EMMANUEL SINACA vs.

  MIGUEL MULA

Facts:

In the 11 May 1998 elections, the two opposing factions of the ruling party LAKAS-NUCD-
UMPD (LAKAS) filled in separate candidates for the position of mayor of the Municipality of
Malimano, Surigao del Norte. One faction headed by Robert Z. Barbers (BARBERS Wing)
nominated Grachil G. Canoy (CANOY), while the other group lead by Francisco T. MATUGAS
(MATUGAS Wing) endorsed the candidacy of Teodoro F. Sinaca, Jr. (TEODORO).

Miguel H. Mula (MULA), a candidate for vice-mayor and belonging to the BARBERS Wing, filed
before the COMELEC a petition for disqualification against TEODORO which was docketed as
SPA 98-021. The Second Division of the COMELEC issued a resolution disqualifying TEODORO
as candidate for mayor of the Municipality of Malimono, Surigao del Norte and ordering the
cancellation of his certificate of candidacy because of prior conviction of bigamy, a crime
involving moral turpitude.

TEODORO filed a motion for reconsideration of the aforesaid resolution. On even date, herein
petitioner Emmanuel D. Sinaca, (EMMANUEL), an independent candidate, withdrew his
certificate of candidacy for Sangguniang Bayan Member, joined and became a member of the
LAKAS party and was nominated by the LAKAS MATUGAS Wing as the substitute mayoralty
candidate for the Municipality of Malimono, Surigao del Norte. On the basis of said nomination,
EMMANUEL filed his certificate of candidacy attached thereto is his certificate of nomination as
LAKAS mayoralty candidate signed by Governor Francisco T. MATUGAS (MATUGAS), as party
provincial chairman together with EMMANUEl’s written acceptance of the party’s nomination.

MULA filed through mail another petition for disqualification, this time against EMMANUEL,
which was received by the COMELEC on 14 May 1998 and was docketed as SPA No. 98-292. In
his petition MULA contended that the nomination of EMMANUEL as substitute candidate is
illegal on the following grounds:

a) The substitute, before he filed his Certificate of Candidacy as LAKAS candidate, was an
independent candidate. Being so, he cannot rightfully substitute the disqualified one;

b) The nomination of respondent substitute bears only the approval of Provincial Chairman
Matugas and without consultation and consent of the higher political hierarchy especially Mr.
Robert Ace Barbers who has also a say on nomination of candidates within his jurisdiction,

c) Substitution generally takes place when by reason of a candidates disqualification the party
to which he belongs loses such representation. In the instant case, the disqualification did not
at all prejudice LAKAS NUCD-UMDP because Mr. Garchil G. Canoy is still there representing
the party after the disqualification. The substitution is a redundancy and not necessary under
the circumstances, more so that it was done with malice and without the required consensus
of the political hierarchy.

In his answer, EMMANUEL moved for the dismissal of the petition for the following reasons:

a) The petition does not state a cause of action as it is not based on any of the grounds for
disqualification

b) The issue of who in LAKAS has the authority to nominate candidates for local officials, is an
intra-party matter hence beyond the jurisdiction of the Comelec;
c) Gov. Matugas was duly authorized by LAKAS as its Provincial Chairman and official
candidate for Provincial Governor to nominate the partys local candidates; and

d) The petition is already moot and academic because of the proclamation of EMMANUEL as
mayor of the Municipality of Malimono, Surigao del Norte.

The COMELEC Second Division dismissed the petition for disqualification and upheld the
candidacy for mayor of EMMANUEL. 

MULA filed a motion for reconsideration raising in the main that the signature alone of
MATUGAS in the nomination was not sufficient

The COMELEC en banc issued a Resolution which set aside the resolution dated 28 May 1998
of the Second Division and disqualified EMMANUEL

Issue:

1. WON Petitioners’ nomination as a substitute candidate was regular and valid

2. WON MATUGAS has no authority to nominate a candidate without the concurrence of

BARBERS

Held:

I.

It is necessary, among others, that the substitute candidate must be of the same political party
as the original candidate and must be duly nominated as such by the political party.

In the instant case, there was substantial compliance with the above said requirements.
EMMANUEL was properly nominated as substitute candidate by the LAKAS party MATUGAS
wing to which TEODORO, the disqualified candidate, belongs. That EMMANUEL is a bona
fide member of the LAKAS party is shown not only by the certificate of membership, which is
being controverted for having been presented as new evidence for the first time before this
court, but more importantly by his certificate of candidacy filed before the COMELEC stating
therein that he belongs to the LAKAS party.

The certificate of candidacy of EMMANUEL permitted the placing of his name before the
electorate. It constituted an authorized badge, which the voter could scrutinize before casting
his ballot. Thus, with the declaration of EMMANUEL in his certificate of candidacy that he is
affiliated with the LAKAS party, he was effectively voted by the electorate not as an independent
candidate, but as a member of the LAKAS party. His allegation in the certificate of candidacy as
to political party to which he belongs is sufficient to make the electorate conscious of the
platform of the said political party.

The fact that EMMANUEL was an independent candidate prior to his nomination is immaterial.
What is more significant is that he had previously withdrawn his certificate of candidacy as
independent candidate for Sangguniang member before he filed his certificate of candidacy as a
substitute for TEODORO at which time he was, for all intents and purposes, already deemed a
member of the LAKAS party MATUGAS wing. As such, EMMANUEL is obliged to pursue and
carry out the partys ideology, political ideas and platforms of government. As the official
candidate of an organized political party, he is bound by the partys rule. He owes loyalty to the
party, its tenet and its policies, its platforms and programs of government. To the electorate he
represents the party, its principles, ideals and objectives.

Even the fact that EMMANUEL only became a member of the LAKAS party after the
disqualification of TEODORO, will not affect the validity of the substitution. There is nothing in
the Constitution or the statute which requires as a condition precedent that a substitute
candidate must have been a member of the party concerned for a certain period of time before
he can be nominated as such. Section 77 of the Omnibus Election Code only mandates that a
substitute candidate should be a person belonging to and certified by the same political party
as the candidate to be replaced. We cannot provide for an additional requirement or condition
not provided under the said provision without encroaching into the domain of the legislative
department.

II.

It is devoid of merit.

Firstly, MATUGAS, was designated by the LAKAS National Headquarters through its Deputy
Secretary General and National Secretariat Executive Director Reynaldo L. Maclang, as the
party officer authorized to nominate, sign, attest under oath, and issue Certificates of
Nomination and Acceptance for the Partys official candidates for the positions of Board
Members, City Councilors, Municipal Mayors, Vice-mayors and councilors for the Province of
Surigao del Norte.

This authorization which was dated March 26, 1998 replaced and/or modified the former
authorization given by the party to both BARBERS and MATUGAS.19 Both BARBERS and
MATUGAS were given separate and distinct authorizations when the mother of BARBERS ran
for governor against MATUGAS.

Secondly, there are only two official candidates for mayor of Malimono, Surigao del Norte,
namely TEODORO and CANOY,20 both of whom are members of the LAKAS party but from
different factions. TEODORO was indorsed by the MATUGAS wing and CANOY by the
BARBERS Wing. The certificates of candidacy of these candidates were never questioned
despite the fact that they belong to the same political party and were separately and
independently endorsed by either BARBERS or MATUGAS. Therefore, if the absence of a joint
nomination is to be considered fatal to the validity of the certificate of candidacy of TEODORO
or CANOY, then there would in effect no candidates running for mayor in the Municipality of
Malimono, Surigao del Norte.

Verily, it stands to reason that with the disqualification of TEODORO, who is a member of the
LAKAS MATUGAS wing, the substitute must come from the same faction as the candidate to be
substituted and since it was MATUGAS who indorsed the nomination of TEODORO, then
MATUGAS nomination of EMMANUEL in substitution of TEODORO is sufficient and in order.

JOEL G. MIRANDA vs. ANTONIO M. ABAYA

Facts:

Jose "Pempe" Miranda, then incumbent mayor of Santiago City, Isabela, filed his certificate of
candidacy for the same mayoralty post for the synchronized May 11, 1998 elections
Private respondent Antonio M. Abaya filed a Petition to Deny Due Course to and/or Cancel
Certificate of Candidacy which was docketed as SPA No. 98-019. The petition was GRANTED
by the Comelec in its resolution dated May 5, 1998. The Comelec further ruled to DISQUALIFY
Jose "Pempe" Miranda.

On May 6, 1998, way beyond the deadline for filing a certificate of candidacy, petitioner Joel G.
Miranda filed his certificate of candidacy for the mayoralty post, supposedly as a substitute for
his father, Jose "Pempe" Miranda.

During the May 11, 1998 elections; petitioner and private respondent vied for the mayoralty
seat, with petitioner garnering 22,002 votes, 1,666 more votes than private respondent who got
only 20,336 votes.

On May 13, 1998, private respondent filed a Petition to Declare Null and Void Substitution with
Prayer for Issuance of Writ of Preliminary Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining Order,
which was docketed as SPA No. 98-288. He prayed for the nullification of petitioner's certificate
of candidacy for being void ab initio because the certificate of candidacy of Jose "Pempe"
Miranda, whom petitioner was supposed to substitute, had already been cancelled and denied
due course.

On May 16, 1998, Comelec's First Division dismissed SPA No. 98-288 motu proprio. Private
respondent moved for reconsideration. On December 8, 1998, the Comelec En Banc rendered
the assailed decision, resolving to GRANT the motion for reconsideration, thus nullifying the
substitution by petitioner Joel G. Miranda of his father as candidate for the mayoralty post of
Santiago City.

Issue: WON Comelec's action nullifying the substitution by and proclamation of petitioner for
the mayoralty post of Santiago City, Isabela is proper and legally sound.

Held:

Under the foregoing rule, there can be no valid substitution for the latter case, much in the
same way that a nuisance candidate whose certificate of candidacy is denied due course
and/or cancelled may not be substituted. If the intent of the lawmakers were otherwise, they
could have so easily and conveniently included those persons whose certificates of candidacy
have been denied due course and/or cancelled under the provisions of Section 78 of the Code.

More importantly, under the express provisions of Section 77 of the Code, not just any person,
but only "an official candidate of a registered or accredited political party" may be substituted.
In Bautista vs. Comelec (G.R. No. 133840, November 13, 1998) this Court explicitly ruled that
"a cancelled certificate does not give rise to a valid candidacy" (p.13).

A person without a valid certificate of candidacy cannot be considered a candidate in much the
same way as any person who has not filed any certificate of candidacy at all can not, by any
stretch of the imagination, be a candidate at all.

The law clearly provides:

Sec. 73. Certificate of candidacy — No person shall be eligible for any elective

public office unless he files a sworn certificate of candidacy within the period
fixed herein.
By its express language, the foregoing provision of law is absolutely mandatory. It is but logical
to say that any person who attempts to run for an elective office but does not file a certificate of
candidacy, is not a candidate at all. No amount of votes would catapult him into office.
In Gador vs.  Comelec (95 SCRA 431 [1980]), the Court held that a certificate of candidacy filed
beyond the period fixed by law is void, and the person who filed it is not, in law, a candidate.
Much in the same manner as a person who filed no certificate of candidacy at all and a person
who filed it out of time, a person whose certificate of candidacy is cancelled or denied due
course is no candidate at all. No amount of votes should entitle him to the elective office
aspired for.

The evident purposes of the law in requiring the filing of certificates of candidacy and in fixing
the time limit therefor are: (a) to enable the voters to know, at least sixty days before the
regular election, the candidates among whom they are to make the choice, and (b) to avoid
confusion and inconvenience in the tabulation of the votes cast. For if the law did not confine
the choice or election by the voters to the duly registered candidates, there might be as many
persons voted for as there are voters, and votes might be cast even for unknown or fictitious
persons as a mark to identify the votes in favor of a candidate for another office in the same
election.

It is at once evident that the importance of a valid certificate of candidacy rests at the very core
of the electoral process. It cannot be taken lightly, lest there be anarchy and chaos. Verily, this
explains why the law provides for grounds for the cancellation and denial of due course to
certificates of candidacy.

All told, a disqualified candidate may only be substituted if he had a valid certificate of
candidacy in the first place because, if the disqualified candidate did not have a valid and
seasonably filed certificate of candidacy, he is and was not a candidate at all. If a person was
not a candidate, he cannot be substituted under Section 77 of the Code. Besides, if we were to
allow the so-called "substitute" to file a "new" and "original" certificate of candidacy beyond the
period for the filing thereof, it would be a crystalline case of unequal protection of the law, an
act abhorred by our Constitution.

PABLO C. VILLABER vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

Facts:

Both petitioner Villaber and respondent Douglas R. Cagas were rival candidates for a
congressional seat in the First District of Davao del Sur during the May 14, 2001 elections.
Villaber filed his certificate of candidacy for Congressman on February 19, 2001, while Cagas
filed his on February 28, 2001.

On March 4, 2001, Cagas filed with the Office of the Provincial Election Supervisor,
Commission on Elections (COMELEC), Davao del Sur, a consolidated petition to disqualify
Villaber and to cancel the latter's certificate of candidacy. Cagas alleged in the said
consolidated petition that on March 2, 1990, Villaber was convicted by the Regional Trial Court
of Manila, Branch 15, in Criminal Case No. 86-46197 for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22
and was sentenced to suffer one (1) year imprisonment. The check that bounced was in the
sum of P100,000.00. Cagas further alleged that this crime involves moral turpitude; hence,
under Section 12 of the Omnibus Election Code, he is disqualified to run for any public office.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC Decision.

Undaunted, Villaber filed with this Court a petition for review on certiorari assailing the Court
of Appeals Decision, docketed as G. R. No. 106709. However, in its Resolutionof October 26,
1992, this Court (Third Division) dismissed the petition. On February 2, 1993, our Resolution
became final and executory.7 Cagas also asserted that Villaber made a false material
representation in his certificate of candidacy that he is "Eligible for the office I seek to be
elected " - which false statement is a ground to deny due course or cancel the said certificate
pursuant to Section 78 of the Omnibus Election Code.

In his answers to the disqualification suit, Villaber countered mainly that his conviction has
not become final and executory because the affirmed Decision was not remanded to the trial
court for promulgation in his presence. Furthermore, even if the judgment of conviction was
already final and executory, it cannot be the basis for his disqualification since violation of B.P.
Blg. 22 does not involve moral turpitude.

The case was forwarded to the COMELEC, Manila, for resolution.1âwphi1.nêt

COMELEC (Second Division), finding merit in Cagas' petition, issued the challenged
Resolution in SPA A 01-058 declaring Villaber disqualified as "a candidate for and from holding
any elective public office" and canceling his certificate of candidacy. Hence, this petition.

Issue: WON violation of B.P. Blg. 22 involves moral turpitude.

Held:

As to the meaning of "moral turpitude," we have consistently adopted the definition in Black's
Law Dictionary as "an act of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the private duties which a man
owes his fellow men, or to society in general, contrary to the accepted and customary rule of
right and duty between man and woman, or conduct contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or
good morals."13

In In re Vinzon,14 the term "moral turpitude" is considered as encompassing "everything

which is done contrary to justice, honesty , or good morals."

The determination of whether a crime involves moral turpitude is a question of fact and
frequently depends on all the circumstances surrounding the violation of the statute.

In the case at bar, petitioner does not assail the facts and circumstances surrounding the
commission of the crime. In effect, he admits all the elements of the crime for which he was
convicted. At any rate, the question of whether or not the crime involves moral turpitude can
be resolved by analyzing its elements alone, as we did in Dela Torre which involves the crime
of fencing punishable by a special law.18

Petitioner was charged for violating B.P. Blg. 22 under the following Information:

"That on or about February 13, 1986, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said
accused did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously make or draw and issue
to Efren D. Sawal to apply on account or for value Bank of Philippine Islands (Plaza
Cervantes, Manila) Check No. 958214 dated February 13, 1986 payable to Efren D.
Sawal in the amount of P100,000.00, said accused well knowing that at the time of
issue he did not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for
payment of such check in full upon its presentment, which check, when
presented for payment within ninety (90) days from the date thereof, was
subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds, and
despite receipt of notice of such dishonor, said accused failed to pay said Efren D.
 Sawal the amount of said check or to make arrangement for full payment of the
same within five (5) banking days after receiving said notice." (Emphasis ours)

He was convicted for violating Section 1 of B.P. Blg. 22 provides :

"SECTION 1. Checks without sufficient funds. - Any person who makes or draws and
issues any check to apply on account or for value, knowing at the time of issue that
he does not have sufficient funds in or credit with the drawee bank for the
payment of such check in full upon its presentment, which check is subsequently
dishonored by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds or credit or would have been
dishonored for the same reason had not the drawer, without any valid reason, ordered
the bank to stop payment, shall be punished by imprisonment of not less than thirty
days but not more than one (1) year or by a fine of not less than but not more than
double the amount of the check which fine shall in no case exceed Two Hundred
Thousand Pesos, or both such fine and imprisonment at the discretion of the court."
(Emphasis ours).

The elements of the offense under the above provision are:

1. The accused makes, draws or issues any check to apply to account or for value;

2. The accused knows at the time of the issuance that he or she does not have
sufficient funds in, or credit with, the drawee bank for the payment of the check
in full upon its presentment; and

3. The check is subsequently dishonored by the drawee bank for insufficiency of funds
or credit, or it would have been dishonored for the same reason had not the drawer,
without any valid reason, ordered the bank to stop payment.19

The presence of the second element manifests moral turpitude. In People vs. Atty. Fe
Tuanda we held that a conviction for violation of B.P. BIg. 22 "imports deceit" and "certainly
relates to and affects the good moral character of a person.…" The effects of the issuance of a
worthless check, as we held in the landmark case of Lozano vs. Martinez, through Justice
Pedro L. Yap, "transcends the private interests of the parties directly involved in the transaction
and touches the interests of the community at large. The mischief it creates is not only a wrong
to the payee or holder, but also an injury to the public" since the circulation of valueless
commercial papers "can very well pollute the channels of trade and commerce, injure the
banking system and eventually hurt the welfare of society and the public interest.” Thus,
paraphrasing Black's definition, a drawer who issues an unfunded check deliberately reneges
on his private duties he owes his fellow men or society in a manner contrary to accepted and
customary rule of right and duty, justice, honesty or good morals.

AMADO S. BAGATSING vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

Facts:

Petitioners Amado S. Bagatsing, Ernesto M. Maceda and Jaime Lopez and herein private
respondent Jose L. Atienza were candidates for the position of Mayor of Manila in the May 11,
1998 elections.

On May 18, 1998, seven (7) days after the elections, petitioners filed with the COMELEC a
complaint for disqualification against private respondent, on the ground that the latter
allegedly caused the disbursement of public funds in the amount of Three Million Three
Hundred Seventy-Five Thousand (P3,375,000.00) Pesos, more or less, within the prohibited
forty-five-day period before the elections in violation of Article 22, Section 261 (g) (2) 1 of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 881, otherwise known as the Omnibus Election Code of the Philippines. The
alleged disbursement was intended to be distributed in the form of financial assistance to the
public school teachers of the City of Manila who manned the precinct polls in that city during
the elections.

On May 20, 1998, the COMELEC (First Division)  issued an order suspending the proclamation
of private respondent

On May 21, 1998, private respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration and sought to set
aside the afore-quoted order directing the suspension of his proclamation as mayor.

On June 4, 1998, the COMELEC (First Division) * handed down a resolution granting the
motion for reconsideration

That same day at around eleven o'clock in the morning, petitioners filed a Motion to Suspend
Immediate Intended Proclamation of Respondent. In the afternoon of the same day, petitioners
likewise filed a Motion for Reconsideration and a Second Motion to Suspend Immediate
Intended Proclamation of Respondent before COMELEC en banc.

Meanwhile, the City Board of Canvassers of Manila reconvened at three o'clock in the afternoon
of the same day, June 4, 1998, and proclaimed private respondent as the duly elected Mayor of
the City of Manila. 

On June 25, 1999, without waiting for the resolution of their motion for reconsideration
pending before the COMELEC en banc, petitioners filed the instant petition to set aside the
June 4, 1998 resolution of the COMELEC's First Division.

Records reveal, however, that said motion for reconsideration pending before the COMELEC en
banc was denied in its Order of July 2, 1998 at the instance of herein petitioners themselves
for the reason that they had already filed a petition before this Court docketed as G.R. No.
134047. 

The instant petition seeks to strike down as having been issued with grave abuse of discretion
COMELEC First Division Resolution dated June 4, 1998 dismissing the petition for
disqualification and referring the case to the COMELEC's Law Department for preliminary
investigation, based on COMELEC Resolution No. 2050. Petitioners contend that Resolution
No. 2050 had already been nullified by the decision of this Court in Sunga vs. Comelec. 7 Such
being the case, petitioners argue that the COMELEC should be compelled by mandamus to
assume jurisdiction and continue to hear and decide the disqualification case.

Issues:

1. WON Resolution No. 2050 had already been nullified by the decision of this Court
in Sunga vs. Comelec.
2. WON the proclamation of private respondent on June 4, 1998 is void because it was
made "without awaiting for the lapse of the five-day period for the finality of decisions
rendered by a division in special actions,"

Held:
I.

Resolution No. 2050 covers two (2) different aspects:

First, as contemplated in paragraph 1, a complaint for disqualification filed before the

election which must be inquired into by the COMELEC for the purpose of determining whether
the acts complained of have in fact been committed. Where the inquiry results in finding before
the election, the COMELEC shall order the candidate's disqualification. In case the complaint
was not resolved before the election, the COMELEC may motu propio or on motion of any the
parties, refer the said complaint to the Law Department of the COMELEC for preliminary
investigation.

Second, as laid down in paragraph 2, a complaint for disqualification filed after the

election against a candidate (a) who has not yet been proclaimed as winner, or (b) who has
already been proclaimed as winner. In both cases, the complaint shall be dismissed as a
disqualification case but shall referred to the Law Department of the COMELEC for preliminary
investigation. However, if before proclamation, the Law Department makes a prima
facie finding of guilt and the corresponding information has been filed with the appropriate trial
court, the complainant may file a petition for suspension of the proclamation of the respondent
with the court before which the criminal case is pending and the said court may order the
suspension of the proclamation if the evidence of guilt is strong.

Petitioners contend that Resolution No. 2050, upon which the COMELEC anchored its
dismissal of the disqualification case, is no longer a good law since it has been nullified
in toto by this Court  in Sunga v. COMELEC. 

Contrary to petitioners' contention, nowhere did the Court strike down COMELEC Resolution
No. 2050 in Sunga.

The ruling in Sunga is not applicable to the case at bar. There, the complaint for
disqualification was filed prior to the May 8, 1995 elections. Under Section 6 of R.A. 6646,
where the complaint was filed before the election but for any reason, a candidate is not
declared by final judgment before the election to be disqualified and he is voted for and receives
the winning number of votes in such election, the COMELEC shall continue with the trial and
hearing of the case. Thus, the facts in Sunga fall under the contemplation of Section 6, namely:
(1) the complaint for disqualification was filed before the election; (2) for any reason, the issue
of disqualification was not finally resolved before the election; and (3) the candidates sought to
be disqualified is voted for and received the winning number of votes. Consequently, the
COMELEC should have continued with the hearing and decided the case on the merits.
Instead, COMELEC erroneously dismissed the disqualification case and referred the matter to
the Law Department for preliminary investigation of the criminal aspect of the case.

In sharp contrast, the complaint for disqualification against private respondent in the case at
bar was lodged on May 18, 1998 or seven (7) days after the 1998 elections. Pursuant to
paragraph 2 of Resolution No. 2050, the complaint shall be dismissed as a disqualification case
and shall be referred for preliminary investigation to the Law Department of the COMELEC.
Under this scenario, the complaint for disqualification is filed after the election which may be
either before or after the proclamation of the respondent candidate.

The COMELEC in Sunga obviously misapplied Resolution No. 2050 in dismissing the

disqualification case therein simply because it remained unresolved before the election and, in
lieu thereof; referring it to its Law Department for possible criminal prosecution of the
respondent for violation of the election laws. Notably, there is nothing in paragraph 1 of
Resolution No. 2050 which directs the dismissal of the disqualification case not resolved before
the election. It says the COMELEC "may motu propio or on motion of any of the parties, refer
the complaint to the Law Department of the Commission as an instrument of the latter in the
exercise of its exclusive power to conduct a preliminary investigation of all cases involving
criminal infractions of the election laws." The referral to the Law Department is discretionary
on the part of the COMELEC and in no way may it be interpreted that the COMELEC will
dismiss the disqualification case or will no longer continue with the hearing of the same. The
reason for this is that a disqualification case may have two (2) aspects, the administrative,
which requires only a preponderance of evidence to prove disqualification, and the criminal,
which necessitates proof beyond reasonable doubt to convict. Where in the opinion of the
COMELEC, the acts which are grounds for disqualification also constitute a criminal offense or
offenses, referral of the case to the Law Department is proper.

II.

The mere filing of a petition for disqualification is not a ground to suspend the proclamation of
the winning candidate. In the absence of an order suspending proclamation, the winning
candidate who is sought to be disqualified is entitled to be proclaimed as a matter of law. This
is clear from Section 6 of R.A. 6646 providing that the proclamation of the candidate sought to
be disqualified is suspended only if there is an order of the COMELEC suspending
proclamation. Here, there was no order suspending private respondent's proclamation.
Consequently, private respondent was legally proclaimed on June 4, 1998.

Neither did the COMELEC err in not ordering the suspension of private respondent's
proclamation. The second paragraph of paragraph 2 of Resolution No. 2050 provides that
where a complaint is filed after the elections but before proclamation as in this case, the
complaint must be dismissed as a disqualification case but shall be referred to the Law
Department for preliminary investigation. If before the proclamation, the Law Department
makes a prima facie finding of guilt and the corresponding information has been filed with the
appropriate trial court, the complainant may file a petition for suspension of the proclamation
of respondent with the court before which the criminal case is pending and that court may
order the suspension of the proclamation if the evidence of guilt is strong. It appearing that
none of the foregoing circumstances obtain herein as there is no prima facie finding of guilt yet,
a suspension of private respondents proclamation is not warranted. The mere pendency of a
disqualification case against a candidate, and a winning candidate at that, does not justify the
suspension of his proclamation after winning in the election. To hold otherwise would unduly
encourage the filing of baseless and malicious petitions for disqualification if only to effect the
suspension of the proclamation of the winning candidate, not only to his damage and prejudice
but also to the defeat of the sovereign will the electorate, and for the undue benefit of
undeserving third parties. 1

Before we end, we take note that when petitioners filed the instant petition on June 25, 1999,
they had before the COMELEC en banc a pending motion for reconsideration of the June 4,
1998 resolution of the First Division. The Court does not look with favor the practice of seeking
remedy from this Court without waiting for the resolution of the pending action before the
tribunal below, absent extraordinary circumstances warranting appropriate action by this
Court. This makes a short shift of established rules of procedure intended for orderly
administrative of justice.

The COMELEC (First Division) in its June 4, 1998 resolution correctly referred petitioners'
complaint for disqualification to its Law Division for appropriate action. There being no
temporary restraining order from this Court, that body as an instrument of the COMELEC
should have continued with its task of determining whether or not there exist probable cause
to warrant the criminal prosecution of those who may be liable for the alleged election offenses.
MARCITA MAMBA PEREZ vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS 

Facts:

On March 26, 1998, private respondent filed his certificate of candidacy for Representative of
the Third District of Cagayan in the May 11, 1998 elections. Four days later, on March 30,
1998, Petitioner, as a voter and citizen, filed in the COMELEC a petition for the disqualification
of private respondent as a candidate on the ground that he had not been a resident of the
district for at least one (1) year immediately before the day of the elections as required by Art.
VI, 6 of the Constitution.

In support of her claim, petitioner presented private respondents certificates of candidacy 1 for
governor of Cagayan in the 1988, 1992, and 1995 elections; his voters affidavit which he used
in the 1987, 1988, 1992, 1995, and 1997 elections; and his voter registration record dated
June 22, 1997, in all of which it is stated that he is a resident of Barangay Calaoagan Dackel,
Municipality of Gattaran, which is outside the Third District of Cagayan. Petitioner alleged that
private respondent filed an application for the transfer of his registration as voter from
Gattaran, Cagayan (First District) to Tuguegarao, Cagayan (Third District) only on December
17, 1997 and that said application was approved only on January 7, 1998. Petitioner prayed
that in the event the case was not finally decided before the elections and private respondent
obtained the highest number of votes, the latters proclamation be suspended.

In his answer, private respondent claimed that while he had been a resident of Gattaran,
Cagayan in 1990, he transferred his residence to Tuguegarao, Cagayan by renting an
apartment at No. 13-E Magallanes St., Tuguegarao, Cagayan, in order to hide his mistress from
public view because, at that time, his marriage to his former wife was still subsisting. In
support of his claim, he presented the affidavit of the owner of the apartment, Engineer Alfredo
Ablaza, in which it is stated that private respondent had been his lessee since July 1990. In
addition, private respondent presented the contract of lease6 of another residential apartment
at Kamias Street, Tanza, Tuguegarao, Cagayan, for the period July 1, 1995 to June 30, 1996,
between him, as lessee, and Tomas T. Decena, as lessor; his marriage license dated January 7,
1997; the marriage certificate between him and his present wife, Lerma Dumaguit, dated
January 18, 1998; the birth certificate of their daughter, Geniah Laureen D. Aguinaldo; and
various letters, all of which show that he had been a resident of Tuguegarao, Cagayan for at
least one (1) year before the May 11, 1998 elections.

On May 10, 1998, the First Division of the COMELEC, in a unanimous resolution, dismissed
the petition for disqualification.

On May 11, 1998, private respondent was elected Representative of the Third District of
Cagayan, with 65,058 votes over his rival Manuel N. Mambas 58,507 votes. Accordingly, on
May 16, 1998, he was proclaimed elected and, on May 17, 1998, he was sworn in office.

On May 22, 1998, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration reiterating her allegation that
private respondent lacked the requisite residency in the Third District of Cagayan and arguing
that the proclamation of private respondent was not a legal impediment to the continuation of
the hearing on her motion in view of R.A. No. 6646, 6. Her motion was, however, denied by the
COMELEC en banc in its resolution of June 11, 1998. Hence, this petition.

Petitioner contends that the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in holding that
private respondent had been a resident of Tuguegarao, Cagayan since July 1990 when he
rented an apartment there in order to hide his mistress. Petitioner contends that transfer of
residence to the place where private respondent is keeping his mistress cannot amount to a
change of domicile because ones domicile is the place where one and ones legitimate family
resides. She also argues that private respondent could not have changed his residence to
Tuguegarao in 1990 considering that his certificates of candidacy for governor of Cagayan in
the 1988, 1992, and 1995 elections, as well as his voter registration records, the latest of
which was made on June 22, 1997, indicate that he is a resident of Gattaran, which is in the
First District of Cagayan. Petitioner avers that in the absence of clear and positive proof, ones
domicile of origin should be deemed to continue and that to successfully effect a change of
domicile, one must prove an actual change of domicile, a bonafide intention of abandoning the
former place of residence and of establishing a new one, and unequivocal acts which
correspond with the intention.

Issue: WON private respondent is eligible for the office of Representative of the Third District of
Cagayan

Held:

In the case at bar, the COMELEC found that private respondent changed his residence from
Gattaran to Tuguegarao, the capital of Cagayan, in July 1990 on the basis of the following: (1)
the affidavit of Engineer Alfredo Ablaza, the owner of the residential apartment at 13-E
Magallanes St., Tuguegarao, Cagayan, where private respondent had lived in 1990; (2) the
contract of lease between private respondent, as lessee, and Tomas T. Decena, as lessor, of a
residential apartment at Kamias St., Tanza, Tuguegarao, Cagayan, for the period July 1, 1995
to June 30, 1996; (3) the marriage certificate, dated January 18, 1998, between private
respondent and Lerma Dumaguit; (4) the certificate of live birth of private respondents second
daughter; and (5) various letters addressed to private respondent and his family, which all
show that private respondent was a resident of Tuguega

rao, Cagayan for at least one (1) year immediately preceding the elections on May 11, 1998.

There is thus substantial evidence supporting the finding that private respondent had been a
resident of the Third District of Cagayan and there is nothing in the record to detract from the
merit of this factual finding.

Petitioner contends that the fact that private respondent was a resident of Gattaran, at least
until June 22, 1997, is shown by the following documentary evidence in the record, to wit: (1)
his certificates of candidacy for governor of Cagayan in the 1988, 1992 and 1995 elections; (2)
his voters registration records, the latest of which was made on June 22, 1997; and (3) the fact
that private respondent voted in Gattaran, Cagayan, in the elections of 1987, 1988, 1992 and
1995.

The contention is without merit. The fact that a person is registered as a voter in one district is
not proof that he is not domiciled in another district. Thus, in Faypon v. Quirino,17 this Court
held that the registration of a voter in a place other than his residence of origin is not sufficient
to consider him to have abandoned or lost his residence.

Nor is it of much importance that in his certificates of candidacy for provincial governor in the
elections of 1988, 1992, and 1995, private respondent stated that he was a resident of
Gattaran. Under the law,18 what is required for the election of governor is residency in the
province, not in any district or municipality, one year before the election.

FRANCIS PANCRATIUS N. PANGILINAN vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

Facts:

The petitioner Francis Pancratius N. Pangilinan and private respondent Feliciano Belmonte, Jr.
were both candidates for congressman in the fourth legislative district of Quezon City in the 11
May 1992 elections.

Elmer Candano and Jose Umali, Jr. as registered voters of the fourth legislative district of
Quezon City, filed with the COMELEC a petition for disqualification 1 against the private
respondent for violation of Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code of the Philippines (B. P.
Blg. 881), alleging inter alia that: (a) during a rally held on 1 April 1992 at Agno Street,
Barangay Tatalon, Quezon City, private respondent boasted and acknowledged that he gave
one (1) sack of rice, P5,000.00 and medicines to the community and had made available to
them the services of a lawyer, (b) similarly, in Barangay San Vicente, during the coronation
night of 4 April 1992 of the winner of the Miss San Vicente pageant, private respondent gave
tickets for two to Hongkong to the winner, Miss Ana Marie Debil.

Acting upon said petition, the respondent COMELEC referred the same to its Law Department
(Investigation and Prosecution Division) for preliminary investigation.

On 20 May 1992, the petitioner herein together with the petitioners/complainants in SPA Case
No. 92-127 filed in the said case an Urgent Motion to Suspend Canvass and/or
Proclamation, alleging therein that the election returns for the fourth district of Quezon City
were being canvassed by the City Board of Canvassers and that in order that the petition for
disqualification against private respondent may not become moot and academic, there was
need for an immediate order directing the City Board of Canvassers of Quezon City to suspend
at once the canvassing of the election returns and the proclamation of the winning candidate
for Representative of the fourth district of Quezon City. The COMELEC, however, failed to act
on the said motion.

Five (5) other petitions for disqualification against private respondent were filed with the
COMELEC, for violation of Section 68 of the Omnibus Election Code outlawing the giving of
money or other material consideration to influence, induce or corrupt the voters and Section
261(k) of the same Code making it unlawful to solicit votes during the day of the election.

During the canvass of the returns, the petitioner, thru his counsel, objected to over 120
election returns being canvassed by the City Board of Canvassers on the ground that they were
tampered, altered or spurious. The City Board of Canvassers, however, overruled petitioner's
objections on the ground that under Section 15 of R.A. No. 7166 and Section 23 of COMELEC
Resolution No. 2413, entitled "General Instructions for the Provincial/City/District and
Municipal Board of Canvassers" pre-proclamation controversies are not allowed in the election
of members of the House of Representatives.

The Board of Canvassers created canvassing committees to canvass the returns. The petitioner
objected to the creation of such committees on the ground that he was not duly informed
thereof and was not given the opportunity to appoint watchers and/or counsel before the said
committees.

The Board of Canvassers, however, ignored the petitioner's objections and proceeded to
canvass the returns.

The petitioner, therefore, filed the present petition.

Issues: WON COMELEC Resolution No. 2413 disallowing pre-proclamation
controversies in the election of members of the House of Representatives are unconstitutional.

Held:

The petitioner claims that the Constitution vests in the COMELEC the power to hear and
decide pre-proclamation controversies without distinction as to whether the pre-proclamation
controversy involves the election of Members of the House of Representatives or provincial or
local elective officials. Hence, the petitioner concludes, the phrase "pre-proclamation
controversies" in Sec. 3, Article IX-C of the 1987 Constitution embraces all pre-proclamation
controversies, including pre-proclamation controversies involving the election of Members of
the House of Representatives.

We do not accept petitioner's contention, Sec. 3, Article IX-C of the 1987 Constitution should
be read in relation to Sec. 2, Article IX-C of the same Constitution.

The Constitution vests in the COMELEC "exclusive original jurisdiction over all contest relating
to the elections, returns, and qualifications of all elective regional, provincial and city officials."
It has no jurisdiction over contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of
Members of the House of Representatives. On the other hand, under Sec. 17, Article VI of the
1987 Constitution, the Electoral Tribunal of the House of Representatives is the "sole judge of
all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications" of its members. Consequently,
the phrase "including pre-proclamation controversies" used in Sec. 3, Article IX-C of the
Constitution should be construed as referring only to "pre-proclamation controversies" in
election cases that fall within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the COMELEC, i.e., election
cases pertaining to the election of regional, provincial and city officials.

Since the 1973 Constitution has been replaced by the 1987 Constitution, the Batasang
Pambansa stands abolished and the legislative power is now vested in the Congress of the
Philippines consisting of the Senate and the House of Representatives. The Senate and the
House of Representatives now have their respective Electoral Tribunals which are the "sole
judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their respective
Members,"9 thereby divesting the Commission on Elections of its jurisdiction under the 1973
Constitution over election cases pertaining to the election of the Members of the Batasang
Pambansa (Congress). It follows that the COMELEC is now bereft of jurisdiction to hear and
decide pre-proclamation controversies against members of the House of Representatives as well
as of the Senate.

Finally, the private respondent Feliciano Belmonte, Jr. has already been proclaimed as the
winner in the fourth district of Quezon City. He has taken his oath of office and assumed his
duties as representative; hence, the remedy open to the petitioner was to have filed an electoral
protest with the Electoral Tribunal of the House of Representatives.

JUAN DOMINO, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

Facts:

DOMINO filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of Representative of the Lone
Legislative District of the Province of Sarangani indicating in item nine (9) of his certificate that
he had resided in the constituency where he seeks to be elected for one (1) year and two (2)
months immediately preceding the election.
Private respondents Narciso Ra. Grafilo, Jr., Eddy B. Java, Juan P. Bayonito, Jr., Rosario
Samson and Dionisio P. Lim, Sr., fied with the COMELEC a Petition to Deny Due Course to or
Cancel Certificate of Candidacy, which was assigned to the Second Division of the COMELEC.
Private respondents alleged that DOMINO, contrary to his declaration in the certificate of
candidacy, is not a resident, much less a registered voter, of the province of Sarangani where
he seeks election

For his defense, DOMINO maintains that he had complied with the one-year residence
requirement and that he has been residing in Sarangani since January 1997. DOMINO
presented before the COMELEC copy of the Decision dated January 19, 1998, of the
Metropolitan Trial Court of Metro Manila, Branch 35, Quezon City, in Exclusion proceeding
where the court declare the registration of petitioners as voters of Precinct No. 4400-A,
Barangay Old Balara, in District III Quezon City as completely erroneous as petitioners were no
longer residents of Quezon City but of Alabel, Sarangani where they have been residing since
December 1996;

On 6 May 1998, the COMELEC 2nd Division promulgated a resolution declaring DOMINO
disqualified as candidate for the position of representative of the lone district of Sarangani for
lack of the one-year residence requirement and likewise ordered the cancellation of his
certificate of candidacy.

On 11 May 1998, the day of the election, the COMELEC issued Supplemental Omnibus
Resolution No. 3046, ordering that the votes cast for DOMINO be counted but to suspend the
proclamation if winning, considering that the Resolution disqualifying him as candidate had
not yet become final and executory.

The result of the election, per Statement of Votes certified by the Chairman of the Provincial
Board of Canvassers, shows that DOMINO garnered the highest number of votes over his
opponents for the position of Congressman of the Province of Sarangani.

DOMINO filed a motion for reconsideration of the Resolution dated 6 May 1998, which was
denied by the COMELEC en banc. Hence, the present Petition for Certiorari with prayer for
Preliminary Mandatory Injunction alleging, in the main, that the COMELEC committed grave
abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction when it ruled that he did not
meet the one-year residence requirement.

On 14 July 1998, acting on DOMINO's Motion for Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order,
the Court directed the parties to maintain the status quo prevailing at the time of the filing of
the instant petition.9

On 15 September 1998, Lucille L. Chiongbian-Solon, (hereafter INTERVENOR), the candidate

receiving the second highest number of votes, was allowed by the Court to
Intervene.10 INTERVENOR in her Motion for Leave to Intervene and in her Comment in
Intervention 11 is asking the Court to uphold the disqualification of petitioner Juan Domino and
to proclaim her as the duly elected representative of Sarangani in the 11 May 1998 elections.

Issue:

1. WON the decision of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City in the exclusion
proceedings declaring him a resident of the Province of Sarangani and not of Quezon
City is final and conclusive upon the COMELEC
2. WON DOMINO a resident of the Province of Sarangani for at least one year immediately
preceding the 11 May 1998 election as stated in his certificate of candidacy
 3. WON COMELEC has jurisdiction
4. WON Lucille L. Chiongbian-Solon, as the candidate who received the next highest
number of votes, be proclaimed as the winning candidate

Held:

I.

The determination of the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City in the exclusion proceedings
as to the right of DOMINO to be included or excluded from the list of voters in the precinct
within its territorial jurisdicton, does not preclude the COMELEC, in the determination of
DOMINO's qualification as a candidate, to pass upon the issue of compliance with the
residency requirement.

The proceedings for the exclusion or inclusion of voters in the list of voters are summary in
character. Thus, the factual findings of the trial court and its resultant conclusions in the
exclusion proceedings on matters other than the right to vote in the precinct within its
territorial jurisdiction are not conclusive upon the COMELEC. Although the court in inclusion
or exclusion proceedings may pass upon any question necessary to decide the issue raised
including the questions of citizenship and residence of the challenged voter, the authority to
order the inclusion in or exclusion from the list of voters necessarily caries with it the power to
inquire into and settle all matters essential to the exercise of said authority. However, except
for the right to remain in the list of voters or for being excluded therefrom for the particular
election in relation to which the proceedings had been held, a decision in an exclusion or
inclusion proceeding, even if final and unappealable, does not acquire the nature of res
judicata.1 In this sense, it does not operate as a bar to any future action that a party may take
concerning the subject passed upon in the proceeding.1 Thus, a decision in an exclusion
proceeding would neither be conclusive on the voter's political status, nor bar subsequent
proceedings on his right to be registered as a voter in any other election.

Moreover, the Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City in its 18 January decision exceeded its
jurisdiction when it declared DOMINO a resident of the Province of Sarangani, approved and
ordered the transfer of his voter's registration from Precinct No. 4400-A of Barangay Old
Balara, Quezon City to precinct 14A1 of Barangay Poblacion, Alabel, Sarangani. It is not within
the competence of the trial court, in an exclusion proceedings, to declare the challenged voter a
resident of another municipality. The jurisdiction of the lower court over exclusion cases is
limited only to determining the right of voter to remain in the list of voters or to declare that the
challenged voter is not qualified to vote in the precint in which he is registered, specifying the
ground of the voter's disqualification. The trial court has no power to order the change or
transfer of registration from one place of residence to another for it is the function of the
election Registration Board as provided under Section 12 of R.A. No. 8189.  The only effect of
the decision of the lower court excluding the challenged voter from the list of voters, is for the
Election Registration Board, upon receipt of the final decision, to remove the voter's registration
record from the corresponding book of voters, enter the order of exclusion therein, and
thereafter place the record in the inactive file

II.

We hold in the negative.

The lease contract entered into sometime in January 1997, does not adequately support a
change of domicile. The lease contract may be indicative of DOMINO's intention to reside in
Sarangani but it does not engender the kind of permanency required to prove abandonment of
one's original domicile. The mere absence of individual from his permanent residence, no
matter how long, without the intention to abandon it does not result in loss or change of
domicile. Thus the date of the contract of lease of a house and lot located in the province of
Sarangani, i.e., 15 January 1997, cannot be used, in the absence of other circumstances, as
the reckoning period of the one-year residence requirement.

Further, Domino's lack of intention to abandon his residence in Quezon City is further
strengthened by his act of registering as voter in one of the precincts in Quezon City. While
voting is not conclusive of residence, it does give rise to a strong presumption of residence
especially in this case where DOMINO registered in his former barangay. Exercising the right of
election franchise is a deliberate public assertion of the fact of residence, and is said to have
decided preponderance in a doubtful case upon the place the elector claims as, or believes to
be, his residence.31 The fact that a party continously voted in a particular locality is a strong
factor in assisting to determine the status of his domicile.

III.

COMELEC, under Sec. 78, Art. IX of the Omnibus Election Code, has jurisdiction over a
petition to deny due course to or cancel certificate of candidacy. Such jurisdiction continues
even after election, if for any reason no final judgment of disqualification is rendered before the
election, and the candidate facing disqualification is voted for and receives the highest number
of votes and provided further that the winning candidate has not been proclaimed or has taken
his oath of office.

It has been repeatedly held in a number of cases, that the House of Representatives Electoral
Tribunal's sole and exclusive jurisdiction over all contests relating to the election, returns and
qualifications of members of Congress as provided under Section 17 of Article VI of the
Constitution begins only after a candidate has become a member of the House of
Representatives. 

The fact of obtaining the highest number of votes in an election does not automatically vest the
position in the winning candidate. A candidate must be proclaimed and must have taken his
oath of office before he can be considered a member of the House of Representatives.

In the instant case, DOMINO was not proclaimed as Congressman-elect of the Lone
Congressional District of the Province of Sarangani by reason of a Supplemental Omnibus
Resolution issued by the COMELEC on the day of the election ordering the suspension of
DOMINO's proclamation should he obtain the winning number of votes. This resolution was
issued by the COMELEC in view of the non-finality of its 6 May 1998 resolution disqualifying
DOMINO as candidate for the position.

Cosidering that DOMINO has not been proclaimed as Congressman-elect in the Lone
Congressional District of the Province of Sarangani he cannot be deemed a member of the
House of Representatives. Hence, it is the COMELEC and not the Electoral Tribunal which has
jurisdiction over the issue of his ineligibility as a candidate.

IV.

It is now settled doctrine that the candidate who obtains the second highest number of votes
may not be proclaimed winner in case the winning candidate is disqualified. In every election,
the people's choice is the paramount consideration and their expressed will must, at all times,
be given effect. When the majority speaks and elects into office a candidate by giving the
highest number of votes cast in the election for that office, no one can be declared elected in
his place.

Sound policy dictates that public elective offices are filled by those who have received the
highest number of votes cast in the election for that office, and it is fundamental idea in all
republican forms of government that no one can be declared elected and no measure can be
declared carried unless he or it receives a majority or plurality of the legal votes cast in the
election.47

The effect of a decision declaring a person ineligible to hold an office is only that the election
fails entirely, that the wreath of victory cannot be transferred 48 from the disqualified winner to
the repudiated loser because the law then as now only authorizes a declaration of election in
favor of the person who has obtained a plurality of votes49 and does not entitle the candidate
receiving the next highest number of votes to be declared elected. In such case, the electors
have failed to make a choice and the election is a nullity.50 To allow the defeated and
repudiated candidate to take over the elective position despite his rejection by the electorate is
to disenfranchise the electorate without any fault on their part and to undermine the
importance and meaning of democracy and the people's right to elect officials of their choice.

ISIDRO B. GARCIA vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

Facts:

During the May 8, 1995 local elections, petitioner Isidro B. Garcia and respondent Augusto M.
Garcia were both candidates for mayor in Taguig, Metro Manila. Claiming that respondent filed
his certificate of candidacy for no other legitimate purpose but to cause confusion and disarray
among the voters of Taguig considering the similarity in their surname, petitioner filed a
petition with the COMELEC for the declaration of respondent as a nuisance candidate
pursuant to Section 69 of the Omnibus Election Code.

In its Resolution, the COMELEC (Second Division) granted the petition and declared
respondent as a nuisance candidate. The COMELEC based its ruling on the following: 1)
dubious veracity of respondent’s certificate of nomination by the PDP-LABAN; 2) failure of
respondent to actively campaign; and 3) the absence of any campaign materials.

Two days after the election, respondent filed a motion for reconsideration with the COMELEC
seeking the reversal of the aforementioned resolution. In the meanwhile, the canvassing of the
election returns proceeded which eventually resulted in the proclamation of petitioner as the
winning candidate. However, another losing candidate, Ricardo Papa filed a petition for
annulment of the proclamation, and an election protest as well, with the COMELEC and the
Regional Trial Court of Pasig, respectively, against petitioner.

COMELEC en banc promulgated the assailed resolution, granting private respondent’s motion
for reconsideration and reversing the previous resolution declaring him a nuisance candidate,
despite admitting that the motion has been rendered moot and academic as a result of
petitioner’s proclamation as winning candidate.

The COMELEC discarded petitioner’s claim that respondent lacked the logistical and
machinery to pursue a serious political campaign due to the absence of propaganda materials,
and ruled that such assumption has no bearing on the qualification of respondent to seek
public office.

Petitioner is now before us seeking nullify and set aside the resolution of the COMELEC en
banc.

Issue: WON COMELEC gravely abused its discretion when it granted respondent’s motion
for reconsideration despite having been rendered moot and academic by the proclamation of
petitioner as duly elected mayor of Taguig

Held:

Well entrenched is the rule that where the issues have become moot and academic, there is no
justiciable controversy, thereby rendering the resolution of the same of no practical use or
value.

Surprisingly, despite respondent COMELEC’s admission that private respondent’s motion for
reconsideration has already been rendered moot and academic due to petitioner’s proclamation
as duly elected mayor of Tagig in the May 8, 1995 elections, it nevertheless resolved to grant
the motion.

Obviously, the assailed resolution would no longer be of any practical use or value to private
respondent considering that he did not even dispute the proclamation of petitioner as the
winning candidate. In fact, even private respondent’s sole purpose in filing his motion for
reconsideration — to regain his legal status as a legitimate and qualified candidate for public
office — has been rendered inconsequential as a result of petitioner’s proclamation.

Petitioner was proclaimed mayor of Tagig as early as May 23, 1995, while the assailed
resolution was promulgated by respondent COMELEC on June 30, 1995. Undoubtedly, there
was more that ample opportunity for the COMELEC to be apprised of supervising events that
rendered private respondent’s motion moot and academic, which in turn should have guided it
to properly deny the motion. But having failed to do so, respondent COMELEC acted with grave
abuse of discretion in granting the motion.

VICTORINO SALCEDO II vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS

Facts:

On February 18, 1968, Neptali P. Salcedo married Agnes Celiz, which marriage is evidenced by
a certified true copy of the marriage contract issued by the Municipal Civil Registrar of Ajuy,
Iloilo. Without his first marriage having been dissolved, Neptali P. Salcedo married private
respondent Ermelita Cacao in a civil ceremony held on September 21, 1986. Two days later, on
September 23, 1986, Ermelita Cacao contracted another marriage with a certain Jesus Aguirre,
as shown by a marriage certificate filed with the Office of the Civil Registrar.

Petitioner Victorino Salcedo II and private respondent Ermelita Cacao Salcedo both ran for the
position of mayor of the municipality of Sara, Iloilo in the May 11, 1998 elections, both of them
having filed their respective certificates of candidacy on March 27, 1998. However, petitioner
filed with the Comelec a petition seeking the cancellation of private respondents certificate of
candidacy on the ground that she had made a false representation therein by stating that her
surname was Salcedo. Petitioner contended that private respondent had no right to use said
surname because she was not legally married to Neptali Salcedo. On May 13, 1998, private
respondent was proclaimed as the duly elected mayor of Sara, Iloilo.

In her answer, private respondent claimed that she had no information or knowledge at the
time she married Neptali Salcedo that he was in fact already married; that, upon learning of his
existing marriage, she encouraged her husband to take steps to annul his marriage with Agnes
Celiz because the latter had abandoned their marital home since 1972 and has not been heard
from since that time; that on February 16, 1998, Neptali Salcedo filed a petition for declaration
of presumptive death before Branch 66 of the Regional Trial Court of Barotac Viejo, Iloilo,
which was granted by the court in its April 8, 1998 decision; that Neptali Salcedo and Jesus
Aguirre are one and the same person; and that since 1986 up to the present she has been
using the surname Salcedo in all her personal, commercial and public transactions.alibräry

Comelec Second Division ruled, by a vote of 2 to 1, that since there is an existing valid
marriage between Neptali Salcedo and Agnes Celiz, the subsequent marriage of the former with
private respondent is null and void. Consequently, the use by private respondent of the
surname Salcedo constitutes material misrepresentation and is a ground for the cancellation of
her certificate of candidacy.

However, in its en banc Resolution, the Comelec overturned its previous resolution, ruling that
private respondents certificate of candidacy did not contain any material misrepresentation.

Issue: WON the use by respondent of the surname Salcedo in her certificate of candidacy
constitutes material misrepresentation under Section 78 in relation to Section 74 of the
Omnibus Election Code.

Held:

In case there is a material misrepresentation in the certificate of candidacy, the Comelec is

authorized to deny due course to or cancel such certificate upon the filing of a petition by any
person pursuant to section 78 of the Code

As stated in the law, in order to justify the cancellation of the certificate of candidacy under
section 78, it is essential that the false representation mentioned therein pertain to a material
matter for the sanction imposed by this provision would affect the substantive rights of a
candidate - the right to run for the elective post for which he filed the certificate of candidacy.
Although the law does not specify what would be considered as a material representation, the
Court has interpreted this phrase in a line of decisions applying section 78 of the Code.

The material misrepresentation contemplated by section 78 of the Code refers to qualifications

for elective office. This conclusion is strengthened by the fact that the consequences imposed
upon a candidate guilty of having made a false representation in his certificate of candidacy are
grave to prevent the candidate from running or, if elected, from serving, or to prosecute him for
violation of the election laws. It could not have been the intention of the law to deprive a person
of such a basic and substantive political right to be voted for a public office upon just any
innocuous mistake.

Petitioner has made no allegations concerning private respondents qualifications to run for the
office of mayor. Aside from his contention that she made a misrepresentation in the use of the
surname Salcedo, petitioner does not claim that private respondent lacks the requisite
residency, age, citizenship or any other legal qualification necessary to run for a local elective
office as provided for in the Local Government Code. Thus, petitioner has failed to discharge
the burden of proving that the misrepresentation allegedly made by private respondent in her
certificate of candidacy pertains to a material matter.

Aside from the requirement of materiality, a false representation under section 78 must consist
of a deliberate attempt to mislead, misinform, or hide a fact which would otherwise render a
candidate ineligible. In other words, it must be made with an intention to deceive the electorate
as to ones qualifications for public office. The use of a surname, when not intended to mislead
or deceive the public as to ones identity, is not within the scope of the provision.

There is absolutely no showing that the inhabitants of Sara, Iloilo were deceived by the use of
such surname by private respondent. Petitioner does not allege that the electorate did not
know who they were voting for when they cast their ballots in favor of Ermelita Cacao Salcedo
or that they were fooled into voting for someone else by the use of such name. It may safely be
assumed that the electorate knew who private respondent was, not only by name, but also by
face and may have even been personally acquainted with her since she has been residing in the
municipality of Sara, Iloilo since at least 1986. Bolstering this assumption is the fact that she
has been living with Neptali Salcedo, the mayor of Sara for three consecutive terms, since 1970
and the latter has held her out to the public as his wife.

We hold that private respondent did not commit any material misrepresentation by the use of
the surname Salcedo in her certificate of candidacy.

SILVERIO R. TAGOLINO vs. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL

Facts:

On November 30, 2009, Richard Gomez filed his certificate of candidacy with the COMELEC,
seeking congressional office as Representative for the Fourth Legislative District of Leyte under
the ticket of the Liberal Party. Subsequently, one of the opposing candidates, Buenaventura
Juntilla (Juntilla), filed a Verified Petition, alleging that Richard, who was actually a resident of
College Street, East Greenhills, San Juan City, Metro Manila, misrepresented in his COC that
he resided in 910 Carlota Hills, Can-adieng, Ormoc City. In this regard, Juntilla asserted that
Richard failed to meet the one (1) year residency requirement under Section 6, Article VI of the
1987 Philippine Constitution and thus should be declared disqualified/ineligible to run for the
said office. In addition, Juntilla prayed that Richard’s CoC be denied due course and/or
cancelled.

COMELEC First Division rendered a Resolution granting Juntilla’s petition without any

qualification.

Aggrieved, Richard moved for reconsideration but the same was denied by the COMELEC En
Banc. Thereafter, in a Manifestation of even date, Richard accepted the said resolution with
finality "in order to enable his substitute to facilitate the filing of the necessary documents for
substitution."

On May 5, 2010, Lucy Marie Torres-Gomez (private respondent) filed her COC together with a
Certificate of Nomination and Acceptance from the Liberal Party endorsing her as the party’s
official substitute candidate vice her husband, Richard, for the same congressional post. In
response to various letter-requests submitted to the COMELEC’s Law Department (Law
Department), the COMELEC En Banc, in the exercise of its administrative functions, issued
Resolution No. 8890 approving, among others, the recommendation of the said department to
allow the substitution of private respondent.
The said resolution was affirmed by the Commission En Banc on May 04, 2010.

The following day, or on May 9, 2010, Juntilla filed an Extremely Urgent Motion for
Reconsideration of the above-mentioned COMELEC En Banc resolution

Pending resolution of Juntilla’s May 9, 2010 Motion, the national and local elections were
conducted as scheduled on May 10, 2010. During the elections, Richards, whose name
remained on the ballots, garnered 101, 250 votes while his opponents, namely, Eufrocino
Codilla, Jr. and herein petitioner Silverio Tagolino, obtained 76,549 and 493 votes,
respectively. In view of the aforementioned substitution, Richard’s votes were credited in favor
of private respondent and as a result, she was proclaimed the duly-elected Representative of
the Fourth District of Leyte.

On May 11, 2010, Juntilla filed an Extremely Urgent Motion to resolve the pending May 9,
2010 Motion relative to Resolution No. 8890. The said motion, however, remained unacted.

On May 24, 2010, petitioner filed a Petition for quo warranto before the HRET in order to oust
private respondent from her congressional seat, claiming that: (1) she failed to comply with the
one (1) year residency requirement under Section 6, Article VI of the Constitution considering
that the transfer of her voter registration from San Rafael Bulacan to the Fourth District of
Leyte was only applied for on July 23, 2009; (2) she did not validly substitute Richard as his
COC was void ab initio; and (3) private respondent’s COC was void due to her non-compliance
with the prescribed notarial requirements i.e., she failed to present valid and competent proof
of her identity before the notarizing officer.

Private respondent denied petitioner’s allegations and claimed that she validly substituted her
husband in the electoral process. She also averred that she personally known to the notary
public who notarized her COC, one Atty. Edgardo Cordeno, and thus, she was not required to
have presented any competent proof of identity during the notarization of the said document.
Lastly, she asserted that despite her marriage to Richard and exercise of profession in Metro
Manila, she continued to maintain her residency in Ormoc City which was the place where she
was born and raised.

After due proceedings, the HRET issued the assailed March 22, 2012 Decision20 which
dismissed the quo warranto petition and declared that private respondent was a qualified
candidate for the position of Leyte Representative (Fourth Legislative District)

Hence, the instant petition.

Issue: WON Richard was validly substituted by private respondent as candidate for Leyte
Representative (Fourth Legislative District) in view of the former’s failure to meet the one (1)
year residency requirement provided under Section 6, Article VI of the Constitution.

Held:

The Omnibus Election Code (OEC) provides for certain remedies to assail a candidate’s bid for
public office. Among these which obtain particular significance to this case are: (1) a petition
for disqualification under Section 68; and (2) a petition to deny due course to and/or cancel a
certificate of candidacy under Section 78. The distinctions between the two are well-perceived.

It must be stressed that one who is disqualified under Section 68 is still technically considered
to have been a candidate, albeit proscribed to continue as such only because of supervening
infractions which do not, however, deny his or her statutory eligibility. In other words, while
the candidate’s compliance with the eligibility requirements as prescribed by law, such as age,
residency, and citizenship, is not in question, he or she is, however, ordered to discontinue
such candidacy as a form of penal sanction brought by the commission of the above-mentioned
election offenses.

On the other hand, a denial of due course to and/or cancellation of a CoC proceeding under
Section 78 of the OEC is premised on a person’s misrepresentation of any of the material
qualifications required for the elective office aspired for. It is not enough that a person lacks the
relevant qualification; he or she must have also made a false representation of the same in the
CoC 

Let it be misunderstood, the denial of due course to or the cancellation of the CoC is not based
on the lack of qualifications but on a finding that the candidate made a material representation
that is false, which may relate to the qualifications required of the public office he/she is
running for. It is noted that the candidates states in his/her CoC that he/she is eligible for the
office he/she seeks. Section 78 of the OEC, therefore, is to be read in relation to the
constitutional and statutory provisions on qualifications or eligibility for public office. If the
candidate subsequently states a material representation in the CoC that is false, the
COMELEC, following the law, is empowered to deny due course to or cancel such certificate.
Indeed, the Court has already likened a proceeding under Section 78 to a quo warranto
proceeding under Section 253 of the OEC since they both deal with the eligibility or
qualification of a candidate, with the distinction mainly in the fact that a "Section 78" petition
is filed before proclamation, while a petition for quo warranto is filed after proclamation of the
winning candidate. (Emphasis supplied)

Corollary thereto, it must be noted that the deliberateness of the misrepresentation, much less
one’s intent to defraud, is of bare significance in a Section 78 petition as it is enough that the
person’s declaration of a material qualification in the CoC be false. In this relation,
jurisprudence holds that an express finding that the person committed any deliberate
misrepresentation is of little consequence in the determination of whether one’s CoC should be
deemed cancelled or not.39 What remains material is that the petition essentially seeks to deny
due course to and/or cancel the CoC on the basis of one’s ineligibility and that the same be
granted without any qualification.40

Pertinently, while a disqualified candidate under Section 68 is still considered to have been a
candidate for all intents and purposes, on the other hand, a person whose CoC had been
denied due course to and/or cancelled under Section 78 is deemed to have not been a
candidate at all. The reason being is that a cancelled CoC is considered void ab initio and thus,
cannot give rise to a valid candidacy and necessarily, to valid votes

Considering that Section 77 requires that there be a candidate in order for substitution to take
place, as well as the precept that a person without a valid CoC is not considered as a candidate
at all, it necessarily follows that if a person’s CoC had been denied due course to and/or
cancelled, he or she cannot be validly substituted in the electoral process. The existence of a
valid CoC is therefore a condition sine qua non for a disqualified candidate to be validly
substituted

Records clearly show that: (1) Richard was held ineligible as a congressional candidate for the
Fourth District of Leyte due to his failure to comply with the one year residency requirement;
(2) Juntilla’s petition prayed for the denial of due course to and/or cancellation of his CoC; and
(3) the COMELEC First Division granted the foregoing petition without any qualification. By
these undisputed and essential facts alone, the HRET should not have adopted the COMELEC
En Banc’s erroneous finding that the COMELEC First Division’s February 17, 2010 Resolution
"speaks only of "disqualification and not of cancellation of Richard’s CoC" and thereby,
sanctioned the substitution of private respondent.

In this case, it is undisputed that Richard was disqualified to run in the May 10, 2010
elections due to his failure to comply with the one year residency requirement. The confusion,
however, stemmed from the use of the word "disqualified" in the February 17, 2010 Resolution
of the COMELEC First Division, which was adopted by the COMELEC En Banc in granting the
substitution of private respondent, and even further perpetuated by the HRET in denying the
quo warranto petition. In short, a finding that Richard was merely disqualified – and not that
his CoC was denied due course to and/or cancelled – would mean that he could have been
validly substitute by private respondent, thereby legitimizing her candidacy.

Yet the fact that the COMELEC First Division’s February 17, 2010 Resolution did not explicitly
decree the denial of due course to and/or cancellation of Richard’s CoC should not have
obviated the COMELEC En Banc from declaring the invalidity of private respondent’s
substitution. It should be stressed that the clear and unequivocal basis for Richard’s
"disqualification" is his failure to comply with the residency requirement under Section 6,
Article VI of the Constitution which is a ground for the denial of due course to and/or
cancellation a CoC under Section 78 of the OEC, misrepresentation contemplated under a
Section 78 petition refers to statements affecting one’s qualifications for elective office such as
age, residence and citizenship or non-possession of natural-born Filipino status. 51 There is
therefore no legal basis to support a finding of disqualification within the ambit of election
laws. Accordingly, given Richard’s non-compliance with the one year residency requirement, it
cannot be mistaken that the COMELEC First Division’s unqualified grant of Juntilla’s "Verified
Petition to Disqualify Candidate for Lack of Qualification" 52 – which prayed that the COMELEC
declare Richard "DISQUALIFIED and INELIGIBLE from seeking the office of Member of the
House of Representatives" and "x x x that his Certificate of Candidacy x x x be DENIED DUE
COURSE and/or CANCELLED" – carried with it the denial of due course to and/or cancellation
of Richard’s CoC pursuant to Section 78.

Case law dictates that if a petition prays for the denial of due course to and/or cancellation of
CoC and the same is granted by the COMELEC without any qualification, the cancellation of
the candidate’s CoC in in order. This is precisely the crux of the Miranda ruling wherein the
Court, in upholding the COMELEC En Banc’s nullification of the substitution in that case,
decreed that the COMELEC Division’s unqualified grant of the petition necessarily included the
denial of due course to and/or cancellation of the candidate’s CoC, notwithstanding the use of
the term "disqualified" in the COMELEC Division’s resolution, as the foregoing was prayed for
in the said petition:

Owing to the lack of proper substitution in its case, private respondent was therefore not a
bona fide candidate for the position of Representative for the Fourth District of Leyte when she
ran for office, which means that she could not have been elected. Considering this
pronouncement, there exists no cogent reason to further dwell on the other issues respecting
private respondent’s own qualification to office.