place so that it might be found and taken
up; but Joe changed his mind and handed the child over to the father, telling him, 'Here is your child, do with it whatever
you please; throw it into the sea if you choose to,' which the latter actually did." Under the facts the accused was held
guilty by inducement.

In a judgment pronounced on the 22nd of January, 1873, it was held that "a woman who, living with a man in scandalous
concubinage in the presence of a daughter who continually manifested her disgust and repugnance for such conduct,
conceived against the daughter the most profound hatred and conceived the purpose of killing her by most insidious
methods, obtaining for that purpose poison and various deadly weapons, and contriving that she and her family and all of
the tenants in the house should go to the theater on an evening during which the daughter was sick and obliged to remain
at home, in order that her lover might be entirely undisturbed in killing the daughter and that he might not be surprised in
the act, such woman is the author and principal of the crime the same as her lover who actually committed the deed."

In a decision of the 6th of July, 1881, the court held that "one who takes advantage of his position as an inspector for the
maintenance of public peace and proposes to a private citizen the perpetration of a robbery, with the threat that unless he
did commit the robbery he would be arrested as an escaped prisoner, at the same time offering to withdraw the officers
from the vicinity of the place to be robbed, and who after the robbery received a part of the booty, was guilty of the crime
as principal, although he did not take personal part therein."

In a decision of the 12th of April, 1882, it was said that "an alcalde of a barrio who, accompanied by a number of peace
officers, ordered them to stop certain music that was being played in the public street, and after the order had been
obeyed and the music stopped one of the persons expressed his resentment against the act whereupon the alcalde
ordered the peace officers to attack the man, which they did, inflicting upon him various wounds, was guilty of the crime
of lesiones graves by inducement."

In a decision of the 21st of June, 1882, it was stated that "a father who from the balcony of his house cried out in a loud
voice to his sons who were fighting with others to kill those with whom they were fighting before they were killed
themselves, because they might as well go to jail for a big thing as a little, was guilty of the crime of lesiones graves by
inducement by reason of the injuries inflicted under such orders."

In a decision of the 22nd day of December, 1883, the court said, "that the inducement and the commission of a crime
whereby the inducer becomes a principal to the same extent and effect as if he had physically committed the crime exist
merely in acts of command, sometimes of advice, or agreement for a consideration, or through influence so effective that
it alone determines the commission of the crime."

In a decision of the 11th of November, 1884, the court laid down the proposition that the secretary of
the ayuntamiento who induced a certain persons to form new lists of compromisarios five days prior to the election of
senators was guilty as principal of the crime against the election lists, saying: "It appearing and it being a fact proved that
the secretary of the ayuntamiento of Jalom, Miguel Antonio Dura, induced the members of the council to commit the act
stated, his participation as principal in the commission of the act is well established according to the provisions of
paragraph 2, article 13, of the Penal Code, because such inducement coming from a person of such influence as the
secretary of the ayuntamiento in a small village must be considered sufficiently dominant to turn the mind of those
induced."

In a decision rendered on the 28th of December, 1886, it was held that a woman who was at enmity with an uncle for
having refused to renounce in her favor a donation which a relative had given to him, who made frequent threats to kill the
uncle and who finally offered a third person a certain sum of money together with the land involved in the donation if he
would kill the uncle, and who told her son that, if they were unable to get anybody else to kill the uncle, he must do it
himself as he would thus inherit 15,000  pesetas with which they could flee abroad, and in case he refused to do it he must
leave the house because he was a coward, was guilty as principal of the crime of murder committed by the son under
such inducement. The court said: "It being borne in mind that the suggestions with which the mother moved the mind of
her son to kill the uncle had the force of a real inducement and inclined and decided the will of the son by means of the
relations which she bore to him as well as the reward which she held up before him."

In a decision of the 26th of January, 1888, it was held that finding as principal in a crime, him who, "by direct and
influential means and taking advantage of the inexperience of a boy of tender age," induces him to commit a crime, was
warranted by law, the court saying that "in view of the fact that the inducement exercised by Juan Santiso with regard to
the boy, Ramon Carballo, to steal the jewels in question from his grandmother's house shows such a direct and inducing
cause of the criminal act that without such inducement the crime would not have been committed."

In a decision of the 9th of April, 1882, the court held "that the inducement referred to in paragraph 2, article 13, of the
Penal Code exists whenever the act performed by the physical author of the crime is determined by the influence of the
inducer over the mind of him who commits the act, whatever be the source of such influence."

In a decision of the 3rd of February, 1897, it was declared that one was the "principal by inducement in five different
larcenies, it having been proved that the inducer, knowing that the oil which was brought to her for sale was stolen by the
persons who were seeking to sell it to her, advised them thereupon to continue stealing oil and furnished them vessels in
which to carry it and contributed on five different occasions to the realization of the larcenies, it appearing that the physical
authors of the crime were boys under 15 years of age and that they acted upon the suggestions of the inducer without
discernment or judgment of their own," the court saying that in view of the fact that she knew that the oil which she first
purchased from the boys was stolen oil, that the boys were less than 15 years of age, and therefore easily led, that she
furnished the vessels in which to carry the stolen property — all indicate conclusively that the five crimes were committed
by the influence exercised by the woman, which inducement was not merely that of favoring the execution of the crime but
was that which determined its commission."

In a decision of the 31st of May, 1898, it was laid down "that the command of a master to his servant, by reason of the
special relations which exist between them, contains the elements of inducement which makes the master who orders
such servant to cut wood belonging to a third person, in order that he might benefit thereby, the principal of the crime
committed by such servant," the court saying that "in view of the fact that the command of the master to the servant, made
within the sphere and under the ordinary conditions of domestic life, when they relate to acts simple and apparently
legitimate, contains the necessary elements, directly and sufficiently efficacious, of inducement according to the
provisions of paragraph 2 of article 13 of the Penal Code, it appearing that the master, taking advantage of the
ascendency and authority which he naturally must exercise over his servant or inferior, ordered him to cut and carry away
wood from land which he knew did not belong to him, without disclosing to the servant that circumstance, which
concealment gave rise to the influence which the master exercised over the servant in that particular act."

The following decisions of the Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands apply the foregoing principles to particular cases.

In the case of the United States vs. Galuran (12 Phil. Rep., 339) it appeared that one of the defendants conceived the
idea of the robbery of a warehouse and assisted in procuring false keys with which to open it. He took no immediate part
in the act of robbery itself. The court in its opinion said:

These facts, which we hold to have been proven, clearly show the guilt of the appellant, Sy-Yoc, as the instigator
of the crime herein prosecuted. From him came the initiative in the robbery; he was the first to conceive the idea
of its commission, and, being unable or unwilling to carry it out himself, he employed Galuran, impelling him to the
material execution of the crime by a promise to pay him P16 for each case of whisky that he was able to steal.
The better to induce him to commit the offense, he clearly demonstrated how easily it could be accomplished,
instructed him as to the best means of carrying it out, and offered him money to pay for the false key. He thus
removed all the difficulties in the way of determination to execute, and the actual execution of the robbery in
 question. These acts constitute a real inducement made directly for the commission of the said robbery, and place
the appellant, Sy-Yoc, in the position of principal in accordance with paragraph 2 of article 13 of the Penal Code.

In the case of the United States vs. Ancheta (15 Phil. Rep., 470) it appeared that the accused induced certain Igorrotes to
kill a third person by holding up before them the fact that by such act they would be able to obtain P40 which was then in
the house of the victim, as well as the carabao which he owned, saying to them, "If you go to work you only make a little; it
is better to kill this man and take his carabao and the P40 which was received from the sale of the house in town." They
having made an unsuccessful attempt upon the life of the proposed victim and having returned and explained why they
had not been able to kill them, the accused said to them: "Why did you eat my chickens if you are not going to do what I
told you to do. I came here to spend the night in Cambaguio because I thought you were going to kill them." The Igorrotes
then spent three days clearing some land for another person from whom they received P2.25. About noon of the third day
of their work, the defendant went to them and said: "Now you must repeat what I told you to do, and comply with our
agreement; I am going to Ululing to-day, and I wish you to kill Tiburcio to-night. You go to the bushes and conceal
yourselves in the same place you were concealed before." The murder was committed as proposed. Upon these facts and
inducer of the crime, and that he was liable as principal. (Supreme court of Spain, 20th of October, 1881, 7th of January,
1887, 12th of January, 1889.)

In the case of the United States vs. Empinado (17 Phil. Rep., 230) it appeared that the accused had a conversation with
Serapio Tapic, a laborer, in which the accused asked him if he knew Antonio Gavato and his associates, to which he
replied in the negative. The defendant then said: "I wish to confer upon you a commission, which is as follows: Order must
be disturbed in the cockpit of Gavato, and when you arrive there wound any person." It seems that Tapic was reluctant to
obey this order, but defendant gave him something to eat and drink until he became intoxicated, and then he gave him a
bolo and P10 and said: "Comply with what I have ordered and in case you incur any responsibility I will be responsible to
the court, and as soon as you wound any person or persons, return to me and I will defend you." The court held that these
facts constituted sufficient inducement to bring the accused within the provisions of article 13, paragraph 2, of the Penal
Code.

In the case of the United States vs. Gamao (23 Phil. Rep., 81) the court said:

Mauricio Gamao, nephew of Gil Gamao, was a poor, ignorant fisherman, and more or less dependent upon his
uncle for subsistence. On the other hand, Capt. Gil Gamao was, when this crime was committed, a man of great
influence in Escalante. He had a great number of people working for him, one of whom was his nephew Mauricio.
He was the local political leader of his party. One of his nephews was president of the town. He had two brothers-
in-law in the municipal council. Of his nephews, one was chief of police and two others were members of the
police force. He had acquired, as we have said, a bitter hatred toward the Roman Catholic Church and the
Spanish friars and priests. He called a meeting in his own house on the afternoon of May 15, where the question
of murdering the priest was discussed. He was the prime mover in this meeting. He dominated all who were
present. He selected his nephew Mauricio to commit the crime and directed him to do it. Mauricio, immediately
after murdering the priest, returned to the house of his uncle Gil and reported the fact. The influence exercised by
Gil Gamao over his nephew was so great and powerful that the latter, through fear, could not resist it. That
Mauricio was directly induced to murder the priest by his uncle Gil we think there can be no question.

In the case of the United States vs. Chan Guy Juan (23 Phil. Rep., 105) it was held that the "one who employs an
innocent agent to commit a crime is liable as a principal, although he does nothing himself in the actual commission of the
crime."

In the case of the United States vs. Alcontin (10 Off. Gaz., 1888) it appeared that "a married woman suggested to her
paramour, with whom she had been maintaining illicit relations that he kill her husband in order that thereafter they might
live together freely. The paramour acting upon these suggestions and actuated by a desire to possess the woman for
himself without the interference of the husband, killed him. The guilty pair immediately thereafter made their escape and
lived together as man and wife until the time of ] their arrest." Upon these facts the court said:

We think that the direct inducement to the commission of the crime is fully established por pacto (for a
consideration); that is to say, on the understanding that the woman would live in illicit relations with the murderer
after the death of her husband; and por precepto (by precept) which constituted "a real, intentional, direct and
efficacious exciting inducement (excitacion) to commit the crime." The propositions and suggestions of the woman
constituted something more than mere counsel or advice which her co-defendant was entirely free to accept or
not, in that they were coupled with a consideration which, in view of the relations existing between them, furnished
a motive strong enough to induce the man to take the life of her husband; and for the further reason that due to
these illicit relations she had required such an influence over her co-defendant that her insistent suggestions that
he commit the crime had a marked and controlling influence upon his mind.
In the case of the United States vs. Matinong (22 Phil. rep., 439) it appeared that the accused proposed to his
companions an assault upon the house of Francisco Tolosa; that armed with a talibon he accompanied them during the
assault; that, while the assault was being made, he stood watch at the foot of the stairs of said house so that his
companions would not be caught, and that, finally, he accompanied them to the place where the deceased was killed.
These facts were held by the court to be sufficient to make the accused a principal by inducement as well as by direct
participation.

In the case at bar, the words and acts of the accused had the effect of a command. There does not seem to have existed,
however, any official relation between the accused and the persons whom he induced to kill Sariol. While he appears to
have been the headman of Parang, those whom he induced held no official position under him and owed him, legally
speaking, no obedience. According to tradition and custom, however, the headman seems to have been a person whose
word was law and whose commands were to be obeyed. Moreover, the accused represented to those who physically
committed the crime that he had a warrant from the governor authorizing, if not requiring, the acts committed, and urged
upon them, in effect, that all must obey the commands of the Government. This representation was false, but it produced
the same effect as if it had been true. It cannot be doubted that the accused knew the representation was false and
purposely and intentionally made it as an additional factor going to insure obedience to his orders.

Even if there should happen to be lacking any element sufficient to bring the acts of the accused within the definition of
inducement by command, and we do not believe there is, there would still remain all of the elements necessary to qualify
the crime as murder by inducement. From the authorities heretofore cited and the principles laid down therein as those
which must govern in the determination of whether or not the acts of an accused constitute inducement under the law, it
may be stated as a general proposition that, where the inducement offered by the accused is of such a nature and made
in such a way that it becomes the determining cause of the crime, and such inducement was offered with the intention of
producing that result, then the accused is guilty by inducement of the crime committed by the person so induced. The
inducement to the crime must be intentional on the part of the inducer and must be made directly for the purpose in view.

The verb "induce" is sufficiently broad, generally speaking, to cover cases where there exists on the part of the inducer the
most positive resolution and the most persistent effort to secure the commission of the crime, together with the
presentation to the person induced of the very strongest kind of temptation, as well as words or acts which are merely the
result of indiscretion or lack of reflection and which carry with them, inherently, almost nothing of inducement or
temptation. A chance word spoken without reflection, a wrong appreciation of a situation, an ironical phrase, a thoughtless
act, may give birth to a thought of, or even a resolution to, crime in the mind of one for some independent reason
predisposed thereto without the one who spoke the word or performed the act having any expectation that his suggestion
would be followed or any real intention that it produce a result. In such case, while the expression was imprudent and the
results of it grave in the extreme, he would not be guilty of the crime committed. Therefore, in applying the principles laid
down to concrete cases it is necessary to remember only that the inducement must be made directly with the intention of
procuring the commission of the crime and that such inducement must be the determining cause of the crime.

In the case before us, as we have seen, the accused falsely represented to the persons who actually committed the crime
that he had an order from the Government requiring the death of Sariol and that they were under obligation to carry out
that order. It is clear from the evidence that this inducement was offered by the accused directly to the persons interested
with the intention of moving them to do his bidding, and that such representation was the moving cause of the fatal act.
While it may be said, and is true, that the personal commands of the accused were entirely sufficient to produce the
effects which actually resulted and that such commands may be considered the moving cause of the crime, still there is
no doubt, under the evidence, that the representation that the accused had in his possession an order from the
Government commanding the death of Sariol was also of material influence in effecting the death; and where two
fundamental causes work together for the production of a single result and one of those causes would lead to a conviction
upon one theory and the other upon another, a conviction is sustainable upon either theory.

There was present premeditation, qualifying the crime as murder. There were present, also, the aggravating
circumstances of desplobado and nocturnity.

We are of the firm conviction that the judgment of the court below is well founded, and we accordingly affirm the same,
with costs.

Arellano, C.J., Torres, Johnson, and Trent, JJ., concur.

 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-42476             July 24, 1935

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
KIICHI OMINE, EDUARDO AUTOR, LUIS LADION, and AGAPITO CORTESANO, defendants-appellants.

Jose Ma. Capili and Habana and Quimpo for appellants.

Office of the Solicitor-General Hilado for appellee.

VICKERS, J.:

Defendants appeal from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Davao finding them guilty of frustrated homicide, with
the aggravating circumstance that advantage was taken of their superior strength, and sentencing each of them to suffer
an indeterminate sentence from six years of prision correccional to twelve years of prision mayor, to indemnify Angel
Pulido jointly and severally in the sum of P540, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the
corresponding costs.

The only assignment of error made by the attorneys for the defendants is that the lower court erred in convicting the
appellants, and in not acquitting them with the costs de oficio.

The first question to be considered is the participation of the several defendants in the commission of the crime.

It appears from the evidence that the defendant Eduardo Autor, Luis Ladion, and Agapito Cortesano were working on the
hemp plantation of Angel Pulido under the direction of their co-defendant Kiichi Omine, who was the overseer or manager,
with a compensation of ten per cent of the gross receipts. The four defendants lived together in a house on the plantation.

Kiichi Omine asked Angel Pullido for permission to open a new road through the plantation. According to the offended
party he refused to grant this request because there was already an unfinished road. Kiichi Omine on the other hand
contends that Angel Pulido gave him the permission requested and he began work on December 24, 1933. When Angel
Pulido and his son, Hilario, accompanied by Saito Paton and a Moro by the name of Barabadan, were returning home
from the cockpit that evening they noticed that a considerable number of hemp plants had been destroyed for the purpose
of opening a new road. Angered by the destruction of the hemp plants, Angel Pulido and his party went to the house of
the defendants, who had just finished their supper. There is a sharp conflict in the evidence as to what followed. The
witnesses for the prosecution contend that while the offended party was talking with Omine, Eduardo Autor attempted to
intervene, but was prevented by Hilario Pulido; that Eduardo Autor attacked Hilario Pulido with a bolo, but did not wound
him except on the left thumb; that Luis Ladion and Agapito Cortesano then held Angel Pulido by the arms, and when
Eduardo Autor approached, Omine shouted to him "pegale y matale", and Autor struck Angel Pulido in the breast with his
bolo.

Kiichi Omine, Luis Ladion, and Agapito Cortesano on the other hand maintain that the offended party and his son were
the aggressors; that the first to arrive was Hilario Pulido, who after applying to Kiichi Omine an offensive epithet and
asking him why he had grubbed up the hemp plants, struck him in the breast with brass knuckles; that when Eduardo
Autor attempted to intervene, Angel Pulido and his son attacked him their fists, Hilario Pulido him on the right cheek with
brass knuckles; that Luis Ladion and Agapito Cortesano ran away before Angel Pulido was wounded by Eduardo Autor;
that Kiichi Omine never uttered the words attributed to him or urged Autor to strike Angel Pulido.

The only eyewitness for the prosecution were the offended party and his son, and a Bagobo, named Saito, who was their
relative and lived with them. Barabadan was not presented as a witness. The witnesses for the defense were the four
appellants.

The offended party received only one wound. Only one blow struck, and it was struck by Eduardo Autor. The anger of
Angel Pulido and his son was, however, directed chiefly against Kiichi Omine, who was responsible for the destruction of
the hemp plants. There was obviously no conspiracy among the defendants, but the offended party and his son and his
relative, Saito, narrated the facts of the incident in such away that all the four defendants would appear to be equally
responsible for the injury sustained by the offended party. The evidence does not convince us that Ladion and Cortesano
took any part in the fight; on the contrary it inclines us to believe that they ran away and were not present when Angel
Pulido was wounded. This impression is strengthened by the fact that they were not included in the original complaint
subscribed and sworn not by the offended party on December 29th. They were not included as defendants until the
amended complaint was filed on February 19, 1934. But if they were present and held the offended party by the arms, as
alleged by him, the evidence does not show that they held him for the purpose of enabling Eduardo Autor to strike him
with his bolo. If they did in fact intervene, it may have been for the purpose of preventing the offended party and his son
from continuing their attack on Omine. There was no need for Ladion and Cortesano to hold Angel Pulido in order to
enable Eduardo Autor to strike him with his bolo, or for Kiichi Omine to induce him to do so by shouting "pegale y matale".
According to the witness for the prosecution, Hilario Pulido and Eduardo Autor had already struck each other in the face
with their fists, and Eduardo Autor had received a blow in the right eye, and then struck Hilario Pulido with his bolo. Angel
Pulido would naturally intervene in the fight between his son and Eduardo Autor, and if he did so, Autor, who had already
drawn his bolo, would strike him without the need of any inducement from Omine. Furthermore, under the circumstances
of this case, even if it were satisfactorily proved that Kiichi Omine uttered the words in question, we are of the opinion that
they would not be sufficient to make him a principal by induction, because it does not appear that the words uttered by
Kiichi Omine caused Eduardo Autor to strike Angel Pulido. In the first place, as we have indicated, Eduardo Autor had
already other reasons for striking Angel Pulido when Omine is alleged to have uttered the words of inducement. In the
second place, the words in question were not in this particular case sufficient to cause Eduardo Autor to strike the
offended party with his bolo. Although Eduardo Autor was working under the direction of Omine, apparently according to
the testimony of Angel Pulido, he was being paid by Pulido. It does not appear that Omine had any particular influence
over Eduardo Autor. The cases cited by the Solicitor-General of a father giving orders to his son are obviously different
from the case at bar.

In the leading case of the United States vs. Indanan (24 Phil., 203), it was held that in order that a person may be
convicted of a crime by inducement it is necessary that the inducement be made directly with the intention of procuring the
commission of the crime and that such inducement be the determining cause of the commission of the crime. In that case
various decisions of the Supreme Court of Spain illustrating the principles involved and their application to particular cases
were cited with approval. One of the decisions cited was that of April 24, 1871, where it was held that one who, during a
riot in which a person was killed, said to one of the combatants, "Stab him! Stab him!", it not appearing the he did anything
more than say these words except to be present at the fight, was not guilty of the crime of homicide by inducement. The
Supreme Court of Spain said: "Considering that, although the phrases pronounced were imprudent and even culpable,
they were not so to the extent that they may be considered the principal and moving cause of the effect produced; direct
inducement cannot be inferred from such phrases, as inducement must precede the act induced and must be so
influential in producing the criminal act that without it the act would not have been performed." Another decision cited was
that of December 22, 1883, where it was held that a father who simply said to his son who was at the time engaged in
combat with another. "Hit him! Hit him!", was not responsible for the injuries committed after such advice was given.

Commenting upon No. 2 of article 13 of the Penal Code, which has been incorporated in the Revised Penal Code without
change as No. 2 of article 17, Viada says that in order that, under the provisions of the Code, such act can be considered
direct inducement, it is necessary that such advice or such words have great dominance and great influence over the
person who acts, that it is necessary that they be as direct, as efficacious, as powerful as physical or moral coercion or as
violence itself. (2 Viada, 386, 5th Edition.)

We are therefore of the opinion that the co-defendants of Eduardo Autor are not responsible for the injury inflicted by him
on Angel Pulido.

The lower court, taking into consideration the nature and location of the wound of the offended party, found that it was the
intention of the defendant Eduardo Autor to kill the offended party, and accordingly found said defendant guilty of
frustrated homicide, but in our opinion the evidence does not justify this finding. It is true that the wound was serious and
in a vital part of the body, but judging from the nature of the wound, which was about eleven inches in length, extending
from the breast to the lower ribs on the right side, we think it is probable that it was caused by the point of the bolo on a
downward stroke. It was not a stab wound, and was probably given during a commotion and without being aimed at any
particular part of the body. As we have already stated, Eduardo Autor struck the offended party only once. This fact tends
to show that it was not his intention to take the offended party's life. If he had so intended, he could easily have
accomplished his purpose, so far as the record shows. It might be contended that Eduardo Autor did not strike the
offended party a second time, because he thought that he had already killed him. This was apparently the theory of the
prosecution, because the offended party and his witnesses testified that the offended party dropped down unconscious
when he was wounded, but the evidence does not seem to us to sustain that contention. In the first place a cutting wound
like that in question would not ordinarily render the injured man immediately unconscious.
In the second place it appears from the affidavit of Saito, one of the witnesses for the prosecution, that Angel Pulido did
not fall down unconscious; but swayed and asked for help, while the blood was flowing from his breast and stomach; that
Saito approached the wounded man to support him and take him home.

It is a rule that in a case of physical injuries the court must be guided by the result unless the intent to kill is manifest.

When criminal liability is made to consist in the intention to perform an act which was not realized, the facts from
which it is claimed that intention sprang must be such as to exclude all contrary supposition. When this intention is
not necessarily disclosed by the acts performed by the defendant, greater importance should not be given to such
acts than that which they in themselves import, nor should the defendant's liability be extended beyond that which
is actually involved in the material results of his act. Intention may only be deduced from the external acts
performed by the agent, and when these acts have naturally given a definite result, the courts cannot, without
clear and conclusive proof, hold that some other result was intended. (U.S. vs. Mendoza, 38 Phil., 691.)

There is no merit in the contention of Eduardo Autor that Angel Pulido was accidentally wounded in a struggle for the
possession of the offended party's bolo. That claim is disproved by the affidavit of Autor, Exhibit E, executed on December
26, 1933, where he stated that he snatched out his bolo and struck Angel Pulido in the stomach because Pulido was very
aggressive.

We are therefore of the opinion that Eduardo Autor is guilty of lesiones graves, since the offended party was incapacitated
for the performance of his usual work for a period of more than ninety days, and not of frustrated homicide.

For the foregoing reasons, the decision appealed from is reversed as to Kiichi Omine, Luis Ladion, and Agapito
Cortesano, and they are acquitted with the proportionate part of the costs de oficio. As to the appellant Eduardo Autor, the
decision of the lower court is modified, and he is convicted of lesiones graves and sentenced to suffer one year, eight
months, and twenty-one days of prision correccional, to indemnify the offended party in the sum of P540, with subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency, which shall not exceed one-third of the principal penalty, and to pay the
corresponding costs. In accordance with the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum sentence to be served by him is
fixed at one year of prision correccional.

Avanceña, C.J., Hull, Diaz, and Recto, JJ., concur.

 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. L-67948 May 31, 1988

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
NAPOLEON MONTEALEGRE, defendant-appellant.

The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

Citizens Legal Assistance Office for defendant-appellant.

CRUZ, J.:

It is a settled rule in this jurisdiction that the conviction of the accused, who is constitutionally presumed innocent, depends
upon the strength of the prosecution and not the weakness of the defense. Unfortunately for the accused in this case, his
prosecution for murder with assault upon a person in authority, undoubtedly already strong, was made even stronger by
the defense itself.

As the trial court * which convicted him saw it, the crime imputed to Napoleon Montealegre was committed as follows:

At about 11:30 in the evening of March 11, 1983, while Edmundo Abadilia was eating at the Meding's Restaurant in Cavite
City, he detected the smell of marijuana smoke coming from a nearby table. Intending to call a policeman, he quietly went
outside and saw Pfc. Renato Camantigue in his car whom he hailed to report the matter. After parking his vehicle,
Camantigue joined Abadilla in the restaurant and soon thereafter the two smelled marijuana smoke from the table
occupied by Vicente Capalad and the accused-appellant. Camantigue then approached the two and collared both of
them, saying "Nagmamarijuana kayo, ano?' Forcing them up, he asked the waitress ff she knew them but the waitress
said she did not. 1 Then the mayhem began.

While Camantigue was holding the two, Montealegre with this right hand and Capalad with his left hand, Capalad
suddenly and surreptitiously pulled out a knife from a scabbard tucked in the right side of his waist and started stabbed
Camantigue in the back. 2 Camantigue let loose Montealegre to draw the gun from his holster but Montealegre, thus
released, restrained Camantigue's hand to prevent the latter from defending himself Montealegre used both his hands for
his purpose 3 as Capalad continued stabbing the Victim. 4 While they were thus grappling, the three fen to the floor and
Capalad, freed from Camantigue's grip, rose and scampered toward the door. Camantigue fired and, continuing the
pursuit outside, fired again. 5 Capalad fled into a dark alley. Camantigue abandoned the chase and asked to be brought to
a hospital. Capalad was later found slumped in the alley with a bullet wound in Ms chest. Neither Camantigue nor
Capalad survived, both expiring the following day. 6

The accused-appellant, for his part, escaped during the confusion. 7 Having been informed of the incident, Capt. Cipriano
Gilera of the Cavite police immediately organized a team that went to look for him that very night. 8 They did not find him
in his house then but he was apprehended in the morning of March 12,1983, on board a vehicle bound for Baclaran. He
gave his name as Alegre but later admitted he was the fugitive being sought. 9

Dr. Regalado Sosa, reporting on the autopsy of the Camantigue's body, testified that death was caused by shock due to
massive internal hemorrhage caused by seven stab wounds affecting the heart, lungs, liver, stomach, pancreas, and
diaphragm.10 The weapon used was 6" in length and about 2 to 2.5 cm. in width and the blood found on it was analyzed
as human.11 The stabbing incident was narrated in detail at the trial by Abadilla, 12 who was corroborated by Generoso
San Juan. 13
On direct examination, Abadilla testified that Montealegre prevented Camantigue from drawing his pistol while he was
being stabbed by Capalad, demonstrating with the aid of court personnel the relative positions of the three during the
incident. 14

On cross-examination, he reiterated his previous declaration even more emphatically, thus:

Q. When accused Montealegre held the hand of Pfc. Camantigue upon drawing his gun,
what happened to Camantigue?

A. He could not move, sir. He could not make any defense because he was being held by
Montealegre and he was being stabbed at the back. 15

He replied as follows to questions on re-direct to stress the participation of the accused-appellant —

Q. When accused Capalad started stabbing Pfc. Camantigue at the back, accused
Montealegre was being held by Pfc. Camantigue at that time?

A. Yes, sir.

Q And in fact Montealegre was very close to the right of Camantigue at that time?

A. Yes sir.

Q And Montealegre was aware that Capalad was stabbing Pfc. Camantigue?

A. Yes, sir, he knew. 16

In answer to clarificatory questions from the court, he declared:

Q. And when Montealegre saw that Camantigue was about to draw gun, Montealegre
grabbed the hand of Camantigue?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. With what hand?

A. Both hands, sir.

Q. And was Camantigue able to pull out from his waist the gun?

A. No. sir.

Q. Why?

A. Because Montealegre was holding his hand, Your Honor.

Q. With both hands?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. Montealegre was holding with both hands rights hand of Camantigue?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. And at this moment when Montealegre was holding with both hands the hand of
Camantigue, what was Capalad doing?
 A. Capalad was still stabbing Camantigue, Your Honor. 17

San Juan was equally categorical in his testimony, saying on direct examination.

Q. When Camantigue was being stabbed, where was Montealegre?

A. He was on the right side.

Q. What was he doing at that time?

A. When Camantigue was being stabbed, he tried to pull his gun but Montealegre held
his hand.

Q. Was Camantigue able to draw his gun?

A. No. sir.

Q. What happened when Camantigue failed to draw his gun? They slammed down on the
floor and when they were already on the floor, I ran away because I was already figures
lightened. 18

The cause of the defense did not improve when on cross-examination, he insisted:

A. When Camantigue was about to draw his gun, Montealegre suddenly held the hand of
Camantigue.

Q. And when Montealegre suddenly held the hand of Camantigue, what happened to
Camantigue?

A. He could not draw his gun because while Montealegre was holding his hand, Capalad
was stabbing him at the back. 19

And to the court, the witness maintained his testimony as follows:

Q. So Camantigue was hit many times by Capalad while Montealegre was holding the
right hand of the policeman to prevent him from drawing his gun?

A. Yes, sir. 20

The accused-appellant, testifying on his behalf, only succeeded in confinning his own guilt. He claimed he ran away
before the stabbing but his testimony, consisting of denials, evasions, contradictions, claims of ignorance and
forgetfulness and protestations of innocence, does not have the ring of truth. The following excerpts are reflective of the
kind of defense he offered to exculpate himself from the charge established against him by the prosecution.

Q. Now, while Pfc. Camantigue was arresting Vicente Capalad, what happened if any?

A. Camantigue pulled his gun.

Q. What happened after that?

A. Nothing, I did not see anymore what happened. 21

xxx xxx xxx

A. I cannot say anything about that. I did not see what really happened.

Q. Did you see Capalad stabbing Pfc. Camantigue?

 A. I did not see. 22

xxx xxx xxx

Q. From whom did you come to know that Pfb. Camantigue shot and killed Vicente
Capalad?

A. From the witness Abadilla. I have heard from him that Camantigue killed Capalad. 23

xxx xxx xxx

Q. Mr. Montealegre, did you notice while Pfc.Camantigue was holding both of you, did
you notice that Vicente Capalad stabbed Pfc. Camantigue?

A. I did not see anything. 24

xxx xxx xxx

Q. And you were standing on the right side of Pfc. Camantigue while Capalad was on the
left side?

A. I am not sure whether I was standing at the right or at the left.

Q. But the fact is that you were standing on the right side of Camantigue?

A. I am not sure if that is the right side.

Q. But you were standing on the side where his gun and holster were placed?

A. I cannot remember. 25

It is simply unbelievable that the accused-appellant did not know what was happening on that evening of March 11, 1983.
As one of the principal figures of the stabbing incident, he could not have not known, nor could he later not remember,
that startling event that even more onlookers could not forget. The evidence has established that the accused-appellant
was directly and personally involved and was in fact one of the two persons held by the victim when he was stabbed. Yet
Montealegre would now insist, quite incredibly, that he was unaware of what had transpired that night.

If it is true, as he says, that he ran away before the stabbing, there would have been less likelihood of Capalad's attack as
Camantigue's attention would have been fully concentrated on his lone captive. Moreover, there would have been nothing
to restrain the policeman from drawing his pistol and defending himself against Capalad if the accused-appellant had, by
his own account, already escaped before the stabbing.

It is also worth noting that, instead of reporting to the authorities, what the accused-appellant did was attempt to hide, only
to be found the following morning on board a bus bound for outside Cavite City. When apprehended, he first gave a false
name before he finally admitted his Identity, thus beginning the mesh of contradictions, admissions and denials, in which
he would enshare himself.

The Court accepts the evidence established by the prosecution that at the time of the stabbing, the victim was in uniform
and, therefore, could easily be recognized as a person in authority. Several witnesses testified as to his attire when he
was killed. 26 And even assuming that the victim was in civilian clothes on that tragic night, the record shows that no less
than the accused-appellant himself, replying to questions put to him by the prosecution, declared twice that he knew the
victim to be a policeman. 27

The accused-appellant was correctly considered a co-principal for having collaborated with Capalad in the killing of the
police officer. The two acted in concert, with Capalad actually stabbing Camantigue seven times and the accused-
appellant holding on to the victim's hands to prevent him from drawing his pistol and defending himself. While it is true that
the accused- appellant did not himself commit the act of stabbing, he was nonetheless equally guilty thereof for having
prevented Camantigue from resisting the attack against him. The accused-appellant was a principal by indispensable
cooperation under Article 17, par. 3, of the Revised Penal Code.

As correctly interpreted, the requisites of this provision are: "(1) participating in the criminal resolution, that is, there is
either anterior conspiracy or unity of criminal purpose and intention immediately before the commission of the crime
charged; and (2) cooperation in the commission of the offense by performing another act without which it would not have
been accomplished.

The prosecution contends that although there was no evidence correspondence of a prior agreement between Capalad
and Montealegre, their subsequent acts should prove the presence of such conspiracy. The Court sustains this view,
which conforms to our consistent holding on this matter:

Conspiracy need not be established by direct proof as it can be inferred from the acts of the appellants. It
is enough that, at the time the offense was committed, participants had the same purpose and were
united in its execution; as may be inferred from the attendant circiumstances. 29

xxx xxx xxx

We agree that there is no evidence to show a previous plan to kill Regino Bautista. The whole incident
happened because the accused came upon Bautista and Mallabo fishing within or near the fishpond
enclosure of Carlo Aquino which was under the care of Vicente Cercano.

But for a collective responsibility among the herein accused to be established, it is not necessary or
essential that there be a previous plan or agreement to commit the assault; it is sufficient that at the time
of the aggression all the accused by their acts manifested a common intent or desire to attack Bautista
and Mallabo, so that the act of one accused became the act of all. 30

xxx xxx xxx

If it be proved that two or more persons aimed by their acts towards accomplishment of the same unlawful
object, each doing a part so that their acts, though apparently independent, were in fact connected and
cooperative, indicating a closeness of personal association and concurrence of sentiment, a conspiracy
may be inferred though no actual meeting among them to concert is proven. A conspiracy only be entered
into after the commencement of overt acts leading to the consummation of the crime. 31

As for the second requirement, the Court has held that:

There can be no question that appellant's act in holding the victim from behind when the latter was
stabbed by his collaborated Victor Buduan, was a positive act towards the realization of a common
criminal intent, although the intent can be classified as instantaneous. It can be safely assumed that had
not appellant held both arms of the victim from behind, the latter could have partied the thrust or even run
away from his assailant. By immobilizing the two hands of the victim from behind, and although there was
no anterior conspiracy , the two cousins showed unity of criminal purpose and intent immediateIy before
the actual stabbing. 32

xxx xxx xxx

It has been sufficiently established that appellant Cabiles seized the running decedent in such a manner
that the latter could not even move or tum around. This enabled the pursuing Labis, who was armed with
a drawn bolo and was barely five meters away from the decedent, to finally overtake him and stab him at
the back with hardly any risk at all. Cabiles therefore performed another act-holding the decedent—
without which the crime would not have been accomplished. This makes him a principal by indispensable
cooperation. 33

The above requisites having been established, the accused-appellant was correctly convicted of the complex crime of
murder, as qualified by treachery, with assault upon a person in authority. Accordingly, he must suffer the penalty
imposed upon him, to wit, reclusion perpetua, there being no aggravating and mitigating circumstances, plus the civil
indemnity, which is hereby increased to P30,000.00, and the actual, mectical and fimeral expenses in the sum of
P37,380.00 as proved at the trial.
Pfc. Renato Camantigue was only 34 years old when he died in line of duty while enforcing the law against the abuse of
dangerous drugs. He was struck down with no less than seven vicious stabs by a man who, by his own admission, was at
the time of the incident "burned" on marijuana. The kiner also eventually succumbed, and that made the second life
needlessly lost to the wickedness of drug addiction. There was another Iife also ruined, this time of the 28 year-old
accused-appellant himself, although, fortunately for him, his loss is not irretrievable nor is his future forever foreclosed. In
the somber shadows of the prison bars, as he ponders the wrong he has done, he may yet find his ultimate redemption in
rehabilitation and remorse.

WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment is AFFIRMED as above modified, without any pronouncement as to costs. It is so
ordered.

Narvasa, Gancayco, Griño-Aquino and Medialdea, JJ., concur.

 FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. No. L-39401. September 30, 1982.]

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. BERTO SIMBRA and SERGIO TOLIBAS, Accused.

SERGIO TOLIBAS, Accused-Appellant.

The Solicitor General for Accused-Appellant.

Manuel V. Montilla for Accused-Appellant.

SYNOPSIS

Gresilda Gonzales left her house to fetch water from the well. Several meters away from her house, appellant and Berto
Simbra accosted her. Simbra grabbed her arms and appellant covered her mouth and the two dragged her to a pile of
sawdust surrounded by high grasses and big trees.Once there, Simbra threw Gresilda to the ground and forcibly removed
her pants and panties. Complainant vigorously struggled but the two accused succeeded in having carnal knowledge of
her a total of five times. When Simbra and appellant were finished, they instructed the complainant not to tell anyone of
the incident or they would kill her. Simbra and appellant then took the complainant to the house of appellant’s sister and
kept her there until complainant’s aunt and a policeman fetched her. Complainant’s mother brought her to the doctor who
upon medical examination concluded that complainant had sexual intercourse with more than one man. A complaint was
filed charging appellant of rape. Simbra fled and was at large until the time of the trial. Appellant contended Simbra anf
himself had sexual intercourse with the complainant but with her consent. He pointed out that if they had raped her, the
doctor would have found abrasions and contusions on her body but there were no such findings. The lower court
convicted the appellant of rape and sentenced him to reclusion perpetua.Hence, this appeal.

The Supreme Court MODIFIED the trial court’s decision by sentencing the appellant twice to reclusion perpetua, as
principal by direct participation and as principal through indispensable cooperation of rape. The Court found the
appellant’s version unbelievable as the complainant would not fabricate such a hideous story since she was not a woman
of loose morals and that the absence of injuries on complainant’s body was due to the fact that only force, not violence
was employed on her.

SYLLABUS

1. CRIMINAL LAW; CRIMES AGAINST CHASTITY; RAPE; FORCE AND INTIMIDATION DOES NOT NECESSARILY
INCLUDE VIOLENCE. — While it is true that Dr. Tupas found no injuries on her body. except the lacerations on her
hymen, the fact is, the rapist did not really employ violence upon her but only used force by holding her arms covering her
mouth, dragging and throwing her to the ground and pinning her down. She was not boxed, beaten or injured in any way.
The force coming as it did from two big men and applied on a 15 year old girl was enough to overcome whatever
resistance there was, without necessity for violence.

2. REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; CREDIBILITY OF WITNESS. — The version of the appellant is hard to believe.
Complainant was not a woman of loose morals that after her alleged sweetheart had satisfied himself she consented to
have sexual intercourse with appellant and with the blessings of Simbra. Even a woman of loose morals would not agree
to allow two men to successively take advantage of her in the presence of the other.

3. CRIMINAL LAW; PERSONS CRIMINALLY LIABLE; PRINCIPAL THROUGH DIRECT PARTICIPATION AND
THROUGH INDISPENSABLE COOPERATION. — Considering that appellant had sexual intercourse with complainant
against her will by employing force and intimidation, the crinme committed is rape through direct participation. And, when
he aided Berto Simbra and made it possible for the latter to have carnal knowledge of complainant also against her will
and through force and intimidation, appellant committed another crime of rape through indispensable cooperation. Thus,
appellant is guilty of two crimes of consummated rape.
 DECISION

RELOVA, J.:

Charged with rape committed according to the information, as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"That in or about the evening of May 24, 1972, in Langihan, Butuan City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused, conspiring, confederating together and mutually, helping one another by
means of force, threats and intimidation, did then and there willfully, and forcibly feloniously and successively have carnal
knowledge with the complainant, one Gresilda Gonzales, a girl 16 years old."cralaw virtua1aw library

Sergio Tolibas was found guilty and sentenced "to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, with all the accessories of the
law; to indemnify the offended party, Gresilda Gonzales, in the sum of TWELVE THOUSAND PESOS (P12,000.00),
without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency; and to pay the costs. In the service of his sentence, the accused
shall be credited with the period of his preventive detention conformably to Article 29 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended I Rep. Act 6127, it appearing that on 6 June 1972 he signed a voluntary agreement to abide by the same
disciplinary rules imposed upon convicted prisoners."cralaw virtua1aw library

Quoting from appellee’s brief, the crime was committed follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"At about 7:30 p.m. on May 24, 1972, complainant Gresilda Gonzales left her house in Langihan, Butuan City, to fetch
water from the artesian well located in the public market. She carried a pail and a hose. About 36 meters away from her
house, along an unlighted portion of the road leading to the public market, appellant and Berto (Roberto) Simbra, strongly
smelling of ‘tuba’, Accused her. Berto Simbra grabbed her by the arms. She struck him with the hose she was holding and
shouted for help. Appellant quickly covered her mouth with a handkerchief. Helping each other, appellant and Berto
Simbra dragged her to the ‘serin’ (as spelled in appellant’s Brief; also spelled ‘siren’ and ‘seren’ in the transcript of
stenographic notes). The ‘serin’ is a pile of sawdust surrounded by breast-high grasses and big trees, near the public
market. (pp. 48-53, 68-69, 71-75, November 22, 1972; pp. 6, 9-10, TSN, February 6, 1973).

"At the ‘serin’, Berto Simbra threw complainant to the ground and, with appellant holding her arms and covering her
mouth, forcibly removed the men’s pants and panties that she was wearing. Then he brought out his penis and went on
top of her. She kicked and struggled vigorously but he nevertheless succeeded in inserting his penis into her vagina and
having carnal knowledge of her. She felt pain and wanted to shout but she could not do so because appellant covered her
mouth. After a while, Berto Simbra stood up and went to urinate. When he came back, he had another sexual intercourse
with her. (pp. 53-56, 75-81, TSN, November 22, 1972.)

"With Berto Simbra also holding complainant, appellant also had carnal knowledge of her although she resisted vigorously
and kicked him. He was able to do so three times. (pp. 56-57, 80-82, TSN, November 22, 1972).

"When Berto Simbra and appellant were finished, complainant noticed a wet substance and plenty of blood in her genitals.
(pp. 4-5, TSN, December 11, 1972)

"Before leaving the ‘serin’, appellant and Berto Simbra instructed complainant not to reveal what happened on pain of
being killed. Appellant emphasized the threat by pretending to choke her. (p. 57, TSN, November 22, 1972; p. 12, TSN,
December 11, 1972)

"Berto Simbra and appellant brought complainant to the house of Ernanita Jusay, sister of appellant, which was about 250
meters distant from the ‘serin’. Although her house was in the same community, complainant told Ernanita Jusay that she
came from Buenavista because that was the instruction of appellant and Berto Simbra. Complainant stayed in the house
of Ernanita Jusay until 9:00 p.m. of May 25, 1972 when her aunt, Alicia Pepito, who lived nearby, and Langihan policeman
Domingo Macuno, Jr. fetched her. She could not leave until she was fetched because appellant and Berto Simbra were
guarding her. (pp. 58-60, 81-86, TSN, November 22, 1972).

"Complainant was brought to Alicia Pepito’s house, then to her house and finally to the police station where she was
interrogated. She and her mother gave sworn statements (Exhibits C and 2) to the police. (pp. 19-22, 60 62, 86, TSN,
November 22, 1972; pp. 6-7, TSN, December 11, 1972).

"Dr. Angelus R. Tupaz, Medico-Legal Officer of the Butuan City Police Department, examined complainant at 2:30 p.m. on
May 27, 1972. He found still fresh lacerations of her hymen at 3:00 and 6:00 o’clock positions which he said were
probably caused by sexual intercourse. He also found a shiny white substance at the cul-de-sac of Douglas of
complainant’s genitals. The substance turned out to be spermatozoa upon examination. The spermatozoa was about one
(1) cc., indicating that it may have come from more than one man. (pp. 67, 11, TSN, November 22, 1972). He prepared a
medical report containing his findings. (Exhibit A/Exhibit 1)

"After the incident, Berto Simbra absconded. He left his house at Langihan; Butuan City, and was nowhere to be found at
the time of the trial. (p. 14, TSN, February 6, 1973) Thus, the trial was only against appellant."cralaw virtua1aw library

Appellant, on the other hand, testified that about 8:30 in the evening of May 24, 1972, he and Berto Simbra went to the
dance hall at the Emilio Compound in Butuan City to dance. They met Gresilda Gonzales, the sweetheart of Simbra, and
upon invitation of Simbra the three of them went to the "serin" (pile of sawdust) at about nine o’clock. In going to the
"serin" they passed through a street where there were many people. Simbra and complainant were conversing with other
as they walked side by side, while he (appellant) was about twelve (12) feet behind them. Upon reaching the "serin" he
(appellant) remained at a place about thirty-five meters away to watch for people who might come around. After a while he
saw complainant taking off her pants and panties, spread them on the "serin" and then lay down on them. Berto Simbra
went on top of her and they had sexual intercourse twice within one hour. After Simbra was through, he approached
appellant and told him to go to her as she was still lying down on the "serin." He did go to where complainant was and
asked her if he could also lie down with her. She consented and three times he had sexual intercourse with
her.chanrobles.com : virtual law library

About 12:00 midnight, the three of them (Simbra, complainant and appellant) went to the house of Ernanita Tolibas Jusay
(appellant’s elder sister). He introduced complainant to Ernanita as his sweetheart from Buenavista. However, Simbra told
Ernanita that he and appellant had just had sexual intercourse with complainant. Appellant and complainant spent the
night in that house while Simbra went home to his own house which was about 150 meters away. The following morning,
complainant spent the whole day in Ernanita’s house doing nothing except sat in the sala, ate and slept. At about 8:30 in
the evening, complainant was fetched by her aunt and a policeman.

Thus, appellant admits that he had carnal knowledge with complainant but claims that he did so with her consent.

The testimony of appellant was substantially corroborated by his sister Ernanita Tolibas Jusay.

The issue in this case is whether appellant had sexual intercourse with complainant against the will of the latter and
through the use of force and intimidation. Appellant claims that the court erred "in giving too much credence to the
testimony of the offended party Gresilda Gonzales."cralaw virtua1aw library

The above pretentions of appellant are not true. Complainant did not for a moment tolerate the indecent acts of appellant
and Simbra. She was going to the artesian well at the public market in Langihan, Butuan City, to fetch water, when she
was seized by Berto Simbra and appellant. Simbra held her arms and dragged her towards the "serin." Her mouth was
covered with a handkerchief by appellant. She struggled and even kicked Berto Simbra and appellant. Upon reaching the
"serin," Simbra threw complainant on the ground while appellant held her arms as Simbra forcibly took-off her pants and
panties and had sexual intercourse with her, twice. Thereafter, Simbra also held complainant when appellant had sexual
intercourse with her, thrice.

After she was raped, complainant was threatened by Simbra and appellant with death if she would reveal what happened
to her. Appellant emphasized the threat by pretending to choke her.

Appellant contends that if violence was employed upon complainant, there would be abrasions and contusions on her
body. While it is true that Dr. Tupaz found no injuries on her body, except the lacerations on her hymen, the fact is, the
rapists did not really employ violence upon her but only used force by holding her arms, covering her mouth, dragging and
throwing her to the ground and pinning her down. She was not boxed, beaten or injured in any way. The force coming as
it did from two big men and applied on a 15-year old girl was enough to overcome whatever resistance there was, without
necessity for violence. This explains the lack of contusions, hematoma, and other injuries on complainant’s body, except
the lacerations on her hymen.

Further, complainant denied the truth of the testimony of appellant that she was the girlfriend of Simbra. She has seen her
rapists passing her house before the date of the incident but the fact is, she came to know their names at the Police
Station only when she was investigated.chanrobles law library
The version of the appellant is hard to believe. Complainant was not a woman of loose morals that after her alleged
sweetheart had satisfied himself she consented to have sexual intercourse with appellant and with the blessings of
Simbra. Even a woman of loose morals would not agree to allow two men to successively take advantage of her in the
presence of the other. In the case of People v. Soriano, 35 SCRA 633, this Court said:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"To begin with, their version is inherently incredible. Indeed, no woman would have consented to have sexual intercourse
with two men-or-three, according to Antonio Gallardo — in the presence of each other, unless she were a prostitute or as
morally debased as one. Certainly, the record before Us contains no indication that Farmacita, a 14-year old, first-year
high school student, can be so characterized. On the contrary, her testimony in court evinced the simplicity and candor
peculiar to her youth. In fact, appellants could not even suggest any reason why Farmacita would falsely impute to them
the commission of the crime charged."cralaw virtua1aw library

Considering that appellant had sexual intercourse with complainant against her will by employing force and intimidation,
the crime committed is rape through direct participation. And, when he aided Berto Simbra and made it possible for the
latter to have carnal knowledge of complainant also against her will and through force and intimidation, appellant
committed another crime of rape through indispensable cooperation. Thus, appellant is guilty of two crimes of
consummated rape.

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is AFFIRMED but modified in the sense that appellant Sergio Tolibas is
hereby sentenced twice to the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua. With costs against Appellant.

SO ORDERED.

Teehankee (Chairman), Makasiar, Melencio-Herrera, Plana, Vasquez and Gutierrez, Jr., JJ., concur.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-32624 February 12, 1980

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
PACIANO NIERRA alias Pacing, GAUDENCIA NIERRA, FELICISIMO DOBLEN alias Simoy and VICENTE
ROJAS, accused-appellants; GASPAR MISA, accused whose death sentence is under automatic review.

Jose W. Diokno for appellant Nierra.

Sedfrey A. Ordoñez for accused Misa.

Alberto Cacnio for appellants Doblen and Rojas.

Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza, Assistant Solicitor Octavio R Ramirez and Trial Attorney Lolita C. Dumlao for
appellee.

PER CURIAM:

Felicisimo Doblen, Vicente Rojas and the spouses Pagano Nierra and Gaudencia Nierra appealed from the decision
dated March 4, 1970 of Judge Pedro Samson C. Animas of the Court of First Instance of South Cotabato, General Santos
City Branch II, convicting them of murder, sentencing each of them to death and ordering them to pay solidarity an
indemnity of twelve thousand pesos to the heirs of the victim Juliana Nierra (Criminal Case No. 2081).

Gaspar Misa, who pleaded guilty to the murder charge, was also sentenced to death and ordered to pay a similar
indemnity (Decision of August 25, 1969, pp. 36-8, Record). His death sentence is under automatic review.

According to the evidence of the prosecution, Juliana Gadugdug-Nierra, 52, and Pagano Nierra, 39, her brother-inlaw,
were competitors in the businesses of launch transportation and the sale of soft drinks in Barrio Tinago, General Santos
City. Juliana sold coca-cola while Pagano sold pepsi-cola. Juliana was the owner of two motor launches, Elsa I and II,
while Paciano was the owner of two launches, Sylvania I and II. Juliana was the wife of Aniceto Nierra, Paciano's elder
brother. To mollify Pagano, by diminishing the competition between their launches, Aniceto sold Elsa II. Nonetheless,
Aniceto and Paciano were not on speaking terms.

In order to monopolize those businesses in the locality, Paciano Nierra conceived the Idea of liquidating his competitor,
Juliana. For that purpose, Felicisimo Doblen, a cousin-in-law of Paciano, accompanied to Paciano's house in the
afternoon of July 4, 1969 Gaspar Misa, 29, a convicted murderer who in 1965 had escaped from the Davao Penal Colony
(Exh. E-4 and E-5, pp. 10-11, Folder of Exhibits). Misa came to Barrio Tinago in June, 1969. He resided with his cousin,
Silvestre Misa. (See Pareja vs. Gomez and People, 115 Phil. 820.)

Upstairs in the bedroom of Paciano's house, Misa, in the presence of Gaudencia Garrido-Nierra, the wife of Paciano,
agreed to kill Juliana in consideration of three thousand pesos. Paciano promised that in the morning after the killing he
would pay Misa four hundred pesos near the municipal hall of Tupi, South Cotabato which is about forty kilometers away
from General Santos City. The balance would be paid in the same place on August 12, 1969.

That arrangement was confirmed by Gaudencia. When Misa scheduled the assassination on July 8, 1969, Pagano said
that it was up to Misa since he was the one who would kill Juliana.
In the evening of July 6, 1969, Doblen, in behalf of Pagano Nierra, delivered to Misa at the beach a package containing a
caliber .38 pistol with five bullets. Misa contacted his friend, Vicente Rojas, and apprised him that he (Misa) had been
hired to kill Juliana. Misa asked Rojas to act as lookout on the night of July 8, 1969 when the killing would be perpetrated.

On that night, Rojas posted himself at the Bernadette store near the creek or canal about twenty-seven steps from the
scene of the crime. Gaudencia was stationed near the house of Maning Desinorio about eighteen steps from the scene of
the crime. Pagano was near the house of Juanito Desinorio about twenty-seven steps from the scene of the crime. The
houses of the two Desinorios were separated from the house of Juliana Nierra by an alley.

Misa secluded himself near a warehouse about five steps from the scene of the crime in close proximity to the back of
Juliana's house where. as he had previously observed some nights before, she used to answer the call of nature. The
house was at the back of the Esso Gas Station near the beach of Sarangani Bay at Barrio Tinago, General Santos City.

Between seven and eight o'clock that night, the unwary Juliana went to the beach where she was accustomed to void and
when she squatted, Misa unexpectedly appeared behind her, held her hair, thus tilting her face, and while in that posture,
he inserted into her mouth the muzzle of the pistol and fired it. Paciano and Gaudencia, who were near the beach,
witnessed the actual killing.

The postmortem examination disclosed that Juliana sustained a gunshot wound in the tongue. The bullet passed through
the buccal cavity down to the spinal column where the slug was extracted.

Aniceto Nierra, on hearing the gunshot and the ensuing commotion, went down from the house and saw his prostrate wife
with blood oozing from her mouth and nose. Her panty was pulled down, her dress was raised up to her waist, and her
genital organ was exposed. At the hospital, the doctor pronounced her dead.

After firing the gun, Misa walked slowly on the beach in front of Paciano and Gaudencia, passed by the alley between the
houses of Tony Desinorio and Francisco Desinorio, emerged at the back of the Esso Gas Station crossed the creek or
canal on the west, reached the Lagao road, threw the gun into the dense talahib grass and rode on a bus. He proceeded
to the Saint Elizabeth Hospital. Then, he changed his mind and returned to the beach near the victim's house.

The Nierra spouses left the scene of the crime by passing through the alley between the house of the victim and the
Desinorio houses, which alley separated the building of the Northern Lines and the Matutum Hotel from the Esso Gas
Station, and emerged on A. Morrow Boulevard which intersects Saguing Street where Paciano and Gaudencia resided.
Their residence was about two hundred meters away from the scene of the crime.

A witness, residing at Morrow Boulevard, who happened to be at the Villa Bus Terminal at around eight-thirty in the
evening of July 8, 1969, when the killing was perpetrated, testified that she saw Pagano Nierra wearing an underwear and
striped T-short running from Saguing Street to Barrio Tinago. About five minutes later, she saw Pagano the boulevard and
running towards Saguing Street. He was wearing long pants. The witness made a statement to the police about what she
had seen.

Early in the morning of the next day, Misa took a bus bound for Tupi and alighted near the municipal building. Paciano
Nierra arrived in that place and gave him four hundred pesos. Misa returned to General Santos City, gave fifty pesos to
Rojas, and proceeded to the victim's house where he mingled with the persons playing cards and domino. He kept vigil
there, staying there for four nights.

He resumed his old job of looking for passengers for the , buses and the pumpboat of Rojas. He received a commission of
one peso per passenger. Policemen arrested him and Rojas as for questioning but they were later released. He left the
city and brought his family to Barrio Luan, Maitum South Cotabato. There, he was arrested again, this time by
Constabulary soldiers.

On August 7, 1969, Misa was interrogated by Patrolman A.B. Vencer Jr. of the city police department. He signed a
confession admitting the killing of Juliana Nierra and implicating the other accused therein. The statement was sworn to
before the fiscal. Two days later, he reenacted the killing. Photographs were taken of the reenactment. A sketch of the
scene of the crime was prepared.

On August 11, 1969, Misa testified at the preliminary in-vestigation. In his testimony, he admitted again the killing and
confirmed his confession implicating Paciano Nierra, his wife Gaudencia, Doblen and Rojas. He executed another
confession on August 12, 1969 which was sworn to before the city judge.
Thirty-seven days after the killing or on August 14, 1969, Misa, Doblen, Rojas and the Nierra spouses, as co-conspirators,
were charged with murder aggravated by reward, treachery, evident premeditation, nocturnity, ignominy and abuse of
superiority and, as to Misa, recidivism, since he had been sentenced to reclusion perpetua for the murder of Antonio Abad
Tormis in Cebu City.

As already stated, Misa pleaded guilty. At the trial of his co accused, his confessions and testimony were offered by the
prosecution and were the main bases of the judgment of conviction and the imposition of the death penalty.

As separate briefs were filed for the defendants, their individual cases will be separately reviewed.

Misa's case. — His counsel de oficio contends that Misa made an improvident plea because the trial court allegedly failed
to explain thoroughly to him the gravity of the offense and the consequences of his plea of guilty.

That contention is not well-taken. Misa, as an escaped prisoner, had acquired some experience in criminal procedure. Not
only that. He executed two extrajudicial confessions. He reenacted the crime as the triggerman He testified at the
preliminary investigation, and, after he was sentenced to death, he was the prosecution star witness during the trial of his
co-accused. His testimony against his co-accused, delineating their roles in the commission of the killing, which he had
perpetrated, fortified his plea of guilty and removed any scintilla of doubt as to his culpability and as to his understanding
of the consequences of his mea culpa (See People vs. Duaban, L-31912, August 24, 1979).

Under the circumstances, we cannot grant counsel de oficio's prayer that the judgment of conviction be set aside and that
the case be remanded to the lower court for new trial To hold a new trial. wherein Misa himself would again be the star
prosecution witness, would be a repetitious and preposterous ceremony.

The case of the Nierra spouses. — They denied any complicity in the killing of Juliana Nierra. Their version is that in the
evening of July 8, 1969, at about eight o'clock in the evening, Paciano Nierra was inside a room of his house. Gaudencia
Nierras was in her room, writing something. Eduardo Nierra, the couple's son, was alone in the sala while Encarnacion
Sabihon a housemaid, was somewhere in the house premises.

Paciano heard somebody coming up the house. When he came out of the room, he met Nolasco Docallos who said that
Juliana Nierra was shot. Paciano Nierra asked who shot her. Docallos answered that he did not know.

Docallos asked Paciano for permission to use the latter's motorcycle in going to the hospital. Paciano instructed his son
Eduardo to render assistance. Paciano could not go out because two years before he had undergone a surgical operation
in Cebu City. Gaudencia could not leave the children alone in the house. Eduardo phoned from the funeral parlor that
Juliana was already dead.

At about five-thirty in the morning of the following day, Gaudencia went to the funeral parlor. She talked with Rodelio, the
son of Juliana. Aniceto Nierra, her brother-in-law and husband of the victim, did not answer when she tried to talk with
him.

Paciano woke up at six o'clock that morning. He and his wife and their Muslim friend Pandita E. Saguil and Fernando
Erro, the uncle of Paciano, boarded a bus and went to Tupi ostensibly to buy bamboos for the outrigger of a vinta, a trip
which the Nierra spouses had previously agreed upon with Saguil. They arrived in Tupi at past ten o'clock. They were not
able to buy bamboos. They ate lunch at the Fernandez Restaurant.

The group returned to General Santos City, arriving there at two o'clock in the afternoon. They went to the funeral parlor.
They were not able to talk with Aniceto Nierra. In the evening of that day, Gaudencia led the prayers for the repose of the
soul of Juliana and she performed that task on the second, third and fourth nights. She did not lead the prayers on the
succeeding nights because she was advised that it was bad for her to do so. Their child attended the novena Paciano
could not attend the novena because he had kidney trouble. They gave one hundred pesos to Juliana's family as
contribution to the funeral expenses.

The Nierra spouses attended the funeral. During the burial, Aniceto lost consciousness and collapsed Paciano revived
him by pressing his abdomen. After the coffin was placed in the tomb, Paciano closed the niche. The Nierra spouses gave
to Aniceto an additional two hundred pesos (Pars. 5-6 and 9-15, pp. 6-11, Appellants' Brief).

Appellants Nierra contend that Misa was not a credible witness because he was a recidivist and his testimony is riddled
with inconsistencies. That contention is devoid of merit.
Misa testified against his own penal interest. The basic point in his confessions and testimony was that he was hired by
the Nierra spouses, through Doblen to kill Juliana for the price of three thousand pesos. That is sufficient for the conviction
of the Nierra spouses as the inducers of the assassination of Juliana. The discrepancies in his testimony refer to minor
details.

And the fact that the Nierra spouses did not comply with their contractual commitment to pay Misa the balance of two
thousand six hundred pesos must have impelled him to unmask them and to reveal the truth even if such a revelation
speeled his own destruction.

The contention that there was no proof of conspiracy among the accused is belied by the facts shown in the record. Misa
had no personal motive for killing Juliana Nierra. He was induced to do so because of the monetary consideration
promised by the Nierra spouses. Doblen (Simoy), married to Paciano's cousin, introduced Misa to the Nierra spouses.
Before Juliana's assassination, Gaudencia had contracted Misa to kill Nene Amador, her former housemaid, who was
allegedly Paciano's mistress. That projected killing did not materialize.

Appellants Nierra contend that Misa's testimony as to the alleged conspiracy is inadmissible in view of the rule that "the
act or declaration of a conspirator relating to the conspiracy and during its existence, may be given in evidence against
the co-conspirator after the conspiracy is shown by evidence other than such act or declaration" (Sec. 27, Rule 130, Rules
of Court).

It is argued that before Misa's testimony could be admitted as evidence against appellants Nierra, the alleged conspiracy
must first be proven by evidence other than such testimony and that there is no such independent evidence. This
argument is wrong. It is not supported by action 27 of Rule 130

Section 27 "applies only to extrajudicial acts or declarations but not to testimony given on the stand at the trial where the
defendant has the opportunity to cross-examine the declarant" (People vs. Serrano, 105 Phil. 531, 541).

Appellants Nierra contend that the trial court erred in finding that the motive for the killing was to stifle business
competition. This argument is refuted by the testimonies of Aniceto Nierra and his son Rodelio which show that Paciano
Nierra was antagonistic to his sister-in-law, Juliana, the manager or "brains" of Aniceto's transportation and coca-cola
distribution businesses.

In 1967, Paciano attempted to destroy Aniceto's launch, Elsa II, while it was under construction. Aniceto had to sell that
launch because of Paciano's threat that somebody would be hurt if its operation was continued. Pagano told Rodelio that
the latter's mother, Juliana, who was pockmarked was bad and dominated her husband Aniceto. On two occasions,
Paciano even challenged his brother to a fight.

Another contention of the appellants is that the trial court convicted them on the basis of the hearsay testimonies of
Guillermo Sanchez and Jose Samoya. This argument is misleading. The judgment of conviction was anchored principally
on the confessions and testimony of Misa, the tool used by the Nierra spouses in encompassing Juliana's death. Misa's
evidence cannot be regarded as hearsay.

The testimonies of Sanchez and Samoya merely proved that Misa, Rojas and Doblen were implicated in the killing of
Juliana Nierra. It was the affidavit of Sanchez, linking Misa to the killing, that gave the police a breakthrough in the
solution of the case. After the connection of Misa with the crime was established, the police arrested him and obtained his
confessions which implicated appellants Nierra as the investigators.

The Nierras in their fifth assignment of error contend that the trial court erred in admitting as evidence the affidavit of
appellant Vicente Rojas (Exh. J) which was obtained through an alleged promise of immunity. The record is not clear as to
that promise of immunity. Rojas' statement was taken on August 1, 1969. On August 12, he testified at the pre
investigation. The record of his testimony before the fiscal was signed by him. He was assisted by counsel at that pre
investigation. (Exh. K et seq.) No promise of immunity was shown to have been made by the fiscal to Rojas.

In any event, his affidavit is a minor piece of evidence and is cumulative in character. As already stated, the crucial and
decisive evidence consists of Misa's testimony and confessions.

Appellants Nierra complain that lawyer Cornelio Falgui acted acted the preliminary investigation as counsel of appellant
Doblen, having been allegedly hired by the offended party, Aniceto Nierra, and then at the trial, he acted as counsel de
oficio of Misa who pleaded guilty. He also appeared for Doblen (6 and 19 tsn).
The alleged double role of Falgui cannot be regarded as having unduly prejudiced appellants Nierra who, as already
noted, were convicted on the basis of Misa's confessions and testimony. The appellants have not successfully overthrown
or rebutted Misa's evidence.

It was Doblen who acted as a double agent. He was a tool of Paciano Nierra and at the same time he posed as a friend
on Aniceto Nierra by pretending that he had no hand in the assassination of Aniceto's wife.

We are convinced that the guilt of appellants Nierra was proven beyond reasonable doubt. On the night of the shooting,
Paciano Nierra and Gaudencia Nierra did not go to the funeral parlor to view the remains of Juliana.

After Paciano and Gaudencia were charged with murder, there was a confrontation between the said spouses and
Aniceto Nierra in the house of their brother, Alonso, in the presence of their other brother, Gerundio. The following
dialogue took place between Paciano and Aniceto:

Paciano: Noy, why did you suspect us to be the killers of your wife?

Aniceto: Will you still deny when Gaspar Misa pointed to you that you were standing by
the post and Paciano (Gaudencia) was also standing in a another post when he (Misa)
killed my wife. From now on I have no brother by the name of Pacing.

Paciano did not comment on his brother's accusation.

Moreover, Misa wrote the following note to Paciano when they were confined in the city jail (translation):

My companion Pacing (Paciano):

I am directly telling you and you could be sure that I will do my best that you will be free. Before the trial of
(in) court, I would like that you give me the sum of P600 even if you give the cash advance of P 500
before Sunday. OK and you give the same thru the hole.

Your
compan
ion,

(Sgd.)
Gaspar
Misa

Believe me that I will free you and burn this immediately. (Exit 1)

The above note clearly proves that Misa and Paciano were co- conspirators. The Nierras were co-principals by
inducement. By acting as lookouts during the perpetration of the killing, they became co-principals by cooperation as well.

Appeal of Doblen and Rojas. — Doblen's alibi was that on the night of the killing, he was stranded at Margos, Glan, South
Cotabato. He returned to General Santos City at ten o'clock in the morning of the following day. He denied that he
accompanied Misa to the house of Paciano Nierra on July 4, 1969 and that he delivered to Misa the package containing
the murder weapon.

Rojas' alibi was that on the night of the killing he slept in his pumpboat at Lion's Beach, General Santos City. However,
that could not have precluded him from having acted as lookout on that same beach.

These appellants, like the Nierra spouses, contend that Misa's confessions and testimony have no probative value
because there was no other evidence proving the alleged conspiracy. As already stated, that rule does not apply to
testimony given on the witness stand where the defendants have the opportunity to cross-examine the declarant (People
vs. Dacanay, 92 Phil. 872).

It is contended that Doblen was not a co-conspirator because he was not present when Misa and the Nierra spouses
discussed the liquidation of Juliana Nierra and that when Doblen delivered the package to Misa, he (Doblen) did not know
that it contained the murder weapon. As to Rojas, it is contended that he was not present at the said conference between
Misa and the Nierra spouses.

These contentions are not well-taken. The activities of Doblen and Rojas indubitably show that they had community of
design with the Nierra spouses and Misa in the assassination of Juliana Nierra.

Like appellants Nierra, Rojas' counsel de oficio contends that the trial court erred in admitting the affidavit of Rojas (Exh.
J) because it was obtained under an alleged promise of immunity.

It should be noted that Rojas' affidavit does not contain anything connecting him to the murder. In that affidavit, he denied
that he had any participation in the commission of the crime and that he conspired with Misa. So, the admission in
evidence of that affidavit did not prejudice him at all.

The killing was correctly characterized by the trial court as murder qualified by treachery and aggravated by premeditation
and price or reward. As to the Nierras, relationship is an additional aggravating circumstance.

Treachery absorbed nocturnity and abuse of superiority. The manner in which Misa liquidated Juliana Nierra added
shame, disgrace or obloquy to the material injury caused by the crime. Hence, ignominy is aggravating (U.S. vs. Abaigar 2
Phil. 417).

In Misa's case, recidivism as an aggravating circumstance offset his plea of guilty. That did not preclude the imposition of
the death penalty upon him.

Considering the aggravating circumstances, the death penalty imposed on the Nierra spouses is in accordance- with law.
However, for lack of the requisite ten votes, the death penalty imposed on Gaudencia Nierra should be commuted
to reclusion perpetua.

Doblen's role was that of having introduced Misa to the Nierra spouses and delivering the murder weapon to Misa. He
was not present at the scene of the crime. On the other hand, Rojas acted as lookout and received fifty pesos for his
work.

After a conscientious reflection on the complicity of Doblen and Rojas, we have reached the conclusion that they should
be held guilty as accomplices. It is true, strictly speaking, that as co-conspirators they should be punished as co-
principals. However, since their participation was not absolutely indispensable to the consummation of the murder, the
rule that the court should favor the milder form of liability may be applied to them (People vs. Tamayo, 44 Phil. 38 and
other cases).

In some exceptional situations, having community of design with the principal does not prevent a malefactor from being
regarded as an accomplice if his role in the perpetration of the homicide or murder was, relatively speaking, of a minor
character (See People vs. Ubiña, 97 Phil. 515; U.S. vs. Doming 1st, 37 Phil. 446; People vs. Daligdig, 89 Phil. 598;
People vs. Largo, 99 Phil. 1061).

WHEREFORE, (1) the lower court's judgment is affirmed with respect to Gaspar Misa and Paciano Nierra.

(2) The death sentence imposed on Gaudencia Nierra is communited to reclusion perpetua. The civil liability imposed
upon her by the trial court is affirmed.

(3) Appellants Felicisimo Doblen and Vicente Rojas are convicted as accomplices. They are each sentenced to an
indeterminate penalty of ten years of prision mayor medium as minimum to seventeen years of reclusion
temporal medium as maximum and to pay solidarily with the principals an indemnity of six thousand pesos (as their quota)
to the heirs of Juliana Nierra. They are each subsidiarily liable to the extent of six thousand pesos for the principals' civil
liability. Costs against the accused.

Fernando, C.J., Teehankee, Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio, Aquino, Concepcion, Jr., Fernandez, Guerrero, De Castro and
Melencio-Herrera, JJ., concur.

Abad Santos, J., took no part.

 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-30028 May 3l, 1982

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
CRESENCIO DOBLE, ET AL defendants, CRESENCIO DOBLE, SIMEON DOBLE and ANTONIO
ROMAQUIN, defendants-appellants.

DE CASTRO, J.:

This case refers to a bank robbery committed in band, with multiple homicide, multiple frustrated homicide and assault
upon agents of persons in authority, on June 14, 1966, in Navotas, Rizal. Only five of ten accused were brought to trial,
the other five named only as "John Does" in the information having remained at large. Two of the five accused who stood
trial, Mateo Raga and Celso Aquino were acquitted, while the trial court, the Court of first Instance of Rizal, imposed the
death penalty on the appellants herein, Cresencio Doble, Simeon Doble and Antonio Romaquin The decision of the trial
court is now before Us for review for having imposed the death penalty.

Both the de ficio counsel for appellants and the then Solicitor General, Hon. Felix Q. Antonio, a retired Justice of this
Court, agree that as so narrated in the appealed decision, and as quoted in appellants' brief, the relevant and material
facts accurately reflect the evidence presented, except only as to the fact that there were eight malefactors, with respect
to which appellants are not in full conformity (p. 2, Appellants' Brief).

As stated in the decision under review, the crime was committed as follows:

Late in the night of June 13, 1966, ten (10) men, almost all of them heavily armed with pistols, carbines
and Thompsons, left the shores of Manila in a motor banca and proceeded to Navotas, Rizal. "Their
mission: to rob the Navotas Branch of the Prudential Bank and Trust Company. Once in Navotas and
taking advantage of the darkness of the night, eight (8) men disembarked from the banca and proceeded
to the beach in the direction of the branch bank. Within a few minutes, shots were heard throwing the
people around in panic. As confusion reigned, the people ran in different directions scampering for safety.
As time went on, the shots grew in intensity. As the commotion died down, the eight men returned to their
banca, still fully armed and some of them carrying what looked like "bayongs". "They boarded the waiting
motor banca and sped away. As a result of the shooting, many people got killed and some injured.
Among those who were killed were agents of the law, like Sgt. Alejandro Alcala of the Philippine
Constabulary, Sgt. Eugenio Aguilos and Cpl. Teofilo Evangelista of the Navotas Police Department.
Dominador Estrella, a market collector, was also killed. 'Those who were injured were Pat. Armando
Ocampo, Exequiel Manalus Jose Fabian, Rosalina Fuerten and Pedro de la Cruz.

The Prudential Bank and Trust Company branch office located at the North hay Boulevard, Navotas,
Rizal, the object of the bloody mission, has an unusual banking hours. It opens at midnight and closes at
8:00 in the morning. The bank has ten employees, more or less, including a security guard. It has two
cages or compartments for tellers. One cage was under the care of Melvin Domingo and the other one
under the care of Alejandro San Juan. At around 12:30 a.m. of June 14, 1966, Cesar Reyes, assistant
cashier of the bank, was near the cage of Domingo when two men entered the bank asking that their
money be changed. Domingo refused, saying that they had no small denominations. Suddenly, three men
armed with long guns barged in and fired at the ceiling and the wall of the bank. They ordered the
employees to lie down, face downward and then demanded the key to the vault. When Reyes answered
that they do not have the key, the armed men aimed their guns at the vault and fired upon it until its doors
were opened. They entered the vault and found that they could not get anything as the compartments
inside the said vault were locked. Not being able to get anything from the vault, the armed men went to
the two teller cages and took whatever they could lay their hands on. Not long afterwards, the men left,
carrying with them the sum of P10,439.95.
 Just beside the bank was a police outpost. On the night in question, Pat. Nicolas Antonio was in the
outpost, together with Sgt. Aguilos, Pats. Pangan, Burgos, Rosal Ocampo and Cpl. Evangelists. were on
duty watching the fish landing. Suddenly, Antonio said, at around 1:30 a.m., he heard a burst which he
believed came from a Thompson. He said he saw a man pointing a Thompson upwards while he was in
front of the banca Afterwards, Antonio said, he heard another burst coming from the same direction.
Antonio and his companions then went to the middle of the road and again they heard shots, and this time
they were successive, coming from their left. Antonio could not see who was firing the shots. Suddenly,
he said, he saw one of this companions Cpl. Evangelista topple down. He saw also Dominador Estrella
sitting down folding his stomach. They were both felled by the shots coming from the left side of the bank.
Antonio told Ocampo to go beside the outpost and held Sgt. Aguilos by the arm. Sgt. Aguilos, however,
collapsed and fell down. He was hit. Later on, Antonio said, he went to the outpost and told Pat. Ocampo
to go too. He said that from the outpost he heard some more shots. Then he saw Ocampo hit in the thigh.
After the firing ceased, Antonio saw his wounded companions placed in a vehicle, together with
Evangelista and Aguilos who were already dead. Later on, he said he saw Sgt. Alcala, a member of the
PC, lying prostrate in the ground already dead. (pp. 83-85, Rollo).

It is noteworthy that from the above narration as to how the robbery and the killing that followed in its wake were actually
committed, the three appellants had no participation. It is not surprising that the Solicitor General has recommended the
acquittal of one of the appellants, Simeon Doble. With this recommendation, it might be well to take up the case of this
appellant ahead of the other two, appellants Antonio Romaquin and Cresencio Doble.

In recommending Simeon Doble's acquittal, the Solicitor General made the following observation:

As to appellant Simeon, the evidence shows only that the malefactors met in his house to discuss the
plan to rob the Prudential Bank This circumstance, standing alone, does not conclude his guilt beyond
reasonable doubt. The facts do not show that he performed any act tending to the perpetration of the
robbery, nor that he took a direct part therein or induced other persons to commit, or that he cooperated
in its consummation by some act without which it would not have been committed. It could be that Simeon
was present at the meeting held in his house and entered no opposition to the nefarious scheme but,
aside from this, he did not cooperate in the commission of the robbery perpetrated by the others. At most,
his act amounted to joining in a conspiracy which is not punishable. Mere knowledge, acquiescence, or
approval of the act, without cooperation or agreement to cooperate, is not enough to constitute one a
party to a conspiracy, but that there must be intentional participation in the transaction with a view to the
furtherance of the common design and purpose (15 CJS 1062).

We are, therefore, unable to agree with the finding of the lower court that Simeon was a principal both by
agreement and encouragement, despite his non-participation in the commission of the crime. Nor was it
clearly proved that Simeon received a part of the looted money as to make him an accessory.
Romaquin's testimony that the day after the robbery he gave P2.00 to Simeon who had asked for
cigarettes (p. 5, t.s.n., May 25, 1967) could hardly be considered as the latter's share of the loot. It is
significant that in his statement he claimed he had not yet received his share. (pp. 10-11, Appellee's Brief;
p. 146, Rollo).

A review of the evidence of record shows the foregoing observation of the Solicitor General to be with convincing
rationality it is only that portion in which is cited Simeon's statement made before the Navotas Police Department (Exh. I
pp. 28-29, Folder of Exhibits) that "he has not yet received his share" that detracts from the solidity of the Solicitor
General's recommendation, for it gives the impression that Simeon had given material or moral support or encouragement
to the malefactors (referring to those still at large as the principal culprits) as to entitle him to a share in the loot. However,
a reading of his whole extra-judicial statement would erase that impression, and reveals the true import of that statement
as intended only to show that Simeon had nothing to do with commission of the crime and therefore did not receive any
share of the fruits thereof. Thus, to quote pertinent portions Of his statement. on custodial investigation:

3. T — Ano ang dahilan at ikaw ay naririto?

S — Dahil po sa aking pagkakasangkot sa holdapan dito sa isang Bangko sa Navotas,

Rizal at ako ay hinuli ng mga tauhan ng M. P. D.

4. T — Kailan ka hinuli?
S — Noon pong Miyerkules ng madaling araw, hindi ko alam ang petsa pero nito pong
buwan na ito.

5. T — Mayroon ka bang nalalaman tungkol sa pagkakaholdap ng isang bangko dito sa

Navotas?

S — Ang nalalaman ko po ay doon nagpulong sa aming bahay ang mga taong

nangholdap dito sa Navotas.

6. T — Sino-sino o ilang tao ang mga nagpulong sa inyong bahay?

S — Pirmero po ay walo (8), pagkatapos ay may dumating na dalawa pa at ang mga

kilala ko lamang po ay sina Tony na may an ng bangka, si Joe Rondina Cresencio Doble
at narinig kong may tinawag pang Erning. lyon pong iba ay hindi ko alam ang pangalan
pero makikilala ko Pag aking nakitang muli.

7. T — Gaano katagal na nagpulong sa inyong bahay ang mga taong ito?

S — Mahigit pong mga isang (1) oras pero hatinggabi na nong Lunes ng gabi (June 13,
1966).

8. T — Ano ang mga bagay na pinagpulongan sa inyong bahay?

S — Tungkol sa kanilang lakad na pagpunta sa isang bangko sa Navotas,

9. T — Sino ang nangunguna sa pulong na iyon?

S — Iyan po (witness pointing to the picture of Rodolfo Dizon, after being shown five (5)
other pictures).

10. T — Ano-ano ang mga narinig mong pinagpulongan?

S — Tungkol po doon sa gagawing pagnanakaw sa isang Bangko sa Navotas, Rizal.

11. T — Samantalang sila ay nagpupulong, ano ang iyong ginagawa?

S — Wala po, hindi ko sila sinasaway at hindi ako kumikibo bastat ako ay nakikinig
lamang.

12. T — Bukod sa narinig mong magnanakaw sa bangko na usapan, ano pa ang iba
mong mga narinig?

S — Sinabi nito (witness pointing to the picture of Rodolfo Dizon) at ni Jose Rondina na
"MALAKING KUARTA TO, PERO MASYADONG MAPANGANIB, AT KAILANGAN AY
HANDA TAYO."

13. T — Ano pa ang sumunod?

S — Nagbubulong-bulongan ang iba tungkol doon sa gagawing paglaban.

14. T — Ano pa ang nangyari?

S — Maya-maya po ay lumakad na sila, hindi ako sumama.

15. T — Pagkatapos?

S — Makaraan po ang mahigit na isang (1) oras ay nagbalik silang lahat.

 16. T — Ano ang nangyari ng magbalik na sila?

S — Matapos po silang bumaba doon sa malapit sa aming bahay ay nagmamadali na

silang umalis dahil sa may tama ang isa sa kanila. At noon pong umaga ng araw na iyon
ay nagpunta ako kay Tony (Antonio Romaquin at kumuha ng dalawang piso (P2.00) dahil
iyong aking parte ay hindi pa naibibigay sa akin. Pagkatapos po ay umuwi na ako sa
amin.

17. T — Ano pa ang iyong masasabi kaugnay ng pangyayaring ito. Ikaw ba ay mayroong
nais na alisin o dili kaya ay baguhin sa salaysay mong ito?

S — Mayroon pa po akong ibig na sabihin.

18. T — Ano pa ang ibig mong sabihin?

S — Bago po tuluyang umalis sila sa aking bahay ay nag-usap-usap silang lahat at ako
ay sumama sa kanilang pag-uusap at nakapagbigay pa ako ng mungkahi na ako na
lamang ang maghihintay sa kanila dahil sa ako ay may pinsala sa paa at maaaring hindi
ako makatakbo at qqqmahuh lamang.

19. T — Iyan bang pinsala mo sa kaliwang paa ay matagal na?

S — Opo, may limang (5) taon na.

20. T — Samantalang nag-uusap sa loob ng bahay mo, nasaan ka?

S — Kasama po sa loob ng aking bahay.

21. T — Ano pa ang masasabi mo?

S — Wala na po.

The only link between Simeon and the crime is his house having been used as the meeting place of the malefactors for
their final conference before proceeding to Navotas to rob the Prudential Bank branch thereat. He did not join them
because of a qqq5yeat old foot injury which would make him only a liability, not one who can help in the devilish venture.
To the malefactors he was most unwanted to join them. If they met at his house it was only because it was near the
landing place of the banca, and so he invited them to his house while waiting for the banca to arrive. His mere presence in
his house where the conspirators met, and for merely telling them that he could not join them because of his foot injury,
and will just wait for them; evidently as a mere gesture of politeness in not being able to join them in their criminal
purpose, for he could not be of any help in the attainment thereof, and also to avoid being suspected that he was against
their vicious plan for which they may harm him, Simeon is by no means a co-conspirator, not having even taken active
part in the talks among the malefactors in his house.

Like the Solicitor General, We, therefore, find no culpable participation of Simeon Doble in the commission of the crime,
for, indeed, by his physical condition alone, he could not in any way be of help to the malefactors in the pursuit of their
criminal design, nor could he have been desired by the latter to be one of them.

Taking up next the case of appellants Antonio Romaquin and Cresencio Doble, their main contention is that their
extrajudicial statements upon which their conviction was principally made to rest, are inadmissible for having been
allegedly obtained by force and intimidation, and in violation of basic constitutional rights to counsel and against self-
incrimination. In support of this contention, appellants have only their own self-serving testimony to rely upon.

Thus, Cresencio Doble testified that while at the Navotas police department someone he could not name boxed him on
the chest, while one Sgt. Lacson hit him on the left side with the butt of a gun causing him to lose consciousness; that he
was made to lie on a narrow table and peppery liquid was poured over his face, his eyesight then becoming dim, and it
was then that he was made to sign a piece of paper which he could not read because of his blurred eyesight.
Romaquin gave a similar story of torture and maltreatment in order to force him to admit culpable participation in the heist.
The inquiry must, accordingly, be whether the claim of violence and involuntariness of their statements is true as to render
said statements inadmissible in evidence.

Disputing the allegation of maltreatment in the execution of the custodial statements (Exhibits E, F, F-1, G, H-1), the
Solicitor General argues that the same is negated by how the details as given by both appellants in their respective
statements fit into each other, at least as to the part played by each from the time Cresencio went to Romaquin's place to
procure the latter's banca up to their get-away from the scene of the crime. Thus, while Romaquin claimed in his
statement that although he wanted to escape from the scene after his passengers have disembarked for their evil mission,
he could not do so because Cresencio had a gun pointed at him to prevent his escape, as was the order given Cresencio
by the rest of the gang. The latter denied this allegation when he testified that he returned the gun given him because he
did not know how to use or manipulate it, although in his extra- judicial statement (Exhibit M, p. 35, Record of Exhibits), he
stated that he accepted the gun.

The statement of Romaquin as just cited in an attempt to exculpate himself which is generally taken as an indication of
lack of undue pressure exerted on one while giving his statement on custodial interrogation. (People vs. Palencia, 71
SCRA 679).

The Solicitor General also observed, in disputing the claim of violent maltreatment to which appellant's were subjected to,
that neither one of the appellants presented medical certificate to attest to the injuries allegedly inflicted (p. 3, Appellee's
Brief) which disproves the claim (People vs. Tuazon, 6 SCRA 249; People vs. Dela Cruz, 88 Phil. 79). He also points to
the fact that in his extrajudicial statement (Exhibit M, p. 35, Record of Exhibits), Celso Aquino, one of the accused, made
no admission of his participation in the bold bank robbery, and in his testimony in court, he admitted that no violence was
applied to him when he gave his statement (p. 12, t.s.n., July 12, 1967; p. 4, Appellee's Brief). 'This is evidence enough
that the appellants could not have been dealt with differently as their co-accused Aquino who was allowed to give his
statement freely without the employment of force or intimidation upon him. The evidence also disclosed a note (Exhibit E)
of Cresencio addressed to Romaquin asking the latter not to reveal the names of their companions. This means that the
names of the members of the band led by Joe Intsik must have been known to both appellants. That the Identity of five of
those charged in this case has remained only as "John Does" indicate the non-employment of any coercive means with
which to force them into revealing the names of their companions in the robbery, again negating the claim of torture and
violence.

It is, likewise, to be noted that appellants Romaquin and Cresencio virtually confirmed their extra-judicial statements when
they testified in court. By all the proofs as cited, persuasive enough to show the voluntariness of their custodial statements
plus the positive denial of Sgt. Lacson, the only one named among the alleged torturers, that any violence was practiced
by the investigators, specifically, the alleged delivery of fist blows on Cresencio. (pp. 3, 6, 7, 18, t.s.n., October 27, 1967)
the alleged involuntariness of the extra-judicial statements is fully discredited.

It is hinted that the killing of suspect Rodolfo Dizon while allegedly attempting to escape could have instilled fear in the
minds of the appellants which affected their freedom of will in giving their own statements (p. 12, Appellant's Brief). This is
a far-fetched argument to prove involuntariness in the giving of the statements, the killing having taken place after their
interrogation. In his supplemental statement dated July 5, 1966 Exhibits F-2, p. 20, Record of Exhibits), Romaquin pointed
to the person of Rodolfo Dizon. His death therefore, took place long after appellants have given their main statements, all
in mid June, 1966. If counsel de oficio had only bothered to check the dates of the main statements of both appellants
which were given not later than just past the middle of June, 1966, and that of the supplementary statement of Romaquin
which is July 5, 1966, he would not have probably come forth with this argument.

Counsel de oficio, invoking a ruling in an American case, Miranda vs. Arizona, 16 L. Ed. 2nd. 694, harps on the
inadmissibility of appellants' custodial statements, for their having been unaided by counsel, nor informed of their right
thereto during the interrogation. 'There might be merit in this contention were the right to counsel during custodial
interrogation one of constitutional grant as is provided in our 1973 Constitution, before which the right was given only to
an accused, not to a mere suspect during in-custody police interrogation (Magtoto vs. Manguera 63 SCRA 4; People vs.
Dumdum Jr. G. R. No. L-35279, July 30, 1979). At the time of their custodial interrogation in 1966, however, the requisite
of assistance of counsel was not yet made a matter of constitutional right, as it has been granted only by the new 1973
Constitution.

The right against self-incrimination, as invoked by appellants, can neither be appreciated to impair the admissibility of their
extra-judicial statements. It is the voluntariness of an admission or confession that determines its admissibility, for no
principle of law or constitutional precept should stand on the way of allowing voluntary admission of one's guilt, the only
requisite justly demanded being that ample safeguard be taken against involuntary confessions. Once the element of
voluntariness is convincingly established, which, incidentally, is even presumed, the admissibility of an extra-judicial
confession, admission or statement becomes unquestionable. 1

The extra-judicial statements of appellants, however, when evaluated with the testimony they gave in court, would
convince Us that their liability is less than that of a co-principal by conspiracy or by actual participation, as as was the
holding of the trial court. The most damaging admission made in the extra-judicial statements of Cresencio is that he was
asked by Joe Intsik, the gang leader, at 8:00 o'clock in the evening of June 13, 1966, if he could procure a banca for his
use, and that Joe Intsik, on being asked by Cresencio, allegedly told him that the banca would be used for robbery.
Cresencio gave an affirmative answer to Joe Intsik's query, having in mind Tony Romaquin who had a banca. Cresencio
accompanied Joe Intsik to Romaquin at 12:00 in the evening. In Romaquin's statement (Exh. C also Exh. 1, Romaquin, p.
15, Record of Exhibits), Cresencio allegedly asked him to bring his friends in his banca, to board a launch for a trip to
Palawan. The discrepancy between the statements of Cresencio and Romaquin as to the intended use of the banca is at
once apparent, for while according to the former, it was for the commission of robbery, according to the latter, it was to
bring Cresencio's friends to board a launch for a trip to Palawan. What is demonstrated thereby is the full freedom with
which both appellants were allowed to give their respective statements while in custodial interrogation.

Cresencio's consenting to look for a banca, however, did not necessarily make him a co-conspirator. Neither would it
appear that Joe Intsik wanted to draft Cresencio into his band of malefactors that would commit the robbery more than
just asking his help to look for a banca. Joe Intsik had enough men all with arms and weapons to perpetrate the crime, the
commission of which needed planning and men to execute the plan with full mutual confidence of each other, which is not
shown with respect to appellants by the way they were asked to look and provide for a banca just a few hours before the
actual robbery.

Romaquin, for his part, appears not to be known to the principal malefactors still at large, to be asked to join actively in the
conspiracy. The amount received by Romaquin who alone was given money by the malefactors in the sum of P441.00,
indicate that the latter did not consider appellant as their confederate in the same character as those constituting the band
of robbers. The sum given to Romaquin could very well represent only the rental of his banca, and for the cooperation he
extended to the malefactors, which, by no means, is an indispensable one. Cresencio, on the other hand, was not given
any part of the loot. It was only Romaquin who gave him P4 1.00, clearly not what should represent his share if he were a
full-fledged ally or confederate.

The apprehension of the malefactors that upon realizing the full impact of their vicious misdeeds, Romaquin might speed
away from the scene in fear of being implicated, as shown by the measure they had taken to prevent his escape, is further
proof that Romaquin was not considered a co-conspirator, who is one who should not be looked upon with mistrust. For
his part, Cresencio testified that while he was given a gun with which to cover Romaquin who might escape, he returned
the gun because he did not know how to use it, and so one of the malefactors was left near the beach to prevent
appellants fleeing from the scene of the crime with banca. In his statement, however, (Exh. M, p. 35, Record of Exhibits),
he refused to accept the gun, but they gave it just the same, and he received it.

The circumstances pointed out would not make appellants liable as co-principals in the crime charged. At the most their
liability would be that of mere accomplices. They joined in the criminal design when Cresencio consented to look for a
banca and Romaquin provided it when asked by the gang leader Joe Intsik, and then brought the malefactors to the
scene of the robbery, despite knowledge of the evil purpose for which the banca was to be used. It was the banca that
brought the malefactors to the bank to be robbed and carried them away from the scene after the robbery to prevent their
apprehension. Appellants thus cooperated but not in an indispensable manner. Even without appellants providing the
banca, the robbery could have been committed, specially with the boldness and determination shown by the robbers in
committing the crime.

The complicity of appellant Cresencio is further shown by his note (Exhibit "H", p. 26, Record of Exhibits) addressed to
Romaquin asking him not to reveal to the police the names of their companions. He went to Romaquin and asked for
money which the latter gave in the sum of P41.00, as if to show that he had helped in some material way to deserve a
share in the loot.

As to Romaquin, while he testified that the malefactors gave a gun to Cresencio with which the latter would prevent
Romaquin from fleeing away from the scene, evidently to show that he never joined in the criminal purpose, and that all
his acts were in fear of bodily harm and therefore, not voluntary, the measure taken by the malefactors to prevent his
escape, could have been just an extra precaution, lest he would be stricken with fear in the course of the commission of
the crime specially if attended by shootings as it was really so. If it is true that he never voluntarily made the trip with
knowledge of the planned robbery, and with Cresencio saying that he returned the gun given him with which to prevent
Romaquin from speeding away, Romaquin could have tried a get-away, as should have been his natural impulse had he
not joined in the criminal design. His act of hiding the money he received from the malefactors, and repainting his boat, all
attest to his guilty conscience arising from the act of cooperation he knowingly extended to the principal culprit to achieve
their criminal purpose.

An accomplice is one who, not being principal as defined in Article 17 of the Revised Penal Code, cooperates in the
execution of the offense by previous or simultaneous acts (Art. 18, Revised Penal Code). There must be a Community of
unlawful purpose between the principal and accomplice and assistance knowingly and intentionally given (U.S. vs. Belco
11 Phil. 526), to supply material and moral aid in the consummation of the offense and in as efficacious way (People vs.
Tamayo, 44 Phil. 38). In this case, appellants' cooperation is like that of a driver of a car used for abduction which makes
the driver a mere accomplice, as held in People vs. Batalan 45 Phil. 573, citing the case of U.S. vs. Lagmay, G.R. No. L-
15009.

It is however, not established by the evidence that in the meeting held in the house of Simeon Doble, the malefactors had
agreed to kill, if necessary to carry out successfully the plan to rob. What appellants may be said to have joined is the
criminal design to rob, which makes them accomplices. Their complicity must, accordingly, be limited to the robbery, not
with the killing. Having been left in the banca, they could not have tried to prevent the killing, as is required of one seeking
relief from liability for assaults committed during the robbery (Art. 296. Revised Penal Code). 2

The finding that appellants are liable as mere accomplices may appear too lenient considering the gravity and viciousness
of the offense with which they were charged. The evidence, however, fails to establish their complicity by a previous
conspiracy with the real malefactors who actually robbed the bank and killed and injured several persons, including peace
officers. The failure to bring to justice the real and actual culprits of so heinous a crime should not bring the wrath of the
victims nor of the outraged public, upon the heads of appellants whose participation has not been shown to be as
abominable as those who had gone into hiding. The desire to bring extreme punishment to the real culprits should not
blind Us in meting out a penalty to appellants more than what they justly deserve, and as the evidence warrants.

Accordingly, We find appellants Cresencio Doble and Antonio Romaquin guilty beyond reasonable doubt, but only as
accomplices for the crime of robbery in band. 3 As discussed earlier, appellant Simeon Doble is entitled to acquittal as so
recommended by the Solicitor General who finds no sufficient evidence, to which We agree, to establish his guilt beyond
reasonable doubt.

The penalty imposable upon appellants Cresencio Doble and Antonio Romaquin, as accomplices for the crime of robbery
in band is prision mayor  minimum which has a range of 6 years, 1 day to 8 years as provided ill Article 295 of the Revised
Penal Code in relation to Article 294, paragraph 5 of the same code. The commission of the crime was aggravated by
nighttime and the use of a motorized banca. There being no mitigating circumstance, both appellants should each be
sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of from five (5) years, four (4) months, twenty-one (21) days of prision
correccional  to eight (8) years of prision mayor as maximum, and to indemnify the heirs of each of the deceased in the
sum of 1112,000.00 not P6,000.00 as imposed by the trial court.

WHEREFORE, modified as above indicated, the judgment appealed from is affirmed in all other respects. The immediate
release of Simeon Doble who is hereby acquitted is ordered, unless he should be continued in confinement for some
other legal cause. Proportionate costs against Cresencio Doble and Antonio Romaquin.

SO ORDERED.

Barredo, Makasiar, Guerrero, Melencio-Herrera, Vasquez, and Gutierrez, JJ., concur.

Aquino and Escolin, JJ., took no part.

Separate Opinions

ABAD SANTOS, J.,  concurring and dissenting:

Giving to Cresencio Doble and Antonio Romaquin the benefit of a lenient attitude, I can agree that they were not
principals but merely accomplices as stated in the main opinion. However, I cannot persuade myself that their complicity
must be limited to the robbery only and should not include the killing. For it must be remembered that the principal
malefactors were each fully armed; the arms consisted of pistols, carbines and Thompson sub-machine guns, This fact
was known to the appellants. In fact the principal malefactors has so many guns that one was given to Cresencio with
which to cover Antonio in case he tried to escape. This shows that the principal malefactors were prepared to kill even an
accomplice so that they could accomplish their criminal objective. How then can it be said that there was no criminal
design to kill but only to rob among the principal malefactors as suggested in the main opinion. And I cannot believe that
under the circumstances the appellants were unaware of the criminal design to kill and that they gave their cooperation —
albeit not indispensable — only — to the robbery. Accordingly, I believe that the appellants should be held guilty as
accomplices in the crime of robbery with homicide.

Fernando, J., I concur with the separate opinion of Justice Vicente Abad Santos.

Concepcion, Jr., J., previously voted to concur with the main opinion.

Relova, J., I concur in the dissent of Justice Abad Santos.

Separate Opinions

ABAD SANTOS, J.,  concurring and dissenting:

Giving to Cresencio Doble and Antonio Romaquin the benefit of a lenient attitude, I can agree that they were not
principals but merely accomplices as stated in the main opinion. However, I cannot persuade myself that their complicity
must be limited to the robbery only and should not include the killing. For it must be remembered that the principal
malefactors were each fully armed; the arms consisted of pistols, carbines and Thompson sub-machine guns, This fact
was known to the appellants. In fact the principal malefactors has so many guns that one was given to Cresencio with
which to cover Antonio in case he tried to escape. This shows that the principal malefactors were prepared to kill even an
accomplice so that they could accomplish their criminal objective. How then can it be said that there was no criminal
design to kill but only to rob among the principal malefactors as suggested in the main opinion. And I cannot believe that
under the circumstances the appellants were unaware of the criminal design to kill and that they gave their cooperation —
albeit not indispensable — only — to the robbery. Accordingly, I believe that the appellants should be held guilty as
accomplices in the crime of robbery with homicide.

Fernando, J., I concur with the separate opinion of Justice Vicente Abad Santos.

Concepcion, Jr., J., previously voted to concur with the main opinion.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 34386             February 7, 1991

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
LUDOVICO C. DOCTOLERO alias "ECOY," CONRADO C. DOCTOLERO alias "CONDRING," and VIRGILIO C.
DOCTOLERO alias "VERGEL," accused-appellants.

The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

Hermogenes S. Decano for accused-appellants.

REGALADO, J.:

Accused-appellants Ludovico Doctolero and his brothers, Conrado and Virgilio Doctolero, charged with and convicted in
the then Court of First Instance, Branch II, Pangasinan, of the crime of multiple murder and unspecified physical injuries,
appealed from the decision of the court a quo the decretal portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the court finds the accused Ludovico Doctolero guilty as principal, and his
co-accused Conrado Doctolero and Virgilio Doctolero guilty as accomplices, in committing the crime of Murder,
which caused the death of Epifania Escosio, Lolita de Guzman Oviedo and Marcelo Doctolero, and in inflicting
physical injury on the minor child, Jonathan Oviedo. Accordingly, in the absence of other circumstances to
mitigate the penalty, the accused Ludovico Doctolero is sentenced to suffer the penalty of three (3) LIFE
IMPRISONMENTS (CADENA PERPETUA) for the deaths of Epifania Escosio, Lolita de Guzman Oviedo and
Marcelo Doctolero, and the additional penalty of 4 Months and 1 Day to 6 Months of arresto mayor, for inflicting
slight physical injury to (sic) the minor child, Jonathan Oviedo. The accused Conrado Doctolero and Virgilio
Doctolero, as accomplices, are sentenced to suffer the penalty of 10 years and 1 Day of prision mayor to 17
Years and 4 months of reclusion temporal, for the death of Epifania Escosio; the penalty of 10 Years and 1 Day
of prision mayor to 17 Years and 4 Months of reclusion temporal, for the death of Lolita de Guzman Oviedo: the
penalty of 10 Years and 1 Day of  prision mayor to 17 Years and 4 Months of reclusion temporal, for the death of
Marcelo Doctolero; and the additional penalty of 2 Months and 1 Day to 4 Months of arresto mayor for the slight
physical injury suffered by the minor child, Jonathan Oviedo. All accused Ludovico, Conrado and Virgilio all
surnamed Doctolero, are ordered to indemnify the heirs of the deceased Epifania Escosio, in the sum of
P12,000.00; the heirs of the deceased Lolita de Guzman Oviedo, in the sum of P12,000.00; and the heirs of the
deceased Marcelo Doctolero, in the sum of P12,000.00; and to pay three-fourths (3/4) of the costs. The accused
Antonio Doctolero is acquitted, with one-fourth (1/4) cost de oficio.1

The information filed against appellants alleges that the crime was committed as follows:

That on or about the 8th day of November, 1970, in barrio Binday, municipality of San Fabian, province of
Pangasinan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused, armed
with bolos, went up the house of Marcial Sagun and once thereat, conspiring together and mutually aiding one
another, with intent to kill and with evident premeditation and treachery, with abuse of superior strength and with
extreme cruelty, did, then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault, hack, stab and strike Lolita
de Guzman Oviedo, Epifania Escosio and Jonathan Oviedo and immediately thereafter, the same accused while
already on the road, conspiring together and mutually aiding one another, with intent to kill and with evident
premeditation and treachery, attack, assault, hack and stab Marcelo Doctolero, thereby inflicting upon him
multiple mortal wounds which caused his death.2

Upon arraignment, all the appellants pleaded not guilty to the crimes charged. In its decision, the trial court made the
following findings and a summary of the evidence for the prosecution thus:
 It is undisputed that on the evening of November 8, 1970, Epifania Escosio and Lolita de Guzman were killed in
the house of Marcial Sagun in Sitio Binday, municipality of San Fabian, province of Pangasinan, where they were
living. Jonathan Oviedo, 1 1/2 year old child of Lolita de Guzman, was on the same occasion, slightly injured while
being fed on the breast of his mother. On the road, a few meters from the house of Marcial Sagun, Marcelo
Doctolero, 81 years old, was fatally injured. He was taken to the Pangasinan Provincial Hospital but he died on
the way. . . .

The evidence for the prosecution tend to show that the three (3) accused, Ludovico, Conrado and Virgilio, all
surnamed Doctolero, were responsible for the death(s) of Epifania Escosio and Lolita de Guzman, and in inflicting
physical injuries to (sic) Jonathan Oviedo. And immediately thereafter, with their father and co-accused, Antonio
Doctolero, they hacked Marcelo Doctolero, with their bolos which caused the death of the latter.

The principal witnesses for the prosecution are: Marcial Sagun, his wife Maria Sagun, and Paciencia Sagun-
Diamoy. According to Marcial Sagun, at about 6:30 in the evening on November 8, 1970, he and his wife, Maria
Oviedo-Sagun and Lolita de Guzman-Oviedo (sister-in-law of Maria Oviedo-Sagun) were on their way home to
Barrio Binday. They came from the field where they bundled their harvests. Upon reaching a crossing of the road
in Bo. Binday they met the accused Ludovico Doctolero who, without warning and without cause or reason, held
the left shoulder of Marcial Sagun with his left hand and struck Marcial Sagun with a bolo. The latter evaded that
blow and wrestled with Ludovico Doctolero for possession of the bolo of the latter. Lolita de Guzman-Oviedo
became frightened when Ludovico Doctolero and Marcial Sagun were wrestling for the possession of the bolo of
the former, so she ran away in the direction of the house in Sitio Binday.

Paciencia Sagun-Diamoy (sister of Marcial Sagun) testified that while she was cleaning palay in the yard of her
uncle, the deceased Marcelo Doctolero, she saw the accused, Ludovico. Conrado and Virgilio (all surnamed
Doctolero) throw stones at the house of Marcial Sagun. While throwing stones, Ludovico allegedly shouted for the
man in the house to come out. Paciencia Sagun-Diamoy went towards the house of Marcial Sagun and saw the
three accused, Ludovico, Conrado and Virgilio, coming down from the house going towards her. She told them:
"Why can't you be patient and forget?" But she was asked not to interfere. At about that time, Marcelo Doctolero,
half-brother of Antonio Doctolero, and uncle of the three accused was going towards the house of Marcial Sagun,
when he met the three accused, Ludovico, Conrado and Virgilio. Marcelo Doctolero told them why they can't be
patient and forget, but the three accused replied "Vulva of your mother, we will also kill you." Then they struck
Marcelo Doctolero several times with their bolos. And when their father Antonio Doctolero arrived, he also struck
Marcelo Doctolero with a bolo on the head. Marcelo Doctolero fell and then all the accused ran away.

The testimony of Paciencia Sagun-Diamoy is sought to be corroborated by the testimony of Maria Oviedo-Sagun
(wife of Marcial Sagun) who declared that while she was in the house of Marcelo Doctolero, to whom she reported
the incident between Ludovico Doctolero and Marcial Sagun, she saw the three accused Ludovico, Conrado and
Virgilio throwing stones at their house and called to all the men in the house to come out. She was about to go to
their house to get her children but she saw the three accused Ludovico, Conrado and Virgilio going up. So she hid
behind the palm tree, a few meters away from their house. While there, she heard Epifania Escosio (her adopted
mother) shouting at her, saying "Enieng, your children." Then she saw the three accused coming down from the
house, going towards the road where they met Marcelo Doctolero whom they also boloed several times until he
fell. When Antonio Doctolero arrived, he also struck Marcelo Doctolero with a bolo. Then they all left. 3

On the other hand, appellants present the following version:

On November 8, 1970, at about 6:00 o'clock in the evening, Ludovico Doctolero met at the crossing of Bo.
Banana and Binday road, San Fabian, Pangasinan. Marcial Sagun, who was with his wife, Maria Oviedo, Antonio
Oviedo and the latter's wife, Lolita de Guzman. Antonio Oviedo is the brother-in-law of Marcial Sagun, he being
the brother of Maria Oviedo. (tsn, p. 7 hearing, February 17, 1971-Somera). Marcial Sagun and company were on
their way home. (p. 8,  Ibid).

Ludovico greeted Marcial Sagun: "Where have you been cousin." (p. 8, ibid) He noticed, however, Antonio Oviedo
holding his bolo on his waist. So, he asked his cousin Marcial Sagun why Antonio Oviedo was like that. The latter
unsheathed his bolo and boloed Ludovico with a downward swing. He parried the bolo with his left hand (p.
9, ibid), but he was hurt in the process (p. 10, ibid).

At that juncture, Marcial Sagun unsheathed his bolo and Ludovico Doctolero also unsheathed his bolo. They
watched each other's step (p. 10, ibid) with the two women, Lolita de Guzman and Maria Oviedo, hitting the back
 of Ludovico with a wood (sic). The latter ignored them, as his eyes were towards Marcial Sagun and his brother-
in-law, Antonio Oviedo (p. 11, ibid).

Realizing that he could not afford to fight both Marcial Sagun and Antonio Oviedo, Ludovico tried to escape by
boloing Maria Oviedo, whom he hit at the back. He retreated and then run (sic) away, with Marcial Sagun and
Antonio Oviedo throwing stones at him. (p. 12, ibid).

Ludovico went to the house of his father, Antonio Doctolero. The latter was eating his meal, together with his
small children upstairs, while accused-appellant, Conrado Doctolero was in the kitchen downstairs also eating his
meal, when Ludovico arrived (p. 13, ibid; p. 4, hearing June 8, 1971-Salazar).

He told his father that he was wounded and asked him to look after his children as he might meet something bad
that night. He did not enter the house anymore: he was only until the door. Then he ran away. His father asked
him what happened, but he did not answer anymore. (p. 14, ibid, p. 4, Salazar).

He ran towards his house, taking a short cut by passing through the house of his cousins, Juanito and Cresencia
Doctolero. As he came near his house, he saw the house of Marcial Sagun, who was also his immediate
neighbor. His blood boiled. He went to Marcial's house calling him to get down. When Marcial did not get down,
he peeped and noticed that Marcial Sagun was not there. So he went upstairs to ask Epifania Escosio, who told
him that Marcial Sagun went towards the South. He was about to leave when the old woman hit him at the back of
his neck, causing him to see darkness and (he) boloed her several times (p. 13-19, tsn, hearing, February 17,
1971).

Ludovico went downstairs to look for Marcial Sagun. He stayed a while at the trunk of the buri tree, thinking that
he might be ambushed. Here, he did not notice anyone coming from the south or the east. So he tried to move,
but as he did so, he noticed someone approaching him coming from the yard of Marcelo Doctolero. As it was dark
he did not recognize the man and thinking that it was Marcial Sagun, he met him. It turned out however, that the
man was Marcelo Doctolero. So he returned the bolo he was holding in its scabbard. He asked Marcelo Doctolero
where Marcial Sagun was, but Marcelo Doctolero answered him, "because of your foolishness" and hit him on the
shoulder, but in the process of evading the blow, Ludovico Doctolero was hit at the back. As Marcelo Doctolero
tried to hit him for a second time he took a side step and took hold of the stick and pulled it away, causing Marcelo
Doctolero to fall on his knees. He was able to get the club, but Marcelo Doctolero unsheathed Ms bolo. When the
latter insisted on unsheathing his bolo, Ludovico Doctolero boloed him many times. (pp. 19-26, ibid).4

The police were then informed of the brutal murders as well as the injury caused to the child. A doctor and a photographer
went to the scene of the crime and pictures were then taken. 5

Quoting from the findings of the Rural Health Officer of San Fabian, the court below established that ––

. . . nine (9) wounds were inflicted on the body of Marcelo Doctolero, namely:

x x x           x x x          x x x

(1) Incised wound, 5 inches from the upper border of the left ear to the side of the forehead. There is fracture of
the underlying skull.

(2) Incised wound 6 inches in length 1 1/2 inches above the 1st wound with fracture of the underlying skull.

(3) Incised wound 4 inches in length 1/2 inch above the 2nd wound with fracture of the underlying skull.

(4) Incised wound 6 inches in length from the upper border of the left eyebrow to the right eyebrow. There is also
fracture of the underlying skull.

(5) Incised wound –– 3 1/2 inches in length 1 1/2 from the angle of the month towards the lower border of the right
ear. The lower lobe of the ear is detached.

(6) The lower third of the left small finger is almost cut off.

(7) Incised wound at the median portion of the left hand. There is a severance from the level of the middle finger.
 (8) Incised wound –– 1 1/2 inches long at the median portion and distal 3rd of the forearm, left.

(9) Incised wound 1 1/2 inches long above the 8th wound.

x x x           x x x          x x x

One wound was inflicted on the body of Lolita de Guzman, namely, "stab wound around 3 cms. long and 4 inches
in depth at the 2nd intercostal space just at the left border of the sternal bone." (Exh. C). And nine (9) wounds
were inflicted on the body of Epifania, namely:

x x x           x x x          x x x

(1) Stab wound around 4 cms. in length and around 5 inches deep penetrating the sternal bone at the level of the
2nd intercostal space.

(2) Incised wound 3 inches in length just skin deep at the level of the right clavicular region.

(3) Incised wound 2 inches in length also skin deep one inch below the second wound.

(4) Chopping wound 3 inches in circumference with fracture of the underlying skull at the right frontal portion of
the head.

(5) Incised wound around one inch length at the left frontal portion of the head.

(6) Incised wound 3 inches long just at the level of the shoulder joint, exposing the bony portion, left.

(7) Incised wound one inch long 1/2 inch below the sixth wound.

(8) Incised wound one inch long 4 inches below the seventh wound.

(9) Incised wound around 3 inches in length at the base and lateral portion of the hand right. There was fracture of
some of the underlying bones.6

Regarding the wounds inflicted upon Jonathan Oviedo, the resident physician at the Pangasinan Provincial Hospital, Dr.
Rodolfo Ramirez, explained the same as follows: "Stab wound, thru and thru, about 1 1/2 inches on the lateral aspect of
the dischartered forearm, right. Then, there was another about 1 inch of the middle aspect of the right forearm. There was
also an incised wound, about 1/2 inch, temporal right." He further testified that the child was admitted to the hospital on
November 8, 1970 and was discharged completely healed fifteen (15) days later. 7

During the pendency of the present petition and on motion of appellant Ludovico Doctolero, on May 17, 1976 the Court
resolved to grant the withdrawal of his appeal8

and entry of judgment with regard to said accused was made on the same day. 9

In a resolution dated June 28, 1988, the Court noted the manifestation of counsel for accused-appellants, dated May 9,
1988, stating that Virgilio Doctolero died on October 22, 1983 as per death certificate attached thereto as Annex
"A".10 Hence, this review is only with respect to the liability of appellant Conrado Doctolero.

The trial court correctly found that appellant Conrado Doctolero participated as an accomplice in the commission of the
crimes charged. In his defense, appellant denies having participated in the commission thereof and raises the effete
defense of alibi, contending that he was not at the place where the crimes were committed. Appellant's pretension,
however, was not corroborated by any evidence other than the testimony of the other erstwhile appellants. While the
testimony of a co-conspirator or an accomplice is admissible, such testimony comes from a polluted source and must be
scrutinized with great caution as it is subject to travel suspicion. 11

This uncorroborated denial of his participation cannot overthrow the positive and categorical testimony of the principal
witnesses of the prosecution, and between the positive declarations of the prosecution Witness and the negative
statements of the accused, the former deserves more credence. 12
There is no showing that the witnesses had any motive to testify falsely against appellants. The only imputed grudge that
Paciencia Sagun-Diamoy may have had against appellants occurred years ago and she was, at the time she testified, on
good terms with appellants as shown by the following testimony of Ludovico Doctolero himself:

Q And even before Paciencia Sagun Diamoy testified as one of the prosecution witness (sic) your relationship
with her was harmonious and rather very closed (sic) being your cousin?

A Yes, sir.

Q As a matter of fact, whenever she goes to San Fabian to visit her relatives she did not fail to see you in your
house?

A Yes, sir sometimes she slept in my house.13

As to Maria Sagun, we agree with the court a quo when it held that "Maria Sagun (wife of Marcial Sagun) pointed to the
three accused. Ludovico, Conrado and Virgilio, all surnamed Doctolero, as the persons who went up her house that night
of November 8, 1970. While Maria Sagun may have a grudge against the accused Ludovico Doctolero by reason of that
previous incident at the crossing yet, no reason or motive is shown why Maria Sagun should also implicate Conrado and
Virgilio Doctolero in the commission of the crime."14

When there is nothing in the records which would show a motive or reason on the part of the witnesses to falsely implicate
the accused, identification should be given full credit. 15

And when there is no evidence and nothing to indicate that the principal witness for the prosecution was moved by
improper motives, the presumption is that he was not so moved, and his testimony is entitled to full faith and credit. 16

In an attempt to disprove the findings of the trial court, appellant points to certain inconsistencies that allegedly render the
testimonies of the prosecution witnesses incredible. These inconsistencies, however, are not so substantial as to destroy
their credibility. As correctly explained by the People, the seeming contradictions and minor inconsistencies in the
testimonies of the prosecution witness pointed out by the appellants in their brief are mere inconsequential variations on
the part of each observer in relating his own observation of the same incident. Contradictions and inconsistencies of
witnesses in regard to the details of an incident far from demonstrating falsehood constitute evidence of good faith. Not all
persons who witness an incident are impressed by it in the same manner and it is but natural that said eyewitnesses
should disagree on minor details.17

In fact, inconsistences and contradictions in the testimony of the prosecution witnesses which refer to minor details cannot
destroy the credibility of the prosecution witnesses.18 And where the prosecution witnesses were able to positively identify
the appellants as the authors of the crime and the testimonies were, on the whole, consistent oil material points, the
contradictions become insignificant.19

Nor can appellant successfully assail the testimony of Sgt. Delfin Ronquillo who conducted the investigation himself and
personally examined the scenes of the multiple killings. Credence is accorded to the testimonies of prosecution witnesses
who are law enforcers for it is presumed that they have regularly performed their duties in the absence of convincing proof
to the contrary. Appellants have not shown that this prosecution witness was motivated by an improper motive other than
that of accomplishing his mission.20

Sgt. Ronquillo established that the reports which were received at the police department of San Fabian, Pangasinan
shortly after the crimes were committed were to the effect that the Doctoleros were involved. He further testified that when
he immediately proceeded to the scene of the crime and investigated Paciencia Sagun-Diamoy she told him that the
accused Doctoleros came with bolos from the house of Marcial Sagun. 21

In fine, Sgt. Ronquillo merely testified objectively on the results of his investigation and the weight to be accorded to his
findings was properly addressed to the trial court.

The lower court held that Conrado Doctolero and his brother, Virgilio, participated as accomplices in the slaying of the
women and the infliction of injuries on the child. We agree with its findings and the ratiocination of the Solicitor General
with its evidentiary substantiation:
 Now, there is no question that while the three appellants were still stoning and hurling challenges at the house of
Marcial Sagun, they must have already heard the two women thereat protesting what they were doing and
shouting back at them (pp. 39-41, 97, 119, tsn. Jan. 13, 1971: pp. 144-146, tsn., Jan. 14, 1971), after which all the
three appellants went up the house. Under these facts, it is impossible that both appellants Virgilio Doctolero and
Conrado Doctolero did not know or were not aware when their brother Ludovico was brutally killing the two
women Lolita de Guzman-Oviedo and Epifania Escosio and wounding the child Jonathan Oviedo inside the room
of said house. Furthermore, from the nature, number, and locations of the many wounds sustained by the two
women and child (Exhs. A, C, D, and D-1), it could not have been possible for Ludovico's two brothers Virgilio and
Conrado (assuming that they did not go inside the house) not to hear either the screams of pain of their brother's
victims or the contact between the blade of his bolo and their bodies when their brother Ludovico was ruthlessly
hacking them several times. . . . Under these circumstances, it is obvious that appellants Conrado Doctolero and
Virgilio themselves knew what was going on inside the room of the house at the time, but they just stood by and
did nothing to stop their brother Ludovico Doctolero from brutally hacking his women victims to death. It is,
therefore, reasonable to believe that the two appellants, Conrado and Virgilio, merely stood by as their brother
Ludovico Doctolero was murdering the two deceased women, ready to lend assistance. Indeed, there is no
question that the presence of these two appellants upstairs in the house of Marcial Sagun gave their brother
Ludovico Doctolero the encouragement and reliance to proceed as he did proceed, in committing the heinous
crimes against two defenseless women and a child.22

We have held that where one goes with the principals, and in staying outside of the house while the others went inside to
rob and kill the victim, the former effectively supplied the criminals with material and moral aid, making him guilty as an
accomplice.23

Appellants contend that the murders occurred as a consequence of a sudden thought or impulse, thus negating a
common criminal design in their minds. This pretension must be rejected since one can be an accomplice even if he did
not know of the actual crime intended by the principal provided he was aware that it was an illicit act. 24

This is a doctrine that dates back to the ruling in U.S. vs. De Jesus25 that where the accomplices therein consented to help
in the commission of forcible abduction, they were responsible for the resulting homicide even if the purpose of the
principal to commit homicide was unknown to the accomplices.

Whatever doubt the court a quo entertained on the criminal responsibility of appellants Conrado and Virgilio Doctolero did
not refer to whether or not they were liable but only with regard to the extent of their participation. There being ample
evidence of their criminal participation, but a doubt exists on the nature of their liability, the courts should favor the milder
form of liability or responsibility which is that of being mere accomplices, 26

no evidence of conspiracy among the appellants having been shown.

The court below, however, erred in the penalty imposed for the physical injuries inflicted on Jonathan Oviedo. The child
required medical attention for fifteen (15) days, hence the liability of appellants therefor is for less serious physical injuries
punished with arresto mayor under Article 265 of the Revised Penal Code. There being no modifying circumstances, a
penalty of twenty (20) days of arresto menor should be imposed for said offense on appellant Conrado Doctolero as an
accomplice.

The death of appellant Virgilio Doctolero during the pendency of this appeal terminated only his criminal liability but not his
civil liability.27

Also, while the death indemnity has been increased to P50,000.00 under current case law, the same should not apply to
Ludovico Doctolero, he having heretofore withdrawn his appeal and the judgment rendered by the trial court having long
since become final and executory with respect to him.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the trial court is MODIFIED and judgment is hereby rendered IMPOSING on appellant
Conrado Doctolero three (3) indeterminate sentences of ten (10) years of prision mayor to seventeen (17) years and four
(4) months of reclusion temporal each for the death of Epifania Escosio, Lolita de Guzman Oviedo and Marcelo Doctolero,
and a penalty of twenty (20) days of arresto menor for the less serious physical injuries inflicted on Jonathan Oviedo.
Appellant Conrado Doctolero and the estate of Virgilio Doctolero are ORDERED to indemnify, in the sum of P50,000.00
for each set or group of heirs, the respective heirs of Epifania Escosio, Lolita de Guzman Oviedo and Marcelo Doctolero,
and to pay one-half (1/2) of the costs.

SO ORDERED.
Melencio-Herrera, Paras, Padilla and Sarmiento, JJ., concur.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-32126 July 6, 1978

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
NEMESIO TALINGDAN, MAGELLAN TOBIAS, AUGUSTO BERRAS, PEDRO BIDES and TERESA
DOMOGMA, accused-appellants.

PER CURIAM:

Appeal from the conviction for the crime of murder and the sentence of life imprisonment, with indemnity to the offended
party, the heirs of the deceased Bernardo Bagabag, in the amount of P12,000, rendered by the Court of First Instance of
Abra in its Criminal Case No. 686, of all the accused the namely, Nemesio Talingdan, Magellan Tobias, Augusta Berras,
Pedro Bides and Teresa Domogma, the last being the supposed wife of the deceased, who, because no certificate nor
any other proof of their marriage could be presented by the prosecution, could not be charged with parricide.

Prior to the violent death of Bernardo Bagabag on the night of June 24, 1967, he and appellant Teresa Domogma and
their children, arrived together in their house at Sobosob, Salapadan, Abra, some 100 meters distant from the municipal
building of the place. For sometime, however, their relationship had been strained and beset with troubles, for Teresa had
deserted their family home a couple of times and each time Bernardo took time out to look for her. On two (2) different
occasions, appellant Nemesis Talingdan had visited Teresa in their house while Bernardo was out at work, and during
those visits Teresa had made Corazon, their then 12-year old daughter living with them, go down the house and leave
them. Somehow, Bernardo had gotten wind that illicit relationship was going on between Talingdan and Teresa, and
during a quarrel between him and Teresa, he directly charged the latter that should she get pregnant, the child would not
be his. About a month or so before Bernardo was killed, Teresa had again left their house and did not come back for a
period of more than three (3) weeks, and Bernardo came to know later that she and Talingdan were seen together in the
town of Tayum Abra during that time; then on Thursday night, just two (2) days before he was gunned down, Bernardo
and Teresa had a violent quarrel; Bernardo slapped Teresa several times; the latter went down the house and sought the
help of the police, and shortly thereafter, accused Talingdan came to the vicinity of Bernardo's house and called him to
come down; but Bernardo ignored him, for accused Talingdan was a policeman at the time and was armed, so the latter
left the place, but not without warning Bernardo that someday he would kin him. Between 10:00 and 11:00 o'clock the
following Friday morning, Bernardo's daughter, Corazon, who was then in a creek to wash clothes saw her mother,
Teresa, meeting with Talingdan and their co-appellants Magellan Tobias, Augusto Berras and Pedro Bides in a small hut
owned by Bernardo, some 300 to 400 meters away from the latter's house; as she approached them, she heard one of
them say "Could he elude a bullet"; and when accused Teresa Domogma noticed the presence of her daughter, she
shoved her away saying "You tell your father that we will kill him".

Shortly after the sun had set on the following day, a Saturday, June 24, 1967, while the same 12-year old daughter of
Bernardo was cooking food for supper in the kitchen of their house, she saw her mother go down the house through the
stairs and go to the yard where she again met with the other appellants. As they were barely 3-4 meters from the place
where the child was in the "batalan", she heard them conversing in subdued tones, although she could not discern what
they were saying. She was able to recognize all of them through the light coming from the lamp in the kitchen through the
open "batalan" and she knows them well for they are all residents of Sobosob and she used to see them almost
everytime. She noted that the appellants had long guns at the time. Their meeting did not last long, after about two (2)
minutes Teresa came up the house and proceeded to her room, while the other appellants went under an avocado tree
nearby. As supper was then ready, the child caged her parents to eat, Bernardo who was in the room adjoining the
kitchen did not heed his daughter's call to supper but continued working on a plow, while Teresa also excused herself by
saying she would first put her small baby to sleep. So Corazon ate supper alone, and as soon as she was through she
again called her parents to eat. This time, she informed her father about the presence of persons downstairs, but
Bernardo paid no heed to what she said. He proceeded to the kitchen and sat himself on the floor near the door. Corazon
stayed nearby watching him. At that moment, he was suddenly fired upon from below the stairs of the "batalan". The four
accused then climbed the stairs of the "batalan" carrying their long guns and seeing that Bernardo was still alive,
Talingdan and Tobias fired at him again. Bides and Berras did not fire their guns at that precise time, but when Corazon
tried to call for help Bides warned her, saying "You call for help and I will kill you", so she kept silent. The assailants then
fled from the scene, going towards the east.

The first to come to the aid of the family was Corazon's male teacher who lived nearby. Teresa came out of her "silid"
later; she pulled Corazon aside and questioned her, and when Corazon informed her that she recognized the killers of her
father to be her co-appellants herein, she warned her not to reveal the matter to anyone, threatening to kill her if she ever
did so. Still later on, other persons arrived and helped fix and dress the lifeless body of the victim, Bernardo, autopsy on
which was performed in his own house by the Municipal Health Officer of the place on June 26, 1967, about 36 hours
after death; burial took place on the same day. The victim's brother who came from Manila arrived one day after the burial
followed by their mother who came from La Paz, Abra where she resides. Corazon, who had not earlier revealed the
Identities of the killers of her father because she was afraid of her own mother, was somehow able to reveal the
circumstances surrounding his killing to these immediate relatives of hers, and the sworn statement she thereafter
executed on August 5, 1967 (Exh. B) finally led to the filing of the information for murder against the herein five (5)
appellants.

On the other hand, according to the evidence for the defense: Teresa prior to her marriage with Bernardo, was a resident
of the town of Manabo, Abra. She has a sister in Manila and two (2) brothers in America who love her dearly, that is why
said brothers of hers had been continuously and regularly sending her monthly $100.00 in checks, starting from the time
she was still single up to the time of her husband's violent death on June 24, 1967, and thereafter. After their marriage,
they moved to and resided in her husband's place in Sallapadan, Abra, bringing with them three (3) carabaos and two (2)
horses, which Bernardo and she used in tilling a parcel of land in said place, separate and distinct from the parcel of land
worked on by Bernardo's parents and their other children. She and Bernardo lived in their own house which was about 4-5
meters away from the house of her parents-in-law. She loved Bernardo dearly, they never quarreled, and her husband
never maltreated her; although sometimes she had to talk to Bernardo when he quarrels with his own mother who wanted
that Bernardo's earnings be given to her, (the mother) which Bernardo never did, and at those times, Bernardo would
admonish Teresa "You leave me alone". Her in-laws also hated her because her mother-in-law could not get the earnings
of Bernardo for the support of her other son, Juanito, in his schooling. On his part, Juanito also disliked her because she
did not give him any of the carpentry tools which her brothers in America were sending over to her. She never left their
conjugal home for any long period of time as charged by her mother-in-law, and if she ever did leave the house to go to
other places they were only during those times when she had to go to Bangued to cash her dollar checks with the PNB
branch there, and even on said trips, she was sometimes accompanied by Bernardo, or if she had to go alone and leaves
Sallapadan in the morning, she rode in a weapons carrier along with merchants going to Bangued in the morning and
always rode back with them to Sallapadan in the afternoon of the same day because the weapons carrier is owned by a
resident of Sallapadan who waits for them. Teresa came to know Talingdan only when the latter became a policeman in
Sallapadan, as whenever any of the carabaos and horses they brought from Manabo to Sallapadan got lost, she and
Bernardo would go and report the matter to the Mayor who would then refer the matter to his policemen, one of whom is
Talingdan, so that they may help locate the lost animals; Teresa knew Talingdan well because they are neighbors, the
latter's home being only about 250-300 meters away from theirs. But illicit relationship had never existed between them.

Early in the evening of June 24, 1967, Teresa was in the kitchen of their house cooking their food for supper. Two of the
children, Corazon and Judit, were with her. Her husband, Bernardo, was then in the adjoining room making a plow. He
had to make the plow at that time of the night because at daytime he worked as a carpenter in the convent. As soon as
the food was ready, she and the children moved over to the adjoining room where Bernardo was to call him for supper,
and he then proceeded to the kitchen to eat. Teresa and the two children were about to follow him to the kitchen when
suddenly they heard more than five (5) or six (6) successive gun shots coming from near their "batalan". They were all so
terrified that they immediately cried for help, albeit she did not know yet at that precise time that her husband was shot, as
she and the children were still in the other room on their way to the kitchen, about three (3) meters away from Bernardo.
But soon Teresa heard her husband crying in pain, and as soon as she reached him, she took Bernardo into her arms.
She did not see the killers of her husband, as the night was then very dark and it was raining. Bernardo was in her arms
when the first group of people who responded to their cry for help arrived. Among them were the chief of police, some
members of the municipal council and appellant Tobias who even advised Teresa not to carry the lifeless body of
Bernardo to avoid abortion as she was then six (6) months pregnant. The chief of police then conducted an investigation
of the surroundings and he found some empty shells and foot prints on the ground some meters away from the "batalan".
He also found some bullet holes on the southern walls of said "batalan" and on the nothern wallings of the kitchen. Later,
Teresa requested some persons to relay the information about the death of her husband to her relatives in Manabo, Abra,
and they in turn passed on the news to Bernardo's mother and her family in La Paz, Abra, where they were then residing,
as they have left their house in Sallapadan about two (2) months previous after they lost the land they used to till there in
a case with the natives called Tingians. Two (2) PC soldiers arrived in the afternoon of June 26, 1967, and after
Bernardo's remains was autopsied and he was buried under their house, they conducted an investigation, but she did not
give them any information relative to the Identity of the persons who shot her husband because she did not really see
them. Her mother-in-law and a brother-in-law, Juanita Bagabag, arrived later, the former from the town of La Paz, Abra,
and the latter from Manila, and after the usual nine (9) days mourning was over, they left Sallapadan, taking Teresa's
children under their custody. Teresa suspects that since her mother-in-law and her brother-in-law have axes to grind
against her and they have her daughter, Corazon, under their custody, they had forced the said child to testify against her.
She further declared that her late husband, Bernardo, had enemies during his lifetime, as he had quarrels with some
people over the land they work on.

Furthermore, the defense presented evidence to the effect that: Talingdan was not in Sallapadan at the time of the killing
of Bernardo on June 24, 1967; being a policeman of the place at the time, he was one of the two (2) policemen who
escorted and acted as bodyguard of the Mayor, when the latter attended the cursillo in Bangued, all of them leaving
Sallapadan on June 22 and returning thereto four (4) days later on June 26, hence, he could not have anything to do with
the said killing. On the other hand, Tobias claimed to be in the house of one Mrs. Bayongan in Sallapadan on the date of
said killing, but he was one of the persons who was called upon by the chief of police of the place to accompany him in
answer to the call for help of the wife of the victim. The other two appellants Bides and Berras also alleged that they were
in the same house of Mrs. Bayongan on that date; they are tillers of the land of said Mrs. Bayongan and had been staying
in her house for a long time. They were sleeping when the chief of police came that evening and asked Tobias, who was
then municipal secretary, to accompany him to the place of the shooting. They did not join them, but continued sleeping.
They never left the said house of Mrs. Bayongan, which is about 250-300 meters away from the place of the killing, that
evening of June 24, 1967.

After carefully weighing the foregoing conflicting evidence of the prosecution and defense, We have no doubt in Our mind
that in that fatal evening of June 24, 1967, appellants Nemesio Talingdan, Magellan Tobias, Augusto Berras and Pedro
Bides, all armed with long firearms and acting inconspiracy with each other gunned down Bernardo as the latter was
sitting by the supper table in their house at Sobosob, Sallapadan, Abra. They were actually seen committing the offense
by the witness Corazon. She was the one who prepared the food and was watching her father nearby. They were all
known to her, for they were all residents of Sobosob and she used to see them often before that night. Although only
Talingdan and Tobias continued firing at her father after they had climbed the stairs of the "batalan", it was Bides who
threatened her that he would kill her if she called for help. Berras did not fire any shot then. But even before the four
appellants went up the "batalan", they already fired shots from downstairs.

We also fully believe Corazon's testimony that two nights before, or on Thursday, June 22, 1967, the deceased Bernardo
and appellant Teresa had a violent quarrel during which he slapped her several times. She went to seek the help of the
police, and it was appellant Talingdan, a policeman of their town, who went to the vicinity of their house and challenged
her father to come down, but the latter refused because the former was a policeman and was armed. And so, Talingdan
left after shouting to her father that "If I will find you someday, I will kill you."

We likewise accept as truthful, Corazon's declaration regarding the amorous relationship between her mother and
appellant Talingdan, as already related earlier above. So also her testimony that in the morning following the quarrel
between her father and her mother and the threat made by Talingdan to the former, between 10:00 and 11:00 o'clock, she
saw all the herein four male accused-appellants meeting with her mother in a small hut some 300 or 400 meters away
from their house, near where she was then washing clothes, and that on said occasion she overheard one of them ask
"Could (sic) he elude a bullet?", We have our doubts, however, as to whether or not her mother did say to her in shoving
her away upon seeing her approach, "You tell your father we will kill him." If it were true that there was really such a
message, it is to be wondered why she never relayed the same to her father, specially when she again saw the said
appellants on the very night in question shortly before the shooting talking together in subdued tones with her mother and
holding long arms. Moreover, it is quite unnatural that such a warning could have been done in such a manner.

Accordingly, it is Our conclusion from the evidence related above and which We have carefully reviewed that appellants
Nemesio Talingdan, Magellan Tobias, Augusto Berras and Pedro Bides are guilty of murder qualified by treachery, as
charged, and that they committed the said offense in conspiracy with each other, with evident premeditation and in the
dwelling of the offended party. In other words, two aggravating circumstances attended the commission of the offense,
namely, evident premeditation and that it was committed in the dwelling of the victim. No mitigating circumstance has
been proven.

Appellants insist in their brief that the lone testimony of Corazon suffered from vital contradictions and inconsistencies and
badges of falsehood because of patently unnatural circumstances alleged by her. We do not agree. As the Solicitor
General has well pointed out, the fact that the witness varied on cross-examination the exact time of some of the
occurrences she witnessed, such as, (1) whether it was before or after Bernardo had began eating when he was shot; (2)
whether it was before or after seeing her mother's meeting with her co-accused in the morning of Friday, June 23, 1967,
that she went to wash clothes; and (3) whether or not the accused were already upstairs or still downstairs when they first
fired their guns, cannot alter the veracity of her having seen appellants in the act of mercilessly and cold-bloodedly
shooting her father to death.

Contrary to the contention of appellants, there was nothing inherently unnatural in the circumstances related by her. We
agree with the following rebuttal of the Solicitor General:

Appellants also attempt to buttress their attack against the credibility of Corazon Bagabag by pointing out
five supposed unnatural declarations in her testimony; First, she said that her father, appeared
unconcerned when she informed him of the presence of people downstairs. But as correctly observed by
the prosecuting fiscal the witness does not know then "the mentality of her father" (p. 62, t.s.n., hearing of
March 29, 1968). Second, Corazon also declared that the accused conversed that Saturday night
preceding the day the crime charged was committed in a lighted place although there was a place which
was unlighted in the same premises. But this only proves that the accused were too engrossed in their
conversation, unmindful of whether the place where they were talking was lighted or not, and unmindful
even of the risk of recognition. Third, witness declared that Pedro Bides and Augusto Berras did not fire
their guns. Even if these accused did withhold their fire, however, since they were privies to the same
criminal design, would this alter their culpability? Should the witness Corazon Bagabag be discredited for
merely stating an observation on her part which is not inherently unnatural? Fourth, Corazon also
declared that only three bullets from the guns of the four male accused found their mark on the body of
her father. But would this not merely prove that not all the accused were good shots? And fifth, the
witness declared that her father was still able to talk after he was shot yet Dr. Jose Dalisan declared that
his death was instantaneous It is respectfully submitted, however, that the doctor's opinion could yield to
the positive testimony of Corazon Bagabag in this regard without in the least affecting the findings of said
doctor as regards the cause of the death of the deceased. As thus viewed, there are no evident badges of
falsehood in the whole breadth and length of Corazon Bagabag's testimony. (Pp. 9-10, People's Brief.)

Why and how Corazon could have concocted her version of the killing of her father, if it were not basically true, is hardly
conceivable, considering she was hardly thirteen (13) years old when she testified, an age when according to Moore, a
child , is, as a rule, but little influenced by the suggestion of others" because "he has already got some principles, lying is
distasteful to him, because he thinks it is mean, he is no stranger to the sentiment of self- respect, and he never loses an
opportunity of being right in what he affirms." (II Moore on Facts, pp. 1055-1056.) No cogent explanation has been offered
why she would attribute the assault on her father to three other men, aside from Talingdan whom she knew had relations
with her mother, were she merely making-up her account of how he was shot, no motive for her to do so having been
shown.

Demolishing the theory of the accused that such testimony was taught to her by her uncle, His Honor pointed out that said
"testimony, both direct and cross, would show that she was constant, firm and steady in her answers to questions directed
to her." We have Ourselves read said testimony and We are convinced of the sincerity and truthfulness of the witness. We
cannot, therefore, share appellants' apprehension in their Seventh Assignment of Error that the grave imputation of a
mother's infidelity and her suggested participation in the killing of her husband, would if consistently impressed in the mind
of their child, constitute a vicious poison enough to make the child, right or wrong, a willing instrument in any scheme to
get even with her wicked mother. We feel Corazon was too young to he affected by the infidelity of her mother in the
manner the defense suggests. We are convinced from a reading of her whole testimony that it could not have been a
fabrication. On the whole, it is too consistent for a child of thirteen years to be able to substantially maintain throughout
her stay on the witness stand without any fatal flaw, in the face of severe and long cross-interrogations, if she had not
actually witnessed the event she had described. We reject the possibility of her having been "brainwashed or coached" to
testify as she did.

The second to the sixth assignments of error in the appeal brief do not merit serious consideration. Anent these alleged
errors, suffice it to say that the following refutations of the Solicitor General are well taken:

Appellants also decry that the trial court allegedly failed to consider the testimony of Dr. Dalisan that the
distance between the assailants and the deceased could have been 4 to 5 meters when the shots were
fired. But the appellants overlook the testimony of Corazon Bagabag that when the first shot was fired, the
gunman was about 3-½ meters from her father (p. 60, t.s.n., hearing of March 29, 1968), which disproves
the theory of the defense that the killers fired from a stonepile under an avocado tree some 4 to 5 meters
away from the deceased's house. Appellants also insist that the Court a quo ignored the testimonies of
defense witness Cpl. Bonifacio Hall and Chief of Police Rafael Berras on their having found bullet marks
on the southern walling of the house of the deceased, as well as empty cal. 30 carbine shells under the
aforementioned avocado tree. The trial court, however, made the following apt observations on the
testimony of defense witness Cpl. Bonifacio Hall:
 This witness stated that we went to the house of the deceased to investigate the crime after the deceased
had already been buried; that he investigated the widow as well as the surroundings of the house where
the deceased was shot. He found empty shells of carbine under the avocado tree. He stated that the
'batalan' of the house of the deceased has a siding of about 1-½ meters high and that he saw bullet holes
on the top portion of the wall directly pointing to the open door of the 'batalan' of the house of the
deceased. When the court asked the witness what could have been the position of the assailant in
shooting the deceased, he stated that the assailant might have been standing. The assailant could not
have made a bullet hole on the top portion of the sidings of the 'batalan' because the 'batalan' is only 1-½
meters high, and further, when asked as to the level of the ground in relation to the top sidings of the
'batalan,' he answered that it is in the same level with the ground. If this is true, it is impossible for the
assailant to make a bullet hole at the top portion sidings of the 'batalan,' hence, the testimony of this
witness who is a PC corporal is of no consequence and without merit. The court is puzzled to find a PC
corporal testifying for the defense in this case, which case was filed by another PC sergeant belonging to
the same unit and assigned in the same province of Abra (pp. 324- 325, rec.).

As regards the empty shells also found in the vicinity of the shooting, suffice it to state that no testimony
has been presented, expert or otherwise, linking said shells to the bullets that were fired during the
shooting incident. Surmises in this respect surely would not overcome the positive testimony of Corazon
Bagabag that the accused shot her father as they came up the 'batalan' of their house. (Pp. 11-12,
People's Brief.)

At the trial, the four male appellants tried to prove that they were not at the scene of the crime when it happened. This
defense of alibi was duly considered by the trial court, but it was properly brushed aside as untenable. In their brief, no
mention thereof is made, which goes to show that in the mind of the defense itself,. it cannot be successfully maintained
and they do not, therefore, insist on it. Nonetheless, it would do well for this Court to specifically affirm the apt pertinent
ratiocination of His Honor in reference thereto thus:

This defense, therefore, is alibi which, in the opinion of the court, can not stand firmly in the face of a
positive and unwavering testimony of the prosecution witness who pointed out to the accused as the
authors of the crime. This is so because, first, according to the three accused — Bides, Tobias and
Berras — they were sleeping at 8:00 o'clock that night in the house of Mrs. Bayongan which is only 250
meters away from the scene of the crime. Granting, for the sake of argument, but without admitting, that
they were already sleeping at 8:00 o'clock in the house of Mrs. Bayongan, Corazon Bagabag clearly
stated that her father was gunned down at sunset which is approximately between 6:00 and 6:30 in the
evening, hence, the accused Tobias, Berras and Bides could have committed the crime and went home
to sleep in the house of Mrs. Bayongan after the commission of the crime. According to Pedro Bides, the
house of Mrs. Bayongan is only 250 meters away from the house of the victim. Second, the three
accused have failed miserably to present the testimony of Mrs. Bayongan, the owner of the house where
they slept that night to corroborate or bolster their defense of alibi. (Pp. 27A-28A, Annex of Appellants'
Brief.)

xxx xxx xxx

Nemesio Talingdan, alias Oming, the last of the accused, also in his defense of alibi, stated that on June
22, 1967, he accompanied Mayor Gregorio Banawa of Sallapadan to Bangued, together with policeman
Cresencio Martinez for the purpose of attending a cursillo in Bangued They started in Sallapadan in the
early morning of June 22, 1967 and arrived in Bangued the same day. According to him, he went to
accompany the mayor to the cursillo house near the Bangued Cathedral and after conducting the mayor
to the cursillo house, he went to board in the house of the cousin of Mayor Banawa near the Filoil Station
at Bangued, Abra. From that time, he never saw the mayor until after they went home to Sallapadan on
June 26th.

This kind of alibi could not gain much weight because he could have returned anytime on the evening of
June 22 or anytime before the commission of the offense to Sallapadan and commit the crime on the 24th
at sunset, then returned to Bangued, Abra to fetch the mayor and bring him back to Sallapadan on the
26th.

The irony of this defense of alibi is that the mayor who was alleged to have been accompanied by
witness-accused is still living and very much alive. As a matter of fact, Mayor Gregorio Banawa is still the
mayor of Sallapadan, Abra, and also policeman Cresencio Martinez, another policeman who
 accompanied the mayor to Bangued, is also still living and still a policeman of Sallapadan. Why were not
the mayor and the policeman presented to corroborate or deny the testimony of Nemesio Talingdan?

Conrado B. Venus, Municipal Judge of Penarrubia Abra, and a member of the Cursillo Movement, was
presented as rebuttal witness for the prosecution. On the witness stand, he stated that he belongs to
Cursillo No. 3 of the Parish of Bangued, Abra, and said cursillo was held on October 20 to 23, 1966, at
the St. Joseph Seminary in Galicia, Pidigan Abra, and not on June 23 to 26, 1967. As a matter of fact,
Mayor Banawa of Sallapadan also attended the cursillo held on October 20 to 23, 1966, as could be seen
in his 'Guide Book' where the signature of Gregorio Banawa appears because they both attended Cursillo
No. 3 of the Parish of Bangued.

(To) this testimony of the rebuttal witness belies partly, if not in full, the testimony of accused Nemesio
Talingdan. (Pp. 29A-30A, Annex of Appellants' Brief.)

Coming now to the particular case of appellant Teresa Domogma, as to whom the Solicitor General has submitted a
recommendation of acquittal, We find that she is not as wholly innocent in law as she appears to the Counsel of the
People. It is contended that there is no evidence proving that she actually joined in the conspiracy to kill her husband
because there is no showing of 'actual cooperation" on her part with her co-appellants in their culpable acts that led to his
death. If at all, what is apparent, it is claimed, is "mere cognizance, acquiescence or approval" thereof on her part, which it
is argued is less than what is required for her conviction as a conspirator per People vs. Mahlon, 99 Phil. 1068. We do not
see it exactly that way.

True it is that the proof of her direct participation in the conspiracy is not beyond reasonable doubt, for which reason, sue
cannot have the same liability as her co-appellants. Indeed, she had no hand at all in the actual shooting of her husband.
Neither is it clear that she helped directly in the planning and preparation thereof, albeit We are convinced that she knew it
was going to be done and did not object. (U.S. vs. Romulo, 15 Phil. 408, 411-414.) It is not definitely shown that she
masterminded it either by herself alone or together with her co-appellant Talingdan. At best, such conclusion could be
plain surmise, suspicion and conjecture, not really includible. After all, she had been having her own unworthy ways with
him for quite a long time, seemingly without any need of his complete elimination. Why go to so much trouble for
something she was already enjoying, and not even very surreptitiously? In fact, the only remark Bernardo had occasion to
make to Teresa one time was "If you become pregnant, the one in your womb is not my child." The worst he did to her for
all her faults was just to slap her.

But this is not saying that she is entirely free from criminal liability. There is in the record morally convincing proof that she
is at the very least an accessory to the offense committed by her co-accused. She was inside the room when her husband
was shot. As she came out after the shooting, she inquired from Corazon if she was able to recognize the assailants of
her father. When Corazon Identified appellants Talingdan, Tobias, Berras and Bides as the culprits, Teresa did not only
enjoin her daughter not to reveal what she knew to anyone, she went to the extent of warning her, "Don't tell it to anyone. I
will kill you if you tell this to somebody." Later, when the peace officers who repaired to their house to investigate what
happened, instead of helping them with the information given to her by Corazon, she claimed she had no suspects in
mind. In other words, whereas, before the actual shooting of her husband, she was more or less passive in her attitude
regarding her co-appellants' conspiracy, known to her, to do away with him, after Bernardo was killed, she became active
in her cooperation with them. These subsequent acts of her constitute "concealing or assisting in the escape of the
principal in the crime" which makes her liable as an accessory after the fact under paragraph 3 of Article 19 of the Revised
Penal Code.

As already indicated earlier, the offense committed by appellants was murder qualified by treachery. It being obvious that
appellants deliberately chose nighttime to suddenly and without warning assault their victim, taking advantage of their
number and arms, it is manifest that they employed treachery to insure success in attaining their malevolent objective. In
addition, it is indisputable that appellants acted with evident premeditation. Talingdan made the threat to kill Bernardo
Thursday night, then he met with his co-accused to work out their conspiracy Friday and again on Saturday evening just
before the actual shooting. In other words, they had motive Talingdan's taking up the cudgels for his paramour, Teresa
and enough time to meditate, and desist, if they were not resolved to proceed with their objective. Finally, they committed
the offense in the dwelling of the offended party.

In these premises, the crime committed by the male appellants being murder, qualified by treachery, and attended by the
generic aggravating circumstances of evident premeditation and that the offense was committed in the dwelling of the
offended party, the Court has no alternative under the law but to impose upon them the capital penalty. However, as to
appellant Teresa, she is hereby found guilty only as an accessory to the same murder.
WHEREFORE, with the above finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt of the appellants Nemesio Talingdan, Magellan
Tobias, Augusto Berras and Pedro Bides of the crime of murder with two aggravating circumstances, without any
mitigating circumstance to offset them, they are each hereby sentenced to DEATH to be executed in accordance with law.
Guilty beyond reasonable doubt as accessory to the same murder, appellant Teresa Domogma is hereby sentenced to
suffer the indeterminate penalty of five (5) years of prision correccional as minimum to eight (8) years of prision mayor  as
maximum, with the accessory penalties of the law. In all other respects, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed, with
costs against appellants.

Barredo, Muñoz Palma, Aquino, Concepcion, Jr., Santos, Fernandez and Guerrero, JJ., concur.

Antonio, Fernando, JJ., took no part.

Separate Opinions

MAKASIAR, J.,  dissenting:

I dissent insofar as the liability of the accused Teresa Domogma who should be convicted, not merely as an accessory,
but of parricide as principal and meted the death penalty, is concerned. A marriage certificate is not indispensable to
establish the fact of marriage; because the presumption that the deceased and the accused Teresa were married subsists
by reason of the fact that they had been living together for about thirteen (13) years as evidenced by the birth of the child-
witness Corazon, who was 12 years old at the time her father was killed on June 24, 1967 by the accused-appellants, and
who was 13 years of age when she testified. They have other children aside from Corazon.

That appellant Teresa is a co-conspirator, not merely an accessory after the fact has been clearly demonstrated by the
testimony of her own daughter, Corazon, who declared categorically that she plotted with her co-appellants the
assassination of her own husband whom she betrayed time and time again by her repeated illicit relations with her co-
accused Nemesio Talingdan, a town policeman and their neighbor. The record is abundant with evidence that Teresa,
without a feeling for shame and unnaturally lacking any concern for her minor children of tender age, deserted several
times their family home to live with and continue with her immoral relations with appellant Talingdan with whom at one
time she cohabited for more than three (3) weeks. Her patient husband had to look for her and to beg her to return each
time she left the family abode for the embrace of her lover.

We should believe Corazon's statement that between 10 and 11 o'clock Friday morning, she saw her mother, appellant
Teresa, meeting with her other co-appellants in a small hut owned by her father some 300 to 400 meters away from the
latter's house near the creek where she was then washing clothes; that she heard one of the conspirators say "Could he
elude a bullet?"; that when her mother noticed her presence, her mother shoved her away saying, "You tell your father
that we will kill him"; that in the evening of the following day, Saturday, June 24, 1967, while she was cooking supper in
their house, she saw her mother go down the stairs and meet the other appellants in the yard about 3 to 4 meters from
where she was in the "batalan"; that she heard them conversing in subdued tones; that she was able to recognize all of
them by the light coming from the kitchen lamp through the open "batalan"; that she knows all of them very well as they
are all residents of their barrio and she used to see them almost everyday; that she noted that appellants were armed with
long guns; that their meeting did not last long; that after about 2 minutes her mother, appellant Teresa, came up the house
and proceed to her room while the other appellants hid under an avocado tree nearby; that when supper was ready she
called her parents to eat; that her father did not heed her call but continued working on a plow while her mother excused
herself by saying she would first put her small baby to sleep; that she (Corazon) ate alone after which she again called her
parents to eat; that about this time she informed her father about the presence of persons downstairs but her father paid
no heed to what she said; that her father proceeded to the kitchen and sat on the floor near the door while Corazon
stayed nearby watching him; that at the that moment her father was shot from below the stairs of the "batalan"; that the
four accused then went up the stairs of the "batalan" with their long guns and, upon seeing that her father was still alive,
appellants Talingdan and Tobias fired at him again; that when she (Corazon) tried to call for help, appellant Bides warned
her saying "You call for help and I will kill you"; and that thereafter, the assailants fled towards the east.

The foregoing testimony of 13-year old Corazon should be accorded belief in the same way that credence was given to
her statement that, upon her mother's inquiry immediately after the shooting as to whether she recognized the assailants
of her father, she (Corazon) readily told her mother that she Identified appellants Talingdan, Tobias, Berras and Bides as
the culprits; for which reason her mother warned her "Don't tell it to anyone. I will kill you if you tell this to somebody."
On Thursday or two days before Bernardo was shot, he and Teresa had a quarrel during which Bernardo slapped Teresa
several times by reason of which Teresa left the house and sought the help of the police. Shortly thereafter appellant
Talingdan came and called Bernardo to come down. When Bernardo ignored him because Talingdan was a policeman
and was then armed, appellant Talingdan left after warning Bernardo that someday he would kill him.

Can there be a clearer demonstration of the active cooperation of Teresa in the conspiracy against the life of her
husband? The majority opinion admits that Teresa was a paramour of appellant Talingdan; hence, she wanted freedom
from her husband, the victim, so that she could enjoy the company of her lover, appellant Talingdan.

From the evidence on record, appellant Teresa had no moral compunction in deserting her family and her children for the
company of her lover. As heretofore stated, she did this several times and continued to do so until the violent death of her
husband even as she was carrying a six-month old baby in her womb, the paternity of which her husband denied.

CASTRO, CJ., concurring:

Concurs, with the observations, however, that the evidence points to the appellant Teresa Domogma as a co-principal
and that she should therefore also be held guilty of murder and sentenced to death.

TEEHANKEE, J., concurring:

Concurs, but join in the partial dissent of Mr. Justice Makasiar insofar as the penal liability of the accused Teresa
Domogma is concerned.

Separate Opinions

MAKASIAR, J.,  dissenting:

I dissent insofar as the liability of the accused Teresa Domogma who should be convicted, not merely as an accessory,
but of parricide as principal and meted the death penalty, is concerned. A marriage certificate is not indispensable to
establish the fact of marriage; because the presumption that the deceased and the accused Teresa were married subsists
by reason of the fact that they had been living together for about thirteen (13) years as evidenced by the birth of the child-
witness Corazon, who was 12 years old at the time her father was killed on June 24, 1967 by the accused-appellants, and
who was 13 years of age when she testified. They have other children aside from Corazon.

That appellant Teresa is a co-conspirator, not merely an accessory after the fact has been clearly demonstrated by the
testimony of her own daughter, Corazon, who declared categorically that she plotted with her co-appellants the
assassination of her own husband whom she betrayed time and time again by her repeated illicit relations with her co-
accused Nemesio Talingdan, a town policeman and their neighbor. The record is abundant with evidence that Teresa,
without a feeling for shame and unnaturally lacking any concern for her minor children of tender age, deserted several
times their family home to live with and continue with her immoral relations with appellant Talingdan with whom at one
time she cohabited for more than three (3) weeks. Her patient husband had to look for her and to beg her to return each
time she left the family abode for the embrace of her lover.

We should believe Corazon's statement that between 10 and 11 o'clock Friday morning, she saw her mother, appellant
Teresa, meeting with her other co-appellants in a small hut owned by her father some 300 to 400 meters away from the
latter's house near the creek where she was then washing clothes; that she heard one of the conspirators say "Could he
elude a bullet?"; that when her mother noticed her presence, her mother shoved her away saying, "You tell your father
that we will kill him"; that in the evening of the following day, Saturday, June 24, 1967, while she was cooking supper in
their house, she saw her mother go down the stairs and meet the other appellants in the yard about 3 to 4 meters from
where she was in the "batalan"; that she heard them conversing in subdued tones; that she was able to recognize all of
them by the light coming from the kitchen lamp through the open "batalan"; that she knows all of them very well as they
are all residents of their barrio and she used to see them almost everyday; that she noted that appellants were armed with
long guns; that their meeting did not last long; that after about 2 minutes her mother, appellant Teresa, came up the house
and proceed to her room while the other appellants hid under an avocado tree nearby; that when supper was ready she
called her parents to eat; that her father did not heed her call but continued working on a plow while her mother excused
herself by saying she would first put her small baby to sleep; that she (Corazon) ate alone after which she again called her
parents to eat; that about this time she informed her father about the presence of persons downstairs but her father paid
no heed to what she said; that her father proceeded to the kitchen and sat on the floor near the door while Corazon
stayed nearby watching him; that at the that moment her father was shot from below the stairs of the "batalan"; that the
four accused then went up the stairs of the "batalan" with their long guns and, upon seeing that her father was still alive,
appellants Talingdan and Tobias fired at him again; that when she (Corazon) tried to call for help, appellant Bides warned
her saying "You call for help and I will kill you"; and that thereafter, the assailants fled towards the east.

The foregoing testimony of 13-year old Corazon should be accorded belief in the same way that credence was given to
her statement that, upon her mother's inquiry immediately after the shooting as to whether she recognized the assailants
of her father, she (Corazon) readily told her mother that she Identified appellants Talingdan, Tobias, Berras and Bides as
the culprits; for which reason her mother warned her "Don't tell it to anyone. I will kill you if you tell this to somebody."

On Thursday or two days before Bernardo was shot, he and Teresa had a quarrel during which Bernardo slapped Teresa
several times by reason of which Teresa left the house and sought the help of the police. Shortly thereafter appellant
Talingdan came and called Bernardo to come down. When Bernardo ignored him because Talingdan was a policeman
and was then armed, appellant Talingdan left after warning Bernardo that someday he would kill him.

Can there be a clearer demonstration of the active cooperation of Teresa in the conspiracy against the life of her
husband? The majority opinion admits that Teresa was a paramour of appellant Talingdan; hence, she wanted freedom
from her husband, the victim, so that she could enjoy the company of her lover, appellant Talingdan.

From the evidence on record, appellant Teresa had no moral compunction in deserting her family and her children for the
company of her lover. As heretofore stated, she did this several times and continued to do so until the violent death of her
husband even as she was carrying a six-month old baby in her womb, the paternity of which her husband denied.

CASTRO, CJ., concurring:

Concurs, with the observations, however, that the evidence points to the appellant Teresa Domogma as a co-principal
and that she should therefore also be held guilty of murder and sentenced to death.

TEEHANKEE, J., concurring:

Concurs, but join in the partial dissent of Mr. Justice Makasiar insofar as the penal liability of the accused Teresa
Domogma is concerned.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 84163 October 19, 1989

LITO VINO, petitioner,
vs.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and THE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.

Frisco T. Lilagan for petitioner.

RESOLUTION

GANCAYCO, J.:

The issue posed in the motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner of the resolution of this Court dated January 18, 1989
denying the herein petition is whether or not a finding of guilt as an accessory to murder can stand in the light of the
acquittal of the alleged principal in a separate proceeding.

At about 7:00 o'clock in the evening of March 21, 1985, Roberto Tejada left their house at Burgos Street, Poblacion,
Balungao, Pangasinan to go to the house of Isidro Salazar to watch television. At around 11:00 P.M., while Ernesto, the
father of Roberto, was resting, he heard two gunshots. Thereafter, he heard Roberto cry out in a loud voice saying that he
had been shot. He saw Roberto ten (10) meters away so he switched on the lights of their house. Aside from Ernesto and
his wife, his children Ermalyn and Julius were also in the house. They went down to meet Roberto who was crying and
they called for help from the neighbors. The neighbor responded by turning on their lights and the street lights and coming
down from their houses. After meeting Roberto, Ernesto and Julius saw Lito Vino and Jessie Salazar riding a bicycle
coming from the south. Vino was the one driving the bicycle while Salazar was carrying an armalite. Upon reaching
Ernesto's house, they stopped to watch Roberto. Salazar pointed his armalite at Ernesto and his companions. Thereafter,
the two left.

Roberto was brought to the Sacred Heart Hospital of Urdaneta. PC/Col. Bernardo Cacananta took his ante-
mortem statement. In the said statement which the victim signed with his own blood, Jessie Salazar was Identified as his
assailant.

The autopsy report of his body shows the following-

Gunshot wound

POE Sub Scapular-5-6-ICA. Pal

1 & 2 cm. diameter left

Slug found sub cutaneously,

2nd ICS Mid Clavicular line left.

CAUSE OF DEATH

Tension Hemathorax 1

Lito Vino and Sgt. Jesus Salazar were charged with murder in a complaint filed by PC Sgt. Ernesto N. Ordono in the
Municipal Trial Court of Balungao, Pangasinan. However, on March 22, 1985, the municipal court indorsed the case of
Salazar to the Judge Advocate General's Office (JAGO) inasmuch as he was a member of the military, while the case
against Vino was given due course by the issuance of a warrant for his arrest. Ultimately, the case was indorsed to the
fiscal's office who then filed an information charging Vino of the crime of murder in the Regional Trial Court of Rosales,
Pangasinan.

Upon arraignment, the accused Vino entered a plea of not guilty. Trial then commenced with the presentation of evidence
for the prosecution. Instead of presenting evidence in his own behalf, the accused filed a motion to dismiss for
insufficiency of evidence to which the prosecutor filed an answer. On January 21, 1986, 2 a decision was rendered by the
trial court finding Vino guilty as an accessory to the crime of murder and imposing on him the indeterminate penalty of
imprisonment of 4 Years and 2 months of prision correccional as minimum to 8 years of prision mayor  as maximum. He
was also ordered to indemnify the heirs of the victim in the sum of P10,000.00 being a mere accessory to the crime and to
pay the costs.

The motion for reconsideration filed by the accused having been denied, he interposed an appeal to the Court of Appeals.
In due course, a Decision was rendered affirming the judgment of the lower court. 3

Hence, the herein petition for review wherein the following grounds are invoked:

1. THAT AN ACCUSED CAN NOT BE CONVICTED AS AN ACCESSORY OF THE CRIME OF MURDER

FOR HAVING AIDED IN THE ESCAPE OF THE PRINCIPAL IF SAID ACCUSED IS BEING CHARGED
SOLELY IN THE INFORMATION AS PRINCIPAL FOR THE SIMPLE REASON THAT THE CRIME
PROVED IS NOT INCLUDED IN THE CRIME CHARGED.

2. THAT "AIDING THE ESCAPE OF THE PRINCIPAL" TO BE CONSIDERED SUFFICIENT IN LAW TO

CONVICT AN ACCUSED UNDER ARTICLE 19, PARAGRAPH 3 OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE
MUST BE DONE IN SUCH A WAY AS TO DECEIVE THE VIGILANCE OF THE LAW ENFORCEMENT
AGENCIES OF THE STATE AND THAT THE "ESCAPE" MUST BE ACTUAL;

3. THE CONVICTION OF AN ACCESSORY PENDING THE TRIAL OF THE PRINCIPAL VIOLATES

PROCEDURAL ORDERLINESS. 4

During the pendency of the appeal in the Court of Appeals, the case against Salazar in the JAGO was remanded to the
civil court as he was discharged from the military service. He was later charged with murder in the same Regional Trial
Court of Rosales, Pangasinan in Criminal Case No. 2027-A. In a supplemental pleading dated November 14, 1988,
petitioner informed this Court that Jessie Salazar was acquitted by the trial court in a decision that was rendered on
August 29, 1988.

The respondents were required to comment on the petition. The comment was submitted by the Solicitor General in
behalf of respondents. On January 18, 1989, the Court resolved to deny the petition for failure of petitioner to sufficiently
show that respondent court had committed any reversible error in its questioned judgment. Hence, the present motion for
reconsideration to which the respondents were again required to comment. The required comment having been
submitted, the motion is now due for resolution.

The first issue that arises is that inasmuch as the petitioner was charged in the information as a principal for the crime of
murder, can he thereafter be convicted as an accessory? The answer is in the affirmative.

Petitioner was charged as a principal in the commission of the crime of murder. Under Article 16 of the Revised Penal
Code, the two other categories of the persons responsible for the commission of the same offense are the accomplice and
the accessory. There is no doubt that the crime of murder had been committed and that the evidence tended to show that
Jessie Salazar was the assailant. That the petitioner was present during its commission or must have known its
commission is the only logical conclusion considering that immediately thereafter, he was seen driving a bicycle with
Salazar holding an armalite, and they were together when they left shortly thereafter. At least two witnesses, Ernesto and
Julius Tejada, attested to these facts. It is thus clear that petitioner actively assisted Salazar in his escape. Petitioner's
liability is that of an accessory.

This is not a case of a variance between the offense charged and the offense proved or established by the evidence, and
the offense as charged is included in or necessarily includes the offense proved, in which case the defendant shall be
convicted of the offense proved included in that which is charged, or of the offense charged included in that which is
proved. 5
In the same light, this is not an instance where after trial has begun, it appears that there was a mistake in charging the
proper offense, and the defendant cannot be convicted of the offense charged, or of any other offense necessarily
included therein, in which case the defendant must not be discharged if there appears to be a good cause to detain him in
custody, so that he can be charged and made to answer for the proper offense. 6

In this case, the correct offense of murder was charged in the information. The commission of the said crime was
established by the evidence. There is no variance as to the offense committed. The variance is in the participation or
complicity of the petitioner. While the petitioner was being held responsible as a principal in the information, the evidence
adduced, however, showed that his participation is merely that of an accessory. The greater responsibility necessarily
includes the lesser. An accused can be validly convicted as an accomplice or accessory under an information charging
him as a principal.

At the onset, the prosecution should have charged the petitioner as an accessory right then and there. The degree of
responsibility of petitioner was apparent from the evidence. At any rate, this lapse did not violate the substantial rights of
petitioner.

The next issue that must be resolved is whether or not the trial of an accessory can proceed without awaiting the result of
the separate charge against the principal. The answer is also in the affirmative. The corresponding responsibilities of the
principal, accomplice and accessory are distinct from each other. As long as the commission of the offense can be duly
established in evidence the determination of the liability of the accomplice or accessory can proceed independently of that
of the principal.

The third question is this-considering that the alleged principal in this case was acquitted can the conviction of the
petitioner as an accessory be maintained?

In United States vs. Villaluz and Palermo, 7 a case involving the crime of theft, this Court ruled that notwithstanding the
acquittal of the principal due to the exempting circumstance of minority or insanity (Article 12, Revised Penal Code), the
accessory may nevertheless be convicted if the crime was in fact established.

Corollary to this is United States vs. Mendoza, 8 where this Court held in an arson case that the acquittal of the principal
must likewise result in the acquittal of the accessory where it was shown that no crime was committed inasmuch as the
fire was the result of an accident. Hence, there was no basis for the conviction of the accessory.

In the present case, the commission of the crime of murder and the responsibility of the petitioner as an accessory was
established. By the same token there is no doubt that the commission of the same offense had been proven in the
separate case against Salazar who was charged as principal. However, he was acquitted on the ground of reasonable
doubt by the same judge who convicted Vino as an accessory. The trial court held that the identity of the assailant was not
clearly established. It observed that only Julius Tejada identified Salazar carrying a rifle while riding on the bicycle driven
by Vino, which testimony is uncorroborated, and that two other witnesses, Ernesto Tejada and Renato Parvian who were
listed in the information, who can corroborate the testimony of Julius Tejada, were not presented by the prosecution.

The trial court also did not give due credit to the dying declaration of the victim pinpointing Salazar as his assailant on the
ground that it was not shown the victim revealed the identity of Salazar to his father and brother who came to his aid
immediately after the shooting. The court a quo also deplored the failure of the prosecution and law enforcement agencies
to subject to ballistic examinations the bullet slug recovered from the body of the victim and the two empty armalite bullet
empty shells recovered at the crime scene and to compare it with samples taken from the service rifle of Salazar. Thus,
the trial court made the following observation:

There appears to be a miscarriage of justice in this case due to the ineptitude of the law enforcement
agencies to gather material and important evidence and the seeming lack of concern of the public
prosecutor to direct the production of such evidence for the successful prosecution of the case. 9

Hence, in said case, the acquittal of the accused Salazar is predicated on the failure of the prosecution to adduce the
quantum of evidence required to generate a conviction as he was not positively identified as the person who was seen
holding a rifle escaping aboard the bicycle of Vino.

A similar situation may be cited. The accessory was seen driving a bicycle with an unidentified person as passenger
holding a carbine fleeing from the scene of the crime immediately after the commission of the crime of murder. The
commission of the crime and the participation of the principal or assailant, although not identified, was established. In
such case, the Court holds that the accessory can be prosecuted and held liable independently of the assailant.
We may visualize another situation as when the principal died or escaped before he could be tried and sentenced. Should
the accessory be acquitted thereby even if the commission of the offense and the responsibility of the accused as an
accessory was duly proven? The answer is no, he should be held criminally liable as an accessory.

Although in this case involving Vino the evidence tended to show that the assailant was Salazar, as two witnesses saw
him with a rifle aboard the bicycle driven by Vino, in the separate trial of the case of Salazar, as above discussed, he was
acquitted as the trial court was not persuaded that he was positively identified to be the man with the gun riding on the
bicycle driven by Vino. In the trial of the case against Vino, wherein he did not even adduce evidence in his defense, his
liability as such an accessory was established beyond reasonable doubt in that he assisted in the escape of the assailant
from the scene of the crime. The identity of the assailant is of no material significance for the purpose of the prosecution
of the accessory. Even if the assailant can not be identified the responsibility of Vino as an accessory is indubitable.

WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration is denied and this denial is FINAL.

SO ORDERED.

Narvasa and Medialdea, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions

CRUZ, J., dissenting:

I agree with the proposition in the ponencia that a person may be held liable as an accessory for helping in the escape of
the principal even if the latter is himself found not guilty. The examples given are quite convincing. However, I do not think
they apply in the case at bar, which is sui generis  and not covered by the general principle.

As Justice Aquino points out, Vino was convicted of having aided Jessie Salazar, who was named as the principal at
Vino's trial. At his own trial, the same Salazar was acquitted for lack of sufficient Identification. Vino was convicted of
helping in the escape not of an unnamed principal but, specifically, of Jessie Salazar. As Salazar himself has been
exonerated, the effect is that Vino is now being held liable for helping an innocent man, which is not a crime. Vino's
conviction should therefore be reversed.

GRIÑO-AQUINO, J.,  dissenting:

I regret to have to disagree with the ponente's opinion.

There are three (3) kinds of accessories under Article 19 of the Revised Penal Code:

ART. 19. Accessories. — Accessories are those who, having knowledge of the commission of the crime,
and without having participated therein, either as principals or accomplices, take part subsequent to its
commission in any of the following manner:

1. By profiting themselves or assisting the offenders to profit by the effects of the crime.

2. By concealing or destroying the body of the crime, or the effects or instruments thereof, in order to
prevent its discovery.

3. By harboring, concealing, or assisting in the escape of the principal of the crime, provided the
accessory acts with abuse of his public functions or whenever the author of the crime is guilty of treason,
 parricide, murder, or an attempt to take the life of the Chief Executive, or is known to be habitually guilty
of some other crime.

An accessory who falls under paragraph 1 may be convicted even if the principal is acquitted, as where the principal was
found to be a minor (U.S. vs. Villaluz and Palermo 32 Phil. 377) or the son of the offended party (Cristobal vs. People, 84
Phil. 473).

An accessory under paragraph 2 who allegedly concealed or destroyed the body of the crime or the effects or instruments
may be convicted if the commission of the crime has been proven, even if the principal has not been apprehended and
convicted.

But an accessory under paragraph 3 who allegedly harbored, concealed the principal or assisted in his escape, may not
be convicted unless the principal, whom he allegedly harbored, concealed, or assisted in escaping, has been identified
and convicted.

I cannot see how the conviction of Vino as an accessory under paragraph 3 of Article 19 of the Rev. Penal Code, for
allegedly having assisted in the escape of Sgt. Jessie Salazar, the alleged killer of Roberto Tejada, can stand since
Salazar (who faced trial separately and subsequently) was acquitted, ironically by the same court that convicted Vino
earlier. The basis for Vino's conviction as accessory in the crime of murder was his having driven the alleged killer Salazar
in his tricycle after Tejada was killed. Since the trial court acquitted Salazar, holding that the prosecution failed to prove
that he was the killer of Tejada, then Vino's having driven him in his tricycle did not constitute the act of assisting in the
escape of a killer.

The cases of U.S. vs. Villaluz and Palermo, 32 Phil. 377 and U.S. vs. Mendoza,  23 Phil. 194 cited in the ponencia are not
in point. In the Villaluz case the charge against accused as an accessory to theft was brought under paragraph 2 of Article
19 of the Revised Penal Code, for having concealed the effects of the crime by receiving and concealing a stolen watch.
Although the principal, a young housegirl, was acquitted on account of her tender age and lack of discernment, the
accessory was nevertheless convicted.

In the Mendoza case, the accused barrio captain who was charged as an accessory under paragraph 2 for not reporting
the fire to the authorities, was acquitted because the crime of arson was not proven, the fire being accidental.

The criminal liability of an accessory under paragraph 3 of Article 19 is directly linked to and inseparable from that of the
principal. Even if as in this case, the crime (murder) was proven but the identity of the murderer was not (for the principal
accused was acquitted by the trial court), the petitioner tricycle-driver who allegedly drove him in his tricycle to escape
from the scene of the crime, may not be convicted as an accessory to the murder, for, as it turned out, the said passenger
was not proven to be the murderer. The accessory may not be convicted under paragraph 3 of Article 19 of the Revised
Penal Code if the alleged principal is acquitted for, in this instance, the principle that "the accessory follows the principal"
appropriately applies.

I therefore vote to acquit the petitioner.

Separate Opinions

CRUZ, J., dissenting:

I agree with the proposition in the ponencia that a person may be held liable as an accessory for helping in the escape of
the principal even if the latter is himself found not guilty. The examples given are quite convincing. However, I do not think
they apply in the case at bar, which is sui generis  and not covered by the general principle.

As Justice Aquino points out, Vino was convicted of having aided Jessie Salazar, who was named as the principal at
Vino's trial. At his own trial, the same Salazar was acquitted for lack of sufficient Identification. Vino was convicted of
helping in the escape not of an unnamed principal but, specifically, of Jessie Salazar. As Salazar himself has been
exonerated, the effect is that Vino is now being held liable for helping an innocent man, which is not a crime. Vino's
conviction should therefore be reversed.
GRIÑO-AQUINO, J.,  dissenting:

I regret to have to disagree with the ponente's opinion.

There are three (3) kinds of accessories under Article 19 of the Revised Penal Code:

ART. 19. Accessories. — Accessories are those who, having knowledge of the commission of the crime,
and without having participated therein, either as principals or accomplices, take part subsequent to its
commission in any of the following manner:

1. By profiting themselves or assisting the offenders to profit by the effects of the crime.

2. By concealing or destroying the body of the crime, or the effects or instruments thereof, in order to
prevent its discovery.

3. By harboring, concealing, or assisting in the escape of the principal of the crime, provided the
accessory acts with abuse of his public functions or whenever the author of the crime is guilty of treason,
parricide, murder, or an attempt to take the life of the Chief Executive, or is known to be habitually guilty
of some other crime.

An accessory who falls under paragraph 1 may be convicted even if the principal is acquitted, as where the principal was
found to be a minor (U.S. vs. Villaluz and Palermo 32 Phil. 377) or the son of the offended party (Cristobal vs. People, 84
Phil. 473).

An accessory under paragraph 2 who allegedly concealed or destroyed the body of the crime or the effects or instruments
may be convicted if the commission of the crime has been proven, even if the principal has not been apprehended and
convicted.

But an accessory under paragraph 3 who allegedly harbored, concealed the principal or assisted in his escape, may not
be convicted unless the principal, whom he allegedly harbored, concealed, or assisted in escaping, has been identified
and convicted.

I cannot see how the conviction of Vino as an accessory under paragraph 3 of Article 19 of the Rev. Penal Code, for
allegedly having assisted in the escape of Sgt. Jessie Salazar, the alleged killer of Roberto Tejada, can stand since
Salazar (who faced trial separately and subsequently) was acquitted, ironically by the same court that convicted Vino
earlier. The basis for Vino's conviction as accessory in the crime of murder was his having driven the alleged killer Salazar
in his tricycle after Tejada was killed. Since the trial court acquitted Salazar, holding that the prosecution failed to prove
that he was the killer of Tejada, then Vino's having driven him in his tricycle did not constitute the act of assisting in the
escape of a killer.

The cases of U.S. vs. Villaluz and Palermo, 32 Phil. 377 and U.S. vs. Mendoza, 23 Phil. 194 cited in the ponencia  are not
in point. In the Villaluz case the charge against accused as an accessory to theft was brought under paragraph 2 of Article
19 of the Revised Penal Code, for having concealed the effects of the crime by receiving and concealing a stolen watch.
Although the principal, a young housegirl, was acquitted on account of her tender age and lack of discernment, the
accessory was nevertheless convicted.

In the Mendoza case, the accused barrio captain who was charged as an accessory under paragraph 2 for not reporting
the fire to the authorities, was acquitted because the crime of arson was not proven, the fire being accidental.

The criminal liability of an accessory under paragraph 3 of Article 19 is directly linked to and inseparable from that of the
principal. Even if as in this case, the crime (murder) was proven but the Identity of the murderer was not (for the principal
accused was acquitted by the trial court), the petitioner tricycle-driver who allegedly drove him in his tricycle to escape
from the scene of the crime, may not be convicted as an accessory to the murder, for, as it turned out, the said passenger
was not proven to be the murderer. The accessory may not be convicted under paragraph 3 of Article 19 of the Revised
Penal Code if the alleged principal is acquitted for, in this instance, the principle that "the accessory follows the principal"
appropriately applies.

I therefore vote to acquit the petitioner.

 MALACAÑANG
Manila

PRESIDENTIAL DECREE No. 1612

ANTI-FENCING LAW OF 1979

WHEREAS, reports from law enforcement agencies reveal that there is rampant robbery and thievery of government and
private properties;

WHEREAS, such robbery and thievery have become profitable on the part of the lawless elements because of the
existence of ready buyers, commonly known as fence, of stolen properties;lawphil.net

WHEREAS, under existing law, a fence can be prosecuted only as an accessory after the fact and punished lightly;

WHEREAS, is imperative to impose heavy penalties on persons who profit by the effects of the crimes of robbery and
theft.

NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of the Philippines by virtue of the powers vested in me by
the Constitution, do hereby order and decree as part of the law of the land the following:

Section 1. Title. This decree shall be known as the Anti-Fencing Law.

Section 2. Definition of Terms. The following terms shall mean as follows:

(a) "Fencing" is the act of any person who, with intent to gain for himself or for another, shall buy, receive,
possess, keep, acquire, conceal, sell or dispose of, or shall buy and sell, or in any other manner deal in any
article, item, object or anything of value which he knows, or should be known to him, to have been derived from
the proceeds of the crime of robbery or theft.

(b) "Fence" includes any person, firm, association corporation or partnership or other organization who/which
commits the act of fencing.

Section 3. Penalties. Any person guilty of fencing shall be punished as hereunder indicated:

(a) The penalty of prision mayor, if the value of the property involved is more than 12,000 pesos but not exceeding
22,000 pesos; if the value of such property exceeds the latter sum, the penalty provided in this paragraph shall be
imposed in its maximum period, adding one year for each additional 10,000 pesos; but the total penalty which
may be imposed shall not exceed twenty years. In such cases, the penalty shall be termed reclusion temporal and
the accessory penalty pertaining thereto provided in the Revised Penal Code shall also be imposed.

(b) The penalty of prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods, if the value of the property robbed or
stolen is more than 6,000 pesos but not exceeding 12,000 pesos.

(c) The penalty of prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods, if the value of the property involved is
more than 200 pesos but not exceeding 6,000 pesos.

(d) The penalty of arresto mayor in its medium period to prision correccional in its minimum period, if the value of
the property involved is over 50 pesos but not exceeding 200 pesos.

(e) The penalty of arresto mayor in its medium period if such value is over five (5) pesos but not exceeding 50
pesos.

(f) The penalty of arresto mayor in its minimum period if such value does not exceed 5 pesos.
Section 4. Liability of Officials of Juridical Persons. If the fence is a partnership, firm, corporation or association, the
president or the manager or any officer thereof who knows or should have known the commission of the offense shall be
liable.

Section 5. Presumption of Fencing. Mere possession of any good, article, item, object, or anything of value which has
been the subject of robbery or thievery shall be prima facie evidence of fencing.

Section 6. Clearance/Permit to Sell/Used Second Hand Articles. For purposes of this Act, all stores, establishments or
entities dealing in the buy and sell of any good, article item, object of anything of value obtained from an unlicensed dealer
or supplier thereof, shall before offering the same for sale to the public, secure the necessary clearance or permit from the
station commander of the Integrated National Police in the town or city where such store, establishment or entity is
located. The Chief of Constabulary/Director General, Integrated National Police shall promulgate such rules and
regulations to carry out the provisions of this section. Any person who fails to secure the clearance or permit required by
this section or who violates any of the provisions of the rules and regulations promulgated thereunder shall upon
conviction be punished as a fence. lawphi1.net

Section 7. Repealing Clause. All laws or parts thereof, which are inconsistent with the provisions of this Decree are
hereby repealed or modified accordingly.

Section 8. Effectivity. This Decree shall take effect upon approval.

Done in the City of Manila, this 2nd day of March, in the year of Our Lord, nineteen hundred and seventy-nine.

RULES AND REGULATIONS TO CARRY OUT THE PROVISIONS OF SECTION 6 OF PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO.
1612, KNOWN AS THE ANTI-FENCING LAW.

Pursuant to Section 6 of Presidential Decree No. 1612, known as the Anti-Fencing Law, the following rules and
regulations are hereby promulgated to govern the issuance of clearances/permits to sell used secondhand articles
obtained from an unlicensed dealer or supplier thereof:

I. Definition of Terms

1. "Used secondhand article" shall refer to any goods, article, item, object or anything of value obtained from an
unlicensed dealer or supplier, regardless of whether the same has actually or in fact been used.

2. "Unlicensed dealer/supplier" shall refer to any persons, partnership, firm, corporation, association or any other
entity or establishment not licensed by the government to engage in the business of dealing in or of supplying the
articles defined in the preceding paragraph.

3. "Store", "establishment" or "entity" shall be construed to include any individual dealing in the buying and selling
used secondhand articles, as defined in paragraph hereof.

4. "Buy and Sell" refer to the transaction whereby one purchases used secondhand articles for the purpose of
resale to third persons.

5. "Station Commander" shall refer to the Station Commander of the Integrated National Police within the
territorial limits of the town or city district where the store, establishment or entity dealing in the buying and selling
of used secondhand articles is located.

II. Duty to Procure Clearance or Permit

1. No person shall sell or offer to sell to the public any used secondhand article as defined herein without first
securing a clearance or permit for the purpose from the proper Station Commander of the Integrated National
Police.

2. If the person seeking the clearance or permit is a partnership, firm, corporation, or association or group of
individuals, the clearance or permit shall be obtained by or in the name of the president, manager or other
responsible officer-in-charge thereof.
 3. If a store, firm, corporation, partnership, association or other establishment or entity has a branch or subsidiary
and the used secondhand article is acquired by such branch or subsidiary for sale to the public, the said branch or
subsidiary shall secure the required clearance or permit.

4. Any goods, article, item, or object or anything of value acquired from any source for which no receipt or
equivalent document evidencing the legality of its acquisition could be presented by the present possessor or
holder thereof, or the covering receipt, or equivalent document, of which is fake, falsified or irregularly obtained,
shall be presumed as having been acquired from an unlicensed dealer or supplier and the possessor or holder
thereof must secure the required clearance or permit before the same can be sold or offered for sale to the public.

III. Procedure for Procurement of Clearances or Permits

1. The Station Commanders concerned shall require the owner of a store or the president, manager or
responsible officer-in-charge of a firm, establishment or other entity located within their respective jurisdictions
and in possession of or having in stock used secondhand articles as defined herein, to submit an initial affidavit
within thirty (30) days from receipt of notice for the purpose thereof and subsequent affidavits once every fifteen
(15) days within five (5) days after the period covered, which shall contain:

(a) A complete inventory of such articles acquired daily from whatever source and the names and
addresses of the persons from whom such articles were acquired.

(b) A full list of articles to be sold or offered for sale as well as the place where the date when the sale or
offer for sale shall commence.

(c) The place where the articles are presently deposited or kept in stock.

The Station Commander may, at his discretion when the circumstances of each case warrant, require that the
affidavit submitted be accompanied by other documents showing proof of legitimacy of the acquisition of the
articles.

2. A party required to secure a clearance or permit under these rules and regulations shall file an application
therefor with the Station Commander concerned. The application shall state:

(a) The name, address and other pertinent circumstances of the persons, in case of an individual or, in
the case of a firm, corporation, association, partnership or other entity, the name, address and other
pertinent circumstances of the president, manager or officer-in-charge.

(b) The article to be sold or offered for sale to the public and the name and address of the unlicensed
dealer or supplier from whom such article was acquired.

In support of the application, there shall be attached to it the corresponding receipt or other equivalent document
to show proof of the legitimacy of acquisition of the article.

3. The Station Commander shall examine the documents attached to the application and may require the
presentation of other additional documents, if necessary, to show satisfactory proof of the legitimacy of acquisition
of the article, subject to the following conditions:

(a) If the legitimacy of acquisition of any article from an unlicensed source cannot be satisfactorily
established by the documents presented, the Station Commander shall, upon approval of the INP
Superintendent in the district and at the expense of the party seeking the clearance/permit, cause the
publication of a notice in a newspaper of general circulation for two (2) successive days enumerating
therein the articles acquired from an unlicensed dealer or supplier, the names and addresses of the
persons from whom they were acquired and shall state that such articles are to be sold or offered for sale
to the public at the address of the store, establishment or other entity seeking the clearance/permit. In
places where no newspapers are in general circulation, the party seeking the clearance or permit shall,
instead, post a notice daily for one week on the bulletin board of the municipal building of the town where
the store, firm, establishment or entity concerned is located or, in the case of an individual, where the
articles in his possession are to be sold or offered for sale.
 (b) If after 15 days, upon expiration of the period of publication or of the notice referred to in the preceding
paragraph, no claim is made with respect to any of the articles enumerated in the notice, the Station
Commander shall issue the clearance or permit sought.

(c) If, before expiration of the same period for publication of the notice or its posting, it shall appear that
any of the articles in question is stolen property, the Station Commander shall hold the article in restraint
as evidence in any appropriate case to be filed. Articles held in restraint shall be kept and disposed of as
the circumstances of each case permit, taking into account all considerations of right and justice in the
case. In any case where any article is held in restraint, it shall be the duty of the Station Commander
concerned to advise/notify the Commission on Audit of the case and comply with such procedure as may
be proper under applicable existing laws, rules and regulations.

4. The Station Commander concerned shall, within seventy-two (72) hours from receipt of the application, act
thereon by either issuing the clearance/permit requested or denying the same. Denial of an application shall be in
writing and shall state in brief the reason/s therefor.

5. The application, clearance/permit or the denial thereof, including such other documents as may be pertinent in
the implementation of Section 6 of P.D. No. 1612 shall be in the forms prescribed in Annexes "A", "B", "C", "D",
and "E" hereof, which are made integral parts of these rules and regulations.

6. For the issuance of clearances/permit required under Section 6 of P.D. No. 1612, no fee shall be charged.

IV. Appeals

Any party aggrieved by the action taken by the Station Commander may elevate the decision taken in the case to the
proper INP District Superintendent and, if he is still dissatisfied therewith may take the same on appeal to the INP
Director. The decision of the INP Director may also be appealed to the INP Director-General whose decision may likewise
be appealed to the Minister of National Defense. The decision of the Minister of National Defense on the case shall be
final. The appeal against the decision taken by a Commander lower than the INP Director-General should be filed to the
next higher Commander within ten (10) days from receipt of notice of the decision. The decision of the INP Director-
General should be appealed within fifteen (15) days from receipt of notice of the decision.

V. Penalties

1. Any person who fails to secure the clearance or permit required by Section 6 of P.D. 1612 or who violates any
of the provisions of these rules and regulations shall upon conviction be punished as a fence.

2. The INP Director-General shall recommend to the proper authority the cancellation of the business license of
the erring individual, store, establishment or the entity concerned.

3. Articles obtained from unlicensed sources for sale or offered for sale without prior compliance with the
provisions of Section 6 of P.D. No. 1612 and with these rules and regulations shall be held in restraint until
satisfactory evidence or legitimacy of acquisition has been established.

4. Articles for which no satisfactory evidence of legitimacy of acquisition is established and which are found to be
stolen property shall likewise be held under restraint and shall, furthermore, be subject to confiscation as evidence
in the appropriate case to be filed. If, upon termination of the case, the same is not claimed by their legitimate
owners, the article/s shall be forfeited in favor of the government and made subject to disposition as the
circumstances warrant in accordance with applicable existing laws, rules and regulations. The Commission on
Audit shall, in all cases, be notified.

5. Any personnel of the Integrated National Police found violating the provisions of Section 6 of P.D. No. 1612 or
any of its implementing rules and regulations or who, in any manner whatsoever, connives with or through his
negligence or inaction makes possible the commission of such violations by any party required to comply with the
law and its implementing rules and regulations, shall be prosecuted criminally without prejudice to the imposition
of administrative penalties.

VI. Visitorial Power

It shall be the duty of the owner of the store or of the president, manager or responsible officer-in-charge of any firm,
establishment or other entity or of an individual having in his premises articles to be sold or offered for sale to the public to
allow the Station Commander or his authorized representative to exercise visitorial powers. For this purpose, however, the
power to conduct visitations shall be exercise only during office or business hours and upon authority in writing from and
by the INP Superintendent in the district and for the sole purpose of determining whether articles are kept in possession or
stock contrary to the intents of Section 6 of P.D. No. 1612 and of these rules and regulations.

VII. Other Duties Imposed Upon Station Commanders and INP District Superintendent and Directors Following Action on
Applications for Clearances or Permits

1. At the end of each month, it shall be the duty of the Station Commander concerned to:

(a) Make and maintain a file in his office of all clearances/permit issued by him.

(b) Submit a full report to the INP District Superintendent on the number of applications for clearances or
permits processed by his office, indicating therein the number of clearances/permits issued and the
number of applications denied. The report shall state the reasons for denial of an application and the
corresponding follow-up actions taken and shall be accompanied by an inventory of the articles to be sold
or offered for sale in his jurisdiction.

2. The INP District Superintendent shall, on the basis of the reports submitted by the Station Commander, in turn
submit quarterly reports to the appropriate INP Director containing a consolidation of the information stated in the
reports of Station Commanders in his jurisdiction.

3. Reports from INP District Superintendent shall serve as basis for a consolidated report to be submitted semi-
annually by INP Directors to the Director-General, Integrated National Police.

4. In all cases, reports emanating from the different levels of the Integrated National Police shall be accompanied
with full and accurate inventories of the articles acquired from unlicensed dealers or suppliers and proposed to be
sold or offered for sale in the jurisdictions covered by the report.

These implementing rules and regulations, having been published in a newspaper of national circulation, shall take effect
on June 15, 1979.

FOR THE CHIEF OF CONSTABULARY DIRECTOR-GENERAL, INP:

 MALACAÑANG
Manila

PRESIDENTIAL DECREE No. 1829

PENALIZING OBSTRUCTION OF APPREHENSION AND PROSECUTION OF CRIMINAL OFFENDERS

WHEREAS, crime and violence continue to proliferate despite the sustained vigorous efforts of the government to
effectively contain them;

WHEREAS, to discourage public indifference or apathy towards the apprehension and prosecution of criminal offenders, it
is necessary to penalize acts which obstruct or frustrate or tend to obstruct or frustrate the successful apprehension and
prosecution of criminal offenders;

NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND, E. MARCOS, President of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested in me by
law do hereby decree and order the following:

Section 1. The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period, or a fine ranging from 1,000 to 6,000 pesos, or both,
shall be imposed upon any person who knowingly or willfully obstructs, impedes, frustrates or delays the apprehension of
suspects and the investigation and prosecution of criminal cases by committing any of the following acts:

(a) preventing witnesses from testifying in any criminal proceeding or from reporting the commission of any
offense or the identity of any offender/s by means of bribery, misrepresentation, deceit, intimidation, force or
threats;

(b) altering, destroying, suppressing or concealing any paper, record, document, or object, with intent to impair its
verity, authenticity, legibility, availability, or admissibility as evidence in any investigation of or official proceedings
in, criminal cases, or to be used in the investigation of, or official proceedings in, criminal cases;

(c) harboring or concealing, or facilitating the escape of, any person he knows, or has reasonable ground to
believe or suspect, has committed any offense under existing penal laws in order to prevent his arrest prosecution
and conviction;

(d) publicly using a fictitious name for the purpose of concealing a crime, evading prosecution or the execution of
a judgment, or concealing his true name and other personal circumstances for the same purpose or purposes;

(e) delaying the prosecution of criminal cases by obstructing the service of process or court orders or disturbing
proceedings in the fiscal's offices, in Tanodbayan, or in the courts;

(f) making, presenting or using any record, document, paper or object with knowledge of its falsity and with intent
to affect the course or outcome of the investigation of, or official proceedings in, criminal cases;

(g) soliciting, accepting, or agreeing to accept any benefit in consideration of abstaining from, discounting, or
impeding the prosecution of a criminal offender;

(h) threatening directly or indirectly another with the infliction of any wrong upon his person, honor or property or
that of any immediate member or members of his family in order to prevent such person from appearing in the
investigation of, or official proceedings in, criminal cases, or imposing a condition, whether lawful or unlawful, in
order to prevent a person from appearing in the investigation of or in official proceedings in, criminal cases;

(i) giving of false or fabricated information to mislead or prevent the law enforcement agencies from apprehending
the offender or from protecting the life or property of the victim; or fabricating information from the data gathered in
confidence by investigating authorities for purposes of background information and not for publication and
publishing or disseminating the same to mislead the investigator or to the court.

If any of the acts mentioned herein is penalized by any other law with a higher penalty, the higher penalty shall be
imposed.
Section 2. If any of the foregoing acts is committed by a public official or employee, he shall in addition to the penalties
provided thereunder, suffer perpetual disqualification from holding public office.

Section 3. This Decree shall take effect immediately.

Done in the City of Manila, this 16th day of January, in the year of Our Lord, nineteen hundred and eighty-one.
 PENALTIES:
A. General Principles

1. Constitutional Limitations

• 1987 Constitution, Art.III Sec. 1,2,12,13,14,15,1617, 20,21, 22

• No Ex post facto Law and Bill of Attainder
• Due Process
• No cruel and inhuman punishment

ARTICLE III
BILL OF RIGHTS

Section 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor shall any person be
denied the equal protection of the laws.

Section 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of
arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched
and the persons or things to be seized.

Section 12.

1. Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to be informed of his right to
remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own choice. If the person cannot
afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be waived except in writing and
in the presence of counsel.

2. No torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which vitiate the free will shall be used against
him. Secret detention places, solitary, incommunicado, or other similar forms of detention are prohibited.

3. Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or Section 17 hereof shall be inadmissible in evidence
against him.

4. The law shall provide for penal and civil sanctions for violations of this Section as well as compensation to the
rehabilitation of victims of torture or similar practices, and their families.

Section 13. All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is
strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance as may be provided by
law. The right to bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended. Excessive
bail shall not be required.

Section 14.

1. No person shall be held to answer for a criminal offense without due process of law.

2. In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved, and shall enjoy
the right to be heard by himself and counsel, to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against
him, to have a speedy, impartial, and public trial, to meet the witnesses face to face, and to have compulsory
process to secure the attendance of witnesses and the production of evidence in his behalf. However, after
arraignment, trial may proceed notwithstanding the absence of the accused: Provided, that he has been duly
notified and his failure to appear is unjustifiable.

Section 15. The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be suspended except in cases of invasion or rebellion,
when the public safety requires it.
Section 16. All persons shall have the right to a speedy disposition of their cases before all judicial, quasi-judicial, or
administrative bodies.

Section 17. No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself.

Section 18.

1. No person shall be detained solely by reason of his political beliefs and aspirations.

2. No involuntary servitude in any form shall exist except as a punishment for a crime whereof the party shall have
been duly convicted.

Section 19.

1. Excessive fines shall not be imposed, nor cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment inflicted. Neither shall death
penalty be imposed, unless, for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes, the Congress hereafter provides for
it. Any death penalty already imposed shall be reduced to reclusion perpetua.

2. The employment of physical, psychological, or degrading punishment against any prisoner or detainee or the use
of substandard or inadequate penal facilities under subhuman conditions shall be dealt with by law.

Section 20. No person shall be imprisoned for debt or non-payment of a poll tax.

Section 21. No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense. If an act is punished by a law
and an ordinance, conviction or acquittal under either shall constitute a bar to another prosecution for the same act.

Section 22. No ex post facto law or bill of attainder shall be enacted.

 2. Prospectivity
B. Purposes
C. Penalties that may be imposed, Art. 21, 24, 25
2. Death Penalty
• 1987 Constitution, Art. III Sec 19 (1)

Section 19.

1. Excessive fines shall not be imposed, nor cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment inflicted. Neither shall death
penalty be imposed, unless, for compelling reasons involving heinous crimes, the Congress hereafter provides for
it. Any death penalty already imposed shall be reduced to reclusion perpetua.

2. The employment of physical, psychological, or degrading punishment against any prisoner or detainee or the use
of substandard or inadequate penal facilities under subhuman conditions shall be dealt with by law.

• R.A. 9346

Thirteenth Congress
Second Regular Session

Begun and held in Metro Manila, on Monday, the twenty-fifth day of July, two thousand and five.

REPUBLIC ACT No. 9346             June 24, 2006

AN ACT PROHIBITING THE IMPOSITION OF DEATH PENALTY IN THE PHILIPPINES

Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the Philippine Congress Assembled:

SECTION 1. The imposition of the penalty of death is hereby prohibited. Accordingly, Republic Act No. Eight Thousand
One Hundred Seventy-Seven (R.A. No. 8177), otherwise known as the Act Designating Death by Lethal Injection is
hereby repealed. Republic Act No. Seven Thousand Six Hundred Fifty-Nine (R.A. No. 7659), otherwise known as the
Death Penalty Law, and all other laws, executive orders and decrees, insofar as they impose the death penalty are hereby
repealed or amended accordingly.

SEC. 2. In lieu of the death penalty, the following shall be imposed.

(a) the penalty of reclusion perpetua, when the law violated makes use of the nomenclature of the penalties of the
Revised Penal Code; or

(b) the penalty of life imprisonment, when the law violated does not make use of the nomenclature of the penalties
of the Revised Penal Code.

SEC. 3. Person convicted of offenses punished with reclusion perpetua, or whose sentences will be reduced to reclusion
perpetua, by reason of this Act, shall not be eligible for parole under Act No. 4180, otherwise known as the Indeterminate
Sentence Law, as amended.

SEC. 4. The Board of Pardons and Parole shall cause the publication at least one a week for three consecutive weeks in
a newspaper of general circulation of the names of persons convicted of offenses punished with reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment by reason of this Act who are being considered or recommend for commutation or pardon; Provided,
however, That nothing herein shall limit the power of the President to grant executive clemency under Section 19, Article
VII of the Constitutions.

SEC. 5. This Act shall take effect immediately after its publication in two national newspapers of general circulation.
• R.A. 7659

REPUBLIC ACT NO. 7659

AN ACT TO IMPOSE THE DEATH PENALTY ON CERTAIN HEINOUS CRIMES, AMENDING FOR THAT PURPOSE
THE REVISED PENAL LAWS, AS AMENDED, OTHER SPECIAL PENAL LAWS, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES

WHEREAS, the Constitution, specifically Article III, Section 19 paragraph (1) thereof, states "Excessive fines shall not be
imposed nor cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment inflicted. Neither shall death penalty be imposed, unless, for
compelling reasons involving heinous crimes, the Congress hereafter provides for it. . .";

WHEREAS, the crimes punishable by death under this Act are heinous for being grievous, odious and hateful offenses
and which, by reason of their inherent or manifest wickedness, viciousness, atrocity and perversity are repugnant and
outrageous to the common standards and norms of decency and morality in a just, civilized and ordered society;

WHEREAS, due to the alarming upsurge of such crimes which has resulted not only in the loss of human lives and
wanton destruction of property but also affected the nation's efforts towards sustainable economic development and
prosperity while at the same time has undermined the people's faith in the Government and the latter's ability to maintain
peace and order in the country;

WHEREAS, the Congress, in the justice, public order and the rule of law, and the need to rationalize and harmonize the
penal sanctions for heinous crimes, finds compelling reasons to impose the death penalty for said crimes;

Now, therefore,

Section 1. Declaration of Policy. - It is hereby declared the policy of the State to foster and ensure not only obedience to
its authority, but also to adopt such measures as would effectively promote the maintenance of peace and order, the
protection of life, liberty and property, and the promotion of the general welfare which are essential for the enjoyment by
all the people of the blessings of democracy in a just and humane society;

Section 2. Article 114 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, is hereby amended to read as follows:

"Art. 114. Treason. - Any Filipino citizen who levies war against the Philippines or adheres to her enemies giving
them aid or comfort within the Philippines or elsewhere, shall be punished by reclusion perpetua to death and
shall pay a fine not to exceed 100,000 pesos."

No person shall be convicted of treason unless on the testimony of two witnesses at least to the same overt act or
on confession of the accused in open court.

Likewise, an alien, residing in the Philippines, who commits acts of treason as defined in paragraph 1 of this
Article shall be punished by reclusion temporal to death and shall pay a fine not to exceed 100,000 pesos."

Section 3. Section Three, Chapter One, Title One of Book Two of the same Code is hereby amended to read as follows:

"Section Three. - Piracy and mutiny on the high seas or in the Philippine waters

Art. 122. Piracy in general and mutiny on the high seas or in Philippine waters. - The penalty of reclusion perpetua
shall be inflicted upon any person who, on the high seas, or in Philippine waters, shall attack or seize a vessel or,
not being a member of its complement nor a passenger, shall seize the whole or part of the cargo of said vessel,
its equipment or passengers.

The same penalty shall be inflicted in case of mutiny on the high seas or in Philippine waters."

Art. 123. Qualified piracy. - The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death shall be imposed upon those who commit
any of the crimes referred to in the preceding article, under any of the following circumstances:

1. Whenever they have seized a vessel by boarding or firing upon the same;
 2. Whenever the pirates have abandoned their victims without means of saving themselves or;

3. Whenever the crime is accompanied by murder, homicide, physical injuries or rape."

Section 4. There shall be incorporated after Article 211 of the same Code a new article to read as follows:

"Art. 211-A. Qualified Bribery. - If any public officer is entrusted with law enforcement and he refrains from
arresting or prosecuting an offender who has committed a crime punishable by reclusion perpetua and/or death in
consideration of any offer, promise, gift or present, he shall suffer the penalty for the offense which was not
prosecuted.

If it is the public officer who asks or demands such gift or present, he shall suffer the penalty of death."

Section 5. The penalty of death for parricide under Article 246 of the same Code is hereby restored, so that it shall read
as follows:

"Art. 246. Parricide. - Any person who shall kill his father, mother, or child, whether legitimate of illegitimate, or
any of his ascendants, or descendants, or his spouse, shall be guilty of parricide and shall be punished by the
penalty of reclusion perpetua to death."

Section 6. Article 248 of the same Code is hereby amended to read as follows:

"Art. 248. Murder. - Any person who, not falling within the provisions of Article 246 shall kill another, shall be guilty
of murder and shall be punished by reclusion perpetua, to death if committed with any of the following attendant
circumstances:

1. With treachery, taking advantage of superior strength, with the aid of armed men, or employing means
to weaken the defense or of means or persons to insure or afford impunity.

2. In consideration of a price, reward or promise.

3. By means of inundation, fire, poison, explosion, shipwreck, stranding of a vessel, derailment or assault
upon a railroad, fall of an airship, or by means of motor vehicles, or with the use of any other means
involving great waste and ruin.

4. On occasion of any of the calamities enumerated in the preceding paragraph, or of an earthquake,

eruption of a volcano, destructive cyclone, epidemic or other public calamity.

5. With evident premeditation.

6. With cruelty, by deliberately and inhumanly augmenting the suffering of the victim, or outraging or
scoffing at his person or corpse."

Section 7. Article 255 of the same Code is hereby amended to read as follows:

"Art. 255. Infanticide. - The penalty provided for parricide in Article 246 and for murder in Article 248 shall be
imposed upon any person who shall kill any child less than three days of age.

If any crime penalized in this Article be committed by the mother of the child for the purpose of concealing her
dishonor, she shall suffer the penalty of prision mayor in its medium and maximum periods, and if said crime be
committed for the same purpose by the maternal grandparents or either of them, the penalty shall be reclusion
temporal."

Section 8. Article 267 of the same Code is hereby amended to read as follows:

"Art. 267. Kidnapping and serious illegal detention. - Any private individual who shall kidnap or detain another, or
in any other manner deprive him of his liberty, shall suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death:
 1. If the kidnapping or detention shall have lasted more than three days.

2. If it shall have been committed simulating public authority.

3. If any serious physical injuries shall have been inflicted upon the person kidnapped or detained; or if
threats to kill him shall have been made.

4. If the person kidnapped or detained shall be a minor, except when the accused is any of the parents,
female or a public officer.

The penalty shall be death penalty where the kidnapping or detention was committed for the purpose of extorting
ransom from the victim or any other person, even if none of the circumstances above-mentioned were present in
the commission of the offense.

When the victim is killed or dies as a consequence of the detention or is raped, or is subjected to torture or
dehumanizing acts, the maximum penalty shall be imposed."

Section 9. Article 294 of the same Code is hereby amended to read as follows:

"Art. 294. Robbery with violence against or intimidation of persons - Penalties. - Any person guilty of robbery with
the use of violence against or intimidation of any person shall suffer:

1. The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death, when by reason or on occasion of the robbery, the crime of
homicide shall have been committed, or when the robbery shall have been accompanied by rape or
intentional mutilation or arson.

2. The penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium period to reclusion perpetua, when or if by reason or
on occasion of such robbery, any of the physical injuries penalized in subdivision I of Article 263 shall
have been inflicted.

3. The penalty of reclusion temporal, when by reason or on occasion of the robbery, any of the physical
injuries penalized in subdivision 2 of the article mentioned in the next preceding paragraph, shall have
been inflicted.

4. The penalty of prision mayor in its maximum period to reclusion temporal in its medium period, if the
violence or intimidation employed in the commission of the robbery shall have been carried to a degree
clearly unnecessary for the commission of the crime, or when in the course of its execution, the offender
shall have inflicted upon any person not responsible for its commission any of the physical injuries
covered by subdivisions 3 and 4 of said Article 263.

5. The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its medium period in other
cases."

Section 10. Article 320 of the same Code is hereby amended to read as follows:

"Art. 320. Destructive Arson. - The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death shall be imposed upon any person who
shall burn:

1. One (1) or more buildings or edifices, consequent to one single act of burning, or as a result of
simultaneous burnings, committed on several or different occasions.

2. Any building of public or private ownership, devoted to the public in general or where people usually
gather or congregate for a definite purpose such as, but not limited to, official governmental function or
business, private transaction, commerce, trade, workshop, meetings and conferences, or merely
incidental to a definite purpose such as but not limited to hotels, motels, transient dwellings, public
conveyances or stops or terminals, regardless of whether the offender had knowledge that there are
persons in said building or edifice at the time it is set on fire and regardless also of whether the building is
actually inhabited or not.
 3. Any train or locomotive, ship or vessel, airship or airplane, devoted to transportation or conveyance, or
for public use, entertainment or leisure.

4. Any building, factory, warehouse installation and any appurtenances thereto, which are devoted to the
service of public utilities.

5. Any building the burning of which is for the purpose of concealing or destroying evidence of another
violation of law, or for the purpose of concealing bankruptcy or defrauding creditors or to collect from
insurance.

Irrespective of the application of the above enumerated qualifying circumstances, the penalty of reclusion
perpetua to death shall likewise be imposed when the arson is perpetrated or committed by two (2) or more
persons or by a group of persons, regardless of whether their purpose is merely to burn or destroy the building or
the burning merely constitutes an overt act in the commission or another violation of law.

The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death shall also be imposed upon any person who shall burn:

1. Any arsenal, shipyard, storehouse or military powder or fireworks factory, ordnance, storehouse,
archives or general museum of the Government.

2. In an inhabited place, any storehouse or factory of inflammable or explosive materials.

If as a consequence of the commission of any of the acts penalized under this Article, death results, the
mandatory penalty of death shall be imposed."

Section 11. Article 335 of the same Code is hereby amended to read as follows:

"Art. 335. When and how rape is committed. - Rape is committed by having carnal knowledge of a woman under
any of the following circumstances:

1. By using force or intimidation;

2. When the woman is deprived of reason or otherwise unconscious; and

3. When the woman is under twelve years of age or is demented.

The crime of rape shall be punished by reclusion perpetua.

Whenever the crime of rape is committed with the use of a deadly weapon or by two or more persons, the penalty
shall be reclusion perpetua to death.

When by reason or on the occasion of the rape, the victim has become insane, the penalty shall be death.

When the rape is attempted or frustrated and a homicide is committed by reason or on the occasion thereof, the
penalty shall be reclusion perpetua to death.

When by reason or on the occasion of the rape, a homicide is committed, the penalty shall be death.

The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with any of the following attendant
circumstances:

1. when the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent, ascendant, step-
parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the common-law-
spouse of the parent of the victim.

2. when the victim is under the custody of the police or military authorities.
 3. when the rape is committed in full view of the husband, parent, any of the children or other relatives
within the third degree of consanguinity.

4. when the victim is a religious or a child below seven (7) years old.

5. when the offender knows that he is afflicted with Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS)
disease.

6. when committed by any member of the Armed Forces of the Philippines or the Philippine National
Police or any law enforcement agency.

7. when by reason or on the occasion of the rape, the victim has suffered permanent physical mutilation."

Section 12. Section 2 of Republic Act No. 7080 (An Act Defining and Penalizing the Crime of Plunder) is hereby amended
to read as follows:

"Sec. 2. Definition of the Crime of Plunder; Penalties. - Any public officer who, by himself or in connivance with
members of his family, relatives by affinity or consanguinity, business associates, subordinates or other persons,
amasses, accumulates or acquires ill-gotten wealth through a combination or series of overt criminal acts as
described in Section 1 (d) hereof in the aggregate amount or total value of at least Fifty million pesos
(P50,000,000.00) shall be guilty of the crime of plunder and shall be punished by reclusion perpetua to death. Any
person who participated with the said public officer in the commission of an offense contributing to the crime of
plunder shall likewise be punished for such offense. In the imposition of penalties, the degree of participation and
the attendance of mitigating and extenuating circumstances, as provided by the Revised Penal Code, shall be
considered by the court. The court shall declare any and all ill-gotten wealth and their interests and other incomes
and assets including the properties and shares of stocks derived from the deposit or investment thereof forfeited
in favor of the State."

Section 13. Sections 3, 4, 5, 7, 8 and 9, of Article II of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, known as the Dangerous
Drugs Act 1972, are hereby amended to read as follows:

"Sec. 3. Importation of Prohibited Drugs. - The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death and a fine ranging from five
hundred thousand pesos to ten million pesos shall be imposed upon any person who, unless authorized by law,
shall import or bring into the Philippines any prohibited drug.

"Sec. 4. Sale, Administration, Delivery, Distribution and Transportation of Prohibited Drugs. - The penalty of
reclusion perpetua to death and a fine from five hundred thousand pesos to ten million pesos shall be imposed
upon any person who, unless authorized by law, shall sell, administer, deliver, give away to another, distribute,
dispatch in transit or transport any prohibited drug, or shall act as a broker in any of such transactions.

Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 20 of this Act to the contrary, if the victim of the offense is a minor, or
should a prohibited drug involved in any offense under this Section be the proximate cause of the death of a
victim thereof, the maximum penalty herein provided shall be imposed.

"Sec. 5. Maintenance of a Den, Dive or Resort for Prohibited Drug Users. - The penalty of reclusion perpetua to
death and a fine ranging from five hundred thousand pesos to ten million pesos shall be imposed upon any
person or group of persons who shall maintain a den, dive or resort where any prohibited drug is used in any form
or where such prohibited drugs in quantities specified in Section 20, Paragraph 1 of this Act are found.

Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 20 of this Act to the contrary, the maximum of the penalty shall be
imposed in every case where a prohibited drug is administered, delivered or sold to a minor who is allowed to use
the same in such place.

Should a prohibited drug be the proximate cause of the death of a person using the same in such den, dive or
resort, the maximum penalty herein provided shall be imposed on the maintainer notwithstanding the provisions of
Section 20 of this Act to the contrary.
 "Sec. 7. Manufacture of Prohibited Drug. - The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death and fine ranging from five
hundred thousand pesos to ten million pesos shall be imposed upon any person who, unless authorized by law,
shall engage in the manufacture of any prohibited drug.

"Sec. 8. Possession or Use of Prohibited Drugs. - The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death and a fine ranging
from five hundred thousand pesos to ten million pesos shall be imposed upon any person who, unless authorized
by law, shall possess or use any prohibited drug subject to the provisions of Section 20 hereof.

"Sec. 9. Cultivation of Plants which are Sources of Prohibited Drugs. - The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death
and a fine ranging from five hundred thousand pesos to ten million pesos shall be imposed upon any person who
shall plant, cultivate or culture any medium Indian hemp, opium poppy (papaver somniferum), or any other plant
which is or may hereafter be classified as dangerous drug or from which any dangerous drug may be
manufactured or derived.

The land or portions hereof, and/or greenhouses on which any of said plants is cultivated or cultured shall be
confiscated and escheated to the State, unless the owner thereof can prove that he did not know such cultivation
or culture despite the exercise of due diligence on his part.

If the land involved in is part of the public domain, the maximum of the penalties herein provided shall be imposed
upon the offender."

Section 14. Sections 14, 14-A, and 15 of Article III of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, known as the Dangerous
Drugs Act of 1972, are hereby amended to read as follows:

"Sec. 14. Importation of Regulated Drugs. - The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death and a fine ranging from
five hundred thousand pesos to ten million pesos shall be imposed upon any person who, unless authorized by
law, shall import or bring any regulated drug in the Philippines.

"Sec. 14-A. Manufacture of Regulated Drugs. - The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death and a fine ranging from
five hundred thousand pesos to ten million pesos shall be imposed upon any person who, unless authorized by
law, shall engage in the manufacture of any regulated drug.

"Sec. 15. Sale, Administration, Dispensation, Delivery, Transportation and Distribution of Regulated Drugs. - The
penalty of reclusion perpetua to death and a fine ranging from five hundred thousand pesos to ten million pesos
shall be imposed upon any person who, unless authorized by law, shall sell, dispense, deliver, transport or
distribute any regulated drug.

Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 20 of this Act to the contrary, if the victim of the offense is a minor, or
should a regulated drug involved in any offense under this Section be the proximate cause of the death of a victim
thereof, the maximum penalty herein provided shall be imposed."

Section 15. There shall be incorporated after Section 15 of Article III of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, known as
the Dangerous Drug Act of 1972, a new section to read as follows:

"Sec. 15-a. Maintenance of a den, dive or resort for regulated drug users. - The penalty of reclusion perpetua to
death and a fine ranging from five hundred thousand pesos to ten million pesos shall be imposed upon any
person or group of persons who shall maintain a den, dive or resort where any regulated drugs is used in any
form, or where such regulated drugs in quantities specified in Section 20, paragraph 1 of this Act are found.

Notwithstanding the provisions of Section 20 of this Act to the contrary, the maximum penalty herein provided
shall be imposed in every case where a regulated drug is administered, delivered or sold to a minor who is
allowed to use the same in such place.

Should a regulated drug be the proximate cause of the death of a person using the same in such den, dive or
resort, the maximum penalty herein provided shall be imposed on the maintainer notwithstanding the provisions of
Section 20 of this Act to the contrary."

Section 16. Section 16 of Article III of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972,
is amended to read as follows:
 "Sec. 16. Possession or Use of Regulated Drugs. - The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death and a fine ranging
from five hundred thousand pesos to ten million pesos shall be imposed upon any person who shall possess or
use any regulated drug without the corresponding license or prescription, subject to the provisions of Section 20
hereof."

Section 17. Section 20, Article IV of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of
1972, is hereby amended to read as follows:

Sec. 20. Application of Penalties, Confiscation and Forfeiture of the Proceeds or Instruments of the Crime. - The
penalties for offenses under Section 3, 4, 7, 8 and 9 of Article II and Sections 14, 14-A, 15 and 16 of Article III of
this Act shall be applied if the dangerous drugs involved is in any of the following quantities :

1. 40 grams or more of opium;

2. 40 grams or more of morphine;

3. 200 grams or more of shabu or methylamphetamine hydrochloride;

4. 40 grams or more of heroin;

5. 750 grams or more of indian hemp or marijuana;

6. 50 grams or more of marijuana resin or marijuana resin oil;

7. 40 grams or more of cocaine or cocaine hydrochloride; or

8. In the case of other dangerous drugs, the quantity of which is far beyond therapeutic requirements, as
determined and promulgated by the Dangerous Drugs Board, after public consultations/hearings
conducted for the purpose.

Otherwise, if the quantity involved is less than the foregoing quantities, the penalty shall range from prision
correccional to reclusion perpetua depending upon the quantity.

Every penalty imposed for the unlawful importation, sale, administration, delivery, transportation or manufacture of
dangerous drugs, the cultivation of plants which are sources of dangerous drugs and the possession of any opium
pipe and other paraphernalia for dangerous drugs shall carry with it the confiscation and forfeiture, in favor of the
Government, of all the proceeds of the crime including but not limited to money and other obtained thereby and
the instruments or tools with which it was committed, unless they are the property of a third person not liable for
the offense, but those which are not of lawful commerce shall be ordered destroyed without delay. Dangerous
drugs and plant sources of such drugs as well as the proceeds or instruments of the crime so confiscated and
forfeited in favor of the Government shall be turned over to the Board for proper disposal without delay.

Any apprehending or arresting officer who misappropriates or misapplies or fails to account for seized or
confiscated dangerous drugs or plant-sources of dangerous drugs or proceeds or instruments of the crime as are
herein defined shall after conviction be punished by the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death and a fine ranging
from five hundred thousand pesos to ten million pesos."

Section 18. There shall be incorporated after Section 20 of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, known as the
Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, a new section to read as follows:

"Sec. 20-A. Plea-bargaining Provisions. - Any person charged under any provision of this Act where the
imposable penalty is reclusion perpetua to death shall not be allowed to avail of the provision on plea bargaining."

Section 19. Section 24 of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, is hereby
amended to read as follows :

"Sec. 24. Penalties for Government Official and Employees and Officers and Members of Police Agencies and the
Armed Forces, 'Planting' of Evidence. - The maximum penalties provided for Section 3, 4(1), 5(1), 6, 7, 8, 9, 11,
 12 and 13 of Article II and Sections 14, 14-A, 15(1), 16 and 19 of Article III shall be imposed, if those found guilty
of any of the said offenses are government officials, employees or officers, including members of police agencies
and the armed forces.

Any such above government official, employee or officer who is found guilty of "planting" any dangerous drugs
punished in Sections 3, 4, 7, 8, 9 and 13 of Article II and Sections 14, 14-A, 15 and 16 of Article III of this Act in
the person or in the immediate vicinity of another as evidence to implicate the latter, shall suffer the same penalty
as therein provided."

Section 20. Sec. 14 of Republic Act No. 6539, as amended, known as the Anti-Carnapping Act of 1972, is hereby
amended to read as follows:

"Sec. 14. Penalty for Carnapping. - Any person who is found guilty of carnapping, as this term is defined in
Section Two of this Act, shall, irrespective of the value of motor vehicle taken, be punished by imprisonment for
not less than fourteen years and eight months and not more than seventeen years and four months, when the
carnapping is committed without violence or intimidation of persons, or force upon things; and by imprisonment for
not less than seventeen years and four months and not more than thirty years, when the carnapping is committed
by means of violence against or intimidation of any person, or force upon things; and the penalty of reclusion
perpetua to death shall be imposed when the owner, driver or occupant of the carnapped motor vehicle is killed or
raped in the course of the commission of the carnapping or on the occasion thereof."

Section 21. Article 27 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, is hereby amended to read as follows:

"Art. 27. Reclusion perpetua. - The penalty of reclusion perpetua shall be from twenty years and one day to forty
years.

Reclusion temporal. - The penalty of reclusion temporal shall be from twelve years and one day to twenty years.

Prision mayor and temporary disqualification. - The duration of the penalties of prision mayor and temporary
disqualification shall be from six years and one day to twelve years, except when the penalty of disqualification is
imposed as an accessory penalty, in which case, it shall be that of the principal penalty.

Prision correccional, suspension, and destierro. - The duration of the penalties of prision correccional,
suspension, and destierro shall be from six months and one day to six years, except when the suspension is
imposed as an accessory penalty, in which case, its duration shall be that of the principal penalty.

Arresto mayor. - The duration of the penalty of arresto mayor shall be from one month and one day to six months.

Arresto menor. - The duration of the penalty of arresto menor shall be from one day to thirty days.

Bond to keep the peace. - The bond to keep the peace shall be required to cover such period of time as the court
may determine."

Section 22. Article 47 of the same Code is hereby amended to read as follows:

Art. 47. In what cases the death penalty shall not be imposed; Automatic review of the Death Penalty Cases. -
The death penalty shall be imposed in all cases in which it must be imposed under existing laws, except when the
guilty person is below eighteen (18) years of age at the time of the commission of the crime or is more than
seventy years of age or when upon appeal or automatic review of the case by the Supreme Court, the required
majority vote is not obtained for the imposition of the death penalty, in which cases the penalty shall be reclusion
perpetua.

In all cases where the death penalty is imposed by the trial court, the records shall be forwarded to the Supreme
Court for automatic review and judgment by the Court en banc, within twenty (20) days but not earlier than fifteen
(15) days after promulgation of the judgment or notice of denial of any motion for new trial or reconsideration. The
transcript shall also be forwarded within ten (10) days from the filing thereof by the stenographic reporter."

Section 23. Article 62 of the same Code, as amended, is hereby amended to read as follows :
 "Art. 62. Effects of the attendance of mitigating or aggravating circumstances and of habitual delinquency. -
Mitigating or aggravating circumstances and habitual delinquency shall be taken into account for the purpose of
diminishing or increasing the penalty in conformity with the following rules:

1. Aggravating circumstances which in themselves constitute a crime specially punishable by law or which are
included by the law in defining a crime and prescribing the penalty therefor shall not be taken into account for the
purpose of increasing the penalty.

1(a). When in the commission of the crime, advantage was taken by the offender of his public position, the penalty
to be imposed shall be in its maximum regardless of mitigating circumstances.

The maximum penalty shall be imposed if the offense was committed by any group who belongs to an
organized/syndicated crime group.

An organized/syndicated crime group means a group of two or more persons collaborating, confederating or
mutually helping one another for purposes of gain in the commission of any crime.

2. The same rule shall apply with respect to any aggravating circumstances inherent in the crime to such a degree
that it must of necessity accompany the commission thereof.

3. Aggravating or mitigating circumstances which arise from the moral attributes of the offender, or from his
private relations with the offended party, or from any other personal cause, shall only serve to aggravate or
mitigate the liability of the principals, accomplices and accessories as to whom such circumstances are attendant.

4. The circumstances which consist in the material execution of the act, or in the means employed to accomplish
it, shall serve to aggravate or mitigate the liability of those persons only who had knowledge of them at the time of
the execution of the act or their cooperation therein.

5. Habitual delinquency shall have the following effects :

(a) Upon a third conviction the culprit shall be sentenced to the penalty provided by law for the last crime
of which he be found guilty and to the additional penalty of prision correccional in its medium and
maximum periods;

(b) Upon a fourth conviction, the culprit shall be sentenced to the penalty provided for the last crime of
which he be found guilty and to the additional penalty of prision mayor in its minimum and medium
periods; and

(c) Upon a fifth or additional conviction, the culprit shall be sentenced to the penalty provided for the last
crime of which he be found guilty and to the additional penalty of prision mayor in its maximum period to
reclusion temporal in its minimum period.

Notwithstanding the provisions of this article, the total of the two penalties to be imposed upon the
offender, in conformity herewith, shall in no case exceed 30 years.

For purposes of this article, a person shall be deemed to be a habitual delinquent, if within a period of ten
years from the date of his release or last conviction of the crimes of serious or less serious physical
injuries, robo, hurto, estafa or falsification, he is found guilty of any of said crimes a third time or oftener.

Section 24. Article 81 of the same Code, as amended, is hereby amended to read as follows :

"Art. 81. When and how the death penalty is to be executed. - The death sentence shall be executed with
preference to any other and shall consist in putting the person under sentence to death by electrocution. The
death sentence shall be executed under the authority of the Director of Prisons, endeavoring so far as possible to
mitigate the sufferings of the person under the sentence during electrocution as well as during the proceedings
prior to the execution.

If the person under sentence so desires, he shall be anaesthetized at the moment of the execution.
 As soon as facilities are provided by the Bureau of Prisons, the method of carrying out the sentence shall be
changed to gas poisoning.

The death sentence shall be carried out not later than one (1) year after the judgment has become final."

Section 25. Article 83 of the same Code is hereby amended to read as follows:

"Art. 83. Suspension of the execution of the death sentence. - The death sentence shall not be inflicted upon a
woman while she is pregnant or within one (1) year after delivery, nor upon any person over seventy years of age.
In this last case, the death sentence shall be commuted to the penalty of reclusion perpetua with the accessory
penalties provided in Article 40.

In all cases where the death sentence has become final, the records of the case shall be forwarded immediately
by the Supreme Court to the Office of the President for possible exercise of the pardoning power."

Section 26.<="" p="">

Section 27. If, for any reason or reasons, any part of the provision of this Act shall be held to be unconstitutional or
invalid, other parts or provisions hereof which are not affected thereby shall continue to be in full force and effect.

Section 28. This Act shall take effect fifteen (15) days after its publication in two (2) national newspapers of general
circulation. The publication shall not be later than seven (7) days after the approval hereof.

Approved: December 13, 1993

People v. Echegaray, 267 SCCRA 682

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. 117472 June 25, 1996

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
LEO ECHEGARAY y PILO, accused-appellant.

PER CURIAM:p

Amidst the endless debates on whether or not the reimposition of the death penalty is indeed a deterrent as far as the
commission of heinous crimes is concerned and while the attendant details pertaining to the execution of a death
sentence remain as yet another burning issue, we are tasked with providing a clear-cut resolution of whether or not the
herein accused-appellant deserves to forfeit his place in human society for the infliction of the primitive and bestial act of
incestuous lust on his own blood.

Before us for automatic review is the judgment of conviction, dated September 7, 1994, for the crime of Rape, rendered
after marathon hearing by the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 104, the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding accused LEO ECHEGARAY Y PILO guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of RAPE as charged in the complaint, aggravated by the fact that the same
was commited by the accused who is the father/stepfather of the complainant, he is hereby sentenced to
suffer the penalty of DEATH, as provided for under RA. No. 7659, to pay the complainant Rodessa
Echegaray the sum
of P50,000.00 as damages, plus all the accessory penalties provided by law, without subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs. 1

We note, however, that the charge had been formulated in this manner:

COMPLAINT

The undersigned accuses LEO ECHEGARAY Y PILO of the crime of RAPE, committed as follows:

That on or about the month of April 1994, in Quezon City, Philippines, the above-named accused, by
means of force and intimidation did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal
knowledge of the undersigned complainant, his daughter, a minor, 10 years of age, all against her will and
without her consent, to her damage and prejudice.

CONTRARY TO LAW2

Upon being arraigned on August 1, 1994, the accused-appellant, assisted by his counsel de oficio, entered the plea of
"not guilty."

These are the pertinent facts of the case as summarized by the Solicitor-General in his brief:

This is a case of rape by the father of his ten-year old daughter.

 Complainant RODESSA ECHEGARAY is a ten-year old girl and a fifth-grader, born on September 11,
1983. Rodessa is the eldest of five siblings. She has three brothers aged 6, 5 and 2, respectively, and a
3-month old baby sister. Her parents are Rosalie and Leo Echegaray, the latter being the accused-
appellant himself. The victim lives with her family in a small house located at No. 199 Fernandez St.,
Barangay San Antonio, San Francisco Del Monte, Quezon City (pp. 5-9, Aug. 9, 1994, TSN).

Sometime in the afternoon of April 1994, while Rodessa was looking after her three brothers in their
house as her mother attended a gambling session in another place, she heard her father, the accused-
appellant in this case, order her brothers to go out of the house (pp. 10-11, ibid). As soon as her brothers
left, accused-appellant Leo Echegaray approached Rodessa and suddenly dragged her inside the room
(p. 12, ibid). Before she could question the appellant, the latter immediately, removed her panty and made
her lie on the floor (p. 13, ibid). Thereafter, appellant likewise removed his underwear and immediately
placed himself on top of Rodessa. Subsequently, appellant forcefully inserted his penis into Rodessa's
organ causing her to suffer intense pain (pp. 14-15, ibid). While appellant was pumping on her, he even
uttered. "Masarap ba, masarap ba?" and to which Rodessa answered: "Tama na Papa, masakit" (p.
16, ibid). Rodessa's plea proved futile as appellant continued with his act. After satisfying his bestial
instinct, appellant threatened to kill her mother if she would divulge what had happened. Scared that her
mother would be killed by appellant, Rodessa kept to herself the ordeal she suffered. She was very afraid
of appellant because the latter, most of the time, was high on drugs (pp. 17-18, ibid.). The same sexual
assault happened up to the fifth time and this usually took place when her mother was out of the house
(p. 19, ibid.). However, after the fifth time, Rodessa decided to inform her grandmother, Asuncion Rivera,
who in turn told Rosalie, Radessa's mother. Rodessa and her mother proceeded to the Barangay Captain
where Rodessa confided the sexual assaults she suffered. Thereafter, Rodessa was brought to the
precinct where she executed an affidavit (p. 21, ibid.). From there, she was accompanied to the Philippine
National Police Crime Laboratory for medical examination (p. 22, ibid.).

Rodessa testified that the said sexual assaults happened only during the time when her mother was
pregnant. Rodessa added that at first, her mother was on her side. However, when appellant was
detained, her mother kept on telling her. "Kawawa naman ang Tatay mo, nakakulong" (pp. 39-40, ibid.).

When Rodessa was examined by the medico-legal officer in the person of Dra. Ma. Cristina B.
Preyna,3 the complainant was described as physically on a non-virgin state, as evidenced by the
presence of laceration of the hymen of said complainant (TSN, Aug. 22, 1995, pp. 8-9). 4

On the other hand, the accused-appellant's brief presents a different story:

. . . the defense presented its first witness, Rosalie Echegaray. She asserted that the RAPE charge
against the accused was only the figment of her mothers dirty mind. That her daughter's complaint was
forced upon her by her grandma and the answers in the sworn statement of Rodessa were coached. That
the accusation of RAPE was motivated by Rodessa's grandmother's greed over the lot situated at the
Madrigal Estate-NHA Project, Barangay San Antonio, San Francisco del Monte, Quezon City, which her
grandmother's paramour, Conrado Alfonso gave to the accused in order to persuade the latter to admit
that Rodessa executed an affidavit of desistance after it turned out that her complaint of attempted
homicide was substituted with the crime of RAPE at the instance of her mother. That when her mother
came to know about the affidavit of desistance, she placed her granddaughter under the custody of the
Barangay Captain. That her mother was never a real mother to her.

She stated that her complaint against accused was for attempted homicide as her husband poured
alcohol on her body and attempted to burn her. She identified the certification issued by the NHA and Tag
No. 87-0393 (Exh. 2). That the Certification based on the Masterlist (Exh. 3) indicates that the property is
co-owned by accused and Conrado Alfonso. That Rodessa is her daughter sired by Conrado Alfonso, the
latter being the paramour of her mother. That Conrado Alfonso waived his right and participation over the
lot in favor of the accused in consideration of the latter's accepting the fact that he is the father of
Rodessa to simulate the love triangle and to conceal the nauseating sex orgies from Conrado Alfonso's
real wife.

Accused testified in his behalf and stated that the grandmother of the complainant has a very strong
motive in implicating him to the crime of RAPE since she was interested to become the sole owner of a
property awarded to her live-in partner by the Madrigal Estate-NHA Project. That he could not have
committed the imputed crime because he considers Rodessa as his own daughter. That he is a painter-
contractor and on the date of the alleged commission of the crime, he was painting the house of one
 Divina Ang of Barangay Vitalis, Parañaque, Metro Manila (Exh. 4). The travel time between his work
place to his residence is three (3) hours considering the condition of traffic. That the painting contract is
evidenced by a document denominated "Contract of Services" duly accomplished (see submarkings of
Exh. 4). He asserted that he has a big sexual organ which when used to a girl 11 years old like Rodessa,
the said female organ will be "mawawarak." That it is abnormal to report the imputed commission of the
crime to the grandmother of the victim.

Accused further stated that her (sic) mother-in-law trumped-up a charge of drug pushing earlier and he
pleaded guilty to a lesser offense of using drugs. The decretal portion of the judgment of conviction
ordering the accused to be confined at the Bicutan Rehabilitation Center irked the grandmother of
Rodessa because it was her wish that accused should be meted the death penalty.

Accused remain steadfast in his testimony perorating the strong motive of Rodessa's grandmother in
implicating him in this heinous crime because of her greed to become the sole owner of that piece of
property at the National Housing Authority-Madrigal Project, situated at San Francisco del Monte, Quezon
City, notwithstanding rigid cross-examination. He asserted that the imputed offense is far from his mind
considering that he treated Rodessa as his own daughter. He categorically testified that he was in his
painting job site on the date and time of the alleged commission of the crime.

Mrs. Punzalan was presented as third defense witness. She said that she is the laundry woman and part
time baby sitter of the family of accused. That at one time, she saw Rodessa reading sex books and the
Bulgar newspaper. That while hanging washed clothes on the vacant lot, she saw Rodessa masturbating
by tinkering her private parts. The masturbation took sometime.

This sexual fling of Rodessa were corroborated by Silvestra Echegaray, the fourth and last witness for the
defense. She stated that she tried hard to correct the flirting tendency of Rodessa and that she scolded
her when she saw Rodessa viewing an X-rated tape. Rodessa according to her was fond of going with
friends of ill-repute. That (sic) she corroborated the testimony of Mrs. Punzalan by stating that she herself
saw Rodessa masturbating inside the room of her house. 5

In finding the accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape, the lower court dismissed the
defense of alibi and lent credence to the straightforward testimony of the ten-year old victim to whom no ill motive to testify
falsely against accused-appellant can be attributed. The lower court likewise regarded as inconsequential the defense of
the accused-appellant that the extraordinary size of his penis could not have insinuated itself into the victim's vagina and
that the accused is not the real father of the said victim.

The accused-appellant now reiterates his position in his attempt to seek a reversal of the lower court's verdict through the
following assignment of errors:

1. THE LOWER COURT FAILED TO APPRECIATE THE SINISTER MOTIVE OF

PRIVATE COMPLAINANT'S GRANDMOTHER? THAT PRECIPITATED THE FILING OF
THE CHARGE OF RAPE, HENCE IT ERRED IN HOLDING ACCUSED GUILTY AS
CHARGED.

2. THE COURT BELOW OVERLOOKED THE FACT THAT THE HEALED

LACERATIONS AT 3 AND 7 O'CLOCK COULD NOT HAVE BEEN DUE TO THE
PUMPING OF THE PENIS OF ACCUSED TO THE VAGINA OF PRIVATE
COMPLAINANT, HENCE IT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT ACCUSED COMMITTED THE
CRIME CHARGED, NOTWITHSTANDING VEHEMENT DENIAL.

3. THE COURT A QUO WHIMSICALLY IGNORED THE DEFENSE OF ALIBI THAT

ACCUSED WAS IN PARAÑAQUE ON THE DATE AND TIME OF THE IMPUTED CRIME
HENCE, IT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT ALIBI IS NOT SUSTAINABLE IN THE CASE AT
BAR.6

Considering that a rape charge, in the light of the reimposition of the death penalty, requires a thorough and judicious
examination of the circumstances relating thereto, this Court remains guided by the following principles in evaluating
evidence in cases of this nature: (a) An accusation for rape can be made with facility; it is difficult to prove but more
difficult for the accused though innocent to disprove; (b) In view of the intrinsic nature of the crime of rape where only two
persons are involved, the testimony of the complainant must be scrutinized with extreme caution; and (c) The evidence for
the prosecution must stand and fall on its own merits, and cannot be allowed to draw strength from the weakness of the
evidence for the defense. 7

Anent the first assigned error, no amount of persuasion can convince this Court to tilt the scales of justice in favor of the
accused-appellant notwithstanding that he cries foul insisting that the rape charge was merely concocted and strongly
motivated by greed over a certain lot situated at the NHA-Madrigal Estate Housing Project, Barangay San Antonio, San
Francisco del Monte, Quezon City. The accused-appellant theorizes that prosecution witness Asuncion Rivera, the
maternal grandmother of the victim Rodessa, concocted the charge of rape so that, in the event that the accused-
appellant shall be meted out a death sentence, title to the lot will be consolidated in her favor. Indeed, the lot in question is
co-owned by the accused-appellant and Conrado Alfonso, the live-in partner of Asuncion Rivera, according to the records
of the National Housing Authority (Exh. "3"). The accused-appellant would want us to believe that the rape charge was
fabricated by Asuncion Rivera in order to eliminate the accused-appellant from being a co-owner. So, the live-in partners
would have the property for their own.8

We believe, as did the Solicitor-General, that no grandmother would be so callous as to instigate her 10-year old
granddaughter to file a rape case against her own father simply on account of her alleged interest over the disputed lot. 9

It is a well-entrenched jurisprudential rule that the testimony of a rape victim is credible where she has no motive to testify
against the accused. 10

We find no flaws material enough to discredit the testimony of the ten-year old Rodessa which the trial court found
convincing enough and unrebutted by the defense. The trial court not surprisingly noted that Rodessa's narration in detail
of her father's monstrous acts had made her cry.11 Once again, we rule that:

. . . The testimony of the victim who was only 12 years old at the time of the rape as to the circumstances
of the rape must be given weight, for testimony of young and immature rape victims are credible (People
v. Guibao, 217 SCRA 64 [1993]). No woman especially one of tender age, practically only a girl, would
concoct a story of defloration, allow an examination of her private parts and thereafter expose herself to a
public trial, if she were not motivated solely by the desire to have the culprit apprehended and punished
(People v. Guibao, supra). 12

The accused-appellant points out certain inconsistencies in the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses in his attempt to
bolster his claim that the rape accusation against him is malicious and baseless. Firstly, Rodessa's testimony that the
accused-appellant was already naked when he dragged her inside the room is inconsistent with her subsequent testimony
that the said accused-appellant was still wearing short pants when she was dragged inside the room. Secondly,
Rodessa's sworn statement before the police investigator which indicated that, while the accused was executing pumping
acts, he uttered the words "Masarap ba?", differ from her testimony in court wherein she related that, when the accused
took out his penis from her vagina, the accused said "Masarap, tapos na." Thirdly, the victim's grandmother, Asuncion
Rivera, recounted in her sworn statement that it was the accused who went to see her to apprise her of the rape
committed on her granddaughter. However, in her testimony in court , Asuncion Rivera claimed that she was the one who
invited the accused-appellant to see her in her house so as to tell her a secret. 13 These alleged discrepancies merely
pertain to minor details which in no way pose serious doubt as to the credibility of the prosecution witnesses. Whether or
not the accused was naked when he dragged Rodessa inside the room where he sexually assaulted her bears no
significant effect on Rodessa's testimony that she was actually raped by the accused-appellant. Moreover, a conflicting
account of whatever words were uttered by the accused-appellant after he forcefully inserted his penis into Rodessa's
private organ against her will cannot impair the prosecution's evidence as a whole. A determination of which version
earmarks the truth as to how the victim's grandmother learned about the rape is inconsequential to the judgment of
conviction.

As we have pronounced in the case of People v. Jaymalin: 14

This Court has stated time and again that minor inconsistencies in the narration of the witness do not
detract from its essential credibility as long as it is on the whole coherent and intrinsically believable.
Inaccuracies may in fact suggest that the witness is telling the truth and has not been rehearsed as it is
not to he expected that he will be able to remember every single detail of an incident with perfect or total
recall.

After due deliberation, this Court finds that the trial judge's assessment of the credibility of the prosecution witnesses
deserves our utmost respect in the absence of arbitrariness.
With respect to the second assigned error, the records of the instant case are bereft of clear and concrete proof of the
accused-appellant's claim as to the size of his penis and that if that be the fact, it could not have merely caused shallow
healed lacerations at 3:00 and 7:00 o'clock. 15 In his testimony, the accused-appellant stated that he could not have raped
Rodessa because of
the size of his penis which could have ruptured her vagina had he actually done so. 16 This Court gives no probative value
on the accused-appellant's self-serving statement in the light of our ruling in the case of People v. Melivo, supra,17 that:

The vaginal wall and the hymenal membrane are elastic organs capable of varying degrees of
distensibility. The degree of distensibility of the female reproductive organ is normally limited only by the
character and size of the pelvic inlet, other factors being minor. The female reprodructive canal being
capable of allowing passage of a regular fetus, there ought to be no difficulty allowing the entry of objects
of much lesser size, including the male reproductive organ, which even in its largest dimensions, would
still be considerably smaller than the full-term fetus.

xxx xxx xxx

In the case at bench, the presence of healed lacerations in various parts of he vaginal wall, though not as
extensive as appellant might have expected them to be, indicate traumatic injury to the area within the
period when the incidents were supposed to have occurred. (At pp. 13-14, emphasis supplied)

In rape cases, a broken hymen is not an essential element thereof. 18 A mere knocking at the doors of the pudenda, so to
speak, by the accused's penis suffices to constitute the crime of rape as full entry into the victim's vagina is not required to
sustain a conviction. 19 In the case, Dr. Freyra, the medico-legal examiner, categorically testified that the healed
lacerations of Rodessa on her vagina were consistent with the date of the commission of the rape as narrated by the
victim to have taken place in April, 1994. 20

Lastly, the third assigned error deserves scant consideration. The accused-appellant erroneously argues that the Contract
of Services (Exhibit 4) offered as evidence in support of the accused-appellant's defense of alibi need not be corroborated
because there is no law expressly requiring so. 21 In view of our finding that the prosecution witnesses have no motive to
falsely testify against the accused-appellant, the defense of alibi, in this case, uncorroborated by other witnesses, should
be completely disregarded. 22 More importantly, the defense of alibi which is inherently weak becomes even weaker in the
face of positive identification of the accused-appellant as perpetrator of the crime of rape by his victim, Rodessa. 23

The Contract of Services whereby the accused-appellant obligated himself to do some painting job at the house of one
Divina Ang in Parañaque, Metro Manila, within 25 days from April 4, 1994, is not proof of the whereabouts of the accused-
appellant at the time of the commission of the offense.

The accused-appellant in this case is charged with Statutory Rape on the basis of the complaint, dated July 14, 1994. The
gravamen of the said offense, as stated in paragraph 3, Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, is the carnal knowledge of
a woman below twelve years old. 24 Rodessa positively identified his father accused-appellant, as the culprit of Statutory
Rape. Her account of how the accused-appellant succeeded in consummating his grievous and odious sexual assault on
her is free from any substantial self-contradiction. It is highly inconceivable that it is rehearsed and fabricated upon
instructions from Rodessa's maternal grandmother Asuncion Rivera as asserted by the accused-appellant. The words of
Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando, speaking for the Court, more than two decades ago, are relevant and worth
reiterating, thus:

. . . it is manifest in the decisions of this Court that where the offended parties are young and immature
girls like the victim in this case, (Cited cases omitted) there is marked receptivity on its, part to tend
credence to their version of what transpired. It is not to be wondered at. The state, as parens patria, is
under the obligation to minimize the risk of harm to those, who, because of their minority, are as yet
unable to take care of themselves fully. Those of tender years deserve its utmost protection. Moreover,
the injury in cases of rape is not inflicted on the unfortunate victim alone. The consternation it causes her
family must also be taken into account It may reflect a failure to abide by the announced concern in the
fundamental law for such institution There is all the more reason then for the rigorous application of the
penal law with its severe penalty for this offense, whenever warranted. It has been aptly remarked that
with the advance in civilization, the disruption in public peace and order it represents defies explanation,
much more so in view of what currently appears to be a tendency for sexual permissiveness. Where the
prospects of relationship based on consent are hardly minimal, self-restraint should even be more
marked. 25
Under Section 11 of Republic Act No. 7659 often referred to as the Death Penalty Law, Art. 335 of the Revised Penal
Code was amended, to wit:

The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with any of the following
attendant circumstances:

1. When the victim is under eigthteen (18) years of age and the offender is a parent, ascendant, step-
parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the third civil degree, or the common-law
spouse of the parent of the victim.

xxx xxx xxx

(Emphasis supplied)

Apparently, as a last glimpse of hope, the accused-appellant questions the penalty imposed by the trial court by declaring
that he is neither a father, stepfather or grandfather of Rodessa although he was a confirmed lover of Rodessa's
mother. 26 On direct examination, he admitted that before the charge of rape was riled against him, he had treated
Rodessa as his real daughter and had provided for her food, clothing, shelter and education. 27 The Court notes that
Rodessa uses the surname of the accused-appellant, not Rivera (her mother's maiden name) nor Alfonso (her
grandmother's live-in partner). Moreover, Rodessa's mother stated during the cross-examination that she, the accused-
appellant, and her five children, including Rodessa, had been residing in one house only. 28 At any rate, even if he were
not the father, stepfather or grandfather of Rodessa, this disclaimer cannot save him from the abyss where perpetrators of
heinous crimes ought to be, as mandated by law. Considering that the accused-appellant is a confirmed lover of
Rodessa's mother, 29 he falls squarely within the aforequoted portion of the Death Penalty Law under the term "common-
law spouse of the parent of the victim."

The fact that the ten-year old Rodessa referred to the accused-appellant as "Papa" is reason enough to conclude that
accused-appellant is either the father or stepfather of Rodessa. Thus, the act of sexual assault perpetrated by the
accused on his young victim has become all the more repulsive and perverse. The victim's tender age and the accused-
appellant's moral ascendancy and influence over her are factors which forced Rodessa to succumb to the accused's
selfish and bestial craving. The law has made it inevitable under the circumstances of this case that the accused-appellant
face the supreme penalty of death. WHEREFORE, we AFFIRM the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City,
Branch 104.

SO ORDERED.
People v. Gallo, G.R. 124736, 29 September 1999

EN BANC

[G.R. No. 124736. September 29, 1999]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ROMEO GALLO y IGLOSO, Accused-Appellant.

RESOLUTION

PER CURIAM:

The penalty imposed upon accused-appellant Romeo Gallo y Igloso by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 68, of
Binangonan, Rizal, after finding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of qualified rape, was affirmed
by this Court in its decision promulgated on 22 January 1998.

On 24 August 1999, accused-appellant filed a Motion to Re-open Case (with Leave of Court) seeking a
modification of the death sentence to reclusion perpetua. Accused-appellant proffers that the reduction sought
by him would be in line with the new Court rulings which annunciate that the seven attendant circumstances
introduced in Section 11 of Republic Act No. 7659 partake of the nature of qualifying circumstances that must be
pleaded in the indictment in order to warrant the imposition of the penalty.

The Court in the case of People vs. Garcia,1 speaking through then, Justice Florenz D. Regalado, ratiocinated that
the additional attendant circumstances introduced by R.A. 7659 should be considered as special qualifying
circumstances distinctly applicable to the crime of rape and, if not pleaded as such, could only be appreciated as
generic aggravating circumstances.2

The Information filed against accused-appellant reads:

That on or sometime in the period of May, 1994 in the Municipality of Cardona, Province of Rizal, Philippines and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above named accused, with lewd designs and by means of
force or intimidation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have sexual intercourse with a 13
year old girl, Marites Gallo y Segovia.3

The above indictment has not specifically alleged that accused-appellant is the victims father; accordingly,
accused-appellants relationship to the victim, although proven during the trial, cannot be considered to be a
qualifying circumstance.4

The next crucial point is whether the Court must now apply retroactively the Garcia doctrine to the conviction of
accused-appellant.

The Court has had the opportunity to declare in a long line of cases that the tribunal retains control over a case
until the full satisfaction of the final judgment conformably with established legal processes. It has the authority
to suspend the execution of a final judgment or to cause a modification thereof as and when it becomes
imperative in the higher interest of justice or when supervening events warrant it. 5cräläwvirtualibräry

The doctrine declared in People vs. Garcia, and its reiteration in People vs. Ramos,6 People vs. Ilao,7 and People
vs. Medina,8 came only after almost a year from the promulgation of the instant case.

The Office of the Solicitor General, when requested to comment on the aforesaid 24 th August 1999 motion of
accused-appellant, had this to state:

Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the law or the Constitution shall form part of the legal system of the
land (Article 8, Civil Code of the Philippines). Medina, which has the force and effect of law, forms part of our
penal statutes and assumes retroactive effect, being as it is, favorable to an accused who is not a habitual
criminal, and notwithstanding that final sentence has already been pronounced against him (Article 22, Revised
Penal Code).
Indeed, by operation of law, appellant is rightfully entitled to the beneficial application of Medina. Accordingly,
the Office of the Solicitor General hereby joins appellants prayer for reduction of his sentence from death
to reclusion perpetua.

The Court agrees with the Office of the Solicitor General in its above observations and sees merit in its stand to
join accused-appellant in praying for a modification of the sentence from death to reclusion perpetua.

WHEREFORE, the motion to re-open the case is GRANTED and the decision sought to be reconsidered is
MODIFIED by imposing on accused-appellant the penalty of reclusion perpetua in lieu of the death penalty and
ordering him to indemnify the victim the amount of P50,000.00.

Considering that the records of all cases where the death penalty is imposed are forwarded to the Office of the
President in accordance with Section 25 of R.A. 7659, the Court directs the Clerk of Court to furnish the Office of
the President with a copy of this resolution for appropriate guidance.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Purisima, Pardo,
Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes, and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.
PDEA v. Brodett, G.R. 196390, Sept. 28, 2011

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 196390               September 28, 2011

PHILIPPINE DRUG ENFORCEMENT AGENCY (PDEA), Petitioner,

vs.
RICHARD BRODETT AND JORGE JOSEPH, Respondents.

DECISION

BERSAMIN, J.:

Objects of lawful commerce confiscated in the course of an enforcement of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of
2002 (Republic Act No. 9165)that are the property of a third person are subject to be returned to the lawful ownerwho is
not liable for the unlawful act. But the trial court may not release such objects pending trial and before judgment.

Antecedents

On April 13, 2009, the State, through the Office of the City Prosecutor of Muntinlupa City,charged RichardBrodett
(Brodett) and Jorge Joseph (Joseph) with a violation of Section 5, in relation to Section 26(b), of Republic Act No. 9165 1 in
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in MuntinlupaCity,docketed as Criminal Case No. 09-208,the accusatory portion of the
information for which reads as follows:

That on or about the 19th day of September 2008, in the City of Muntinlupa, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring and confederating together and mutually helping and aiding each
other, they not being authorized by law, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously sell, trade, deliver and give
away to another, sixty (60) pieces of blue-colored tablets with Motorala (M) logos, contained in six (6) self-sealing
transparent plastic sachets with recorded total net weight of 9.8388 grams, which when subjected to laboratory
examination yielded positive results for presence of METHAMPHETAMINE, a dangerous drug. 2

Also on April 16, 2009, the State, also through the Office of the City Prosecutor of Muntinlupa City, filed another
information charging only Brodett with a violation of Section 11 of R.A. No. 9165, docketed as Criminal Case No. 09-209,
with the information alleging:

That on or about the 19th day of September 2008, in the City of Muntinlupa, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, not being authorized by law, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully, and
feloniously have in his possession, custody and control the following:

a. Four (4) yellow tablets with Playboy logos and ten (10) transparent capsules containing white powdery
substance contained in one self-sealing transparent plastic sachet having a net weight of 4.9007 grams, which
when subjected to laboratory examination yielded positive results for presence of METHYLENE
DIOXYMETHAMPHETAMINE (MDMA), commonly known as "Ecstasy", a dangerous drug;

b. Five (5) self-sealing transparent plastic sachets containing white powdery substance with total recorded net
weight of 1.2235 grams, which when subjected to laboratory examination yielded positive results for presence of
COCCAINE, a dangerous drug;

c. Five (5) self-sealing transparent plastic sachets containing white powdery substance, placed in a light-yellow
folded paper, with total recorded net weight of 2.7355 grams, which when subjected to laboratory examination
yielded positive results for presence of COCCAINE, a dangerous drug;
 d. Three (3) self-sealing transparent plastic sachets containing dried leaves with total recorded net weight of
54.5331 grams, which when subjected to laboratory examination yielded positive results for presence of
TETRAHYDROCANNABINOL, a dangerous drug.3

In the course of the proceedings in the RTC, on July 30, 2009, Brodett filed a MotionToReturn Non-Drug Evidence. He
averred that during his arrest, Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) had seized several personal non-drug effects
from him,including a 2004 Honda Accord car with license plate no. XPF-551;and that PDEArefused to return his personal
effects despite repeated demands for their return. He prayed that his personal effects be tendered to the trial court to be
returned to himupon verification.4

On August 27, 2009, the Office of the City Prosecutor submitted its Comment and Objection, 5 proposingthereby that the
delivery to the RTC of the listedpersonal effects for safekeeping, to be held there throughout the duration of the trial,
would be to enable the Prosecution and the Defense to exhaust their possible evidentiary value. The Office of the City
Prosecutor objected to the return of the car because it appeared to be the instrument in the commission of the violation of
Section 5 of R.A. No. 9165 due to its being the vehicle used in the transaction of the sale of dangerous drugs.

On November 4, 2009, the RTC directedthe release of the car, viz:

WHEREFORE, the Director of PDEA or any of its authorized officer or custodian is hereby directed to: (1) photograph the
abovementioned Honda Accord, before returning the same to its rightful owner Myra S. Brodett and the return should be
fully documented, and (2) bring the personal properties as listed in this Order of both accused, Richard S. Brodett and
Jorge J. Joseph to this court for safekeeping, to be held as needed.

SO ORDERED.6

PDEA moved to reconsider the order of the RTC, but its motion was denied on February 17, 2010 for lack of merit, to wit:

WHEREFORE,premises considered, the Motion for Reconsideration is hereby DENIED for lack of merit. The Order of the
Court dated November 4, 2009 is upheld.

SO ORDERED.7

Thence, PDEA assailed the order of the RTC in the Court of Appeals (CA) by petition for certiorari, claiming that the
orders of the RTC were issued in grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

On March 31, 2011, the CA promulgated its Decision,8 dismissing the petition for certiorari thusly:

xxxx

Here it is beyond dispute that the Honda Accord subject of this petition is owned by and registered in the name of Myra S.
Brodett, not accused Richard Brodett. Also, it does not appear from the records of the case that said Myra S. Brodett has
been charged of any crime, more particularly, in the subject cases of possession and sale of dangerous drugs. Applying
Section 20 of the law to the dispute at bar, We therefore see no cogent reason why the subject Honda Accord may not be
exempted from confiscation and forfeiture.

xxxx

We thus cannot sustain petitioner’s submission that the subject car, being an instrument of the offense, may not be
released to Ms. Brodett and should remain in custodia legis. The letters of the law are plain and unambiguous. Being so,
there is no room for a contrary construction, especially so that the only purpose of judicial construction is to remove doubt
and uncertainty, matters that are not obtaining here. More so that the required literal interpretation is consistent with the
Constitutional guarantee that a person may not be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED and consequently DISMISSED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.9

Hence, PDEA appeals.

 Issues

Essentially,PDEA asserts that the decision of the CAwas not in accord with applicable laws and the primordial intent of the
framers of R. A. No. 9165.10 It contends that the CA gravely erred in its ruling; that the Honda Accord car, registered under
the name of Myra S. Brodett (Ms.Brodett), had been seized from accused Brodettduring a legitimate anti-illegal operation
and should not be released from the custody of the law;that the Motion to Return Non-Drug Evidencedid not intimate or
allege that the car had belonged to a third person; and that even if the car had belonged to Ms. Brodett, a third person,
her ownership did not ipso facto authorize its release, because she was under the obligation to prove to the RTC that she
had no knowledge of the commission of the crime.

In hisComment,11 Brodettcounters that the petitioner failed to present any question of law that warranted a review by the
Court;that Section 20 of R. A. No. 9165 clearly and unequivocally states that confiscation and forfeiture of the proceeds or
instruments of the supposed unlawful act in favor of the Government may be done by PDEA, unless such proceeds or
instruments are the property of a third person not liable for the unlawful act; that PDEA is gravely mistaken in its reading
that the third person must still prove in the trial court that he has no knowledge of the commission of the crime; and that
PDEA failed to exhaust all remedies before filing the petition for review.

The decisive issue is whether or not the CA erred in affirming the orderfor the release of the car to Ms.Brodett.

Ruling

The petition is meritorious.

Applicable laws and jurisprudence on releasing

property confiscated in criminal proceedings

It is not open to question thatin a criminal proceeding, the court having jurisdiction over the offense has the power to order
upon conviction of an accusedthe seizure of (a) the instruments to commit the crime, including documents, papers, and
other effects that are the necessary means to commit the crime; and (b) contraband, the ownership or possession of
which is not permitted for being illegal. As justification for the first, the accused must not profit from his crime, or must not
acquire property or the right to possession of property through his unlawful act. 12 As justification for thesecond, to return to
the convict from whom thecontraband was taken, in one way or another,is not prudent or proper, because doing so will
give rise to a violation of the law for possessing the contraband again. 13 Indeed, the court having jurisdiction over the
offense has theright to dispose of property used in the commission of the crime, such disposition being an accessory
penalty to be imposed on the accused, unless the property belongs to a third person not liable for the offense that it was
used as the instrument to commit.14

In case of forfeiture of property for crime, title and ownership of the convict are absolutely divested and shall pass to the
Government.15 But it is required that the property to be forfeited must be before the court in such manner that it can be
said to be within its jurisdiction.16

According to the Rules of Court, personal property may be seized in connection with a criminal offense either by authority
of a search warrant or as the product of a search incidental to a lawful arrest. If the search is by virtue of a search warrant,
the personal property that may be seized may be that which is the subject of the offense; or that which has been stolen or
embezzled and other proceeds, or fruits of the offense; orthat which has been used or intended to be used as the means
of committing an offense.17 If the search is an incident of a lawful arrest, seizure may be made of dangerous weapons or
anything that may have been used or may constitute proof in the commission of an offense. 18 Should there be no ensuing
criminal prosecution in which the personal property seized is used as evidence, its return to the person from whom it was
taken, or to the person who is entitled to its possession is but a matter of course, 19 except if it is contraband or illegal per
se. A proper court may order the return of property held solely as evidence should the Government be unreasonably
delayed in bringing a criminal prosecution.20 The order for the disposition of such property can be made only when the
case is finally terminated.21

Generally, the trial court is vested with considerable legal discretion in the matter of disposing of property claimed as
evidence,22 and this discretion extends even to the manner of proceeding in the event the accused claims the property
was wrongfully taken from him.23 In particular, the trial court has the power to return property held as evidence to its
rightful owners, whether the property was legally or illegally seized by the Government. 24 Property used as evidence must
be returned once the criminal proceedings to which it relates have terminated, unless it is then subject to forfeiture or
other proceedings.25

II

Order of release was premature and made

in contravention of Section 20, R.A. No. 9165

It is undisputed that the ownership of the confiscated car belonged to Ms. Brodett, who was not charged either in
connection with the illegal possession and sale of illegal drugs involving Brodett and Joseph that were the subject of the
criminal proceedings in the RTC, or even in any other criminal proceedings.

In its decision under review, the CA held as follows:

A careful reading of the above provision shows that confiscation and forfeiture in drug-related cases pertains to "all the
proceeds and properties derived from the unlawful act, including but not limited to, money and other assets obtained
thereby, and the instruments or tools with which the particular unlawful act was committed unless they are the property of
a third person not liable for the unlawful act." Simply put, the law exempts from the effects of confiscation and forfeiture
any property that is owned by a third person who is not liable for the unlawful act.

Here, it is beyond dispute that the Honda Accord subject of this petition is owned by and registered in the name of Myra S.
Brodett, not accused Richard Brodett. Also, it does not appear from the records of the case that said Myra S. Brodett has
been charged of any crime, more particularly, in the subject cases of possession and sale of dangerous drugs. Applying
Section 20 of the law to the dispute at bar, We therefore see no cogent reason why the subject Honda Accord may not be
exempted from confiscation and forfeiture.

Basic is the rule in statutory construction that when the law is clear and unambiguous, the court has no alternative but to
apply the same according to its clear language. The Supreme Court had steadfastly adhered to the doctrine that the first
and fundamental duty of courts is to apply the law according to its express terms, interpretation being called only when
such literal application is impossible. No process of interpretation or construction need be resorted to where a provision of
law peremptorily calls for application.

We thus cannot sustain petitioner’s submission that the subject car, being an instrument of the offense, may not be
released to Ms. Brodett and should remain in custodia legis. The letters of the law are plain and unambiguous. Being so,
there is no room for a contrary construction, especially so that the only purpose of judicial construction is to remove doubt
and uncertainty, matters that are not obtaining here. More so that the required literal interpretation is not consistent with
the Constitutional guarantee that a person may not be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of
law.26 (emphases are in the original text)

The legal provision applicable to the confiscation and forfeiture of the proceeds or instruments of the unlawful act,
including the properties or proceeds derived from illegal trafficking of dangerous drugs and precursors and essential
chemicals,is Section 20 of R.A. No. 9165, which pertinently providesas follows:

Section 20.Confiscation and Forfeiture of the Proceeds or Instruments of the Unlawful Act, Including the Properties or
Proceeds Derived from the Illegal Trafficking of Dangerous Drugs and/or Precursors and Essential Chemicals. – Every
penalty imposed for the unlawful importation, sale, trading, administration, dispensation, delivery, distribution,
transportation or manufacture of any dangerous drug and/or controlled precursor and essential chemical, the cultivation or
culture of plants which are sources of dangerous drugs, and the possession of any equipment, instrument, apparatus and
other paraphernalia for dangerous drugs including other laboratory equipment, shall carry with it the confiscation and
forfeiture, in favor of the government, of all the proceeds derived from unlawful act, including, but not limited to, money
and other assets obtained thereby, and the instruments or tools with which the particular unlawful act was committed,
unless they are the property of a third person not liable for the unlawful act, but those which are not of lawful commerce
shall be ordered destroyed without delay pursuant to the provisions of Section 21 of this Act.

After conviction in the Regional Trial Court in the appropriate criminal case filed, the Court shall immediately schedule a
hearing for the confiscation and forfeiture of all the proceeds of the offense and all the assets and properties of the
accused either owned or held by him or in the name of some other persons if the same shall be found to be manifestly out
of proportion to his/her lawful income: Provided, however, That if the forfeited property is a vehicle, the same shall be
auctioned off not later than five (5) days upon order of confiscation or forfeiture.
During the pendency of the case in the Regional Trial Court, no property, or income derived therefrom, which may be
confiscated and forfeited, shall be disposed, alienated or transferred and the same shall be in custodialegis and no bond
shall be admitted for the release of the same.

The proceeds of any sale or disposition of any property confiscated or forfeited under this Section shall be used to pay all
proper expenses incurred in the proceedings for the confiscation, forfeiture, custody and maintenance of the property
pending disposition, as well as expenses for publication and court costs. The proceeds in excess of the above expenses
shall accrue to the Board to be used in its campaign against illegal drugs. 27

There is no question, for even PDEA has itself pointed out, that the text of Section 20 of R. A. No. 9165relevant to the
confiscation and forfeiture of the proceeds or instruments of the unlawful act is similar to that ofArticle 45 of the Revised
Penal Code, which states:

Article 45.Confiscation and Forfeiture of the Proceeds or Instruments of theCrime. – Every penalty imposed for the
commission of a felony shall carry with it the forfeiture of the proceeds of the crime and the instruments or tools with which
it was committed.

Such proceeds and instruments or tools shall be confiscated and forfeited in favor of the Government, unless they be the
property of a third person not liable for the offense, but those articles which are not subject of lawful commerce shall be
destroyed.

The Court has interpreted and applied Article 45of the Revised Penal Codein People v. Jose, 28 concerning the
confiscation and forfeiture of the car used by the four accused when they committed theforcible abduction with rape,
although the car did not belong to any of them, holding:

xxx Article 45 of the Revised Penal Code bars the confiscation and forfeiture of an instrument or tool used in the
commission of the crime if such "be the property of a third person not liable for the offense," it is the sense of this Court
that the order of the court below for the confiscation of the car in question should be set aside and that the said car should
be ordered delivered to the intervenor for foreclosure as decreed in the judgment of the Court of First Instance of Manila in
replevin case. xxx29

Such interpretation is extended by analogy to Section 20, supra. To bar the forfeiture of the tools and instruments
belonging to a third person,therefore, there must be an indictment charging such third person either as a principal,
accessory, or accomplice. Less than that will not suffice to prevent the return of the tools and instruments to the third
person, for a mere suspicion of that person’s participation is not sufficient ground for the court to order the forfeiture of the
goods seized.30

However, the Office of the City Prosecutorproposed throughits Comment and Objection submitted on August 27, 2009 in
the RTC31 that the delivery to the RTC of the listed personal effects for safekeeping, to be held there throughout the
duration of the trial, would be to enable the Prosecution and the Defenseto exhaust their possible evidentiary value. The
Office of the City Prosecutor further objected to the return of the car because it appeared to bethe vehicle used in the
transaction of the sale of dangerous drugs, and, as such, was the instrument in the commission of the violation of Section
5 of R.A. No. 9165.

On its part, PDEA regards the decision of the CA to be not in accord with applicable laws and the primordial intent of the
framers of R. A. No. 9165,32 and contends that the car should not be released from the custody of the law because it had
been seized from accused Brodett during a legitimate anti-illegal operation. It argues that the Motion to Return Non-Drug
Evidencedid not intimate or allege that the car had belonged to a third person; and that even if the car had belonged to
Ms. Brodett, a third person, her ownership did not ipso facto authorize its release, because she was under the obligation
to prove to the RTC that she had no knowledge of the commission of the crime. It insists that the car is a property in
custodialegis and may not be released during the pendency of the trial.

We agree with PDEA and the Office of the City Prosecutor.

We note that the RTC granted accusedBrodett’sMotion To Return Non-Drug Evidence on November 4, 2009 when the
criminal proceedings were still going on, and the trial was yet to be completed. Ordering the release of the car at that
pointof the proceedings was premature, considering that the third paragraph of Section 20, supra, expressly forbids the
disposition, alienation, or transfer of any property, or income derived therefrom, that has been confiscated from the
accused charged under R.A. No. 9165 during the pendency of the proceedings in the Regional Trial Court.Section 20
further expressly requires that such property or income derived therefrom should remain in custodialegis in all that time
and that no bond shall be admitted for the release of it.

Indeed, forfeiture, if warrantedpursuant to either Article 45 of the Revised Penal Code and Section 20 of R.A. No. 9165,
would be a part of the penalty to be prescribed. The determination of whetheror not the car (or any other article
confiscated in relation to the unlawful act) would be subject of forfeiture could be made only when the judgment was to be
rendered in the proceedings. Section 20 is also clear as to this.

The status of the car (or any other article confiscated in relation to the unlawful act) for the duration of the trial in the
RTCas being in custodialegisisprimarily intended to preserve it as evidence and to ensure its availability as such. To
release it before the judgment is rendered is to deprive the trial court and the parties access to it as evidence.
Consequently, that photographs were ordered to be taken of the car was not enough, for mere photographs might not fill
in fully the evidentiary need of the Prosecution. As such, the RTC’s assailed orders were issued with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction for being in contravention with the express language of Section 20 of
R.A. No. 9165.

Nonetheless, the Court need not annul the assailed orders of the RTC, or reverse the decision of the CA. It appears
thaton August 26, 2011 the RTC promulgated its decision on the merits in Criminal Case No. 09-208 and Criminal Case
No. 09-209, acquitting both Brodettand Joseph and further ordering the return to the accused of all non-drug evidence
except the buy-bust money and the genuine money,because:

The failure of the prosecution therefore to establish all the links in the chain of custody is fatal to the case at bar. The
Court cannot merely rely on the presumption of regularity in the performance of official function in view of the glaring
blunder in the handling of the corpus delicti of these cases. The presumption of regularity should bow down to the
presumption of innocence of the accused. Hence, the two (2) accused BRODETT and JOSEPH should be as it is hereby
ACQUITTED of the crimes herein charged for Illegal Selling and Illegal Possession of Dangerous Drugs.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, for failure of the prosecution to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable
doubt, RICHARD BRODETT y SANTOS and JORGE JOSEPH y JORDANA are ACQUITTED of the crimes charged in
Criminal Case Nos. 09-208 and 09-209.

The subject drug evidence are all ordered transmitted to the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) for proper
disposition. All the non-drug evidence except the buy bust money and the genuine money are ordered returned to the
accused.

The genuine money used in the buy bust operation as well as the genuine money confiscated from both accused are
ordered escheated in favor of the government and accordingly transmitted to the National Treasury for proper disposition.
(emphasis supplied)33

The directive to return the non-drug evidence hasovertaken the petition for review as to render further action upon it
superfluous. Yet, the Court seizes the opportunity to perform its duty to formulate guidelines on the matter of confiscation
and forfeiture of non-drug articles, including those belonging to third persons not liable for the offense, in order to clarify
the extent of the power of the trial court under Section 20 of R.A. No. 9165. 34 This the Court must now do in view of the
question about the confiscation and forfeiture of non-drug objects being susceptible of repetition in the future. 35 1âwphi1

We rule that henceforth the Regional Trial Courts shall comply strictly with the provisions of Section 20 of R.A. No. 9165,
and should not release articles, whether drugs or non-drugs, for the duration of the trial and before the rendition of the
judgment, even if owned by a third person who is not liable for the unlawful act.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition for review isDENIED.

The Office of the Court Administrator is directed to disseminate this decision to all trial courts for their guidance.

SO ORDERED.

LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:
 TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO
Associate Justice
Acting Chairperson

MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ*

Associate Justice Associate Justice

JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA**

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the
writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO

Associate Justice
Acting Chairperson

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, and the Acting Division Chairperson’s Attestation, it is hereby
certified that the conclusions in the above Decision had beenreached in consultation before the case was assigned to the
writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice
Republic v. Glasgow, 542 SCRA 95, Jan. 18, 2008 4. Duration and Effect, Arts. 27-45

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 170281             January 18, 2008

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the ANTI-MONEY LAUNDERING COUNCIL, petitioner,

vs.
GLASGOW CREDIT AND COLLECTION SERVICES, INC. and CITYSTATE SAVINGS BANK, INC., respondents.

DECISION

CORONA, J.:

This is a petition for review1 of the order2 dated October 27, 2005 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 47,
dismissing the complaint for forfeiture3 filed by the Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Anti-Money Laundering
Council (AMLC) against respondents Glasgow Credit and Collection Services, Inc. (Glasgow) and Citystate Savings Bank,
Inc. (CSBI).

On July 18, 2003, the Republic filed a complaint in the RTC Manila for civil forfeiture of assets (with urgent plea for
issuance of temporary restraining order [TRO] and/or writ of preliminary injunction) against the bank deposits in account
number CA-005-10-000121-5 maintained by Glasgow in CSBI. The case, filed pursuant to RA 9160 (the Anti-Money
Laundering Act of 2001), as amended, was docketed as Civil Case No. 03-107319.

Acting on the Republic’s urgent plea for the issuance of a TRO, the executive judge 4 of RTC Manila issued a 72-hour TRO
dated July 21, 2003. The case was thereafter raffled to Branch 47 and the hearing on the application for issuance of a writ
of preliminary injunction was set on August 4, 2003.

After hearing, the trial court (through then Presiding Judge Marivic T. Balisi-Umali) issued an order granting the issuance
of a writ of preliminary injunction. The injunctive writ was issued on August 8, 2003.

Meanwhile, summons to Glasgow was returned "unserved" as it could no longer be found at its last known address.

On October 8, 2003, the Republic filed a verified omnibus motion for (a) issuance of alias summons and (b) leave of court
to serve summons by publication. In an order dated October 15, 2003, the trial court directed the issuance
of alias summons. However, no mention was made of the motion for leave of court to serve summons by publication.

In an order dated January 30, 2004, the trial court archived the case allegedly for failure of the Republic to serve
the alias summons. The Republic filed an ex parte omnibus motion to (a) reinstate the case and (b) resolve its pending
motion for leave of court to serve summons by publication.

In an order dated May 31, 2004, the trial court ordered the reinstatement of the case and directed the Republic to serve
the alias summons on Glasgow and CSBI within 15 days. However, it did not resolve the Republic’s motion for leave of
court to serve summons by publication declaring:

Until and unless a return is made on the alias summons, any action on [the Republic’s] motion for leave of court to
serve summons by publication would be untenable if not premature.

On July 12, 2004, the Republic (through the Office of the Solicitor General [OSG]) received a copy of the sheriff’s return
dated June 30, 2004 stating that the alias summons was returned "unserved" as Glasgow was no longer holding office at
the given address since July 2002 and left no forwarding address.
Meanwhile, the Republic’s motion for leave of court to serve summons by publication remained unresolved. Thus, on
August 11, 2005, the Republic filed a manifestation and ex parte motion to resolve its motion for leave of court to serve
summons by publication.

On August 12, 2005, the OSG received a copy of Glasgow’s "Motion to Dismiss (By Way of Special Appearance)" dated
August 11, 2005. It alleged that (1) the court had no jurisdiction over its person as summons had not yet been served on
it; (2) the complaint was premature and stated no cause of action as there was still no conviction for estafa or other
criminal violations implicating Glasgow and (3) there was failure to prosecute on the part of the Republic.

The Republic opposed Glasgow’s motion to dismiss. It contended that its suit was an action quasi in rem where
jurisdiction over the person of the defendant was not a prerequisite to confer jurisdiction on the court. It asserted that prior
conviction for unlawful activity was not a precondition to the filing of a civil forfeiture case and that its complaint alleged
ultimate facts sufficient to establish a cause of action. It denied that it failed to prosecute the case.

On October 27, 2005, the trial court issued the assailed order. It dismissed the case on the following grounds: (1)
improper venue as it should have been filed in the RTC of Pasig where CSBI, the depository bank of the account sought
to be forfeited, was located; (2) insufficiency of the complaint in form and substance and (3) failure to prosecute. It lifted
the writ of preliminary injunction and directed CSBI to release to Glasgow or its authorized representative the funds in CA-
005-10-000121-5.

Raising questions of law, the Republic filed this petition.

On November 23, 2005, this Court issued a TRO restraining Glasgow and CSBI, their agents, representatives and/or
persons acting upon their orders from implementing the assailed October 27, 2005 order. It restrained Glasgow from
removing, dissipating or disposing of the funds in account no. CA-005-10-000121-5 and CSBI from allowing any
transaction on the said account.

The petition essentially presents the following issue: whether the complaint for civil forfeiture was correctly dismissed on
grounds of improper venue, insufficiency in form and substance and failure to prosecute.

The Court agrees with the Republic.

The Complaint Was Filed

In The Proper Venue

In its assailed order, the trial court cited the grounds raised by Glasgow in support of its motion to dismiss:

1. That this [c]ourt has no jurisdiction over the person of Glasgow considering that no [s]ummons has been served
upon it, and it has not entered its appearance voluntarily;

2. That the [c]omplaint for forfeiture is premature because of the absence of a prior finding by any tribunal that
Glasgow was engaged in unlawful activity: [i]n connection therewith[,] Glasgow argues that the [c]omplaint states
no cause of action; and

3. That there is failure to prosecute, in that, up to now, summons has yet to be served upon Glasgow. 5

But inasmuch as Glasgow never questioned the venue of the Republic’s complaint for civil forfeiture against it, how could
the trial court have dismissed the complaint for improper venue? In Dacoycoy v. Intermediate Appellate Court 6 (reiterated
in Rudolf Lietz Holdings, Inc. v. Registry of Deeds of Parañaque City),7 this Court ruled:

The motu proprio dismissal of petitioner’s complaint by [the] trial court on the ground of improper venue is
plain error…. (emphasis supplied)

At any rate, the trial court was a proper venue.

On November 15, 2005, this Court issued A.M. No. 05-11-04-SC, the Rule of Procedure in Cases of Civil Forfeiture, Asset
Preservation, and Freezing of Monetary Instrument, Property, or Proceeds Representing, Involving, or Relating to an
Unlawful Activity or Money Laundering Offense under RA 9160, as amended (Rule of Procedure in Cases of Civil
Forfeiture). The order dismissing the Republic’s complaint for civil forfeiture of Glasgow’s account in CSBI has not yet
attained finality on account of the pendency of this appeal. Thus, the Rule of Procedure in Cases of Civil Forfeiture applies
to the Republic’s complaint.8 Moreover, Glasgow itself judicially admitted that the Rule of Procedure in Cases of Civil
Forfeiture is "applicable to the instant case."9

Section 3, Title II (Civil Forfeiture in the Regional Trial Court) of the Rule of Procedure in Cases of Civil Forfeiture
provides:

Sec. 3. Venue of cases cognizable by the regional trial court. – A petition for civil forfeiture shall be filed in any
regional trial court of the judicial region where the monetary instrument, property or proceeds
representing, involving, or relating to an unlawful activity or to a money laundering offense are
located; provided, however, that where all or any portion of the monetary instrument, property or proceeds is
located outside the Philippines, the petition may be filed in the regional trial court in Manila or of the judicial region
where any portion of the monetary instrument, property, or proceeds is located, at the option of the petitioner.
(emphasis supplied)

Under Section 3, Title II of the Rule of Procedure in Cases of Civil Forfeiture, therefore, the venue of civil forfeiture cases
is any RTC of the judicial region where the monetary instrument, property or proceeds representing, involving, or relating
to an unlawful activity or to a money laundering offense are located. Pasig City, where the account sought to be forfeited
in this case is situated, is within the National Capital Judicial Region (NCJR). Clearly, the complaint for civil forfeiture of
the account may be filed in any RTC of the NCJR. Since the RTC Manila is one of the RTCs of the NCJR, 10 it was a
proper venue of the Republic’s complaint for civil forfeiture of Glasgow’s account.

The Complaint Was Sufficient In Form And Substance

In the assailed order, the trial court evaluated the Republic’s complaint to determine its sufficiency in form and substance:

At the outset, this [c]ourt, before it proceeds, takes the opportunity to examine the [c]omplaint and determine
whether it is sufficient in form and substance.

Before this [c]ourt is a [c]omplaint for Civil Forfeiture of Assets filed by the [AMLC], represented by the Office of
the Solicitor General[,] against Glasgow and [CSBI] as necessary party. The [c]omplaint principally alleges the
following:

(a) Glasgow is a corporation existing under the laws of the Philippines, with principal office address at Unit 703,
7th Floor, Citystate Center [Building], No. 709 Shaw Boulevard[,] Pasig City;

(b) [CSBI] is a corporation existing under the laws of the Philippines, with principal office at Citystate Center
Building, No. 709 Shaw Boulevard, Pasig City;

(c) Glasgow has funds in the amount of P21,301,430.28 deposited with [CSBI], under CA 005-10-000121-5;

(d) As events have proved, aforestated bank account is related to the unlawful activities of Estafa and violation of
Securities Regulation Code;

(e) The deposit has been subject of Suspicious Transaction Reports;

(f) After appropriate investigation, the AMLC issued Resolutions No. 094 (dated July 10, 2002), 096 (dated July
12, 2002), 101 (dated July 23, 2002), and 108 (dated August 2, 2002), directing the issuance of freeze orders
against the bank accounts of Glasgow;

(g) Pursuant to said AMLC Resolutions, Freeze Orders Nos. 008-010, 011 and 013 were issued on different
dates, addressed to the concerned banks;

(h) The facts and circumstances plainly showing that defendant Glasgow’s bank account and deposit are related
to the unlawful activities of Estafa and violation of Securities Regulation Code, as well as to a money laundering
offense [which] [has] been summarized by the AMLC in its Resolution No. 094; and

(i) Because defendant Glasgow’s bank account and deposits are related to the unlawful activities of Estafa and
violation of Securities Regulation Code, as well as [to] money laundering offense as aforestated, and being the
 subject of covered transaction reports and eventual freeze orders, the same should properly be forfeited in favor
of the government in accordance with Section 12, R.A. 9160, as amended. 11

In a motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action, the focus is on the sufficiency, not the veracity, of the material
allegations.12 The determination is confined to the four corners of the complaint and nowhere else. 13

In a motion to dismiss a complaint based on lack of cause of action, the question submitted to the court for
determination is the sufficiency of the allegations made in the complaint to constitute a cause of action and not
whether those allegations of fact are true, for said motion must hypothetically admit the truth of the facts alleged in
the complaint.

The test of the sufficiency of the facts alleged in the complaint is whether or not, admitting the facts
alleged, the court could render a valid judgment upon the same in accordance with the prayer of the
complaint.14 (emphasis ours)

In this connection, Section 4, Title II of the Rule of Procedure in Cases of Civil Forfeiture provides:

Sec. 4.  Contents of the petition for civil forfeiture. - The petition for civil forfeiture shall be verified and contain the
following allegations:

(a) The name and address of the respondent;

(b) A description with reasonable particularity of the monetary instrument, property, or proceeds, and their
location; and

(c) The acts or omissions prohibited by and the specific provisions of the Anti-Money Laundering Act, as
amended, which are alleged to be the grounds relied upon for the forfeiture of the monetary instrument,
property, or proceeds; and

[(d)] The reliefs prayed for.

Here, the verified complaint of the Republic contained the following allegations:

(a) the name and address of the primary defendant therein, Glasgow; 15

(b) a description of the proceeds of Glasgow’s unlawful activities with particularity, as well as the location thereof,
account no. CA-005-10-000121-5 in the amount of P21,301,430.28 maintained with CSBI;

(c) the acts prohibited by and the specific provisions of RA 9160, as amended, constituting the grounds for the
forfeiture of the said proceeds. In particular, suspicious transaction reports showed that Glasgow engaged in
unlawful activities of estafa and violation of the Securities Regulation Code (under Section 3(i)(9) and (13), RA
9160, as amended); the proceeds of the unlawful activities were transacted and deposited with CSBI in account
no. CA-005-10-000121-5 thereby making them appear to have originated from legitimate sources; as such,
Glasgow engaged in money laundering (under Section 4, RA 9160, as amended); and the AMLC subjected the
account to freeze order and

(d) the reliefs prayed for, namely, the issuance of a TRO or writ of preliminary injunction and the forfeiture of the
account in favor of the government as well as other reliefs just and equitable under the premises.

The form and substance of the Republic’s complaint substantially conformed with Section 4, Title II of the Rule of
Procedure in Cases of Civil Forfeiture.

Moreover, Section 12(a) of RA 9160, as amended, provides:

SEC. 12. Forfeiture Provisions. –

 (a) Civil Forfeiture.  – When there is a covered transaction report made, and the court has, in a petition filed for the
purpose ordered seizure of any monetary instrument or property, in whole or in part, directly or indirectly, related
to said report, the Revised Rules of Court on civil forfeiture shall apply.

In relation thereto, Rule 12.2 of the Revised Implementing Rules and Regulations of RA 9160, as amended, states:

RULE 12
Forfeiture Provisions

xxx xxx xxx

Rule 12.2. When Civil Forfeiture May be Applied. – When there is a SUSPICIOUS TRANSACTION REPORT OR
A COVERED TRANSACTION REPORT DEEMED SUSPICIOUS AFTER INVESTIGATION BY THE AMLC, and
the court has, in a petition filed for the purpose, ordered the seizure of any monetary instrument or property, in
whole or in part, directly or indirectly, related to said report, the Revised Rules of Court on civil forfeiture shall
apply.

RA 9160, as amended, and its implementing rules and regulations lay down two conditions when applying for civil
forfeiture:

(1) when there is a suspicious transaction report or a covered transaction report deemed suspicious after
investigation by the AMLC and

(2) the court has, in a petition filed for the purpose, ordered the seizure of any monetary instrument or property, in
whole or in part, directly or indirectly, related to said report.

It is the preliminary seizure of the property in question which brings it within the reach of the judicial process. 16 It is actually
within the court’s possession when it is submitted to the process of the court. 17 The injunctive writ issued on August 8,
2003 removed account no. CA-005-10-000121-5 from the effective control of either Glasgow or CSBI or their
representatives or agents and subjected it to the process of the court.

Since account no. CA-005-10-000121-5 of Glasgow in CSBI was (1) covered by several suspicious transaction reports
and (2) placed under the control of the trial court upon the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction, the conditions
provided in Section 12(a) of RA 9160, as amended, were satisfied. Hence, the Republic, represented by the AMLC,
properly instituted the complaint for civil forfeiture.

Whether or not there is truth in the allegation that account no. CA-005-10-000121-5 contains the proceeds of unlawful
activities is an evidentiary matter that may be proven during trial. The complaint, however, did not even have to show or
allege that Glasgow had been implicated in a conviction for, or the commission of, the unlawful activities of estafa and
violation of the Securities Regulation Code.

A criminal conviction for an unlawful activity is not a prerequisite for the institution of a civil forfeiture proceeding. Stated
otherwise, a finding of guilt for an unlawful activity is not an essential element of civil forfeiture.

Section 6 of RA 9160, as amended, provides:

SEC. 6. Prosecution of Money Laundering. –

(a) Any person may be charged with and convicted of both the offense of money laundering and the unlawful
activity as herein defined.

(b) Any proceeding relating to the unlawful activity shall be given precedence over the prosecution of any offense
or violation under this Act without prejudice to the freezing and other remedies provided. (emphasis supplied)

Rule 6.1 of the Revised Implementing Rules and Regulations of RA 9160, as amended, states:

Rule 6.1. Prosecution of Money Laundering –

 (a) Any person may be charged with and convicted of both the offense of money laundering and the unlawful
activity as defined under Rule 3(i) of the AMLA.

(b) Any proceeding relating to the unlawful activity shall be given precedence over the prosecution of any offense
or violation under the AMLA without prejudice to the application ex-parte by the AMLC to the Court of Appeals
for a freeze order with respect to the monetary instrument or property involved therein and resort to other
remedies provided under the AMLA, the Rules of Court and other pertinent laws and rules. (emphasis
supplied)

Finally, Section 27 of the Rule of Procedure in Cases of Civil Forfeiture provides:

Sec. 27. No prior charge, pendency or conviction necessary. – No prior criminal charge, pendency of or
conviction for an unlawful activity or money laundering offense is necessary for the commencement or the
resolution of a petition for civil forfeiture. (emphasis supplied)

Thus, regardless of the absence, pendency or outcome of a criminal prosecution for the unlawful activity or for money
laundering, an action for civil forfeiture may be separately and independently prosecuted and resolved.

There Was No Failure

To Prosecute

The trial court faulted the Republic for its alleged failure to prosecute the case. Nothing could be more erroneous.

Immediately after the complaint was filed, the trial court ordered its deputy sheriff/process server to serve summons and
notice of the hearing on the application for issuance of TRO and/or writ of preliminary injunction. The subpoena to
Glasgow was, however, returned unserved as Glasgow "could no longer be found at its given address" and had moved
out of the building since August 1, 2002.

Meanwhile, after due hearing, the trial court issued a writ of preliminary injunction enjoining Glasgow from removing,
dissipating or disposing of the subject bank deposits and CSBI from allowing any transaction on, withdrawal, transfer,
removal, dissipation or disposition thereof.

As the summons on Glasgow was returned "unserved," and considering that its whereabouts could not be ascertained
despite diligent inquiry, the Republic filed a verified omnibus motion for (a) issuance of alias  summons and (b) leave of
court to serve summons by publication on October 8, 2003. While the trial court issued an alias summons in its order
dated October 15, 2003, it kept quiet on the prayer for leave of court to serve summons by publication.

Subsequently, in an order dated January 30, 2004, the trial court archived the case for failure of the Republic to cause the
service of alias summons. The Republic filed an ex parte omnibus motion to (a) reinstate the case and (b) resolve its
pending motion for leave of court to serve summons by publication.

In an order dated May 31, 2004, the trial court ordered the reinstatement of the case and directed the Republic to cause
the service of the alias summons on Glasgow and CSBI within 15 days. However, it deferred its action on the Republic’s
motion for leave of court to serve summons by publication until a return was made on the alias summons.

Meanwhile, the Republic continued to exert efforts to obtain information from other government agencies on the
whereabouts or current status of respondent Glasgow if only to save on expenses of publication of summons. Its efforts,
however, proved futile. The records on file with the Securities and Exchange Commission provided no information. Other
inquiries yielded negative results.

On July 12, 2004, the Republic received a copy of the sheriff’s return dated June 30, 2004 stating that the alias summons
had been returned "unserved" as Glasgow was no longer holding office at the given address since July 2002 and left no
forwarding address. Still, no action was taken by the trial court on the Republic’s motion for leave of court to serve
summons by publication. Thus, on August 11, 2005, the Republic filed a manifestation and ex parte motion to resolve its
motion for leave of court to serve summons by publication.

It was at that point that Glasgow filed a motion to dismiss by way of special appearance which the Republic vigorously
opposed. Strangely, to say the least, the trial court issued the assailed order granting Glasgow’s motion.
Given these circumstances, how could the Republic be faulted for failure to prosecute the complaint for civil forfeiture?
While there was admittedly a delay in the proceeding, it could not be entirely or primarily ascribed to the Republic. That
Glasgow’s whereabouts could not be ascertained was not only beyond the Republic’s control, it was also attributable to
Glasgow which left its principal office address without informing the Securities and Exchange Commission or any official
regulatory body (like the Bureau of Internal Revenue or the Department of Trade and Industry) of its new address.
Moreover, as early as October 8, 2003, the Republic was already seeking leave of court to serve summons by publication.

In Marahay v. Melicor,18 this Court ruled:

While a court can dismiss a case on the ground of non prosequitur, the real test for the exercise of such power is
whether, under the circumstances, plaintiff is chargeable with want of due diligence in failing to proceed with
reasonable promptitude. In the absence of a pattern or scheme to delay the disposition of the case or a
wanton failure to observe the mandatory requirement of the rules on the part of the plaintiff, as in the
case at bar, courts should decide to dispense with rather than wield their authority to dismiss. (emphasis
supplied)

We see no pattern or scheme on the part of the Republic to delay the disposition of the case or a wanton failure to
observe the mandatory requirement of the rules. The trial court should not have so eagerly wielded its power to dismiss
the Republic’s complaint.

Service Of Summons
May Be By Publication

In Republic v. Sandiganbayan,19 this Court declared that the rule is settled that forfeiture proceedings are actions in rem.
While that case involved forfeiture proceedings under RA 1379, the same principle applies in cases for civil forfeiture
under RA 9160, as amended, since both cases do not terminate in the imposition of a penalty but merely in the forfeiture
of the properties either acquired illegally or related to unlawful activities in favor of the State.

As an action in rem, it is a proceeding against the thing itself instead of against the person. 20 In actions in rem or quasi in
rem, jurisdiction over the person of the defendant is not a prerequisite to conferring jurisdiction on the court, provided that
the court acquires jurisdiction over the res.21 Nonetheless, summons must be served upon the defendant in order to
satisfy the requirements of due process.22 For this purpose, service may be made by publication as such mode of service
is allowed in actions in rem and quasi in rem.23

In this connection, Section 8, Title II of the Rule of Procedure in Cases of Civil Forfeiture provides:

Sec. 8.  Notice and manner of service. - (a) The respondent shall be given notice of the petition in the same manner as
service of summons under Rule 14 of the Rules of Court and the following rules:

1. The notice shall be served on respondent personally, or by any other means prescribed in Rule 14 of the Rules
of Court;

2. The notice shall contain: (i) the title of the case; (ii) the docket number; (iii) the cause of action; and (iv) the
relief prayed for; and

3. The notice shall likewise contain a proviso that, if no comment or opposition is filed within the reglementary
period, the court shall hear the case ex parte and render such judgment as may be warranted by the facts alleged
in the petition and its supporting evidence.

(b) Where the respondent is designated as an unknown owner or whenever his whereabouts are
unknown and cannot be ascertained by diligent inquiry, service may, by leave of court, be effected
upon him by publication of the notice of the petition in a newspaper of general circulation in such
places and for such time as the court may order. In the event that the cost of publication exceeds the
value or amount of the property to be forfeited by ten percent, publication shall not be required. (emphasis
supplied)

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The October 27, 2005 order of the Regional Trial Court of Manila,
Branch 47, in Civil Case No. 03-107319 is SET ASIDE. The August 11, 2005 motion to dismiss of Glasgow Credit and
Collection Services, Inc. is DENIED. And the complaint for forfeiture of the Republic of the Philippines, represented by the
Anti-Money Laundering Council, is REINSTATED.

The case is hereby REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 47 which shall forthwith proceed with the
case pursuant to the provisions of A.M. No. 05-11-04-SC. Pending final determination of the case, the November 23, 2005
temporary restraining order issued by this Court is hereby MAINTAINED.

SO ORDERED.

Puno, C.J., Chairperson, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Azcuna, Leonardo-de Castro, JJ., concur.

Enrile v. Salazar, 186 SCRA 217 --- HABA NETO SEARCH NYO NALANG
Napolis v. CA, 43 SCRA 301

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-28865 February 28, 1972

NICANOR NAPOLIS, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS, and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

Victor Arichea for petitioner.

Office of the Solicitor General Felix V. Makasiar, Assistant Solicitor General Antonio G. Ibarra and Solicitor Conrado T.
Limcaoco for respondents.

CONCEPCION, C.J.:p

Appeal taken by Nicanor Napolis from a decision of the Court of Appeals affirming that of the Court of First Instance of
Bataan, the dispositive part of which reads as follows:

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, the Court hereby finds the accused Bonifacio
Malana, Nicanor Napolis and Apolinario Satimbre guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of robbery
in band and sentences Bonifacio Malanaas an accessory after the fact to suffer imprisonment of from six
(6) months, arresto mayor, as minimum to six (6) years,  prision correccional, as maximum and to
indemnify the offended party, Ignacio Peñaflor in the sum of P80.00 with subsidiary imprisonment in case
of insolvency but not to exceed one-third (1/3)of the principal penalty and the accused Nicanor Napolis
and Apolinario Satimbre to suffer imprisonment of from ten (10) years and one (1) day, prision mayor, as
minimum, to seventeen (17) years, four (4) months and one (1) day, reclusion temporal,  as maximum,
both to indemnify the spouses Ignacio Peñaflor and Casimira Lagman in the sum of Two Thousand Five
Hundred Fifty-Seven Pesos (P2,557.00) without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and all
three to pay the proportionate part of the costs.

The main facts, on which there is no dispute, are set forth in the decision of the Court of Appeals, from which We quote:

At about 1:00 o'clock in the early morning of October 1, 1956, Mrs. Casimira Lagman Peñaflor , 47-year
old wife of Ignacio Peñaflor , the owner of a store located at the new highway, Hermosa, Bataan, after
answering a minor call of nature, heard the barkings of the dog nearby indicating the presence of
strangers around the vicinity. Acting on instinct, she woke up husband Ignacio Peñaflor who, after getting
his flashlight and .38 caliber revolver, went down the store to take a look. As he approached the door of
the store, it suddenly gave way having been forcibly pushed and opened by 4 men, one of them holding
and pointing a machinegun. Confronted by this peril, Ignacio Peñaflor fired his revolver but missed. Upon
receiving from someone a stunning blow on the head, Ignacio fell down but he pretended to be dead. He
was hogtied by the men. The fact, however, was that he did not lose consciousness (tsn. 5, I). The men
then went up the house. One of the robbers asked Mrs. Casimira L. Peñaflor for money saying that they
are people from the mountain. Mrs. Casimira L. Peñaflor , realizing the danger, took from under the mat
the bag containing P2,000.00 in cash and two rings worth P350.00 and delivered them to the robber.
Thereupon, that robber opened and ransacked the wardrobe. Then they tied the hands of Mrs. Casimira
L. Peñaflor and those of her two sons. After telling them to lie down, the robbers covered them with
blankets and left. The revolver of Ignacio, valued at P150.00, was taken by the robbers. The spouses
 thereafter called for help and Councilor Almario, a neighbor, came and untied Ignacio Peñaflor . The
robbery was reported to the Chief of Police of Hermosa and to the Philippine Constabulary.

Chief of Police Delfin Lapid testified that he went to the premises upon receiving the report of Councilor
Almario and found owner Ignacio Peñaflor with a wound on the head (tsn. 23, I). The wardrobe was
ransacked and things scattered around. It appears that the robbers bore a hole on the sidewall of the
ground floor of the store and passed through it to gain entrance. According to Chief of Police Delfin Lapid,
"they removed the adobe stone and that is the place where they passed through" (tsn. 24, I). In that same
morning, policeman Melquiades Samaniego reported seeing suspicious characters passing through a
nearby field and when the field was inspected, the authorities were able to locate a greasegun with 5
bullets and a pistol with 3 bullets (tsn. 24, I, testimony of Chief of Police)...

It appears that, shortly after the occurrence, a criminal complaint for robbery in band was filed with the Justice of the
Peace Court of Hermosa, Bataan. Named as defendants in the complaint, as subsequently amended, were Nicanor
Napolis, Bonifacio Malana, Ben de la Cruz, Mauricio Anila, alias Mori, Jose Escabel, alias Pepe, Antonio Bededia, alias
Toning, John Doe, alias Sommy Casimiro, Apolinario Satimbre, Paul Doe, et al. Napolis, Malana, Anila and Casimiro
having waived their right to a preliminary investigation, the case, insofar as they are concerned, was forwarded to the
Court of First Instance of Bataan, where the corresponding information was filed. As subsequently amended, by the
inclusion, as defendants therein, of Antonio Bededia alias Toning, Domingo Flores alias Eko, Ben de la Cruz, Jose
Escabel alias Pepe, Apolinario Satimbre, Carlito Veloso and Paul Doe, it is alleged in said information: .

That on or about 1:00 o'clock in the early morning of October 1, 1956, in the Municipality of Hermosa,
Province of Bataan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the herein accused
Bonifacio Malana, Nicanor Napolis, Ben de la Cruz, Mauricio Anila, Alias Mori, Jose Escabel, Alias Pepe,
Antonio Bededia, alias Toning, John Doe, Alias Sommy Casimiro, Apolinario Satimbre, Carlito Veloso,
Domingo Flores, Alias Eko and Paul Doe, by conspiring, confederating and helping one another, with the
intent to gain and armed with a Grease Gun, Three (3) caliber .45 pistols and two (2) revolvers, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, entered the dwelling of the spouses IGNACIO PEÑAFLOR
and CASIMIRA L. PEÑAFLOR by boring a hole under the sidewall of the ground floor of the house and
once inside, attack, assault and hit Ignacio Peñaflor with the handle of the Grease Gun causing him to fall
on the ground and rendering him unconscious, tied his hands and feet and then leave him; that the same
accused approached Casimira L. Peñaflor , threatened her at gun point and demanded money; that the
same accused while inside the said house searched and ransacked the place and take and carry away
the following cash money and articles belonging to said spouses Ignacio Peñaflor and Casimira L.
Peñaflor , to wit: P2,000.00 in cash, Philippine Currency, One (1) ring (Brillante) valued at P350.00, One
(1) licensed Commando Colt Revolver, Serial No. 532132 and One (1) Flashlight, valued at P7.00, to the
damage and prejudice of said spouses in the total sum of TWO THOUSAND FIVE HUNDRED FIFTY-
SEVEN PESOS, (P2,557.00) Philippine Currency.".

At the trial of Malana, Napolis, Satimbre, De la Cruz, Anila, Casimiro and

Flores,1 the evidence for the prosecution consisted of the testimony of the offended parties, Ignacio Peñaflor and his wife
Casimira Lagman Peñaflor , Provincial Fiscal Eleno L. Kahayon, Clerk of Court Pedro Aldea, Deputy Clerk of Court
Eulogio C. Mina, Delfin Lapid, the Chief of Police of Hermosa, Bataan, and Lt. Luis Sacramento of the Constabulary and
the affidavits, Exhibits A, B and C of defendants Napolis, Satimbre and Malana, respectively, admitting their participation
in the commission of the crime charged.

Mr. and Mrs. Peñaflor testified mainly on the robbery involved in the charge, whereas Fiscal Kahayon narrated the
circumstances under which the affidavit Exhibit A was subscribed and sworn to before him by appellant Napolis; Police
Chief Lapid and Lt. Sacramento dwelt on the investigations conducted by them and the circumstances under which said
defendants made their aforementioned affidavits; and Clerk of Court Pedro Aldea and Deputy Clerk of Court Eulogio C.
Mina explained how Exhibits B and C were subscribed and sworn to before them by defendants Satimbre and Malana,
respectively.

Upon the other hand, Napolis tried to establish an alibi. Testifying in his own defense, he would have Us believe that on
October 1, 1956, he was in his house in Olongapo, Zambales, because of a tooth extracted from him by one Dr. Maginas.

Defendant Satimbre, in turn, introduced his own testimony and that of his wife Engracia Mendoza. Satimbre claimed to be
innocent of the crime charged and said that, although reluctant to sign Exhibit B, he eventually signed thereon, upon the
advice of his wife Engracia Mendoza — who sought to corroborate him — and Mayor Guillermo Arcenas of Hermosa, in
order that he may not be implicated in a robbery that took place in Balanga, Bataan, and that he could be sent back to his
hometown, Hermosa, Bataan.
Before the conclusion of the trial, the court of first instance of Bataan dismissed the case as against defendants Flores,
Anila, Casimiro and De la Cruz.

In due course, said court convicted Nicanor Napolis, Bonifacio Malana and Apolinario Satimbre, as above indicated. Said
defendants appealed to the Court of Appeals which, however, dismissed Malana's appeal, and affirmed the decision of
the Court of First Instance, insofar as Napolis and Satimbre are concerned. Satimbre did not appeal from said decision of
the Court of Appeals, whereas Napolis alleges that said court has erred — .

I. In affirming  in toto the conviction of petitioner herein, of the crime charged based upon a lurking error of
identity.

II. In affirming the conviction of petitioner based upon an extra-judicial confession extracted through
duress.

III. In affirming the decision of the court a quo based upon the evidence on record adduced during the
trial.

IV. In deciding the case not in accordance with the provision of law and jurisprudence on the matter.

Under the first assignment of error, it is urged that appellant has not been sufficiently identified as one of those who
perpetrated the crime charged. In support of this contention, it is argued that the identification made by Mrs. Peñaflor was
due to a picture of appellant taken by Lt. Sacramento from the files of the police in Olongapo, Zambales, and then shown
to her, before he (appellant) was apprehended and then brought to her presence for identification. It is thus implied that
Mrs. Peñaflor identified him in consequence of the suggestion resulting from the picture she had seen before he was
taken to her for said purpose. The defense further alleges that she could not have recognized appellant herein, in the
evening of the occurrence, because the same was dark, and the flashlight used by the malefactors was then focused
downward.

Appellant's pretense is, however, devoid of factual basis. The record shows that the authorities were notified immediately
after the occurrence; that, soon after, peace officers — Police Chief Lapid and PC Lt. Sacramento — repaired to the
house of Mr. and Mrs. Peñaflor and investigated them; that based upon the description given by Mrs. Peñaflor , one
individual was apprehended and then presented to Mrs. Peñaflor , who said that he was not one of the thieves; that
another person subsequently arrested and taken to Mrs. Peñaflor was, similarly, exonerated by her; that in the course of
the investigation conducted by the Philippine Constabulary, Lt. Sacramento later brought Mrs. Peñaflor to the offices of
the police force in Olongapo and showed her the pictures of police characters on file therein; that among those pictures,
she noticed that of appellant herein, who, she believed, was one of the culprits; and that appellant was, therefore, arrested
and brought to Mrs. Peñaflor , who positively identified him as one of the malefactors.

In other words, Lt. Sacramento did not suggest to Mrs. Peñaflor , through the aforementioned picture of appellant, that he
was one of the thieves. It was she who told Lt. Sacramento that said picture was that of one of the thieves. Besides, the
fact that Mrs. Peñaflor readily exonerated the first two suspects, arrested by the authorities, shows that appellant herein
would not have been identified by her if she were not reasonably certain about it.

Then, again, she had ample opportunity to recognize appellant herein because it was he who demanded money from her
and to whom she delivered P2,000 in cash and two (2) rings worth P350; it was, also, he who opened and ransacked her
wardrobe; and it was he who tied her hands and those of her two sons. These series of acts, performed in her presence,
consumed sufficient time — from 10 to 20 minutes — to allow her eyesight to be adjusted to existing conditions, and,
hence, to recognize some of the robbers. The night was dark; but, there were two flashlights switched on, namely, that of
her husband, and the one used by the thieves. Although the latter was, at times, focused downward, it had to be aimed,
sometimes, in another direction, particularly when the money and rings were delivered to appellant herein, and when he
opened and ransacked the wardrobe of Mrs. Peñaflor . Lastly, her testimony was confirmed by other circumstances
presently to be mentioned, in connection with the consideration of the other alleged errors pointed out by appellant herein.

The second assignment of error is based upon a wrong premise — that appellant's conviction was based upon his extra-
judicial confession and that the same had been made under duress.

Said extra-judicial confession was merely one of the factors considered by His Honor, the trial Judge, and the Court of
Appeals in concluding that the evidence for the defense cannot be relied upon and that the witnesses for the prosecution
had told the truth. Besides, appellant's confession was not tainted with duress. In this connection, the Court of Appeals
had the following to say: .
 Apart from the reliability of Mrs. Casimira Lagman Peñaflor 's identification, we have the extra-judicial
confession of appellant Nicanor Napolis, marked Exh. A, subscribed and sworn to by said accused on
October 26, 1956, 25 days after the occurrence, before Provincial Fiscal Eleno L. Kahayon, the 64-year
old prosecutor who, since July 18, 1946, was the Provincial Fiscal of Bataan up to the present. His
testimony shows that he read the confession, Exh. A, to said accused in the Tagalog dialect; asked him
whether he understood it to which appellant Napolis answered "yes"; inquired whether he was coerced to
which he replied "No"; and then, required him to raise his hand in affirmation which he did (tsn. 14-15, I).
Thereupon, appellant Napolis signed the confession in his (Fiscal's) presence. Provincial Fiscal Eleno L.
Kahayon further testified that he saw no signs of physical violence on the person of the appellant who
appeared normal in his appearance (tsn. 15, I). In this confession, Exh. A, appellant Napolis related that it
was co-accused Antonio Bededia (still-at-large) who pointed the greasegun to husband Ignacio Peñaflor
and who hit him (Peñaflor ) on the head and that it was co-accused Ben de la Cruz (whose case was
dismissed) who wrested Peñaflor 's revolver. For his part, appellant Napolis admitted that it was he who
talked to Mrs. Casimira L. Peñaflor and it was he who got the money bag. The loot, according to him, was
split from which he received a share of P237.00 (Answer to Q. A, Exh. A). Among others, he mentioned
appellant Bonifacio Malana as the owner of the greasegun and the one who got Peñaflor 's revolver from
the hands of co-accused Ben de la Cruz. ... .

It may not be amiss to advert to the fact that, on appeal from a decision of the Court of Appeals, the findings of fact made
in said decision are final, except — .

(1) When the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculations, surmises or conjectures; (2) when
the inference is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) when there is a grave abuse of discretion;
(4) when the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) when the findings of fact are
conflicting; (6) when the Court of Appeals, in making its findings, went beyond the issues of the case and
the same is contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee. 2

and that the case at bar does not fall under any of the foregoing exceptions.

The third assignment of error is predicated upon the theory that the evidence for the prosecution is contradictory and,
hence, unworthy of credence. Counsel for the defense alleges that, whereas Ignacio Peñaflor said that the thieves had
entered his house by forcing its door open, Mrs. Peñaflor testified that their entry was effected through an excavation by
the side of the house, and the chief of police affirmed that the malefactors had removed a piece of wood and an adobe
stone to get into said house. No such contradictions, however, exist. The house of Mr. and Mrs. Peñaflor consisted of two
(2) parts, one of which was a store and the other the dwelling proper, adjoining the store, which had a door leading thereto
(to the dwelling proper). Mrs. Peñaflor testified that the culprits had entered the store by removing an adobe stone from a
wall thereof, and this was corroborated by the chief of police, although he added that the malefactors had, also, removed
a piece of wood from said wall. Upon the other hand, the testimony of Mr. Peñaflor referred to a door, inside the store,
leading to the dwelling proper, as distinguished from the store.

In the light of the foregoing, and considering that the findings of fact made by the Court of Appeals are supported by those
of His Honor, the trial Judge, who had observed the behaviour of the witnesses during the trial, it is clear to Us that the
first three (3) assignments of error are untenable.

The fourth assignment of error refers to the characterization of the crime committed and the proper penalty therefor. It
should be noted that the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court convicting Napolis, Malana and Satimbre
of the crime of robbery committed by armed persons, in an inhabited house, entry therein having been made by breaking
a wall, as provided in Article 299 (a) of the Revised Penal Code, and, accordingly, sentencing Napolis and Satimbre to an
indeterminate penalty ranging from ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, to seventeen (17) years,
four (4) months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as maximum, which is in accordance with said legal provision.

In addition, however, to performing said acts, the malefactors had, also, used violence against Ignacio Peñaflor , and
intimidation against his wife, thereby infringing Article 294 of the same Code, under conditions falling under sub-paragraph
(5) of said article, which prescribes the penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its
medium period, which is lighter than that prescribed in said Article 299, although, factually, the crime committed is more
serious than that covered by the latter provision. This Court had previously ruled — .

... that where robbery, though committed in an inhabited house, is characterized by intimidation, this
factor "supplies the controlling qualification," so that the law to apply is article 294 and not article 299 of
the Revised Penal Code. This is on the theory that "robbery which is characterized by violence or
 intimidation against the person is evidently graver than ordinary robbery committed by force upon things,
because where violence or intimidation against the person is present there is greater disturbance of the
order of society and the security of the individual." (U.S. vs. Turla, 38 Phil. 346; People vs. Baluyot, 40
Phil. 89.) And this view is followed even where, as in the present case, the penalty to be applied under
article 294 is lighter than that which would result from the application of article 299. ... . 3

Upon mature deliberation, We find ourselves unable to share the foregoing view. Indeed, one who, by breaking a wall,
enters, with a deadly weapon, an inhabited house and steals therefrom valuable effects, without violence against or
intimidation upon persons, is punishable under Art. 299 of the Revised Penal Code with reclusion temporal.4 Pursuant to
the above view, adhered to in previous decision,5 if, aside from performing said acts, the thief lays hand upon any person,
without committing any of the crimes or inflicting any of the injuries mentioned in subparagraphs (1) to (4) of Art. 294 of
the same Code, the imposable penalty -- under paragraph (5) thereof -- shall be  much lighter.6 To our mind, this result
and the process of reasoning that has brought it about, defy logic and reason.

The argument to the effect that the violence against or intimidation of a person supplies the "controlling qualification," is far
from sufficient to justify said result. We agree with the proposition that robbery with "violence or intimidation against the
person is evidently graver than ordinary robbery committed by force upon things," but, precisely, for this reason, We
cannot accept the conclusion deduced therefrom in the cases above cited — reduction of the penalty for the latter offense
owing to the concurrence of violence or intimidation which made it a more serious one. It is, to our mind, more plausible to
believe that Art. 294 applies only where robbery with violence against or intimidation of person takes
place without entering an inhabited house, under the conditions set forth in Art. 299 of the Revised Penal Code.

We deem it more logical and reasonable to hold, as We do, when the elements of both provisions are present, that the
crime is a complex one, calling for the imposition -- as provided in Art. 48 of said Code -- of the penalty for the most
serious offense, in its maximum period, which, in the case at bar, is reclusion temporal in its maximum period. This
penalty should, in turn, be imposed in its maximum period -- from nineteen (19) years, one (1) month and eleven (11)
days to twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal  — owing to the presence of the aggravating circumstances of nighttime. In
short, the doctrine adopted in U.S. v. De los Santos7 and applied in U.S. v. Manansala,8 U.S. v. Turla,9 People v.
Baluyot, 10 Manahan v. People, 11 and People v. Sebastian, 12 is hereby abandoned and appellant herein should be
sentenced to an indeterminate penalty ranging from ten (10) years, and one (1) day of prision mayor to nineteen (19)
years, one (1) month and eleven (11) days of reclusion temporal.

Thus modified as to the penalty, the decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby affirmed in all other respects, with costs
against herein appellant, Nicanor Napolis. It is so ordered.

Reyes, J.B.L., Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro, Fernando, Teehankee, Barredo and Villamor, JJ., concur.

Makasiar, J., took part.

People v. Toling, 62 SCRA 17

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-27097 January 17, 1975

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
ANTONIO TOLING y ROVERO and JOSE TOLING y ROVERO, defendants-appellants.

Office of the Solicitor General Felix V. Makasiar and Solicitor Dominador L. Quiroz for plaintiff-appellee.

Santiago F. Alidio as counsel de oficio for defendants-appellants.

AQUINO, J.:

Antonio Toling and Jose Toling, brothers, appealed from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Laguna, finding
them guilty of multiple murder and attempted murder, sentencing them to death and ordering them to indemnify each set
of heirs of (1) Teresita B. Escanan, (2) Antonio B. Mabisa, (3) Isabelo S. Dando, (4) Elena B. Erminio (5) Modesta R.
Brondial (6) Isabel Felices and (7) Teodoro F. Bautista in the sum of P6,000 and to pay Amanda Mapa the sum of P500
(Criminal Case No. SC-966). The judgment of conviction was based on the following facts:

Antonio Toling and Jose Toling, twins, both married, are natives of Barrio Nenita which is about eighteen (or nine)
kilometers away from Mondragon, Northern Samar. They are illiterate farmers tilling their own lands. They were forty-eight
years old in 1966. Antonio is one hour older than Jose. Being twins, they look alike very much. However, Antonio has a
distinguishing cut in his ear (44 tsn Jan. 14, 1966).

Antonio's daughter, Leonora, was working in Manila as a laundrywoman since September, 1964. Jose's three children
one girl and two boys, had stayed in Manila also since 1964.

Antonio decided to go to Manila after receiving a letter from Leonora telling him that she would give him money. To have
money for his expenses, Antonio killed a pig and sold the meat to Jose's wife for sixty pesos. Jose decided to go with
Antonio in order to see his children. He was able to raise eighty-five pesos for his expenses.

On January 6, 1965, with a bayong containing their pants and shirts, the twins left Barrio Nenita and took a bus to Allen.
From there, they took a launch to Matnog, Sorsogon. From Matnog, they went to Daraga, Albay on board an Alatco bus,
and from Daraga, they rode on the train, arriving at the Paco railroad station in Manila at about seven o'clock in the
morning of January 8th. It was their first trip to the big city.

At the Paco station, the twins took a jeepney which brought them to Tondo. By means of a letter which Aniano Espenola a
labor-recruiter, had given them, they were able to locate an employment agency where they learned the address of the
Eng Heng Glassware. Antonio's daughter was working in that store. Accompanied by Juan, an employee of the agency,
they proceeded to her employer's establishment. Leonora gave her father fifty pesos. Sencio Rubis Antonio's grandson,
gave him thirty pesos. Antonio placed the eighty pesos in the right pocket of his pants. It was then noontime.

Jose was not able to find any of his children in the city. The twins returned to the agency where they ate their lunch at
Juan's expense. From the agency, Juan took the twins to the Tutuban railroad station that same day, January 8th, for their
homeward trip.
After buying their tickets, they boarded the night Bicol express train at about five o'clock in the afternoon. The train left at
six o'clock that evening.

The twins were in coach No. 9 which was the third from the rear of the dining car. The coach had one row of two-
passenger seats and another row of three- passenger seats. Each seat faced an opposite seat. An aisle separated the
two rows. The brothers were seated side by side on the fourth three-passenger seat from the rear, facing the back door.
Jose was seated between Antonio, who was near the window, and a three-year old boy. Beside the boy was a woman
breast-feeding her baby who was near the aisle. That woman was Corazon Bernal. There were more than one hundred
twenty passengers in the coach. Some passengers were standing on the aisle.

Sitting on the third seat and facing the brothers were two men and an old woman who was sleeping with her head resting
on the back of the seat (Exh. 2). on the two-passenger seat across the aisle in line with the seat where the brothers were
sitting, there were seated a fat woman, who was near the window, and one Cipriano Reganet who was on her left. On the
opposite seat were seated a woman, her daughter and Amanda Mapa with an eight-month old baby. They were in front of
Reganet.

Two chico vendors entered the coach when the train stopped at Cabuyao, Laguna. The brothers bought some chicos
which they put aside. The vendors alighted when the train started moving. It was around eight o'clock in the evening.

Not long after the train had resumed its regular speed, Antonio stood up and with a pair of scissors (Exh. B) stabbed the
man sitting directly in front of him. The victim stood up but soon collapsed on his seat.

For his part, Jose stabbed with a knife (Exh. A) the sleeping old woman who was seated opposite him. She was not able
to get up anymore.1

Upon seeing what was happening, Amanda Mapa, with her baby, attempted to leave her seat, but before she could
escape Jose stabbed her, hitting her on her right hand with which she was supporting her child (Exh. D-2). The blade
entered the dorsal side and passed through the palm. Fortunately, the child was not injured. Most of the passengers
scurried away for safety but the twins, who had run amuck, stabbed everyone whom they encountered inside the coach. 2

Among the passengers in the third coach was Constabulary Sergeant Vicente Z. Rayel, a train escort who, on that
occasion, was not on duty. He was taking his wife and children to Calauag, Quezon. He was going to the dining car to
drink coffee when someone informed him that there was a stabbing inside the coach where he had come from. He
immediately proceeded to return to coach No. 9. Upon reaching coach 8, he saw a dead man sprawled on the floor near
the toilet. At a distance of around nine meters, he saw a man on the platform separating coaches Nos. 8 and 9, holding a
knife between the thumb and index finger of his right hand, with its blade pointed outward. He shouted to the man that he
(Rayel) was a Constabularyman and a person in authority and Rayel ordered him to lay down his knife (Exh. A) upon the
count of three, or he would be shot.

Instead of obeying, the man changed his hold on the knife by clutching it between his palm and little finger (with the blade
pointed inward) and, in a suicidal impulse, stabbed himself on his left breast. He slowly sank to the floor and was prostrate
thereon. Near the platform where he had fallen, Rayel saw another man holding a pair of scissors (Exh. B). He retreated
to the steps near the platform when he saw Rayel armed with a pistol.

Rayel learned from his wife that the man sitting opposite her was stabbed to death.

Constabulary Sergeant Vicente Aldea was also in the train. He was in the dining car when he received the information that
there were killings in the third coach. He immediately went there and, while at the rear of the coach, he met Mrs. Mapa
who was wounded. He saw Antonio stabbing with his scissors two women and a small girl and a woman who was later
identified as Teresita B. Escanan (Exh. I to I-3). Antonio was not wounded. Those victims were prostrate on the seats of
the coach and on the aisle.

Aldea shouted at Antonio to surrender but the latter made a thrust at him with the scissors. When Antonio was about to
stab another person, Aldea stood on a seat and repeatedly struck Antonio on the head with the butt of his pistol, knocking
him down. Aldea then jumped and stepped on Antonio's buttocks and wrested the scissors away from him. Antonio
offered resistance despite the blows administered to him.

When the train arrived at the Calamba station, four Constabulary soldiers escorted the twins from the train and turned
them over to the custody of the Calamba police. Sergeant Rayel took down their names. The bloodstained scissors and
knife were turned over to the Constabulary Criminal Investigation Service (CIS).
Some of the victims were found dead in the coach while others were picked up along the railroad tracks between
Cabuyao and Calamba. Those who were still alive were brought to different hospitals for first-aid treatment. The dead
numbering twelve in all were brought to Funeraria Quiogue, the official morgue of the National Bureau of Investigation
(NBI) in Manila, where their cadavers were autopsied (Exh. C to C-11). A Constabulary photographer took some pictures
of the victims (Exh. G to I-2, J-1 and J-2).

Of the twelve persons who perished, eight, whose bodies were found in the train, died from stab wounds, namely:

(1) Isabel Felices, 60, housewife, Ginlajon, Sorsogon.

(2) Antonio B. Mabisa, 28, married, laborer, Guinayangan, Quezon.

(3) Isabelo S. Dando, 45, married, Paracale, Camarines Norte.

(4) Susana C. Hernandez, 46, married, housekeeper, Jose Panganiban, Camarines Norte.

(5) Teodoro F. Bautista, 72, married, Nawasa employee, San Juan, Rizal.

(6) Modesta R. Brondial 58, married, housekeeper, Legaspi City.

(7) Elena B. Erminio 10, student, 12 Liberty Avenue, Cubao, Quezon City and

(8) Teresita B. Escanan, 25, housemaid, 66 Menlo Street, Pasay City (Exh. C to C-3, C-7, C-8, C-9, C-11, L to L-2, N to
N-2, 0 to 0-2, P to P-2, Q to Q-2, R to R-2 and T to T-2)

Four dead persons were found near the railroad tracks. Apparently, they jumped from the moving train to avoid being
killed. They were:

(1) Timoteo U. Dimaano, 53 married, carpenter, Miguelin, Sampaloc, Manila. .

(2) Miguel C. Oriarte, 45, married, Dalagan, Lopez, Quezon.

(3) Salvador A. Maqueda 52, married, farmer, Lopez, Quezon and

(4) Shirley A. Valenciano, 27, married, housekeeper, 657-D Jorge Street, Pasay City (Exh. C-4. C-5, C-6, C-10, J, J-1, J-
2, K to K-2, M to M-3 and S to S-2).

Among the injured were Lucila Pantoja, Baby X, Mrs. X, Mrs. Armanda Mapa-Dizon, Brigida Sarmiento-Palma, Cipriano
Reganet and Corazon Bernal-Astrolavio (Exh. D to D-5). Mrs. Astrolavio supposedly died later (43 tsn January 14, 1966).

Mrs. Mapa declared that because of the stab wound inflicted upon her right hand by Jose Toling, she was first brought to
the Calamba Emergency Hospital. Later, she was transferred to the hospital of the Philippine National Railways at
Caloocan City where she was confined for thirteen days free of charge. As a result of her injury, she was not able to
engage in her occupation of selling fish for one month, thereby losing an expected earning of one hundred fifty pesos.
When she ran for safety with her child, she lost clothing materials valued at three hundred pesos aside from two hundred
pesos cash in a paper bag which was lost.

The case was investigated by the Criminal Investigation Service of the Second Constabulary Zone headquarters at Camp
Vicente Lim, Canlubang, Laguna. On January 9, 1965 Constabulary investigators took down the statements of Mrs.
Mapa-Dizon, Cipriano Reganet, Corazon Bernal, Brigida de Sarmiento and Sergeant Aldea. On that date, the statements
of the Toling brothers were taken at the North General Hospital. Sergeant Rayel also gave a statement.

Antonio Toling told the investigators that while in the train he was stabbed by a person "from the station" who wanted to
get his money. He retaliated by stabbing his assailant. He said that he stabbed somebody "who might have died and
others that might not". He clarified that in the train four persons were asking money from him. He stabbed one of them. "It
was a hold-up".
He revealed that after stabbing the person who wanted to rob him, he stabbed other persons because, inasmuch as he
"was already bound to die", he wanted "to kill everybody"  (Exh. X or 8, 49 tsn Sept. 3, 1965).

Jose Toling, in his statement, said that he was wounded because he was stabbed by a person "from Camarines" who was
taking his money. He retaliated by stabbing his assailant with the scissors. He said that he stabbed two persons who were
demanding money from him and who were armed with knives and iron bars.

When Jose Toling was informed that several persons died due to the stabbing, he commented that everybody was trying
"to kill each other" (Exh. I-A).

According to Jose Toling, two persons grabbed the scissors in his pocket and stabbed him in the back with the scissors
and then escaped. Antonio allegedly pulled out the scissors from his back, gave them to him and told him to avenge
himself with the scissors.

On January 20, 1965 a Constabulary sergeant filed against the Toling brothers in the municipal court of Cabuyao, Laguna
a criminal complaint for multiple murder and multiple frustrated murder. Through counsel, the accused waived the second
stage of the preliminary investigation. The case was elevated to the Court of First Instance of Laguna where the Provincial
Fiscal on March 10, 1965 filed against the Toling brothers an information for multiple murder (nine victims), multiple
frustrated murder (six victims) and triple homicide (as to three persons who died after jumping from the running train to
avoid being stabbed).

At the arraignment, the accused, assisted by their counsel de oficio pleaded not guilty. After trial, Judge Arsenio Nañawa
rendered the judgment of conviction already mentioned. The Toling brothers appealed.

In this appeal, appellants' counsel de oficio assails the credibility of the prosecution witnesses, argues that the appellants
acted in self-defense and contends, in the alternative, that their criminal liability was only for two homicides and for
physical injuries.

According to the evidence for the defense (as distinguished from appellants' statements, Exhibits 1 and 8), when the
Toling twins were at the Tutuban Railroad Station in the afternoon of January 8, 1965, Antonio went to the ticket counter
to buy tickets for himself and Jose. To pay for the tickets, he took out his money from the right pocket of his pants and
later put back the remainder in the same pocket. The two brothers noticed that four men at some distance from them were
allegedly observing them, whispering among themselves and making signs. The twins suspected that the four men
harbored evil intentions towards them.

When the twins boarded the train, the four men followed them. They were facing the twins. They were talking in a low
voice. The twins sat on a two passenger seat facing the front door of the coach, the window being on the right of Antonio
and Jose being to his left. Two of the four men, whom they were suspecting of having evil intentions towards them, sat on
the seat facing them, while the other two seated themselves behind them. Some old women were near them. When the
train was already running, the man sitting near the aisle allegedly stood up, approached Antonio and pointed
a balisong knife at his throat while the other man who was sitting near the window and who was holding also
a balisong knife attempted to pick Antonio's right pocket, threatening him with death if he would not hand over the money.
Antonio answered that he would give only one-half of his money provided the man would not hurt him, adding that his
(Antonio's) place was still very far.

When Antonio felt some pain in his throat, he suddenly drew out his hunting knife or small bolo (eight inches long
including the handle) from the back pocket of his pants and stabbed the man with it, causing him to fall to the floor with
his balisong. He also stabbed the man who was picking his pocket. Antonio identified the two men whom he had stabbed
as those shown in the photographs of Antonio B. Mabisa (Exh. L-1 and L-2 or 5-A and
5-B) and Isabelo S. Dando (Exh. N-1 and N-2 or 7-A and 7-B). While Antonio was stabbing the second man, another
person from behind allegedly stabbed him on the forehead, causing him to lose consciousness and to fall on the floor
(Antonio has two scars on his forehead and a scar on his chest and left forearm, 85, 87 tsn). He regained consciousness
when two Constabulary soldiers raised him. His money was gone.

Seeing his brother in a serious condition, Jose stabbed with the scissors the man who had wounded his brother. Jose hit
the man in the abdomen. Jose was stabbed in the back by somebody. Jose stabbed also that assailant in the middle part
of the abdomen, inflicting a deep wound.
However, Jose did not see what happened to the two men whom he had stabbed because he was already weak. He fell
down and became unconscious. He identified Exhibit A as the knife used by Antonio and Exhibit B as the scissors which
he himself had used. He recovered consciousness when a Constabulary soldier brought him out of the train.

The brothers presented Doctor Leonardo del Rosario, a physician of the North General Hospital who treated them during
the early hours of January 9, 1965 and who testified that he found the following injuries on Antonio Toling:

Wound, incised, 1-1/4 inches (sutured), frontal, right; 3-1/2 inches each, mid-frontal (wound on the
forehead) and

Wound, stabbed, 3/4 inch, 1 inch medial to anterior axillary line level of 3rd ICS right, penetrating thoracic
cavity (chest wound (Exh. 11).

and on Jose Toling a stab wound, one inch long on the paravertebral level of the fifth rib on the left, penetrating the
thoracic cavity (Exh. 10). The wound was on the spinal column in line with the armpit or "about one inch from the midline
to the left" (113 tsn). The twins were discharged from the hospital on January 17th.

The trial court, in its endeavor to ascertain the motive for the twins' rampageous behavior, which resulted in the macabre
deaths of several innocent persons, made the following observations:

What could be the reason or motive that actuated the accused to run amuck? It appears that the accused
travelled long over land and sea spending their hard earned money and suffering privations, even to the
extent of foregoing their breakfast, only to receive as recompense with respect to Antonio the meager
sum of P50 from his daughter and P30 from his grandson and with respect to Jose to receive nothing at
all from any of his three children whom he could not locate in Manila.

It also appears that the accused, who are twins, are queerly alike, a fact which could easily invite some
people to stare or gaze at them and wonder at their very close resemblance. Like some persons who
easily get angry when stared at, however, the accused, when stared at by the persons in front of them,
immediately suspected them as having evil intention towards them (accused).

To the mind of the Court, therefore, it is despondency on the part of the accused coupled with their
unfounded suspicion of evil intention on the part of those who happened to stare at them that broke the
limit of their self-control and actuated them to run amuck.

We surmise that to the captive spectators in coach No. 9 the spectacle of middle-aged rustic twins, whom, in the limited
space of the coach, their co-passengers had no choice but to notice and gaze at, was a novelty. Through some telepathic
or extra-sensory perception the twins must have sensed that their co-passengers were talking about them in whispers and
making depreciatory remarks or jokes about their humble persons. In their parochial minds, they might have entertained
the notion or suspicion that their male companions, taking advantage of their ignorance and naivete, might victimize them
by stealing their little money. Hence, they became hostile to their co-passengers. Their pent-up hostility erupted into
violence and murderous fury.

A painstaking examination of the evidence leads to the conclusion that the trial court and the prosecution witnesses
confounded one twin for the other. Such a confusion was unavoidable because the twins, according to a Constabulary
investigator, are "very identical". Thus, on the witness stand CIS Sergeants Alfredo C. Orbase and Liberato Tamundong
after pointing to the twins, refused to take the risk of identifying who was Antonio and who was Jose. They confessed that
they might be mistaken in making such a specific identification (28 tsn September 3, 1965; 32 tsn November 5, 1965).

In our opinion, to ascertain who is Antonio and who is Jose, the reliable guides would be their sworn statements (Exh. 1
and 8), executed one day after the killing, their own testimonies and the medical certificates (Exh. 10 and 11). Those parts
of the evidence reveal that the one who was armed with the knife was Antonio and the one who was armed with the
scissors was Jose. The prosecution witnesses and the trial court assumed that Antonio was armed with the scissors (Exh.
B) and Jose was armed with the knife (Exh. A). That assumption is erroneous.

In his statement and testimony, Antonio declared that he was armed with a knife, while Jose declared that he was armed
with the scissors which Antonio had purchased at the Tutuban station, before he boarded the train and which he gave to
Jose because the latter is a barber whose old pair of scissors was already rusty. As thus clarified, the person whom
Sergeant Rayel espied as having attempted to commit suicide on the platform of the train by stabbing himself on the chest
would be Antonio (not Jose). That conclusion is confirmed by the medical certificate, Exhibit 11, wherein it is attested that
Antonio had a wound in the chest. And the person whom Sergeant Aldea subdued after the former had stabbed several
persons with a pair of scissors (not with a knife) was Jose and not Antonio. That fact is contained in his statement of
January 9, 1965 (p. 9, Record).

The mistake of the prosecution witnesses in taking Antonio for Jose and vice-versa does not detract from their credibility.
The controlling fact is that those witnesses confirmed the admission of the twins that they stabbed several passengers.

Appellants' counsel based his arguments on the summaries of the evidence found in the trial court's decision. He argues
that the testimonies of Sergeants Rayel and Aldea are contradictory but he does not particularize on the supposed
contradictions.

The testimonies of the two witnesses do not cancel each other. The main point of Rayel's testimony is that he saw one of
the twins stabbing himself in the chest and apparently trying to commit suicide. Aldea's testimony is that he knocked down
the other twin, disabled him and prevented him from committing other killings.

It may be admitted that Rayel's testimony that Aldea took the knife of Jose Toling was not corroborated by Aldea. Neither
did Aldea testify that Antonio was near Jose on the platform of the train. Those discrepancies do not render Rayel and
Aldea unworthy of belief. They signify that Aldea and Rayel did not give rehearsed testimonies or did not compare notes.

Where, as in this case, the events transpired in rapid succession in the coach of the train and it was nighttime, it is not
surprising that Rayel and Aldea would not give identical testimonies (See 6 Moran's Comments on the Rules of Court,
1970 Ed. 139-140; People vs. Resayaga, L-23234, December 26, 1963, 54 SCRA 350). There is no doubt that Aldea and
Rayel witnessed some of the acts of the twins but they did not observe the same events and their powers of perception
and recollection are not the same.

Appellants' counsel assails the testimony of Mrs. Mapa. He contends that no one corroborated her testimony that one of
the twins stabbed a man and a sleeping woman sitting on the seat opposite the seat occupied by the twins. The truth is
that Mrs. Mapa's testimony was confirmed by the necropsy reports and by the twins themselves who admitted that they
stabbed some persons.

On the other hand, the defense failed to prove that persons, other than the twins, could have inflicted the stab wounds.
There is no doubt as to the corpus delicti. And there can be no doubt that the twins, from their own admissions (Exh. 1
and 8) and their testimonies, not to mention the testimonies of Rayel, Aldea, Mrs. Mapa and the CIS investigators, were
the authors of the killings.

Apparently, because there was no doubt on the twins' culpability, since they were caught in flagrante delicto the CIS
investigators did not bother to get the statements of the other passengers in Coach No. 9. It is probable that no one
actually saw the acts of the twins from beginning to end because everyone in Coach No. 9 was trying to leave it in order to
save his life. The ensuing commotion and confusion prevented the passengers from having a full personal knowledge of
how the twins consummated all the killings.

On the other hand, the twins' theory of self-defense is highly incredible. In that crowded coach No. 9, which was lighted, it
was improbable that two or more persons could have held up the twins without being readily perceived by the other
passengers. The twins would have made an outcry had there really been an attempt to rob them. The injuries, which they
sustained, could be attributed to the blows which the other passengers inflicted on them to stop their murderous rampage.

Appellants' view is that they should be held liable only for two homicides, because they admittedly killed Antonio B.
Mabisa and Isabelo S. Dando, and for physical injuries because they did not deny that Jose Toling stabbed Mrs. Mapa.
We have to reject that view. Confronted as we are with the grave task of passing judgment on the aberrant behavior of
two yokels from the Samar hinterland who reached manhood without coming into contact with the mainstream of
civilization in urban areas, we exercised utmost care and solicitude in reviewing the evidence. We are convinced that the
record conclusively establishes appellants' responsibility for the eight killings.

To the seven dead persons whose heirs should be indemnified, according to the trial court, because they died due to stab
wounds, should be added the name of Susana C. Hernandez (Exh. P, P-1 and P-2). The omission of her name in
judgment was probably due to inadvertence. According to the necropsy reports, four persons, namely, Shirley A.
Valenciano, Salvador A. Maqueda, Miguel C. Oriarte and Timoteo U. Dimaano, died due to multiple traumatic injuries
consisting of abrasions, contusions, lacerations and fractures on the head, body and extremities (Exh. J to J-2, K to K-2,
M to M-2 and S to S-2).
The conjecture is that they jumped from the moving tracing to avoid being killed but in so doing they met their untimely
and horrible deaths. The trial court did not adjudge them as victims whose heirs should be indemnified. As to three of
them, the information charges that the accused committed homicide. The trial court dismissed that charge for lack of
evidence.

No one testified that those four victims jumped from the train. Had the necropsy reports been reinforced by testimony
showing that the proximate cause of their deaths was the violent and murderous conduct of the twins, then the latter
would be criminally responsible for their deaths.

Article 4 of the Revised Penal Code provides that "criminal liability shall be incurred by any person committing a felony
(delito) although the wrongful act done be different from that which he intended". The presumption is that "a person
intends the ordinary consequences of his voluntary act" (Sec. 5[c], Rule 131, Rules of Court).

The rule is that "if a man creates in another man's mind an immediate sense of danger which causes such person to try to
escape, and in so doing he injures himself, the person who creates such a state of mind is responsible for the injuries
which result" (Reg. vs. Halliday 61 L. T. Rep. [N.S.] 701, cited in U.S. vs. Valdez, 41 Phil. 4911, 500).

Following that rule, is was held that "if a person against whom a criminal assault is directed reasonably believes himself to
be in danger of death or great bodily harm and in order to escape jumps into the water, impelled by the instinct of self-
preservation, the assailant is responsible for homicide in case death results by drowning" (Syllabus, U.S. vs.
Valdez, supra, See People vs. Buhay, 79 Phil. 371).

The absence of eyewitness-testimony as to the jumping from the train of the four victims already named precludes the
imputation of criminal responsibility to the appellants for the ghastly deaths of the said victims.

The same observation applies to the injuries suffered by the other victims. The charge of multiple frustrated murder based
on the injuries suffered by Cipriano Pantoja, Dinna Nosal, Corazon Bernal and Brigida Sarmiento (Exh. D, D-3 to D-5) was
dismissed by the trial court for lack of evidence. Unlike Mrs. Mapa, the offended parties involved did not testify on the
injuries inflicted on them.

The eight killings and the attempted killing should be treated as separate crimes of murder and attempted murder qualified
be treachery (alevosia) (Art. 14[16], Revised Penal Code). The unexpected, surprise assaults perpetrated by the twins
upon their co-passengers, who did not anticipate that the twins would act like juramentados and who were unable to
defend themselves (even if some of them might have had weapons on their persons) was a mode of execution that
insured the consummation of the twins' diabolical objective to butcher their co-passengers. The conduct of the twins
evinced conspiracy and community of design.

The eight killings and the attempted murder were perpetrated by means of different acts. Hence, they cannot be regarded
as constituting a complex crime under article 48 of the Revised Penal Code which refers to cases where "a single act
constitutes two or more grave felonies, or when an offense is a necessary means for committing the other".

As noted by Cuello Calon, the so-called "concurso formal o ideal de delitos reviste dos formas: (a) cuando un solo hecho
constituye dos o mas delitos (el llamado delito compuesto); (b) cuando uno de ellos sea medio necesario para cometer
otro (el llamado delito complejo)." (1 Derecho Penal, 12th Ed. 650).

On the other hand, "en al concurso real  de delitos", the rule, when there is "acumulacion material de las penas", is that "si
son varios los resultados, si son varias las acciones, esta conforme con la logica y con la justicia que el agente soporte la
carga de cada uno de los delitos" (Ibid, p. 652, People vs. Mori, L-23511, January 31, 1974, 55 SCRA 382, 403).

The twins are liable for eight (8) murders and one attempted murder. (See People vs. Salazar, 105 Phil. 1058 where the
accused Moro, who ran amuck, killed sixteen persons and wounded others, was convicted of sixteen separate murders,
one frustrated murder and two attempted murders; People vs. Mortero, 108 Phil. 31, the Panampunan massacre case,
where six defendants were convicted of fourteen separate murders; People vs. Remollino, 109 Phil. 607, where a person
who fired successively at six victims was convicted of six separate homicides; U. S. Beecham, 15 Phil. 272, involving four
murders; People vs. Macaso, 85 Phil. 819, 828, involving eleven murders; U.S. vs. Jamad, 37 Phil. 305; U.S. vs. Balaba,
37 Phil. 260, 271. Contra: People vs. Cabrera, 43 Phil. 82, 102-103; People vs. Floresca, 99 Phil. 1044; People vs.
Sakam, 61 Phil. 27; People vs. Lawas, 97 Phil. 975; People vs. Manantan, 94 Phil. 831; People vs. Umali, 96 Phil. 185;
People vs. Cu Unjiengi, 61 Phil. 236; People vs. Penas, 66 Phil. 682; People vs. De Leon, 49 Phil. 437, where the crimes
committed by means of separate acts were held to be complex on the theory that they were the product of a single
criminal impulse or intent).
As no generic mitigating and aggravating circumstances were proven in this case, the penalty for murder should be
imposed in its medium period or reclusion perpetua (Arts. 64[l] and 248, Revised Penal Code. The death penalty imposed
by the trial court was not warranted.

A separate penalty for attempted murder should be imposed on the appellants. No modifying circumstances can be
appreciated in the attempted murder case.

WHEREFORE, the trial court's judgment is modified by setting aside the death sentence. Defendants-appellants Antonio
Toling and Jose Toling are found guilty, as co-principals, of eight (8) separate murders and one attempted murder. Each
one of them is sentenced to eight (8) reclusion perpetuas  for the eight murders and to an indeterminate penalty of one (1)
year of prision correccional as minimum to six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor  as maximum for the attempted
murder and to pay solidarily an indemnity of P12,000 to each set of heirs of the seven victims named in the dispositive
part of the trial court's decision and of the eight victim, Susana C. Hernandez, or a total indemnity of P96,000, and an
indemnity of P500 to Amanda Mapa. In the service of the penalties, the forty-year limit fixed in the penultimate paragraph
of article 70 of the Revised Penal Code should be observed. Costs against the appellants.

SO ORDERED.

Makalintal, C.J., Castro, Fernando, Teehankee, Barredo, Antonio, Esguerra, Fernandez and Muñoz Palma, JJ., concur.

Makasiar, J., took no part.

Footnotes

1 That initial stabbing was described by Corazon Bernal-Astrolavio in her statement dated January 9,
1965 in this manner (page 16 of the Record):

"4. T: May nasaksihan ba kayong hindi pangkaraniwang pangyayari na naganap nang gabing iyon at
kung mayroon maaari ba ninyong maisalaysay sa maikli ngunit maliwanag na pananalita?

"S: Mayroon po. Nakaupo ako nuon sa bandang hulihan nang tren. Nagpapasuso ako nuon nang aking
anak nang biglang nagkagulo. Iyong katabi kong lalaki na may katandaan na ay biglang sinaksak iyong
kaharap kong babae sa upuan. Nabuwal iyong kanyang sinaksak, at ako naman ay nagtatakbo na dala
ko iyong dalawa kong anak. Sumiksik kami doon sa may kubeta nang tren na nang mangyari iyon ay
lumalakad. Hindi ko alam na iyong aking kanan sintido ay nagdurugo. Nang tahimik na ay dinala kami sa
ospital sa Calamba at doon ay ginamot ako roon.

"5. T: Sinabi ninyo na nang biglang magkagulo samantalang lumalakad ang tren ay iyong katabi ninyong
lalaki na may katandaan na ay biglang sinaksak iyong kaharap ninyong babae sa upuan, nakita ba ninyo
kung ano ang ipinanaksak nang lalaking ito?

"S: Hindi ko na po napansin dahil sa aking takot."

2 Mrs. Mapa's statement (Exh. E) reads:

"4. T: Sino po ang sumaksak sa inyo?

S: Iyon pong lalaking mataas na payat na bisaya. Hindi ko po kilala pero kung makikita ko ay makikilala
ko. Ito pong sumaksak sa akin na ito ay dinala rin sa ospital sa Calamba, Laguna. Nauna po lamang ako
at nakita kong siya ang isinunod na may saksak din.

5. T: Bakit naman ninyo namukhaan itong sumaksak sa inyong ito?

S: Kahelera po namin iyan sa upuan.

6. T: Maaari po ba ninyong isalaysay sa maikli ngunit maliwanag na pananalita ang buong pangyayaring
inyong nasaksihan?

S: Opo. Nagpapasuso ako nuon nang aking anak, nang walang ano-ano ay nakita ko na lamang iyong
nakasaksak sa akin na biglang tumayo sa kanyang kinauupuan at biglang sinaksak iyong kaharap niyang
sa upuan na babae na natutulog. Itong katabi nang nanaksak na ito ay tumayo rin at nanaksak din nang
nanaksak at ang lahat nang makitang tao ay hinahabol at sinasaksak. Bata, matanda ay sinasaksak nang
dalawang ito at madaanan. Nang bigla kong tayo ay natamaan iyong aking kanang kamay nang kabig
niya nang saksak. Nagtuloy ako sa kubeta sa tren at doon ako sumiksik. Nang payapa na ang lahat ay
dinala ako sa Calamba sa ospital doon, at ako'y ginamot nang pangunang lunas.

7. T: Itong katabi na lalaking sinasabi ninyong nanaksak din ay kung makita ninyong muli ay makikilala pa
ninyo?

S: Makikilala ko rin po. Magkahawig po sila nang nakasaksak sa akin."

The statement of Cipriano Reganet who was wounded (Exh. D-4), in a way corroborates Mrs. Mapa's
statement. Reganet's statement reads in part as follows (Exh. F);

"3. T: Maaari po ba ninyong masabi kung bakit kayo naririto ngayon sa PNR Hospital dito sa Caloocan
City?

S: Dahil po sa mga saksak na tinamo ko nang magkaroon nang gulo sa loob nang tren kagabing humigit
kumulang sa mga alas nueve (9:00 P.M.) petcha 8 nitong Enero 1965.

4. T: Sino po ang sumaksak sa inyo kung inyong nakikilala?

S: Hindi ko po alam ang pangalan pero mamumukhaan ko kung ihaharap sa akin. Ang sumaksak po sa
akin ay iyong kasama ko sa ambulancia na nagdala saamin dito sa ospital na ito.

5. T: Bakit naman ninyo natiyak na ang sumaksak sa inyo ay iyong kasama ninyo sa ambulancia na
nagdala sa inyo sa ospital na ito?

S: Malapit po lamang ang kanyang inuupuan sa aking inuupuan sa loob nang tren kaya namukhaan ko
siya.

6. T: Ilan beses kayong sinaksak nang taong ito?

S: Dalawang beses po.

7. T: Saan-saan panig nang katawan kayo nagtamo nang saksak?

S: Sa aking noo at sa kanang kamay nang sangahin ko ang kanyang pangalawang saksak.

8. T: Bakit po naman kayo sinaksak nang taong ito?

S: Hindi ko po alam. Primero nanaksak siya sa kanyang kaharap sa upuan at saksak nang saksak sa
mga taong kanyang makita.

9. T: Ilan ang nakita ninyong nananaksak?

S: Dalawa pong magkatabi na magkahawig ang mukha.

10. T: Nang mangyari po ba ito ay tumatakbo ang tren?

S: Tumatakbo po.

11. T: Papaano kayo nakaligtas?

S: Tumakbo po ako at kumabit sa rampa at nang medyo tahimik na balak kong magbalik sa loob nang
tren. Nakita ko na maraming sugatan at sa wari ko ay patay na. Sa mga nakita ko sa loob nang tren ay
iyong sumaksak sa akin, na nakasandal at nang makita ako ay tinanganan iyong kanyang panaksak at
tinangka akong habulin. Tumakbo ako at tumalon sa lupa. Sa pagtalon kong iyon ay napinsala ang aking
kaliwang balikat.

12. T: Ano po ang ipinanaksak sa inyo?

S: Para pong punyal na ang haba ay kumulang humigit sa isang dangkal".

Mrs. Brigida Sarmiento-Palma, who was also wounded (Exh. D-3) executed a statement which reads in
part as follows (page 20, Record):

"4. T: Maaari po ba ninyong ysay sa maikli ngunit maliwanag na pananalita ang buong pangyayari?

S: Opo. Nakaupo po ako nuon kaharap papuntang Bicol. Walang ano-ano ay bigla na lamang nakita ko
na may sinaksak at pagkatapos nakita ko na lahat nang makita babae o lalaki at sinaksak. Nang ako'y
tumayo para tumakbo ay nilapitan ako at ako naman ang sinaksak. Sumigaw ako at humingi nang saklolo
at nakiusap sa isang tao na tagpan nang tualya iyong tinamo kong saksak sa kaliwang puson na tumama
sa buto. Makalipas ang ilang sandali ay dinala na ako sa ospital.

5. T: Nakikilala ba ninyo iyong sumaksak sa inyo?

S: Kilala ko po sa mukha at kasama ko pa kahapon nang dalhin ako sa ospital na ito.

6. T: Ilan po itong nakita ninyong nanaksak?

S: Dalawa po sila na magkahawig ang mukha.

People v. Salvilla, 184 SCRA 671

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 86163               April 26, 1990

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
BIENVENIDO SALVILLA, REYNALDO CANASARES, RONALDO CANASARES, and SIMPLICIO CANASARES,
BIENVENIDO SALVILLA, defendant-appellant.

The Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.

Resurreccion S. Salvilla for defendant-appellant.

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:

Accused Bienvenido Salvilla alone appeals from the Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 28, Iloilo City, * dated 29
August 1988, in Criminal Case No. 20092, finding him and his co-accused Reynaldo, Ronaldo and Simplicio, all surnamed
Canasares, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of "Robbery with Serious Physical Injuries and Serious Illegal
Detention" and sentencing them to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.

The Information filed against them reads:

The undersigned City Fiscal accuses BIENVENIDO SALVILLA, REYNALDO CANASARES, RONALDO
CANASARES, and SIMPLICIO CANASARES, whose maternal surnames, dated and places of birth cannot be
ascertained of the crime of ROBBERY WITH SERIOUS PHYSICAL INJURIES AND SERIOUS ILLEGAL
DETENTION (Art, 294, paragraph 3, in conjunction with Article 267 of the Revised Penal Code), committed as
follows:

That on or about the 12th day of April, 1986, in the City of Iloilo, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Court, said accused, conspiring and confederating among themselves, working together and helping one another,
armed with guns and handgrenade and with the use of violence or intimidation employed on the person of
Severino Choco, Mary Choco, Mimie Choco and Rodita Hablero did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
criminally take and carry away, with intent of gain, cash in the amount of P20,000.00, two (2) Men's wrist watches,
one (1) Lady's Seiko quartz wrist watch and one (1) Lady's Citizen wrist watch and assorted jewelries, all valued
at P50,000.00; that on the occasion and by reason of said robbery, Mary Choco suffered serious physical injuries
under paragraph 2 of Article 263, Bienvenido Salvilla likewise suffered serious physical injuries and Reynaldo
Canasares also suffered physical injuries; that the said accused also illegally detained, at the compound of the
New Iloilo Lumber Company, Iznart Street, Iloilo City, Severino Choco, owner/proprietor of said Lumber Company,
Mary Choco, Mimie Choco, who is a minor, being 15 years of age, and Rodita Hablero, who is a salesgirl at said
Company; that likewise on the occasion of the robbery, the accused also asked and were given a ransom money
of P50,000.00; that the said crime was attended by aggravating circumstances of band, and illegal possession of
firearms and explosives; that the amount of P20,000.00, the ransom money of P50,000.00, two (2) Men's wrist
watches, two (2) lady's wrist watches, one (1) .38 caliber revolver and one (1) live grenade were recovered from
the accused; to the damage and prejudice of the New Iloilo Lumber Company in the amount of P120,000.00.

The evidence for the prosecution may be re-stated as follows:

On 12 April 1986, a robbery was staged by the four accused at the New Iloilo Lumber Yard at about noon time. The plan
was hatched about two days before. The accused were armed with homemade guns and a hand grenade. When they
entered the establishment, they met Rodita Hablero an employee thereat who was on her way out for her meal break and
announced to her that it was a hold-up. She was made to go back to the office and there Appellant Salvilla pointed his gun
at the owner, Severino Choco, and his two daughters, Mary and Mimie the latter being a minor 15 years of age, and told
the former that all they needed was money. Hearing this, Severino told his daughter, Mary, to get a paper bag wherein he
placed P20,000.00 cash (P5,000.00, according to the defense) and handed it to Appellant. Thereafter, Severino pleaded
with the four accused to leave the premises as they already had the money but they paid no heed. Instead, accused
Simplicio Canasares took the wallet and wristwatch of Severino after which the latter, his two daughters, and Rodita, were
herded to the office and kept there as hostages.

At about 2:00 o'clock of the same day, the hostages were allowed to eat. The four accused also took turns eating while
the others stood guard. Then, Appellant told Severino to produce P100,000.00 so he and the other hostages could be
released. Severino answered that he could not do so because it was a Saturday and the banks were closed.

In the meantime, police and military authorities had surrounded the premises of the lumber yard. Major Melquiades B.
Sequio Station Commander of the INP of Iloilo City, negotiated with the accused using a loud speaker and appealed to
them to surrender with the assurance that no harm would befall them as he would accompany them personally to the
police station. The accused refused to surrender or to release the hostages.

Thereafter, OIC Mayor, Rosa Caram, of Iloilo City arrived and joined the negotiations. In her dialogue with the accused,
which lasted for about four hours, Appellant demanded P100,000.00, a coaster, and some raincoats. She offered them
P50,000.00 instead, explaining the difficulty of raising more as it was a Saturday. Later, the accused agreed to receive the
same and to release Rodita to be accompanied by Mary Choco in going out of the office. When they were out of the door,
one of the accused whose face was covered by a handkerchief, gave a key to Mayor Caram. With this, Mayor Caram
unlocked the padlocked door and handed to Rodita the P50,000.00, which the latter, in turn, gave to one of the accused.
Rodita was later set free but Mary was herded back to the office.

Mayor Caram, Major Sequio and even volunteer radio newscasters continued to appeal to the accused to surrender
peacefully but they refused.1âwphi1 UItimatums were given but the accused did not budge. Finally, the police and military
authorities decided to launch an offensive and assault the place. This resulted in injuries to the girls, Mimie and Mary
Choco as well as to the accused Ronaldo and Reynaldo Canasares. Mary suffered a "macerated right lower extremity just
below the knee" so that her right leg had to be amputated. The medical certificate described her condition as "in a state of
hemorrhagic shock when she was brought in to the hospital and had to undergo several major operations during the
course of her confinement from April 13, 1986 to May 30, 1986."

For his part, Appellant Salvilla confirmed that at about noon time of 12 April 1986 he and his co-accused entered the
lumber yard and demanded money from the owner Severino Choco He demanded P100,000.00 but was given only
P5,000.00, which he placed on the counter of the office of the lumber yard. He admitted that he and his co-accused kept
Severino, his daughters, and Rodita inside the office. He maintained, however, that he stopped his co-accused from
getting the wallet and wristwatch of Severino and, like the P5,000.00 were all left on the counter, and were never touched
by them. He claimed further that they had never fired on the military because they intended to surrender. Appellant's
version also was that during the gunfire, Severino's daughter stood up and went outside; he wanted to stop her but he
himself was hit by a bullet and could not prevent her. Appellant also admitted the appeals directed to them to surrender
but that they gave themselves up only much later.

After trial, the Court a quo meted out a judgment of conviction and sentenced each of the accused "to suffer the penalty
of reclusion perpetua, with the accessory penalties provided by law and to pay the costs."

Appellant Salvilla's present appeal is predicated on the following Assignments of Error:

1. The lower court erred in holding that the crime charged was consummated and in not holding that the same
was merely attempted.

2. The lower court erred in not appreciating the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender."

Upon the facts and the evidence, we affirm.

The defense contends that "The complete crime of larceny (theft/robbery) as distinguished from an attempt requires
asportation or carrying away, in addition to the taking, In other words, the crime of robbery/theft has three consecutive
stages: 1) the giving 2) the taking and 3) the carrying away or asportation And without asportation the crime committed is
only attempted" (Memorandum for Appellant Salvilla, Records, p. 317).
There is no question that in robbery, it is required that there be a taking of personal property belonging to another. This is
known as the element of asportation the essence of which is the taking of a thing out of the possession of the owner
without his privity and consent and without the animus revertendi (Aquino, Revised Penal Code, p. 97, citing 5 C.J. 607).
In fact, if there is no actual taking, there can be no robbery. Unlawful taking of personal property of another is an essential
part of the crime of robbery.

Appellant insists that while the "giving" has been proven, the "taking" has not. And this is because neither he nor his three
co-accused touched the P5,000.00 given by Severino nor the latter's wallet or watch during the entire incident; proof of
which is that none of those items were recovered from their persons.

Those factual allegations are contradicted by the evidence. Rodita, the lumberyard employee, testified that upon demand
by Appellant, Severino put P20,000.00 inside a paper bag and subsequently handed it to Appellant. In turn, accused
Simplicio Canasares took the wallet and wristwatch of Severino. In respect of the P50,000.00 from Mayor Caram, Rodita
declared that the Mayor handed the amount to her after she (the Mayor) had opened the padlocked door and that she
thereafter gave the amount to one of the holduppers. The "taking" was, therefore, sufficiently proved (TSN, July 1, 1987,
pp. 12-13, 15-16, 27-31). The money demanded, and the wallet and wristwatch were within the dominion and control of
the Appellant and his co-accused and completed the taking.

The State established a "taking" sufficient to support a conviction of robbery even though the perpetrators were
interrupted by police and so did not pick up the money offered by the victim, where the defendant and an
accomplice, armed with a knife and a club respectively, had demanded the money from the female clerk of a
convenience store, and the clerk had complied with their instructions and placed money from the register in a
paper bag and then placed the bag on the counter in front of the two men; these actions brought the money within
the dominion and control of defendant and completed the taking. (Johnson vs. State, 432 So 2d 758).

"Severance of the goods from the possession of the owner and absolute control of the property by the taker, even
for an instant, constitutes asportation (Adams vs. Commonwealth, 154 SW 381; State vs. Murray, 280 SW 2d
809; Mason vs. Commonwealth, 105 SE 2d 149) [Emphasis supplied].

It is no defense either that Appellant and his co-accused had no opportunity to dispose of the personalities taken. That
fact does not affect the nature of the crime, From the moment the offender gained possession of the thing, even if the
culprit had no opportunity to dispose of the same, the unlawful taking is complete (Reyes, Revised Penal Code Annotated,
Book II, 1981 ed., p. 594).

The crime is consummated when the robber acquires possession of the property, even if for a short time, and it is
not necessary that the property be taken into the hands of the robber, or that he should have actually carried the
property away, out of the physical presence of the lawful possessor, or that he should have made his escape with
it" (People vs. Quinn, 176 P 2d 404; Woods vs. State, 220 SW 2d 644; People vs. Beal, 39 P 2d 504; People vs.
Clark, 160 P 2d 553).

Contrary to Appellant's submission, therefore, a conviction for consummated and not merely attempted Robbery is in
order.

It is the contention of Appellant that Rodita could not have seen the taking because the place was dark since the doors
were closed and there were no windows. It will be recalled, however, that Rodita was one of the hostages herself and
could observe the unfolding of events. Her failure to mention the taking in her sworn statement would not militate against
her credibility, it being settled that an affidavit is almost always incomplete and inaccurate and does not disclose the
complete facts for want of inquiries or suggestions (People vs. Andaya, G.R. No. L-63862, 31 July 1987, 152 SCRA 570;
People vs. Tan, et al., 89 Phil. 337 [1951]).

The fact, too, that Rodita was an employee of Severino would not lessen her credibility. The defense has not proven that
she was actuated by any improper motive in testifying against the accused.

In the last analysis, the basic consideration centers around the credibility of witnesses in respect of which the findings of
the Trial Court are entitled to great weight as it was in a superior position to assess the same in the course of the trial
(see People vs. Ornoza G.R. No. L-56283, 30 June 1987, 151 SCRA 495; People vs. Alcantara, G.R. No. L-38042, 30
June 1987, 151 SCRA 326).

Anent the second assignment of error, the "surrender" of the Appellant and his co-accused cannot be considered in their
favor to mitigate their liability. To be mitigating, a surrender must have the following requisites: (a) that the offender had
not been actually arrested; (b) that the offender surrendered himself to a person in authority or to his agent; and (c) that
the surrender was voluntary (People vs. Canamo, G.R. No. L-62043, 13 August 1985, 138 SCRA 141).

The "surrender" by the Appellant and his co-accused hardly meets these requirements. They were, indeed, asked to
surrender by the police and military authorities but they refused until only much later when they could no longer do
otherwise by force of circumstances when they knew they were completely surrounded and there was no chance of
escape. The surrender of the accused was held not to be mitigating as when he gave up only after he was surrounded by
the constabulary and police forces (People vs. Sigayan et al., G.R. Nos. L-18523-26, 30 April 1966, 16 SCRA 839; People
vs. Mationg G.R. No. L-33488, 29 March 1982, 113 SCRA 167). Their surrender was not spontaneous as it was motivated
more by an intent to insure their safety. And while it is claimed that they intended to surrender, the fact is that they did not
despite several opportunities to do so. There is no voluntary surrender to speak of (People vs. Dimdiman 106 Phil. 391
[1959]).

All told, the assigned errors remain unsubstantiated and we find the guilt of the accused-appellant, Bienvenido Salvilla,
established beyond reasonable doubt.

Although unassigned as an error, we deem it necessary to turn now to the nature of the linked offenses involved and the
penalty imposed by the Trial Court.

Appellant and his co-accused were charged in the Information with "Robbery with Serious Physical Injuries and Serious
Illegal Detention ("Art. 295, par. 3, in conjunction with Art. 267, RPC )and sentenced to reclusion perpetua. We agree with
the Trial Court that a complex crime under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code has been committed such that the
penalty for the more serious offense of Serious Illegal Detention (Art. 267, Revised Penal Code), or "reclusion perpetua to
death," is to be imposed instead of the penalty prescribed for Robbery with Serious Physical Injuries (Art. 294 (3), which
is reclusion temporal.

Under Article 48, a complex crime arises "when an offense is a necessary means for committing the other." The term
"necessary means" does not connote indispensable means for if it did then the offense as a "necessary means" to commit
another would be an indispensable element of the latter and would be an ingredient thereof. The phrase "necessary
means" merely signifies that one crime is committed to facilitate and insure the commission of the other (Aquino, Revised
Penal Code, Vol. I, 1987 ed., p. 624, citing Dissent, Montemayor, J., Amado Hernandez, 99 Phil. 515). In this case, the
crime of Serious Illegal Detention was such a "necessary means" as it was selected by Appellant and his co-accused to
facilitate and carry out more effectively their evil design to stage a robbery.

The facts of this case differ from those in People vs. Astor, et al. (G.R. Nos. L-71765-66, 29 April 1987, 149 SCRA 325)
where the accused were convicted of Robbery but acquitted in the case for Serious Illegal Detention and where it was
held that "the detention is absorbed in the crime of robbery." For one, in Astor, there were two (2) separate Informations
filed, one for Robbery and another for Serious Illegal Detention. In the present case, only one Information was filed
charging the complex offense. For another, in Astor, the robbery had already been consummated and the detention was
merely to forestall the capture of the robbers by the police. Not so in this case, where the detention was availed of as a
means of insuring the consummation of the robbery. Further, in Astor, the detention was only incidental to the main crime
of robbery so that it was held therein:

. . . were appellants themselves not trapped by the early arrival of the police at the scene of the crime, they would
have not anymore detained the people inside since they have already completed their job. Obviously, appellants
were left with no choice but to resort to detention of these people as security, until arrangements for their safe
passage were made. This is not the crime of illegal detention punishable under the penal laws but an act of
restraint in order to delay the pursuit of the criminals by peace officers (People v. Sol, 9 Phil. 265; People v. Uday
55 Phil. 167, cited in the Revised Penal Code, Aquino, Vol. 3, 1976 ed., p. 1337). Where the victims in a robbery
case were detained in the course of robbery, the detention is absorbed by the crime of robbery (P. v. Baysa, 92
Phil. 1008, id.). In the case at bar, the detention was only incidental to the main crime of robbery, and although in
the course thereof women and children were also held, that threats to kill were made, the act should not be
considered as a separate offense. Appellants should only be held guilty of robbery.

In contract, the detention in the case at bar was not only incidental to the robbery but was a necessary means to commit
the same.1âwphi1 After the amount of P20,000.00 was handed to Appellant, the latter and his co-accused still refused to
leave. The victims were then taken as hostages and the demand to produce an additional P100,000.00 was made as a
prerequisite for their release. The detention was not because the accused were trapped by the police nor were the victims
held as security against the latter. The detention was not merely a matter of restraint to enable the malefactors to escape,
but deliberate as a means of extortion for an additional amount. The police and other authorities arrived only much later
after several hours of detention had already passed. And, despite appeals to appellant and his co-accused to surrender,
they adamantly refused until the amount of P100,000.00 they demanded could be turned over to them. They even
considered P50,000.00, the amount being handed to them, as inadequate.

The foregoing features also distinguish this case from those of U.S. v. Sol, 9 Phil. 265 [1907] where the restraint was for
no other purpose than to prevent the victims from reporting the crime to the authorities; from People v. Gamboa, 92 Phil.
1085 [1953] where the victims were taken to a place one kilometer away and shot in order to liquidate the witnesses to the
robbery; from People v. Baysa, 92 Phil. 1008 [1953]; People v. Manzanilla, 43 Phil. 167 [1922], all of which cases were
cited in  Astor and where the victims were only incidentally detained so that the detention was deemed absorbed in
robbery.

In other words, unlike in the above cases, the elements of the offense of Serious Illegal Detention are present in this case.
The victims were illegally deprived of their liberty. Two females (Mary and Minnie) and a minor (Minnie), a specified
circumstance in Article 267 (3), were among those detained. The continuing detention was also for the purpose of
extorting ransom, another listed circumstance in Article 267 (last parag.) not only from the detained persons themselves
but even from the authorities who arrived to rescue them.

It follows then that as the detention in this case was not merely incidental to the robbery but a necessary means employed
to facilitate it, the penalty imposed by the Trial Court is proper.

WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED. Proportionate costs.

SO ORDERED.

Paras, Padilla Sarmiento and Regalado JJ., concur.

People v. Valdez, 304 SCRA 611 --- SOBRANG HABA
People v. de Leon 49 Phil 437

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

THIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 179943               June 26, 2009

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,

vs.
MARLON ALBERT DE LEON y HOMO, Appellant.

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

This is an appeal from the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA), affirming with modification the Decision 2 of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC), Branch 76, San Mateo, Rizal, finding appellant Marlon Lambert De Leon y Homo guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of robbery with homicide.

The factual and procedural antecedents are as follows:

According to the prosecution, in the early morning, around 2 o'clock of January 7, 2000, Eduardo Zulueta and Fortunato
Lacambra III, both gasoline boys; Julieta Amistoso, cashier; and Edralin Macahis, security guard; all employees of
Energex Gasoline Station, located at Barangay Guinayan, San Mateo, Rizal, were on duty when a mint green-colored
Tamaraw FX arrived for service at the said gasoline station. 3

Eduardo Zulueta was the one who attended to the said vehicle. He went to the driver’s side in order to take the key of the
vehicle from the driver so that he could open the gas tank. He saw through the lowered window shield that there were
about six to seven persons aboard the vehicle. He proceeded to fill up ₱50.00 worth of diesel in the gas tank. After doing
this, he returned the key to the driver. While returning the key, the driver told him that the engine of the vehicle would not
start.4 Eduardo Zulueta offered to give the vehicle a push. While Eduardo Zulueta and fellow gasoline boy Fortunato
Lacambra III were positioned at the back of the vehicle, ready to push the same, the six male passengers of the same
vehicle, except the driver, alighted and announced a hold-up. They were armed with a shotgun and .38 caliber pistol. 5

Fortunato Lacambra III was ordered to lie down,6 while Eduardo Zulueta was directed to go near the Car Wash
Section.7 At that instance, guns were poked at them.8

Appellant, who guarded Eduardo Zulueta, poked a gun at the latter and took the latter's wallet containing a pawnshop
ticket and ₱50.00, while the companion of the former, hit the latter on his nape with a gun. 9

Meanwhile, four members of the group went to the cashier's office and took the money worth ₱3,000.00. 10 Those four
robbers were also the ones who shot Edralin Macahis in the stomach. 11 Thereafter, the same robbers took Edralin
Macahis' service firearm.12

After he heard successive gunshots, Eduardo Zulueta saw appellant and his companions immediately leave the
place.13 The robbers boarded the same vehicle and proceeded toward San Mateo, Rizal. 14 When the robbers left, Eduardo
Zulueta stood up and found Julieta Amistoso, who told him that the robbers took her bag and jewelry. He also saw that
Edralin Macahis had a gunshot wound in the stomach. He immediately hailed a vehicle which transported the injured
Edralin Macahis to the hospital.15 Later on, Edralin Macahis died at the hospital due to the gunshot wound. 16

The following day, Eduardo Zulueta identified appellant as one of the robbers who poked a gun at him. 17

However, according to appellant, from January 4 to 6, 2000, he stayed at the house of his Tita Emma at Pantok,
Binangonan, Rizal, helping the latter in her canteen. On the evening of January 6, at approximately 9 o'clock, appellant
asked permission from his Tita Emma to go to Antipolo. Catherine Homo, appellant's cousin and the latter's younger
brother, accompanied appellant to the terminal. While waiting for a ride, the vehicle, a Tamaraw FX, of a certain Christian
Gersalia, a relative of appellant and Catherine Homo, passed by. Catherine Homo asked Christian Gersalia if he would
allow appellant to hitch a ride on his vehicle. Christian Gersalia agreed. Aside from Christian Gersalia, there were other
passengers in the said vehicle.18

When the vehicle reached Masinag, where appellant was supposed to alight, he was not allowed to do so; instead, he
was asked by the other passengers to join them in their destination. While on the road, appellant fell asleep. When he
woke up, they were in a gasoline station. He then saw Christian Gersalia and the other passengers conducting a hold-up.
He never left the vehicle and was not able to do anything because he was overwhelmed with fear. After he heard the
gunshots, Christian Gersalia and the other passengers went to the vehicle and proceeded towards Marikina. On their way,
they were followed by policemen who fired at them. The other passengers fired back at the policemen. It was then that the
vehicle hit a wall prompting the other passengers to scamper in different directions leaving him behind. When the
policemen arrived, he was immediately arrested.19

As a result of the above incident, four Informations for Robbery with Homicide were filed against appellant, Rudy Gersalia,
Christian Gersalia, Dondon Brenvuela, Jonathan Brenvuela, Pantoy Servantes, an alias "Rey," an alias "Jonard," an alias
"Precie," and an alias "Renato," which read as:

Criminal Case No. 4747

That on or about the 7th day of January 2000, in the Municipality of San Mateo, Province of Rizal, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring and confederating together with Rudy
Gersalia, Christian Gersalia, Dondon Brenvuela, Jonathan Brenvuela, Pantoy Servantes, Alias "Rey," Alias "Jonard," Alias
" Precie" and Alias "Renato" whose true names, identities and present whereabouts are still unknown and still at-large,
and conspiring and mutually helping and assisting one another, while armed with unlicensed firearms and acting as a
band, with intent of gain with aggravating circumstances of treachery, abuse of superior strength and using disguise, fraud
or craft and taking advantage of nighttime, and by means of motor vehicle and by means of force, violence and
intimidation, employed upon ENERGEX GASOLINE STATION, owned by Regino C. Natividad, and represented by
Macario C. Natividad, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously rob, steal and carry away its cash earnings
worth ₱3,000.00, to the damage and prejudice of said Energex Gasoline Station in the aforesaid amount of ₱3,000.00 and
on the occasion of the said robbery, the above-named accused, while armed with unlicensed firearms with intent to kill,
conspiring and confederating together with Rudy Gersalia, Christian Gersalia, Dondon Brenvuela, Jonathan Brenvuela,
Pantoy Servantes, Alias "Rey," Alias "Jonard," Alias "Precie" and Alias "Renato," whose true names, identities and
present whereabouts are still unknown and still at-large, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack,
assault and shoot one EDRALIN MACAHIS, a Security Guard of Energex Gasoline Station, thereby inflicting upon him
gunshot wound on his trunk which directly caused his death.

Contrary to law.

Criminal Case No. 4748

That on or about the 7th day of January 2000 in the Municipality of San Mateo, Province of Rizal, Philippines and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring and confederating , together with Rudy
Gersalia, Christian Gersalia, Dondon Brenvuela, Jonathan Brenvuela, Pantoy Servantes, Alias "Rey," Alias "Jonard," Alias
" Precie" and Alias "Renato," whose true names, identities and present whereabouts are still unknown and still at-large
and conspiring and mutually helping and assisting one another, while armed with unlicensed firearms and acting as a
band, with intent of gain, with aggravating circumstances of treachery, abuse of superior strength and using disguise,
fraud or craft and taking advantage of nighttime, and by means of a motor vehicle and by means of force, violence and
intimidation, employed upon the person of JULIETA A. AMISTOSO, the Cashier of Energex Gasoline Station, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously rob, steal and carry away the following, to wit:

a) One (1) ladies ring with sapphire stone valued at ₱1,500.00

b) One (1) Omac ladies wristwatch valued at ₱2,000.00

c) Guess black bag valued at ₱500.00

d) Leather wallet valued at ₱150.00

e) White T-Shirt valued at ₱175.00

to her damage and prejudice in the total amount of ₱4,325.00 and on the occasion of the said robbery, the above-named
accused while armed with unlicensed firearms with intent to kill, conspiring and confederating together with Rudy
Gersalia, Christian Gersalia, Dondon Brenvuela, Jonathan Brenvuela, Pantoy Servantes, Alias "Rey," Alias "Jonard," Alias
"Precie" and Alias "Renato," whose true names, identities and present whereabouts are still unknown and still at-large, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and shoot one EDRALIN MACAHIS, a Security Guard of
Energex Gasoline Station, thereby inflicting upon him gunshot wound on his trunk which directly caused his death.

Contrary to law.

Criminal Case No. 4749

That on or about the 7th day of January 2000, in the Municipality of San Mateo, Province of Rizal, Philippines and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring and confederating together with Rudy
Gersalia, Christian Gersalia, Dondon Brenvuela, Jonathan Brenvuela, Pantoy Servantes, Alias "Rey," Alias "Jonard," Alias
"Precie" and Alias "Renato," whose true names, identities and present whereabouts are still unknown and still at-large,
and conspiring and mutually helping and assisting one another, while armed with unlicensed firearms and acting as a
band, with intent of gain, with aggravating circumstances of treachery, abuse of superior strength and using disguise,
fraud or craft and taking advantage of nighttime, and by means of a motor vehicle and by means of force, violence and
intimidation, employed upon EDRALIN MACAHIS, a Security Guard of Energex Gasoline Station, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously rob, steal, and carry away his service firearm .12 gauge shotgun with serial number
13265 valued at ₱12,000.00 owned by Alert and Quick (A-Q) Security Services Incorporated represented by its General
Manager Alberto T. Quintos to the damage and prejudice of said Alert and Quick (A-Q) Security Services Incorporated in
the aforesaid amount of ₱12,000.00 and on the occasion of the said robbery the above-named accused, while armed with
unlicensed firearms, with intent to kill conspiring and confederating together with Rudy Gersalia, Christian Gersalia,
Dondon Brenvuela, Jonathan Brenvuela, Pantoy Servantes, Alias "Rey", Alias "Jonard", Alias " Precie" and Alias
"Renato", whose true names, identities and present whereabouts are still unknown and still at-large, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and shoot one EDRALIN MACAHIS, thereby inflicting upon him gunshot
wound on his trunk which directly caused his death.

Contrary to law.

Criminal Case No. 4750

That on or about the 7th day of January 2000, in the Municipality of San Mateo, Province of Rizal, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring and confederating together with Rudy
Gersalia, Christian Gersalia, Dondon Brenvuela, Jonathan Brenvuela, Pantoy Servantes, Alias "Rey," Alias "Jonard," Alias
"Precie" and Alias "Renato," whose true names, identities and present whereabouts are still unknown and still at-large and
conspiring and mutually helping and assisting one another, while armed with unlicensed firearms and acting as a band,
with intent of gain, with aggravating circumstances of treachery, abuse of superior strength and using disguise, fraud or
craft and taking advantage of nighttime, and by means of a motor vehicle and by means of force, violence and
intimidation, employed upon the person of EDUARDO ZULUETA, a gasoline boy of Energex Gasoline Station, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously rob, steal and carry away the following to wit:

a) Pawnshop Ticket from M. Lhuiller Pawnshop for one (1) black Citizen men's watch (automatic) valued at
₱2,000.00

b) Cash money worth ₱50.00

to his damage and prejudice in the total amount of ₱2,050.00 and on the occasion of the said robbery, the above-
named accused, while armed with unlicensed firearms with intent to kill, conspiring and confederating together
with Rudy Gersalia, Christian Gersalia, Dondon Brenvuela, Jonathan Brenvuela, Pantoy Servantes, Alias "Rey,"
Alias "Jonard," Alias "Precie" and Alias "Renato," whose true names, identities and present whereabouts are still
unknown and still at-large, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and shoot one
EDRALIN MACAHIS, a Security Guard of Energex Gasoline Station, thereby inflicting upon him gunshot wound
on his trunk which directly caused his death.

Contrary to law.

Upon arraignment on March 23, 2000, appellant, with the assistance of counsel de parte, entered a plea of not guilty on
all the charges. Thereafter, trial on the merits ensued.
The prosecution presented five witnesses, namely: Macario C. Natividad, 20 then officer-in-charge of Energex Gasoline
Station where the incident took place; Edito Macahis, 21 a cousin of the deceased security guard Edralin Macahis;
Fortunato Lacambra III,22 a gasoline boy of the same gas station; Eduardo Zulueta, 23 also a gasoline boy of the same gas
station, and Alberto Quintos,24 general manager of Alert and Quick Security Services, Inc., where the deceased security
guard was employed.

The defense, on the other hand, presented two witnesses, namely: Catherine Homo, 25 a cousin of appellant and the
appellant26 himself.

On December 20, 2001, the RTC rendered its Decision 27 convicting appellant beyond reasonable doubt of all the charges
against him, the dispositive portion of which reads:

1. In Criminal Case No. 4747, finding accused Marlon Albert de Leon y Homo guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of Robbery with Homicide, as defined and penalized under No. 1 of Art. 294 of the Revised Penal Code,
as amended by Sec. 9 of R.A. 7659, in relation to Sec. 1 of P.D. 1866, as further amended by Sec. 1 of R.A.
8294, having acted in conspiracy with other malefactors who have, to date, remained at-large, and sentencing the
said Marlon Albert de Leon y Homo to the penalty of Death, taking into consideration the use of an unlicensed
firearm in the commission of the crime as an aggravating circumstance; to pay Energex Gasoline Station owned
by Regino Natividad and represented by Macario C. Natividad the amount of ₱3,000.00 as compensatory
damages and to pay the costs;

2. In Crim. Case No. 4748, finding accused Marlon Albert de Leon y Homo guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of Robbery with Homicide, as defined and penalized under No. 1 of Art. 294 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended by Sec. 9 of R.A. 7659, in relation to Sec. 1 of P.D. 1866, as further amended by Sec. 1 of R.A. 8294,
having acted in conspiracy with other malefactors who have, to date, remained at-large, and sentencing the said
Marlon Albert de Leon y Homo to the penalty of Death, taking into consideration the use of an unlicensed firearm
in the commission of the crime as an aggravating circumstance, and to pay the costs;

3. In Crim. Case No. 4749, finding accused Marlon Albert de Leon y Homo guilty beyond reasonable ground of
the crime of Robbery with Homicide, as defined and penalized under No. 1 of Art. 294 of the Revised Penal Code,
as amended by Sec. 9 of R.A. 7659, in relation to Sec. 1 of P.D. 1866, as further amended by Sec. 1 of R.A.
8294, having acted in conspiracy with other malefactors who have, to date, remained at-large, and sentencing the
said Marlon Albert de Leon y Homo to the penalty of Death, taking into consideration the use of an unlicensed
firearm in the commission of the crime as an aggravating circumstance; to indemnify the heirs of Edralin Macahis
in the amount of ₱50,000.00 as death indemnity; to pay ₱12,000.00 as compensatory damages for the stolen
service firearm if restitution is no longer possible and ₱50,000.00 as moral damages, and to pay the costs;

4. In Crim. Case No. 4750, finding accused Marlon Albert de Leon y Homo guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of Robbery with Homicide, as defined and penalized under No. 1 of Art. 294 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended by Sec. 9 of R.A 7659, in relation to Sec. 1 of P.D. 1866, as further amended by Sec. 1 of R.A. 8294,
having acted in conspiracy with other malefactors who have, to date, remained at-large, and sentencing the said
Marlon Albert de Leon y Homo to the penalty of Death, taking into consideration the use of an unlicensed firearm
in the commission of the crime as an aggravating circumstance and to pay Eduardo Zulueta, victim of the robbery,
in the amount of ₱2,050.00 as compensatory damages for the stolen properties if restitution is no longer possible
and to pay the costs.

As against accused Rudy Gersalia and Christian Gersalia, who have, to date, remained at-large, let a warrant of arrest be
issued against them and let these cases be, in the meantime, sent to the archives without prejudice to their reinstatement
upon apprehension of the said accused.

As against accused Dondon Brenvuela, Jonathan Brenvuela, Pantoy Servantes, Alias "Rey," Alias "Jonard," Alias "Precie
and Alias "Renato," whose true names, identities and present whereabouts are still unknown and are still at-large, let
these cases be, in the meantime, sent to the archives without prejudice to their reinstatement upon the identification and
apprehension of the said accused.

SO ORDERED.

The cases were appealed to this Court, however, on September, 21, 2004, 28 in conformity with the Decision dated July 7,
2004 in G.R. Nos. 147678-87 entitled The People of the Philippines v. Efren Mateo y Garcia, modifying the pertinent
provisions of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, more particularly Sections 3 and 10 of Rule 125 and any other rule
insofar as they provide for direct appeals from the RTCs to this Court in cases where the penalty imposed is
death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, as well as the Resolution of this Court, en banc dated September 19,
1995, in "Internal Rules of the Supreme Court" in cases similarly involving the death penalty, pursuant to the Court's
power to promulgate rules of procedure in all courts under Article VII, Section 5 of the Constitution, and allowing an
intermediate review by the CA before such cases are elevated to this Court. This Court transferred the cases to the CA for
appropriate action and disposition.

The CA, on June 29, 2007,29 affirmed with modification, the Decision of the RTC, with the dispositive portion reading:

WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Accused Marlon Albert de Leon y Homo is
hereby found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Robbery with Homicide of only one count.

Given the passage of Republic Act 9346 which took effect on 24 June 2006, the penalty imposed upon Marlon de Leon y
Homo is hereby reduced or commuted to reclusion perpetua.

SO ORDERED.

On December 10, 2007, this Court accepted the appeal, 30 the penalty imposed being reclusion perpetua.

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), on February 8, 2008, filed its Manifestation and Motion In Lieu of the
Supplemental Brief31 dated February 4, 2008 stating that it will no longer file a supplemental brief, considering that
appellant has not raised any new issue that would require the filing of a supplemental brief.

Appellant filed a Manifestation32 on February 22, 2008 stating that he re-pleads and adopts his Appellant's Brief and Reply
Brief as Supplemental Brief.

Appellant, in his Brief,33 assigned the following errors:

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING ACCUSED-APPELLANT A CO-CONSPIRATOR IN THE

COMMISSION OF THE CRIME CHARGED DESPITE THE FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION TO PROVE THE
SAME AND GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.

II

ON THE ASSUMPTION THAT ACCUSED-APPELLANT IS GUILTY OF ROBBERY WITH HOMICIDE, THE

TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN IMPOSING FOUR (4) DEATH PENALTIES DESPITE THAT THE CRIME
CHARGED WAS PRODUCED BY ONE SINGLE ACT WHICH SHOULD BE METED WITH A SINGLE PENALTY.

The OSG, in its Appellee's Brief,34 insisted that all the elements of the crime and the appellant's participation in the crime
had been established.

Appellant, in his Reply Brief,35 argued that the penalty should not be death, but only reclusion perpetua, because the
aggravating circumstance of use of unlicensed firearm, although alleged in the Information, was not alleged with
specificity.

Article 294, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code provides:

Art. 294. Robbery with violence against or intimidation of persons – Penalties. - Any person guilty of robbery with the use
of violence against or any person shall suffer:

1. The penalty of reclusion perpetua to death, when by reason or on occasion of the robbery, the crime of homicide shall
have been committed, or when the robbery shall have been accompanied by rape or intentional mutilation or arson.

In People v. De Jesus,36 this Court had exhaustively discussed the crime of robbery with homicide, thus:
For the accused to be convicted of the said crime, the prosecution is burdened to prove the confluence of the following
elements:

(1) the taking of personal property is committed with violence or intimidation against persons;

(2) the property taken belongs to another;

(3) the taking is animo lucrandi; and

(4) by reason of the robbery or on the occasion thereof, homicide is committed. 37

In robbery with homicide, the original criminal design of the malefactor is to commit robbery, with homicide perpetrated on
the occasion or by reason of the robbery.38 The intent to commit robbery must precede the taking of human life. 39 The
homicide may take place before, during or after the robbery. It is only the result obtained, without reference or distinction
as to the circumstances, causes or modes or persons intervening in the commission of the crime that has to be taken into
consideration.40 There is no such felony of robbery with homicide through reckless imprudence or simple negligence. The
constitutive elements of the crime, namely, robbery with homicide, must be consummated.

It is immaterial that the death would supervene by mere accident; or that the victim of homicide is other than the victim of
robbery, or that two or more persons are killed, or that aside from the homicide, rape, intentional mutilation, or usurpation
of authority, is committed by reason or on the occasion of the crime. Likewise immaterial is the fact that the victim of
homicide is one of the robbers; the felony would still be robbery with homicide. Once a homicide is committed by or on the
occasion of the robbery, the felony committed is robbery with homicide. All the felonies committed by reason of or on the
occasion of the robbery are integrated into one and indivisible felony of robbery with homicide. The word "homicide" is
used in its generic sense. Homicide, thus, includes murder, parricide, and infanticide.

Intent to rob is an internal act, but may be inferred from proof of violent unlawful taking of personal property. When the fact
of asportation has been established beyond reasonable doubt, conviction of the accused is justified even if the property
subject of the robbery is not presented in court. After all, the property stolen may have been abandoned or thrown away
and destroyed by the robber or recovered by the owner. 41 The prosecution is not burdened to prove the actual value of the
property stolen or amount stolen from the victim. Whether the robber knew the actual amount in the possession of the
victim is of no moment, because the motive for robbery can exist regardless of the exact amount or value involved. 42

When homicide is committed by reason or on the occasion of robbery, all those who took part as principals in the robbery
would also be held liable as principals of the single and indivisible felony of robbery with homicide, although they did not
actually take part in the killing, unless it clearly appears that they endeavored to prevent the same. 43

If a robber tries to prevent the commission of homicide after the commission of the robbery, he is guilty only of robbery
and not of robbery with homicide. All those who conspire to commit robbery with homicide are guilty as principals of such
crime, although not all profited and gained from the robbery. One who joins a criminal conspiracy adopts the criminal
designs of his co-conspirators and can no longer repudiate the conspiracy once it has materialized. 44

Homicide is said to have been committed by reason or on the occasion of robbery if, for instance, it was committed (a) to
facilitate the robbery or the escape of the culprit; (b) to preserve the possession by the culprit of the loot; (c) to prevent
discovery of the commission of the robbery; or, (d) to eliminate witnesses in the commission of the crime. As long as there
is a nexus between the robbery and the homicide, the latter crime may be committed in a place other than the situs of the
robbery.

From the above disquisition, the testimonies of the witnesses, and pieces of evidence presented by the prosecution, the
crime of robbery with homicide was indeed committed. There was no mistaking from the actions of all the accused that
their main intention was to rob the gasoline station and that on occasion of such robbery, a homicide was committed. The
question now is whether there was conspiracy in the commission of the crime. According to appellant, the prosecution
failed to prove that he was a co-conspirator. However, this Court finds no merit to appellant's argument.

If it is proved that two or more persons aimed by their acts towards the accomplishment of the same unlawful object, each
doing a part so that their combined acts, though apparently independent, were in fact connected and cooperative,
indicating a closeness of personal association and a concurrence of sentiment, a conspiracy may be inferred though no
actual meeting among them to concert means is proved. That would be termed an implied conspiracy. 45 The prosecution
was able to prove the presence of an implied conspiracy. The witnesses were able to narrate in a convincing manner, the
circumstances surrounding the commission of the robbery and positively identified appellant as one of the robbers.
Witness Eduardo Zulueta testified that appellant was one of the robbers who poked a gun at him, thus:

Q. Were you able to identify those two armed male persons who poked their guns at you?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: Kindly look around inside this courtroom and inform the Hon. Court whether those two (2) persons who poked
their guns at you were (sic) present now?

A: Only one, sir, and there he is.

(At this juncture, witness pointing to a certain person who answered by the name of MARLON ALBERT DE LEON
when asked.)

Q: This Marlon De Leon was he the one who guarded you in the carwash or not?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: Now, what happened to you at the carwash where this Marlon De Leon was guarding you?

A: His gun was poked at me, sir.

Q: What else transpired, Mr. Witness, or what else happened to you aside from that?

A: He hit me with his gun on my nape, sir.

Q: What else, Mr. Witness?

A: He got my wallet from my pocket, sir.

Q: Who hit you with a gun?

A: His other companion, sir.46

Appellant was also identified by witness Fortunato Lacambra III, thus:

Q: What about that person who ordered Zulueta to go to the carwash section and hit him, was he also armed?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: What kind of firearm was he carrying then?

A: Also .38 caliber, sir.

Q: Were you able to identify or recognize that person who approached and ordered Zulueta to go to the carwash
section?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: If that person is inside the courtroom, will you be able to identify him?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: Kindly point to him?

 A: That man, sir. (Witness pointed to a person who answered by the name of Marlon Albert de Leon). 47

Therefore, it can be inferred from the role appellant played in the commission of the robbery, that a conspiracy existed
and he was part of it. To be a conspirator, one need not participate in every detail of the execution; he need not even take
part in every act or need not even know the exact part to be performed by the others in the execution of the conspiracy.
Each conspirator may be assigned separate and different tasks which may appear unrelated to one another but, in fact,
constitute a whole collective effort to achieve their common criminal objective. 48 Once conspiracy is shown, the act of one
is the act of all the conspirators. The precise extent or modality of participation of each of them becomes
secondary,49 since all the conspirators are principals.

As to the credibility of the witnesses, the RTC's findings must not be disturbed. The well-settled rule in this jurisdiction is
that the trial court’s findings on the credibility of witnesses are entitled to the highest degree of respect and will not be
disturbed on appeal without any clear showing that it overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied some facts or
circumstances of weight or substance which could affect the result of the case. 50

For his defense, appellant merely denied participating in the robbery. However, his presence during the commission of the
crime was well-established as appellant himself testified as to the matter. Granting that he was merely present during the
robbery, his inaction does not exculpate him. To exempt himself from criminal liability, a conspirator must have performed
an overt act to dissociate or detach himself from the conspiracy to commit the felony and prevent the commission
thereof.51 Appellant offered no evidence that he performed an overt act neither to escape from the company of the robbers
nor to prevent the robbery from taking place. His denial, therefore, is of no value. Courts generally view the defenses of
denial and alibi with disfavor on account of the facility with which an accused can concoct them to suit his defense. As
both evidence are negative and self-serving, they cannot attain more credibility than the testimonies of prosecution
witnesses who testify clearly, providing thereby positive evidence on the various aspects of the crime committed. 52

Consequently, the CA was correct in ruling that appellant was guilty only of one count of robbery with homicide. In the
crime of robbery with homicide, there are series of acts, borne from one criminal resolution, which is to rob. As
decided53 by the Court of Appeals:

A continued (continuous or continuing) crime is defined as a single crime, consisting of a series of acts but all arising from
one criminal resolution.54 Although there is a series of acts, there is only one crime committed; hence, only one penalty
shall be imposed.55

In the case before Us, [appellant] and his companions intended only to rob one place; and that is the Energex gasoline
station. That they did; and in the process, also took away by force the money and valuables of the employees working in
said gasoline station. Clearly inferred from these circumstances are the series of acts which were borne from one criminal
resolution. A continuing offense is a continuous, unlawful act or series of acts set on foot by a single impulse and operated
by an unintermittent force, however long a time it may occupy. 56 This can be said of the case at hand.

Akin to the extant case is that of People v. De la Cruz,57 wherein the robbery that took place in several houses belonging
to different persons, when not absolutely unconnected, was held not to be taken as separate and distinct offenses. They
formed instead, component parts of the general plan to despoil all those within the vicinity. In this case, the Solicitor
General argued that the [appellant] had committed eight different robberies, because the evidence shows distinct and
different acts of spoilation in different houses, with several victimized persons. 58 The Highest Tribunal, however, ruled that
the perpetrated acts were not entirely distinct and unconnected from one another. 59 Thus, the single offense or crime.

Now, this Court comes to the penalty imposed by the CA. The decision 60 merely states that, in view of the enactment of
R.A. 9346, the sentence of Death Penalty, imposed upon appellant, is automatically commuted to reclusion perpetua, but
is silent as to how it had arrived into such a conclusion.1avvphi1

Under Article 294 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. No. 7659, robbery with homicide is punishable
by reclusion perpetua to death, which are both indivisible penalties. Article 63 of the same Code provides that, in all cases
in which the law prescribes a penalty composed of two indivisible penalties, the greater penalty shall be applied when the
commission of the deed is attended by one aggravating circumstance. 61 It must be remembered that the Informations filed
with the RTC alleged the aggravating circumstance of the use of unlicensed firearm. Pursuant to the third paragraph of
Section 1 of P.D. No. 1866, as amended by R.A. No. 8294, such use of an unlicensed firearm is a special and not a
generic aggravating circumstance in the homicide or murder committed. As explained by this Court in Palaganas v.
People:62
Generic aggravating circumstances are those that generally apply to all crimes such as those mentioned in Article 14,
paragraphs No. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 9, 10, 14, 18, 19 and 20, of the Revised Penal Code. It has the effect of increasing the
penalty for the crime to its maximum period, but it cannot increase the same to the next higher degree. It must always be
alleged and charged in the information, and must be proven during the trial in order to be appreciated. 63 Moreover, it can
be offset by an ordinary mitigating circumstance.

On the other hand, special aggravating circumstances are those which arise under special conditions to increase the
penalty for the offense to its maximum period, but the same cannot increase the penalty to the next higher degree.
Examples are quasi-recidivism under Article 160 and complex crimes under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code. It does
not change the character of the offense charged.64 It must always be alleged and charged in the information, and must be
proven during the trial in order to be appreciated. 65 Moreover, it cannot be offset by an ordinary mitigating circumstance.

It is clear from the foregoing that the meaning and effect of generic and special aggravating circumstances are exactly the
same except that in case of generic aggravating, the same CAN be offset by an ordinary mitigating circumstance whereas
in the case of special aggravating circumstance, it CANNOT be offset by an ordinary mitigating circumstance.

Aside from the aggravating circumstances abovementioned, there is also an aggravating circumstance provided for under
Presidential Decree No. 1866,66 as amended by Republic Act No. 8294,67 which is a special law. Its pertinent provision
states:

If homicide or murder is committed with the use of an unlicensed firearm, such use of an unlicensed firearm shall be
considered as an aggravating circumstance.

In interpreting the same provision, the trial court reasoned that such provision is "silent as to whether it is generic or
qualifying."68 Thus, it ruled that "when the law is silent, the same must be interpreted in favor of the accused." 69 Since a
generic aggravating circumstance is more favorable to petitioner compared to a qualifying aggravating circumstance, as
the latter changes the nature of the crime and increase the penalty thereof by degrees, the trial court proceeded to
declare that the use of an unlicensed firearm by the petitioner is to be considered only as a generic aggravating
circumstance.70 This interpretation is erroneous, since we already held in several cases that with the passage of Republic
Act No. 8294 on 6 June 1997, the use of an unlicensed firearm in murder or homicide is now considered as a SPECIAL
aggravating circumstance and not a generic aggravating circumstance. 71 Republic Act No. 8294 applies to the instant
case since it took effect before the commission of the crimes in 21 April 1998. Therefore, the use of an unlicensed firearm
by the petitioner in the instant case should be designated and appreciated as a SPECIAL aggravating circumstance and
not merely a generic aggravating circumstance.

In another case,72 this Court ruled that, the existence of the firearm can be established by testimony, even without the
presentation of the firearm.73 In the said case, it was established that Elmer and Marcelina Hidalgo died of, and Pedro
Hidalgo sustained, gunshot wounds. The ballistic examination of the slugs recovered from the place of the incident
showed that they were fired from a .30 carbine rifle and a .38 caliber firearm. The prosecution witnesses positively
identified appellant therein as one of those who were holding a long firearm. It was also established that the same
appellant was not a licensed firearm holder. Hence, this Court ruled that the trial court and the CA correctly appreciated
the use of unlicensed firearm as an aggravating circumstance.

After a careful study of the records of the present case, this Court found that the use of unlicensed firearm was not duly
proven by the prosecution. Although jurisprudence dictates that the existence of the firearm can be established by mere
testimony, the fact that appellant was not a licensed firearm holder must still be established. The prosecution failed to
present written or testimonial evidence to prove that appellant did not have a license to carry or own a firearm, hence, the
use of unlicensed firearm as an aggravating circumstance cannot be appreciated.

Finally, it is worth noting that the RTC ordered appellant to indemnify the heirs of Edralin Macahis the amount of
₱50,000.00 as death indemnity, ₱12,000.00 as compensatory damages for the stolen service firearm if restitution is no
longer possible and ₱50,000.00 as moral damages. Actual damages were never proven during the trial. Hence, this
Court's rulings74 on temperate damages apply, thus:

In People vs. Abrazaldo,75 we laid down the doctrine that where the amount of actual damages for funeral expenses
cannot be determined because of the absence of receipts to prove them, temperate damages may be awarded in the
amount of ₱25,00076 This doctrine specifically refers to a situation where no evidence at all of funeral expenses was
presented in the trial court. However, in instances where actual expenses amounting to less than ₱25,000 are proved
during the trial, as in the case at bar, we apply the ruling in the more recent case of People vs. Villanueva77 which modified
the Abrazaldo doctrine. In Villanueva, we held that "when actual damages proven by receipts during the trial amount to
less than ₱25,000, the award of temperate damages for ₱25,000 is justified in lieu of the actual damages of a lesser
amount." To rule otherwise would be anomalous and unfair because the victim’s heirs who tried but succeeded in proving
actual damages of an amount less than ₱25,000 would be in a worse situation than those who might have presented no
receipts at all but would now be entitled to ₱25,000 temperate damages. 78

WHEREFORE, the Decision dated June 29, 2007 of the Court of Appeals is
hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Appellant Marlon Albert de Leon y Homo is hereby found guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Robbery with Homicide, the penalty of which, is reclusion perpetua in view of the
absence of any mitigating or aggravating circumstance. Appellant is also liable to pay the heirs of the victim, ₱25,000.00
as temperate damages, in addition to the other civil indemnities and damages adjudged by the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 76, San Mateo, Rizal.

SO ORDERED.

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Chairperson

MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO PRESBITERIO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice Associate Justice

ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA

Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the
writer of the opinion of the Court’ Division.

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice
Third Division, Chairperson

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the above Decision
were reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the Court’s Division.

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
People v. Simon, G.R. No. 930280, 29 July 1994, 234 SCRA 555 (1994)
Lim v. People, G.R. No. 130038, 18 September 2000

EN BANC

[G.R. No. 130038. September 18, 2000.]

ROSA LIM, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

DECISION

PARDO, J.:

The case is an appeal from the decision 1 of the Court of Appeals affirming in toto that of the Regional Trial Court, Cebu
City. 2 Both courts found petitioner Rosa Lim guilty of twice violating Batas Pambansa Bilang 22 3 and imposing on her
two one-year imprisonment for each of the two violations and ordered her to pay two fines, each amounting to two
hundred thousand pesos (P200,000.00). The trial court also ordered petitioner to return to Maria Antonia Seguan, the
jewelry received or its value with interest, to pay moral damages, attorney’s fees and costs. 4

We state the relevant facts. 5

On August 25, 1990, petitioner called Maria Antonia Seguan by phone. Petitioner thereafter went to Seguan’s store. She
bought various kinds of jewelry — Singaporean necklaces, bracelets and rings worth P300,000.00. She wrote out a check
dated August 25, 1990, payable to "cash" drawn on Metrobank in the amount of P300,000.00 6 and gave the check to
Seguan.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

On August 26, 1990, petitioner again went to Seguan’s store and purchased jewelry valued at P241,668.00. Petitioner
issued another check payable to "cash" dated August 16, 1990 drawn on Metrobank in the amount of P241,668.00, 7 and
sent the check to Seguan through a certain Aurelia Nadera.

Seguan deposited the two checks with her bank. The checks were returned with a notice of dishonor. Petitioner’s account
in the bank from which the checks were drawn was closed.

Upon demand, petitioner promised to pay Seguan the amounts of the two dishonored checks. She never did.

On June 5, 1991, 8 an Assistant City Prosecutor of Cebu filed with the Regional Trial Court, Cebu City, Branch 23 two
informations against petitioner. Both informations were similarly worded. The difference is that in Criminal Case No.
22128, the bouncing check is Metro Bank Check No. CLN 094244392 dated August 26, 1990 in the amount of
P241,668.00. The informations read: 9

Criminal Case No. 22127 —

"The undersigned Prosecutor I of the City of Cebu, accuses ROSA LIM for VIOLATION OF BATAS PAMBANSA BILANG
22 committed as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"That on or about the 20th day of August, 1990, and for sometime subsequent thereto, in the City of Cebu Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, knowing at the time of issue of the check she does not
have sufficient funds in the drawee bank for the payment of such check in full upon its presentment, with deliberate intent,
with intent of gain and of causing damage, did then and there issue, make or draw Metro Bank Check NO. 1 CLN
094244391 dated August 25, 1990 in the amount of P300,000.00 payable to Maria Antonia Seguan which check was
issued in payment of an obligation of said accused, but when the said check was presented with the bank the same was
dishonored for reason "Account Closed" and despite notice and demands made to redeem or make good said check, said
accused failed and refused, and up to the present time still fails and refuses to do so, to the damage and prejudice of said
Maria Antonia Seguan in the amount of P300,000.00, Philippine Currency.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

"CONTRARY TO LAW."cralaw virtua1aw library

Criminal Case No. 22128 —

"The undersigned Prosecutor I of the City of Cebu, accuses ROSA LIM for VIOLATION OF BATAS PAMBANSA BILANG
22, COMMITTED AS FOLLOWS:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"That on or about the 20th day of August, 1990, and for sometime subsequent thereto, in this City of Cebu, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, knowing at the time of issue of the check she does
not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the payment of such check in full upon its presentment, with
deliberate intent, with intent of gain and of causing damage, did then and there issue, make or draw Metro Bank Check
No. CLN-094244392 dated August 26, 1990 in the amount of P241,668.00 payable to Maria Antonia Seguan which check
was issued in payment of an obligation of said accused but when the said check was presented with the bank, the same
was dishonored for reason "Account Closed" and despite notice and demands made to redeem or make good said check,
said accused failed and refused, and up to the present time still fails and refuses to do so, to the damage and prejudice of
said Maria Antonia Seguan in the amount of P241,668.00, Philippine Currency.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

"CONTRARY TO LAW.

"Cebu City, Philippines, 30 May 1991." 10

Upon arraignment, petitioner pleaded "not guilty" in both cases.

After due trial, on December 29, 1992, the trial court rendered a decision in the two cases convicting petitioner, to wit: 11

"WHEREFORE, prosecution having established the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt, judgment is hereby
rendered convicting the accused, Rosa Lim and sentencing her in Criminal Case No. CBU-22127, to suffer the penalty of
imprisonment for a period of ONE (1) YEAR and a fine of TWO HUNDRED THOUSAND (P200,000.00) PESOS and in
Criminal Case No. CBO-22128, the same penalty of imprisonment for ONE YEAR and fine of TWO HUNDRED
THOUSAND (P200,000.00) is likewise imposed.

"The accused is hereby ordered to pay private complainant Maria Antonia Seguan, the sum of P541,668.00 which is the
value of the jewelries bought by the accused from the latter with interest based on the legal rate to be counted from June
5, 1991, the date of the filing of the informations, or return the subject jewelries; and further to pay private
complainant:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"(a) The sum of P50,000.00 as moral damages in compensation for the latter’s worries with the freezing of her business
capital involved in these litigated transactions;

"(b) The sum of P10,000.00 for attorney’s fees, plus costs.

"SO ORDERED." 12

In due time, petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals. 13

On October 15, 1996, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision, dismissing the appeal in this wise:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is DISMISSED. The decision appealed from is AFFIRMED in toto.

"SO ORDERED." 14

Hence, this appeal. 15

In this appeal, petitioner argues that she never knew Seguan and much more, had any "transaction" with her. According to
petitioner, she issued the two checks and gave them to Aurelia Nadera, not to Seguan. She gave the two checks to
Aurelia Nadera from whom she got two sets of jewelry, as a "security arrangement" or "guarantee" that she would return
the jewelry received if she would not be able to sell them. 16

The appeal has no merit.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

The elements of B. P. Blg. 22 are: 17

"(1) The making, drawing and issuance of any check to apply for account or for value;

"(2) The knowledge of the maker, drawer, or issuer that at the time of issue he does not have sufficient funds in or credit
with the drawee bank for the payment of such check in full upon its presentment; and
"(3) The subsequent dishonor of the check by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit or dishonor for the same
reason had not the drawer, without any valid cause, ordered the bank to stop payment."cralaw virtua1aw library

Petitioner never denied issuing the two checks. She argued that the checks were not issued to Seguan and that they had
no pre-existing transaction. The checks were issued to Aurelia Nadera as mere guarantee and as a security arrangement
to cover the value of jewelry she was to sell on consignment basis. 18 These defenses cannot save the day for her. The
first and last elements of the offense are admittedly present. To escape liability, she must prove that the second element
was absent, that is, at the time of issue of the checks, she did not know that her funds in the bank account were
insufficient. She did not prove this.

B.P. No. 22, Section 2 creates a presumption juris tantum that the second element prima facie exists when the first and
third elements of the offense are present. 19 If not rebutted, it suffices to sustain a conviction. 20

The gravamen of B. P. No. 22 is the act of making and issuing a worthless check or one that is dishonored upon its
presentment for payment. And the accused failed to satisfy the amount of the check or make arrangement for its payment
within five (5) banking days from notice of dishonor. 21 The act is malum prohibitum, pernicious and inimical to public
welfare. 22 Laws are created to achieve a goal intended and to guide and prevent against an evil or mischief. 23 Why and
to whom the check was issued is irrelevant in determining culpability. The terms and conditions surrounding the issuance
of the checks are also irrelevant. 24chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

Unlike in estafa, 25 under B.P. No. 22, one need not prove that the check was issued in payment of an obligation, or that
there was damage. The damage done is to the banking system. 26

In United States v. Go Chico, we ruled that in acts mala prohibita, the only inquiry is, "has the law been violated?" When
dealing with acts mala prohibita 27 —

". . . it is not necessary that the appellant should- have acted with criminal intent. In many crimes, made such by statutory
enactment, the intention of the person who commits the crime is entirely immaterial. This is necessarily so. If it were not,
the statute as a deterrent influence would be substantially worthless. It would be impossible of execution. In many cases,
the act complained of is itself that which produces the pernicious effect the statute seeks to avoid. In those cases the
pernicious effect is produced with precisely the same force and result whether the intention of the person performing the
act is good or bad."cralaw virtua1aw library

This case is a perfect example of an act mala prohibita. Petitioner issued two checks. They were dishonored upon
presentment for payment due to the fact that the account was closed. Petitioner failed to rebut the presumption that she
knew her funds were insufficient at the time of issue of the checks. And she failed to pay the amount of the checks or
make arrangement for its payment within five (5) banking days from receipt of notice of dishonor. B. P. No. 22 was clearly
violated. Hoc quidem per quare durum est sed ita lex scripta est. The law may be exceedingly hard but so the law is
written.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

However, we resolve to modify the penalty imposed on petitioner. B. P. No. 22 provides a penalty of "imprisonment of not
less than thirty days but not more than one year or a fine of not less than, but not more than double, the amount of the
check which fine shall in no case exceed two hundred thousand pesos, or both such fine and imprisonment at the
discretion of the Court." 28

In Vaca v. Court of Appeals, 29 we held that in determining the penalty to be imposed for violation of B.P. No. 22, the
philosophy underlying the Indeterminate Sentence Law applies. The philosophy is to redeem valuable human material,
and to prevent unnecessary deprivation of personal liberty and economic usefulness with due regard to the protection of
the social order. There, we deleted the prison sentence imposed on petitioners. We imposed on them only a fine double
the amount of the check issued. We considered the fact that petitioners brought the appeal, believing in good faith, that no
violation of B.P. No. 22 was committed, "otherwise, they would have simply accepted the judgment of the trial court and
applied for probation to evade prison term." 30 We do the same here. We believe such would best serve the ends of
criminal justice.

Consequently, we delete the prison sentences imposed on petitioner. The two fines imposed for each violation, each
amounting to P200,000.00 are appropriate and sufficient.

The award of moral damages and order to pay attorney’s fees are deleted for lack of sufficient basis.

WHEREFORE, we AFFIRM with modification the decision of the Court of Appeals. 31 We find petitioner Rosa Lim guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of two counts of violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22. We SET ASIDE the sentence of
imprisonment and hereby sentence her only to pay a fine of P200,000.00 in each case, with subsidiary imprisonment in
case of insolvency or non-payment not to exceed six (6) months. 32 We DELETE the award of moral damages and
attorney’s fees. The rest of the judgment of the trial court as affirmed by the Court of Appeals shall stand. Costs against
petitioner.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza, Panganiban, Purisima, Buena, Gonzaga-Reyes and
De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.

Quisumbing, J., concurs in the result.

Ynares-Santiago, is on leave.
People v. Gabres, 267 SCRA 581, 595-596 (1997)

FIRST DIVISION

[G.R. Nos. 118950-54. February 6, 1997]

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. LUCRECIA GABRES, also known as MONA

GABRES, Accused-Appellant.

DECISION

VITUG, J.:

Five counts of estafa were filed against the spouses Perlito (Lito) and Lucrecia (Mona) Gabres and, except for the names
of the private complainants and the amounts involved, the text in each of the corresponding informations is substantially
the same in all; viz:1chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

"The undersigned accuses SPOUSES LITO and LUCRECIA GABRES also known as MONA GABRES of the crime of
Estafa, defined and penalized under Article 315, paragraph 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code, committed as follows:

"That on or about the months of April, 1992 up to July, 1992 and sometime subsequent thereto, at Acop, Municipality of
Tublay, Province of Benguet, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
with intent to defraud and by means of deceit through false representations and pretenses made by them prior to or
simultaneous with the commission of the fraud, did then and there willfully unlawfully and feloniously defraud JOEL
PANIDA, by then and there representing themselves as a duly authorized or licensed recruiters for overseas employment,
when in truth and in fact they were not, thereby inducing the said person to give to them the sum of FORTY-FIVE
THOUSAND PESOS (P45,000), Philippine Currency, for placement abroad, which amount they misappropriated for their
own use and benefit and then either fail or refuse and continue to fail or refuse to return the same despite repeated
demands, all to the damage and prejudice of said person in the total sum aforesaid and other consequential damages.

"Contrary to Law."2chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

In addition, the spouses were charged with having engaged in large scale illegal recruitment; thus:

"The undersigned accuses Lito Gabres and Lucrecia Gabres also known as Mona Gabres of Illegal Recruitment, defined
under par. 1, Art. 38 of P.D. 442, as amended, otherwise known as The Labor Code of the Philippines, and penalized
under Art. 39(b) of the same Code, as amended by P.D. 2018, committed as follows:

"That on or about the month of April, 1992 up to July, 1992 and sometime subsequent thereto, at the Municipality of
Tublay, Province of Benguet, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
conspiring, confederating and mutually aiding each other, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and knowingly recruit
ORETA NISPEROS, TARCISO DACSIG, JULIUS AOAY, JOEL PANIDA and RONALD MIRABUENO for overseas
employment, by then and there misrepresenting themselves as a duly authorized or licensed recruiters when in truth and
in fact they were not and by reason of said misrepresentations, they were able to obtain from the said complainants the
aggregate sum of ONE HUNDRED EIGHTY FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (P185,000.00) Philippine Currency, all to the
damage and prejudice of the above-named complainants in the total sum aforesaid sum and other consequential
damages.

"That such illegal recruitment having been committed by in large scale, it constitutes economic sabotage.

"Contrary to Law."3chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

The six cases were tried, preceded by the arraignment of the accused, jointly.

The following version of the case is culled from the evidence given by the prosecution.

Some time in March of 1992, Oreta Nisperos heard that the accused couple were recruiting factory workers for abroad.
With great anticipation, Nisperos, accompanied by her son, Ramil, and her neighbors, Joel Panida and Julius Aoay, 4 went
to the residence of the Gabreses in Bauang, La Union. After the group was introduced by Nisperos' cousin, Rosario
Zapanta, the spouses confirmed their being engaged in the recruitment of factory workers for Korea. A "package deal"
was reached. Each applicant was to be charged a placement fee of P45,000.00. The parties agreed to meet again on 12
April 1992 at the Dr. Yares Clinic in Baguio City. On the appointed date and time, Mona Gabres alone showed up to meet
with the applicants. The latter were joined, in this meeting, by Tarciso Dacsig, Jr., Jonard Dulay and Ronaldo Mirabueno,
who all promised to also come up with the required "placement fees."

At the respective dates stated below, the accused spouses received the following amounts from each of the applicants;
thus:

"DATE OF PAYMENT   NAME OF PAYOR   AMOUNT

1. April 26, 1992 - Oreta Nisperos (for Ramil Nisperos) - P5,000.00(No receipt)

Joel Panida - P5,000.00 (Exh. `A' - CR No. 1800)

Tarciso Dacsig, Jr. - P5,000.00 (Exh. 'A' - CR No. 1803)

2 : May 1, 1992 - Julius Aoay - P5,000.00 (Exh. `A' - CR No. 1802)
3 : May 5, 1992 - Tarciso Dacsig, Jr. - P5,000.00 (Exh. `B' - CR No. 1803)

Oreta Nisperos (for Ramil Nisperos) - P5,000.00 (No receipt)

4. June 7, 1992 - Oreta Nisperos (for Ramil Nisperos) - P5,000.00 (Exh. `B' - CR No. 1800)

Joel Panida - P5,000.00 (Exh. `B' - CR No. 1800)

    P5,000.00 (Exh. `B' - CR No. 1800)

Tarciso Dacsig, Jr. - P5,000.00 (Exh. `B' - CR No. 1800)

Julius Aoay -
5. June 10, 1992 - Oreta Nisperos (for Ramil Nisperos) - P30,000.00 (Exh. `B' - CR No.
1801)
6. June 17, 1992 - Oreta Nisperos (for Joan Nisperos) - P5,000.00 (Exh. `C' - CR No. 1801)
7. June 18, 1992 - Oreta Nisperos (for Jonard Dulay) - P5,000.00 (Exh. `D' - CR No. 1801)
8. July 3, 1992 - Joel Panida - P35,000.00 (Exh. `C' - CR No.
1800)
- Tarciso Dacsig, Jr. - P25,000.00 (Exh. `D' - CR No.
1803)
- Julius Aoay - P30,000.00 (Exh. `C' - CR No.
1802)"5

On 03 July 1992, the accused spouses assured Ramil Nisperos, Joan Nisperos, Joel Panida, Tarciso Dacsig, Jr., Julius
Aoay, Jonard Dulay and Ronaldo Mirabueno that they could expect within a few days their departure for abroad. The
promise was not fulfilled. Then, in order to appease the applicants, the spouses explained that it was only the call of the
Korean employer, Mr. Kim, that was being awaited so as to firm up the flight schedule. The call never came. After a series
of follow-ups, the applicants were directed by the spouses to confer with the latter's supposed associate in Manila, one
Rebecca (Vicky) Naval, who was said to be managing the Bachs and Cochs Travel Agency. Naval initially denied any
association with the Gabreses; she later, however, told the group that she had been engaged by the spouses to process
the travel documents, plane tickets and flight bookings of the applicants, and that the required visas were already being
applied for.

After several more months of waiting and still getting nowhere, the applicants finally demanded the return of their money
from the spouses. Each applicant was issued four checks, each for P10,000.00, but which, when presented for payment,
all bounced.6chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

The would-be overseas workers sought the assistance of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration-Cordillera
Administrative Region ("POEA-CAR") which certified, through Atty. Justinian O. Lichnachan, that the accused spouses
were "not licensed or authorized to recruit workers for overseas employment within the City of Baguio or any part of the
region."
Lito Gabres managed to elude arrest, and the trial proceeded only against his wife. Mona Gabres pleaded "not guilty" to
each of the accusations. She denied any involvement in her husband's activities.

The defense sought to establish that Mona was a mere fish vendor in Bauang, La Union, and that this work demanded her
full attention. Her husband used to be an overseas contract worker himself and, thereafter, a liaison officer for Caro Fran
Recruitment Agency, whose job included the processing and following-up of travel papers with the Department of Foreign
Affairs. In July, 1992, her husband introduced her to Vicky Naval who requested Mona to safekeep the collection of
placement fees from the applicants. She admitted having joined her husband, but only once, in collecting the payments
made by private complainants on 03 July 1992 at Acop, Tublay, Benguet, which was duly remitted to Naval.

In a decision, dated 14 December 1994, Judge Romeo A. Brawner 9 (now Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals)
rendered judgment that concluded:

"WHEREFORE, all premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:

"1. In Criminal Case No. 93-CR-1800, this Court finds accused Lucrecia `Mona' Gabres GUILTY beyond reasonable
doubt to suffer an indeterminate sentence of imprisonment of five (5) years, two (2) months and one (1) day of prision
correccional as MINIMUM to nine (9) years and ten (10) months of prision mayor as MAXIMUM;

"3. In Criminal Case No. 93-CR-1802, this Court finds accused Lucrecia `Mona' Gabres GUILTY beyond reasonable
doubt of the offense charged and hereby sentences her to suffer an indeterminate sentence of imprisonment of two (2)
years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of prision correccional as MINIMUM to seven (7) years of prision mayor as
MAXIMUM;

"4. In Criminal Case No. 93-CR-1803, this Court finds accused Lucrecia `Mona' Gabres GUILTY beyond reasonable
doubt of the offense charged and hereby sentences her to suffer an indeterminate sentence of imprisonment of two (2)
years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of Prision correccional as MINIMUM to seven (7) years of prision mayor as
MAXIMUM;

"5. In Criminal Case No. 93-CR-1804, this Court finds accused Lucrecia `Mona' Gabres NOT GUILTY of the offense
charged due to insufficiency of evidence and hereby acquits her with proportionate costs de oficio;

"6. In Criminal Case No. 93-CR-1805, this Court finds accused Lucrecia `Mona' Gabres GUILTY beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime charged and hereby sentences her to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and to pay a fine of ONE
HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P100,000.00).

"On the civil liability in the estafa cases, accused Lucrecia `Mona' Gabres is hereby ordered to pay to Joel Panida, Oreta
Nisperos, Julius Aoay and Tarciso Dacsig, Jr. the amounts of P45,000.00, P55,000.00, P40,000.00 and P40,000.00,
respectively, as actual damages.

"Proportionate costs against the accused Lucrecia `Mona' Gabres.

"In the service of her sentence, the accused shall be credited to the full term of her preventive imprisonment as provided
for by Article 29 of the Revised Penal Code, provided the conditions set forth therein for the enjoyment of the same have
been met.

"With respect to accused Perlito `Lito' Gabres, let these cases be sent to the files without prejudice to their revival as soon
as he shall have been arrested and brought to the jurisdiction of this Court.

"In order that he may not escape the clutches of the law, let Warrants of Arrest issue addressed to the PNP Station
Commander, Bauang, La Union and the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI), Manila. Further, the Commission of
Immigration and Deportation (CID), Manila is ordered to include the name of accused Perlito `Lito' Gabres in its Hold
Departure List.

"SO ORDERED."10chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Mona Gabres appealed the decision to this Court. Appellant, in main, would wish to sway the Court into thinking that the
real culprit was Lito Gabres and that the complaining witnesses gave stress over her participation only because her
husband could not be apprehended.
The Court, regrettably, must sustain the conviction.

The testimony given by each of the private complainants unquestionably would point to both the spouses to be the culprits
in an elaborate scheme to defraud the hopeful applicants for overseas work. The Court quotes from the transcript of the
proceedings.

Testimony of Oreta Nisperos:

"ATTY. PAOAD:

"Now, Madam witness, you said a while ago that it was the later part of March, 1992 that you and your cousin went to see
the two accused in Bauang, what transpired then?

"A They told us that they were recruiting factory workers for Korea.

"Q What else happened?

"A They told us that if my children are interested we will see each other in Baguio City on April 12.

"Q What was your agreement as to where shall you meet each other and the date.

"A I suggested that we will see each other at the clinic of Dr. Yares.

"Q Where is the clinic of Dr. Yares located?

"A It is located at Harrison Road, Baguio City.

"Q On that particular of April 12, 1992 were you able to meet each other?

"A Yes, ma'am.

"Q Who were your companions?

"A My companions were Julius Aoay, Joel Panida and my son Ramil Nisperos.

"Q Who from the side of the accused came to see you on April 12, 1992.

"A Mrs. Mona Gabres, ma'am.

"Q How about the other accused, Lito Gabres.

"A He was not there, ma'am.

"Q Now, what transpired on April 12, 1992?

"A They told us that if we are interested we will pay an advance payment of P5,000.00 each.

"Q For each applicant?

"A Yes, ma'am.

"Q What else did you talk about?

"A They told us that if we have money we will see each other on April 26.

"Q Where will you see each other on April 26?

"A I told her that we will see at Acop, Tublay because they knew where we are.

"Q What particular place in Acop?

"A At our residence, sir.

"ATTY. PAOAD:

"Now, how much all in all are the two accused asking you to pay in consideration of the same in Korea?

"A They were asking P45,000.00.

"Q Now, you said that you agreed to meet each other again on April 26, 1992, what happened on that date?

"A They came at our residence, both of them.

"Q The two accused?

"A Yes, ma'am.

"Q Now, when the two accused came to your residence on April 26, what happened?

"A My son paid an amount of P5,000.00.

"Q Who particularly paid for your son?

"A I paid for my son, ma'am.

"Q Aside from you and your son who else were present?

"A Also present were Joel Panida, Tarcisio Dacsig.

"Q How about Julius Aoay?

"A He was also present, ma'am.

"Q You said a while ago, Madam witness, that on April 26 you paid P5,000.00 for your son, what is your basis in saying
that you paid P5,000.00 on that day?

"A They issued us a receipt, ma'am.

"Q Who received the payment?

"A It was Mona Gabres, ma'am.

"Q Who issued the receipt?

"A It was Lito Gabres who was making the receipt, ma'am.

"x x x x x x x x x.

"Q Now, after April 26, 1992 what happened?

"A They told us that they will go back at our residence on May 1 and if the other applicants will have their money at that
time they will process their papers.
"Q Who paid on May 1, 1992?

"A Julius Aoay, ma'am.

"ATTY. PAOAD:

"Who received the payment?

"A Both the two accused, ma'am. One will receive the amount and the other will issue the receipt." 11

Testimony of Tarciso Dacsig, Jr.:

"Q Now, to whom did you give this P5,000.00?

"A I handed it to Aunt Oreta who gave it to Mona Gabres, Ma'am.

"Q Now, who issued you a receipt?

"A Mona Gabres.

"Q What about her husband Lito Gabres?

"A Aunt Oreta gave the P5,000.00 to Mona Gabres who counted the money, after counting the money Lito Gabres gave it
to Mona Gabres.

"x x x x x x x x x.

"Q I would like to show to you this receipt dated July 31, 1992 previously marked as Exhibit `B-1' for Crim. Case No. 92-
CR-1803 and Exhibit `I-1' in Crim. Case No. 92-CR-1805, is this the receipt you are referring to?

"A Yes, Ma'am.

"Q Now, who issued you this receipt?

"A Lito Gabres, Ma'am.

"Q Now, if this receipt was issued by Lito Gabres what was the participation of Mona Gabres?

"A I handed this P25,000.00 to Lito Gabres, he counted it and then handed it to Mona Gabres,
Ma'am."12chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Testimony of Julius Aoay:

"Q I would like to show you a receipt dated June 7, 1992 which has been previously marked as Exhibit `A' in Criminal
Case 1801, as Exhibit `B' in Criminal Case 1805, as Exhibit `B' in Criminal Case 1800, as Exhibit `C' in Criminal Case
1803 and as Exhibit `B' in Criminal Case 1802, is this the receipt issued to you?

"A Yes, it is.

"Q Could you tell us who wrote this receipt?

"A It was Mona Gabres, ma'am.

"Q How about Lito Gabres what was his participation?

"A He was the one counting the money."13chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

In the scheduled meeting on 12 April 1992, it was only accused-appellant who, in fact, showed up to meet with the
applicants for overseas work. Joel Panida testified:

"Q On April 12, 1992 were you present in that meeting?

"A Yes, I was also there, ma'am.

"Q Who else were present on that day, April 12, 1992?

"A Mrs. Nisperos, Tarcisio Dacsig, Ramil Nisperos and Julius Aoay.

"Q Who from the side of the accused came to see you?

"A It was Mona Gabres only, ma'am.

"Q How about Lito Gabres, was he also present?

"A He was not there, ma'am.

"Q On April 12, 1992 what transpired in that meeting?

"A She introduced herself as a recruiter for workers going to Korea. She also asked us that if we are interested then we
will give P5,000.00 each as down payment." 14

The Court finds it hard to accept the claim that private complainants have prevaricated the evidence to implicate Mona
Gabres only because the authorities have yet to succeed in arresting her husband. It is, of course, unfortunate that the
husband, at least momentarily, is able to ward off the long arm of the law; nevertheless, it should, in the end, still catch up
with him.

Accused-appellant has indeed committed estafa by means of deceit punishable under Article 315 (2)(a) of the Revised
Penal Code.15 The trial court's brief ratiocination is well taken; viz:

"There is no dispute that damages have been incurred by the complainants. They parted with their money in consideration
of deployment for work in a foreign country, but which unfortunately remains unrestituted despite the failure in that regard
of the person or persons who promised that they will be sent off to work abroad." 16chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Accused-appellant is likewise guilty of illegal recruitment in large scale, an offense under Article 38(b), in relation to Article
39, of the Labor Code which provides:

"ART. 38. Illegal Recruitment. - (a) Any recruitment activities, including the prohibited practices enumerated under Article
34 of this Code, to be undertaken by non-licensees or non-holders of authority shall be deemed illegal and punishable
under Article 39 of this Code. The Ministry of Labor and Employment or any law enforcement officer may initiate
complaints under this Article.

"(b) Illegal recruitment when committed by a syndicate or in large scale shall be considered an offense involving economic
sabotage and shall be penalized in accordance with Article 39 hereof.rny

"Illegal recruitment is deemed committed by a syndicate if carried out by a group of three (3) or more persons conspiring
and/or confederating with one another in carrying out any unlawful or illegal transaction, enterprise or scheme defined
under the first paragraph hereof. Illegal recruitment is deemed committed in large scale if committed against three (3) or
more persons individually or as a group."

"x x x x x x x x x.

"ART. 39. Penalties. - (a) The penalty of life imprisonment and a fine of One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000) shall
be imposed if illegal recruitment constitutes economic sabotage as defined herein."

Quite appropriately, the trial court has observed:

"(T)here are two elements of the crime (of illegal recruitment), namely: (1) that the offender is a non-licensee or non-
holder of authority to lawfully engage in the recruitment and placement of workers; and (2) that the offender undertakes
any of the recruitment activities defined under Article 13 (b) of the Labor Code, as amended, or any prohibited practices
enumerated under Article 34 of the same code. (PEOPLE vs. CORAL, G.R. Nos. 97849-54, March 1, 1994, 230 SCRA
499). Without any doubt, this Court finds the two elements of the crime present in the case at bar. That the accused are
non-licensees or non-holders of authority to lawfully recruit is evident in the certification issued by Atty. Justinian
Lichnachan of the POEA-CAR Regional Extension Office of Baguio City (Exhibit `D,' 93-CR-1800). Article 13(b) of the
Labor Code defines recruitment and placement as `any act of canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing,
hiring or procuring workers, and includes referrals, contract services, promising or advertising for employment, locally or
abroad, whether for profit or not: Provided, that any person or entity which, in any manner, offers or promises for a fee
employment to two or more persons shall be deemed engaged in recruitment and placement.' The act of the accused in
holding out a placement fee of P45,000.00 per applicant in exchange for an employment abroad; the several collections
made by them; and their promise to send off the applicants for work in Korea were just some of the circumstances that
would qualify the acts of the accused under the definition of recruitment and placement." 17

The Court, however, would have to reduce the award of actual damages to Oreta Nisperos from P55,000.00
to P50,000.00. Oreta concededly could not present any receipt for the supposed payments she allegedly made on 26
April 1992 and on 05 May 1992, for P5,000.00 each, on behalf of Ramil Nisperos. Joel Panida, in his testimony, attested
to the payment made on 26 April 199218 but no similar evidence was presented to prove the payment made on 05 May
1992.

Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code provides:

"ART 315. Swindling (estafa). - Any person who shall defraud another by any of the means mentioned hereinbelow shall
be punished by:

"1st. The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its minimum period, if the amount of the
fraud is over 12,000 pesos but does not exceed 22,000 pesos; and if such amount exceeds the latter sum, the penalty
provided in this paragraph shall be imposed in its maximum period, adding one year for each additional 10,000 pesos; but
the total penalty which may be imposed shall not exceed twenty years. In such case, and in connection with the accessory
penalties which may be imposed and for the purpose of the other provisions of this Code, the penalty shall be
termed prision mayor or reclusion temporal, as the case may be;

"2nd. The penalty of prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods, if the amount of the fraud is over 6,000
pesos but does not exceed 12,000 pesos;

"3rd. The penalty of arresto mayor  in its maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum period, if such amount is
over 200 pesos but does not exceed 6,000 pesos; and

"4th. By arresto mayor in its medium and maximum periods, if such amount does not exceed 200 pesos, provided that in
the four cases mentioned, the fraud be committed by any of the following means."

Under the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the maximum term of the penalty shall be "that which, in view of the attending
circumstances, could be properly imposed" under the Revised Penal Code, and the minimum shall be "within the range of
the penalty next lower to that prescribed" for the offense. 19 The penalty next lower should be based on the penalty
prescribed by the Code for the offense, without first considering any modifying circumstance attendant to the commission
of the crime.20 The determination of the minimum penalty is left by law to the sound discretion of the court and it can be
anywhere within the range of the penalty next lower without any reference to the periods into which it might be
subdivided.21 The modifying circumstances are considered only in the imposition of the maximum term of the
indeterminate sentence.22

The fact that the amounts involved in the instant case exceed P22,000.00 should not be considered in the initial
determination of the indeterminate penalty; instead, the matter should be so taken as analogous to modifying
circumstances in the imposition of the maximum term of the full indeterminate sentence. This interpretation of the law
accords with the rule that penal laws should be construed in favor of the accused. Since the penalty prescribed by law for
the estafa charge against accused-appellant is prision correccional  maximum to prision mayor minimum, the penalty next
lower would then be prision correccional minimum to medium. Thus, the minimum term of the indeterminate sentence
should be anywhere within six (6) months and one (1) day to four (4) years and two (2) months while the maximum term
of the indeterminate sentence should at least be six (6) years and one (1) day because the amounts involved
exceeded P22,000.00, plus an additional one (1) year for each additional P10,000.00.
Accordingly, the Court thus finds some need to modify in part the penalties imposed by the trial court; viz:

In Criminal Case No. 93-CR-1800, the amount involved is P45,000.00. Hence, the minimum penalty should be reduced to
four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional, which is the maximum of the allowable minimum penalty of the
indeterminate sentence. The maximum penalty imposed by the court a quo is within lawful range.

In Criminal Case No. 93-CR-1801, the amount involved, as so modified by this Court, is P50,000.00. The minimum
penalty should then be reduced to four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional (the maximum of the minimum
of the indeterminate sentence). The maximum penalty should at least be six (6) years and one (1) day of prision
mayor plus a period of two (2) years (one [1] year for each additional P10,000.00) for a total maximum period of eight (8)
years and one (1) day of prision mayor.

In Criminal Case No. 93-CR-1802 and No. 93-CR-1803, the amounts involved in each total P40,000.00. The minimum
penalty of the indeterminate sentence imposed by the court a quo of two (2) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day
of prision correccional is within lawful range. The maximum penalty, however, should at least be six (6) years and one (1)
day of prision mayor plus a period of one (1) year for a total maximum period of seven (7) years and one (1) day of prision
mayor.

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is AFFIRMED with modification only insofar as the penalties therein imposed
are concerned; thus -

(1) In Criminal Case No. 93-CR-1800, accused-appellant is sentenced to an indeterminate sentence of imprisonment of
from four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional as MINIMUM, to eight (8) years and ten (10) months
of prision mayor as MAXIMUM.

(2) In Criminal Case No. 93-CR-1801, accused-appellant is sentenced to an indeterminate sentence of imprisonment of
from four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional as MINIMUM, to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision
mayor as MAXIMUM, the actual damages being reduced to P50,000.00.

(3) In Criminal Case No. 93-CR-1802, accused-appellant is sentenced to an indeterminate sentence of imprisonment of
from two (2) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of prision correccional as MINIMUM, to seven (7) years and one (1)
day of prision mayor as MAXIMUM.

(4) Criminal Case No. 93-CR-1803, accused-appellant is sentenced to an indeterminate sentence of from two (2) years,
eight (8) months and one (1) day of prision correccional as MINIMUM, to seven (7) years and one (1) day of prision
mayor as MAXIMUM.

All other aspects of the dispositive portion of the decision appealed from are AFFIRMED.

Costs against accused-appellant.

SO ORDERED.

Padilla, (Chairman), Bellosillo, Kapunan and Hermosisima, Jr., JJ., concur.

Endnotes:

1
 Criminal Case No. 93-CR-1800.

2
 Rollo, pp. 46-47.

3
 Rollo, p. 47.

4
 All residents of Acop, Tublay, Benguet.

5
 Rollo, pp. 44-45.
6
 Apparently, though, it was Vicky Naval who issued the checks (Julius Aoay, TSN, 15 June 1994, pp. 3-4).

7
 Rollo, p. 46.

8
 In his resolution, dated 12 August 1993, the investigating prosecutor recommended the exoneration of Rebecca Naval
on the ground that her liability was purely civil in nature. The resolution was approved by the Provincial Prosecutor
(Records, p.13).

9
 Regional Trial Court, Branch 10, La Trinidad, Benguet.

10
 Rollo, pp. 53-54.

11
 TSN, 05 April 1994, pp. 6-11.

12
 TSN, 10 May 1994, pp.5-6.

13
 TSN, 23 May 1994, p.6.

14
 TSN, 26 April 1994, p. 12.

15
 "ART. 315. Swindling (estafa). - Any person who shall defraud another by any of the means mentioned hereinbelow
shall be punished by:

"x x x x x x x x x.
"2. By means of any of the following false pretenses or fraudulent acts executed prior to or simultaneously
with the commission of the fraud:
"(a) By using fictitious name, or falsely pretending to possess power, influence, qualifications, property,
credit, agency, business or imaginary transactions, or by means of other similar deceits."

16
 Rollo, p. 49.

17
 Rollo, p. 52.

18
 TSN, 26 April 1994, pp. 12-13.

19
 See Section 1 of Act No. 4103, otherwise known as the Indeterminate Sentence Law, as amended.

20
 People v. Gonzales, 73 Phil. 549.

21
 People v. Ducosin, 59 Phil. 109.

22
 People v. Joya, 98 Phil. 238.
People v. Lampaza, 319 SCRA 112 (1999)

THIRD DIVISION

[G.R. No. 138876. November 24, 1999]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. EGMEDIO LAMPAZA, Accused-Appellant.

DECISION

PANGANIBAN, J.:

The medical examination of a victim is not a requisite for the successful prosecution of rape. Even without a medical
report, a court may convict an accused based on the offended party's credible testimony. The "sweetheart" defense
cannot be given credence in the absence of corroborative proof like love notes, mementos, pictures or tokens. Love is not
a license to rape.

The Case

Egmedio Lampaza appeals the March 14, 1994 Decision 1 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of San Jose, Antique (Branch
10)2 in Criminal Case No. 3692, finding him guilty of rape.

In an Information dated May 25, 1988 and "at the instance of the offended party," Assistant Provincial Fiscal Juan C.
Mission Jr. charged appellant as follows:3

"That on or about the 20th day of March, 1988, in the Municipality of Tobias Fornier, Province of Antique, Republic of the
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused with lewd design, through
intimidation, violence and force and with the use of a deadly weapon, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously have carnal knowledge with Teodora Wacay without and against the consent of the offended party."

With the assistance of Atty. Esdras F. Tayco, appellant entered a plea of not guilty when arraigned on June 9, 1988. 4 Trial
proceeded in due course. Thereafter, the trial court promulgated its assailed Decision, the decretal portion of which
reads:5

"WHEREFORE, in the light of the above facts, law and jurisprudence, after the prosecution has presented thorough and
convincing evidence, the Court finds accused EGMEDIO LAMPAZA GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
RAPE and applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law hereby sentences him to suffer the penalty of imprisonment for the
period of Twelve (12) Years and one (1) Day to Fourteen (14) Years and Eight (8) Months as minimum to Seventeen (17)
Years and Four (4) Months and One (1) Day to Twenty (20) Years as maximum and to indemnify Teodora Wacay [in] the
amount of P30,000.00 as damages, without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and to pay the costs.

On June 1, 1994, appellant, through Counsel Cezar C. Tajanlangit, filed a Notice of Appeal to the Court of Appeals
(CA).6 After the defense and the prosecution filed their respective Briefs, the appellate court 7 rendered a Decision
affirming the conviction of appellant, but modifying the penalty to reclusion perpetua. The dispositive portion of the CA
Decision reads:8

"WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that appellant EGMEDIO LAMPAZA is

hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay complainant Teodora Wacay the amount
of P50,000.00 for moral damages.

In the light of Section 13, Rule 124 of the Rules of Court, 9 the CA "recalled" the entry of the above judgment, certified the
case to this Court and elevated the records.10

The Facts

Version of the Prosecution

In its Brief,11 the Office of the Solicitor General adopted the following facts as summarized by the trial court: 12
"The first witness presented was a college student who is the nephew of the private offended party, who went to the
house of the latter on March 20, 1988, without finding her there. Witness looked for Teodora, proceeding to the place
where farm animals are grazed, which was two hills away. (pp. 2-4 TSN, September 27, 1989)

"Witness saw [his] aunt running out [of] one of the nipa huts in the farm. When [his] aunt reached him, she was sobbing
and very pale. She immediately asked him to accompany her back to her house. His aunt explained to him that she ha[d]
to leave that place immediately because she was afraid of somebody and therefore could not stay in Sitio Namontonan,
Brgy. Camandagan, Tobias Fornier, Antique. (pp. 5-7, TSN, Ibid.)

"During cross examination, defense counsel verified the details regarding the testimony under direct-examination of this
witness, as to the reason witness was in that sitio (p. 8, TSN, id.), the distance between the house and the grazing area of
the farm animals, the location of the nipa hut and other details. (p. 9, TSN, id.)

Witness repeated to the Court that [his] aunt was very afraid when he met her running out of the nipa hut although she did
not tell him yet what happened. That [his] aunt was trembling, very pale and looking very weak. (p. 10, TSN, id.)

The private offended party herself testified, and positively identified accused in open court. (p. 18, TSN, id.) That in the
morning of March 20, 1988 she was in her farm lot in Sitio Namontonan, Barangay Camandagan, Tobias Fornier, Antique.
When she was about to graze their animals, all of a sudden accused came from behind her and twisted both her arms.
Then accused lifted her and brought her to a nipa hut which was uninhabited. Victim struggled to set herself free, to no
avail despite kicking, shouting and struggling to be free from the hold of the accused. (pp. 18-23, TSN, id.)

Accused dropped [the] victim to the floor of the nipa hut; pinned both her legs including her right hand with [his] knees
[and took] off his pants. The accused ha[d] his bolo beside him with which he threatened the victim. Victim testified that
accused raped her then, explaining in detail the commission of the said act. (pp. 23-29, TSN, id.)

Witness informed her husband and her mother about the rape that evening. (pp. 31-32, TSN, id.)

During cross-examination, defense counsel tried to impeach the testimony of the witness by eliciting the information that
accused and victim were close neighbors; that during the incident private offended party passed by accused who was
cutting bamboo poles, on her way to the grazing area of the farm lot. (pp. 3-4, TSN, November 7, 1989). She described
again the force and intimidation emanating from the accused in committing the act complained of. Private offended party
informed the Court of the great fear she felt that she was trembling and almost speechless when the incident happened.
(pp. 5-7; 11-22, TSN, Ibid.)

Witness was never attracted to the accused as she testified on cross[-]examination. (p. 19, TSN, id.)

When queried by the Court as to the length of the sexual intercourse she stated that it lasted only three minutes, although
the acts of force, intimidation and the struggle lasted for more than ten minutes. (pp. 22-23, TSN, id.)

During the hearing of January 4, 1990, prosecution presented another witness in the person of the husband of the
offended party (p. 32), who testified that the latter informed him about her being raped by the accused; that [he] wanted to
kill the accused but he was prevailed upon by his wife and decided to file a case in Court, hence the criminal complaint (p.
34). Witness was in another town during the incident: that he returned to his house in the afternoon of the following day,
when his wife informed him of the incident. (p. 32-34)

"They went to the police authorities the following day and filed their formal complaint, contained in a sworn statement. (pp.
34-38, TSN, id.)

Version of the Defense

Insisting that appellant and complainant were sweethearts, the defense presents the following version of the facts: 13

"The defense's version of the case is as follows: Accused Egmedio Lampaza and complainant Teodora Wacay are
neighbors. They have known each other since childhood. Accused courted complainant who later became his girlfriend.
However, they married different persons, but that notwithstanding, they have had intimate relations.

"In the morning of 20 March 1988, accused heard a signal from complainant. The latter informed him that her husband
was in another town, and when he asked her "what now because your husband is not there," complainant just laughed.
Complainant told accused that she was going to fetch her carabao, so he followed her. When he reached the place where
she was, he put his arms around her, but she brushed them aside, apprehensive that they might be seen. Complainant
went up the nipa hut, the same place where they had had sexual intercourse, and made love again, with complainant
taking off her clothes first, followed by accused taking off his pants and shirt. They made love consensually. He did not
threaten complainant; neither did he use force [or] violence in consummating the sexual act because the same was with
the consent of complainant (t.s.n., August 6, 1991.)

"Filomena Lampaza, the lawfully-wedded wife of the accused, testified that complainant is the mistress of her husband,
the accused. Because of her husband's extra-marital relationship, they were always quarreling. To avoid further trouble
she went to Iloilo to work as a housemaid for Judge Amelia K. Del Rosario (pp. 49-50, t.s.n., Sept. 24, 1991). The latter
testified that Filomena had worked for her family as a housemaid, and during the course of her employment she had
confided to her employer that her (Filomena's) husband was maltreating her and ha[d] a querida (t.s.n., Jan. 30, 1992)."

Ruling of the RTC and the CA

Debunking the claim that the sexual intercourse was consensual, the trial court held that appellant used force against the
victim by twisting her arm and bodily lifting her from the farm lot to the nipa hut. He also threatened and intimidated her by
placing a bolo beside her during the actual rape. The trial court ruled: 14

"Our assessment and appraisal of the facts of the case show that there was force committed on the victim when her arms
were twisted and she was bodily lifted from the farm lot to the nipa hut. She was intimidated or there was a threat to
intimidate her, when the bolo was placed beside her during the rape.

"This court finds that the incident complained of which occurred on March 20, 1988 was x x x done without the consent
[or] approval of the victim.

"We do not see any reason why Teodora Wacay related the incident to her husband the following evening, if indeed the
rape was not committed because the husband was out of town then. Much more, that she went to court. In People vs.
Estolano, 193 SCRA 383, the Supreme Court held that complainant would not have made the offense subject and
endured the ordeal of testifying to all its gory detail if she had not in fact been raped."

Affirming appellants conviction, the Court of Appeals modified the penalty to reclusion perpetua and increased the moral
damages to P50,000.

Assignment of Errors

Appellant contends that the trial court committed the following errors: 15

x x x [I]n holding that accused-appellant used force and intimidation on complainant in order to consummate the sexual
act

II

x x x [I]n holding that the sexual intercourse herein complained of was done without the consent [or] approval of the victim

III

x x x [I]n finding accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of rape based on the inconsistencies, contradictions,
and incredibilities palpably apparent in complainants testimony and in [the testimonies] of her witnesses

In resolving this appeal, we shall address seriatim the three grounds raised by appellant.

The Courts Ruling

The appeal has no merit.

 First Issue: Force and Intimidation

Appellant contends that rape was not proven because force and intimidation were not established beyond reasonable
doubt. Specifically, he argues that the testimony of the victim on this point should be rejected, because it conflicted with
her Sworn Statement given during the preliminary investigation. First, in her statement she averred that he pressed [her]
forward towards the nipa hut; but she testified that he lifted her. Second, she declared in her statement that he forcibly
made [her] lie down, but she testified that he dump[ed] [her] on the floor. Third, she also stated that appellants bolo was
tucked to his side, but she testified that it was placed beside her. 16

We are not convinced. The "conflicts" cited by appellant are largely semantical, not factual, in character. Whether
appellant forcibly made her lie down on the floor or whether he dumped her makes no substantial difference in
appreciating the fact of the crime: that she was down on the floor against her will. Likewise, appellant makes too much
ado about the discrepancy between her being pressed forward and her being lifted; the allegedly conflicting statements
equally mean that he forced her to go to the nipa hut. Moreover, the well-settled rule is that inconsistencies between an
affidavit and a testimony do not necessarily discredit the witness, for affidavits are generally incomplete 17 and are not
considered final repositories of truth.18

In any event, we agree with the trial court that appellant used force and intimidation in ravaging complainant. Although its
factual findings are not absolutely binding on this Court because it was not the ponente who heard the prosecution
witnesses,19 we believe and so hold that the totality of the evidence presented indubitably demonstrates that appellant had
sexual intercourse with complainant against her will. He twisted the arms of the terrified victim, forced her to go inside the
uninhabited nipa hut, placed the bolo beside her, and threatened to kill her in order to sate his lust. The victim testified as
follows:20

Q. Now, while you were untying the rope of your carabao, do you recall of any unusual incident that happened?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. What was that incident?

A. All of a sudden, a person came from behind me and twisted both my hands. (Witness demonstrated with her right hand
twisted towards the left side of her body while the left hand was also twisted towards the right side of her body, both
hands in front).

xxx

Q. Now, after the accused Egmedio Lampaza twisted your arms, what else happened?

A. He lifted me.

Q. Will you please demonstrate to this Honorable Court how you were lifted by Egmedio Lampaza?

A. (With Julie Magbanua acting in place of the victim and the witness in place of the accused, the accused stands behind
the victim and place[s] both arms around the victim while the arms of the victim are twisted with the right arms towards the
left and the left arms towards the right side of her body and from that position the accused lifts the victim upward, raising
the victim about three inches from the ground.)

Q. Now, Madam Witness, while you were being lifted by the accused in the position you have just mentioned, what else
did he do?

A. Egmedio Lampaza told me, Come, lets have sexual intercourse.

Q. While saying that and while lifting you, what else did Egmedio Lampaza do, if any?

A. He brought me to the nipa hut, Sir.

Q. How far is that nipa hut from where you were at that time?
A. About five arms stretch away, Sir.

Q. Was that hut inhabited?

A. No one lives there.

xxx

Q. While you were being lifted by the accused and being carried to the nipa hut, what did you do if you did anything?

A. I struggled to set myself free.

Q. Will you please demonstrate to this Honorable Court how you struggled?

A. (At this juncture, Julie Magbanua takes the place of the accused while the witness takes the place of the victim and
from the position previously described, with the xxx arms [of the accused] around the victim, the victim struggle[s] to set
herself free by moving her body towards the left and right and trie[s] to push her head downward away from the arms of
the accused [who is] embracing her. The witness further states that since her feet were off the ground, it [was] hard to set
herself free).

Q. Now, aside from struggling hard to free yourself from the clutches of the accused, what else did you do if any?

A. I kicked both my legs. (Witness demonstrates a movement as if she were pedalling an unseen bicycle).

Q. Did you make any statement while you were trying to struggle from the hold of the accused?

A. I did not say anything. I only struggled.

Q. Why did you not say anything?

xxx

A. Because I was afraid, Sir.

PROSECUTOR CASALAN:

Q. Was the accused able to reach the nipa hut with you?

A. Yes, Sir.

Q. While you were already at the nipa hut, what did the accused do, if any?

A He dumped me on the floor of the nipa hut.

xxx

Q After the accused dumped you on the floor of the nipa hut, what happened to you?

A The accused pinned both my legs as well as my right hand, Sir, with both of his knees.

xxx

PROSECUTOR CASALAN:

Q Now, Madam Witness, while in this position, what next did the accused do?
A The accused took off his pants.

Q While the accused was doing that, was the accused saying anything?

A Yes, Sir.

Q What did he say?

A If you do not allow me to have sexual intercourse with you, I am going to kill you.

Q Did you notice if there was any weapon carried by the accused with him?

A Yes, Sir.

Q What was he carrying?

A He was carrying a bolo, Sir.

Q Where was the bolo of the accused at that time?

A It was beside me, Sir.

Appellant further argues that if there was any resistance [by the victim], it was couched in general terms. 21 The argument
is bereft of merit. We must stress that the law does not impose upon a rape victim the burden of proving
resistance.22 Indeed, physical resistance need not be established when the culprit employed intimidation, 23 which, insofar
as it was directed at the mind of the victim, must be viewed in the light of the latter's perception and judgment at the
time.24 In the present case, the victim was terrified because the threat of the appellant to kill her was substantiated by the
bolo he placed beside her. Furthermore, she could not have successfully resisted because, according to her, he was
husky and strong.

Neither are we persuaded by his contention that complainant did not undergo medical examination to show signs of
physical struggle or assault.25 The fact that the victim had no visible signs of injury did not by itself disprove rape. 26 We
reiterate that she was too intimidated to offer serious resistance to the advances of appellant.

More important, no law requires a medical examination for the successful prosecution of rape. 27 Even without a medical
report, the rape victims credible testimony, standing alone, is a sufficient basis for conviction. 28 In the present case, we
find no reason to disbelieve her testimony. Time and time again, the Court has held that no woman in her right mind would
declare to the whole world that she was raped and subject herself to the concomitant strain and stigma, unless she is
telling the truth.29 For his part, appellant failed to adduce any evidence to show that the victim's testimony was false.

Second Issue: Sweetheart Theory

Appellant admits that he had sexual intercourse with the complainant that fateful day, but argues that they were lovers
and the act was consensual.30 He adds that their respective marriages to different persons had not prevented them from
engaging in sexual dalliances with each other.

We are not persuaded. Other than his bare assertions, appellant adduced no independent proof that he was the
sweetheart of the victim. His defense was neither corroborated by any other witness nor substantiated by any memento,
love note, picture or token.31 Furthermore, even assuming that the two were lovers, their relationship did not give him a
license to sexually assault her.32

Appellants defense is further negated by the behavior of the victim who, according to Rogelio Sumbilon, was running out
of the crime scene sobbing and very pale33 immediately after the commission of the crime. Elaborating during cross-
examination, he said that the victim was in a hurry, as if she was afraid of something and as if somebody was running
after her.34 When they reached her house, she told him that she was afraid and that they should hurry to her mothers
house about three or four kilometers away. Her conduct clearly belied appellants claim that the sexual act was
consensual.
 Third Issue: Alleged Inconsistencies and Incredibilities

Appellant contends that the prosecution witnesses should not be accorded credence because their testimonies were
replete with inconsistencies and incredibilities. In addition to the instances alluded to earlier, appellant cites the following:
the victim testified that she shouted, although she said in her Sworn Statement that she had not done so; she allegedly
told her husband of the rape on the evening of the fateful day, but her husband testified that he did not return home until
the afternoon of the following day.35

We are not persuaded. The aforecited inconsistencies are minor in character and, as such, do not impugn the credibility of
the complainant. Indicative of an unrehearsed testimony, the slight contradictions even serve to strengthen her
credibility.36 Indeed, the Court cannot expect a rape victim to remember every ugly detail of the sexual assault. 37

Equally unconvincing is the alleged physical impossibility of the victims narration that he was allegedly pinning her down
with both his hands while taking off his shirt at the same time. 38 The alleged impossibility does not imply the falsity of her
testimony; it only means that it was impossible for her to remember the minutiae of appellants act.

Appellant also challenges the plausibility of the following assertions of the victim: (a) she made no mention of the rape to
her nephew when she saw him right after the incident; 39 (b) she did not immediately tell her husband that she had been
raped;40 (c) she did not report the outrage to the police or to the barangay officials. 41

These arguments are puerile. Complainants testimony was not weakened by her failure to immediately narrate the
incident to her nephew or to her husband. There is no code of conduct prescribing the correct reaction of a rape victim to
the sexual assault. When placed under a great deal of emotional stress, the workings of the human mind are
unpredictable.42 Some may immediately relay the incident to authorities and close relatives, but others need time to
compose themselves before deciding on a course of action. 43 Although she did not immediately inform her nephew about
the incident, she told her husband about it after he arrived from another town, when they were about to sleep. That same
night, she and her husband decided to report the outrage to the authorities. In this light, her account is far from incredible.
Even assuming that there was a delay in reporting the incident to the police, this fact is not necessarily an indication of
fabrication.44

Crime and Punishment

Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code provides that rape is committed when carnal knowledge of a woman is obtained
under any of the following circumstances: (1) force or intimidation is used (2) the woman is deprived of reason or
otherwise unconscious, or (3) the woman is under twelve years of age or is demented. Herein appellant does not deny
that he had carnal knowledge of the victim. Moreover, the totality of the evidence presented shows that he employed force
and intimidation against her. Clearly, his conviction of rape should be affirmed.

Under the law in effect when the crime was committed, the penalty for simple rape was reclusion perpetua. In imposing a
lower indeterminate penalty, the trial court erred, because the Indeterminate Sentence Law does not apply when the
offense involved is punishable with reclusion perpetua.

Likewise, appellant should be ordered to pay the victim P50,000 as indemnity ex delicto, in line with existing
jurisprudence.45 We agree with the Court of Appeals that he should also be ordered to pay P50,000 as moral damages.
The Court has held that the fact that complainant has suffered the trauma of mental, physical and psychological sufferings
which constitute the bases for moral damages is too obvious to still require the victims recital thereof at the trial x x x. 46

WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED, with the MODIFICATIONthat the appellant
shall pay the victim P50,000 as indemnity ex delicto in addition to the P50,000 awarded as moral damages. Costs against
appellant.

SO ORDERED.

Melo (Chairman), Vitug, Purisima, and Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ., concur.

People v. Oyanib, G.R. No. 130634-35, 12 March 2001

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. Nos. 130634-35. March 12, 2001

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. MANOLITO OYANIB y MENDOZA, Accused-Appellant.

DECISION

PARDO, J.:

Accused Manolito Oyanib y Mendoza appeals from the joint decision 1 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 02, Iligan City
finding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of homicide and parricide and sentencing him to an indeterminate penalty 2 of
six (6) months one day (1) to six (6) years of prision correccional  as minimum to six (6) years one (1) day to eight (8)
years of prision mayor as maximum, 3  and to pay P50,000.00 civil indemnity and the costs for the death of Jesus
Esquierdo, and to reclusion perpetua, to pay P50,000.00 and the costs for the death of his wife, Tita T.
Oyanib. 4cräläwvirtualibräry

On September 11, 1995, Iligan City Prosecutor Ulysses V. Lagcao filed with the Regional Trial Court, Iligan City two (2)
separate informations charging accused Manolito Oyanib y Mendoza with murder and parricide, as follows:

Criminal Case No. 6012

That on or about September 4, 1995, in the City of Iligan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the said accused, armed with a deadly weapon to wit: a hunting knife about six inches long and with intent to kill and
evident premeditation and by means of treachery, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault,
stab and wound one Jesus Esquierdo, thereby inflicting upon him the following physical injuries, to wit:

Cardiorespiratory arrest

Hypovolemic shock irreversible

Multiple organ injury

Multiple stab wound chest & abdomen

and as a result thereof the said Jesus Esquierdo died.

Contrary to and in violation of Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code with the aggravating circumstances (sic) of evident
premeditation.5cräläwvirtualibräry

Criminal Case No. 6018

That on or about September 4, 1995, in the City of Iligan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the said accused, having conceived and (sic) deliberate intent to kill his wife Tita Oyanib, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously and with evident premeditation, attack, assault, stab and wound his wife, as a result of said
attack, the said Tita Oyanib died.

Contrary to and in violation of Article 246 of the Revised Penal Code. 6cräläwvirtualibräry

The prosecutor recommended no bail for the temporary liberty of accused Manolito Oyanib y Mendoza in both cases.

On September 11, 1995, accused voluntarily surrendered to the police authorities 7 and was immediately detained at the
Iligan City Jail. 8cräläwvirtualibräry

On January 17, 1996, the trial court arraigned accused Manolito Oyanib y Mendoza by reading the informations against
him and translating them into the Visayan dialect. 9 He pleaded not guilty to both charges.
As the two (2) cases arose from the same set of facts, the trial court conducted a joint trial.

Accused Manolito Oyanib y Mendoza (hereafter Manolito) and Tita T. Oyanib (hereafter Tita) were married on February 3,
1979 10 and had two (2) children, Desilor and Julius. They lived in Purok 1, Tambacan, Iligan City.

In 1994, due to marital differences, Manolito and Tita separated, with Manolito keeping custody of their two (2) children.
Tita rented a room at the second floor of the house of Edgardo Lladas (hereafter Edgardo), not far from the place where
her family lived.

At about 9:30 in the evening of September 4, 1995, while Edgardo and his family were watching TV at the sala located at
the ground floor of their house at Purok 3-A, Tambacan, Iligan City, they heard a commotion coming from the second floor
rented by Tita. The commotion and the noise lasted for quite some time. When it died down, Edgardo went upstairs to
check. 11cräläwvirtualibräry

Upstairs, Edgardo saw Tita wearing a duster, bloodied and sprawled on the floor. He saw Manolito stabbing Jesus
Esquierdo (hereafter Jesus) while sitting on the latters stomach. Jesus was wearing a pair of long black pants. When
Edgardo asked Manolito what he was doing, accused told Edgardo not to interfere.

Thereafter, Edgardo left the house and called the police. Meanwhile, the neighbors brought Tita to the hospital. She died
on the way to the hospital. 12cräläwvirtualibräry

SPO3 Eduard Tubil, police investigator, General Investigation Office, Iligan City Police Command, Precinct I, Poblacion,
Iligan City said that at about 9:00 in the evening of September 4, 1995, while he was on duty, he received an information
regarding a stabbing incident at the Llagas residence at Purok 3-A, Tambacan, Iligan City. 13cräläwvirtualibräry

At the crime scene, SPO3 Tubil saw the lifeless body of Jesus lying face up with several stab wounds in different parts of
the body. Jesus was clad in t-shirt and long pants. From the crime scene, he recovered a knife. Afterwards, he went to Dr.
Uy Hospital to check on Tita; he was informed that she was dead. Manolito was the suspect in the killing of Jesus and
Tita. 14 The incident was recorded in the police blotter as Entry No. 137138. 15cräläwvirtualibräry

On September 5, 1995, Dr. Leonardo A. Labanon, Medico-Legal Officer, Iligan City examined the bodies of Jesus and
Tita. 16 Jesus sustained multiple stab wounds, and those inflicted in the right and left chests and stomach were
fatal. 17 The cause of death was cardiorespiratory arrest, hypovolemic shock irreversible, multiple organ injury and multiple
stab wound chest and abdomen. 18cräläwvirtualibräry

Likewise, Tita sustained several stab wounds, with the fatal wounds inflicted in the left chest and right side of the
abdomen. The cause of death was cardiorespiratory arrest, hypovolemic shock and multiple stab
wound. 19cräläwvirtualibräry

As heretofore stated, in 1994, following a series of arguments, Manolito and Tita decided to live separately. Manolito
retained custody of their two (2) children. Immediately after the separation, Tita stayed at her friend Merlyns house for two
(2) months. Afterwards, she transferred to the Lladas residence, located at Purok 3, G. Tambacan, Iligan City, and rented
the second floor. 20 The rented space consisted mainly of a sala with one adjoining room. It was arranged in a manner that
if one enters the main entrance door, one is immediately led to the sala  and from the sala, directly to the door of the
adjoining room.

Despite their separation, Manolito tried to win Tita back and exerted all efforts towards reconciliation for the sake of the
children. However, Tita was very reluctant to reconcile with Manolito. 21 In fact, she was very open about her relationship
with other men and would flaunt it in front of Manolito. One time, he chanced upon his wife and her paramour, Jesus, in a
very intimate situation by the hanging bridge at Brgy. Tambacan, Iligan City. 22 Manolito confronted Tita and Jesus about
this. He censured his wife and reminded her that she was still his wife. They just ignored him; they even threatened to kill
him. 23cräläwvirtualibräry

In the evening of September 4, 1995, after supper, his daughter Desilor handed Manolito a letter from the Iligan City
National High School. The letter mentioned that his son Julius failed in two (2) subjects and invited his parents to a
meeting at the school. Because he had work from 8:00 in the morning until 5:00 in the afternoon the next day, Manolito
went to Titas house to ask her to attend the school meeting in his behalf. 24cräläwvirtualibräry
Upon reaching Titas rented place, he heard sounds of romance (kissing) coming from the inside. He pried open the door
lock using a hunting knife. He caught his wife Tita and Jesus having sexual intercourse. Jesus was on top of Tita and his
pants were down to his knees.

Upon seeing him, Jesus kicked Manolito in the cheek. Manolito immediately stabbed Jesus. Though Jesus was 59 in
height and weighed about 70 kg., the suddenness of the assault caused him to lose his balance and fall down. Manolito
took advantage of this opportunity and stabbed Jesus in the stomach. Tita left the room upon seeing Manolito, only to
come back armed with a Tanduay bottle. She hit Manolito in the head, while at the same time shouting kill him Jake, kill
him Jake. 25cräläwvirtualibräry

In the commotion, Manolito stabbed Jesus, hitting him in the abdomen. Jesus fell down and Manolito stabbed him again.
Meanwhile, Tita stabbed Manolito in the arm with the broken Tanduay bottle. This angered Manolito and he stabbed Tita
in the left breast. He stabbed her three (3) more times in different parts of her body. Tita fell near the lifeless body of her
paramour. It was at this point that Edgardo, the owner of the house Tita was renting, appeared from the ground floor and
inquired about what had happened. Manolito told Edgardo not to interfere because he had nothing to do with it.

Thereafter, Manolito left the house of Edgardo and went to Kilumco, Camague, Iligan City and stayed at the wake of his
friends neighbor. He threw away the knife he used in stabbing his wife and her paramour. At around 4:00 in the morning
of the following day, he went to Camague Highway to catch a bus for Lentogan, Aurora, Zamboanga. While in Lentogan,
he heard over radio DXIC that there was a call for him to surrender. He heeded the call and gave himself up to the police
authorities in Precinct 2, Nonocan, Iligan City. 26cräläwvirtualibräry

When asked why he was carrying a knife when he went to his wifes place, Manolito said that he brought it for self-
defense. Prior to the incident, he received threats from his wife and her paramour, Jesus, that they would kill him so they
could live together. 27cräläwvirtualibräry

After trial, on May 26, 1997, the trial court promulgated a joint decision finding accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crimes charged. The dispositive portion reads:

WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing findings and pronouncements and having carefully observed the demeanor of
witnesses, this Court hereby declares accused MANOLITO OYANIB y Mendoza GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of Homicide (Crim. Case No. II-6012) and Parricide (Crim. Case No. II-6018) and appreciating the two (2) mitigating
circumstances of passion or obfuscation and voluntary surrender without any aggravating circumstances to consider, this
Court sentences accused Manolito Oyanib y Mendoza to suffer an imprisonment as follows:

1) In Criminal Case No. II-6012:

To an Indeterminate Penalty ranging from SIX (6) MONTHS ONE (1) DAY to SIX (6) YEARS as Minimum to Six (6)
YEARS ONE (1) DAY to EIGHT (8) YEARS as Maximum; to indemnify heirs of Jesus Esquierdo the sum of P50,000.00
as civil indemnity, and to pay the costs.

2) In Criminal Case No. II-6018:

To RECLUSION PERPETUA pursuant to Republic Act No. 7659; to indemnify heirs of his wife P50,000.00 as civil
indemnity and to pay the costs.

It is likewise ordered that the aforesaid imprisonment is subject to the forty (40) years limitation prescribed in Article 70 of
the Revised Penal Code.

Accused is likewise entitled to full credit of his preventive imprisonment.

SO ORDERED.

Iligan City, Philippines, May 26, 1997.

MAXIMO B. RATUNIL

Presiding Judge28cräläwvirtualibräry
On June 17, 1997, accused Manolito Oyanib y Mendoza interposed an appeal from the joint decision of the trial court to
the Supreme Court. 29cräläwvirtualibräry

Accused admitted the killings. He argued that he killed them both under the exceptional circumstances provided in Article
247 of the Revised Penal Code. He raised several errors allegedly committed by the trial court, which boiled down to the
basic issue of whether accused is entitled to the exceptional privilege under Article 247 of the Revised Penal Code. 30 He
questioned the trial courts appreciation of the facts and the evidence, contending that it ignored and overlooked vital
pieces of physical evidence material to the defense of the accused, like the photograph of the lifeless body of Jesus.
Accused contends that the photograph graphically showed that Jesus pants were wide open, unzipped and unbuttoned,
revealing that he was not wearing any underwear, lending credence to his defense that he caught his wife and her
paramour in the act of sexual intercourse. On the other hand, the Solicitor General submitted that accused-appellant failed
to discharge the burden of proving, by clear and convincing evidence, that he killed the victims under the exceptional
circumstances contemplated in Article 247 of the Revised Penal Code. Hence, the trial court did not err in denying him the
exempting privilege under the Article. 31cräläwvirtualibräry

We find the appeal meritorious.

At the outset, accused admitted killing his wife and her paramour. He invoked Article 247 of the Revised Penal Code as
an absolutory and an exempting cause. An absolutory cause is present where the act committed is a crime but for
reasons of public policy and sentiment there is no penalty imposed. 32cräläwvirtualibräry

Having admitted the killing, it is incumbent upon accused to prove the exempting circumstances to the satisfaction of the
court in order to be relieved of any criminal liability. Article 247 of the Revised Penal Code prescribes the following
essential elements for such a defense: (1) that a legally married person surprises his spouse in the act of committing
sexual intercourse with another person; (2) that he kills any of them or both of them in the act or immediately thereafter;
and (3) that he has not promoted or facilitated the prostitution of his wife (or daughter) or that he or she has not consented
to the infidelity of the other spouse. 33 Accused must prove these elements by clear and convincing evidence, otherwise
his defense would be untenable. The death caused must be the proximate result of the outrage overwhelming the
accused after chancing upon his spouse in the act of infidelity. Simply put, the killing by the husband of his wife must
concur with her flagrant adultery. 34cräläwvirtualibräry

There is no question that the first element is present in the case at bar. The crucial fact that accused must convincingly
prove to the court is that he killed his wife and her paramour in the act of sexual intercourse or immediately thereafter.

After an assiduous analysis of the evidence presented and the testimonies of the witnesses, we find accused to have
acted within the circumstances contemplated in Article 247 of the Revised Penal Code. Admittedly, accused-appellant
surprised his wife and her lover in the act of sexual intercourse.

To the mind of the court, what actually happened was that accused chanced upon Jesus at the place of his wife. He saw
his wife and Jesus in the act of having sexual intercourse. Blinded by jealousy and outrage, accused stabbed Jesus who
fought off and kicked the accused. He vented his anger on his wife when she reacted, not in defense of him, but in
support of Jesus. Hence, he stabbed his wife as well several times. Accused Manolito Oyanib y Mendoza surrendered to
the police when a call for him to surrender was made.

The law imposes very stringent requirements before affording the offended spouse the opportunity to avail himself of
Article 247, Revised Penal Code. As the Court put it in People v. Wagas: 35cräläwvirtualibräry

The vindication of a Mans honor is justified because of the scandal an unfaithful wife creates; the law is strict on this,
authorizing as it does, a man to chastise her, even with death. But killing the errant spouse as a purification is so severe
as that it can only be justified when the unfaithful spouse is caught in flagrante delicto; and it must be resorted to only with
great caution so much so that the law requires that it be inflicted only during the sexual intercourse or immediately
thereafter.

WHEREFORE , the Court REVERSES the appealed decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 02, Iligan City in
Criminal Cases Nos. II-6012 and II-6018. The Court sentences accused Manolito Oyanib y Mendoza to two (2) years and
four (4) months of destierro. 36 He shall not be permitted to enter Iligan City, nor within a radius of one hundred (100)
kilometers from Iligan City. 37cräläwvirtualibräry

Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Puno, Kapunan,  and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.
People v. Ducosin, 59 Phil 109 (1933)
EN BANC

[G.R. No. 38332. December 14, 1933.]

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. VALERIANO DUCOSIN, Defendant-Appellant.

Alejandra F. Antonio for Appellant.

Attorney-General Jaranilla for Appellee.

SYLLABUS

1. INDETERMINATE SENTENCE LAW, CONSTRUED; MAXIMUM AND MINIMUM PENALTIES. — Under section 1 of
Act No. 4103 the court must, instead of a single fixed penalty, determine two penalties, referred to in the Indeterminate
Sentence Act as the "maximum" and "minimum." The prisoner must serve the minimum penalty before he is eligible for
parole under the provisions of Act No. 4103, which leaves the period between the minimum and maximum penalty
indeterminate in the sense that he may, under the conditions set out in said Act, be released from serving said period in
whole or in part. He must be sentenced, therefore, to imprisonment for a period which is not more than the "maximum" nor
less than the "minimum", as these terms are used in the Indeterminate Sentence Law.

2. ID.; ID. — The maximum penalty must be determined, in any case punishable by the Revised Penal Code, in
accordance with the rules and provisions of said Code exactly as if Act No. 4103, the Indeterminate Sentence Law, had
never been passed. It was not the purpose of said Act to make inoperative any of the provisions of the Revised Penal
Code. Neither the title nor the body of the Act indicates any intention on the part of the Legislature to repeal or amend any
of the provisions of the Revised Penal Code.

3. ID.; MINIMUM PENALTY. — In determining the "minimum" penalty Act No. 4103 confers upon the courts in the fixing of
penalties the widest discretion that the courts have ever had. The determination of the "minimum" penalty presents two
aspects: first, the more or less mechanical determination of the extreme limits of the minimum imprisonment period; and
second, the broad question of the factors and circumstances that should guide the discretion of the court in fixing the
minimum penalty within the ascertained limits. We construe the expression in section 1 "the penalty next lower to that
prescribed by said Code for the offense" to mean the penalty next lower to that determined by the court in the case before
it as the maximum (that is to say the correct penalty fixed by the Revised Penal Code).

4. ID.; ID. — The Indeterminate Sentence Law, Act No. 4103, simply provides that the "minimum" shall "not be less than
the minimum imprisonment period of the penalty next lower." In other words, it is left entirely within the discretion of the
court to fix the minimum imprisonment anywhere within the range of the next lower penalty without reference to the
degrees into which it may be subdivided.

5. ID.; ID. — Keeping in mind the basic purpose of the Indeterminate Sentence Law "to uplift and redeem valuable human
material, and prevent unnecessary and excessive deprivation of personal liberty and economic usefulness" (Message of
the Governor-General, Official Gazette No. 92, vol. XXX I, August 3, 1933), it is necessary to consider the criminal, first,
as an individual and, second, as a member of society. In a word, the Indeterminate Sentence Law aims to individualize
the administration of our criminal law to a degree not heretofore known in these Islands. Some factors to be taken into
consideration are indicated.

6. ID.; ID. — Act No. 4103 does not require the court to fix the minimum term of imprisonment in the minimum period of
the degree next lower to the maximum penalty.

DECISION

BUTTE, J.:

This appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Manila convicting the appellant of the crime of frustrated
murder was referred by the first division to the court in banc for the proper interpretation and application of Act No. 4103 of
the Philippine Legislature approved on December 5, 1933, commonly known as the "Indeterminate Sentence Law." As
this is the first case which has come before us involving the Indeterminate Sentence Law, it will be convenient to set out
here some of its provisions.
Section 1 of Act no. 4103 is as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Hereafter, in imposing a prison sentence for an offense punished by acts of the Philippine Legislature, otherwise than by
the Revised Penal Code, the court shall order the accused to be imprisoned for a minimum term, which shall not be less
than the minimum term of imprisonment provided by law for the offense, and for a maximum term which shall not exceed
the maximum fixed by law; and where the offense is punished by the Revised Penal Code, or amendments thereto, the
court shall sentenced the accused to such maximum as may, in view of attending circumstances, be properly imposed
under the present rules of the said Code, and to a minimum which shall not be less than the minimum imprisonment
period of the penalty next lower to that prescribed by said Code for the offense. Except as provided in section two hereof,
any person who shall have been so convicted and sentenced and shall have served the minimum sentence imposed
hereunder, may be released on parole in accordance with the provisions of this Act."cralaw virtua1aw library

Section 2 is as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"This Act shall not apply to persons convicted of offenses punished with death penalty or life imprisonment; to those
convicted of treason, conspiracy or proposal to commit treason; to those convicted to misprision of treason, sedition or
espionage; to those convicted of piracy; to those who are habitual delinquents; to those who shall have escaped from
confinement or evaded sentence; to those who having been granted conditional pardon by the Chief Executive shall have
violated the terms thereof; to those who maximum term of imprisonment does not exceed one year; nor to those already
sentenced by final judgment at the time of approval of this Act, except as provided in section five hereof."cralaw virtua1aw
library

Section 3 of Act No. 4103 creates a "Board of Indeterminate Sentence" to be composed of the Secretary of Justice as
chairman and four members to be appointed by the Governor-General, with the advice and consent of the Philippine
Senate. This section describes the qualifications of the members. Section 4 gives the board authority to adopt rules of
procedure and provides for the compensation of the members.

Section 5 makes it the duty of the board to study the physical, mental and moral record of the prisoners who shall be
eligible to parole and authorizes the board to determine the proper time for the release of such prisoners. After a prisoner
has served the "minimum penalty" imposed upon on him and the board is satisfied that such prisoner is fitted by his
training for release and that there is a reasonable probability that he will not violate the law again and that his release "will
not be incompatible with the welfare of society", the board may in its discretion authorize the release of such prisoner on
parole. The board may also recommend the release on parole of other prisoners may also recommend the release on
parole of other prisoners previously convicted of any offense other than those named in section 2.

Section 6 provides for the surveillance of prisoners released on parole for a period "equivalent to the remaining portion of
the maximum sentence imposed upon him or until final release and discharge by the Board of Indeterminate Sentence."
Section 7 provides that a certified copy of the board’s order of conditional or final release shall be filed with the court and
with the Chief of Constabulary.

Section 8 provides that any prisoner who violates any of the conditions of his parole, who violates any of the conditions of
his parole, who violates any law during the period of surveillance for which he has been convicted, shall be subject to re-
arrest and confinement and "shall serve the remaining unexpired portion of the maximum sentence for which he was
originally committed to prison" unless the board grants a new parole.

Section 9 provides that Act No. 4103, the Indeterminate Sentence Law, shall not be construed to impair the powers given
to the Governor-General under section 64 of the Administrative Code or the Organic Act of the Philippine Islands.

By its terms, Act No. 4103 became law upon its approval, that is to say, on December 5, 1933.

In the case before us, Valeriano Ducosin was tried on September 30, 1932, for the crime of frustrated murder upon the
following information:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"That on or about the 23d day of September, 1932, in the City of Manila, Philippine Islands, the said accused did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, and with intent to kill, treacherously attack, assault and wound one Rafael
Yanguas by then and there suddenly and without any warning, stabbing the latter with a knife, thereby inflicting upon him
several wounds in different parts of the body, some of which are necessarily mortal, thus performing all the acts of
execution which would produce the death of the said Rafael Yanguas as a consequence, but which, nevertheless, did not
produce it by reason of causes independent of the will of said accused, that is, by the timely intervention of medical
assistance.
"Contrary to law."cralaw virtua1aw library

Upon arraignment the accused pleaded guilty and was sentenced to ten years and one day of prision mayor with the
accessory penalties prescribed by law and to pay the costs. The penalty for the crime of murder, under article 248 of the
Revised Penal Code, is reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death. Under article 50, the penalty for a frustrated
felony is the one next lower in degree to that prescribed for the consummated felony, which in the present case is prision
mayor in its maximum period to reclusion temporal in its medium period, or from ten years and one day to seventeen
years and four months. The accused having pleaded guilty, this extenuating circumstance, in the absence of any
aggravating circumstance, fixes the penalty within the minimum period, that is to say, from ten years and one day to
twelve years, leaving to the discretion of the court the precise time to be served within said range, i. e., not less than ten
years and one day nor more than twelve years. The penalty imposed by the trial judge being within this range is correct
and therefore is the penalty prescribed by the Revised Penal Code for the offense which this accused has committed.

As Act No. 4103, the Indeterminate Sentence Law, was enacted after this appeal was lodged in this court, we are now
required to revise the sentence imposed upon the appellant and to bring the same into conformity with Act No. 4103.

It will be observed from section 1 of said Act that the court must now, instead of a single fixed penalty, determine two
penalties, referred to in the Indeterminate Sentence Act as the "maximum" and "minimum." The prisoner must serve the
minimum penalty before he is eligible for parole under the provisions of Act No. 4103, which leaves the period between
the minimum and maximum penalty indeterminate in the sense that he may, under the conditions set out in said Act, be
released from serving said period in whole or in part. He must be sentenced, therefore, to imprisonment for a period which
is not more than the "maximum" nor less than the "minimum", as these terms are used in the Indeterminate Sentence law.

This leads up to the important question: How shall the "maximum" and the "minimum" penalty be determined?

The maximum penalty must be determined, in any case punishable by the Revised Penal Code, in accordance with the
rules and provisions of said Code exactly as if Act No. 4103, the Indeterminate Sentence Law, had never been passed.
We think it is clear from a reading of Act No. 4103 that it was not its purpose to make inoperative any of the provisions of
the Revised Penal Code. Neither the title nor the body of the Act indicates any intention on the part of the Legislature to
repeal or amend any of the provisions of the Revised Penal Code. The legislative history of the Act further shows that
attention was called to the necessity for taking care "so as not to bring the provisions of this bill in conflict with the
provisions of our penal laws, especially with those treating with penalties." (Committee Report, House of Representatives
H-3321, Ninth Philippine Legislature, Third Session.)

The last mentioned report gives an illustration of the application of the Indeterminate Sentence Law to offenses penalized
by the Revised Penal Code:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Suppose that a man is found guilty of malversation of public funds in the amount of P10,000. No mitigating nor
aggravating circumstances are present. Under this law the court may impose on him a maximum sentence not exceeding
ten years and eight months but not less than nine years, four months and one day (see art. 217, No. 3, Revised Penal
Code), and a minimum which shall not be less than four years, two months and one day (the minimum imprisonment
period of prision correccional in its maximum to prision mayor in its minimum. See article 61, Revised Penal Code). The
court, therefore, may sentence the accused to be imprisoned for not less than five years nor more than ten years or for
not less than seven years nor more than ten years and eight months, etc."cralaw virtua1aw library

It will be seen from the foregoing example that the "maximum" is determined in accordance with the provisions of the
Revised Penal Code. In the example given reference is made to article 217, paragraph 3, of the Revised Penal Code
which provides that the defendant shall suffer the penalty of prision mayor in its medium and maximum period. The
penalty is placed in the medium degree because of the absence of mitigating or aggravating circumstance, that is to say,
anywhere between nine years, four months and one day and ten years and eight months in the discretion of the court. In
the case on appeal here the penalty was imposed in the minimum of the proper penalty under the Revised Penal Code
because of the plea of guilty, that is to say, between ten years and one day and twelve years in the discretion of the court.
This discretion is in nowise impaired or limited by Act No. 4103. The trial court, in conformity with the discretion conferred
upon it by the Revised Penal Code, might have assessed the penalty at, let us say, eleven years. We wish to make it
clear that Act No. 4103 does not require this court to assess the said penalty at 12 years, which is the longest time of
imprisonment within the minimum degree.

We find, therefore, that ten years and one day of imprisonment conforms to the provisions and rules of the Revised Penal
Code and is therefore fixed and established as the maximum of the sentence which shall be imposed upon the Appellant.

We come now to determine the "minimum imprisonment period" referred to in Act No. 4103. Section 1 of said Act provides
that this "minimum which shall not be less than the minimum imprisonment period of the penalty next lower to that
prescribed by said Code for the offense." We are here upon new ground. It is in determining the "minimum" penalty that
Act No. 4103 confers upon the courts in the fixing of penalties the widest discretion that the courts have ever had. The
determination of the "minimum" penalty presents two aspects: first, the more or less mechanical determination of the
extreme limits of the minimum imprisonment period; and second, the broad question of the factors and circumstances that
should guide the discretion of the court in fixing the minimum penalty within the ascertained limits.

We construe the expression in section 1 "the penalty next lower to that prescribed by said Code for the offense" to mean
the penalty next lower to that determined by the court in the case before it as the maximum (that is to say the correct
penalty fixed by the Revised Penal Code, see our discussion above). In the example which the legislature had before it in
the Committee Report above mentioned, the maximum of the sentence was correctly stated to be the medium degree of
prision mayor in its medium and maximum period. The penalty next lower is prision correccional in its maximum degree to
prision mayor in its minimum degree (article 61, paragraph 4, Revised Penal Code), that is to say, anywhere from four
years, two months and one day to eight years. The Indeterminate Sentence Law, Act No. 4103, simply provides that the
"minimum" shall "not be less than the minimum imprisonment period of the penalty next lower." In other words, it is left
entirely within the discretion of the court to fix the minimum of the penalty anywhere between four years, two months and
one day and eight years. In the example given by the committee they stated that the court might fix the minimum penalty
at five years or seven years.

In the case before us on this appeal the next lower penalty to the maximum already determined as aforesaid, is prision
correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its medium period, that is to say, from four years, two months and
one day to ten years. As stated, it is in the discretion of the court to fix the time of imprisonment within the said range
without reference to the technical subdivisions of maximum degree, medium degree and minimum degree, and in this
particular the courts are vested as stated with a wider discretion than they ever had before.

We come now to the second aspect of the determination of the minimum penalty, namely, the considerations which
should guide the court in fixing the term or duration of the minimum period of imprisonment. Keeping in mind the basic
purpose of the Indeterminate Sentence Law "to uplift and redeem valuable human material, and prevent unnecessary and
excessive deprivation of personal liberty and economic usefulness" (Message of the Governor-General, Official Gazette
No. 92, vol. XXXI, August 3, 1933), it is necessary to consider the criminal, first, as an individual and, second, as a
member of society. This opens up an almost limitless filed of investigation and study which it is the duty of the court to
explore in each case as far as is humanly possible, with the end in view that penalties shall not be standardized but fitted
as far as is possible to the individual, with due regard to the imperative necessity of protecting the social order.

Considering the criminal as an individual, some of the factors that should be considered are: (1) His age, especially with
reference to extreme youth or old age; (2) his general health and physical condition; (3) his mentality, heredity and
personal habits; (4) his previous conduct, environment and mode of life (and criminal record if any); (5) his previous
education, both intellectual and moral; (6) his proclivities and aptitudes for usefulness or injury to society; (7) his
demeanor during trial and his attitude with regard to the crime committed; (8) the manner and circumstances in which the
crime was committed; (9) the gravity of the offense (note that section 2 of Act No. 4103 excepts certain grave crimes —
this should be kept in mind in assessing the minimum penalties for analogous crimes).

In considering the criminal as a member of society, his relationship, first, toward his dependents, family and associates
and their relationship with him, and second, his relationship towards society at large and the State are important factors.
The State is concerned not only in the imperative necessity of protecting the social organization against the criminal acts
of destructive individuals but also in redeeming the individual for economic usefulness and other social ends. In a word,
the Indeterminate Sentence Law aims to individualize the administration of our criminal law to a degree not heretofore
known in these Islands. With the foregoing principles in mind as guides, the courts can give full effect to the beneficent
intention of the Legislature.

It is our duty now to assess the minimum imprisonment period under Act No. 4103 in the case before us on this appeal.
Unfortunately, as this defendant was convicted before Act No. 4103 became effective, and as we know nothing of his
antecedents because his plea of guilty rendered it unnecessary to take any testimony, we are confined to the record
before us. He plead guilty to all of the acts which constitute the crime of murder and only the timely intervention of medical
assistance prevented the death of his victim and the prosecution of the appellant for murder. He was given the full benefit
of the plea of guilty in the fixing of the maximum of the sentence. With such light as we have received from the record in
this case, we have concluded that a reasonable and proper minimum period of imprisonment should be seven years,
which is within the range of the penalty next lower in degree to the maximum, that is to say, within the range from four
years, two months and one day to ten years of prision correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its medium
period. We repeat that Act No. 4103 does not require the court to fix the minimum term of imprisonment in the minimum
period of the degree next lower to the maximum penalty.

The judgment of the court below is modified to this extent: that the defendant-appellant is hereby sentenced to a
maximum penalty of ten years and one day of prision mayor in its maximum degree, and to a minimum imprisonment
period of seven years, and as thus modified, the judgment appeared from is affirmed. With costs de oficio.

Avanceña, C.J., Street, Malcolm, Villa-Real, Abad Santos, Hull, Vickers, and Imperial, JJ., concur.
People v. Formigones, 87 Phil 658 (1950)

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-3246            November 29, 1950

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
ABELARDO FORMIGONES, defendant-appellant.

Luis Contreras for appellant.

Office of the Solicitor General Felix Bautista Angelo and Solicitor Felix V. Makasiar for appellee.

MONTEMAYOR, J.:

This is an appeal from the decision of the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur finding the appellant guilty of parricide
and sentencing him to reclusion perpetua, to indemnify the heirs of the deceased in the amount of P2,000, and to pay the
costs. The following facts are not disputed.

In the month of November, 1946, the defendant Abelardo Formigones was living on his farm in Bahao, Libmanan,
municipality of Sipocot, Camarines Sur, with his wife, Julia Agricola, and his five children. From there they went to live in
the house of his half-brother, Zacarias Formigones, in the barrio of Binahian of the same municipality of Sipocot, to find
employment as harvesters of palay. After about a month's stay or rather on December 28, 1946, late in the afternoon,
Julia was sitting at the head of the stairs of the house. The accused, without any previous quarrel or provocation
whatsoever, took his bolo from the wall of the house and stabbed his wife, Julia, in the back, the blade penetrating the
right lung and causing a severe hemorrhage resulting in her death not long thereafter. The blow sent Julia toppling down
the stairs to the ground, immediately followed by her husband Abelardo who, taking her up in his arms, carried her up the
house, laid her on the floor of the living room and then lay down beside her. In this position he was found by the people
who came in response to the shouts for help made by his eldest daughter, Irene Formigones, who witnessed and testified
to the stabbing of her mother by her father.

Investigated by the Constabulary, defendant Abelardo signed a written statement, Exhibit D, wherein he admitted that he
killed The motive was admittedly of jealousy because according to his statement he used to have quarrels with his wife for
the reason that he often saw her in the company of his brother Zacarias; that he suspected that the two were maintaining
illicit relations because he noticed that his had become indifferent to him (defendant).

During the preliminary investigation conducted by the justice of the peace of Sipocot, the accused pleaded guilty, as
shown by Exhibit E. At the trial of the case in the Court of First Instance, the defendant entered a plea of not guilty, but did
not testify. His counsel presented the testimony of two guards of the provincial jail where Abelardo was confined to the
effect that his conduct there was rather strange and that he behaved like an insane person; that sometimes he would
remove his clothes and go stark naked in the presence of his fellow prisoners; that at times he would remain silent and
indifferent to his surroundings; that he would refused to take a bath and wash his clothes until forced by the prison
authorities; and that sometimes he would sing in chorus with his fellow prisoners, or even alone by himself without being
asked; and that once when the door of his cell was opened, he suddenly darted from inside into the prison compound
apparently in an attempt to regain his liberty.

The appeal is based merely on the theory that the appellant is an imbecile and therefore exempt from criminal liability
under article 12 of the Revised Penal Code. The trial court rejected this same theory and we are inclined to agree with the
lower court. According to the very witness of the defendant, Dr. Francisco Gomez, who examined him, it was his opinion
that Abelardo was suffering only from feeblemindedness and not imbecility and that he could distinguish right from wrong.

In order that a person could be regarded as an imbecile within the meaning of article 12 of the Revised Penal Code so as
to be exempt from criminal liability, he must be deprived completely of reason or discernment and freedom of the will at
the time of committing the crime. The provisions of article 12 of the Revised Penal Code are copied from and based on
paragraph 1, article 8, of the old Penal Code of Spain. Consequently, the decisions of the Supreme Court of Spain
interpreting and applying said provisions are pertinent and applicable. We quote Judge Guillermo Guevara on his
Commentaries on the Revised Penal Code, 4th Edition, pages 42 to 43:

The Supreme Court of Spain held that in order that this exempting circumstances may be taken into account, it is
necessary that there be a complete deprivation of intelligence in committing the act, that is, that the accused be
deprived of reason; that there be no responsibility for his own acts; that he acts without the least
discernment;1 that there be a complete absence of the power to discern, or that there be a total deprivation of
freedom of the will. For this reason, it was held that the imbecility or insanity at the time of the commission of the
act should absolutely deprive a person of intelligence or freedom of will, because mere abnormality of his mental
faculties does not exclude imputability.2

The Supreme Court of Spain likewise held that deaf-muteness cannot be equaled to imbecility or insanity.

The allegation of insanity or imbecility must be clearly proved. Without positive evidence that the defendant had
previously lost his reason or was demented, a few moments prior to or during the perpetration of the crime, it will
be presumed that he was in a normal condition. Acts penalized by law are always reputed to be voluntary, and it
is improper to conclude that a person acted unconsciously, in order to relieve him from liability, on the basis of his
mental condition, unless his insanity and absence of will are proved.

As to the strange behaviour of the accused during his confinement, assuming that it was not feigned to stimulate insanity,
it may be attributed either to his being feebleminded or eccentric, or to a morbid mental condition produced by remorse at
having killed his wife. From the case of United States vs. Vaquilar (27 Phil. 88), we quote the following syllabus:

Testimony of eye-witnesses to a parricide, which goes no further than to indicate that the accused was moved by
a wayward or hysterical burst of anger or passion, and other testimony to the effect that, while in confinement
awaiting trial, defendant acted absentmindedly at times, is not sufficient to establish the defense of insanity. The
conduct of the defendant while in confinement appears to have been due to a morbid mental condition produced
by remorse.

After a careful study of the record, we are convinced that the appellant is not an imbecile. According to the evidence,
during his marriage of about 16 years, he has not done anything or conducted himself in anyway so as to warrant an
opinion that he was or is an imbecile. He regularly and dutifully cultivated his farm, raised five children, and supported his
family and even maintained in school his children of school age, with the fruits of his work. Occasionally, as a side line he
made copra. And a man who could feel the pangs of jealousy to take violent measure to the extent of killing his wife whom
he suspected of being unfaithful to him, in the belief that in doing so he was vindicating his honor, could hardly be
regarded as an imbecile. Whether or not his suspicions were justified, is of little or no import. The fact is that he believed
her faithless.

But to show that his feeling of jealousy had some color of justification and was not a mere product of hallucination and
aberrations of a disordered mind as that an imbecile or a lunatic, there is evidence to the following effect. In addition to the
observations made by appellant in his written statement Exhibit D, it is said that when he and his wife first went to live in
the house of his half brother, Zacarias Formigones, the latter was living with his grandmother, and his house was vacant.
However, after the family of Abelardo was settled in the house, Zacarias not only frequented said house but also used to
sleep there nights. All this may have aroused and even partly confirmed the suspicions of Abelardo, at least to his way of
thinking.

The appellant has all the sympathies of the Court. He seems to be one of those unfortunate beings, simple, and even
feebleminded, whose faculties have not been fully developed. His action in picking up the body of his wife after she fell
down to the ground, dead, taking her upstairs, laying her on the floor, and lying beside her for hours, shows his feeling of
remorse at having killed his loved one though he thought that she has betrayed him. Although he did not exactly surrender
to the authorities, still he made no effort to flee and compel the police to hunt him down and arrest him. In his written
statement he readily admitted that he killed his wife, and at the trial he made no effort to deny or repudiate said written
statement, thus saving the government all the trouble and expense of catching him, and insuring his conviction.

Although the deceased was struck in the back, we are not prepared to find that the aggravating circumstance of treachery
attended the commission of the crime. It seems that the prosecution was not intent or proving it. At least said aggravating
circumstance was not alleged in the complaint either in the justice of the peace court or in the Court of First Instance. We
are inclined to give him the benefit of the doubt and we therefore declined to find the existence of this aggravating
circumstance. On the other hand, the fact that the accused is feebleminded warrants the finding in his favor of the
mitigating circumstance provided for in either paragraph 8 or paragraph 9 of article 13 of the Revised Penal Code, namely
that the accused is "suffering some physical defect which thus restricts his means of action, defense, or communication
with his fellow beings," or such illness "as would diminish the exercise of his will power." To this we may add the mitigating
circumstance in paragraph 6 of the same article, — that of having acted upon an impulse so powerful as naturally to have
produced passion or obfuscation. The accused evidently killed his wife in a fit of jealousy.

With the presence of two mitigating circumstances without any aggravating circumstance to offset them, at first we
thought of the possible applicability of the provisions of article 64, paragraph 5 of the Revised Penal Code for the purpose
of imposing the penalty next lower to that prescribed by article 246 for parricide, which is reclusion perpetua to death. It
will be observed however, that article 64 refers to the application of penalties which contain three periods whether it be a
single divisible penalty or composed of three different penalties, each one of which forms a period in accordance with the
provisions of articles 76 and 77, which is not true in the present case where the penalty applicable for parricide is
composed only of two indivisible penalties. On the other hand, article 63 of the same Code refers to the application of
indivisible penalties whether it be a single divisible penalty, or two indivisible penalties like that of reclusion perpetua to
death. It is therefore clear that article 63 is the one applicable in the present case.

Paragraph 2, rule 3 of said article 63 provides that when the commission of the act is attended by some mitigating
circumstance and there is no aggravating circumstance, the lesser penalty shall be applied. Interpreting a similar legal
provision the Supreme Court in the case of United States vs. Guevara (10 Phil. 37), involving the crime of parricide, in
applying article 80, paragraph 2 (rule 3 of the old Penal Code) which corresponds to article 63, paragraph 2 (rule 3 of the
present Revised Penal Code), thru Chief Justice Arellano said the following:

And even though the court should take into consideration the presence of two mitigating circumstances of a
qualifying nature, which it can not afford to overlook, without any aggravating one, the penalty could not be
reduced to the next lower to that imposed by law, because, according to a ruling of the court of Spain, article 80
above-mentioned does not contain a precept similar to that contained in Rule 5 of article 81 (now Rule 5, art. 64 of
the Rev. Penal Code.) (Decision of September 30, 1879.)

Yet, in view of the excessive penalty imposed, the strict application of which is inevitable and which, under the
law, must be sustained, this court now resorts to the discretional power conferred by paragraph 2 of article 2 of
the Penal Code; and.

Therefore, we affirm the judgment appealed from with costs, and hereby order that a proper petition be filed with
the executive branch of the Government in order that the latter, if it be deemed proper in the exercise of the
prerogative vested in it by the sovereign power, may reduce the penalty to that of the next lower.

Then, in the case of People vs. Castañeda  (60 Phil. 604), another parricide case, the Supreme Court in affirming the
judgment of conviction sentencing defendant to reclusion perpetua, said that notwithstanding the numerous mitigating
circumstances found to exist, inasmuch as the penalty for parricide as fixed by article 246 of the Revised Penal Code is
composed of two indivisible penalties, namely, reclusion perpetua to death, paragraph 3 of article 63 of the said Code
must be applied. The Court further observed:

We are likewise convinced that appellant did not have that malice nor has exhibited such moral turpitude as
requires life imprisonment, and therefore under the provisions of article 5 of the Revised Penal Code, we
respectfully invite the attention of the Chief Executive to the case with a view to executive clemency after
appellant has served an appreciable amount of confinement.

In conclusion, we find the appellant guilty of parricide and we hereby affirm the judgment of the lower court with the
modification that the appellant will be credited with one-half of any preventive imprisonment he has undergone. Appellant
will pay costs.

Following the attitude adopted and the action taken by this same court in the two cases above cited, and believing that the
appellant is entitled to a lighter penalty, this case should be brought to the attention of the Chief Executive who, in his
discretion may reduce the penalty to that next lower to reclusion perpetua to death or otherwise apply executive clemency
in the manner he sees fit.

Moran, Bengzon, C. J., Paras, Feria, Pablo, Tuason, Reyes, and Jugo, JJ., concur.