SCOPE OF SECTION 27 OF INDIAN EVIDENCE ACT

A PROJECT SUBMITTED IN PARTIAL FULFILLMENT OF THE COURSE

OF LAW OF EVIDENCE, SEMESTER-IV DURING THE ACADEMIC YEAR
2017-18.

SUBMITTED BY:
SWETA
1658
B.B.A. LLB

SUBMITTED TO:
DR. SITA RAMA RAO
(FACULTY, LAW OF EVIDENCE)

APRIL, 2018
CHANAKYA NATIONAL LAW UNIVERSITY,
NYAYA NAGAR, MITHAPUR, PATNA-800001

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 DECLARATION BY THE CANDIDATE

I hereby declare that the work reported in the BB.A LLB (Hons), Project Report entitled
“SCOPE OF SECTION 27 OF INDIAN EVIDENCE ACT” submitted at Chanakya National
Law University, Patna is an authentic record of my work carried out under the supervision of
Dr. Sita Rama Rao. I have not submitted this work elsewhere for any other degree or diploma. I
am fully responsible for the contents of my Project Report.

(Signature of the Candidate)

Sweta Kumari
Chanakya National Law University, Patna
10/ 04/ 2018

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 CONTENTS

1. Acknowledgement……………………………………………………4
2. Research Methodology……………………………………………….5
3. Scope of S. 27, IEA…………………………………………………..6
3.1 Principle…………………………………………………….....6
3.2 Object…………………………………………………………7
4. Essential Requirements……………………………………………….9
5. Constitutional Validity……………………………………………….15
5.1 Article 14……………………………………………………..15
5.2 Article 20 (3)………………………………………………....16
6. S. 26 & S. 27 Compared……………………………………………..18
7. Judicial Pronouncements……………………………………………..22
8. Conclusion……………………………………………………………24
9. Bibliography………………………………………………………….26

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 ACKNOWLEDGEMENT

A project is a joint endeavor is to be accomplished with utmost compassion, diligence and with
support of all. Gratitude is a notable response of one’s soul to kindness or help generously
rendered by another and its acknowledgement is the duty and joyance. I am overwhelmed in all
humbleness and gratefulness to acknowledge from the bottom of my heart to all those who have
helped me to put these ideas, well above the level of simplicity and into something concrete
effectively and moreover on time.

This project would not have been completed without effort of my revered Evidence Law teacher
Dr. Sita Rama Rao whose support and guidance was the driving force to successfully complete
this project. I express my heartfelt gratitude to him. Thanks are also due to my parents, family,
friends and all those who helped me in this project in any way. Moreover thanks to all those who
helped me in any way, be it words, presence, encouragement or blessings.

-Sweta kumari
- 4th Semester
-B.B.A LLB

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 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

 Doctrinal or Non Doctrinal

My project is based upon doctrinal method of research. This project has been done after a
thorough research based upon intrinsic and extrinsic aspects of the project.

 Primary or Secondary
This research is totally based on secondary materials as it is based on textbooks, articles
and internet research.

OBJECTIVE OF THE STUDY:

 To understand the scope and relevance of section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act.
 To examine the constitutional validity of this section.

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 SCOPE OF SECTION 27, INDIAN EVIDENCE ACT 1872

There are two exceptions laid down in the Evidence Act so far the admissibility of confession
made by an accused is concerned. First, exception relates to when confession is made by the
accused in immediate presence of a magistrate (Section 26) and the other has been mentioned in
Section 27 i.e. when the confession leads to discoveries of facts. The section permits the proof of
all kinds of information whether contained in a confession or not, and therefore goes beyond the
provisions of Sections 25 and 26.

SECTION 27 OF THE INDIAN EVIDENCE ACT, 1872

How much of information received from accused may be proved:

Provided that, when any fact is deposed to as discovered in consequence of information received
from a person accused of any offence, in the custody of a police officer, so much of such
information, whether it amounts to a confession or not, as relates distinctly to the fact thereby
discovered, may be proved.

PRINCIPLE

Section 27 is based on the principle that if the confession of the accused is supported by the
discovery of a fact then it may be presumed to be true and not to have been extracted. It lays
down that during the period of investigation or during police custody any information is given by
the accused of an offence to the police officer that leads to discover any fact, may be proved
whether such information amounts to confession or not, and obtained under inducement, threat
or promise. It comes into operation only –

 If and when certain fact are deposed to as discovered in consequence of information

received from an accused person in police custody, and
 If the information relates distinctly to the fact discovered.

This section is based on the view that if a fact is actually discovered in consequence of
information given, some guarantee is afforded thereby that the information was true and
accordingly can be safely allowed to be given in evidence. But clearly the extent of the

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information admissible must depend on the exact nature of the fact discovered to which such
information is required to relate.

Under sections 24, 25 and 26 a confession which is inadmissible would be admissible under
section 27 subject to discoveries of facts on the basis of information given by the accused.
Section 27 is by way of proviso to Sections 25 to 26 and a statement even by way of confession
made in police custody which is distinctly relates to the facto discovered in admissible in
evidence agreement the accused.1

OBJECT OF SECTION 27:

Basic object of the section is to provide evidence for admission and such evidence relates to
some sort of discovery of fact. It would appear that under Section 27 as it stands in order to
render evidence holding to discovery of on fact admissible, the information must come from any
accused in custody of the police. It is well settled that recovery of object is not discovery of fact
envisaged in the section. Recovery so made prusuant to discovery statement can be relied upon
to complete chain of events relating to crime.
However, where there is direct evidence by the eye-witness non-recovery of the offending car
said to have been used by the accused will be no ground to disbelieve otherwise the credit
worthy evidence of the prosecution witnesses.

Where the recovery of panchnama of the sticks, the alleged crime article, had no mention that the
sticks had any marks of blood, the evidence of recovery of the sticks cannot constitute
incriminating evidence against the accused. Evidence of recovery cannot be relied upon for
conviction “so far as recovery of the sword as concerned, the same was not sent for any
examination by the Forensic Science Laboratory and the report if any was not exhibited and even
no question in that regard was put to the accused while he was examined under section 313 of the
Code.”(Cr. P.C.). Non discovery of weapon sickle does not go to discreet the witness.

Discovery statement of the accused and recovery of revolver in pursuant thereto is an important
circumstance against the accused which can be taken into consideration. Unless the disclosure

1
Pandu Rang kallu Patil v. State of Maharashtra AIR 2002 SC 739.

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statement is proved, the consequential recovery at the instance of the accused is not covered
within the framework of Section 27 of the Evidence Act. Where in a plan an unknown woman
was raped and her dead body was buried, disclosure statement of accused persons pointing out
the place of rape was not admissible.

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 ESSENTIAL REQUIREMENTS

The conditions necessary for application of this provision are:

(i) The fact of which evidence is sought to be given must be relevant to the issue;
(ii) The fact must have been discovered in consequence of some information received
from theaccused whether the said information amounts to a confession or not;
(iii) The person giving the information must be accused of any offence;
(iv) He must be in custody of a police officer;
(v) The discovery of a fact in consequence of information received from an accused
in custody must be deposed;
(vi) That portion only of the information which relates distinctly to the fact discovered
can be proved.

 The Facts Discovered

The fact discovered in consequence of information must be a relevant fact. The fact must be the
consequence and the information, the cause of its discovery. The information and the fact should
be connected with each other as cause and effect. If any portion of the information does not
satisfy this test, it should be excluded. 2 Therefore, it is the connection of the thing discovered
with the offence which renders it is a relevant fact. 3 The mere pointing out of places by the
accused where the occurrence took place without any material thing having been found there
would not be included within the term fact discovered under Section 27. 4 Similarly, a discovery
of a person who afterwards comes to rank as a co-accused does not come within the term ‘fact’
as postulated in section 27.5

2
Rajender Kumar v. State of Rajasthan, 2003 Cri. L.J. 4344 (S.C.)
3
Ayyappan v. State of Kerala, 2005 Cri. L.J. 57 (Kerla High Court).
4
Charat alias Sunda v. State of Haryana, 2005, Cri. L.J. 1523 (Punjab & Haryana High Court).
5
R.V. Babulal (1884)6 All 509.

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 The fact discovered may be the stolen property, the instrument of crime, the corpse of the person
murdered or any other material thing; or may be a material thing in relation to the place or the
locality where it is found.6

“Fact” as defined in Section 3 of the Evidence Act includes both physical and psychological
facts. But it appears that discovery of any fact referred to in Section 27 of the act does not
include mental or psychological facts, for example, the mental acts of becoming aware of
something or intention. The word ‘fact’ is used in the sense of physical fact which can be
perceived by the sense and discovery of such facts alone can eliminate the fear of confession
being extracted by improper inducement and confirm the truth of the information received from
the accused. It is laid down that normally the section is brought into operation when a person in
police custody produced form some place of concealment some object such as a dead body, a
weapon or ornaments said to be connected with the crime of which the information is the
accused.7 The fact discovered embraces the place from which the object is produced and the
knowledge of the accused as to this.

In Udai Bhan v. The State of Uttar Pradesh,8 the facts and the decision thereon were as follows:

The complainant went out for a short while by locking his shop. On his return after about 3/4th
of an hour he found his shop broken open and above containing Rs. 2,000/- and clothes and
another box from the pond containing Rs. 200/- stolen. During the investigation on being
interrogated the accused while in police custody brought a box from the pond near his field and
handed it over to the police. The accused also handed over to the police the key which fitted the
lock and said that he had opened the lock of the shop of the complainant with that key. Recovery
memos were prepared in which the police had stated those matter relating to discovery. It was
held that the evidence in regard to the discovery of the key as well as the box was admissible in
evidence under section 27 of the evidence Act. The handing over of the key was not a
confessional statement but the confession made in fact is that with that key the shop of the
complainant was opened and therefore that portion was inadmissible in evidence and only that
portion was admissible which distinctly related to the fact discovered, i.e., the finding of the key.
Similarly, the recovery of the box was provable because there was no statement of a confessional
6
Surjit Singh v. State of Punjab, 2005 Cri. L.J. 1176 (Punjab & Haryana High Court).
7
Bharat v. State of M.P., 2003 Cri L.J. 1297 S.C.
8
AIR 1962, SC 1116.

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nature in the recovery memo relating to it. It was also observed that a discovery of a fact includes
the object found, the place form which it is produced and the knowledge of the accused as to its
existence.

 Information must be Received form a Person Accused of any Offence

The expression ‘accused person’ in section 24 and the expression ‘person accused of any
offence’ in Section 25 have the same connotation, and describes the person against whom
evidence is sought to be led in a criminal proceeding. The expression ‘accused of any offence’ in
Section 27 as in Section 25, is also descriptive of the person concerned against whom evidence
relating to information alleged to be given by him is made provably by section 27 of the
evidence Act. It does not predicate a formal accusation against him at the time of making the
statement sought to be proved as a condition of its applicability.9

 Information should come from Accused himself

When information under Section 27, Evidence Act, is sought to be admitted, the condition
imposed is that it should be an information coming form a person accused of any offence in the
custody of a police officer. This information must, therefore, come from an accused himself, and
not from anybody else, and this must lead to the discovery of some relevant fact. The discovery
of the dead body had been made by the accused himself but the information that the dead body
lay at a certain place before the accused had discovered it, was given by somebody else, and it
was therefore, held that this information could not be admitted in evidence. 10 On accused’s
statement, while in police custody, the police officer went to the house of one Bhupat Singh. The
property was not found in Bhupat Singh’s house but in evidenceBhupat Singh had stated that the
accused had brought a bandle to his house and buried it in a room there. He had also stated that
later one Dilipat Singh, brother of the accused, had asked him to make over the property to Ram
Piarey, and he had accordingly handed it over to him. The property was ultimately recovered
from Ram Piarey who deposed in court that Bhupat Singh had given him certain properties and
that he gave them to the sub-inspector. The court held that it was the information of Bhupat
Singh and Ram Piarey that led to the discovery and not the information of the accused and
therefore, what they had stated in this connection was not admissible in evidence under section

9
State of U.P. v. Deoman Upadhyay, AIR 1960 S.C. 1125.
10
In re Addanki Vankadu, AIR 1939 Mad. 266.

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27 Evidence Act.11 In fact when there has to be a further inquiry of an independent nature before
the discovery is made one cannot say that it is ‘distinctly’ related to the information, and so the
information is not admissible under the Section. 12 The accused made a statement that the box
which he stole was lying concealed under his fodder and that he would produce it. On a search,
the accused failed to find the box. Thereupon, he stated that perhaps his mother had placed the
box somewhere. The box was discovered as a result of the information furnished by the mother.
The court held that none of the statements of the accused has lead to any discovery. The
knowledge of the stolen property could not be attributed to the accused.13

 Information Emanating from more than one Accused

For information to be admissible under Section 27, should proceed from a person accused of any
offence. It is not un-often that there are more than one such person, and the information that is
given by one may be known to others also who are similarly conditions. But where one such
person hadmade a statement which leads to the discovery of the incriminating article, a similar
statement by another person would be of no avail to the police because the police already knows
where the incriminating article is, and it would be merely repeating things if others are also
asked about it. The High Court of Kutch held that if the whereabouts of the stolen articles were
discovered from the statement of one accused then the statements of the other accused would not
be admissible as they do not lead to discovery. 14 Once property has been discovered in
consequence of information received from a suspected person, it cannot be re-discovered in
consequence of information received from another suspected person, and therefore, it is only the
information that was given by the first person and which led to the actual discovery which may
be proved under the terms of Section 27.15 Even where the information which leads to the
discovery of the incriminating articles comes from one person, but the actual discovery is made
by the other, anything which this person might have said in the matter is not admissible in
evidence under Section 27. It is clear that where the case of the prosecution is that discovery was
made in consequence of information coming from two persons, evidence must be led to indicate
as to which of them first made the statement which led to the discovery. It is the statement made
11
Kartar Singh v. State, AIR 1952 A.P. 42.
12
Ponu Pilli v. State, 1955 Kerala Law Times 214.
13
Bala v. State, 1955 Rajasthan Law Weekly 314.
14
Mala Bijal v. State, AIR 1954 Kutch 22.
15
Budh v. Emperor, AIR 1922 Lah.

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by the first individual which can be admitted under Section 27, as against him. The statement
made by the other cannot be used in evidence. But where the prosecution is not in a position to
establish in a case of joint statement as to who made the first statement that led to the discovery,
the evidence under the section would not be admissible to establish the guilt of either of the
accused and therefore, the evidence is to be discarded altogether.16

The statement attributed to the accused Choteylal was “I and Hirachand have kept (them) hidden
at mile No. 313 in the jungle near the railway line-2 bales in the nala and 2 bales in the bushes. I
can go and point for which I shall go and point out.” Hirachand, the second accused had made
the statement.

“All these five bales were kept hidden on the same day in the night before sunrise. I am prepared
to go and point out. I may be excused.” Both the accused were stated to have given the statement
in the, presence of each other, but the discovery was made at the instance of individual accused,
three bales by one accused and tow bales by the other accused. The prosecution did not lead
evidence as to which accused had made the statement first. The court held that it was clear
enough that the sub-inspector had made Hirachand to discover two bales and Chhoteylal to
discover three bales not because Hirachand or Chhoteylal was individually not in a position to
discover all the five bales, but to establish the fact that both accused persons knew the places
where the bales were kept. That simultaneous statements were per se inadmissible in evidence
but since in the case discoveries had been made by individual accused which afforded a
guarantee about the truth of the statements and therefore, these simultaneous or joint statements
were admissible and could be considered against each of the accused.17

“It therefore, follows that if the statement is jointly recorded or the statement attributed to
different accused is of the same pattern that would constitute but one composite statement that
would not serve to faster the individual guilt, for there would be no knowing on whose
information the material fact was discovered.18 However, each case will have to be judged on its
own facts but the underlying principle seems to be that the information is such information as
cannot be said to be already in the possession of the police and the discovery is made in

16
Gurubaru v. The King, AIR 1949 Orr; Abdul Qudir v. Emperor, AIR 1946 Cal. 452.
17
State of M.P. v. Chhoteylal, AIR 1955 Nag. 71
18
Karappa Vallayan v. State, AIR 1960 Kerla 238.

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consequence of that information and further that the discovery is not re-discovery of something
already discovered.19

 Consequential discoveries must from Confessions to Police

Under the Evidence Act, there are two situations in which confessions to police are admitted in
evidence. One is when the statement is made in the immediate presence of a Magistrate, and the
second, when the statement leads to the discovery of a fact connected with the crime. The
discovery assures the truth of the statement and makes it reliable even if it was extorted. This is
so provided in Section 27. In order to assure genuineness of recoveries, it has become a matter of
practice that recoveries should be effected in the presence of witnesses. The Supreme Court has
pointed out that there is no such practice that where recoveries have to be effected form different
places, different sets of persons should be called to witness them. The fact that the witnesses to
recoveries are the neighbours of the deceased and, therefore, sympathetic to him, is not material.

The section is quite apparently laid out as a proviso or an exception to the preceding section
which deal with confessions in police custody and other involuntary confessions. Thus it seems
that the intention of the legislation that all objections to the validity of that part of the statement
are washing which leads to the discovery of an article connected with the crime finding of
articles in consequence of the confession appears to the trustworthy that part which relates to
them.” Whether such a states are proceeds out of inducements, threats or torture are absolutely
immaterial Statements made by the accused in connection with an investigation in the other case
which lead to the discovery of a fact are also relevant. 20 That is of an involuntary confession
confirmed by the discovery of real evidence admissible because the truth of the statement is
established by that evidence.

19
Nathu v. State, AIR 1958 All 467.
20
State of Rajasthan v. Bhup Singh, (1997)10 S.C.C. 675.

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 CONSTITUTIONAL VALIDITY

Constitutional validity of section 27 has been challenged as it being violative of Article 14 and
Article 20 (3) of the Constitution.

ARTICLE 14:

In State of U.P. v. Deoman Upadhayay21 the validity of Section 27 of the Evidence Act was
challenged on the ground that it was offending Article 14 of the Constitution of India. The case
involved an extensive discussion upon the constitutional validity of this section.

Deoman, the accused, was married to one Dulari. Dulari’s parents had died in her infancy and
she was brought up by her cousin, Sukhdei. Skhdei gifted a part of her own inherited lands to
Dulari, and the whole of the land was being cultivated by Deoman’s uncle, Mahabir, Deoman
and Mahabir were negotiating sale of some of the lands, but Sukhdei protested. Deoman slapped
her and threatened to smash her face. Early in the next morning Sukhdei was lying dead on her
bed with a number of wounds and a pool of blood below the cot. Deoman was missing. When he
was apprehended some two days later he told the police that he attacked Sukhdei with a gandasa
which he had earlier borrowed from another and killed her on the spot and thereafter threw the
gandasa into the village tank, washed himself and absconded. In the presence of the investigating
officer and certain witnesses, he waded into the tank and took out the gandasa. A serologist
examined it and testified that it was stained with human blood. Thus its connection with the
murder was clearly established.

The statement of the accused to the police and consequential discovery of the gandasa when seen
in the background of his anger with Sukhdei, the borrowing of gandasa, some persons having
seen him running towards the tank, taking bath in it and his disappearance, left no doubt that he
was guilty and the Sessions Judge accordingly convicted him.

He appealed to the High Court, among others on the ground that S. 27 was violative of the
Constitution of India. The High Court declared S. 27 to be unconstitutional. The High Court

21
AIR 1960 SC 1125.

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excluded statement of the accused and without it there being not much evidence, acquitted the
accused. The State appealed to the Supreme Court, where by a majority, acquitted the accused.
The State appealed to the Supreme Court, where by a majority, the section was declared to be
constitutional and the conviction of Deoman was restored. The Supreme Court held that, that part
of the statement of the accused by which he said that he had killed Sukhdei was not relevant.
This should be excluded, but the rest was relevant and even then there was sufficient proof of his
guilt. The discussion in the Supreme Court centered round the constitutional validity of section
27, Shah, J., (afterwards C.J.), with whom majority agreed, pointed out that the expression
“accused of any offence” is descriptive of the person against whom the information is provable
under section 27. “It does not predicate a formal accusation against him at the time of making the
statement sought to be proved, as condition of its applicability.” The Court rejected the
suggestion that the provisions of section 161 of the Criminal Procedure Code and those of
section 27 of the Evidence Act were discriminatory and, therefore, violative of Article 14 of the
Constitution. Under the Criminal Procedure Code if a person not in police custody has given
some information to the police in consequence of which something connected with a crime is
discovered, the information is not provable against him if he is subsequently prosecuted for the
crime; but if he were in police custody at the time that he gave the information, it would have
become provable against him.

Thus the classification is between persons not in custody and those in custody. The Supreme
Court held the classification to be reasonable. “This distinction between persons in custody and
persons not in custody, in the context of admissibility of statement made by them concerning the
offence charged cannot be called arbitrary, artificial or evasive : the legislature has made a real
distinction between these two classes, and has enacted distinct rules about admissibility of
statements confessional or otherwise made by them. The reason for the classification is to
encourage people not in custody to give information about crimes.

ARTICLE 20 (3):

Again, it was challenged that the section violates Article 20 (3) of the Indian Constitution
because the confessions which lead to discovery of the facts are used against the person making
it and thus are self incriminating and thus this section is unconstitutional. Again it was held that

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only voluntary confessions made by the persons accused of an offense are admissible which lead
to discovery of the facts. And since voluntary confessions are admissible, the section is not self
incriminatory and thus constitutionally valid or intra-vires.

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 SECTION 26 AND 27 COMPARED

SECTION 26 INDIAN EVIDENCE AC, 1872

No confession made by any person whilst he is in the custody of a police officer, unless it be
made in the immediate presence of a Magistrate, shall be proved as against such person.”

Explanation: In this section, ‘Magistrate’ does not include the head of a village discharging
magisterial functions in the Presidency of Fort. St. George or elsewhere, unless such headman is
a Magistrate exercising the powers of a Magistrate under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1882
(10 of 1882)

Though section 27 is in the form of a proviso to Sec. 26, these sections do not deal with evidence
of the same character. Section 26 of the confession to police altogether, but S. 27 lets in a
statement which leads or crucial discovery whether it amounts to confession or not. Under
Section 27 a confession made in the presence of a Magistrate is wholly provable, whereas
Section 27 permits only that part of the statement which leads to the discovery of fact. 22 The
scope of the section was explained by the Privy Council in Pulukuri Kottaya v. Emperor. 23

A number of accused persons were prosecuted for rioting and murder. Some of them were
sentenced to death and some transportation for life. They appealed to the Privy Council on
grounds among others, that the statements of some of them were admitted is violation of Sections
26 and 27. The statement of one of them was “About 14 days ago I, Kottaya, and people of my
party lay in wait for Sivayya and others… We all beat Sivayya and Subayya to death. Ramayya
who was in our party received blows on his hands. He had a spear in his hands. He gave it to me
then. I hid it and my stick in the trick of my village. I will show if you come. We did all this at
the instance of Pulukuri Kottaya”. Another accused said : “I stabbed Sivayya with a spear. I hid
the spear in a yard in my village. I will show you the place”. The relevant articles were produced
from their respective places of hiding.

The High Court of Madras admitted the whole of the above statement. Proceeding against the
weight of Indian authority, the High Court held that unless the whole of the statement is
22
State of U.P., v. Deoman Upadhaya, AIR 1960 S.C. 1125 at p. 1129.
23
AIR 1947 PC 67.

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admitted, it would be difficult to connect the articles produced with the offence, the only
connecting link being the confessional statement. The court followed its own earlier Full Bench
decision in Athappa Goundan v. Emperor.24 In that case the court had to deal with a confession
of murder made by a person in police custody, and the court admitted the confession because in
the last sentence (readily separable from the rest) there was offer to produce two bottles, a rope
and a cloth bag, which, according to the confession, had been used in the commission of the
murder, and the objects were in fact produced. The court was impressed by the consideration that
as the objects produced were not in themselves of incriminating nature their production would be
irrelevant unless they were shown to be connected with the murder and there was no evidence so
to connect them apart from the confession. Sir John Beaumont, who delivered the judgement of
the Privy Council, at once pointed out that the case was wrongly decided and was against the
trend of Indian authority. The result of the decision was to read in Section 27 something which is
not there and admit in evidence a confession barred by Section 26.

Explaining the relationship between Sections 26 and 27 and the ban imposed by Section 26, their
Lordships said:

That ban was presumably inspired by the fear of the Legislature that a person under police
influence might be induced to confess by the exercise of undue pressure. But if all that is
required to lift the ban be the inclusion in the confession of information relating to an object
subsequently produced, the ban will lose its effect. On normal principles of construction their
Lordships think that the proviso to Section 26 added by Section 27 should not be held to nullify
the substance of the section. In their Lordships’ view it is fallacious to treat the “fact discovered”
as equivalent to the object produced; the fact discovered embraces the place from which the
object is produced and the knowledge of accused as to this, and the information given must relate
distinctly to this fact. Information as to the past use of the object produced is not related to its
discovery. Information supplied by a person in custody that “I will produce a knife concealed in
the roof of my house” does not lead to the discovery of a knife. It leads to the discovery of a fact
that a knife is concealed in the house of the informant to his knowledge, and if the knife is
proved to have been used in the commission of the offence, the fact discovered is very relevant.

24
ILR 1937 Mad. 695 : AIR 1937 Mad. 618 : 171 I.C. 245 (F.B.)

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But if to the statement the words are added “with which I stabbed A” these words are
inadmissible since they do not relate to the discovery of the knife in the house of the informant.25

Explaining the scope of the section in general terms, their Lordships observed:

“Section 27, which is not artistically worded, provides an exception to the prohibition imposed
by the preceding section, and enables certain statements made by a person in police custody to
the proved. The condition necessary to bring the section into operation is that discovery of a fact
in consequence of information received from a person accused of any offence in the custody of
police officer must be deposed to, and thereupon so much of the information as relates distinctly
to the fact thereby discovered may be proved. The section seems to be based on the view that if a
fact is actually discovered in consequence of information given, some guarantee is afforded
thereby that the information was true and accordingly can be safely allowed to be given in
evidence. Normally the section is brought into operation when a person in police custody
produces from some place of concealment some object, such as, a dead body, a weapon or
ornaments, said to be connected with the crime of which the informant is accused.”26

Referring to the facts of the case their Lordships held that the whole of statement except the
passage, “I hid it (a spear) and my stick in the trick in the village. I will show if you come” is
inadmissible. Referring to the statement of the other accused, “I stabbed Sivayya with a spear, I
hid the spear in a yard of my village, I will show you the place,” their Lordships held that the
first sentence must be omitted. Only the information that definitely relates to the facts discovered
is admissible. But the information should not be truncated in such manner as to make it
insensible. The information must be recorded. Where it is not recorded, the exact information
must be adduced through evidence.27

In a case involving robbery and murder, one of the accused persons told: “I am wearing the pant
which I washed after the commission of the offence.” The other accused said “I can recover the
looted property.” The property was then recovered at his instance from the place of hiding. An
objection to the admissibility of these statements was overruled. The words did not implicate the
accused persons with the commission of the crime. They referred only to the articles connected

25
AIR 1947 PC 67
26
AIR 1947 PC 67 at p. 70.
27
Bodh Raj v. State of J. & K. AIR 2002 S C. 3164.

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with the crime.28 Where the accused took the investigation officer and panchas to the dealer from
whom he purchased the weapon of murder, the information was held to be inadmissible under S.
27. It was, however, admissible under S. 8 as showing the conduct of the accused person.29

It is necessary that the person in question should be accused of some offence. Where without any
accusation a person was brought to the police station for interrogation, his statement and
consequential discovery of a fact were held to be not relevant under S. 27.30

The fact discovered on the basis of information supplied may qualify for relevancy if it is the
immediate and proximate cause of the information. It is not necessary that the accused should be
taken to the spot to point to the place of hiding, through this fact may be taken into account for
evaluation of evidentiary value. The fact that the disclosure statement was signed by the accused
does not detract it from its admissibility. A joint and simultaneous disclosure is also relevant. But
such a thing being rare, it will be one of factors to go towards evaluation. The information which
brings about discoveries is relevant only against the accused who furnished such information and
not against other accused. Where the discovery was due to the knowledge gained by the police
from other sources, the statement of the accused was not relevant under Section 27. But his
conduct in pointing out the shop and its proprietor was relevant under Section 8.

JUDICIAL PRONOUNCEMENTS
28
Sanay v. State (NCT of Delhi), AIR 2001 S.C. 979.
29
H.P. Administration v. Om Prakash, AIR 1972 SC 975.
30
Manoranjan Singh v. State of Delhi, (1998)3 SCC 523.

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Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act has been very controversial as to its applicability. Perhaps
the earliest reported case from the Supreme Court blazing a new trail on the aspect of recovery at
the instance of the accused is the Three Judge decision Ramkishan Mithanlal Sharma and ors v.
State of Bombay31. In this case, far from recording any information given by the accused the
investigating officer even did not care to divulge any oral information. The investigating officer
Hujur Ahmed Khan deposed that accused No.1 made certain statements in consequence of which
he took accused No.1 and 2 to Itawa and leaving accused No.2 the party proceeded to Bhagwasi
with accused No.1 and he there pointed out Baliram who at the instance of Accused No.1 dug
out from a mud house a tin box containing three revolvers and two tins containing live
cartridges. Another piece of evidence from the police officer was this. On reaching Bagwasi
“The 1st accused took us to a certain house where he pointed out witness Kamala (wife of 1st
accused). At the instance of the accused witness Kamala brought from somewhere outside that
house a steel box, when it was opened I found six big bundles and five smaller bundles of
hundred rupee G.C. Notes.” It was contended that the expression “in consequence of certain
statement made by accused No. 1 and “at the instance of accused No.1” came within the ban of
Section 27 of the Evidence Act.

Rejecting the contention the Supreme Court held thus : “ If the police officer wants to prove the
information or a part thereof, the Court would have to consider whether it relates to the fact
thereby discovered and allow proof thereof only if that condition was satisfied. If however, the
police officer does not want to prove the information or any part thereof, Section 27 does not
come into operation at all.” It was further held that since the police officer did not want to prove
any information, the operation of Section 27 was not attracted and prima-facie there was nothing
to prevent that evidence being admitted against accused No.1.

On the 7th December 1971 the Supreme Court decided H.P. Administration v. Om Prakash 32.
The case dealt with a blend of several written record of the information provided by the accused
as also of physically leading the police to the place and discovering the fact. After discussing at
considerable length the law laid down in Pulkuri Kotayya case, the Supreme Court had to decide

31
AIR 1955 S.C. 104.
32
AIR 1972 S.C. 975

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the admissibility of a statement of the accused that he had purchased the weapon from Ganga
Singh PW-11 and that he would take them to him. The accused did lead the police and witnesses
to the “Thari” of PW-11 had pointed him out to them. The Supreme Court concluded thus- “A
witness cannot be said to be discovered if nothing is to be found or recovered from him as a
consequence of the information furnished by the accused and the information which disclosed
the identity of the witness will not be admissible. But even apart from the admissibility of the
information under Section 27, the evidence of the investigating officer and the panchas that the
accused had taken them to PW-11 and pointed him out and as corroborated by PW-11 himself
would be admissible under Section 8 of the Evidence Act as conduct of the accused.

In Bahadul v. State of Orissa33, decided on the 16th January, 1979, the High Court relied on the
production of a Tangia (axe) by the accused before police admissible as conduct under Section 8
of the Evidence Act in the appeal by the convicted accused. The Supreme Court observed that
since the accused made no statement under Section 27 of the Evidence Act the recovery of the
Tangia would not be admissible under Section 27 of the Evidence Act and in the circumstances
of that case mere production of the Tangia would not be sufficient to convict the accused. Thus
the case failed on a matter of appreciation of the evidence and not on a question of law that
failing Section 27 of the Evidence Act, Section 8 cannot apply.

CONCLUSION

33
AIR 1979 S.C. 1262

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Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act provides that if a fact is deposed to as discovered in
consequence of the information received by accused of any offence, in the custody of a police
officer, so much of such information, whether it amounts to a confession or not, as relates
distinctly to the fact thereby discovered, may be proved. Section 27 is based on the principle that
if the confession of the accused is supported by the discovery of a fact then it may be presumed
to be true and not to have been extracted. It lays down that during the period of investigation or
during police custody any information is given by the accused of an offence to the police officer
that leads to discover any fact, may be proved whether such information amounts to confession
or not, and obtained under inducement, threat or promise.

Section 24, 25 and 26 of the Indian Evidence Act provides for complete ban on confessions
made by the accused under some conditions or circumstances. The basic principle underlying
these sections, leading to ban on confessions made by accused of an offence is that such
confessions cannot be relied upon as it is presumed that such confessions would not be voluntary
or may even be faulty. However, section 27 has lifted such ban on admissibility of such sections
to some extent. However, the basic aim is not to remove the ban on confessions provided by
these sections, but is only to make those statements admissible upon which reliability as to its
authenticity can be placed. Only those statements which lead to discovery of some facts in
reference to the offence accused of, are admissible. In fact, even if such statements or
information consists of both discovery of facts as well as confession of an accused of his guilt,
only that part of the statement is admissible which consists of discovery of facts and the rest is
inadmissible.

There have been various controversies with regard to the applicability and constitutional validity
of this section. Constitutional validity of this section was challenged in the case of State of U.P.
v. Deoman Upadhyay as to being violative of Article 14 because of discrimination made by the
section between confessions made by persons in custody and out of custody. This discrimination
by the section was removed by the judgment of the Supreme Court in which it was held that this
section will be applicable both on persons in custody and out of custody. Further, it was
challenged that the section violates Article 20 (3) of the Indian Constitution because the
confessions which lead to discovery of the facts are used against the person making it and thus
are self incriminating and thus this section is unconstitutional. Again it was held that only

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voluntary confessions made by the persons accused of an offense are admissible which lead to
discovery of the facts. And since voluntary confessions are admissible, the section is not self
incriminatory and thus constitutionally valid or intra-vires.

The controversies related to the section arose mainly due to the reason of wrong interpretations
and wrong applicability of the sections by various courts as evident in the Athappa case. In this
case, the court took into consideration both the parts of the information as received from the
accused, i.e. the part consisting of the discovery of fact and the part containing the confessin of
guilt. However, the position became clear only in the Pulkuri Kotayya case when Privy Council
held that only the part consisting of the discovery of the fact is admissible. Therefore, it can be
concluded after various judgments of the courts that there is no part in section 27 which is ultra
vires, in fact its only the wrong interpretations of the courts which create controversies in this
regard.

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 BIBLIOGRAPHY

 Books Referred:
 Batuk Lal, “The Law of Evidence”, Central Law Agency, 21st Edition, 2016.
 Justice M.R. Mallick, “Criminal Manual”, Professional Book Publishers, 2017.

 Websites Referred:

 http://www.shareyouressays.com/knowledge/section-27-of-the-indian-evidence-
act-1872/120404.
 https://www.lawnotes.in/Section_27_of_Indian_Evidence_Act,_1872.
 https://www.legalcrystal.com/cases/search/name:indian-evidence-act-1872-
section-27.
 http://jaassam.gov.in/pdf/article/Article-25.pdf.
 http://www.tnsja.tn.nic.in/article/App%20of%20Evi%20by%20DMJ.pdf.
 http://shodhganga.inflibnet.ac.in/bitstream/10603/7860/12/12_chapter%205.pdf.

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