Roger E. H.

CARR, ST AT,IN
Coates AND TROTSKY
In this two part essay the author, a post-graduate history
student, discusses the historical m e th o d and theory of the
e m in e n t historian E. H . Carr in relation to the struggle
between Stalin and Trotsky in the early years of the Soviet
State.

H . C A R R is best know n for his History of Soviet Russia, the

first th ree volum es of w hich have been p u b lish ed by P enguin,
b u t he has also w ritten on th e p hilosophy of history. In 1961 he
gave the G eorge M acaulay T rev ely an M em orial lectures a t C am ­
bridge U niversity o n th e them e W h a t is H istory? I n these lectures
C arr placed g reat stress on th e im p o rtan ce of historical causation.
Some h isto rian s an d philosophers consider causation of little im p o rt­
ance in history. R . G. C ollingw ood, an im p o rta n t ph ilo so p h er of
history, for instance, regards th e essence of history to be the th o u g h t
th a t lies b e h in d events a n d th a t to discuss this is sufficient to
ex p lain w hat h a p p e n e d in history.1 H e rb e rt B utterfield, Professor
of H isto ry a t C am bridge, has said th a t all an h isto ria n can do to
ex p lain events is to am plify th e d etail in o rd e r to establish greater
concreteness.2 O n the o th e r h an d , C arr asserts th a t causation is the
very basis of history: “T h e study of history is a study of causes.”3
In this article th ere is an ex a m in a tio n of C a rr’s m odel of
historical causation a n d its relevance to o n e of the central issues
d ealt w ith in his History of Soviet Russia: th e factional struggle of
1923-4, w hich m ig h t be referred to in a sh o rt-hand way as the
S talin-T ro tsk y struggle. T h is is a p o in t of some interest; it lends
itself to a con sid eratio n of C a rr’s m ethodology, in p a rtic u la r the
degree of success he achieved in p u ttin g th eo ry in to practice in a
specific histo rical work. C a rr’s p re se n ta tio n of the causes of the
in tra-p arty struggle offers a suitable test of his ideas on historical
causation.
C a rr’s views m ay be expressed thus. H e attaches g reat im portance
io causation in history. M a n ’s actions are n o t pre-determ ined; nor
is an y th in g an d everything possible in h u m a n affairs. H u m a n
actions have a cause or causes, b u t a n in d iv id u al is m orally
responsible for his o r h er personality. I t is the h isto ria n ’s task
to uncover th e causes of w hat h a p p e n e d in th e past. In do in g this
the h isto ria n w orks th ro u g h e x p la n a tio n hypotheses, b u t the final
test of th e v alid ity of a hypothesis is an em p irical one. I n consid­
ering possible causes th e h isto ria n w ill consider a m u ltip lic ity of
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A U STRA LIA N L E F T RE V IE W Aiigiist-Sept em ber, 1(10!)

causes; he will, how ever, ra n k th em in some sort ot o rd e r ot im p o rt­

ance. In d o in g this he w ill be governed by an end-in-view w hich
w ill be largely influenced by the values he brings to the subject
m atte r u n d e r consideration. T h e h isto rian w ill seek to reduce the
com plexity of history to o rd e r a n d he will seek to sim plify his
e x p la n atio n — to fix on th e m ajo r cause. H istorians do not
assume th a t events are in evitable, b u t they are p rin cip ally concerned
w ith ex p lain in g why o n e p a rtic u la r course r a th e r th a n a n o th e r was
taken. “A ccident” o r “ch an ce”’ affect history b u t it is the h isto r­
ia n ’s task to exam ine th e causal sequences ra tio n a lly a n d pick out
th e causes w hich p ro v id e a basis for fru itfu l gen eralisation a n d for
the draw in g of conclusions.
It can be said im m ed iately th a t C a rr’s practice does n o t m easure
u p com pletely to his theoretical m odel. As G. R. E lto n has
observed, in a ra th e r hostile tre a tm e n t of C arr's views, C a n 's history
of Soviet Russia is largely a n a rra tiv e one; it is difficult at times
to find the causal th re a d .4 T h e p a rty crisis a t the end of 1923 in
w hich T ro tsk y an d th e o p p o sitio n were defeated is n o t d ealt w ith
separately a n d a t no tim e does C arr offer a full e x p la n a tio n hypo­
thesis. Partly this arises fro m th e n a tu re of C a rr’s history. It
is a m am m o th enterp rise, a n d is at th e one tim e a history of the
R ussian rev o lu tio n an d its developm ent, a history of th e R ussian
C om m unist Party, a h isto ry of Soviet R ussia’s re la tio n s w ith the
w orld an d a history of th e in te rn a tio n a l co m m unist m ovem ent.
C a rr him self adm its, m ore th a n once, th a t it has got o u t of hand,
a n d yet there is a ra tio n a le for each topic w hich is in c lu d ed .5
C arr sees R ussia a t th e h e a rt of a w orld re v o lu tio n so he feels
obliged to w rite a history of Soviet R ussia in th is way. A t the
same tim e he has created difficult m ethodological p roblem s w hich
he h a sn ’t solved successfully. In o rd er to grasp how C a rr sees the
I actional struggle of 1923 it is necessary to range over the three
volum es of T h e Bolshevik R e v o lu tio n 1917-1923, T h e In te rre gn um
1923-24, a n d Socialism in O ne Country 1924-1926, volum e I, an d it
is only in the la tte r volum e th a t there is w hat one feels is an
ad eq u ate a tte m p t at an e x p la n a tio n sketch of th e p o litical struggle
inside Russia. N evertheless, scattered th ro u g h the o th e r volum es
there is qu ite a deal of causal analysis in w hich C a rr offers an e x p la n ­
atio n of events.
F or the purp o se of this article a tte n tio n is m ainly on the
situ a tio n u p to an d in c lu d in g the th irte e n th p a rty conference w hich
began on Ja n u a ry 16, 1924. C a rr believes this to be the crucial
tu rn in g p o in t an d h olds th a t th e th irte e n th congress fo u r m onths
la ter only com pleted T ro tsk y ’s ro u t an d confirm ed the b a n k ­
ru p tcy of his p la tfo rm a n d th e eclipse of his a u th o rity in the party."
T h e struggle against trotskyism co n tin u ed th ro u g h 1924 an d 1925
an d eventually Zinoviev a n d K am enev fo u n d them selves at odds
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A U ST R A L IA N L E F T REYIEAV A ugust-Septem ber, 1969

w ith S ta lin a n d they jo in ed the o p p o sitio n ; b u t the m a in im p lica­

tions of th e p o litical struggle, w h ich by th e en d of th e decade
engulfed B u k h arin , Rykov a n d T o m sk y too, h a d becom e a p p a re n t
by th e e n d of 1923. So it is o n th e defeat of T ro tsk y a n d the
o p p o sitio n in 1923 th a t we m ust co n cen trate.7

C a rr’s account suggests a g reat n u m b e r of causes. F or conven­

ience they can be divided in to groups. T h e re are causes w hich
can be described as historical, th a t is, they arose from the specific
R ussian m ilieu : such things as th e backw ardness of R u ssian life
an d th e p e c u lia r social differences of R ussian society. A p art
from n u m ero u s scattered references C a rr brin g s these causes u n d er
notice in tw o ch ap ters of Socialism in O ne C ountry, Vol. 1: “T h e
Legacy of H isto ry ’’ a n d “Class a n d P a rty ”. H e states th a t the
R u ssian histo rical p a tte rn h a d th ree im p o rta n t consequences: first,
a chro n ically am b iv alen t a ttitu d e to w estern E urope; secondly,
develo p m en t rested o n the concep tio n of “rev o lu tio n from above”;
a n d th ird ly , a p a tte rn n o t of o rderly developm ent, b u t of spasm odic
advances by fits a n d starts. T h ese factors influenced the develop­
m en t of social ditferences. R ussia was now m ore sharply th a n
ever d iv id ed betw een “a society” w hich solaced itself fo r the back­
w ardness of R ussian life in the c o n tem p latio n of w estern ideas
a n d the en jo y m en t of the trap p in g s of civilisation, a n d the “d a rk ”
mass of th e R ussian people p lu n g ed in th e im m em orial R ussian
tra d itio n of poverty a n d ignorance.8 T h e hot-house-like developm ent
of Russia, p a rtic u la rly its industry, p ro d u c e d the in d u strial m a n ­
ager, w ho from th e first was “ the ad m in istrato r, the organiser, the
b u re a u c ra t,” an d th e greatest p ro p o rtio n of the new generation
of in d u stria l workers, w ho were still peasants in factory clothes.
T h e sm all p ro p o rtio n of m ore u rb a n ise d a n d so phisticated workers
was dispersed by the exigencies of rev o lu tio n an d civil w ar, a n d the
balance was fu rth e r upset by the early p e rio d of the N ew Econom ic
Policy (N EP) u n d e r w hich heavy in d u stry , in w hich the w orker’s
o u tlo o k a n d statu s diverged m ost from the peasant, was neglected.
Above all, th ere was the huge p easan t mass w hich gave its ch ar­
acteristic q u alities to Russia. R u ssian society h a d a highly self-
conscious intellig en tsia, b u t it h a d n o co u n ter-p art to the w estern
m iddle class.u
C arr sees th e difference betw een th e “w esterners” a n d “easterners”
as a basis of deep division. T h e M ensheviks w ere “w esterners” and
the Bolsheviks “easterners”. T h e M ensheviks, in c lu d in g T rotsky,
attack ed th e Bolsheviks as Slavophil m arxists. A fter 1917 th e same
division affected th e Bolsheviks an d te n d e d to be reflected in the
differing em phasis given to the claim s of ag ricu ltu re an d industry.
A t the tim e of th e “scissors crisis” in 1923, th e m ajo rity were eager
to m a in ta in th e status quo a n d let th e fu tu re w ait; the revival of
heavy in d u stry m u st be p o stponed u n til m ore p ro p itio u s times. B ut
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A U STRA LIA N L E F T REV IEW A ugust-Septem ber, 1969

the m inority, soon to be th e “o p p o sitio n ”, ap p ro ach ed th e “scissors

crisis’’ from th e sta n d p o in t of industry. O n th is view, th e prim ary
cause of th e crisis was th e failu re of the revival of in d u stry to keep
pace w ith th e revival of ag ricu ltu re, a n d th e rem edy could only be
to come to th e a id of industry, an d p rim arily of heavy in d ustry
as its essential base.10

C arr traces this elem en t in the p rin c ip a l characters. T rotsky

was the m ost “w estern” of th e Bolshevik leaders a n d the least
specifically R ussian. H e idealised w estern E u ro p e; ‘above all the
R ussia against w hich T ro tsk y reacted was th e p easan t R ussia of
his youth. T h e m a tu re T ro tsk y was w holly u r b a n ’.11 O n the o ther
h a n d of all th e early Bolshevik leaders S talin was sin g u lar in the
absence of significant “w estern” influence. A lone am ong them
he h a d never lived in w estern E urope, a n d he n e ith e r rea d n o r
spoke any w estern language. T h o se w ho stood closest to him —
M olotov, M ikoyan, K aganovich, Kirov, V oroshilov, K uibyshev —
were as in n o cen t as him self of any w estern b ackground. As a p o lar
opposite of T rotsky, S talin, in spite of b ein g a G eorgian, was n o t
m erely non-w estern b u t d istin ctly “R u ssian ” in th e n a rro w e r sense.
N o t only was he th e m ost “ R ussian ” of th e early leaders, b u t he
was o u tstan d in g in his low ra tin g of the local n atio n alism s of the
form er R ussian E m p ire an d he was one of th e engineers of the
forced bolshevisation of his n ativ e G eorgia.12

N o t at all u n re la te d to th e w estern-eastern q u estio n lay a c u ltu ra l

difference w hich C a rr em phasises as an im p o rta n t causal factor in
the split of 1923. E ver since 1917 T ro tsk y h a d ch am p io n ed the
cause of th e specialists. L en in generally gave his su p p o rt. T hey
b o th asserted th a t th e use of ex-officers in the R e d A rm y and
technical experts a n d m anagers in in d u stry was inescapable. In
spite of dem ands fo r w o rkers’ control a n d th e p ro le ta ria n d ic ta to r­
ship, the im p o rtan ce of one-m an m an ag em en t in a d m in istra tio n
was upheld. L en in constantly deplo red th e lack of cu ltu re in the
h an d lin g of business affairs. H ow ever, in 1922, 65 p e r cent of the
m anaging personnel w ere officially classified as “w orkers” a n d 35
p er cent as “non-w orkers” (only one in seven of these b ein g p arty
m em bers); a year la te r these p ro p o rtio n s h a d been alm ost exactly
reversed, only 36 p e r cent being “w orkers” an d 64 p e r cent "non-
w orkers” of w hom nearly one-half w ere n ow p a rty m em bers.13
T h is was a resu lt of N E P a n d a policy of en co uraging form er
bourgeois m anagers a n d specialists to jo in th e party, i.e. to become
“R ed m anagers” o r “R e d in d u strialists.”

In A pril 1923 a t th e tw elfth p arty congress, T ro tsk y presented

th e central com m ittee re p o rt o n in d u stry a n d u n d e rlin e d the role
of “th e d irecto r w ho strives for profits.”14 T h eo rists w ere w ell
represented in th e o p p o sitio n an d they in c lu d e d some of the best
63
 A U ST R A L IA N L E F T REV IEW A ugust-Septem ber, 190!)

econom ic b rain s in the party. M ost of the im p o rta n t early Bol­

sheviks a n d M ensheviks, w ith the ex ception of Stalin, a n d perhaps
Zinoviev, were pre-em inently intellectu als a n d they were uneasy
ab o u t any course of action w hich could n o t be justified by th e o re t­
ical arg u m en t; in this respect T ro tsk y h a d a rem arkable facility
a n d for sheer force of in tellect co u ld h a rd ly be m atched. O n the
o th e r h a n d , for S talin doctrin e was subsidiary to strategy and
tactics. T ra in e d in a G eorgian sem inary for the o rth o d o x priest­
hood, he show ed a m arked distru st of too im ag in ative an approach
to m atters of policy.1"’

T h e p o sitio n of the w orking class in this setting is a paradox.

In a negative sense, C arr sees “ the d isin teg ratio n of the w orking
class” as a cause of th e split. T h e R ussian w orking class was a new
w orking class, sm all in relatio n to th e to ta l p o p u la tio n an d a fairly
fragile social fo rm ation. T h e stress of rev o lu tio n a n d civil w ar
d ep le te d the w orking class dram atically. By 1921-2 it h ad fallen
to h a lf its 1913 num bers; a n d th e w astage was heaviest am ong
skilled w orkers. By th e en d of 1920 Petrogracl a n d Moscow h ad
lost a b o u t h a lf th e ir p o p u la tio n .16 N o t only d id the p ro le ta ria t
decline in n u m b ers b u t it lost its d istin ctiv e character. “In 1923
heavy in d u stry , before th e w ar th e m a in o ccu p ation of the skilled
a n d class-conscious w orker, h a d still scarcely risen above the record
low levels of 1920 a n d 1921.”17 T h e o p p o sitio n urged the m ajority
to rectify th e neglect of heavy in d u stry w ith o u t w hich an advance
to socialism could n o t occur, b u t they saw th e pro b lem as one of
econom ics — resources, finance, p lan n in g , efficiency, m anagem ent.
T h e y d id n o t seek allies in trad e u n io n circles a n d the w orkers’
oppositio n groups, w ho ap p ro ach ed the p ro b lem as one of em ploy­
m ent, wages an d trad e u n io n influence in m anagem ent. I n p a r­
tic u lar th e trade u nions suspected T ro tsk y , w ho was the one
p o ten tia l lead er of an “in d u stria l” o pposition, because of his record
as the p ro tag o n ist of the m ilita risa tio n of lab o r u n d e r w ar com ­
m unism , a n d as th e cham p io n of th e “sta tisa tio n ” of the trad e unions.
In the h e a t of the trad e u n io n controversy in D ecem ber 1920 he
rallied to th e defence of bureau cracy o n th e score of the low
political a n d c u ltu ra l level of the masses; an d there was a wide gull
betw een his convictions as a centraliser an d a p la n n e r in econom ic
organisatio n a n d the quasi-syndicalist views of the “w orkers”
groups. A t th e tw elfth p a rty congress in A p ril 1923 T ro tsk y n o t
only looked forw ard w ith relative e q u a n im ity to increased u n e m ­
ploym en t re su ltin g from the ra tio n a lisa tio n of in d u stry a n d the
dism issal of re d u n d a n t workers, b u t co n d o n ed the continuous dow n­
w ard pressure on wages as a necessary c o n trib u tio n to “socialist
ac cu m u latio n .”18 I t was because of T ro tsk y ’s stand on these issues
th a t S talin was able, a t the th irte e n th P a rty conference, to stigm atise
T ro tsk y as th e “p a tria rc h of the b u re a u c rats.”19
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AU STRA LIA N L E F T RE V IE W A ugust-Septeniber, 1969

T h e backw ardness of R ussian life rested o n p o o r technological

developm ent an d low econom ic achievem ent. In this lay a general
econom ic cause. A dded to th e general backw ardness was the great
cost to the econom y of th e ab n o rm ality from 1917 to 1921. W ith
the in tro d u c tio n of N E P in M arch 1921 econom ic policy becam e
an issue a ro u n d w hich o p p o sitio n crystallised. D ifferences o n m any
p o in ts — finance, trad e, prices, em ploym ent, wages, m anagem ent
etc. — tended to revolve a ro u n d the state of heavy industry. A gri­
culture, ru ra l a n d a rtisa n industry, even the consum er goods in d u s­
tries, revived b u t ca p ita l goods-producing in d u stries rem ain ed stag­
n an t. O pposition p a rty criticism of econom ic policy was concerned
w ith the adverse effects of N E P o n heavy in d u stry , an d sought first
a n d forem ost to m itig ate these effects th ro u g h a n extension of state
subsidies — if necessary by c u rta ilin g th e benefits w hich N E P h a d
conferred on th e p easan t by increasing the b u rd en s on him . T rotsky,
in the w in ter of 1922-23, becam e th e spokesm an of in d u stry in the
P olitburo, w here he m o re th a n once pressed th e d em and fo r a m ore
generous cred it policy. T h is was th e situ atio n in w hich the so-called
“scissors crisis” developed. C arr treats it as an im m ediate cause
of the in tra-p arty struggle.20

At. the tw elfth p a rty Congress in A p ril 1923, in th e course of

his rep o rt o n in d u stry fo r th e cen tral com m ittee, T ro tsk y p roduced
a diagram w hich h a d th e app earan ce of an o pen p a ir of scissors.
From a p o in t of p a rity w ith 1913 prices in Septem ber 1922, in d u s­
tria l prices a n d a g ric u ltu ra l prices h ad increasingly diverged u n til
they reached, in M arch 1923, 140 p er cent of th e 1913 prices for
in d u strial prices w hile a g ric u ltu ra l prices h a d su n k to 80 p e r cent.
T h is situ atio n h a d com e a b o u t because of th e p rim in g of the con­
sum er goods in d u stries w ith com m ercial cred it a n d the drive for
profits by the in d u stria l syndicates w ith a re su lta n t rise in prices.
T h e econom ic p ic tu re was com plicated by a currency refo rm w hich
set o u t to replace d ep reciated rou b les w ith gold-backed chervonets.
U n d e r the im p act of N E P unem p lo y m en t rose ra p id ly from a half
m illio n in S eptem ber 1922 to a m illio n a n d a q u a rte r a t the end
of 1923.21 A lth o u g h a t first largely confined to “Soviet w orkers”
(i.e. clerical w orkers o r o th e r w orkers dism issed from Soviet in stitu ­
tions), and th e u n sk illed casual la b o r of sem i-peasants, it eventually
spread to th e factory w orkers as u n saleable goods p ile d u p . An
ad d itio n al factor c o n trib u tin g to th e econom ic an d social crisis of
1923 was th e u n c e rta in real value of m oney wages w hich flu ctu ated
due to currency m a n ip u la tio n . Associated w ith this were defaults
in wage paym ent. T h e to ta l effect was a wave of strikes in the
sum m er of 1923.22
T h e p la n n in g controversy can be looked at as a cause of the split,
e ith e r econom ic o r p o litic a l or a b it of b o th . I t can be related
im m ediately to th e state of heavy in d u stry an d the arg u m en t a b o u t
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 A U ST R A L IA N I.E F T REVIEW A ugust-Septem ber, 1969

finance for industry; m ore especially it involved the debate about

th e o rg an isatio n of G osplan — th e state p la n n in g commission.
P la n n in g was considered p a rt of socialism an d the Bolsheviks
argued a b o u t its app licatio n to Russia. V arious arrangem ents w hich
were m ade h a d im plications for th e developm ent of a p lan n ed
econom y. In F eb ru ary 1921 the g o v ern m en t set u p G osplan. In
A ugust T ro tsk y , w ho h a d been increasingly occupied w ith econom ic
questions since th e en d of th e civil war, p u t forw ard a p la n for
an au to n o m o u s G osplan w ith large powers. A t first L en in resisted
T rotsk y , especially his proposals th a t G osplan should have legis­
lative pow ers an d th a t a d ep u ty p resid en t of the council of com ­
m issars sh o u ld becom e p resident of G osplan. T h e n at the end of
D ecem ber 1922, w hen L en in was becom ing increasingly concerned
a b o u t several p roblem s a b o u t w hich, w hile recu p eratin g from ill­
ness, he h a d h a d second thoughts, he suggested m eeting T ro tsk y ’s
proposals h alf way. H ow ever, T ro tsk y h a d n o o th e r su pporters in
the P o litb u ro an d the reform of G osplan was shelved. A t the tw elfth
P a rty congress in A p ril 1923 b o th T ro tsk y ’s re p o rt a n d the resolu­
tio n p resen ted bore clear signs of an uneasy truce on fu n d am en tal
issues of econom ic policy.23
1 R. C. Collingw ood, T h e Idea o f H istory (O xford, 1962).
2 H. B utterfield, T h e W hig Interpretation o f H istory (London, 1963), p. 72.
3 E. H . C arr, W hat is History? (London, 1961), p. 81.
4 C. R. E lton, T h e Practice of H istory (Sydney, 1967), pp. 13-14.
5 E. H . C arr, Socialism in One C ountry, 1924-1926 (L ondon, 1958), vol. i, p. vi,
vol. iii p a rt I, p.v. T h e num b erin g of th e volum es has got out of h an d too.
6 E. H . C arr, T h e Interregnum 1923-24 (L ondon, 1960), p. 366.
7 T h e P o litb u ro elected 2 Ju n e 1924 a fte r th e 13th p a rty congress h a d seven
m em bers: Kam enev, T rotsky, Stalin, Zinoviev, Rykov, T om sky a n d B ukarin; of
this group, by Decem ber 1930, w hen Rykov was expelled from the P olitburo,
only Stalin rem ained. L eonard Shapiro, T h e C om m unist Party of the Soviet
U nion (L ondon, 1962), pp. 606-7.
8 C arr, Socialism in One C ountry, vol i, p .ll .
9 Ib id , pp. 16-18.
10 C arr, T h e In terreg n u m , 1923-1924, pp. 90-1.
11 C arr, Socialism in One C ountry, vol. i, pp. 143-4.
12 Ibid., pp. 179-80.
13 C arr, T h e In terreg n u m , pp. 40-1.
14 Q uoted, ibid., p. 46.
15 C arr, Socialism in O ne C ountry, vol. i, p p . 146, 180-2.
16 C arr, T h e B olshevik R evo lu tio n , vol. ii, p p . 173-6.
17. C arr, Socialism in O ne C ountry, vol. i, p. 100.
18 C arr, T h e Interregnum , pp. 59-84.
19. Ibid., p. 336.
20. Ibid., p p . 3-17.
21 C arr, T h e In terreg n u m , pp. 47-8.
22 Ibid., pp. 68-78.
23 C arr, T h e Bolshevik R evolution, vol. ii, pp. 370-80. Stalin appears to have
played little p a r t in this controversy except fo r a letter he w rote to L enin in
M arch 1921 in w hich he supported L enin's a tta ch m en t to G O EL R O and called
for "practical m en,” a “practical outlook” a n d a “practical start).” I. V. Stalin,
IVorks, vol. 5, pp. 50-1.

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