Indian Foreign Policy Unit 1-Questions

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Indian Foreign Policy Unit 1-

Questions:
1. What are the sources of India’s Foreign Policy? Do you think there is a hierarchy of sources in terms
of their impact on policy decisions? (2017)

2. What are the essential elements of India’s Foreign Policy? How does it assist in India becoming a
Global power? (2018)

3. What are the new objectives and principles of India’s Foreign Policy since the turn of this century?
(2017)

4. Discuss shifts in India’s Foreign Policy from being a postcolonial state to an aspiring global power.

5. Critically analyze different approaches to India’s Foreign Policy.

6. Examine basic factors and determinants of India’s Foreign Policy.

7. Critically trace paradigm shifts in India’s Foreign Policy since its independence.

8. Discuss the basic determinants of India’s foreign policy in the light of changing times. (2019)

9. Do you think Non-alignment as a principle of IFP is a viable response to contemporary economic-


political and strategic world structure? (2019)

Expected questions – Short questions/notes

1. Nehruvian approach to India’s Foreign Policy (do from Guha and Bipin Chandra)

2. Relevance of Non-Alignment movement in post-cold war era (2018)

3. Gujral Doctrine (2019)

Structure-

Intro

Sources- Historic bg. Leadership (paradigm shift, post-independence to post-cold war) Geography,
Media, Beuracracy, Army etc.

Determinants and Objectives

6 schools

Relevance of NAM (Phases and Liberation)

Gijral doctrine

Generic overview of IFP in 21th cent

(External Ministers ’s speech and Though numerous and formidable, these challenges are not beyond
the reach of India’s policy establishment. India needs a clear vision, the requisite political and
institutional will, and effective leadership to address these challenges. In particular, there are three
important strategic questions confronting the Indian leadership. First, how do they manage the
contentious relationship with Pakistan even if they cannot bring about a rapprochement on the
Kashmir question? Second, how does India respond to and cope with the extraordinary rise of the
PRC? Third and finally, what sort of relationship will India forge with the United States in the ensuing
decades? There are no clear-cut answers to these questions. However, much of the future direction
and substance of India’s foreign policy will necessarily revolve around those subjects.

Answer (generic)

Introduction-
Foreign policy is the sum total of principles, interests and objectives which a state formulates in
conducting its relations with other states. Similarly, each state has its foreign policy through which it tries
to develop relations with other nations at international level. Through its foreign policy, states make
efforts to change the behavior of other states or to control and regulate the activities of other states to
attain its nation interests. Hence, foreign policy represents both continuity and change in the relations
among states. Besides, it represents both positive and negative dimensions. It is positive when it makes
efforts to change the behavior of other states, while it works negative when it do not try to change the
activities of other states. Therefore, foreign policy is a commitment by the state to put forward its
principles, interests and objectives by way of which one state tries its best to pursue its relations with
other states in the international system.

In Indian context, the foreign policy is sum total of principles , interests and objectives with an aspiration
of becoming a global power, influencing the world.

Historical background: Other than international and national environment shaping the IFP
of a country, its historical narrative too, plays an important role in determining the base for an approach
that has developed over the course of time.

India’s policy while contributing to the international domain is, thus not limited to the contemporary
times. The ancient trade with Mesopotamia that of Harappa, followed by constant interactions form
Magnolia, Greek, Arabs and etc. defines the historic contribution of India to the world. The approach is
considered to be a by-product of the two dominant ideological streams prevalent in its culture since the
ancient times. The tradition of advocating friendship, cooperation, peace and non-violence as
proclaimed by Buddha and later by Gandhi. Realism, that developed not in the contemporary time hence
can be seen as relevant approach by Kautilya in his advice to the kings.

With the onset of colonialism, the Indian Foreign policy took shape in 3 processes that can be
categorized as,

1- Criticism of Colonialism; as the congress, the leading force behind Indian struggle for
independence took international stances, contemplating the British rule. The INC, advocated the
struggle of Ireland’s independence in 1920 as in 1892, its object to various British policies that
reflected India as a base for political maneuvering in South Asian region. In 1921, for the first
time in its All India Congress Committee meeting in Delhi, it declared through a general
resolution that "the present environment of India in no way represents Indian opinion". Besides,
it also declared that its neighbors not at all threaten India.

2- International status; already acquiring the international identity even prior to its independence.
India played an important role in rising its concerns and making representation in international
conferences starting from 1817 Colonial conference to 1917.

3- The WW2; which laid the foundations for Indian Independence, giving an upper hand to
the Indian leaders in influencing foreign policymaking though negotiation and consensus
building wherein understanding of gaining state legitimacy through foreign policy
making, hence achieving independence

Leadership- Post Independence and cold war era, NAM,


Phases, Paradigm shifts.
Consequently, foreign policy has largely been shaped by the chief executive, who has the added burden
of approximating what domestic groups want and balancing his or her perception of domestic political
concerns with other foreign policy interests. Jawaharlal Nehru, India's first prime minister, asserted,
according to V.K. Krishna Menon, Nehru’s closest political confidant, that "so far as the public was
concerned, the presentation and handling (of foreign policy) was his.

With independence came the cold war era that can be categorized in 3 phases. The first section deals
with the period from 1947 to 1962, the second from 1962 to 1991 and the third from 1991 to the
present. The first in the circle of Idealism, second drifting away from that and 3 rd, entering in the
sequence of a Realist world order, post cold war.

Systemic, national and decision-making factors helped shape post independence India’s foreign policy
choices.

 The systemic constraints on India’s foreign policy stemmed from the onset of the Cold War. As
initially, none of the power block was strategically interested in India as a nascent nation with
less importance. However, at a regional level, the distribution of power placed India at a
disadvantage. The other major regional state, the People’s Republic of China (PRC) posed a
significant security threat to India, one which it chose to ignore due to its idealist leadership
ruling. At a national level, the memories of colonial rule contributed to a political culture which
privileged the concept of national autonomy, that acted a deterrence against any foreign
intervention and due the horrors of colonial past, the policy makers were, while drafting the
international approaches were sensitive on how to keep India outside the orbit of both the super
powers. This strategy came to be known as nonalignment and Indian policymakers were at pains
to distinguish it from “neutralism”. The real architect of this policy was Prime Minister Nehru is
views toward the Soviet Union were more ambivalent. He was cognizant of the horrors of Stalin’s
collectivist enterprise though admiring of the achievements of the forced-draught
industrialization program.

The programmatic approach towards NAM, by Nehru can be seen in light of two aspects: First, he was
acutely concerned about the opportunity costs of defense spending. Any involvement with the two
emerging blocs, he feared, would draw India into the titanic struggle and divert critical resources from
economic development.13 Second, he was intent on maintaining India’s hard-won independence.
Moving into the ambit of either superpower could compromise such freedom of maneuver.

 The Pathway to 1962- From the time of independence to the disastrous border conflict with the
PRC, three key features characterized India’s foreign policy. First, India played a significant role in
multilateral institutions and particularly in United Nations peacekeeping operations. Second, it
also emerged as a critical proponent of the nonaligned movement. Third, as a leader of the
nonaligned movement it also made a significant contribution toward the process of
decolonization. These three critical commitments, in turn, manifested themselves at global,
regional and national levels. At a global level, India attempted to defuse Cold War tensions in a
number of contexts, regional and functional.

This endeavor was a manifestation of India’s interest in forging a particular global order as India also
sought to play a vital role in United Nations peacekeeping operations as well as the peaceful resolution
of regional dispute. Additionally, India proved to be a tireless campaigner in the effort to bring about
decolonization. To that end, India’s diplomacy was carefully geared to the discussion of the issue at
various international fora and especially in the NonAligned Movement (NAM).

At national level, the country’s commitment to nonalignment led to the adoption of a particular set of
significant policy choices. Specifically, one of the key elements of the doctrine of nonalignment was the
limitation of high defense expenditures.17 To this end India pursued the policy of Panchsheel (or the Five
Principles of Peaceful Coexistence) towards the PRC. The five principles were mutual respect for each
other’s territorial integrity and sovereignty; non-aggression; non-interference in one another’s internal
affairs; equality and mutual benefit; and peaceful coexistence.18 As a consequence, Indian military
expenditures were drastically limited even when steady evidence about a possible security threat from
the PRC continued to mount.19 Such a policy, unfortunately, proved to be extremely costly when the
border negotiations with the PRC ultimately reached a cul-de-sac in 1960.

 “Modified Structuralism”: The Post-Nehru Era.

The defeat of 1962, led India to shred its older skin and take up the changes within. Military
modernization was one among others. Compulsively after Nehru’s demise in 1964, his successors still
could not formally abandon the stated adherence to a policy of nonalignment. Consequently, the
rhetoric of nonalignment remained a staple of Indian foreign policy. India’s foreign policy behavior,
however, increasingly assumed a more Realist orientation.

Once again, global, regional, and personal factors contributed to the major policy shift.

Despite a fleeting moment of military cooperation with India in the aftermath of the 1962 war, the
United States disengaged itself from South Asia, loosing its intrest in India. Sensing an opportunity to
expand their influence in the subcontinent, the Soviets brokered a peace agreement between India
and Pakistan in the Central Asian city of Tashkent in 1966. With this American disengagement from
the subcontinent, Pakistan sought to expand the scope of its security cooperation with the PRC to
balance Indian power, thereby contributing to a growing security nexus between India’s two major
adversaries.

At a regional level, India’s misgivings about its security increased in the aftermath of the first Chinese
nuclear test at Lop Nor in 1964. After considerable debate, the ruling Congress party and the new
Prime Minister, Lal Bahadur Shastri, reaffirmed the country’s public commitment to nonalignment
and eschewed any immediate plans to acquire nuclear weapons. However, in 1966, Prime Minister
Indira Gandhi, Shastri’s successor, decided to seek a nuclear guarantee from the great powers. This
effort proved to be quite fruitless.28 In the aftermath of this failure, Prime Minister Gandhi
authorized India’s Subterranean Nuclear Explosions Project (SNEP) which culminated in India’s first
nuclear test of May 1974. Under Indira Gandhi, India’s foreign policy sought to sustain two
competing visions of world order by still supporting the cause of decolonization and reversing its
idealist approach by steering towards more realist approach. Part of this strategy involved the
acquisition of a tacit security guarantee from the Soviet Union to counter possible Chinese
malfeasance, by signing 20 years pact with the former. Shortly after, the 1971 war with Pakistan,
India emerged as the undisputed dominant power within the subcontinent.

But, was unable to transcend the region. The failure of the tactic was due to several reason from
economic stagnation. The failure to develop ties with the global economy contributed to a paucity of
foreign investment, important technological lags. India’s political choices at systemic and national
levels also did very little to enhance its global stature as was evident in the case of OPEC and oil crisis
of 1973. This granted India, a status of Marginal Asian Player, confined in the Asian boundaries.

This period also saw a shift of Indian preference towards USSR, owing to USA’s growing interest in
Pakistan to counter Soviets in afghan.

 Post 1991 Changes-

Few events, barring the shock of the 1962 Sino-Indian border war, has had as much of an impact on
India’s foreign and security policies as the collapse of the Soviet Union and the concomitant end of
the Cold War. This transformation of global order led Indian policy makers make fundamental
changes in Indian Foreign outlook.

The NAM lost its gravity and in words of Inder Kumar Gujral, “It is a mantra that we have to keep
repeating, but who are you going to be nonaligned against?” Not only this but the country was also
confronted with an unprecedented fiscal crisis partly as a consequence of the first Gulf War of 1991
including spike in oil prices, extraction of workers from Gulf that considerably contributed to the
economy of the country and lost of substantial remittances that the workers from the Gulf had
contributed to the Indian exchequer. The then Finance Minister Manmohan Singh, chose to
dramatically alter India’s domestic and international economic policies

Finding opportunity in the crisis, the Indian executive proceeded with reforms as it was convinced
that global economic integration was imperative for India for factors beyond the immediate crisis
and sought to forge a new vison for the country.

The starboard turn towards US and growing its participation in world economic order along with its
strategic engagement of Southeast Asian reflected in its “Look East” policy stemmed from India’s
search for new friends and partners after the loss of its superpower patron in 1991. Closer to home,
Narasimha Rao regime sought to improve relations with China and Pakistan through various
confidence building measures in the shadow of insurgencies arising in 1989 in J and K.

 Crossing the Nuclear Rubicon and Beyond:


The conventional military capabilities, the persistence of the border dispute and the PRC’s
nuclear weapons posed an altogether different order of threat to India’s security, led the
leadership to push India into nuclear weapons program with no first use policy. The specific
timing of the program, contrary to much polemical writing on the subject had little to do with
the ascendance of the right-of-center Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) to power.56 Instead it was
closely tied to the successful extension of the NPT in 1995 and the seeming inexorable efforts of
the Clinton administration to conclude a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty. Fearful that the
passage of the test ban treaty was all but inevitable, Indian policymakers chose to exercise the
nuclear option before ineluctable pressures were brought to bear on India to accede to the
regime. Despite the initial burst of hostility from the United States and the other great powers,
the international community has come to grudgingly accept India as a de facto nuclear weapons
state. This pushed India closer to US as the Bush administration offered India a substantial
civilian nuclear, that ended India’s nuclear isolation.

These attitudes had enabled India’s successful dominance of South Asia, and a gradual spreading
of her influence eastwards into South-East Asia and the Indian Ocean.

The post 1999 phase sought Through a Hindutva emphasis on regaining India’s glorious Hindu
past, the BJP wished to reverse the perceived failure of India to successfully impose itself
regionally and globally, and they resuscitated calls for India to reclaim her rightful place in the
world. Indian government and Ministry of External Affairs officials undertook a policy of ‘total
diplomacy’ with all states .As India aimed to inculcate new and deeper relationships across the
world whereby greater attention was given to the P-5 powers and second/middle-tier powers
such as Japan, Australia, the European Union (EU) and Israel.

New diplomatic groupings (often with countries also striving for increased international status)
also began to emerge, such as the Russia-China-India (RCI), Brazil-Russia-India-China (BRIC), and
India-Brazil-South Africa (IBSA) formations. Such pragmatic and strategic developments were
now a signal to other states ‘that India’s strategic frontier may not be coterminous with its
political borders. By the beginning of the 21st century, India’s Great Power aspiration was
ascendant as her political, diplomatic and trade links increased exponentially: ‘India matters’.

Critically, the USA began to accept the new consequences of India in terms of her economy,
nuclear capabilities, stable democracy and large middle class. Such respect and acceptance
increased India’s international standing and made closer US ties a new pillar of India’s foreign
policy. In turn, India became a key strategic partner of the USA, witnessed in their bilateral
Defense Agreement drawn up in 2005.

Other sources and determinants of IFP-


Geography- Geography plays an important role in formulation of India’s foreign policy. Size,
topography, boundaries, population, climate, temperature, water resources, soil etc all are included in
geography. But in Indian context mainly three factors---

(1) geographical position,

(2) size, and


(3) boundaries are prominent to show its influence.

India’s geographical position provides it an important place in international and regional context but at
the same time creates a sense of insecurity also. In the north, mountain range like Himalaya and in the
south, Indian Ocean makes India strategically insecure. India’s geographical position has influenced it from
ancient to the modern period. The size of a country also plays an important role in determination of its
foreign policy. India has 3.27 million square kilometre area which puts India at 7th position in the world.
This is an important position. Its sub-continental form has always been very important in context of its
foreign policy, and still it enjoys the same importance. Boundaries of nations also play an important role in
geographical situations. India has a geographical position through which it has a direct relation with its
seven neighbours--Afghanistan, Pakistan, China, Bhutan, Nepal, Burma and Bangladesh. With some other
countries like---Sri Lanka, Malaysia, Indonesia, Maldives etc---it has a close maritime boundary. India is
facing pressure on its foreign relations since beginning due to the disputes arising out of the boundaries’
controversies.

Military Capability-
Military capability has an important place in the determination of the foreign policy of a country. But two things
must be taken into consideration in this context. First, military capability is not an independent element in itself but
it depends on economic position of a nation. Second, military power as an authoritative element is important and
necessary for great powers but it is not so in case of a developing country like India. Its main reason is that India
cannot play a strong role on the basis of its military power in the world in context of great powers. But it has to be
dependent on diplomacy up to a large extent. In the changing global milieu of today where peace establishing has
become a difficult task, it becomes necessary for India to keep sufficient military to secure its national boundaries

International Organizations-
Transformation of world through international organizations has a direct relation with India’s foreign
policy. If we see the political traditions of India, we will come to know that these have been in favor of
establishing a peaceful, nonviolent and equitable world structure. Beside this, there is coordination
between the values of India’s freedom movement and the objectives of United Nations. Above situation
continued in post-cold war era also. Only the issues of debate have changed. Above situation continued
in post-cold war era also. Only the issues of debate have changed.

Another factors making considerable contribution in shaping the IFP are the ethnic and religious linkages
of India with South Asian nations, as is evident in the cases o Sri lanka, Nepal and Bangladesh.
Overlapping water resources in the eastern part of the subcontinent shapes Indian policy Toward
Bangladesh and Nepal. Growing domestic demands within India for irrigation and hydro-generated
electricity have played a role in India's policies toward those states. The potential for foreign exploitation
of domestic tensions is a another area that has aroused domestic foreign policy concerns Allegations of
Chinese assistance to tribal insurgency movements in north- w cast India was a major stumbling block to
improved Sino-Indian relations during the 1960s and 1970s.

While there are important domestic interests regarding specific foreign policy actions, Indian prime
ministers have generally had a free hand in the conduct of foreign policy. In part, this is due to the lack of
effective parliamentary restraints on the prime minister; to the inability of associational groups to
mobilize popular support on foreign policy questions; to the lack of a bipartisan tradition between the
ruling party and the opposition; to the pervasive view that stand of official policy is somehow
illegitimate; and, finally, to the dominance of a single party at the center, role of Prime Minister is very
influential in formation of foreign policy.The brief period of Janata rule (mid-1977 to mid-1979)also
demonstrated how factionalism can undermine a prime minister's control over foreign policy. The
variation led considerable opposition and under such circumstances, the government was less able, or
less willing, to orchestrate public and parliamentary opinion.

Diaspora-
Diaspora means the people who have spread in different countries other than if their origin. The Indian
diaspora is widely distributed across the world. They form some of the most influential classes in the
developed countries. Thus, they have strong influence on the policies of their host country towards
India.

Leadership or Ideology of other nations-


For most of the last century, there was a divide in the world along ideologies of communism and
capitalism. These days it can be inferred that, adoption of right policies of protectionism and nation first
policies for e.g.- Trump administration making shifts in the Visa policies of the country, can lead to
fundamental changes in approach of Indian foreign policy in the same context.

Principles of Indian Foreign Policy-


Reflecting from the determinants, it can be concluded that the IFP, takes the following principles into
consideration:

 Anti colonial- India has suffered for a long time under colonial oppression. Hence anti
colonialism has been a core principle in its foreign policy. Tn this regard, after gaining
independence, India had advocated freedom from colonialism for all other countries. India also
provided leadership for the NAM to all such countries with colonial history.

 Equal Sovereignty- India believes that all nations, regardless of their size or economic or military
power, are equal. They all enjoy equal sovereignty which must be respected.

 Non alignment- as discussed above, paved a major road for IFP for decades following the
Independence.

 Panchsheel- The panchsheel was a set of five principles of FP given by JLN which was based on
the principles of Mutual respect for territorial integrity and sovereignty, Mutual non-aggression,
Mutual non-interference in internal affairs, equality and mutual benefit and peaceful co-
existence.
 The Gujral Doctrine- is a set of five principles to guide the conduct of
foreign relations with India’s immediate neighbours.
 These five principles arise from the belief that India’s stature and strength
cannot be isolated from the quality of its relations with its neighbours.
 It, thus, recognises the supreme importance of friendly, cordial relations
with neighbours.
 These principles are:

o With neighbours like Bangladesh, Bhutan, Maldives, Nepal and Sri


Lanka, India does not ask for reciprocity but gives and accommodates what
it can in good faith and trust.
o No South Asian country should allow its territory to be used against the
interest of another country of the region.
o No country should interfere in the internal affairs of another.
o All South Asian countries must respect each other’s territorial integrity
and sovereignty.
o They should settle all their disputes through peaceful bilateral
negotiations.

Application of Gujral Doctrine


 The resolution of the water-sharing dispute with Bangladesh in just three
months in 1996-97.
 This almost coincided with the treaty with Nepal for taming the Mahakali river
for the generation of hydel power.
 It was followed by agreements with Sri Lanka for expanding development
cooperation.
 Also, it led to the starting of composite dialogue with Pakistan.

o The composite dialogue was based on the principle that while entire
spectrums of relationships came under sincere problem-solving dialogues.
o Cooperation must begin on agreed terms in agreed areas (trade, travel,
culture etc.) even as certain disputes remained unresolved (Kashmir,
terrorism).

Relevance of Gujral Doctrine


 Pakistan: For 200 years, Britain practised the principle of divide and rule in
its empire.

o India and Pakistan were born as two sovereign nations into a pool of
mutual hatred, hostility distrust and suspicion.
o To this inherited pool, new tensions and confrontations over religion
(the two nations theory), territory ( Kashmir ) and national aspirations were
added.
o Further, the creation of Bangladesh sharpened the strategic conflict
between India and Pakistan.
 Nepal: Domestic politics in Nepal has led to a strategic deadlock between the
two close neighbours.
 Srilanka: The outbreak of the armed insurgency of Tamil Tigers in Jaffna
created an almost inevitable chasm between India and SriLanka.
 Bangladesh: Illegal migration has always been a contentious issue between
India and Bangladesh.

Challenges to Gujral Doctrine


 China’s footprint in the subcontinent has expanded (Belt and Road
initiative) and the logic of improved connectivity within the subcontinent is often
trumped by heightened security concerns.
 Development cooperation as an instrument of India’s neighbourhood policy is
weakened by the paucity of resources.

o India is unable to match the scale of resources China is able to deploy


in our neighbourhood to win influence.
 The current slowdown in the Indian economy has meant that there is less
willingness on India's part to further open its market to its neighbours.
 India's borders become transmission belts for security threats such as
cross-border terrorism, contraband trade or drug trafficking.
 November 2008 Mumbai attacks, reflected the weakness of this doctrine: that
'inherent goodwill' may not work with openly hostile neighbours.

Way Forward
There is no doubt that the challenges which India must deal with in its
neighbourhood have become more complex and even threatening compared to
two decades ago.In an age of shifting geopolitics and altered the balance of power,
India will need to re-strategise its neighbourhood policy. Connectivity must be
pursued with greater vigour while security concerns are addressed through cost-
effective, efficient and reliable technological measures which are in use in other
parts of the world. India should become a transit country of choice for all its
neighbours by extending national treatment on its transport network and ports.
Above all, “neighbourhood first” must be anchored in the sustained engagement at all
levels of the political and people to people levels, building upon the deep cultural affinities
which are unique to India’s relations with its neighbours.

6 ideological schools that dominated the IFP since


Independence-
Indian grand strategic thinking, in terms of how to approach the foreign policy can be described in terms
of three leading 'schools': Nehruvian, Neoliberalism and Hyperrealism. These schools have come into
sharp relief with the end of the Cold War. Their adherents are to be found in the various branches of
government - the civil services and armed forces even in the slight of ideology of many political parties.
Proponents of the various schools are also to be found in the media, academic life and policy institutes.

While Nehruvian, Neoliberalism and Hyperrealism dominate strategic thinking in contemporary India,
historically there were alternatives, specifically, Marxism, Hindutva and Gandhianism. These three
schools, in the loose sense that the term 'schools' has been used here, have had their 'prophet voices'
and adherents, and the first two in particular have had the backing of political parties.

The approaches function in 3 spheres of Nature of International Life, Nature of Adversary and Role of
Force.

 The Nehruvian approach, in the regard of Nature of International life, considers anarchy can be
made less painful through international laws and institutions. Advocating military restraint,
promoting negotiation and compromises. The approach emphasizes on the values of
cooperation more than conflict through free interaction and welfare of all nations. Furthermore,
to make preparations for war and balance of power the central objectives of security and foreign
policy is, for Nehruvian, both ruinous and futile: ruinous because arms spending can only
impoverish societies materially and create the very conditions that sustain violence and war,
futile because, ultimately, balances of power are fragile and do not prevent large scale violence.
Force is meaningless for them.

 Neoliberals also accept the general characterization of international relations as a state of war.
That coercion plays an imp. Role in such a world is not denied by them. They often express their
distinct view of international relations by comparing the role of military and economic power.
Acc. To them, states pursue not just military power but also economic well-being. They do so in
part because economic strength is ultimately he basis for miliaty power. Economic power may be
more effective than military power and military power, with its diversion of finace and capital to
non-productive ends, can in fact derogate from economic power. Neolibera.ls believe that
economic wellbeing is vital for national security in a broader sense. The key question is, thus
where does economic strength and well-being come from? In the Neoliberal view, it can only
come from free market policies. Free market policies at home imply, in addition, free trade
abroad. Advisories for them are not fixed and are products of misunderstandings, where in
military confrontations are futile as they lead the economies into ruins. Where Nehruvian see
communication and contact as the key to the transformation of international relations,
Neoliberals believe that trade and economic interactions can achieve this, Where Nehruvian
favor international law, institutions, treaties, and agreements as a way of transcending anarchy,
Neoliberals place their faith in self-regarding calculations of the national interest. States act
towards each other not so much according to agreed-upon principles and norms of international
behavior but rather guided by the purely instrumental benefits of alternative lines of policy and
their watchword is flexibility and pragmatism.

 Hyperrealists harbor the most pessimistic view of international relations. They see an
endless cycle of repetition in interstate interactions. The governing metaphor of them is
‘Threat and counter Threat’. They hold that conflict and rivalry between states cannot be
transformed into peace and friendship, they can only be managed by the threat and use of
violence. This implies that the surest way of achieving peace and stability is through the
accumulation of military and power and the willingness to use force. They reject the
Nehruvian and neoliberalist concerns shaping global political approaches. They count the
power in the service of national interests. War, for them, is a constant reality and all are the
adversaries. Hence, military concentration is important.

The following schools accept the prevalence of anarchy in international system and importance
of national interest and reality of violence.

 Marxism: as for the Marxists, above all, there is class. Marxism has famously had its tensions
with nationalism. Indian Marxist thought accepts the existence and importance of
nationalism, but at the center of its politics is the existence of class and class struggle.
Relations between states are a function of class relations and, in the long run, as socialism
and then communism are achieved nation-states as well as the,' international system would
become largely irrelevant if they are not abolished altogether. Indian Marxists accepted the
Stalinist argument that socialism and communism would have to be consolidated in the
Soviet Union and thence spread in stages to the rest of the world: put more abstractly, the
struggle between the working class and bourgeoisie is a national one first and foremost. 36
In this sense, Marxists accepted the interim reality of nation-states even as socialism and
communism advanced. In the interim, the usual imperatives and practices of international
relations would subsist - the competition between states, the insistence on sovereignty, the
possibility of war, and the necessity of national armies. For them, the primary threat is
imperialism and in a capitalist world, the agent of same, for them is US and to contain that
forces, Indian working class and peasantry needs to be developed and protected. Marxists
do not give up altogether on the Indian ruling class and bourgeoisie. This class u1n be used
to further progressive causes in India and to resist the US abroad.

 Hindutva also regards nationalism and the nation-state with a degree of ambivalence,
though perhaps with a less jaundiced eye· than either Marxism or Gandhianism. For political
Hinduism, civilizations matter. The relationships between civilizations are primary.
Civilizations are in competition, and historically are marked by rise and fall. The notion is
somewhat similar with the Westphalian international system of nation states, upholding and
promoting their civilizations. , it is civilizations that shape and move history. Hindu
civilization, being superior to others, will eventually lead the world - not through the force of
arms but rather through its powers of attraction. Other civilizations will come to
acknowledge that Hindu civilization has answered the most profound questions about
human existence and has constructed an order that regulates human relationships better
than any other. They see the threat s to India in. terms of three civilizations the Christian
West the Muslim world, and China. In the Hindutva the threat to India is not only from the
values and practices of Islam and China as civilizational entities as it is from the ambitions of
the Pakistani and Chinese states. They are proponents of organized violence to archive the
national interest.

 Gandhians view of nationalism and nation-states is also quite ambivalent. While Gandhi
himself led the nationalist movement and certainly affirmed the necessity of independence
from British rule, he saw nationalism and the nation-state embedded within a much larger
set of relationships. At the centre of the Gandhian worldvie·w is the individual and his
conscience.38 The individual's values and behaviour are the key to ordering human
relationships. Truth and non-violence must guide con science, and it is an individual's right
and responsibility to abide, the dictates finally of her conscience, not the norms and rules of
collective. They acknowledges the prevalence of contentation and violence but still
advocates to live a simple life and self reliance. For them the greatest threat to India is
moderninty, as the industrialized and so called forward march pose a great threat to Indian
traditions and the idea Indian culture. An india organized on Ghandian lines would not be an
object of aggression and would threaten no one. Inclividuals and nations, in defence of their
securit; and honour. could use violence if they had no nther means availabe to them and if
they were not trained in the arts of non-violent resistance.

Indian FP in contemporary sense-


 This fifth phase (1998-2013): India, a Balancing Power

o In this period, India gradually acquired the attributes of a balancing


power (against the rise of China).
o It is reflected in the India-US nuclear deal (123 Agreement).
o At the same time, India could also make common cause with China on
climate change and trade, and consolidate further ties with Russia while
helping to fashion BRICS into a major global forum.
 The sixth phase (2013-until now): Energetic Engagement

o In this phase of transitional geopolitics, India's policy of Non-Alignment


has turned into Multi Alignment.
o India’s External Affairs Minister, Dr. S. Jaishankar, has signaled that
the era of risk averse passivity has receded, giving rise to expectations of
greater realism backed by political will. India sees itself as a stabilizing
power which finds benefit in multiple external engagements, hoping to
build momentum for a multipolar world with a multipolar Asia at its core.
India’s balancing posture and its growing military and strategic capabilities
are seen to provide a degree of reassurance against global turbulence and
competitive geopolitics
o Moreover, India is now more aware of its own capabilities and the
expectations that the world has of India.

 That India is among the major economies of the world is one


factor.
 The relevance of India’s talent in creating and sustaining global
technology is also likely to grow in time.
 India's willingness to shape key global negotiations (such as
conference in Paris on climate change) is equally significant.
 India has been able to assert itself beyond South Asia, through
its approach towards the Indian Ocean Region (SAGAR initiative) and
the extended neighbourhood (Act East policy and Think West policy).

Globally, India wants to remain a relevant and influencing power on issues


ranging from climate sustainability to fair trade, digital technologies to the
space and cyber commons, through national interest based multilateral
engagement. Finally, an underlying presumption defining India’s foreign
policy today is that the basic orientation has changed to overcome
ideological dogma and the hesitations of history. This perception, however,
remains to be tested against persisting default practices and traditional
mindsets, which to a considerable extent remain anchored in discourses of
strategic autonomy. (mention about border disputes and covid-19)
Relevance of nam form article.

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