A.M. No.

MTJ-00-1265               April 6, 2000

VALENCIDES VERCIDE, complainant,
vs.
JUDGE PRISCILLA T. HERNANDEZ, Fifth Municipal Circuit Trial Court, Clarin and Tudela,
Misamis Occidental, respondent.

DECISION

MENDOZA, J.:

This is a complaint filed against Judge Priscilla T. Hernandez of the Fifth Municipal Circuit Trial
Court, Clarin and Tudela, Misamis Occidental, charging her with grave abuse of authority and
ignorance of the law for her dismissal of a case which complainant Valencides Vercide and his wife
had filed against Daria Lagas Galleros for recovery of possession of a piece of land. The land is
located in Upper Centro, Tudela, Misamis Occidental. Defendant Galleros is a resident of the same
municipality, while complainant and his wife are residents of Dipolog City. Because of this fact, the
case was filed in court without prior referral to the Lupong Tagapamayapa.

However, this matter was raised by defendant in her answer as an affirmative defense, and
respondent, in her order of July 15, 1997, ordered the dismissal of the case without prejudice to the
prosecution of the counterclaim pleaded by the defendant in her answer. In support of her order,
respondent cited P.D. No. 1508, §3 of which provides:

Venue. - Disputes between or among persons actually residing in the same barangay shall be
brought for amicable settlement before the Lupon of said barangay. Those involving actual residents
of different barangays within the same city or municipality shall be brought in the barangay where
the respondent or any of the respondents actually resides, at the election of the
complainant. However, all disputes which involve real property or any interest therein shall be
brought in the barangay where the real property or any part thereof is situated. (Emphasis added)

Complainant and his wife moved for a reconsideration, citing the following provisions of R.A. 7160,
"The Local Government Code of 1991":

SEC. 408. Subject matter for Amicable Settlement; Exception Thereto. — The lupon of each
barangay shall have authority to bring together the parties actually residing in the same city or
municipality for amicable settlement of all disputes except:

(a) Where one party is the government of any subdivision or instrumentality thereof;

(b) Where one party is a public officer or employee, and the dispute relates to the
performance of his official functions;

(c) Offenses punishable by imprisonment exceeding one (1) year or a fine exceeding Five
Thousand pesos (P5,000.00);

(d) Offenses where there is no private offended party;

(e) Where the dispute involves real property located in different cities or municipalities unless
the parties thereto agree to submit their differences to amicable settlement by an appropriate
lupon;
 (f) Disputes involving parties who actually reside in barangays of different cities or
municipalities, except where such barangay units adjoin each other and the parties thereto
agree to submit their differences to amicable settlement by an appropriate lupon;

(g) Such other classes of disputes which the President may determine in the interest of
justice or upon recommendation of the Secretary of Justice. marie

The court in which the non-criminal cases not falling within the authority of the lupon under this Code
are filed may, at any time before trial, motu proprio refer the case to the lupon concerned for
amicable settlement.

SEC. 409. Venue. - (a) Disputes between persons actually residing in the same barangay shall be
brought for amicable settlement before the lupon of said barangay.

(b) Those involving actual residents of different barangays within the same city of
municipality shall be brought in the barangay where the respondent or any of the
respondents actually resides, at the election of the complainant.

(c) All disputes involving real property or any interest therein shall be brought in the
barangay where the real property or the larger portion thereof is situated.

(d) Those arising at the workplace where the contending parties are employed or at the
institution where such parties are enrolled for study shall be brought in the barangay where
such workplace or institution is located.

Objections to venue shall be raised in the mediation proceedings before the punong barangay;
otherwise, the same shall be deemed waived. Any legal question which may confront the punong
barangay in resolving objections to venue herein referred to may be submitted to the Secretary of
Justice or his duly designated representative whose ruling thereon shall be binding.

They argued that under §408(f), in relation to §409(c), where the parties to a dispute involving real
property or any interest therein are not actual residents of the same city or municipality or of
adjoining barangays, prior resort to barangay conciliation is not required.

However, respondent denied the motion. In her order dated September 9, 1997, respondent stated:

The Court after taking into consideration the Motion for Reconsideration and the ground relied upon
by the counsel finds that counsel for the plaintiffs failed to correlate Sections 408 and 409 of
Republic Act No. 7160 and to consider Rule VIII, paragraph (a) of the Katarungang Pambarangay
Rules, the rules and regulations [of] which were promulgated to implement Sections 399 to 422,
Chapter 7, Title One Book III and Section 515, Book IV of R.A. No. 7160, otherwise known as the
Katarungang Pambarangay Law, to wit:

"RULE VIII - PRE-CONDITION FOR FORMAL ADJUDICATION

Conciliation, pre-condition for filing of complaint in court or government office. novero

(a) No individual may go directly to court or to any government office for adjudication of his dispute
with another individual upon any matter falling within the authority of the Punong Barangay or
Pangkat ng Tagapagkasundo to settle under these Rules, unless, after personal confrontation of the
parties before them earnest efforts to conciliate have failed to result in a settlement or such
settlement has been effectively repudiated."

and also Rule VI, Section 3 paragraph (c) of the same Katarungang Pambarangay Rules which
provides:

"Rule VI - Amicable Settlement of Disputes

Section 3. Venue. The place of settlement shall be subject to the following rules:

....

(c) Dispute involving real property shall be brought for settlement in the Barangay where the real
property or larger portion thereof is situated.

From the provisions of the above-cited Rules it was very clear that parties whose disputes involved
real property should first br[ing] the said dispute before the barangay where the property was
located, and that [because of] failure to bring the dispute before the Barangay for conciliation no
action may be filed in court for final adjudication of the said dispute.

That parties should first comply with the provisions of the Katarungang Pambarangay Law before the
Court can acquire jurisdiction over the complaint. That non-compliance of the plaintiff to the
requirement of the Katarungang Pambarangay Law was admitted by her in paragraph 3 of the
complaint. Her allegation of non-compliance with the mandatory requirement of Lupon Conciliation
before the filing of the complaint, in a way divest[s] the Court of its jurisdiction over the case. In the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 16, Section 1, paragraph (j) provides:

"That a condition precedent for filing the claim has not been complied with"

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Motion for Reconsideration is hereby denied.

Complainant alleges that in dismissing Civil Case No. 295, respondent judge committed "(a) Grave
abuse of authority by knowingly rendering an unjust and unlawful order; (b) Ignorance of the law in
its highest order, she being a judge; (c) Grave disobedience to the jurisprudence laid down by the
Supreme Court of the Philippines on the matter of exemption of lupon conciliation of contending
parties who are not residen[ts] of the same city or municipality." He states that respondent
"practically threw several decisions of the Supreme Court on the matter out of the window and
obviously followed hook, line and sinker the arguments of the [defendant] Daria Galleros."

In answer, respondent judge claims that she merely followed the law in dismissing the case. She
prays that the complaint against her be dismissed and that complainant be ordered to stop harassing
her just because he had not been able to obtain the relief he wanted in Civil Case No. 295. nigel

In its memorandum dated February 29, 2000, the Office of the Court Administrator recommends the
dismissal of this case on the ground that the "issue [raised] is purely judicial and is best resolved by
a court of competent jurisdiction" and that, even if respondent had erred, she should not be held
administratively liable since there is no allegation that she acted in bad faith or knowingly rendered
an unjust judgment.
In Tavora v. Veloso, this Court already ruled that where parties do not reside in the same city or
1 

municipality or in adjoining barangays, there is no requirement for them to submit their dispute
involving real property to the Lupong Tagapamayapa. As explained in that case:

The sole issue raised is one of law: Under the given facts, is the respondent judge barred from
taking cognizance of the ejectment case pursuant to Sec. 6 of PD 1508 establishing a system of
amicably settling disputes at the barangay level? The section reads:

"SECTION. 6. Conciliation, precondition to filing of complaint. - No complaint, petition, action or

proceeding involving any matter within the authority of the Lupon as provided in Section 2 hereof
shall be filed or instituted in court or any other government office for adjudication unless there has
been a confrontation of the parties before the Lupon Chairman or the Pangkat and no conciliation or
settlement has been reached as certified by the Lupon Secretary or the Pangkat Secretary, attested
by the Lupon or Pangkat Chairman, or unless the settlement has been repudiated. . . ." (Italics
supplied)

For the above provision to be operative, the controversy must be within the jurisdiction of the Lupong
Tagapayapa (Lupon or Barangay court). On this point, the relevant provisions of PD 1508 are:

"SECTION 2. Subject matters for amicable settlement. - The Lupon of each barangay shall have
authority to bring together the parties actually residing in the same city or municipality for amicable
settlement of all disputes except:

(1) Where one party is the government, or any subdivision or instrumentality thereof;

(2) Where one party is a public officer or employee, and the dispute relates to the
performance of his official functions;

(3) Offenses punishable by imprisonment exceeding 30 days, or a fine exceeding P200.00;

(4) Offenses were there is no private offended party;

(5) Such other classes of disputes which the Prime Minister may in the interest of justice
determine, upon recommendation of the Minister of Justice and the Minister of Local
Government. ella

"SECTION 3. Venue. — Disputes between or among persons actually residing in the same
barangay shall be brought for amicable settlement before the Lupon of said barangay. Those
involving actual residents of different barangays within the same city or municipality shall be brought
in the barangay where the respondent or any of the respondents actually resides, at the election of
the complainant. However, all disputes which involve real property or any interest therein shall be
brought in the barangay where the real property or any part thereof is situated.

"The Lupon shall have no authority over disputes:

(1) involving parties who actually reside in barangays of different cities or municipalities, except
where such barangays adjoin each other; and

(2) involving real property located in different municipalities." (Italics supplied)

The foregoing provisions are quite clear. Section 2 specifies the conditions under which the Lupon of
a barangay "shall have authority" to bring together the disputants for amicable settlement of their
dispute: The parties must be "actually residing in the same city or municipality." At the same time,
Section 3 — while reiterating that the disputants must be "actually residing in the same barangay" or
in "different barangays within the same city or municipality" — unequivocably declares that the
Lupon shall have "no authority" over disputes "involving parties who actually reside in barangays
of different cities or municipalities," except where such barangays adjoin each other.

Thus, by express statutory inclusion and exclusion, the Lupon shall have no jurisdiction over
disputes where the parties are not actual residents of the same city or municipality, except where the
barangays in which they actually reside adjoin each other.

It is true that immediately after specifying the barangay whose Lupon shall take cognizance of a
given dispute, Sec. 3 of PD 1508 adds:

"However, all disputes which involve real property or any interest therein shall be brought in the
barangay where the real property or any part thereof is situated."

Actually, however, this added sentence is just an ordinary proviso and should operate as such.
marinella

The operation of a proviso, as a rule, should be limited to its normal function, which is to restrict or
vary the operation of the principal clause, rather than expand its scope, in the absence of a clear
indication to the contrary.2

To be sure, the Court was interpreting in that case the provisions of P.D. No. 1508 which, except for
some modifications, are applicable to the case before respondent judge because they are now found
in §§408-409 of R.A. No. 7160 which took effect on January 1, 1992. The ruling in Tavora v. Veloso,
reiterated in other cases, should be familiar to the bench and the bar. As we have held in Espiritu v.
3 

Jovellanos, the phrase "Ignorance of the law excuses no one" has a special application to judges
4 

who, under the injunction of Canon 1.01 of the Code of Judicial Conduct, "should be the embodiment
of competence, integrity, and independence." In Bacar v. De Guzman, it was held that when the law
5 

violated is basic, the failure to observe it constitutes gross ignorance. Reiterating this ruling, it was
emphasized in Almeron v. Sardido that the disregard of an established rule of law amounts to gross
6 

ignorance of the law and makes the judge subject to disciplinary action.

In the case at bar, respondent showed patent ignorance ¾ if not disregard ¾ of this Court’s rulings
on the jurisdiction of the Lupong Tagapamayapa by her erroneous quotations of the provisions of the
Katarungang Pambarangay Rules implementing R.A. No. 7160. While a judge may not be held
administratively accountable for every erroneous order or decision he renders, his error may be so
gross or patent that he should be administratively disciplined for gross ignorance of the law and
incompetence.

In this case, respondent at first cited P.D. No. 1508, §3 as basis of her action. When her attention
was called to the fact that this had been repealed by §409(c) of R.A. No. 7160, respondent, who
obviously was more intent in justifying her previous order than correcting her error, quoted out of
context the provisions of the Katarungang Pambarangay Rules implementing the Katarungang
Pambarangay provisions of R.A. No. 7160. She thus violated Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial
Conduct which provides that "In every case, a judge shall endeavor diligently to ascertain the facts
and the applicable law unswayed by partisan interest, public opinion or fear of criticism."
Contrary to respondent’s interpretation, it is clear even from the Katarungang Pambarangay Rules
that recourse to barangay conciliation proceedings is not necessary where the parties do not reside
in the same municipality or city or in adjoining barangays. Rule VI of the same states in pertinent
part:

SECTION 2. Subject matters for settlement. - All disputes may be the subject of proceedings for
amicable settlement under these rules except the following enumerated cases:

(a) Where one party is the government, or any subdivision or instrumentality thereof; alonzo

(b) Where one party is a public officer or employee, and the dispute relates to the
performance of his official functions;

(c) Offenses for which the law prescribes a maximum penalty of imprisonment exceeding
one (1) year or a fine exceeding Five Thousand pesos (P5,000.00);

(d) Offenses where there is no private offended party;

(e) Where the dispute involves real properties located in different cities or municipalities
unless the parties thereto agree to submit their differences to amicable settlement by an
appropriate lupon;

(f) Disputes involving parties who actually reside in barangays of different cities or

municipalities, except where such barangay units adjoin each other and the parties thereto to
agree to submit their differences to amicable settlement by an appropriate lupon;

(g) Such other classes of disputes which the President may determine in the interest of
justice or upon the recommendation of the Secretary of Justice.

The foregoing exceptions notwithstanding, the court in which non-criminal cases not falling within the
authority of the lupon under these Katarungang Pambarangay Law and Rules are filed may, at any
time before trial, motu proprio refer the case to the lupon concerned for amicable settlement.

SECTION 3. Venue. The place of settlement shall be subject to the following rules:

(a) Where the parties reside in the same barangay, the dispute shall be brought for
settlement in said barangay;

(b) Where the parties reside in different barangays in the same city or municipality, the
dispute shall be settled in the barangay where the respondent or any one of the respondents
actually resides, at the choice of the complainant;

(c) Dispute involving real property shall be brought for settlement in the barangay where the
real property or larger portion thereof is situated;

(d) Disputes arising at the workplace where the contending parties are employed or at the
institution where such parties are enrolled for study, shall be brought in the barangay where
such workplace or institution is located;
 (e) Any objection relating to venue shall be raised before the Punong Barangay during the
mediation proceedings before him. Failure to do so shall be deemed a waiver of such
objection;

(f) Any legal question which may confront the Punong Barangay in resolving objections to
venue herein referred to may be submitted to the Secretary of Justice, or his duly designated
representative, whose ruling thereon shall be binding. brando

(Emphasis added)

Indeed, these provisions, which are also found in P.D. No. 1508, have already been authoritatively
interpreted by this Court, and the duty of respondent judge was to follow the rulings of this Court.
Her insistence on her own interpretation of the law can only be due either to an ignorance of this
Court’s ruling or to an utter disregard thereof. We choose to believe that her failure to apply our
rulings to the case before her was simply due to gross ignorance which, nevertheless, is
inexcusable. In accordance with the ruling in Ting v. Atal, in which a judge who was similarly found
7 

guilty of gross ignorance of the law was fined P2,000.00, respondent judge should likewise be fined
the same amount.

WHEREFORE, respondent is hereby found guilty of gross ignorance of the law and is hereby
ordered to pay a FINE of TWO THOUSAND (P2,000.00) PESOS with a WARNING that repetition of
the same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely.

SO ORDERED.
A.C. No. 6296 November 22, 2005

ATTY. EVELYN J. MAGNO, Complainant,

vs.
ATTY. OLIVIA VELASCO-JACOBA, Respondent.

RESOLUTION

GARCIA, J.:

In her sworn complaint, as endorsed by the President of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP),
Nueva Ecija Chapter, Atty. Evelyn J. Magno charged Atty. Olivia Velasco-Jacoba, a member of the
same IBP provincial chapter, with willful violation of (a) Section 415 of the Local Government Code
(LGC) of 1991 and (b) Canon 4 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

This disciplinary case arose out of a disagreement that complainant had with her uncle, Lorenzo
Inos, over a landscaping contract they had entered into. In a bid to have the stand-off between them
settled, complainant addressed a letter, styled "Sumbong",1 to Bonifacio Alcantara, barangay captain
of Brgy. San Pascual, Talavera, Nueva Ecija. At the barangay conciliation/confrontation proceedings
conducted on January 5, 2003, respondent, on the strength of a Special Power of Attorney signed by
Lorenzo Inos, appeared for the latter, accompanied by his son, Lorenzito. Complainant’s objection to
respondent’s appearance elicited the response that Lorenzo Inos is entitled to be represented by a
lawyer inasmuch as complainant is herself a lawyer. And as to complainant’s retort that her being a
lawyer is merely coincidental, respondent countered that she is appearing as an attorney-in-fact, not
as counsel, of Lorenzo Inos.

Complainant enumerated specific instances, with supporting documentation, tending to prove that
respondent had, in the course of the conciliation proceedings before the Punong Barangay, acted as
Inos Lorenzo’s counsel instead of as his attorney-in-fact. This is what complainant said in her
complaint: 2

5. xxx Atty. Olivia Jacoba asked for an ocular inspection of the subject matter of the complaint. A
heated argument took place because Lorencito Inos said that [complainant’s brother] Melencio
Magno, Jr. made alterations in the lagoon …. Afterwards Atty. Olivia Jacoba . . . returned to the
barangay hall to have the incident recorded in the barangay blotter.... attached as Annex "A"

6. That on January 12, 2003, … Lorenzo Inos appeared before the hearing also with the assistance
of [respondent]. When the minutes of the proceeding (sic) was read, [respondent] averred that the
minutes is partial in favor of the complainant because only her statements were recorded for which
reason, marginal insertions were made to include what [respondent] wanted to be put on record. She
also signed as "saksi" in the minutes ….

7. xxx In a letter (answer to the "sumbong") sent to the Punong Barangay dated December 22, 2002,
she signed representing herself as "Family Legal Counsel of Inos Family", a copy of the letter is
attached as Annex "C" . . . . (Words in bracket added.)

In an Order dated February 17, 2003, Atty. Victor C. Fernandez, IBP Director for Bar Discipline,
directed the respondent to submit, within fifteen (15) days from notice, her answer to the complaint,
otherwise she will be considered as in default.3
The case, docketed as CBD No. 03-1061, was assigned to Commissioner Rebecca Villanueva-
Maala, who admitted respondent’s answer notwithstanding her earlier order of July 15, 2003,
declaring respondent in default for failure to file an answer in due time.4

In her Answer, respondent alleged that the administrative complaint was filed with the Office of
the Punong Barangay, instead of before the Lupong Tagapamayapa, and heard by Punong
Barangay Bonifacio Alcantara alone, instead of the collegial Lupon or a conciliation panel known
as pangkat. Prescinding from this premise, respondent submits that the prohibition against a lawyer
appearing to assist a client in katarungan pambarangay proceedings does not apply. Further, she
argued that her appearance was not as a lawyer, but only as an attorney-in-fact.

In her report dated October 6, 2003,5 Commissioner Maala stated that the "charge of complainant
has been established by clear preponderance of evidence" and, on that basis, recommended that
respondent be suspended from the practice of her profession for a period of six (6) months. On the
other hand, the Board of Governors, IBP Commission on Bar Discipline, while agreeing with the
inculpatory finding of the investigating commissioner, recommended in its Resolution No. XVI-2003-
235,6 a lighter penalty, to wit:

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, the Report and
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein made part of
this Resolution/Decision as Annex "A"; and, finding the recommendation fully supported by the
evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules, with modification, and considering
respondent's actuations was in violation of Section 415 which expressly prohibits the presence and
representation by lawyers in the Katarungan Pambarangay, Atty. Olivia Velasco-Jacoba is
hereby ADMONISHED.

This resolution is now before us for confirmation.

Section 415 of the LGC of 19917, on the subject Katarungang Pambarangay, provides:

Section 415. Appearance of Parties in Person. - In all katarungang pambarangay proceedings, the

parties must appear in person without the assistance of the counsel or representative, except for
minors and incompetents who may be assisted by their next of kin who are not lawyers.

The above-quoted provision clearly requires the personal appearance of the parties in katarungan
pambarangay conciliation proceedings, unassisted by counsel or representative. The rationale
behind the personal appearance requirement is to enable the lupon to secure first hand and direct
information about the facts and issues,8 the exception being in cases where minors or incompetents
are parties. There can be no quibbling that laymen of goodwill can easily agree to conciliate and
settle their disputes between themselves without what sometimes is the unsettling assistance of
lawyers whose presence could sometimes obfuscate and confuse issues.9 Worse still, the
participation of lawyers with their penchant to use their analytical skills and legal knowledge tend to
prolong instead of expedite settlement of the case.

The prohibition against the presence of a lawyer in a barangay conciliation proceedings was not, to
be sure, lost on respondent. Her defense that the aforequoted Section 415 of the LGC does not
apply since complainant addressed her Sumbong to the barangay captain of Brgy. San Pascual who
thereafter proceeded to hear the same is specious at best. In this regard, suffice it to state that
complainant wrote her Sumbong with the end in view of availing herself of the benefits of barangay
justice. That she addressed her Sumbong to the barangay captain is really of little moment since the
latter chairs the Lupong Tagapamayapa.10
Lest it be overlooked, the prohibition in question applies to all katarungan barangay proceedings.
Section 412(a)11 the LGC of 1991 clearly provides that, as a precondition to filing a complaint in
court, the parties shall go through the conciliation process either before the lupon chairman or
the lupon or pangkat. As what happened in this case, the punong barangay, as chairman of
the Lupon Tagapamayapa, conducted the conciliation proceedings to resolve the disputes between
the two parties.

Given the above perspective, we join the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline in its determination that
respondent transgressed the prohibition prescribed in Section 415 of the LGC. However, its
recommended penalty of mere admonition must have to be modified. Doubtless, respondent’s
conduct tended to undermine the laudable purpose of the katarungan pambarangay system. What
compounded matters was when respondent repeatedly ignored complainant’s protestation against
her continued appearance in the barangay conciliation proceedings.

WHEREFORE, Atty. Olivia Velasco-Jacoba is hereby FINED in the amount of Five Thousand Pesos
(₱5,000.00) for willful violation of Section 415 of the Local Government Code of 1991
with WARNING that commission of similar acts of impropriety on her part in the future will be dealt
with more severely.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-60367 September 30, 1982

ATTY. VENUSTIANO T. TAVORA, petitioner,

vs.
HON. ROSARIO R. VELOSO, in her capacity as the Presiding Judge of Branch III of the City
Court of Manila, and JULIETA CAPATI, respondents.

PLANA, J.:

Venustiano T. Tavora, a resident of Marikina, Metro Manila, owns an apartment in Quiapo, Manila
which he has leased to Julieta Capati, a resident of Quiapo. On account of alleged violations of the
lease agreement by the lessee (unauthorized subleasing and failure to pay rent), the lessor filed on
January 12, 1981 an ejectment suit (Civil Case No. 060828) in the City Court of Manila. The
defendant filed a motion t/ dismiss on the sole ground of lack of jurisdiction for failure of the plaintiff
to bring the dispute first to the barangay court for possible amicable settlement under PD 1508.
Parenthetically, there is no question that there has been no attempt to amicably settle the dispute
between Tavora and Capati at the barangay level.

After denying the motion to dismiss as well as a subsequent motion for reconsideration, the
municipal court reversed itself and dismissed the ejectment case.

Alleging grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction, petitioner Tavora has come to
this Court on certiorari and mandamus praying that the order of dismissal be set aside and that
respondent judge be ordered to hear and decide the case.

The sole issue raised is one of law: Under the given facts, is the respondent judge barred from
taking cognizance of the ejectment case pursuant to Sec-6 of PD 1508 establishing a system of
amicably settling disputes at the barangay level? The section reads:

SECTION 6. Conciliation, precondition to filing of complaint. — No complaint,

petition, action or proceeding involving any matter within the authority of the
Lupon as provided in Section 2 hereof shall be filed or instituted in court or any other
government office for adjudication unless there has been a confrontation of the
parties before the Lupon Chairman or the Pangkat and no conciliation or settlement
has been reached as certified by the Lupon Secretary or the Pangkat Secretary,
attested by the Lupon or Pangkat Chairman, or unless the settlement has been
repudiated ... (Emphasis supplied.)

For the above provision to be operative, the controversy must be within the jurisdiction of the Lupong
Tagapayapa (Lupon or Barangay court). On this point, the relevant provisions of PD 1508 are:

SECTION 2. Subject matters for amicable settlement. — The Lupon of each

barangay shall have authority to bring together the parties actually residing in the
same city or municipality for amicable settlement of all disputes except:

(1) Where one party is the government, or any subdivision or instrumentality thereof;

(2) Where one party is a public officer or employee, and the dispute relates to the
performance of his official functions;
 (3) Offenses punishable by imprisonment exceeding 30 days, or a fine exceeding
P200.00;

(4) Offenses where there is no private offended party;

(5) Such other classes of disputes which the Prime Minister may in the interest of
justice determine, upon recommendation of the Minister of Justice and the Minister of
Local Government.

SECTION 3. Venue. — Disputes between or among persons actually residing in the

same barangay shall be brought for amicable settlement before the Lupon of said
barangay. Those involving actual residents of different barangays within the same
city or municipality shall be brought in the barangay where the respondent or any of
the respondents actually resides, at the election of the complainant. However, all
disputes which involve real property or any interest therein shall be brought in the
barangay where the real property or any part thereof is situated.

The Lupon shall have no authority over disputes:

(1) involving parties who actually reside in barangays of different cities or

municipalities, except where such barangays adjoin each other; and

(2) involving real property located in different municipalities. (Emphasis supplied.)

The foregoing provisions are quite clear. Section 2 specifies the conditions under which the Lupon of
a barangay "shall have authority" to bring together the disputants for amicable settlement of their
dispute: The parties must be "actually residing in the same city or municipality." At the same time,
Section 3 — while reiterating that the disputants must be "actually residing in the same barangay" or
in "different barangays within the same city or municipality — unequivocably declares that the Lupon
shall have "no authority" over disputes "involving parties who actually reside in barangays
of different cities or municipalities," except where such barangays adjoin each other.

Thus, by express statutory inclusion and exclusion, the Lupon shall have no jurisdiction over
disputes where the parties are not actual residents of the same city or municipality, except where the
barangays in which they actually reside adjoin each other,

It is true that immediately after specifying the barangay whose Lupon shall take cognizance of a
given dispute, Sec. 3 of PD 1508 adds:

However, all disputes which involve real property or any interest therein shall be
brought in the barangay where the real property or any part thereof is situated.

Actually, however, this added sentence is just an ordinary proviso and should operate as such. The
operation of a proviso, as a rule, should be limited to its normal function, which is to restrict or vary
the operation of the principal clause, rather than expand its scope, in the absence of a clear
indication to the contrary.

The natural and appropriate office of a proviso is . . . to except something from the
enacting clause; to limit, restrict, or qualify the statute in whole or in part; or to
exclude from the scope of the statute that which otherwise would be within its terms.
(73 Am Jur 2d 467.)
Therefore, the quoted proviso should simply be deemed to restrict or vary the rule on
venue prescribed in the principal clauses of the first paragraph of Section 3, thus: Although venue is
generally determined by the residence of the parties, disputes involving real property shall be
brought in the barangay where the real property or any part thereof is situated, notwithstanding that
the parties reside elsewhere within the same city/municipality.

In the instant case, the plaintiff in the ejectment case (petitioner herein) is a resident of Marikina,
while the defendant (private respondent) is a resident of Quiapo. No Lupon therefore is authorized to
take cognizance of their dispute.

Finding the petition to be meritorious, the dismissal of Civil Case No. 060828 (ejectment) by the
respondent Judge being predicated upon a misconstruction of PD 1508, the same should be
granted. (Co Tiamco vs. Diaz, 75 Phil. 672.)

Accordingly, the assailed order of dismissal dated February 22, 1982 as well as the order dated
March 23, 1982 denying reconsideration thereof, are hereby set aside; and the respondent Judge is
directed to hear and decide the aforesaid ejectment case on its merits. Costs against private
respondents.

SO ORDERED.