Munich Personal RePEc Archive

THE rice problem in the Philippines:

trends, constraints, and policy
imperatives

Balisacan, Arsenio M. and Ravago, Majah-Leah V.

Department of Agriculture, Philippines, University of the

Philippines Diliman

2003

Online at https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/24865/
MPRA Paper No. 24865, posted 10 Sep 2010 17:16 UTC
 The Rice Problem in the Philippines: Trends,
Constraints, and Policy Imperatives1

Arsenio M. Balisacan2
and
Majah-Leah V. Ravago3

1. Introduction

Every political dispensation in recent decades has taken the view that the country
has to be able to feed itself. For the country’s political leaders and the agriculture
bureaucracy, this has meant that rice, the country’s staple food, has to be locally
produced at quantity sufficient to meet the rice requirement of the burgeoning population.
Indeed, rice self-sufficiency has been an objective enshrined in all government programs
for the agricultural sector since the early 1960s. To achieve the objective, the
Government has intervened, albeit in varying degrees, in the marketplace to affect
virtually all segments of the supply chain, including importation, and of the demand
spectrum. Yet, self-sufficiency has remained elusive. The population is far from being
more food-secure now than a decade or two ago. Over the years, rice has become more
expensive in the Philippines than in most developing countries of Asia. This has caused
reduction in the purchasing power of the incomes of the poor, including landless farmers
and urban poor workers whose spending on rice constitutes about 22% of their total
household expenditure. Arguably, this could partly explain for the much higher incidence
of absolute poverty in the Philippines than in Indonesia, Thailand, and even Vietnam
(Balisacan 2003). What has gone wrong?

In this paper, we examine the performance of the rice sector over the last three
decades. Our aim is to identify policy imperatives and investment options for the sector
in the wake of globalization and population pressure. While a number of observations
found in the paper are not new and have already been pointed out elsewhere (see, e.g.,
David 2003, Roumasset 2000, Clarete 1999, Tolentino 1999, David and Balisacan 1995),
we move beyond the usual description of past performance to include as well an ex-ante
assessment of the effects of trade policy reforms on the rice economy in the short and
medium terms.

1
Presented at the 25th Annual Scientific Meeting of the National Academy of Science and Technology,
Manila Hotel, Manila, 10 July 2003.
2
Professor of Economics, University of the Philippines-Diliman. E-mail: [email protected]
3
Research Associate, Agriculture Secretary’s Technical Advisory Group, Department of Agriculture. E-
mail: [email protected]

1
2. Performance of the Rice Sector

The rice sector has continued to account for about 20% of agriculture’s gross
value added (Figure 1). It is also the single most important source of livelihood among
small farmers and landless agricultural workers who comprise the bulk of the agricultural
labor force (who in turn represent 40% of the labor force nationwide). It is thus not
surprising that the growth trend in rice production roughly mirrors that in agriculture
(Figure 2).

With the introduction of modern rice technology in the second half of the 1960s,
coupled with substantial investment in irrigation, rice production grew remarkably at an
average annual rate of 5.9% in the 1970s (Table 1). The country turned from being a net
importer to being self sufficient and even a marginal rice exporter towards the end of the
1970s until the early years of the 1980s (Table 2).

Production growth slowed down significantly in the 1980s. The average growth of
2.02% was in fact lower than the average population growth of 2.3%. The country once
again imported rice to feed its growing population and continued to do so in the ensuing
decade. Surprisingly, despite the slowdown in domestic production and the continued
surge in population, the proportion of imports to total rice production was lower in the
1980s than in the previous decade (Table 2). This would suggest that average per capita
demand for rice fell in the 1980s, which could be attributed partly to the significant
decline in average per capita income during this period owing to a confluence of
domestic and global factors (David and Balisacan, 1995).

Rice production picked up once more in the 1990s, growing at an average rate of
about 2.8% a year. This performance was attributable to the rising real domestic rice
price (despite falling world price) and falling real input prices, except wages (Figures 3
and 4). The onslaught of the El Niño phenomenon in 1998 caused rice production to fall
sharply by 24.2%. However, an equally sharp rebound took place in the following year
when output rose by 37.8%, effectively allowing a positive production growth for the
decade. Nonetheless, imports during this period surged; the ratio of net imports to total
production increased to an average of 8.4% (Table 2).

Yield increases accounted for much—about 80%—of the quite remarkable

production growth in the 1970s. Area expansion constituted the balance. Yield growth
accounted for an even greater share of output growth in the 1980s. But yield growth
during this period (2.2%) was lower than in the previous period (5.0%), especially in
irrigated areas, as increases in rice cropping intensity were not enough to offset the
declines in rainfed lowland and upland areas planted to rice. In the 1990s, yield growth
dropped even lower (to 1.0%), accounting for just about one-third of the production
growth. Although production growth was higher than in the 1980s, the growth came not
from increases in productivity but from expansion in hectarage planted to rice.

The trend in rice production followed quite closely the trends in technological
change, irrigation development, price incentives, and the shifts in crop area planted to

2
rice between favorable and less-favorable production environment. In the 1970s, the
accelerated growth of yield and crop area came from the expansion of irrigated area,
extensive adoption of modern varieties, and high output and low input prices (Figures 4,
5, and 6).

In stark contrast, in the 1980s, the adoption of modern varieties started to plateau,
the crop area expansion slowed down, real prices of rice dropped sharply, input prices
increased, and credit granted to the palay sector declined (Figures 5 and 7). Rainfed and
upland crop areas contracted substantially. All these factors could have caused the
slowdown in rice production growth during this period.

Modest increases in government irrigation spending in the first half of 1990s led
to the opening up of additional irrigated areas Figure 8. Output prices also continued to
remain above world prices (though not enough to reverse the overall downward trend
since the mid-1970s), while input prices other than wages declined up to the onset of the
Asian financial crisis in late 1997 and 1998. These developments proved favorable for the
growth of rice production. However, as discussed below, the government’s effort to prop
up rice prices through quantitative import restrictions hurt landless workers and small
farmers who are net buyers of rice, as well as urban workers.

Incidentally, public expenditures in agriculture increased markedly in the 1990s

and early 2000s, but these were not in areas where the gains in terms of improvement in
long-term productivity are expected to be high (David 2003). Spending on R&D, basic
transport infrastructure, and institutional development, for example, had low priorities
vis-à-vis redistribution programs (e.g., NFA procurement, land reform).

3. Rice Policy Framework

As noted earlier, the government intervened heavily in the rice sector to achieve
the twin objectives of stable and high prices for farmers and of stable and low prices for
consumers. It has employed a variety of instruments—output procurement, credit
subsidies, tariffs and quantitative trade restrictions, provision of rice subsidy to
consumers, and public spending in research, irrigation, extension, land reform, other
support services—to effect these objectives.

Of these interventions, perhaps the most controversial ones have to do with the
operations of the National Food Authority (NFA), the government’s price and supply
stabilization arm in the rice sector. NFA has the monopoly over international trade of
rice, the discretion to issue import licenses, and the mandate to operate the marketing and
price support operations of rice and corn. Its interventions have been justified on the
grounds that the world rice price is highly volatile and that private traders extract
monopoly profits from farmers during harvest season and from consumers when rice is
scarce. Various studies, notably David (2003), Roumasset (1999), Tolentino (1999), and
Balisacan, Clarete, and Cortez (1992) have shown that these interventions have in fact
exacerbated market failures, increased the volatility of domestic prices, reduced the

3
welfare of both consumers and producers, discouraged the private sector from investing
in efficiency-enhancing distribution and storage facilities, and bred corruption and
institutional sclerosis.

Rather than gaining from NFA operations, taxpayers have in fact been losing.
Roumasset (1999) estimated the total costs of price controls on rice in 1999 to the tune of
49 billion pesos: 3.7 billion pesos in terms of foregone tariff revenues, 18.5 billion pesos
of foregone consumer tax revenue, 7.9 billion pesos of foregone producer tax revenue,
6.4 billion pesos of excess burden to consumers, and 3.3 billion pesos of excess burden to
producers. In 1998, the financial subsidies to NFA amounted to over 6.3 billion pesos.
This amount is far more than the amount (less than one billion pesos) provided to
agricultural research and development in rice, which arguably yield far higher social rates
of return.

Notwithstanding the enormous resources spent on NFA operations, domestic rice

prices are far higher in the Philippines than in other Southeast Asian countries, especially
since the mid-1990s (Figure 9). In the late 1990s, following the ascension of the country
to the World Trade Organization (WTO), domestic prices soared, rising 86% and 40%
higher than in Thailand and Indonesia, respectively. In the same year (1996), the
Philippine nominal wholesale price was almost twice (91%) as much as the world price.

4. Policy and investment responses: two scenarios

Rice production and importation fluctuated in the past forty years. The production
years between 1977 and 1983, wherein the country was even able to export rice at some
point, was short lived. During most of the ensuing years, given low growth of
productivity and rapidly growing population (see Figure 10), consumption increasingly
outpaced production. Imports rose in tandem with population growth, especially in the
second half of the 1990s when the country was also beset by the El Nino phenomenon
(Table 2).

In 1996, in conformity with the country’s accession to the WTO, Congress passed
Republic Act 8178, which lifted all quantitative import restrictions in agriculture except
rice. In lieu of these restrictions, their tariff equivalents were put in place. But because it
is not a simple exercise to find the tariff equivalent of a QR, the process led to “dirty
tariffication.” Nearly all the commodities were given tariff rates of 100%, even though
the nominal protection rates of these commodities, based on strict comparison of
domestic price and world price, were much less than 100% (David 2003). In other words,
the tariffs given were much more than the tariff equivalents of the protection regime
existing before the accession to WTO. At the end of the 1990s, the overall tariff
protection for agriculture (13.3%) was higher than that for industry.

For rice, the tariff equivalent of its present QR from 1995-2002 is 67.2%. This is
measured as percentage difference between domestic price and comparable world price

4
(Table 3). Clearly this commodity has been highly protected in recent years. As noted
earlier, protection is justified as a mechanism to shield the incomes of small farmers from
erosion caused by competitive imports. However, this stance fails to address the root
causes of the lack of farmers’ capacity to ably compete with imports: the government’s
failure to provide the required public support services necessary to increase productivity.

The growing list of global and regional trade arrangements necessitates an

examination on the protection being bestowed to rice producers. The exemption of
tariffication of rice QRs in the WTO is due to expire in 2004. Any changes in tariffs will
affect not only the commodity’s output but the other industry’s output as well that uses
rice as input (i.e. rice milling sector).

In the long run, liberalizing rice trade enhances the welfare of the poor especially
landless workers and urban consumers. However, there is a short term cost during the
transition period from the old to the new regime. Farmers may not be able to quickly shift
productive resources from rice to other activities. Because land is immobile, or because it
would take time to tailor land for other crops or uses, there would likely be short-term
adjustment cost for rice farmers (as well as those depending on rice for their productive
activities). This may take the form of reduced incomes, labor displacement, or both.

To further examine the rice and agriculture problem, an enhanced multi-market

simulation model of Philippine agriculture, the Agricultural Policy Simulation Model
(APSM), was used to generate probable outcomes to a variety of “what if” questions.
Two cases are shown here: a base scenario or the “business-as-usual” agenda and a strong
reform agenda. In the base case, quantitative restrictions (QRs) equivalent to 50% tariff
rates are maintained for the major sub-sectors of agriculture (rice included), while public
investments in the sector continue at a slow pace, as in the 1980s and 1990s. The strong
reform agenda, on the other hand, is characterized by gradual liberalization of agricultural
trade – removal of QRs and reduction of tariffs over a five-year period – complemented
by an increased public investment in support services, particularly irrigation, R&D, and
extension.1 The results are summarized in Figures 11 and 12.

The “business-as-usual” simulation results suggest that yield growth rates in the
medium term are low by historical and international standards. Imports of the country’s
major staples – rice and corn – rise significantly during the period. Poverty reduction is
slow, especially in rural areas. Furthermore, the low growth of incomes in rural areas
compared to urban areas induces substantial out-migration form rural to urban areas,
thereby accentuating population-related urban problems.

On the other hand, the “strong-reform agenda” scenario suggests reduced

domestic agricultural prices arising from the reduction in tariffs and removal of QRs.
Farm household incomes rise despite the fall in farm prices owing to increases in
agricultural productivity that are brought about by a more aggressive public investment in
irrigation, R&D, and information generation and diffusion. Furthermore, the impact on

1
For details on the exercise, see Antiporta, Balisacan, and Paris (2002).

5
poverty is high in the medium term: poverty incidence in this scenario is lower, on the
average, by 10 percentage points than in the base case.

Clearly, in the Philippine case, the “business-as-usual” approach to governing

agriculture and the rural sector needs to be abandoned in favor of more aggressive
reforms and investment aimed at raising agricultural productivity and sustaining gains in
farm incomes, reducing the “cost of doing business” in rural areas, and taking advantage
of opportunities for growth offered by globalization. This should also be coupled with
ensured accountability, improved coordination, and program focus among agriculture-
related agencies of the government. This is an important area where the NGOs, local
governments and civil society can come in. They must play an active role in planning,
implementing, and monitoring agricultural and rural development programs. This helps
foster accountability and sustainability in the system.

5. Concluding Remarks

The comparatively poor performance of the rice sector in recent years is

microcosm of the state of Philippine agriculture. Both domestic policies and institutions
have constrained efficiency and raised the “cost of doing business” in agriculture, thereby
blunting productivity growth and eroding the country’s competitiveness in the global
marketplace. Rice has become more expensive in the Philippines than in other developing
East Asian countries, owing principally to the government’s ill-advised self-sufficiency
objective. Liberalizing rice trade enhances the welfare of the poor, especially landless
workers and urban consumers, although the short-term cost to the rice sector in terms of
reduced incomes and labor displacement may be quite substantial. However, when this is
combined with public investment in productivity-enhancing support services (particularly
R&D and irrigation), rice trade liberalization is a win-win proposition.

In addressing the pressing issues of today vis-à-vis poverty and food insecurity, it
is important not to lose sight of the key lessons on agricultural growth and development
in Asia in the past half-century. One such powerful lesson has to do with enabling the
rural poor through policy, investment, and institutional reforms that enhance the
efficiency of domestic markets and provide improved access to technology,
infrastructure, and education. This enabling environment allows rural growth benefits to
be broadly based, thereby enhancing overall nutrition, human capital development, and
productivity and economic growth in the medium- to long-term. Almost invariably, the
successful cases of rural development and poverty reduction have shown tenacity in the
pursuit of efficiency-enhancing reforms. The key driver to these reforms has been neither
globalization nor agricultural policy in developed countries. Rather, it is—by and
large—the internal realization that reforms are for the benefit of the country and its
citizens.

Globalization has its downside risks, but it also offers potentially enormous
benefits. Many developing-country globalizers have shown that those benefits more than
outweigh the costs: the speed of poverty reduction is, for example, unprecedented in

6
China, Vietnam, and India. The challenge for the Philippines is to find the appropriate
mix of policies and institutions needed to exploit the benefits, while being on guard for
the downside risks. Fortuitously, for agriculture and the rural sector, the key policy and
governance reforms—enhancing economic competition, investing in efficiency-
enhancing infrastructure and support services, and enabling institutions to efficiently
respond to changes in economic landscape—required for improved efficiency (increased
productivity and income) are largely compatible with globalization as well.

7
References

Balisacan, A.M. (2003), “Poverty and Inequality,” in A.M. Balisacan and H.Hill (eds.), The
Philippine Economy: Development, Policies, and Challenges. New York, Oxford
University Press; Quezon City, Ateneo de Manila University Press.

Balisacan, A.M. (1994), “Demand for Food in the Philippines: Responses to Price and
Income Changes,” Philippine Review of Economics and Business 21: 137-163.

Balisacan, A.M., R.L. Clarete, and A.M. Cortez (1992), The Food Problem in the Philippines:
Priority Issues and Policy Options. Report submitted to the International Food Policy
Research Institute, Washington, D.C.

Clarete, R.L. (1999), “Trade-Related Problem and Policy Issues in Philippine

Agriculture,” Philippine Review of Economics and Business 26: 127-158.

David, C.C. (2003), “Agriculture,” in A.M. Balisacan and H.Hill (eds.), The Philippine
Economy: Development, Policies, and Challenges. New York, Oxford University
Press.

David, C.C. and A.M. Balisacan (1995), “Philippine Rice Supply Demand: Prospects and
Policy Implications,” Journal of Philippine Development 22.

Roumasset, J. (2000), “Market-Friendly Food Security: Alternatives for Restructuring

NFA, Unpublished paper, Department of Economics, University of Hawaii,
Honolulu.

Tolentino, Bruce J. (1999), “Monopoly and Regulatory Constraints to Rapid Agricultural

Growth and Sustainable Food Security in the Philippines,” Economic Policy
Agenda Series No. 8, Foundation for Economic Freedom, Inc.

8
Table 1. Growth rates of palay production, area, and yield by production environment,
Philippines 1970-2002.

1970-1980 1980-1990 1990-2000 1995-2002

Total
Production 5.92 2.02 2.66 2.79

Area 0.97 -0.18 1.67 0.98

(16) (-9) (63) (35)

Yield 4.96 2.21 0.99 1.81

(84) (109) (37) (65)

Irrigated areas
Production 4.75 3.70 3.39 3.40

Area 1.18 2.45 2.77 2.09

(25) (66) (82) (62)

Yield 3.57 1.25 0.62 1.30

(75) (34) (18) (38)

Rainfed
Production 3.08 -0.61 0.78 1.27

Area 1.33 -2.21 0.11 -0.86

(43) (362) (14) (-68)

Yield 1.73 1.60 0.68 2.14

(56) (-263) (87) (168)

Upland
Production -1.09 -7.76 -1.62 -1.89

Area -2.22 -10.67 -3.25 -3.00

(203) (138) (200) (159)

Yield 1.14 2.91 1.45 1.04

(-104) (-37) (-89) (-55)

Source: BAS Selected Statistics on Agriculture, various years, updated from David and
Balisacan, 1995.

9
Table 2. Trends in imports, ratio of imports to production, and ratio of
exports to production of rice, 1960-2001.
Year Rice Rice Net Rice net imports Availability
Production Net imports Availability % of per capita
000 mt 000 mt 000 mt production (kg/cap)
(a) (b) (a) + (b) (b) / (a)
1965 2,613 339 2,952 12.97 93
1966 2,653 108 2,761 4.07 86
1967 2,811 310 3,121 11.03 98
1968 2,893 -15 2,878 -0.52 83
1969 3,179 -1 3,178 -0.03 87
1970 3,459 -2 3,457 -0.06 91
1971 3,416 379 3,795 11.08 101
1972 3,324 451 3,775 13.57 98
1973 3,501 308 3,809 8.81 96
1974 3,607 165 3,772 4.58 91
1975 4,148 147 4,295 3.54 100
1976 4,253 55 4,308 1.29 99
1977 4,715 -15 4,700 -0.32 112
1978 4,688 -47 4,641 -1.01 111
1979 4,995 -127 4,868 -2.55 110
1980 4,970 -231 4,740 -4.64 95
1981 5,142 -83 5,059 -1.62 101
1982 5,417 0 5,417 0.00 109
1983 4,742 -40 4,702 -0.84 81
1984 5,089 190 5,279 3.74 97
1985 5,724 541 6,265 9.45 122
1986 6,010 0 6,010 0.00 110
1987 5,551 0 5,551 0.00 92
1988 5,831 95 5,926 1.63 101
1989 6,148 209 6,357 3.40 103
1990 6,058 593 6,651 9.79 113
1991 6,288 -10 6,278 -0.16 102
1992 5,934 -30 5,904 -0.51 88
1993 6,132 210 6,342 3.42 93
1994 6,850 0 6,850 0.00 99
1995 6,851 240 7,091 3.50 103
1996 7,334 893 8,227 12.17 118
1997 7,325 731 8,056 9.98 113
1998 5,561 2,126 7,686 38.23 102
1999 7,661 782 8,443 10.20 114
2000 8,053 617 8,670 7.66 115
2001 8,421 739 9,160 8.78 119

Source: BAS, NSO, and NFA, updated from David and Balisacan, 1995.

10
Table 3. Trends in domestic price, border price, and nominal protection
rate of rice, Philippines. 1960-2000.

Domestic Border price ($/t)

a
Price World World World
$/t priceb pricec priced(+15%) NPR
(1) (2) (3) (4)
1975 250 269 363 309 -31.24
1976 257 213 255 245 1.08
1977 265 228 272 262 -2.74
1978 259 321 368 369 -29.41
1979 264 292 334 336 -21.10
1980 284 387 434 445 -34.63
1981 315 402 483 462 -34.66
1982 306 243 293 279 4.42
1983 257 239 277 275 -7.36
1984 268 233 252 268 6.17
1985 325 198 216 228 50.58
1986 265 180 211 207 25.81
1987 266 204 230 235 15.83
1988 288 272 301 313 -4.25
1989 345 291 320 335 7.81
1990 345 248 287 285 20.11
1991 310 241 314 277 -1.24
1992 349 233 287 268 21.39
1993 369 203 270 234 36.67
1994 427 347 268 399 59.57
1995 545 290 321 334 69.78
1996 605 276 339 317 78.52
1997 516 247 304 284 70.02
1998 386 250 304 287 26.89
1999 403 211 248 242 62.37
2000 367 167 202 192 81.68
2001 314 149 173 171 81.44
2002 320 171 192 196 66.94
Notes :
a - Refers to domestic wholesale price. Source: Bureau of Agricultural Statistics
b - Refers to 35% brokens, Source: World Bank/ADB.
c - Refers to 5% broken, fob Bangkok
d - Refers to 35% brokens, fob Bangkok + 15% to convert to CIF Manila, Source: World Bank/ADB.

11
Figure 1. Percent share of major crops, livestock and poultry to agriculture
GVA, 1967-2002, Philippines.

(%)
100

Livestock, Poultry, & Others

80

Other crops
60

40
Sugar, Corn, Coconut, Banana

20

Palay

0
1967 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 1999 2002

Source: NSCB

12
Figure 2. Growth rates of agriculture and palay GVA (3-year moving average).

(%)
20

15
Palay

10

Agriculture
5

0
1968 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 1999 2002

-5

-10

Source: NSCB

13
Figure 3. Trends in nominal and real domestic and world price of rice, Philippines, 1960-2002.

$/Mt Nominal 1980=100 Real

700 250

Domestic
600

200 World

500
World

150
400

Domestic
300
100

200

50
100

0 0
1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2002 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2002

Notes:
Domestic - Refers to domestic wholesale price. Source: Bureau of Agricultural Statistics
World price - Refers to 35% brokens, fob Bangkok + 15% to convert to CIF Manila Source: World Bank/ADB.
CPI all items is used to deflate domestic prices. Source: National Statistics Office
US PPI all items is used to deflate world prices. Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics
Figures updated from David and Balisacan, 1995.

14
Figure 4. Trends in the relative price of rice (Pr) to the wholesale price index (WPI), corn (Pc), sugar (Ps), and relative prices of farm inputs
to rice, Philippines, 1960-2002, (3-year moving average).

Index 1985=100 Inde x 1985=100 Index 1985=100

225 225 225
Pr/Ps
200 200 200

175 175 175 Wage/Pr

150 Pr/WPI 150

150
Urea price /Pr
125 Pr/P wc 125 Ag chem price/Pr 125

100 100 100

75 75 75 Machine price/Pr

50 50 50

25 25 25

0
0 0
1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2002 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2002 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2002

Sources: Wholesale ordinary price of rice, corn grain prices, urea, agricultural wages from BAS.
Price of sugar from SRA.
Retail prices for machinery, agricultural chemicals, and wholesale price index from NSO and SPEI-BSP.
GVA from NIA-NSCB
Figures updated from David and Balisacan, 1995.

15
 Figure 5. Trends in palay area and yield, total and by production environment, Philippines, 1970-2002, (3-year moving average).

(000 ha) (000 ha) Crop area (Mt/ha) Crop yield

(Mt/ha)

4500 4 3000 4.0

Source of basic data: BAS, figures updated from David
Irrigated
3.5
and Balisacan, 1995.
2500 Irrigated
3.5
4000
3.0
Area 3 2000
3500 2.5
Rainfed

2.5 1500 2.0

Rainfed

3000
1.5
Yield 2 1000 Upland
1.0
2500
1.5 500
Upland 0.5

2000 1 0 0.0
1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2002 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2002 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2002

16
 Figure 6. Trends in the adoption of modern varieties and rate of irrigated area,
Philippines, 1966-2002, (3-year moving average).

(%)
100

80 MV

Irrig
60

40

20

0
1966 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2002

Source: BAS, updated from David and Balisacan, 1995.

17
 Figure 7. Trends in the agricultural production loans granted to palay sector,
1980-2002, Philippines, (3-year moving average).

(%)
50

40 Growth rate s

30

20
% to total

10

0
1981 1985 1990 1995 1998 2002

-10

-20

Source: BAS Selected Statistics.

18
 Figure 8. Trends in real government expenditures in agriculture by policy
instrument (1965-1998).

Bn pesos (at 1985 prices)

14

12
Other
Agriculture

10

8
Irrigation

NFA

0
1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 1998

Source: David, 2002.

19
 Figure 9. Trends in domestic wholesale prices of rice in selected Asian countries,
1980-2000.

$/Mt

700

Philippines
Indonesia
600 India
Thailand
Vietnam
500

400

300

200

100

0
1980 1982 1984 1986 1988 1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000

Source of basic of data: IRRI World Rice Statistics and BAS.

20
Figure 10. Consumption, rice production, and net imports vs. population, 1990-2001.

Mn MT Mn persons
Mn MT Mn persons
84
2.5 90

9
80
80 2.0

Consumption 70
8
Population
76 1.5 (right scale)
60

7
72 1.0 50

Ne t imports
6 40
68 0.5
Rice
Production
30
5 Population 64 0.0
(right scale) 1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 200220

4 60 -0.5 10
1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2001

Source of basic data: NSO, NFA, and BAS.

21
Figure 11. Base scenario: “business-as-usual” agenda.

Yield of Major Crops, Philippines

Ba se Sce na rio

3
tons/ha 3

1
Yield growth will be low by historical and
1 international standards.
0
00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17
Ye ar

Rice Corn

Net Imports of Major Crops, Philippines

Base Scenario
3,000

2,500

2,000 Net imports of staple will rise sharply....

thousand tons

1,500

1,000

500

-500
00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17
Year

Rice Corn

Net Migration to Urban Areas

Thousands Base Scenario
214
212
210
208
206
204
202
Influx of rural population to urban
200
198
areas will continue.
196
194
Year

Base

22
Figure 12. Alternative scenario: “strong reform” agenda.

Prices of Major Crops, Philippines

Difference Between Base and Simulated Scenario

2.00
1.00 Prices of staple will be lower...
0.00
-1.00 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17
-2.00
Pe s o s /k g

-3.00
-4.00
-5.00
-6.00
-7.00
-8.00
Year

Rice Corn

Yield of Major Crops,

tons/ha Difference Between Base and Simulated
Simulated Less Base
2.60
2.40
2.20
... but output per hectare will grow faster.
2.00
1.80
1.60
1.40
1.20
1.00
0.80
0.60
0.40
0.20
0.00
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Year

Rice Corn

23
Figure 12 (cont’d.). Alternative Scenario:“Strong Reform”Agenda.
Net Imports of Major Crops, Philippines
Difference Between Base and Simulated Scenario

1,000.0
0.0
-1,000.0
thousand tons

-2,000.0
-3,000.0
-4,000.0
00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17
-5,000.0
-6,000.0 Net imports of staple will be lower...
-7,000.0
-8,000.0
Year

Rice Corn

40 Poverty reduction will be faster...

35
30
25
20
15
10
5
0
1st Yr 3rd Yr 5th Yr

Base Sim

Net Migration to Urban Areas

Base vs Simulated Run
214
212
210
208
(thousands)

206
204
202
200
198
196
… and outmigration from rural to urban areas
194
96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09 10 11 12 13 14 15
Year
Simulation Base 24