2effect and Application of Laws

Effect and Application of Laws (Arts.
1-18, New Civil Code)
Cases:
Articles 1-10
1. Tanada v. Tuvera, G.R. No. L-63915, 29 December 1986, 146 SCRA 446
EN BANC
[G.R. No. L-63915. December 29, 1986.]
LORENZO M. TAÑADA, ABRAHAM F. SARMIENTO, and MOVEMENT OF ATTORNEYS FOR

BROTHERHOOD, INTEGRITY AND NATIONALISM, INC. (MABINI), Petitioners, v. HON.
JUAN C. TUVERA. in his capacity as Executive Assistant to the President, HON.
JOAQUIN VENUS, in his capacity as Deputy Executive Assistant to the President,
MELQUIADES P. DE LA CRUZ, ETC., ET AL., Respondents.
SYLLABUS
FERNAN, J., concurring:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
1. CIVIL LAW; EFFECT AND APPLICATION OF LAWS; ARTICLE 2, CIVIL CODE; PUBLICATION OF
LAWS MADE TO ENSURE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS AND TO INFORMATION. —
The categorical statement by this Court on the need for publication before any law be made
effective seeks to prevent abuses on the part if the lawmakers and, at the time, ensure to the
people their constitutional right to due process and to information on matter of public
concern.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary:red
RESOLUTION
CRUZ, J.:
Due process was invoked by the petitioners in demanding the disclosure or a number of
presidential decrees which they claimed had not been published as required by law. The
government argued that while publication was necessary as a rule, it was not so when it was
"otherwise provided," as when the decrees themselves declared that they were to become
effective immediately upon their approval. In the decision of this case on April 24, 1985, the
Court affirmed the necessity for the publication of some of these decrees, declaring in the
dispositive portion as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"WHEREFORE, the Court hereby orders respondents to publish to the Official Gazette all
unpublished presidential issuances which are of general application, and unless so published,
they shall have no binding force and effect."cralaw virtua1aw library
The petitioners are now before us again, this time to move for reconsideration/clarification of
that decision. 1 Specifically, they ask the following questions:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
1. What is meant by "law of public nature" or "general applicability" ?
2. Must a distinction be made between laws of general applicability and laws which are not?
3. What is meant by "publication" ?
4. Where is the publication to be made?
5. When is the publication to be made?
Resolving their own doubts, the petitioners suggest that there should be no distinction between
laws of general applicability and those which are not; that publication means complete
publication; and that the publication must be made forthwith in the Official Gazette. 2
In the Comment 3 required of the then Solicitor General, he claimed first that the motion was a
request for an advisory opinion and should therefore be dismissed, and, on the merits, that the
clause "unless it is otherwise provided" in Article 2 of the Civil Code meant that the publication
required therein was not always imperative; that publication, when necessary, did not have to be
made in the Official Gazette; and that in any case the subject decision was concurred in only by
three justices and consequently not binding. This elicited a Reply 4 refuting these arguments.
Came next the February Revolution and the Court required the new Solicitor General to file a
Rejoinder in view of the supervening events, under Rule 3, Section 18, of the Rules of Court.
Responding, he submitted that issuances intended only for the interval administration of a
government agency or for particular persons did not have to be published; that publication when
necessary must be in full and in the Official Gazette; and that, however, the decision under
reconsideration was not binding because it was not supported by eight members of this Court. 5
The subject of contention is Article 2 of the Civil Code providing as

follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"ART. 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in
the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided. This Code shall take effect one year after
such publication."cralaw virtua1aw library
After a careful study of this provision and of the arguments of the parties, both on the original
petition and on the instant motion, we have come to the conclusion, and so hold, that the clause
"unless it is otherwise provided" refers to the date of effectivity and not to the requirement of
publication itself, which cannot in any event be omitted. This clause does not mean that the
legislature may make the law effective immediately upon approval, or on any other date, without
its previous publication.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary
Publication is indispensable in every case, but the legislature may in its discretion provide that
the usual fifteen-day period shall be shortened or extended. An example, as pointed out by the
present Chief Justice in his separate concurrence in the original decision, 6 is the Civil Code
which did not become effective after fifteen days from its publication in the Official Gazette but
"one year after such publication." The general rule did not apply because it was "otherwise
provided."cralaw virtua1aw library
It is not correct to say that under the disputed clause publication may be dispensed with
altogether. The reason is that such omission would offend due process insofar as it would deny
the public knowledge of the laws that are supposed to govern it. Surely, if the legislature could
validly provide that a law shall become effective immediately upon its approval notwithstanding
the lack of publication (or after an unreasonably short period after publication), it is not unlikely
that persons not aware of it would be prejudiced as a result; and they would be so not because
of a failure to comply with it but simply because they did not know of its existence. Significantly,
this is not true only of penal laws as is commonly supposed. One can think of many non-penal
measures, like a law on prescription, which must also be communicated to the persons they may
affect before they can begin to operate.cralawnad
We note at this point the conclusive presumption that every person knows the law, which of
course presupposes that the law has been published if the presumption is to have any legal
justification at all. It is no less important to remember that Section 6 of the Bill of Rights
recognizes "the right of the people to information on matters of public concern," and this
certainly applies to, among others, and indeed especially, the legislative enactments of the
government.
The term "laws" should refer to all laws and not only to those of general application, for strictly
speaking all laws relate to the people in general albeit there are some that do not apply to them
directly. An example is a law granting citizenship to a particular individual, like a relative of
President Marcos who was decreed instant naturalization. It surely cannot be said that such a law
does not affect the public although it unquestionably does not apply directly to all the people.
The subject of such law is a matter of public interest which any member of the body politic may
question in the political forums or, if he is a proper party, even in the courts of justice. In fact, a
law without any bearing on the public would be invalid as an intrusion of privacy or as class
legislation or as an ultra vires act of the legislature. To be valid, the law must invariably affect
the public interest even if it might be directly applicable only to one individual, or some of the
people only, and not to the public as a whole.
We hold therefore that all statutes, including those of local application and private laws, shall be
published as a condition for their effectivity, which shall begin fifteen days after publication
unless a different effectivity date is fixed by the legislature.chanrobles.com:cralaw:red
Covered by this rule are presidential decrees and executive orders promulgated by the President
in the exercise of legislative powers whenever the same are validly delegated by the legislature
or, at present, directly conferred by the Constitution. Administrative rules and regulations must
also be published if their purpose is to enforce or implement existing law pursuant also to a valid
delegation.
Interpretative regulations and those merely internal in nature, that is, regulating only the
personnel of the administrative agency and not the public, need not be published. Neither is
publication required of the so-called letters of instructions issued by administrative superiors
concerning the rules or guidelines to be followed by their subordinates in the performance of
their duties.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Accordingly, even the charter of a city must be published notwithstanding that it applies to only a
portion of the national territory and directly affects only the inhabitants of that place. All
presidential decrees must be published, including even, say, those naming a public place after a
favored individual or exempting him from certain prohibitions or requirements. The circulars
issued by the Monetary Board must be published if they are meant not merely to interpret but to
"fill in the details" of the Central Bank Act which that body is supposed to enforce.
However, no publication is required of the instructions issued by, say, the Minister of Social
Welfare on the case studies to be made in petitions for adoption or the rules laid down by the
head of a government agency on the assignments or workload of his personnel or the wearing of
office uniforms. Parenthetically, municipal ordinances are not covered by this rule but by the
Local Government Code.
We agree that the publication must be in full or it is no publication at all since its purpose is to
inform the public of the contents of the laws. As correctly pointed out by the petitioners, the
mere mention of the number of the presidential decree, the title of such decree, its whereabouts
(e.g., "with Secretary Tuvera"), the supposed date of effectivity, and in a mere supplement of
the Official Gazette cannot satisfy the publication requirement. This is not even substantial
compliance. This was the manner, incidentally, in which the General Appropriations Act for FY
1975, a presidential decree undeniably of general applicability and interest, was "published" by
the Marcos administration. 7 The evident purpose was to withhold rather than disclose
information on this vital law.
Coming now to the original decision, it is true that only four justices were categorically for
publication in the Official Gazette 8 and that six others felt that publication could be made
elsewhere as long as the people were sufficiently informed. 9 One reserved his vote 10 and
another merely acknowledged the need for due publication without indicating where it should be
made, 11 It is therefore necessary for the present membership of this Court to arrive at a clear
consensus on this matter and to lay down a binding decision supported by the necessary vote.
There is much to be said of the view that the publication need not be made in the Official
Gazette, considering its erratic releases and limited readership. Undoubtedly, newspapers of
general circulation could better perform the function of communicating the laws to the people as
such periodicals are more easily available, have a wider readership, and come out regularly. The
trouble, though, is that this kind of publication is not the one required or authorized by existing
law. As far as we know, no amendment has been made of Article 2 of the Civil Code. The
Solicitor General has not pointed to such a law, and we have no information that it exists. If it
does, it obviously has not yet been published.
At any rate, this Court is not called upon to rule upon the wisdom of a law or to repeal or modify
it if we find it impractical. That is not our function. That function belongs to the legislature. Our
task is merely to interpret and apply the law as conceived and approved by the political
departments of the government in accordance with the prescribed procedure. Consequently, we
have no choice but to pronounce that under Article 2 of the Civil Code, the publication of laws
must be made in the Official Gazette, and not elsewhere, as a requirement for their effectivity
after fifteen days from such publication or after a different period provided by the
legislature.chanrobles law library
We also hold that the publication must be made forthwith, or at least as soon as possible, to give
effect to the law pursuant to the said Article 2. There is that possibility, of course, although not
suggested by the parties that a law could be rendered unenforceable by a mere refusal of the
executive, for whatever reason, to cause its publication as required. This is a matter, however,
that we do not need to examine at this time.
Finally, the claim of the former Solicitor General that the instant motion is a request for an
advisory opinion is untenable, to say the least, and deserves no further comment.
The days of the secret laws and the unpublished decrees are over. This is once again an open
society, with all the acts of the government subject to public scrutiny and available always to
public cognizance. This has to be so if our country is to remain democratic, with sovereignty
residing in the people and all government authority emanating from them.
Although they have delegated the power of legislation, they retain the authority to review the
work of their delegates and to ratify or reject it according to their lights, through their freedom of
expression and their right of suffrage. This they cannot do if the acts of the legislature are
concealed.
Laws must come out in the open in the clear light of the sun instead of skulking in the shadows
with their dark, deep secrets. Mysterious pronouncements and rumored rules cannot be
recognized as binding unless their existence and contents are confirmed by a valid publication
intended to make full disclosure and give proper notice to the people. The furtive law is like a
scabbarded saber that cannot feint, parry or cut unless the naked blade is drawn.
WHEREFORE, it is hereby declared that all laws as above defined shall immediately upon their
approval, or as soon thereafter as possible, be published in full in the Official Gazette, to become
effective only after fifteen days from their publication, or on another date specified by the
legislature, in accordance with Article 2 of the Civil Code.chanroblesvirtual|awlibrary
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee, C.J., Feria, Yap, Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Alampay, Gutierrez, Jr ., and Paras, JJ.,

concur.
Separate Opinions
FERNAN, J., concurring:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
While concurring in the Court’s opinion penned by my distinguished colleague, Mr. Justice Isagani
A. Cruz, I would like to add a few observations. Even as a Member of the defunct Batasang
Pambansa, I took a strong stand against the insidious manner by which the previous
dispensation had promulgated and made effective thousands of decrees, executive orders, letters
of instructions, etc. Never has the law-making power which traditionally belongs to the
legislature been used and abused to satisfy the whims and caprices of a one-man legislative mill
as it happened in the past regime. Thus, in those days, it was not surprising to witness the sad
spectacle of two presidential decrees bearing the same number, although covering two different
subject matters. In point is the case of two presidential decrees bearing number 1686 issued on
March 19, 1980, one granting Philippine citizenship to Michael M. Keon, the then President’s
nephew and the other imposing a tax on every motor vehicle equipped with air-conditioner. This
was further exacerbated by the issuance of PD No. 1686-A also on March 19, 1980 granting
Philippine citizenship to basketball players Jeffrey Moore and Dennis George
Still.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
The categorical statement by this Court on the need for publication before any law may be made
effective seeks to prevent abuses on the part of the lawmakers and, at the same time, ensures
to the people their constitutional right to due process and to information on matters of public
concern.
FELICIANO, J., concurring:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
I agree entirely with the opinion of the court so eloquently written by Mr. Justice Isagani A. Cruz.
At the same time, I wish to add a few statements to reflect my understanding of what the Court
is saying.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary
A statute which by its terms provides for its coming into effect immediately upon approval
thereof, is properly interpreted as coming into effect immediately upon publication thereof in the
Official Gazette as provided in Article 2 of the Civil Code. Such statute, in other words, should
not be regarded as purporting literally to come into effect immediately upon its approval or
enactment and without need of publication. For so to interpret such statute would be to collide
with the constitutional obstacle posed by the due process clause. The enforcement of
prescriptions which are both unknown to and unknowable by those subjected to the statute, has
been throughout history a common tool of tyrannical governments. Such application and
enforcement constitutes at bottom a negation of the fundamental principle of legality in the
relations between a government and its people.
At the same time, it is clear that the requirement of publication of a statute in the Official
Gazette, as distinguished from any other medium such as a newspaper of general circulation, is
embodied in a statutory norm and is not a constitutional command. The statutory norm is set out
in Article 2 of the Civil Code and is supported and reinforced by Section 1 of Commonwealth Act
No. 638 and Section 35 of the Revised Administrative Code. A specification of the Official Gazette
as the prescribed medium of publication may therefore be changed. Article 2 of the Civil Code
could, without creating a constitutional problem, be amended by a subsequent statute providing,
for instance, for publication either in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation
in the country. Until such an amendatory statute is in fact enacted, Article 2 of the Civil Code
must be obeyed and publication effected in the Official Gazette and not in any other
medium.chanrobles virtualawlibrary chanrobles.com:chanrobles.com.ph
Endnotes:
1. Rollo, pp. 242-250.
2. Ibid., pp. 244-248.
3. Id., pp. 271-280.

4. Id., pp. 288-299.
5. Id., pp. 320-322.
6. 136 SCRA 27, 46.
7. Rollo, p. 246.
8. Justices Venicio Escolin (ponente), Claudio Teehankee, Ameurfina Melencio-Herrera, and

Lorenzo Relova.
9. Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando and Justices Felix V. Makasiar, Vicente Abad-Santos, Efren
I. Plana, Serafin P. Cuevas, and Nestor B. Alampay.
10. Justice Hugo E. Gutierrez, Jr.
11. Justice B. S. de la Fuente.
2. De Roy v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 80718, 29 January 1988
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. L-80718. January 29, 1988.]
FELISA P. DE ROY and VIRGILIO RAMOS, Petitioners, v. COURT OF APPEALS and LUIS

BERNAL, SR., GLENIA BERNAL, LUIS BERNAL, JR., HEIRS OF MARISSA BERNAL, namely,
GLICERIA DELA CRUZ BERNAL and LUIS BERNAL, SR., Respondents.
SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; CIVIL PROCEDURE; APPEAL; PERIOD FOR APPEALING OR FOR FILING A
MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION, NON-EXTENDIBLE. — The rule laid down in Habaluyas
Enterprises, Inc. v. Japzon, [G.R. No. 70895, August 5, 1985, 138 SCRA 46], that the fifteen-day
period for appealing or for filing a motion for reconsideration cannot be extended.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; GROSS PERIOD IN BOCAVA CASE, INAPPLICABLE TO THE CASE AT BAR. — The
one-month grace period from the promulgation on May 30, 1986 of the Court’s Resolution in the
clarificatory Habaluyas case, or up to June 30, 1986, within which the rule barring extensions of
time to file motions for new trial or reconsideration may still be allowed cannot be invoked by the
petitioners as their motion for extension of time was filed on September 9, 1987, more than a
year after the grace period on June 30, 1986.
RESOLUTION
CORTES, J.:
This special civil action for certiorari seeks to declare null and void two (2) resolutions of the
Special Division of the Court of Appeals in the Luis Bernal, Sr., Et. Al. v. Felisa Perdosa De Roy,
Et Al., CA-G.R. CV No. 07286. The first resolution promulgated on 30 September 1987 denied
petitioner’s motion for extension of time to file a motion for reconsideration and directed entry of
judgment since the decision in said case had become final; and the second Resolution dated 27
October 1987 denied petitioners’ motion for reconsideration for having been filed out of time.
At the outset, this Court could have denied the petition outright for not being verified as required
by Rule 65 section 1 of the Rules of Court. However, even if the instant petition did not suffer
from this defect, this Court, on procedural and substantive grounds, would still resolve to deny
it.
The facts of the case are undisputed. The firewall of a burnedout building owned by petitioners
collapsed and destroyed the tailoring shop occupied by the family of private respondents,
resulting in injuries to private respondents and the death of Marissa Bernal, a daughter. Private
respondents had been warned by petitioners to vacate their shop in view of its proximity to the
weakened wall but the former failed to do so. On the basis of the foregoing facts, the Regional
Trial Court. First Judicial Region, Branch XXXVIII, presided by the Hon. Antonio M. Belen,
rendered judgment finding petitioners guilty of gross negligence and awarding damages to
private respondents. On appeal, the decision of the trial court was affirmed in toto by the Court
of Appeals in a decision promulgated on August 17, 1987, a copy of which was received by
petitioners on August 25, 1987. On September 9, 1987, the last day of the fifteen-day period to
file an appeal, petitioners filed a motion for extension of time to file a motion for reconsideration,
which was eventually denied by the appellate court in the Resolution of September 30, 1987.
Petitioners filed their motion for reconsideration on September 24, 1987 but this was denied in
the Resolution of October 27, 1987.
This Court finds that the Court of Appeals did not commit a grave abuse of discretion when it
denied petitioners’ motion for extension of time to file a motion for reconsideration, directed
entry of judgment and denied their motion for reconsideration. It correctly applied the rule laid
down in Habaluyas Enterprises, Inc. v. Japzon, [G.R. No. 70895, August 5, 1985, 138 SCRA 46],
that the fifteen-day period for appealing or for filing a motion for reconsideration cannot be
extended. In its Resolution denying the motion for reconsideration, promulgated on May 30,
1986 (142 SCRA 208), this Court en banc restated and clarified the rule, to wit:chanrob1es
virtual 1aw library
Beginning one month after the promulgation of this Resolution, the rule shall be strictly enforced
that no motion for extension of time to file a motion for reconsideration may be filed with the
Metropolitan or Municipal Trial Courts, the Regional Trial Courts, and the Intermediate Appellate
Court. Such a motion may be filed only in cases pending with the Supreme Court as the court of
last resort, which may in its sound discretion either grant or deny the extension requested. (at p.
212)
Lacsamana v. Second Special Cases Division of the Intermediate Appellate Court, [G.R. No.
73146-53, August 26, 1986, 143 SCRA 643], reiterated the rule and went further to restate and
clarify the modes and periods of appeal.
Bacaya v. Intermediate Appellate Court, [G.R. No. 74824, Sept. 16, 1985, 144 SCRA 161],
stressed the prospective application of said rule, and explained the operation of the grace period,
to wit:chanrobles.com:cralaw:red
In other words, there is one-month grace period from the promulgation on May 30, 1986 of the
Court’s Resolution in the clarificatory Habaluyas case, or up to June 30, 1986, within which the
rule barring extensions of time to file motions for new trial or reconsideration is, as yet, not
strictly enforceable.
Since petitioners herein filed their motion for extension on February 27, 1986, it is still within the
grace period, which expired on June 30, 1986, and may still be allowed.
This grace period was also applied in Mission v. Intermediate Appellate Court [G.R. No. 73669,
October 28, 1986, 145 SCRA 306].
In the instant case, however, petitioners’ motion for extension of time was filed on September 9,
1987, more than a year after the expiration of the grace period on June 30, 1986. Hence, it is no
longer within the coverage of the grace period. Considering the length of time from the
expiration of the grace period to the promulgation of the decision of the Court of Appeals on
August 25, 1987, petitioners cannot seek refuge in the ignorance of their counsel regarding said
rule for their failure to file a motion for reconsideration within the reglementary
period.chanrobles.com.ph : virtual law library
Petitioners contend that the rule enunciated in the Habaluyas case should not be made to apply
to the case at bar owing to the non-publication of the Habaluyas decision in the Official Gazette
as of the time the subject decision of the Court of Appeals was promulgated. Contrary to
petitioners’ view, there is no law requiring the publication of Supreme Court decisions in the
Official Gazette before they can be binding and as a condition to their becoming effective. It is
the bounden duty of counsel as lawyer in active law practice to keep abreast of decisions of the
Supreme Court particularly where issues have been clarified, consistently reiterated, and
published in the advance reports of Supreme Court decisions (G.R.s) and in such publications as
the Supreme Court Reports Annotated (SCRA) and law journals.
This Court likewise finds that the Court of Appeals committed no grave abuse of discretion in
affirming the trial court’s decision holding petitioner liable under Article 2190 of the Civil Code,
which provides that "the proprietor of a building or structure is responsible for the damage
resulting from its total or partial collapse, if it should be due to the lack of necessary
repairs."cralaw virtua1aw library
Nor was there error in rejecting petitioners argument that private respondents had the "last clear
chance" to avoid the accident if only they heeded the warning to vacate the tailoring shop and,
therefore, petitioners prior negligence should be disregarded, since the doctrine of "last clear
chance," which has been applied to vehicular accidents, is inapplicable to this case.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court Resolved to DENY the instant petition for lack of
merit.
Fernan (Chairman), Gutierrez, Jr., Feliciano and Bidin, JJ., concur.

3. People vs., Quo Po Lay 94 Phil 640
4. NPC v. Pinatubo Commercial, G.R. No. 176006, 26 March 2010.
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 176006 : March 26, 2010]
NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION, PETITIONER, VS. PINATUBO COMMERCIAL,

REPRESENTED BY ALFREDO A. DY, RESPONDENT.
DECISION
CORONA, J.:
The National Power Corporation (NPC) questions the decision dated June 30, 2006 rendered by
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Mandaluyong City, Branch 213 declaring items 3 and 3.1 of NPC
Circular No. 99-75 unconstitutional. The dispositive portion of the decision provides:
WHEREFORE then, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered declaring item[s] 3 and
3.1 of NAPOCOR Circular No. 99-75, which [allow] only partnerships or corporations that directly
use aluminum as the raw material in producing finished products either purely or partly out of
aluminum, to participate in the bidding for the disposal of ACSR wires as unconstitutional for
being violative of substantial due process and the equal protection clause of the Constitution as
well as for restraining competitive free trade and commerce.
The claim for attorney's fees is denied for lack of merit.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
NPC also assails the RTC resolution dated November 20, 2006 denying its motion for
reconsideration for lack of merit.
In this petition, NPC poses the sole issue for our review:
WHETHER OR NOT THE RTC GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT DECLARED ITEMS 3 AND 3.1 OF
NAPOCOR CIRCULAR NO. 99-75 AS UNCONSTITUTIONAL FOR BEING VIOLATIVE OF
SUBSTANTIAL DUE PROCESS AND THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE OF THE CONSTITUTION AS
WELL AS FOR RESTRAINING COMPETITIVE FREE TRADE AND COMMERCE.
NPC Circular No. 99-75 dated October 8, 1999 set the guidelines in the "disposal of scrap
aluminum conductor steel-reinforced or ACSRs in order to decongest and maintain good
housekeeping in NPC installations and to generate additional income for NPC." Items 3 and 3.1 of
the circular provide:
3. QUALIFIED BIDDERS
3.1 Qualified bidders envisioned in this circular are partnerships or corporations that directly use
aluminum as the raw material in producing finished products either purely or partly out of
aluminum, or their duly appointed representatives. These bidders may be based locally or
overseas.
In April 2003, NPC published an invitation for the pre-qualification of bidders for the public sale
of its scrap ACSR cables. Respondent Pinatubo Commercial, a trader of scrap materials such as
copper, aluminum, steel and other ferrous and non-ferrous materials, submitted a pre-
qualification form to NPC. Pinatubo, however, was informed in a letter dated April 29, 2003 that
its application for pre-qualification had been denied. Petitioner asked for reconsideration but NPC
denied it.
Pinatubo then filed a petition in the RTC for the annulment of NPC Circular No. 99-75, with a
prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary
injunction. Pinatubo argued that the circular was unconstitutional as it violated the due process
and equal protection clauses of the Constitution, and ran counter to the government policy of
competitive public bidding.
The RTC upheld Pinatubo's position and declared items 3 and 3.1 of the circular unconstitutional.
The RTC ruled that it was violative of substantive due process because, while it created rights in
favor of third parties, the circular had not been published. It also pronounced that the circular
violated the equal protection clause since it favored manufacturers and processors of aluminum
scrap vis-Ã -vis dealers/traders in the purchase of aluminum ACSR cables from NPC. Lastly, the
RTC found that the circular denied traders the right to exercise their business and restrained free
competition inasmuch as it allowed only a certain sector to participate in the bidding.
In this petition, NPC insists that there was no need to publish the circular since it was not of
general application. It was addressed only to particular persons or class of persons, namely the
disposal committees, heads of offices, regional and all other officials involved in the disposition of
ACSRs. NPC also contends that there was a substantial distinction between manufacturers and
traders of aluminum scrap materials specially viewed in the light of RA 7832. According to NPC,
by limiting the prospective bidders to manufacturers, it could easily monitor the market of its
scrap ACSRs. There was rampant fencing of stolen NPC wires. NPC likewise maintains that
traders were not prohibited from participating in the pre-qualification as long as they had a tie-
up with a manufacturer.
The questions that need to be resolved in this case are:
(1) whether NPC Circular No. 99-75 must be published; and

(2) whether items 3 and 3.1 of NPC Circular No. 99-75 -
(a) violated the equal protection clause of the Constitution and

(b) restrained free trade and competition.
TaÃ±ada v. Tuvera stressed the need for publication in order for statutes and administrative
rules and regulations to have binding force and effect, viz.:
x x x all statutes, including those of local application and private laws, shall be published as a
condition for their effectivity, which shall begin fifteen days after publication unless a different
effectivity is fixed by the legislature.
Covered by this rule are presidential decrees and executive orders promulgated by the President
in the exercise of legislative power or, at present, directly conferred by the Constitution.
Administrative Rules and Regulations must also be published if their purpose is to enforce or
implement existing law pursuant also to a valid delegation.
TaÃ±ada, however, qualified that:
Interpretative regulations and those merely internal in nature, that is, regulating only the
personnel of the administrative agency and not the public, need not be published. Neither is
publication required of the so-called letters of instructions issued by administrative superiors
concerning the rules or guidelines to be followed by their subordinates in the performance of
their duties. (emphasis ours)
In this case, NPC Circular No. 99-75 did not have to be published since it was merely an internal
rule or regulation. It did not purport to enforce or implement an existing law but was merely a
directive issued by the NPC President to his subordinates to regulate the proper and efficient
disposal of scrap ACSRs to qualified bidders. Thus, NPC Circular No. 99-75 defined the
responsibilities of the different NPC personnel in the disposal, pre-qualification, bidding and
award of scrap ACSRS. It also provided for the deposit of a proposal bond to be submitted by
bidders, the approval of the award, mode of payment and release of awarded scrap ACSRs. All
these guidelines were addressed to the NPC personnel involved in the bidding and award of scrap
ACSRs. It did not, in any way, affect the rights of the public in general or of any other person not
involved in the bidding process. Assuming it affected individual rights, it did so only remotely,
indirectly and incidentally.
Pinatubo's argument that items 3 and 3.1 of NPC Circular No. 99-75 deprived it of its "right to
bid" or that these conferred such right in favor of a third person is erroneous. Bidding, in its
comprehensive sense, means making an offer or an invitation to prospective contractors
whereby the government manifests its intention to invite proposals for the purchase of supplies,
materials and equipment for official business or public use, or for public works or repair. Bidding
rules may specify other conditions or require that the bidding process be subjected to certain
reservations or qualifications. Since a bid partakes of the nature of an offer to contract with the
government, the government agency involved may or may not accept it. Moreover, being the
owner of the property subject of the bid, the government has the power to determine who shall
be its recipient, as well as under what terms it may be awarded. In this sense, participation in
the bidding process is a privilege inasmuch as it can only be exercised under existing criteria
imposed by the government itself. As such, prospective bidders, including Pinatubo, cannot claim
any demandable right to take part in it if they fail to meet these criteria. Thus, it has been stated
that under the traditional form of property ownership, recipients of privileges or largesse from
the government cannot be said to have property rights because they possess no traditionally
recognized proprietary interest therein.
Also, as the discretion to accept or reject bids and award contracts is of such wide latitude,
courts will not interfere, unless it is apparent that such discretion is exercised arbitrarily, or used
as a shield to a fraudulent award. The exercise of that discretion is a policy decision that
necessitates prior inquiry, investigation, comparison, evaluation, and deliberation. This task can
best be discharged by the concerned government agencies, not by the courts. Courts will not
interfere with executive or legislative discretion exercised within those boundaries. Otherwise,
they stray into the realm of policy decision-making.
Limiting qualified bidders in this case to partnerships or corporations that directly use aluminum
as the raw material in producing finished products made purely or partly of aluminum was an
exercise of discretion by the NPC. Unless the discretion was exercised arbitrarily or used as a
subterfuge for fraud, the Court will not interfere with the exercise of such discretion.
This brings to the fore the next question: whether items 3 and 3.1 of NPC Circular No. 99-75
violated the equal protection clause of the Constitution.
The equal protection clause means that "no person or class of persons shall be deprived of the
same protection of laws which is enjoyed by other persons or other classes in the same place
and in like circumstances." The guaranty of the equal protection of the laws is not violated by a
legislation based on a reasonable classification. The equal protection clause, therefore, does not
preclude classification of individuals who may be accorded different treatment under the law as
long as the classification is reasonable and not arbitrary.
Items 3 and 3.1 met the standards of a valid classification. Indeed, as juxtaposed by the RTC,
the purpose of NPC Circular No. 99-75 was to dispose of the ACSR wires. As stated by Pinatubo,
it was also meant to earn income for the government. Nevertheless, the disposal and revenue-
generating objective of the circular was not an end in itself and could not bar NPC from imposing
conditions for the proper disposition and ultimately, the legitimate use of the scrap ACSR wires.
In giving preference to direct manufacturers and producers, it was the intent of NPC to support
RA 7832, which penalizes the theft of ACSR in excess of 100 MCM. The difference in treatment
between direct manufacturers and producers, on one hand, and traders, on the other, was
rationalized by NPC as follows:
x x x NAPOCOR can now easily monitor the market of its scrap ACSR wires and verify whether or
not a person's possession of such materials is legal or not; and consequently, prosecute under
R.A. 7832, those whose possession, control or custody of such material is unexplained. This is
based upon the reasonable presumption that if the buyer were a manufacturer or processor, the
scrap ACSRs end with him as the latter uses it to make finished products; but if the buyer were a
trader, there is greater probability that the purchased materials may pass from one trader to
another. Should traders without tie-up to manufacturers or processors of aluminum be allowed
to participate in the bidding, the ACSRs bidded out to them will likely co-mingle with those
already proliferating in the illegal market. Thus, great difficulty shall be encountered by
NAPOCOR and/or those authorities tasked to implement R.A. 7832 in determining whether or not
the ACSRs found in the possession, control and custody of a person suspected of theft [of]
electric power transmission lines and materials are the fruit of the offense defined in Section 3 of
R.A. 7832.
Items 3 and 3.1 clearly did not infringe on the equal protection clause as these were based on a
reasonable classification intended to protect, not the right of any business or trade but the
integrity of government property, as well as promote the objectives of RA 7832. Traders like
Pinatubo could not claim similar treatment as direct manufacturers/processors especially in the
light of their failure to negate the rationale behind the distinction.
Finally, items 3 and 3.1 of NPC Circular No. 99-75 did not restrain free trade or competition.
Pinatubo contends that the condition imposed by NPC under items 3 and 3.1 violated the
principle of competitiveness advanced by RA 9184 (Government Procurement Reform Act) which
states:
SEC. 3. Governing Principles on Government Procurement. - All procurement of the national
government, its departments, bureaus, offices and agencies, including state universities and
colleges, government-owned and/or controlled corporations, government financial institutions
and local government units, shall, in all cases, be governed by these principles:
xxx
(b) Competitiveness by extending equal opportunity to enable private contracting parties who
are eligible and qualified to participate in public bidding. (emphasis ours)
The foregoing provision imposed the precondition that the contracting parties should
be eligible and qualified. It should be emphasized that the bidding process was not a "free-for-
all" where any and all interested parties, qualified or not, could take part. Section 5(e) of RA
9184 defines competitive bidding as a "method of procurement which is open to participation by
any interested party and which consists of the following processes: advertisement, pre-bid
conference, eligibility screening of prospective bidders, receipt and opening of bids,
evaluation of bids, post-qualification, and award of contract x x x." The law categorically
mandates that prospective bidders are subject to eligibility screening, and as earlier stated,
bidding rules may specify other conditions or order that the bidding process be subjected to
certain reservations or qualifications. Thus, in its pre-qualification guidelines issued for the sale
of scrap ACSRs, the NPC reserved the right to pre-disqualify any applicant who did not meet the
requirements for pre-qualification. Clearly, the competitiveness policy of a bidding process
presupposes the eligibility and qualification of a contestant; otherwise, it defeats the principle
that only "responsible" and "qualified" bidders can bid and be awarded government
contracts. Our free enterprise system is not based on a market of pure and unadulterated
competition where the State pursues a strict hands-off policy and follows the let-the-devil-
devour-the-hindmost rule.
Moreover, the mere fact that incentives and privileges are granted to certain enterprises to the
exclusion of others does not render the issuance unconstitutional for espousing unfair
competition. While the Constitution enshrines free enterprise as a policy, it nonetheless reserves
to the government the power to intervene whenever necessary to promote the general
welfare. In the present case, the unregulated disposal and sale of scrap ACSR wires will hamper
the government's effort of curtailing the pernicious practice of trafficking stolen government
property. This is an evil sought to be prevented by RA 7832 and certainly, it was well within the
authority of the NPC to prescribe conditions in order to prevent it.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Mandaluyong City, Branch 213 dated June 30, 2006 and resolution dated November 20, 2006
are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Civil Case No. MC-03-2179 for the annulment of NPC Circular
No. 99-75 is hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
Velasco, Jr., Peralta, Bersamin, and Mendoza, JJ., concur.
Endnotes:
Additional member per raffle dated March 24, 2010 in lieu of Justice Antonio Eduardo B.
Nachura.
Represented by the Office of the Solicitor General.
Rollo, p. 40.
Id., p. 42.
Id., p. 21.
Subject: Implementing Guidelines Governing the Disposal Through Sale of SCRAP ACSRs.
Rollo, p. 43.
Aluminum conductor steel-reinforced.
Rollo, p. 74.
Id., p. 56.
Docketed as Civil Case No. MC-03-2179.
Rollo, pp. 56-59.
Id., pp. 37-40.
Republic Act No. 7832 or the Anti-Electricity and Electric Transmission Lines/Materials Pilferage
Act of 1994.
Id., pp. 22-30.
G.R. No. L-63915, 24 April 1985, 146 SCRA 446.

Id., p. 453-454.
Id., p. 454.
Items 4.1 to 4.1.2 require Cost Center Heads to report either to the Chairman of the Central or
Regional Asset Management Sub-Committee (CAMSUC/RAMSUC) all available scrap ACSRs in
their respective area of responsibility; Items 4.2 to 4.2.5 tasked the Head Office Bidding and
Services Section and the Regional Materials Planning Services with the pre-qualification of
prospective bidders; Items 4.3 to 4.3.4 set the procedure in the public bidding to be conducted
by the CAMSUC or RAMSUC; and Items 4.4 to 4.4.4 direct the appraisal and coordination by the
Asset Disposal Section and its Regional Counterpart of the awarded scrap ACSRs.
Items 5 to 8 and subsections.
J.G. Summit Holdings, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 124293, 24 September 2003, 412 SCRA
10, 31-32.
Id., p. 32.
Desierto v. Ocampo, G.R. No. 155419, 4 March 2005, 452 SCRA 789, 804.
Terminal Facilities and Services Corporation v. Philippine Ports Authority, G.R. No. 135639, 27
February 2002, 378 SCRA 82, 106.
Albay Accredited Constructors Association, Inc. v. Desierto, G.R. No. 133517, 30 January 2006,
480 SCRA 520, 533.
Abakada Guro Party List v. Ermita, G.R. No. 168056, 1 September 2005, 469 SCRA 1, 139.
Coconut Oil Refiners Association, Inc. v. Torres, G.R. No. 132527, 29 July 2005, 465 SCRA 47,
75.
Ambros v. Commission on Audit, G.R. No. 159700, 30 June 2005, 462 SCRA 572, 597.
Rollo, p. 39.
Id., p. 206.
Section 3 (a)(1) to (4), in relation to Section 3 (b)(2).
Rollo, pp. 288-289.
Supra, J.G. Summit Holdings, Inc., note 20.
Rollo, p. 69.
Supra, Desierto, note 22, citing National Power Corporation v. Philipp Brothers Oceanic, Inc.. 369
SCRA 629 (2001).
Tatad v. Secretary of the Department of Energy, G.R. No. 124360, 5 November 1997, 281 SCRA
330, 357.
Pest Management Association of the Philippines (PMAP) v. Fertilizer and Pesticide Authority
(FPA), G.R. No. 156041, 21 February 2007, 516 SCRA 360, 369.
Ibid.
5. Neri vs. Senate Committee on Accountability of Public Officers G.R. No. 180643
March 25, 2008
Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
ROMULO L. NERI,
Petitioner,
-versus-
G. R. No. 180643
March 25, 2008
SENATE COMMITTEE ON ACCOUNTABILITY OF PUBLIC

OFFICERS AND INVESTIGATIONS, SENATE COMMITTEE ON
TRADE AND COMMERCE, AND SENATE COMMITTEE ON
NATIONAL DEFENSE AND SECURITY,
Respondents.
CONCURRING OPINION
CORONA, J.:
The … deal which gave rise to petitioner’s examination by a committee of the Senate was one
that aroused popular indignation as few cases of graft and corruption have….
All the more necessary it is that we should approach the consideration of this case with
circumspection, lest the influence of strong public passions should get the better of our
judgment. It is trite to say that public sentiment fades into insignificance before a proper
observance of constitutional processes, the maintenance of the constitutional structure, and the
protection of individual rights. Only thus can a government of laws, the foundation stone of
human liberty, be strengthened and made secure for that very public.[1]
The history of liberty has largely also been a chronicle of the observance of procedural
safeguards.[2] The annihilation of liberty, on the other hand, often begins innocently with a
relaxation of those safeguards “in the face of plausible-sounding governmental claims of a need
to deal with widely frightening and emotion-freighted threats to the good order of society.”[3]
With this in mind, I wish to address an aspect of this case distinct from but nonetheless just as
important as the burning issue of executive privilege that is engrossing and deeply dividing the
nation. This cannot be relegated to the sidelines as the Court settles the raging conflict between
the executive and legislative departments.
In the middle of the struggle for power stands petitioner Romulo L. Neri, the man in the eye of
the storm. As Citizen Neri, he has rights guaranteed by the Constitution. In other words, in the
case of Neri as an individual and as a citizen, liberty is at stake. And individual liberty can never
be overlooked, disregarded or taken for granted. Under our fundamental law, the constitution of
liberty precedes the constitution of government. Thus, it is the Court’s high duty not only to
arbitrate the intense tug-of-war between the political branches but, more importantly, to keep
the bell of liberty tolling amidst the noise of political turmoil.
Factual Backdrop
The Senate, through respondent Committees (the Senate Committees on Accountability of Public
Officers and Investigations [Blue Ribbon Committee], on Trade and Commerce and on National
Defense and Security), began an inquiry into the allegedly anomalous national broadband
network (NBN) project. Respondent Committees vowed to pursue the truth behind the NBN
project and what they believed to be the allegedly disadvantageous contract between the
Republic of the Philippines, represented by the Department of Transportation and
Communications, and Zhing Xing Telecommunications Equipment (ZTE). Respondent
Committees claimed they wished to overhaul the purported “dysfunctional government
procurement system.”chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
In connection with the legislative inquiry, Neri was issued an invitation to attend respondent
Committees’ proceedings to shed light on the NBN project and explain the government’s
agreement with ZTE. Neri honored the invitation and attended the hearing on September 26,
2007. For 11 hours, he testified on matters which he personally knew, except on those matters
which he believed to be covered by executive privilege.
On November 13, 2007, respondent Committees issued a subpoena ad testificandum to Neri

requiring him to appear before them and to testify again on November 20, 2007.
In a letter dated November 15, 2007, Executive Secretary Eduardo R. Ermita requested Senator
Alan Peter S. Cayetano, chairman of respondent Blue Ribbon Committee,[4] to dispense with the
testimony of Neri on the ground of executive privilege which he (as Executive Secretary) was
invoking “by order of the President.”chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
As he was ordered by the President not to appear before respondent Committees, Neri did not
attend the November 20, 2007 hearing. But respondent Committees issued an order dated
November 22, 2007 directing Neri to show cause why he should not be cited in contempt under
Section 6, Article 6 of the Rules of the Blue Ribbon Committee for his non-appearance in the
November 20, 2007 hearing. In response, Neri submitted his explanation in a letter dated
November 29, 2007. On December 7, 2007, he filed this petition for certiorari with prayer for the
issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or preliminary injunction assailing the November
22, 2007 show cause order for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion.
Neri’s explanation and this petition notwithstanding, respondent Committees cited him in
contempt in an order dated January 30, 2008. They ordered his arrest and detention until such
time that he should appear and testify.
Strict Observance Of Rules Of Procedure Governing Legislative Inquiries
Section 21, Article VI of the Constitution provides:

chanrobles virtual law library
Section 21. The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its respective committees may
conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure.
The rights of persons appearing in, or affected by, such inquiries shall be respected. (emphasis
supplied)
This recognizes the power of Congress to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation. This power is
intimately connected with the express power of legislation and does not even have to be
expressly granted.[5] Nonetheless, the drafters of the Constitution saw it fit to include a
provision that would clearly spell out this power. The incorporation of the rule on legislative
inquiry in the Constitution, however, was not intended to authorize the conduct of such inquiries
but to limit them[6] and to forestall possible abuse. On this account, Justice Isagani Cruz
commented:
The reason is that in the past this power was much abused by some legislators who used it for
illegitimate ends or to browbeat or intimidate witnesses, usually for grandstanding purposes
only. There were also times when the subject of the inquiry was purely private in nature and
therefore outside the scope of the powers of the Congress.
To correct these excesses, it is now provided that the legislative inquiry must be in aid of
legislation, whether it be under consideration already or still to be drafted. Furthermore, the
conduct of the investigation must be strictly in conformity with the rules of procedure that must
have been published in advance for the information and protection of the witnesses.[7]
(emphasis supplied)
Section 21, Article VI regulates the power of Congress to conduct legislative investigations by
providing a three-fold limitation: (1) the power must be exercised in aid of legislation; (2) it
must be in accordance with the duly published rules of procedure and (3) the rights of persons
appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be respected.
The first limitation ensures that no person can be punished for contumacy as a witness unless his
testimony is required in a matter which Congress or any of its committees has jurisdiction to
inquire into.[8] This is an essential element of the jurisdiction of the legislative body.[9]
The second limitation means that either House of Congress or any of its committees must follow
its duly published rules of procedure. Violation of the rules of procedure by Congress or any of its
committees contravenes due process.[10]
The third limitation entails that legislative investigation is circumscribed by the Constitution,
particularly by the Bill of Rights. As such, this limitation does not create a new constitutional
right.[11] It simply underscores fundamental rights such as the rights against self-incrimination,
unreasonable searches and seizures and to demand that Congress observe its own rules as part
of due process.[12] Thus, the respected American constitutional scholar Lawrence H. Tribe
observed:
Although only loosely restricting the substantive scope of congressional investigations, [Congress
is required] to adopt important procedural safeguards in the conduct of its investigations.
Because the Bill of Rights limits the lawmaking process as well as the content of resulting
legislation, congressional investigators must respect the Fifth Amendment privilege against
compelled self-incrimination, the Fourth Amendment prohibition against unreasonable searches
and seizures, and the requirement of due process that, if government actors promulgate rules
limiting their own conduct, they must comply with such rules.[13] (emphasis supplied)
In this case, the Senate promulgated Rules of Procedure of the Senate Governing Inquiries in Aid
of Legislation (Rules of Procedure of the Senate) as well as the Rules of the Committee on
Accountability of Public Officers and Investigations (Rules of the Blue Ribbon Committee)
pursuant to Section 21, Article VI. These rules of procedure serve as procedural safeguards in
legislative investigations. They guarantee that proceedings are orderly, effective and efficient.
More importantly, they shield the witnesses appearing before the Senate or its committees from
unnecessary, unreasonable or arbitrary action on the part of the inquiring body or its members.
Hence, they are the standards upon which the validity of any action undertaken by the Senate or
its committees shall be measured.
The rules of procedure are required to be promulgated and published not so much to impose a
duty on the witness appearing in a legislative inquiry but to enforce restrictions on Congress
regarding the manner it conducts its inquiry. Thus, the Senate or any of its committees are
bound to observe the very rules they themselves established to govern their own conduct. Since
this obligation is imposed by the Constitution itself, it cannot be ignored, trifled with or violated
without transgressing the fundamental law.
In sum, Congress has the inherent power to conduct inquiries in aid of legislation. However, as a
condition for the exercise of this power, the Constitution requires Congress to lay down and
publish specific and clear rules of procedure. No action which affects the substantial rights of
persons appearing in legislative inquiries may be taken unless it is in accordance with duly
published rules of procedure. In other words, before substantial rights may be validly affected,
Congress or its committees must faithfully follow the relevant rules of procedure relating to it.
This will ensure the constitutional intent of respect for the rights of persons appearing in or
affected by legislative inquiries. In the absence of a rule of procedure on any matter which is the
subject of a legislative inquiry, any action which impinges on substantial rights of persons would
be unconstitutional.
Absence Of Power To Order Arrest
The gravity of the consequences of respondent Committees’ order to arrest Neri allegedly for
being in contempt cannot be underestimated. It poses a serious threat to his liberty.
The Rules of Procedure of the Senate and the Rules of the Blue Ribbon Committee do not state
that respondent Committees have the power to issue an order of arrest. Such omission is fatal to
respondent Committees’ cause. It negates their claim that the order to arrest Neri is valid, lawful
and constitutional.
As stated previously, the second constitutional limitation to the power of legislative investigation
is the promulgation and publication of rules of procedure that will serve as guidelines in the
exercise of that power. Respondent Committees transgressed this constitutional constraint
because there is no rule of procedure governing the issuance of an order of arrest.
Under the Rules of Procedure of the Senate and the Rules of the Blue Ribbon Committee,
respondent Committees are authorized only to detain a witness found guilty of contempt. On the
other hand, nowhere does the word “arrest” appear in either rules of procedure.
There is a whale of a difference between the power to detain and the power to arrest.
To detain means to hold or keep in custody.[14] On the other hand, to arrest means to seize,
capture or to take in custody by authority of law.[15] Thus, the power to detain is the power to
keep or maintain custody while the power to arrest is the power to take custody. The power to
detain implies that the contumacious witness is in the premises (or custody) of the Senate and
that he will be kept therein or in some other designated place. In contrast, the power to arrest
presupposes that the subject thereof is not before the Senate or its committees but in some
other place outside.
The distinction is not simply a matter of semantics. It is substantial, not conceptual, for it affects
the fundamental right to be free from unwarranted governmental restraint.
Since the Rules of Procedure of the Senate and the Rules of the Blue Ribbon Committee speak
only of a power to order the detention of a contumacious witness, it cannot be expanded to
include the power to issue an order of arrest. Otherwise, the constitutional intent to limit the
exercise of legislative investigations to the procedure established and published by the Senate or
its committees will be for naught.
In this connection, respondent Committees cannot rely on Arnault v. Nazareno to justify the
order to arrest Neri. Arnault was explicit:
Like the Constitution of the United States, ours does not contain an express provision
empowering either of the two Houses of Congress to punish nonmembers for contempt. It may
also be noted that whereas in the United States the legislative power is shared between the
Congress of the United States, on the one hand, and the respective legislatures of the different
States, on the other — the powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution nor
prohibited by it to States being reserved to the states, respectively, or to the people — in the
Philippines, the legislative power is vested in the Congress of the Philippines alone. It may
therefore be said that the Congress of the Philippines has a wider range of legislative field than
the Congress of the Unites States or any State Legislature.
Our form of government being patterned after the American system — the framers of our
Constitution having been drawn largely from American institution and practices — we can, in this
case, properly draw also from American precedents in interpreting analogous provisions of our
Constitution, as we have done in other cases in the past.
Although there is no provision in the Constitution expressly investing either House of Congress
with power to make investigations and exact testimony to the end that it may exercise its
legislative functions advisedly and effectively, such power is so far incidental to the legislative
function as to be implied. In other words, the power of inquiry — with process to enforce it — is
an essential and appropriate auxiliary to the legislative function. A legislative body cannot
legislate wisely or effectively in the absence of information respecting the conditions which the
legislations is intended to affect or change; and where the legislative body does not itself possess
the requisite information — which is not frequently true — recourse must be had to others who
do possess it. Experience has shown that mere requests for such information are often
unavailing, and also that information which is volunteered is not always accurate or complete; so
some means of compulsion is essential to obtain what is needed. (McGrain vs. Daugherty, 273
U.S., 135; 71 L. ed., 580; 50 A. L. R., 1.) The fact that the Constitution expressly hives to
congress the power to punish its Members for disorderly behaviour, does not by necessary
implication exclude the power to punish for contempt any other person. (Anderson vs. Dunn, 6
Wheaton. 204; 5 L ed., 242.)[16] (emphasis supplied)
Arnault was decided under the 1935 Constitution in which Section 21, Article VI of the 1987
Constitution has no counterpart. Since there was no provision on legislative inquiry at that time,
Arnault defined and delimited the power “partly by drawing from American precedents and partly
by acknowledging the broader legislative power of the Philippine Congress as compared to the
U.S. Federal Congress which shares legislative power with the legislatures of the different states
of the American union.”[17]
Under the 1987 Constitution, however, the power has been expressly subjected to three
limitations. Thus, while Congress cannot be deprived of its inherent contempt power (and the
corollary power to order the arrest of a contumacious party) in relation to legislative
investigations, the power must be wielded subject to constitutional constraints. In this case, the
Senate or any of its committees may order the arrest of a contemnor only in accordance with its
duly published rules of procedure. In the absence of a provision stating how, why and when
arrest may be ordered, no order of arrest may validly be issued.
Nor can respondent Committees seek refuge in Senate v. Ermita.[18] In that case, the Court
declared:
Section 21, Article VI likewise establishes crucial safeguards that proscribe the legislative power
of inquiry. The provision requires that the inquiry be done in accordance with the Senate or
House’s duly published rules of procedure, necessarily implying the constitutional infirmity of an
inquiry conducted without duly published rules of procedure.
An action as critical and as significant as an order of arrest must be done strictly in accordance
with a specific provision in the duly published rules of procedure. Otherwise, it is constitutionally
invalid.
This interpretation does not unduly emasculate the power to conduct legislative investigations.
Any evisceration results not from an interpretation which hews closely to the language of the
Constitution but rather from the manifest failure to establish rules of procedure on a matter that
infringes on the individual’s liberty.
Lack Of Sanction On Refusal Or Failure To Obey Subpoena Ad Testificandum
Neri was ordered arrested and detained allegedly for contempt because of his refusal or
failure to comply with a subpoena ad testificandum. However, a careful reading of the Rules of
Procedure of the Senate and the Rules of the Blue Ribbon Committee shows that they do not
provide for a sanction on the refusal or failure to obey a subpoena ad testificandum. Respondent
Committees are authorized to detain a person only in the exercise of their contempt power.
Section 18 of the Rules of Procedure of the Senate and Section 6, Article 6 of the Rules of the
Blue Ribbon Committee respectively provide:
Sec. 18. Contempt
The Committee, by a vote of a majority of all its members, may punish for contempt any witness
before it who disobeys any order of the Committee or refuses to be sworn or to testify or to
answer a proper question by the Committee or any of its members, or testifying, testifies falsely
or evasively. A contempt of the Committee shall be deemed a contempt of the Senate. Such
witness may be ordered by the Committee to be detained in such place as it may designate
under the custody of the Sergeant-at-Arms until he agrees to produce the required documents,
or to be sworn or to testify, or otherwise purge himself on that contempt. (emphasis supplied)
SECTION 6. Contempt – (a) The Committee, by a vote of a majority of all its members, may
punish for contempt any witness before it who disobeys any order of the Committee, including
refusal to produce documents pursuant to a subpoena duces tecum, or refuses to be sworn or to
testify or to answer a proper question by the Committee or any of its members, or testifying,
testifies falsely or evasively. A contempt of the Committee shall be deemed a contempt of the
Senate. Such witness may be ordered by the Committee to be detained in such place as it may
designate under the custody of the Sergeant-at-Arms until he agrees to produce the required
documents, or to be sworn or to testify, or otherwise purge himself on that contempt.
(b) A report of the detention of any person for contempt shall be submitted by the Sergeant-at-
Arms to the Committee and the Senate. (emphasis supplied)
The absence of a provision penalizing refusal or failure to comply with a subpoena ad

testificandum should be interpreted against respondent Committees. Neri cannot be punished
for contempt for lack of, again, the requisite published rules of procedure.
This deficiency becomes all the more pronounced when compared to Section 9, Rule 21 of the
Rules of Court:
SEC. 9. Contempt. – Failure by any person without adequate cause to obey a subpoena served
upon him shall be deemed a contempt of the court from which the subpoena is issued. If the
subpoena was not issued by a court, the disobedience thereto shall be punished in accordance
with the applicable law or Rule.
The contempt provision of Rule 21 expressly penalizes the unwarranted failure to obey a
subpoena (whether ad testificandum or duces tecum) as contempt of court. In contrast, the
Rules of Procedure of the Senate and the Rules of the Blue Ribbon Committee cover only the
following acts of a witness before it: disobedience of any committee order including refusal to
produce documents pursuant to a subpoena duces tecum, refusal to be sworn or to testify or to
answer a proper question and giving of false or evasive testimony. chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Limited Scope Of Power To Punish For Contempt
In relation to legislative investigations, the contempt power of Congress or its committees is

recognized as an essential and appropriate auxiliary to the legislative function.[19] However, the
power to punish for contempt is not limitless. It must be used sparingly with caution, restraint,
judiciousness, deliberation and due regard to the provisions of the law and the constitutional
rights of the individual.[20] Strict compliance with procedural guidelines governing the contempt
power is mandatory.[21]
Pursuant to the Rules of Procedure of the Senate and the Rules of the Blue Ribbon Committee,
the proper subject of the contempt power is “any witness before” the concerned committee(s) of
the Senate. This means that the witness must be in attendance or physically present at the
legislative inquiry. It is in this context (and this context alone) that the respective provisions of
the Rules of Procedure of the Senate and the Rules of the Blue Ribbon Committee speak of the
witness’s disobedience of any committee order, refusal to be sworn or to testify or to answer a
proper question and giving of false or evasive testimony. Likewise, it is only in accordance with
such premise that a witness may be ordered detained.
In this case, Neri was not before the respondent Committees. That was why respondent
Committees ordered his arrest. Indeed, the subpoena ad testificandum issued to Neri
commanded him to appear and testify before the Blue Ribbon Committee on November 20,
2007. The December 2, 2007 show cause order was issued because he “failed to appear” in the
November 20, 2007 hearing while the January 30, 2008 arrest order was issued on account of
his “failure to appear and testify.”chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Respondent Committees try to downplay the nature of their contempt power as “coercive, not
punitive.” However, the language of the Rules of Procedure of the Senate and the Rules of the
Blue Ribbon Committee indicates otherwise. The respective provisions on contempt identically
state that respondent Committees “may punish for contempt.” Thus, the contempt power of
respondent Committees is meant as a punishment, not merely as an instrument of coercion. And
something which inflicts a punishment or penalty is punitive.[22]
Moreover, while the contempt power of the legislature is sui generis,[23] it is analogous to that
exercised by courts of justice.[24] As a rule, proceedings against a purported contemnor are
commonly treated as criminal in nature.[25] This being so, the order holding Neri in contempt
for his alleged failure or refusal to obey a subpoena ad testificandum notwithstanding the
absence of duly promulgated rules of procedure on that matter was tantamount to an ex post
facto act.
The power to declare a person in contempt has serious implications on the rights of the supposed
contemnor, particularly on his liberty. Thus, when a committee rule relates to a matter of such
importance, it must be strictly observed.[26]
A Final Word
The hands that wield the power of legislative investigations are powerful. Section 21, Article VI of
the Constitution cushions the impact by providing substantive as well as procedural limitations.
Unfortunately, in Machiavellian fashion, respondent Committees disregarded the procedural
safeguards purportedly in the name of truth and good governance. In so doing, they dealt a
devious blow not only on Neri but also on our cherished traditions of liberty.
Accordingly, I vote to GRANT the petition.
RENATO C. CORONA
Associate Justice
Footnotes:
[1] Arnault v. Nazareno, 87 Phil. 29 (1950), Justice Pedro Tuason, dissenting.
[2] McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332 (1943).
[3] Amsterdam, Anthony G., Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 Minn. L. Rev. 349, 354
(1973).
[4] The lead committee in the joint legislative inquiry.
[5] Cruz, Isagani A., Philippine Political Law, 2002 edition, Central Lawbook Publishing Co., Inc.,
p. 163.
[6] Id.
[7] Id., pp. 163-164.
[8] Arnault v. Nazareno, supra note 1.
[9] Bernas S.J., Joaquin G., The 1987 Constitution Of The Republic Of The Philippines: A
Commentary, 2003 edition, Rex Bookstore, Inc., p. 737.
[10] Id., p. 740.
[11] Id.
[12] Id., pp. 740-741.
[13] Tribe, Lawrence H., I American Constitutional Law 794-795 (2000).
[14] Webster’s Third New International Dictionary, 1993 edition, p. 616.

[15] Id., p. 121.
[16] Id. The principle was further explained in Arnault v. Balagtas (97 Phil. 358 [1955]):
The principle that Congress or any of its bodies has the power to punish recalcitrant witnesses is
founded upon reason and policy. Said power must be considered implied or incidental to the
exercise of legislative power. How could a legislative body obtain the knowledge and information
or, which to base intended legislation if it cannot require and compel the disclosure of such
knowledge and information, if it is impotent to punish a defiance of its power and authority?
When the framers of the Constitution adopted the principle of separation of powers, making each
branch supreme within the realm of its respective authority, it must have intended each
department's authority to be full and complete, independently of the other's authority or power.
And how could the authority and power become complete if for every act of refusal, every act of
defiance, every act of contumacy against it, the legislative body must resort to the judicial
department for the appropriate remedy, because it is impotent by itself to punish or deal
therewith, with the affronts committed against its authority or dignity (emphasis supplied)
[17] Negros Oriental II Electric Cooperative, Inc. v. Sangguniang Panlungsod of Dumaguete,

G.R. No. L-72492, 05 November 1987, 155 SCRA 421.
[18] G.R. Nos. 169777/169659/169660/169667/169834/171246, 20 April 2006.
[19] Arnault v. Nazareno, supra; Senate v. Ermita, supra.
[20] Regalado v. Go, G.R. No. 167988, February 6, 2007.
[21] Id.
[22] See Black’s Law Dictionary, 4th edition, p. 1399.
[23] Negros Oriental II Electric Cooperative, Inc. v. Sangguniang Panlungsod of Dumaguete,

supra.
[24] Anderson v. Dunn, 19. U.S. [6 Wheat.] 204 (1821) cited in Sabio v. Gordon, G.R. Nos.
174340/ 174318/174177, 17 October 2006.
[25] Regalado v. Go, supra.
[26] Yellin v. United States, 374 U.S. 109; Gojack v. United States, 384 U.S. 702 (1966).
6 Pimentel v. SENATE COMMITTEE OF THE WHOLE, G.R. No. 187714, March 8, 2011
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 187714, March 08 : 2011]
AQUILINO Q. PIMENTEL, JR., MANUEL B. VILLAR, JOKER P. ARROYO, FRANCIS N.

PANGILINAN, PIA S. CAYETANO, AND ALAN PETER S. CAYETANO, PETITIONERS, VS.
SENATE COMMITTEE OF THE WHOLE REPRESENTED BY SENATE PRESIDENT JUAN
PONCE ENRILE, RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
Before the Court is a petition for prohibition[1] with prayer for issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction and/or temporary restraining order filed by Senators Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr. (Senator
Pimentel), Manuel B. Villar (Senator Villar), Joker P. Arroyo, Francis N. Pangilinan, Pia S.
Cayetano, and Alan Peter S. Cayetano (petitioners). Petitioners seek to enjoin the Senate
Committee of the Whole (respondent) from conducting further hearings on the complaint filed by
Senator Maria Ana Consuelo A.S. Madrigal (Senator Madrigal) against Senator Villar pursuant to
Senate Resolution No. 706 (P.S. Resolution 706) on the alleged double insertion of P200 million
for the C-5 Road Extension Project in the 2008 General Appropriations Act.
The Antecedents
On 15 September 2008, Senator Panfilo Lacson (Senator Lacson) delivered a privilege speech
entitled "Kaban ng Bayan, Bantayan!"[2] In his privilege speech, Senator Lacson called attention
to the congressional insertion in the 2008 General Appropriations Act, particularly the P200
million appropriated for the construction of the President Carlos P. Garcia Avenue Extension from
Sucat Luzon Expressway to Sucat Road in ParaÃ±aque City including Right-of-Way (ROW), and
another P200 million appropriated for the extension of C-5 road including ROW. Senator Lacson
stated that C-5 is what was formerly called President Carlos P. Garcia Avenue and that the
second appropriation covers the same stretch - from Sucat Luzon Expressway to Sucat Road in
ParaÃ±aque City. Senator Lacson inquired from DBM Secretary Rolando Andaya, Jr. about the
double entry and was informed that it was on account of a congressional insertion. Senator
Lacson further stated that when he followed the narrow trail leading to the double entry, it led to
Senator Villar, then the Senate President.
On 8 October 2008, Senator Madrigal introduced P.S. Resolution 706, [3] the full text of which
reads:
WHEREAS the Senate President has repeatedly and publicly "advocated" (sic) the construction of
the C-5 Road/Pres. C.P. Garcia Avenue Extension linking Sucat Road in ParaÃ±aque City to the
South Luzon Expressway;
WHEREAS it was discovered that there was a double insertion of P200 million for the C-5 Road
Extension project in the 2008 General Appropriations Act;
WHEREAS Committee on Finance Chair Sen. Juan Ponce Enrile confirmed that the double
insertion for the C-5 Road Extension Project was made by the Senate President;
WHEREAS this double insertion is only the tip of the iceberg;
WHEREAS there is overwhelming evidence to show that the Senate President, from the time he
was member of the House of Representatives, used his influence on the executive to cause the
realignment of the C-5 Road Extension project to ensure that his properties in Barangay San
Dionisio, ParaÃ±aque City and Barangays Pulang Lupa and Mayuno Uno, Las PiÃ±as would be
financially benefited by the construction of the new road;
WHEREAS there is overwhelming evidence to show that the Senate President, through his
corporations, negotiated the sale of his properties as roads right of way to the government, the
same properties affected by the projects he proposed;
WHEREAS there is overwhelming evidence to show that the Senate President caused the sale of
his landholdings to government as a grossly overpriced cost prejudicial to other lot owners in the
area, the government, and the Filipino people;
WHEREAS there is overwhelming evidence to show that the Senate President, in the overpriced
sale of another property, used his power and influence to extort from the original landowner the
profit made from the overprice by the Villar owned corporations;
WHEREAS these acts of the Senate President are in direct violation of the Constitution, the Anti-
Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards of Public Officers;
WHEREAS the Senate President has violated the public trust of the people in order to serve his
personal interests thereby sacrificing the people's welfare;
WHEREAS the illegal and unethical conduct of the Senate President has betrayed the trust of the
people, and by doing so has shamed the Philippine Senate;
WHEREAS it is incumbent upon the members of the Senate now to reclaim the people's trust and
confidence and show that the illegal conduct of any of its member, even of its leaders, shall not
go unpunished;
WHEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED AS IT IS HEREBY RESOLVED, TO DIRECT THE COMMITTEE ON

ETHICS AND PRIVILEGES TO INVESTIGATE THE CONDUCT OF SENATE PRESIDENT MANUEL B.
VILLAR, JR. FOR USING HIS POSITION OF POWER TO INFLUENCE PUBLIC OFFICIALS IN
RELOCATING THE C-5 ROAD EXTENSION PROJECT TO DELIBERATELY PASS THRU HIS
PROPERTIES, AND TO NEGOTIATE THE OVERPRICED PURCHASE OF ROAD RIGHTS OF WAY THRU
SEVERAL PROPERTIES ALSO OWNED BY HIS CORPORATIONS REDOUNDING IN HUGE PERSONAL
FINANCIAL BENEFITS FOR HIM TO THE DETRIMENT OF THE FILIPINO PEOPLE, THEREBY
RESULTING IN A BLATANT CONFLICT OF INTEREST.
Adopted,
(Sgd.)
M.A. MADRIGAL[4]
On even date, P.S. Resolution 706 was referred to the Committee on Ethics and Privileges (Ethics
Committee) which at that time was composed of the following members:
Sen. Pia S. Cayetano - Chairperson
Sen. Loren Legarda - Member in lieu of Sen. Madrigal
Sen. Joker Arroyo - Member
Sen. Alan Peter Cayetano- Member
Sen. Miriam Defensor-Santiago- Member
Sen. Gregorio Honasan - Member
Sen. Panfilo Lacson - Inhibited and replaced by Sen. Rodolfo Biazon
On 17 November 2008, Senator Juan Ponce Enrile (Senator Enrile) was elected Senate President.
The Ethics Committee was reorganized with the election of Senator Lacson as Chairperson, and
Senators Richard Gordon, Gregorio Honasan, Loren Legarda, and Mar Roxas as members for the
Majority. On 16 December 2008, Senator Lacson inquired whether the Minority was ready to
name their representatives to the Ethics Committee.[5] After consultation with the members of
the Minority, Senator Pimentel informed the body that there would be no member from the
Minority in the Ethics Committee.[6] On 26 January 2009, Senator Lacson reiterated his appeal to
the Minority to nominate their representatives to the Ethics Committee. [7] Senator Pimentel
stated that it is the stand of the Minority not to nominate any of their members to the Ethics
Committee, but he promised to convene a caucus to determine if the Minority's decision on the
matter is final.[8] Thereafter, the Senate adopted the Rules of the Senate Committee on Ethics
and Privileges (Committee Rules) which was published in the Official Gazette on 23 March 2009.
[9]
On 20 April 2009, Senator Villar delivered a privilege speech[10] where he stated that he would
answer the accusations against him on the floor and not before the Ethics Committee. On 27
April 2009, Senator Lacson delivered another privilege speech[11] where he stated that the Ethics
Committee was not a kangaroo court. However, due to the accusation that the Ethics Committee
could not act with fairness on Senator Villar's case, Senator Lacson moved that the responsibility
of the Ethics Committee be undertaken by the Senate, acting as a Committee of the Whole. The
motion was approved with ten members voting in favor, none against, and five abstentions. [12]
Respondent Senate Committee of the Whole conducted its hearings on 4 May 2009, with eleven
Senators present, and on 7 May 2009, with eight Senators present. On both hearings, petitioners
objected to the application of the Rules of the Ethics Committee to the Senate Committee of the
Whole. In particular, petitioners questioned the determination of the quorum. On 11 May 2009,
petitioners proposed 11 amendments to the Rules of the Ethics Committee that would constitute
the Rules of the Senate Committee of the Whole, out of which three amendments were adopted.
On 14 May 2009, Senator Pimentel raised as an issue the need to publish the proposed amended
Rules of the Senate Committee of the Whole. On even date, respondent proceeded with the
Preliminary Inquiry on P.S. Resolution 706. On 18 May 2009, the Chairman submitted a report
on the Preliminary Inquiry with a directive to all Senators to come up with a decision on the
preliminary report on 21 May 2009. On 21 May 2009, respondent declared that there was
substantial evidence to proceed with the adjudicatory hearing. The preliminary conference was
set on 26 May 2009.
Petitioners came to this Court for relief, raising the following grounds:
1. The transfer of the complaint against Senator Villar from the Ethics Committee to the Senate
Committee of the Whole is violative of Senator Villar's constitutional right to equal protection;
2. The Rules adopted by the Senate Committee of the Whole for the investigation of the
complaint filed by Senator Madrigal against Senator Villar is violative of Senator Villar's right to
due process and of the majority quorum requirement under Art. VI, Sec. 16(2) of the
Constitution; and
3. The Senate Committee of the Whole likewise violated the due process clause of the
Constitution when it refused to publish the Rules of the Senate Committee of the Whole in spite
of its own provision [which] require[s] its effectivity upon publication. [13]
In its Comment, respondent argues that:
1. The instant petition should be dismissed for failure to join or implead an indispensable party.
In the alternative, the instant petition should be archived until such time that the said
indispensable party has been joined or impleaded and afforded the opportunity to be heard;
2. There was no grave abuse of discretion on the part of respondent Committee;
3. Petitioners are not entitled to a writ of prohibition for failure to prove grave abuse of discretion
on the part of respondent Committee of the Whole;
4. The principle of separation of powers must be upheld;
5. The instant petition must be dismissed for being premature. Petitioners failed to observe the
doctrine or primary jurisdiction or prior resort;
6. It is within the power of Congress to discipline its members for disorderly behavior;
7. The determination of what constitutes disorderly behavior is a political question which

exclusively pertains to Congress;
8. The Internal Rules of the Senate are not subject to judicial review in the absence of grave
abuse of discretion; [and]
9. The Rules of the Ethics Committee, which have been duly published and adopted[,] allow the
adoption of supplementary rules to govern adjudicatory hearings.[14]
The Issues
The issues for the Court's resolution are the following:
1. Whether Senator Madrigal, who filed the complaint against Senator Villar, is an indispensable
party in this petition;
2. Whether the petition is premature for failure to observe the doctrine of primary jurisdiction or
prior resort;
3. Whether the transfer of the complaint against Senator Villar from the Ethics Committee to the
Senate Committee of the Whole is violative of Senator Villar's right to equal protection;
4. Whether the adoption of the Rules of the Ethics Committee as Rules of the Senate Committee
of the Whole is a violative of Senator Villar's right to due process and of the majority quorum
requirement under Art. VI, Section 16(2) of the Constitution; and
5. Whether publication of the Rules of the Senate Committee of the Whole is required for their
effectivity.
The Ruling of this Court
Indispensable Party
Section 7, Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides:
SEC. 7 - Compulsory joinder of indispensable parties. - Parties in interest without whom no final
determination can be had of an action shall be joined as plaintiffs or defendants.
The test to determine if a party is an indispensable party is as follows:
An indispensable party is a party who has an interest in the controversy or subject matter that a
final adjudication cannot be made, in his absence, without injuring or affecting that interest, a
party who has not only an interest in the subject matter of the controversy, but also has an
interest of such nature that a final decree cannot be made without affecting his interest or
leaving the controversy in such a condition that its final determination may be wholly
inconsistent with equity and good conscience. It has also been considered that an indispensable
party is a person in whose absence there cannot be a determination between the parties already
before the court which is effective, complete or equitable. Further, an indispensable party is one
who must be included in an action before it may properly go forward.
A person who is not an indispensable party, however, if his interest in the controversy or subject
matter is separable from the interest of the other parties, so that it will not necessarily be
directly or injuriously affected by a decree which does complete justice between them. Also, a
person is not an indispensable party if his presence would merely permit a complete relief
between him and those already parties to the action, or if he has no interest in the subject
matter of the action. It is not a sufficient reason to declare a person to be an indispensable party
that his presence will avoid multiple litigation.[15]
In this case, Senator Madrigal is not an indispensable party to the petition before the Court.
While it may be true that she has an interest in the outcome of this case as the author of P.S.
Resolution 706, the issues in this case are matters of jurisdiction and procedure on the part of
the Senate Committee of the Whole which can be resolved without affecting Senator Madrigal's
interest. The nature of Senator Madrigal's interest in this case is not of the nature that this case
could not be resolved without her participation.
Doctrine of Primary Jurisdiction
Respondent asserts that the doctrine of primary jurisdiction "simply calls for the determination of
administrative questions, which are ordinarily questions of fact, by administrative agencies
rather than by courts of justice."[16] Citing Pimentel v. HRET,[17] respondent avers that primary
recourse of petitioners should have been to the Senate and that this Court must uphold the
separation of powers between the legislative and judicial branches of the government.
The doctrine of primary jurisdiction does not apply to this case. The Court has ruled:
x x x It may occur that the Court has jurisdiction to take cognizance of a particular case, which
means that the matter involved is also judicial in character. However, if the case is such that its
determination requires the expertise, specialized skills and knowledge of the proper
administrative bodies because technical matters or intricate questions of fact are involved, then
relief must first be obtained in an administrative proceeding before a remedy will be supplied by
the courts even though the matter is within the proper jurisdiction of the court. x x x [18]
The issues presented here do not require the expertise, specialized skills and knowledge of
respondent for their resolution. On the contrary, the issues here are purely legal questions which
are within the competence and jurisdiction of the Court, and not an administrative agency or the
Senate to resolve.[19]
As regards respondent's invocation of separation of powers, the Court reiterates that "the
inviolate doctrine of separation of powers among the legislative, executive or judicial branches of
government by no means prescribes for absolute autonomy in the discharge by each of that part
of the governmental power assigned to it by the sovereign people." [20] Thus, it has been held that
"the power of judicial review is not so much power as it is [a] duty imposed on this Court by the
Constitution and that we would be remiss in the performance of that duty if we decline to look
behind the barriers set by the principle of separation of powers."[21] The Court, therefore, is not
precluded from resolving the legal issues raised by the mere invocation by respondent of the
doctrine of separation of powers. On the contrary, the resolution of the legal issues falls within
the exclusive jurisdiction of this Court.
Transfer of the Complaint from the Ethics Committee

to the Senate Committee on the Whole
Petitioners allege that the transfer of the complaint against Senator Villar to the Senate
Committee of the Whole violates his constitutional right to equal protection. Petitioners allege
that the Senate Committee of the Whole was constituted solely for the purpose of assuming
jurisdiction over the complaint against Senator Villar. Petitioners further allege that the act was
discriminatory and removed Senator Villar's recourse against any adverse report of the Ethics
Committee to the Senate as a body.
We do not agree with petitioners.
Reviewing the events that led to the constitution of the Senate Committee of the Whole, the
Court notes that upon the election of Senator Enrile as Senate President on 17 November 2008,
the Ethics Committee was also reorganized. Senator Lacson, who first called the Senate's
attention to the alleged irregularities committed by Senator Villar, was elected as Chairperson.
On 16 December 2008, when Senator Lacson inquired whether the Minority was ready to name
their representatives to the Ethics Committee, Senator Pimentel informed the body that there
would be no member from the Minority in the Ethics Committee. On 26 January 2009, Senator
Lacson reiterated his appeal to the Minority to nominate their representatives to the Ethics
Committee. Senator Pimentel informed him that it is the stand of the Minority not to nominate
any of their members to the Ethics Committee. Senator Pimentel promised to convene a caucus
to determine if the Minority's decision on the matter is final but the records did not show that a
caucus was convened.
On 20 April 2009, Senator Villar delivered a privilege speech where he stated that he would
answer the accusations against him on the floor and not before the Ethics Committee. It
was because of the accusation that the Ethics Committee could not act with fairness on Senator
Villar's case that Senator Lacson moved that the responsibility of the Ethics Committee be
undertaken by the Senate acting as a Committee of the Whole, which motion was approved with
ten members voting in favor, none against, and five abstentions.
The Rules of the Ethics Committee provide that "all matters relating to the conduct, rights,
privileges, safety, dignity, integrity and reputation of the Senate and its Members shall be under
the exclusive jurisdiction of the Senate Committee on Ethics and Privileges."[22] However, in this
case, the refusal of the Minority to name its members to the Ethics Committee stalled the
investigation. In short, while ordinarily an investigation about one of its members' alleged
irregular or unethical conduct is within the jurisdiction of the Ethics Committee, the Minority
effectively prevented it from pursuing the investigation when they refused to nominate their
members to the Ethics Committee. Even Senator Villar called the Ethics Committee a kangaroo
court and declared that he would answer the accusations against him on the floor and not before
the Ethics Committee. Given the circumstances, the referral of the investigation to the
Committee of the Whole was an extraordinary remedy undertaken by the Ethics Committee and
approved by a majority of the members of the Senate.
Adoption of the Rules of the Ethics Committee

by the Senate Committee of the Whole
Petitioners allege that the adoption of the Rules of the Ethics Committee by the Senate
Committee of the Whole is violative of Senator Villar's right to due process.
We do not agree.
Again, we reiterate that, considering the circumstances of this case, the referral of the
investigation by the Ethics Committee to the Senate Committee of the Whole is an extraordinary
remedy that does not violate Senator Villar's right to due process. In the same manner, the
adoption by the Senate Committee of the Whole of the Rules of the Ethics Committee does not
violate Senator Villar's right to due process.
The Constitutional right of the Senate to promulgate its own rules of proceedings has been
recognized and affirmed by this Court. Thus:
First. Section 16(3), Article VI of the Philippine Constitution states: "Each House shall determine
the rules of its proceedings."
This provision has been traditionally construed as a grant of full discretionary authority to the
House of Congress in the formulation, adoption and promulgation of its own rules. As such, the
exercise of this power is generally exempt from judicial supervision and interference, except on a
clear showing of such arbitrary and improvident use of the power as will constitute a denial of
due process.
x x x. The issue partakes of the nature of a political question which, under the Constitution, is to
be decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary
authority has been delegated to the legislative or executive branch of the government. Further,
pursuant to his constitutional grant of virtually unrestricted authority to determine its own rules,
the Senate is at liberty to alter or modify these rules at any time it may see fit, subject only to
the imperatives of quorum, voting and publication.[23]
The only limitation to the power of Congress to promulgate its own rules is the observance of
quorum, voting, and publication when required. As long as these requirements are complied
with, the Court will not interfere with the right of Congress to amend its own rules.
Prior Publication
Petitioners assail the non-publication of the Rules of the Senate Committee of the Whole.
Respondent counters that publication is not necessary because the Senate Committee of the
Whole merely adopted the Rules of the Ethics Committee which had been published in the Official
Gazette on 23 March 2009. Respondent alleges that there is only one set of Rules that governs
both the Ethics Committee and the Senate Committee of the Whole.
In Neri v. Senate Committee on Accountability of Public Officers and Investigations,[24] the Court

declared void unpublished rules of procedure in Senate inquiries insofar as such rules affect the
rights of witnesses. The Court cited Section 21, Article VI of the Constitution which mandates:
Sec. 21. The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its respective Committees may
conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure.
The rights of persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be respected. (Emphasis
supplied)
The Court explained in the Resolution[25] denying the motion for reconsideration:
The language of Section 21, Article VI of the Constitution requiring that the inquiry be conducted
in accordance with the duly published rules of procedure is categorical. It is incumbent upon
the Senate to publish the rules of its legislative inquiries in each Congress or otherwise make the
published rules clearly state that the same shall be effective in the subsequent Congresses or
until they are amended or repealed to sufficiently put public on notice.
If it was the intention of the Senate for its present rules on legislative inquiries to be effective
even in the next Congress, it could have easily adopted the same language it had used in its
main rules regarding effectivity.
Lest the Court be misconstrued, it should likewise be stressed that not all orders issued or
proceedings conducted pursuant to the subject Rules are null and void. Only those that result
in violation of the rights of witnesses should be considered null and void, considering
that the rationale for the publication is to protect the rights of the witnesses as
expressed in Section 21, Article VI of the Constitution. Sans such violation, orders and
proceedings are considered valid and effective.[26] (Emphasis supplied)
In the recent case of Gutierrez v. The House of Representatives Committee on Justice, et al.,
[27]
the Court further clarified:
x x x inquiries in aid of legislation under Section 21, Article VI of the Constitution is

the sole instance in the Constitution where there is a categorical directive to duly publish a set
of rules of procedure. Significantly notable in Neri is that with respect to the issue of publication,
the Court anchored its ruling on the 1987 Constitution's directive, without any reliance on or
reference to the 1986 case of TaÃ±ada v. Tuvera. TaÃ±ada naturally could neither have
interpreted a forthcoming 1987 Constitution nor had kept a tight rein on the Constitution's
intentions as expressed through the allowance of either a categorical term or a general sense of
making known the issuances.[28]
The Constitution does not require publication of the internal rules of the House or Senate. Since
rules of the House or the Senate that affect only their members are internal to the House or
Senate, such rules need not be published, unless such rules expressly provide for their
publication before the rules can take effect.
In this case, the proceedings before the Senate Committee of the Whole affect only members of
the Senate since the proceedings involve the Senate's exercise of its disciplinary power over one
of its members. Clearly, the Rules of the Senate Committee of the Whole are internal to the
Senate. However, Section 81, Rule 15 of the Rules of the Senate Committee of the Whole
provides:
Sec. 81. EFFECTIVITY. These Rules shall be effective after publication in the Official Gazette or in
a newspaper of general circulation.[29]
Hence, in this particular case, the Rules of the Senate Committee of the Whole itself provide that
the Rules must be published before the Rules can take effect. Thus, even if publication is not
required under the Constitution, publication of the Rules of the Senate Committee of the Whole is
required because the Rules expressly mandate their publication. The majority of the members of
the Senate approved the Rules of the Senate Committee of the Whole, and the publication
requirement which they adopted should be considered as the will of the majority. Respondent
cannot dispense with the publication requirement just because the Rules of the Ethics Committee
had already been published in the Official Gazette. To reiterate, the Rules of the Senate
Committee of the Whole expressly require publication before the Rules can take effect. To
comply with due process requirements, the Senate must follow its own internal rules if the rights
of its own members are affected.
Incidentally, we note that Section 4, Rule 1 of the Rules of the Senate Committee of the
Whole[30] is an exact reproduction of Section 4, Rule 1 of the Rules of the Senate Committee on
Ethics and Privileges[31] which states that the Ethics Committee shall be composed of seven
members, contrary to the fact that the Senate Committee of the Whole consists of all members
of the Senate. In addition, Section 5(B), Rule 1 of the Rules of the Senate Committee of the
Whole[32] is an exact reproduction of Section 5(B), Rule 1 of the Rules of the Senate Committee
on Ethics and Privileges[33] which states that only two members of the Ethics Committee shall
constitute a quorum, contrary to respondent's allegation in its Comment that eight members of
the Senate Committee of the Whole shall constitute a quorum.[34]
However, if the Senate is constituted as a Committee of the Whole, a majority of the Senate is
required to constitute a quorum to do business pursuant to Section 16(2), Article VI of the
Constitution.[35] Otherwise, there will be a circumvention of this express provision of the
Constitution on quorum requirement. Obviously, the Rules of the Senate Committee of the Whole
require modification to comply with requirements of quorum and voting which the Senate must
have overlooked in this case. In any event, in case of conflict between the Rules of the Senate
Committee of the Whole and the Constitution, the latter will of course prevail.
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition in part. The referral of the complaint by the Committee
on Ethics and Privileges to the Senate Committee of the Whole shall take effect only upon
publication of the Rules of the Senate Committee of the Whole.
SO ORDERED.
Corona, C.J., Carpio Morales, Velasco, Jr., Leonardo-De Castro, Peralta, Bersamin, Del
Castillo, Abad, Villarama, Jr., Perez, Mendoza, and Sereno, JJ., concur.
Nachura and Brion, JJ., on official leave.
Endnotes:
[1]
Under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
[2]
Rollo, pp. 117-123.
3Id. at 53-54. RESOLUTION DIRECTING THE COMMITTEE ON ETHICS AND PRIVILEGES TO

INVESTIGATE THE CONDUCT OF SENATE PRESIDENT MANUEL B. VILLAR, JR. FOR USING HIS
POSITION OF POWER TO INFLUENCE PUBLIC OFFICIALS IN RELOCATING THE C-5 ROAD
EXTENSION PROJECT TO DELIBERATELY PASS THRU HIS PROPERTIES, AND TO NEGOTIATE THE
OVERPRICED PURCHASE OF ROAD RIGHTS OF WAY THRU SEVERAL PROPERTIES ALSO OWNED
BY HIS CORPORATIONS REDOUNDING IN HUGE PERSONAL PERSONAL FINANCIAL BENEFITS
FOR HIM TO THE DETRIMENT OF THE FILIPINO PEOPLE, THEREBY RESULTING IN A BLATANT
CONFLICT OF INTEREST.
[4]
Id.
[5]
Id. at 131. Journal of the Senate.
[6]
Id.
[7]
Id. at 132. Journal of the Senate.
[8]
Id.
[9]
Id. at 141-154.
[10]
Id. at 155-159. Journal of the Senate.
[11]
Id. at 162-164. Journal of the Senate.
[12]
Id. at 165.
[13]
Id. at 19-20.
[14]
Id. at 86-87.
[15]
Lagunilla v. Velasco, G.R. No. 169276, 16 June 2009, 589 SCRA 224, 232-233
citing Regner v. Logarta, G.R. No. 168747, 19 October 2007, 537 SCRA 277 and Arcelona v.
Court of Appeals, 345 Phil. 250 (1997).
[16]
Rollo, p. 108, Comment.
[17]
441 Phil. 492 (2002).
[18]
Industrial Enterprises, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 88550, 18 April 1990, 184 SCRA
426, 431-432.
[19]
Arimao v. Taher, G.R. No. 152651, 7 August 2006, 498 SCRA 74.
[20]
Francisco, Jr. v. House of Representatives, 460 Phil. 830 (2003).
[21]
Tolentino v. Secretary of Finance, G.R. No. 115455, 25 August 1994, 235 SCRA 630.
[22]
Section 2.
[23]
Dela Paz v. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, G.R. No. 184849, 13 February 2009, 579
SCRA 521, 525.
[24]
G.R. No. 180643, 25 March 2008, 549 SCRA 77.
[25]
G.R. No. 180643, 4 September 2008, 564 SCRA 152.
[26]
Id. at 230-231.
[27]
G.R. No. 193459, 15 February 2011.
[28]
Emphasis in the original.
[29]
Rollo, p. 52.
[30]
Id. at 31.
[31]
Id. at 141. It states:
Sec. 4. Composition. - It shall have seven (7) members who, including the Chairperson, shall be
chosen by the Senate. The President Pro Tempore and both the Majority and Minority Leaders of
the Senate are Ex-Officio Members of the Committee.
[32]
Id. at 32.
[33]
Id. at 141. It states:
Sec. 5. Meetings. x x x.
B. QUORUM: The presence of at least two (2) Members of the Committee shall constitute a
quorum.
[34]
Id. at 96. The Comment states:
x x x For instance, with respect to the quorum, the records of the deliberations of the
Respondent Committee of the Whole will show that Senate President Enrile, after tracing the long
history of instances when the Senate was constituted as a Senate Committee of the Whole,
pointed out that for purposes of its proceedings and consistent with tradition and practice, eight
(8) of its members - not two (2) as Petitioners claimed - will constitute the quorum.
[35]
Section 16. x x x
(2) A majority of each House shall constitute a quorum to do business, but a smaller number
may adjourn from day to day and may compel the attendance of absent Members in such
manner, and under such penalties, as such House may provide.
7. Valeroso v. People, G.R. No. 164815, 22 February 2008
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. NO. 164815 : February 22, 2008]
SR. INSP. JERRY C. VALEROSO, Petitioner, v. THE PEOPLE OF THE

PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
REYES, R.T., J.:
THE law looks forward, never backward. Lex prospicit, non respicit. A new law has a prospective,
not retroactive, effect.1 However, penal laws that favor a guilty person, who is not a habitual
criminal, shall be given retroactive effect.1-a These are the rule, the exception and exception to
the exception on effectivity of laws.
Ang batas ay tumitingin sa hinaharap, hindi sa nakaraan. Gayunpaman, ang parusa ng

bagong batas ay iiral kung ito ay pabor sa taong nagkasala na hindi pusakal na
kriminal.
We apply the exception rather than the rule in this Petition for Review on Certiorari of the
decision of the Court of Appeals (CA), affirming with modification that of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) in Quezon City, finding petitioner liable for illegal possession of a firearm.
The Facts
On July 10, 1996, at around 9:30 a.m., SPO2 Antonio M. Disuanco of the Criminal Investigation
Division, Central Police District Command, received a dispatch order2 from the desk officer.3 The
order directed him and three (3) other policemen to serve a warrant of arrest 4 issued by Judge
Ignacio Salvador against petitioner Sr. Insp. Jerry C. Valeroso in a case for kidnapping with
ransom.5
After a briefing, the team conducted the necessary surveillance on petitioner, checking his
hideouts in Cavite, Caloocan, and Bulacan.6 Eventually, the team proceeded to the Integrated
National Police (INP) Central Station at Culiat, Quezon City, where they saw petitioner as he was
about to board a tricycle.7 SPO2 Disuanco and his team approached petitioner.8 They put him
under arrest, informed him of his constitutional rights, and bodily searched him. 9 Found tucked in
his waist10 was a Charter Arms, bearing Serial Number 5231511 with five (5) live ammunition.
Petitioner was then brought to the police station for questioning.
A verification of the subject firearm at the Firearms and Explosives Division at Camp Crame
revealed that it was not issued to petitioner but to a certain Raul Palencia Salvatierra of
Sampaloc, Manila.14 Epifanio Deriquito, the records verifier, presented a certification 15 to that
effect signed by Edwin C. Roque, chief records officer of the Firearms and Explosive Division. 16
Petitioner was then charged with illegal possession of firearm and ammunition under Presidential
Decree (P.D.) No. 1866,17 as amended. The Information read:
That on or about the 10th day of July, 1996, in Quezon City, Philippines, the said accused without
any authority of law, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and knowingly have in his/her
possession and under his/her custody and control
One (1) cal. 38 "Charter Arms" revolver bearing Serial No. 52315 with five (5) live ammo.
without first having secured the necessary license/permit issued by the proper authorities.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Quezon City, Philippines, July 15, 1996.
(Sgd.)
GLORIA VICTORIA C. YAP

Assistant City Prosecutor18
With the assistance of his counsel de parte, Atty. Oscar Pagulayan, petitioner pleaded not guilty
when arraigned on October 9, 1996.19 Trial on the merits ensued.
SPO2 Disuanco and Deriquito testified for the prosecution in the manner stated above.
Upon the other hand, the defense version was supplied by the combined testimonies of petitioner
Sr. Insp. Jerry C. Valeroso, SPO3 Agustin R. Timbol, Jr. and Adrian Yuson.
Petitioner recounted that on July 10, 1996, he was fast asleep in the boarding house of his
children located at Sagana Homes, Barangay New Era, Quezon City.20 He was roused from his
slumber when four (4) heavily armed men in civilian clothes bolted the room.21 They trained their
guns at him22 and pulled him out of the room. They then tied his hands and placed him near the
faucet.23 The raiding team went back inside and searched and ransacked the room.24 SPO2
Disuanco stood guard outside with him.25 Moments later, an operative came out of the room and
exclaimed, "Hoy, may nakuha akong baril sa loob!"26
Petitioner was told by SPO2 Disuanco that "we are authorized to shoot you because there's a
shoot to kill order against you, so if you are planning do so something, do it right now."27 He was
also told that there was a standing warrant for his arrest. 28 However, he was not shown any
proof when he asked for it.29 Neither was the raiding group armed with a valid search warrant.
According to petitioner, the search done in the boarding house was illegal. The gun seized from
him was duly licensed and covered by necessary permits. He was, however, unable to present
the documentation relative to the firearm because it was confiscated by the police. Petitioner
further lamented that when he was incarcerated, he was not allowed to engage the services of a
counsel. Neither was he allowed to see or talk to his family. 31
Petitioner contended that the police had an axe to grind against him. While still with the
Narcotics Command, he turned down a request of Col. Romulo Sales to white-wash a drug-
related investigation involving friends of the said police officer. Col. Sales was likewise subject of
a complaint filed with the Ombudsman by his wife. Col. Sales was later on appointed as the head
of the unit that conducted the search in his boarding house.32
SPO3 Timbol, Jr. of the Narcotics Command testified that he issued to petitioner a Memorandum
Receipt dated July 1, 199333 covering the subject firearm and its ammunition. This was upon the
verbal instruction of Col. Angelito Moreno. SPO3 Timbol identified his signature 34 on the said
receipt.35
Adrian Yuson, an occupant of the room adjacent to where petitioner was arrested, testified that
on July 10, 1996, two (2) policemen suddenly entered his room as he was preparing for
school.36 They grabbed his shoulder and led him out.37 During all those times, a gun was poked
at him.38 He was asked where petitioner was staying. Fearing for his life, he pointed to
petitioner's room.39
Four (4) policemen then entered the room.40 He witnessed how they pointed a gun at petitioner,
who was clad only in his underwear.41 He also witnessed how they forcibly brought petitioner out
of his room.42 While a policeman remained near the faucet to guard petitioner, three (3) others
went back inside the room.43 They began searching the whole place. They forcibly opened his
locker,44 which yielded the subject firearm.45
RTC and CA Dispositions
On May 6, 1998, the trial court found petitioner guilty as charged, disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby finds the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Violation of
Section 1 of Presidential Decree No. 1866 as amended by Republic Act No. 8294 and hereby
sentences him to suffer the penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period or from 4
years, 2 months and 1 day as minimum to 6 years as maximum and to pay the fine in the
amount of Fifteen Thousand Pesos (P15,000.00).
The gun subject of this case is hereby ordered confiscated in favor of the government. Let the
same be put in trust in the hands of the Chief of the PNP.
SO ORDERED.46
Petitioner moved to reconsider47 but his motion was denied on August 27, 1998.48 He appealed to
the CA.
On May 4, 2004, the appellate court affirmed with modification the RTC disposition. The fallo of
the CA decision reads:
Verily, the penalty imposed by the trial court upon the accused-appellant is modified to 4 years
and 2 months as minimum up to 6 years as maximum.
WHEREFORE, withthe foregoing MODIFICATION as to the penalty, the decision appealed from

is hereby AFFIRMED in all other respects.
SO ORDERED.49
His motion for reconsideration50 having been denied through a Resolution dated August 3,
2004,51 petitioner resorted to the present petition under Rule 45.
Issues
Petitioner raises the following issues for Our consideration:
I. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED SERIOUS ERRORS OF LAW IN AFFIRMING

THE CONVICTION OF PETITIONER DESPITE THE ABSENCE OF PROOF BEYOND REASONABLE
DOUBT.
II. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED SERIOUS ERRORS OF FACT AND LAW IN
SUSTAINING THE LEGALITY OF THE SEARCH AND THE VALIDITY AND ADMISSIBILITY OF THE
EVIDENCE OBTAINED THEREFROM DESPITE THE OVERWHELMING PROOF THAT THE SAME IS
THE FRUIT OF THE POISONOUS TREE.
III. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED SERIOUS ERRORS OF LAW IN NOT
UPHOLDING THE REGULARITY AND VALIDITY SURROUNDING THE ISSUANCE OF THE
MEMORANDUM RECEIPTS (SIC) IN FAVOR OF PETITIONER WHICH PROVES HIS INNOCENCE OF
THE CRIME CHARGE (SIC).52 (Underscoring supplied)cralawlibrary
Our Ruling
In illegal possession of firearm and ammunition, the prosecution has the burden of proving the
twin elements of (1) the existence of the subject firearm and ammunition, and (2) the fact that
the accused who possessed or owned the same does not have the corresponding license for it. 53
The prosecution was able to discharge its burden.
The existence of the subject firearm and its ammunition was established through the testimony
of SPO2 Disuanco.54 Defense witness Yuson also identified the firearm.55 Its existence was
likewise admitted by no less than petitioner himself.56
As for petitioner's lack of authority to possess the firearm, Deriquito testified that a verification
of the Charter Arms Caliber .38 bearing Serial No. 52315 with the Firearms and Explosives
Division at Camp Crame revealed that the seized pistol was not issued to petitioner. It was
registered in the name of a certain Raul Palencia Salvatierra of Sampaloc, Manila.57 As proof,
Deriquito presented a certification signed by Roque, the chief records officer of the same office. 58
The Court on several occasions ruled that either the testimony of a representative of, or a
certification from, the Philippine National Police (PNP) Firearms and Explosive Office attesting
that a person is not a licensee of any firearm would suffice to prove beyond reasonable doubt the
second element of possession of illegal firearms.59 The prosecution more than complied when it
presented both.
The certification is outside the scope of the hearsay rule.
The general rule is that a witness can testify only to those facts which he knows of his personal
knowledge; that is, which are derived from his own perception. 60 Otherwise, the testimony is
objectionable for being hearsay.61
On this score, the certification from the Firearms and Explosives Division is an exception to the
hearsay rule by virtue of Rule 130, Section 44 of the Rules of Court which provides:
Sec. 44. Entries in official records. - Entries in official records made in the performance of his
official duty by a public officer of the Philippines, or by a person in the performance of a duty
specifically enjoined by law, are prima facieevidence of the facts therein stated.
It may be true that the contents of said certification are only prima facie evidence of the facts
stated there. However, the failure of petitioner to present controverting evidence makes the
presumption unrebutted. Thus, the presumption stands.
Petitioner, however, raises several points which he says entitles him to no less than an acquittal.
The assessment of credibility of witnesses lies with the trial court.
First, petitioner says that the seizure of the subject firearm was invalid. The search was
conducted after his arrest and after he was taken out of the room he was occupying. 62
This contention deserves scant consideration.
Petitioner's version of the manner and place of his arrest goes into the factual findings made by
the trial court and its calibration of the credibility of witnesses. However, as aptly put by Justice
Ynares-Santiago in People v. Rivera:63
x x x the manner of assigning values to declarations of witnesses on the witness stand is best
and most competently performed by the trial judge who had the unmatched opportunity to
observe the witnesses and assess their credibility by the various indicia available but not
reflected on record. The demeanor of the person on the stand can draw the line between fact
and fancy or evince if the witness is telling the truth or lying through his teeth. We have
consistently ruled that when the question arises as to which of the conflicting versions of the
prosecution and the defense is worthy of belief, the assessment of the trial courts are generally
viewed as correct and entitled to great weight. Furthermore, in an appeal, where the culpability
or innocence of the accused depends on the issue of credibility of witnesses and the veracity of
their testimonies, findings of the trial court are given the highest degree of respect if not
finality.64 (Underscoring supplied)cralawlibrary
The trial court found the prosecution version worthy of credence and belief. We find no
compelling reason not to accept its observation on this score.
Worth noting is the fact that petitioner is a ranking police officer who not only claims to be highly
decorated,65 but have effected a number of successful arrests 66 as well. Common sense would
dictate that he must necessarily be authorized to carry a gun. We thus agree with the Office of
the Solicitor General that framing up petitioner would have been a very risky proposition. Had
the arresting officers really intended to cause the damnation of petitioner by framing him up,
they could have easily "planted" a more incriminating evidence rather than a gun. That would
have made their nefarious scheme easier, assuming that there indeed was one.
The pieces of evidence show that petitioner is not legally authorized to possess the
subject firearm and its five (5) ammunition.
Second, petitioner insists that he is legally authorized to possess the subject firearm and its
ammunition on the basis of the Memorandum Receipt issued to him by the PNP Narcotics
Command.67
Although petitioner is correct in his submission that public officers like policemen are accorded
presumption of regularity in the performance of their official duties,68 it is only a presumption; it
may be overthrown by evidence to the contrary. The prosecution was able to rebut the
presumption when it proved that the issuance to petitioner of the Memorandum Receipt was
anything but regular.
SPO3 Timbol, Jr. testified that he issued the Memorandum Receipt to petitioner based on the
verbal instruction of his immediate superior, Col. Moreno.69 However, a reading of Timbol's
testimony on cross-examination70 would reveal that there was an unusual facility by which said
receipt was issued to petitioner. Its issuance utterly lacked the usual necessary bureaucratic
constraints. Clearly, it was issued to petitioner under questionable circumstances.
Failure to offer an unlicensed firearm as evidence is not fatal provided there is

competent testimony as to its existence.
Third, petitioner claims that the subject firearm and ammunition should have been excluded as
evidence because they were not formally offered by the prosecution 71 in violation of Section 34,
Rule 132 of the Rules of Court.72
We note that petitioner contradicted himself when he argued for the validity of the Memorandum
Receipt and, at the same time, for the exclusion in evidence of the subject firearm and its
ammunition. Petitioner's act may result to an absurd situation where the Memorandum Receipt is
declared valid, while the subject firearm and its ammunition which are supposedly covered by
the Memorandum Receipt are excluded as evidence. That would have made the Memorandum
Receipt useless.
In any case, petitioner's contention has no leg to stand on.
Contrary to petitioner's claim, the subject firearm73 and its five (5) live ammunition74 were
offered in evidence by the prosecution.75 Even assuming arguendo that they were not offered,
petitioner's stance must still fail. The existence of an unlicensed firearm may be established by
testimony, even without its presentation at trial. In People v. Orehuela,76 the non-presentation of
the pistol did not prevent the conviction of the accused.
The doctrine was affirmed in the recent case of People v. Malinao.77
As previously stated, the existence of the subject firearm and its five (5) live ammunition were
established through the testimony of SPO2 Disuanco.78 Yuson also identified said
firearm.79 Petitioner even admitted its existence.80
We hasten to add that there may also be conviction where an unlicensed firearm is presented
during trial but through inadvertence, negligence, or fortuitous event (for example, if it is lost), it
is not offered in evidence, as long as there is competent testimony as to its existence.
Penal and civil liabilities
Petitioner was charged with the crime of illegal possession of firearms and ammunition under the
first paragraph of Section 1 of P.D. No. 1866, as amended. It provides that "[t]he penalty
of reclusion temporal in its maximum period to reclusion perpetua shall be imposed upon any
person who shall unlawfully manufacture, deal in, acquire, dispose, or possess any firearm, part
of firearm, ammunition or machinery, tool or instrument used or intended to be used in the
manufacture of any firearm or ammunition."
P.D. No. 1866, as amended, was the governing law at the time petitioner committed the offense
on July 10, 1996. However, R.A. No. 8294 amended P.D. No. 1866 on July 6, 1997, 81 during the
pendency of the case with the trial court. The present law now states:
SECTION 1. Unlawful Manufacture, Sale, Acquisition, Disposition or Possession of Firearms or

Ammunition or Instruments Used or Intended to be Used in the Manufacture of Firearms or
Ammunition. - The penalty of prision correccional in its maximum period and a fine of not less
than Fifteen Thousand Pesos (P15,000) shall be imposed upon any person who shall unlawfully
manufacture, deal in, acquire, dispose, or possess any low-powered firearm, such as rimfire
handgun, .380 or .32 and other firearm of similar firepower, part of firearm, ammunition, or
machinery, tool or instrument used or intended to be used in the manufacture of any firearm or
ammunition: Provided, That no other crime was committed. (Underscoring supplied)cralawlibrary
As a general rule, penal laws should not have retroactive application, lest they acquire the
character of an ex post facto law.82 An exception to this rule, however, is when the law is
advantageous to the accused. According to Mr. Chief Justice Araullo, this is "not as a right" of the
offender, "but founded on the very principles on which the right of the State to punish and the
commination of the penalty are based, and regards it not as an exception based on political
considerations, but as a rule founded on principles of strict justice."83
Although an additional fine of P15,000.00 is imposed by R.A. No. 8294, the same is still
advantageous to the accused, considering that the imprisonment is lowered to prision
correccional in its maximum period84 from reclusion temporalin its maximum period to reclusion
perpetua85 under P.D. No. 1866.
Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, prision correccional maximum which ranges from four
(4) years, two (2) months and one (1) day to six (6) years, is the prescribed penalty and will
form the maximum term of the indeterminate sentence. The minimum term shall be one degree
lower, which is prision correccional in its medium period (two [2] years, four [4] months and one
[1] day to four [4] years and two [2] months).86 Hence, the penalty imposed by the CA is
correct. The penalty of four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional medium, as
minimum term, to six (6) years of prision correccional maximum, as maximum term, is in
consonance with the Court's ruling in Gonzales v. Court of Appeals87 and Barredo v. Vinarao.88
As to the subject firearm and its five (5) live ammunition, their proper disposition should be
made under Article 45 of the Revised Penal Code89 which provides, among others, that the
proceeds and instruments or tools of the crime shall be confiscated and forfeited in favor of the
government.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated May 4, 2004 is AFFIRMED in full.
SO ORDERED.
Endnotes:
1
New Civil Code, Art. 4.
1-a
Revised Penal Code, Art. 22 provides: Retroactive effect of penal laws. - Penal laws shall have
a retroactive effect in so far as they favor the person guilty of a felony, who is not a habitual
criminal, as this term is defined in Rule 5 of Article 62 of this Code, although at the time of the
publication of such laws a final sentence has been pronounced and the convict is serving the
same.
2
Exhibit "D."
3
TSN, November 6, 1996, pp. 4-5, 9.
4
Exhibit "B."
5
TSN, November 6, 1996, pp. 4, 7, 9.
6
Id. at 11.
7
Id. at 3. INP is now Philippine National Police (PNP).
8
Id. at 4.
9
Id. at 5-6.
10
TSN, November 6, 1996, pp. 14-15; TSN, December 11, 1996, p. 10.
11
Exhibit "E."
12
Exhibits "E-1" to "E-5."
13
TSN, November 6, 1996, p. 6.
14
TSN, December 11, 1996, p. 21.
15
Exhibit "C."
PNPFED 12 Jul[y] 1996
C E R T I F I C A T I O N
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:
This is to certify that [the] Revolver, Charter Arms, Cal. 38 with serial number 52315 is
registered to RAUL PALENCIA SALVATIERA of Sampaloc, Manila, acquired thru transfer f[ro]m
Wilburn Irwin Lucasan per index card d[a]t[e]d 10 December 1990.
This certification is issued for whatever legal purpose it may serve.
FOR THE CHIEF, FED:
EDWIN C[.] ROQUE (Sgd.)

P/Sr. Inspector
Chief, Records Br[.]
16
TSN, December 11, 1996, pp. 19-20.
17
Entitled "An Act Codifying the Laws on Illegal/Unlawful Possession, Manufacture, Dealing in,
Acquisition or Disposition of Firearms, Ammunition or Explosives or Instruments Used in the
Manufacture of Firearms, Ammunition or Explosives, and Imposing Stiffer Penalties for Certain
Violations Thereof, and for Relevant Purposes." This law was issued by President Ferdinand E.
Marcos on June 29, 1983. See Zuño, Sr. v. Dizon, A.M. No. RTJ-91-752, June 23, 1993, 223
SCRA 584, 598.
18
Rollo, p. 35.
19
Id. at 38.
20
TSN, February 19, 1997, pp. 19-21.
21
Id. at 21.
22
Id.
23
Id. at 22.
24
Id. at 3, 6.
25
TSN, March 17, 1997, p. 5.
26
Id. at 4.
27
Id. at 10.
28
Id. at 11.
29
Id. at 12.
30
Id. at 14.
31
Id. at 21-22.
32
TSN, March 17, 1997, pp. 22-26.
33
Exhibit "1."
34
Exhibit "1-A."
35
TSN, June 4, 1996, pp. 2-6.
36
TSN, August 4, 1997, p. 7.
37
Id. at 8.
38
Id.
39
Id. at 8-9.
40
Id. at 9.
41
Id. at 10.
42
Id.
43
Id. at 11.
44
Id. at 12.
45
Id.
46
Rollo, p. 44.
47
Exhibit "E."
48
Exhibit "F."
49
Rollo, p. 31.
50
Exhibit "I."
51
Exhibit "B."
52
Rollo, p. 125.
53
Padilla v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 121917, March 12, 1997, 269 SCRA 402; Mallari v. Court
of Appeals, G.R. No. 110569, December 19, 1996, 265 SCRA 456; People v. Damaso, G.R. No.
93516, August 12, 1992, 212 SCRA 547.
54
TSN, November 6, 1996, pp. 4, 7, 9.
55
TSN, August 4, 1997, p. 12.
56
TSN, March 17, 1997, pp. 14-15, 19.
57
TSN, December 11, 1996, p. 21.
58
Id. at 19-20.
59
People v. Taan, G.R. No. 169432, October 30, 2006, 506 SCRA 219; Ungsod v. People, G.R.
No. 158904, December 16, 2005, 478 SCRA 282; People v. Lazaro, G.R. No. 112090, October
26, 1999, 317 SCRA 435, citing Padilla v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 121917, March 12, 1997,
269 SCRA 402; Rosales v. Court of Appeals, G.R. NOS. 106229-30, March 15, 1996, 255 SCRA
123; People v. Orehuela, G.R. NOS. 108780-81, April 29, 1994, 232 SCRA 82. See also Mallari v.
Court of Appeals, supra note 53; People v. Solayao, G.R. No. 119220, September 20, 1996, 262
SCRA 255.
60
Rules of Court, Rule 130, Sec. 36.
61
The United States Federal Rule of Evidence defines hearsay as "a statement, other than one
made by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the
truth of the matter asserted." Cleary, E.W., McCormick on Evidence (1984), 3rd ed., p. 729,
citing Federal Rule of Evidence 801(c). Accordingly, hearsay evidence is objected to due to the
following reasons:
Oath. Among the earliest of the criticisms of hearsay, and one often repeated in judicial opinions
down to the present, is the objection that the out-of-court declarant who made the hearsay
statement commonly speaks or writes without the solemnity of the oath administered to
witnesses in a court of law. The oath may be important in two aspects. As a ceremonial and
religious symbol it may induce in the witness a feeling of special obligation to speak the truth,
and also it may impress upon the witness the danger of criminal punishment for perjury, to
which the judicial oath or an equivalent solemn affirmation would be a prerequisite condition. x x
x
Personal presence at trial. Another objection early asserted and repeated of late is the want of
opportunity, in respect to the out-of-court declarant, for observation of his demeanor, with the
light that this may shed on his credibility, that would be afforded if he were a witness on the
stand.
The solemnity of the occasion and possibility of public disgrace can scarcely fail to impress the
witness, and falsehood no doubt becomes more difficult if the person against whom directed is
present.
Moreover, personal presence eliminates the danger that in the oral reporting of an out-of-court
statement that the witness reporting the statement may do so inaccurately. It seems probable
that the reporting of words spoken is subject to special dangers of inaccuracy beyond the
fallibility common to all reproduction from memory of matters of observation, and this seems a
substantial danger in the admission of hearsay. x x x
Cross-examination. It would be generally agreed today that noncompliance with the third
condition is the main justification for the exclusion of hearsay. This is the lack of any opportunity
for the adversary to cross examine the absent declarant whose out-of-court statement is
reported by the witness. x x x In perhaps his most famous remark, Wigmore described cross-
examination as "beyond any doubt the greatest legal engine ever invented for the discovery of
truth." (Underscoring supplied) (Id. at 727-728.)
62
Rollo, pp. 8, 136.
63
433 Phil. 343 (2002), citing People v. Sanchez, G.R. NOS. 121039-45, January 25, 1999, 302
SCRA 21; People v. Librando, 390 Phil. 543 (2000); People v. Deleverio, G.R. NOS. 118937-38,
April 24, 1998, 289 SCRA 547; People v. Zaballero, G.R. No. 100935, June 30, 1997, 274 SCRA
627.
64
People v. Rivera, id. at 352.
65
Rollo, p. 61.
66
TSN, March 17, 1997, p. 25.
67
Rollo, pp. 11-12, 138.
68
Gutang v. People, 390 Phil. 805, 817-818 (2000), citing People v. William, G.R. No. 93712,
June 15, 1992, 209 SCRA 808; People v. Rumeral, G.R. No. 86320, August 5, 1991, 200 SCRA
194. See also Rules of Court, Rule 131, Sec. 3(m).
69
TSN, June 4, 1997, pp. 3-6.
70
Id. at 7-11.
FISCAL: I am asking you why your office likewise issued [a] Memo Receipt if he [i.e., Colonel
Angelito Moreno] normally issue (sic) a firearm for [an] officer of the PNP?cralawred
A. Because our office has also authorized us to issue.
Q: And who authorized your office?cralawred
A: It is our Commanding Officer, Sir.
Q: And who authorized the Commanding Officer?cralawred
INTERPRETER:
Witness cannot answer.
Q: Where does the Commanding Officer derive his authority?cralawred

A: What I know is that the Commanding Officer is authorized to [issue] firearm that will be
issued to a PNP Officer but I do not know who gave the authority to our officer.
xxx
Q: As such, do you keep inventory of such supplies?cralawred
A: Yes, Sir.
Q: Do you have the inventory of this particular gun, the original?cralawred
A: Yes, Sir.
Q: Do you have that inventory with you, that inventory of such gun, the Memo Receipt?
cralawred
A: That firearm was not in my custody.
Q: But you said a while ago it is with you, which is which, do you have or do you not have the
listing of such inventory?cralawred
A: None, Sir.
xxx
FISCAL: Mr. Witness, other than this case, were there any instances where you issued Memo
Receipt as verbally directed by your alleged Commanding Officer Moreno?cralawred
A: Yes, Sir, I m only a RSO since November 1993.
Q: Precisely, 1991 to 1993, for a period wherein you claimed you hold an office of RSO, has
(sic) this the only time you issued?cralawred
A: Many time[s], Sir.
COURT: Let's clarify this. The Court understands to (sic) your previous answer that this is the
first time that you have done this procedure of issuing guns to an officer. Are you changing that
this is the first time and not many times?cralawred
A: That is the only first (sic) time, as instructed by the Commanding Officer, Your Honor.
(Underscoring supplied)cralawlibrary
71
Rollo, pp. 11, 137-138.
72
Sec. 34. Offer of evidence. - The court shall consider no evidence which has not been formally
offered. The purpose for which the evidence is offered must be specified.
73
Exhibit "E."
74
Exhibits "E-1" to "E-5."
75
TSN, February 19, 1997, p. 14.
76
G.R. NOS. 108780-81, April 29, 1994, 232 SCRA 82, 95-96.
As Mr. Justice Feliciano held for the Court:

x x x Upon the other hand, we note also that the allegedly unlicensed murder weapon was not
presented in evidence by the prosecution. What the prosecution did present to show absence of
a license or permit to possess the firearm used to kill Teoberto, was a certification issued by the
Bohol Regional Headquarters of the Integrated National Police, dated 20 December 1989, x x x:
xxx
We consider that the certification was adequate to show that the firearm used by Modesta
Orehuela in killing Teoberto Cañizares was a firearm which Orehuela was not licensed to possess
and to carry outside his residence on the night that Teoberto Cañizares was shot to death. That
that firearm was a .38 caliber pistol was shown by the testimony and report of NBI Ballistician
Bonifacio Ayag. When the above circumstances are taken together with the testimony of the eye-
witness that Modesto Orehuela was in fact in possession of a firearm and used the same to kill
Teoberto Cañizares, we believe that accused Orehuela was properly found guilty of aggravated or
qualified illegal possession of firearm and ammunition. (Underscoring supplied)cralawlibrary
77
G.R. No. 128148, February 16, 2004, 423 SCRA 34. See also People v. Taan, supra note
59; People v. Taguba, 396 Phil. 366 (2000).
78
TSN, November 6, 1996, pp. 4, 7, 9.
79
TSN, August 4, 1997, p. 12.
80
TSN, March 17, 1997, pp. 14-15, 19.
81
People v. Lazaro, supra note 59.
82
Mejia v. Pamaran, G.R. NOS. L-56741-42, April 15, 1988, 160 SCRA 457, 472. An ex post
facto law is one which:
1. Makes criminal an act done before the passage of the law and which was innocent when done,
and punishes such an act;
2. Aggravates a crime, or makes it greater than it was, when committed;
3. Changes the punishment and inflicts a greater punishment than the law annexed to the crime
when committed;
4. Alters the legal rules of evidence, and authorizes conviction upon less or different testimony
than the law required at the time of the commission of the offense;
5. Assuming to regulate civil rights and remedies only, in effect imposes penalty or deprivation of
a right for something which when done was lawful; and
6. Deprives a person accused of a crime of some lawful protection to which he has become
entitled, such as the protection of a former conviction or acquittal, or a proclamation of amnesty.
83
People v. Moran, 44 Phil. 387, 408 (1923), citing Fiore, Irretroactividad e Interpretacion de las
Leyes.
84
Reyes, L.B., The Revised Penal Code, Book II, 2001 ed., p. 1021. PRISION CORRECCIONAL IN
ITS MAXIMUM PERIOD. - 4 years, 2 months and 1 day to 6 years
Minimum : 4 years, 2 months and 1 day to 4 years, 9 months and 10 days
Medium : 4 years, 9 months and 11 days to 5 years, 4 months and 20 days

Maximum : 5 years, 4 months and 21 days to 6 years
85
Id. at 1026. RECLUSION TEMPORAL IN ITS MAXIMUM PERIOD TO RECLUSION PERPETUA. - 17
years, 4 months and 1 day to reclusion perpetua
Minimum : 17 years, 4 months and 1 day to 18 years and 8 months
Medium : 18 years, 8 months and 1 day to 20 years
Maximum : Reclusion perpetua

86
Id. at 1021. PRISION CORRECCIONAL IN ITS MEDIUM PERIOD. - 2 years, 4 months and 1 day
to 4 years and 2 months
Minimum : 2 years, 4 months and 1 day to 2 years, 11 months and 10 days
Medium : 2 years, 11 months and 11 days to 3 years, 6 months and 20 days
Maximum : 3 years, 6 months 21 days to 4 years and 2 months.

87
343 Phil. 297 (1997).
88
G.R. No. 168728, August 2, 2007.
89
Art. 45. Confiscation and forfeiture of the proceeds or instruments of the crime. - Every
penalty imposed for the commission of a felony shall carry with it the forfeiture of the proceeds
of the crime and the instruments or tools with which it was committed.
Such proceeds and instruments or tools shall be confiscated and forfeited in favor of the
Government, unless they be the property of a third person not liable for the offense, but those
articles which are not subject of lawful commerce shall be destroyed. (Underscoring supplied).
8. PNB v. Office of the President, G.R. No. 104528, 18 January 1996
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 104528. January 18, 1996.]
PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, Petitioner, v. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, HOUSING AND

LAND USE REGULATORY BOARD (HLURB), ALFONSO MAGLAYA, ANGELINA MAGLAYA P.
REYES, JORGE C. BERNARDINO, CORAZON DE LEON, VICTORIANO ACAYA, FLORENCIA
CULTURA, MARIA CAMPOS, ERNESTO SARMIENTO, SANTIAGO TAMONAN, APOLONIA
TADIAQUE, SIMEON DE LEON, NATIVIDAD J. CRUZ, NATIVIDAD B. LORESCO,
FELICIDAD GARCIA, ANA ANITA TAN, LUCAS SERVILLION, JOSE NARAWAL,
represented by their duly authorized Attorney-in-Fact, CORAZON DE LEON AND
SPOUSES LEOPOLDO AND CARMEN
SEBASTIAN, Respondents.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
SYLLABUS
1. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW; OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT- APPEAL THEREFROM MAY BE TAKEN TO
THE COURT OF A~PEALS; SUPREME COURT MAY TAKE COGNIZANCE THEREOF IN THE INTEREST
OF SPEEDY JUSTICE. — Under Revised Administrative Circular No. 1-95, "appeals from
judgments or final orders of the . . . Office of the President . . . may be taken to the Court of
Appeals . . ." However, in order to hasten the resolution of this case, which was deemed
submitted for decision three years ago, the Court resolved to make an exception to the said
Circular in the interest of speedy justice.
2. CIVIL LAW; GENERALLY, LAWS HAVE NO RRETROACTIVE EFFECT — Pursuant to Article 4 of

the Civil Code," (l)aws shall have no retroactive effect, unless the contrary is provided."cralaw
virtua1aw library
3. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW; PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 957 (THE SUBDIVISION AND

CONDOMINIUM BUYERS’ PROTECTIVE DECREE) WITH RETROACTIVE APPLICATION. — It is
obvious and indubitable that P.D. 957 was intended to cover even those real estate mortgages,
like the one at issue here, executed prior to its enactments, and such intent (as succinctly
captured in the preamble) must be given effect if the laudable purpose of protecting innocent
purchasers is to be achieved. While P.D. 957 did not expressly provide for retroactivity in its
entirety, yet the same can be plainly inferred from the unmistakable intent of the law to protect
innocent lot buyers from scheming subdivision developers. As between these small lot buyers
and the gigantic financial institutions which the developers deal with, it is obvious that the law as
an instrument of social justice - must favor the weak. Likewise noteworthy are certain provisions
of P.D. 957, which themselves constitute strong arguments in favor of the retroactivity of P.D.
957 as a whole. These are Sections 20, 21 and 23 thereof, which by their very terms have
retroactive effect and will impact upon even those contracts and transactions entered into prior
to P.D. 957’s enactment
4. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION; INTENT OF THE STATUTE IS THE LAW. — The instent of a

statute is the law. If a statute is valid it is to have effect according to the purpose and intent of
the lawmaker. The intent is the vital part, the essence of the law, and the primary rule of
construction is to ascertain and give effect to the intent. The intention of the legislature in
enacting a law is the law itself, and must be enforced when ascertained; although it may not be
consistent with the strict letter of the statute. Courts will not follow the letter of a statute when it
leads away from the true intent and purpose of the legislature and to conclusions inconsistent
with the general purpose of the act. Intent is the spirit which gives life to a legislative
enactment. In construing statutes the proper course is to start out and follow the true intent of
the legislature and to adopt that sense which harmonizes best with the context and promotes in
the fullest manner the apparent policy and objects of the legislature. (Sutherland, in his well-
known treatise on Statutory Construction [quoted with approval by this Court in an old case of
consequence, Ongsiako v. Gamboa]).
5. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; CONSTITUTION, NON-IMPAIRMENT CLAUSE: CAN NOT PREVAIL OVER

POLICE POWER OF THE STATE. — Despite the Impairment clause, a contract valid at the time of
its execution may be legally modified or even completely invalidated by a subsequent law. If the
law is a proper exercise of the police power, it will prevail over the contract. Into each contract
are read the provisions of existing law and, always, a reservation of the police power as long as
the agreement deals with a matter affecting the public welfare. Such a contract, it has been held,
suffers a congenital infirmity, and this is its susceptibility to change by the legislature as a
postulate of the legal order.
6. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 957 (THE SUBDIVIION AND

CONDOMINIUM BUYERS’ DECREE); REAL ESTATE MORTGAGE MADE BY THE SUBDIVISION
OWNER IN FAVOR OF THE BANK DECLARED NULL AND VOID WHERE RIGHTS OF SUBDIVISION
LOT BUYERS CLASH WITH THE MORTGAGEES BANK’S RIGHT TO FORECLOSE. — The decision of
the Court of Appeals in Breta and Hamor v. Lao, et al, penned by then Court of Appeals Associate
Justice Jose A R. Melo, now a respected member of this Court, is persuasive, the factual
circumstances therein being of great similarity to the antecedent facts of the case at bench. By
the foregoing citation, this Court thus adopts by reference the foregoing as part of this Decision.
The real estate mortgage in the above cited case, although constituted in 1975 and outside the
beneficial aegis of P.D. 957,was struck down by the Court of Appeals which found in favor of
subdivision lot buyers when the rights of the latter clashed with the mortgagee bank’s right to
foreclose the property. The Court of Appeals in that case upheld the decision of the trial court
declaring the real estate mortgage as null and void.
7. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID. MORTGAGEE BANK OBLIGED TO ACCEPT PAYMENT OF REAMINING UNPAID
AMORTIZATIONS OF SUBDIVISION LOT BUYERS. — A to the second issue of non-privity,
petitioner avers that, in view of the provisions of Article 1311 of the Civil Code, PNB, being a
"total stranger to the land purchase agreement," cannot be made to take the developer’s place.
We disagree. P.D. 957 being applicable, Section 18 of said law obliges petitioner Bank to accept
the payment of the rernaining unpaid amortizations tendered by private respondents. Privity of
contracts as a defense does not apply in this case for the law explicitly grants to the buyer the
option to pay the installment payment for his lot or unit directly to the mortgagee (petitioner),
which is required to apply such payments to reduce the corresponding portion of the mortgage
indebtedness secured by the particular lot or unit being paid for. And, as stated earlier, this is
without prejudice to petitioner Bank’s seeking relief against the subdivision developer.
RESOLUTION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
May a buyer of a property at a foreclosure sale dispossess prior purchasers on installment of

individual lots therein, or compel them to pay again for the lots which they previously bought
from the defaulting mortgagor-subdivision developer, on the theory that P.D. 957, "The
Subdivision and Condominium Buyers’ Protective Decree", is not applicable to the mortgage
contract in question, the same having been executed prior to the enactment of P.D. 957? This is
the question confronting the Court in this Petition challenging the Decision dated March 10, 1992
of the Office of the President of the Philippines in O.P. Case No. 4249, signed by the Executive
Secretary, Franklin M. Drilon, "by authority of the President."cralaw virtua1aw library
Private respondents were buyers on installment of subdivision lots from Marikina Village, Inc.
(represented by spouses Antonio and Susana Astudillo). Notwithstanding the land purchase
agreements it executed over said lots, the subdivision developer mortgaged the lots in favor of
the petitioner, Philippine National Bank. Unaware of this mortgage, private respondents duly
complied with their obligations as lot buyers and constructed their houses on the lots in question.
Subsequently, the subdivision developer defaulted and PNB foreclosed on the mortgage. As
highest bidder at the foreclosure sale, the bank became owner of the lots.chanroblesvirtual|
awlibrary
Acting on suits brought by private respondents (which were later consolidated), the HLURB Office
of Appeals Adjudication and Legal Affairs (OAALA) in a decision rendered on October 28, 1988
ruled that PNB — without prejudice to seeking relief against Marikina Village, Inc. — may collect
from private respondents only the "remaining amortization, in accordance with the land purchase
agreements they had previously entered into with "Marikina Village. Inc., and cannot compel
private respondents to pay all over again for the lots they had already bought from said
subdivision developer. On May 2, 1989, the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board affirmed
this decision. On March 10, 1992, the Office of the President, invoking P.D. 957, likewise
concurred with the HLURB. Hence, the present recourse to this Court.
Under Revised Administrative Circular No. 1-95, "appeals from judgments or final orders of
the . . . Office of the President . . . may be taken to the Court of Appeals . . . ." However, in
order to hasten the resolution of this case, which was deemed submitted for decision three years
ago, the Court resolved to make an exception to the said Circular in the interest of speedy
justice.
Petitioner bank raised the following issues:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
1. The Office of the President erred in applying P.D. 957 because said law was enacted only on
July 12, 1976, while the subject mortgage was executed on December 18, 1975; and
2. Petitioner Bank is not privy to the contracts between private respondents and mortgagor-
subdivision developer, hence, the Office of the President erred in ordering petitioner Bank to
accept private respondents’ remaining amortization and issue the corresponding titles after
payment thereof.
Normally, pursuant to Article 4 of the Civil Code." (l)aws shall have no retroactive effect, unless
the contrary is provided." However, it is obvious and indubitable that P.D. 957 was intended to
cover even those real estate mortgages, like the one at issue here, executed prior to its
enactment, and such intent (as succinctly captured in the preamble quoted below) must be given
effect if the laudable purpose of protecting innocent purchasers is to be achieved:chanrobles.com
: virtual lawlibrary
"WHEREAS, it is the policy of the State to afford its inhabitants the requirements of decent
human settlement and to provide them with ample opportunities for improving their quality of
life;
"WHEREAS, numerous reports reveal that many real estate subdivision owners, developers,
operators, and/or sellers have reneged on their representations and obligations to provide and
maintain properly subdivision roads, drainage, sewerage, water systems, lighting systems, and
other similar basic requirements, thus endangering the health and safety of home and lot
buyers;
"WHEREAS, reports of alarming magnitude also show cases of swindling and fraudulent
manipulations perpetrated by unscrupulous subdivision and condominium sellers and operators,
such as failure to deliver titles to the buyers or titles free from liens and encumbrance’ and to
pay real estate taxes, and fraudulent sales of the same subdivision lots to different innocent
purchasers for value;" 1 (Emphasis supplied)
While P.D. 957 did not expressly provide for retroactivity in its entirety, yet the same can be
plainly inferred from the unmistakable intent of the law to protect innocent lot buyers from
scheming subdivision developers. As between these small lot buyers and the gigantic financial
institutions which the developers deal with, it is obvious that the law — as an instrument of
social justice — must favor the weak. Indeed, the petitioner Bank had at its disposal vast
resources with which it could adequately protect its loan activities, and therefore is presumed to
have conducted the usual "due diligence" checking and ascertained (whether thru ocular
inspection or other modes of investigation) the actual status, condition, utilization and occupancy
of the property offered as collateral. It could not have been unaware that the property had been
built on by small lot buyers. On the other hand, private respondents obviously were powerless to
discover the attempt of the land developer to hypothecate the property being sold to them. It
was precisely in order to deal with this kind of situation that P.D. 957 was enacted, its very
essence and intendment being to provide a protective mantle over helpless citizens who may fall
prey to the razzmatazz of what P.D. 957 termed "unscrupulous subdivision and condominium
sellers."cralaw virtua1aw library
The intent of the law, as culled from its preamble and from the situation, circumstances and
condition it sought to remedy, must be enforced. Sutherland, in his well-known treatise on
Statutory Construction (quoted with approval by this Court in an old case of consequence,
Ongsiako v. Gamboa 2), says:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"The intent of a statute is the law. If a statute is valid it is to have effect according to the
purpose and intent of the lawmaker. The intent is the vital part, the essence of the law, and the
primary rule of construction is to ascertain and give effect to the intent. The intention of the
legislature in enacting a law is the law itself, and must be enforced when ascertained; although it
may not be consistent with the strict letter of the statute. Courts will not follow the letter of a
statute when it leads away from the true intent and purpose of the legislature and to conclusions
inconsistent with the general purpose of the act. Intent is the spirit which gives life to a
legislative enactment. In construing statutes, the proper course is to start out and follow the true
intent of the legislature and to adopt that sense which harmonizes best with the context and
promotes in the fullest manner the apparent policy and objects of the legislature."
3chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Truly, this Court cannot allow the injustice that will be wrought by a strictly prospective
application of the law. Little people who have toiled for years through blood and tears would be
deprived of their homes through no fault of their own. As the Solicitor General, in his comment,
argues:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Verily, if P.D. 957 were to exclude from its coverage the aforecited mortgage contract, the
vigorous regulation which P.D. 957 seeks to impose on unconscientious subdivision sellers will be
translated into a feeble exercise of police power just because the iron hand of the State cannot
particularly touch mortgage contracts badged with the fortunate accident of having been
constituted prior to the enactment of P.D. 957. Indeed, it would be illogical in the extreme if P.D.
957 is to be given full force and effect and yet, the fraudulent practices and manipulations it
seeks to curb in the first instance can nevertheless be liberally perpetrated precisely because
P.D. 957 cannot be applied to existing antecedent mortgage contracts. The legislative intent
could not have conceivably permitted a loophole which all along works to the prejudice of
subdivision lot buyers (private respondents)." 4
Likewise noteworthy are certain provisions of P.D. 957, which themselves constitute strong
arguments in favor of the retroactivity of P.D. 957 as a whole. These are Sections 20, 21 and 23
thereof, which by their very terms have retroactive effect and will impact upon even those
contracts and transactions entered into prior to P.D. 957’s enactment:chanroblesvirtual|awlibrary
"SEC. 20. Time of Completion. — Every owner or developer shall construct and provide the
facilities, improvements, infrastructures and other forms of development, including water supply
and lighting facilities, which are offered and indicated in the approved subdivision or
condominium plans, brochures, prospectus, printed matters, letters or in any form of
advertisement, within one year from the date of the issuance of the license for the subdivision or
condominium project or such other period of time as may be fixed by the Authority.
"SEC. 1. Sales Prior to Decree. — In cases of subdivision lots or condominium units sold or
disposed of prior to the effectivity of this Decree, it shall be incumbent upon the owner or
developer of the subdivision or condominium project to complete compliance with his or its
obligations as provided in the preceding section within two years from the date of this Decree
unless otherwise extended by the Authority or unless an adequate performance bond is filed in
accordance with Section 6 hereof.
"Failure of the owner or developer to comply with the obligations under this and the preceding
provisions shall constitute a violation punishable under Section 38 and 39 of this
Decree.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
"SEC. 23. Non-Forfeiture of Payments. — No installment payment made by a buyer in a

subdivision or condominium project for the lot or unit he contracted to buy shall be forfeited in
favor of the owner or developer when the buyer, after due notice to the owner or developer,
desists from further payment due to the failure of the owner or developer to develop the
subdivision or condominium project according to the approved plans and within the time limit for
complying with the same. Such buyer may, at his option, be reimbursed the total amount paid
including amortization interests but excluding delinquency interests, with interest thereon at the
legal rate." (Emphasis supplied)
As for objections about a possible violation of the impairment clause, we find the following
statements of Justice Isagani Cruz enlightening and pertinent to the case a
bench:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Despite the impairment clause, a contract valid at the time of its execution may be legally
modified or even completely invalidated by a subsequent law. If the law is a proper exercise of
the police power, it will prevail over the contract.chanrobles.com : virtual lawlibrary
"Into each contract are read the provisions of existing law and, always, a reservation of the
police power as long as the agreement deals with a matter affecting the public welfare. Such a
contract, it has been held, suffers a congenital infirmity, and this is its susceptibility to change by
the legislature as a postulate of the legal order." 5
This Court ruled along similar lines in Juarez v. Court of Appeals 6:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"The petitioner complains that the retroactive application of the law would violate the impairment
clause. The argument does not impress. The impairment clause is now no longer inviolate; in
fact, there are many who now believe it is an anachronism in the present-day society. It was
quite useful before in protecting the integrity of private agreements from government meddling,
but that was when such agreements did not affect the community in general. They were indeed
purely private agreements then. Any interference with them at that time was really an
unwarranted intrusion that could properly struck down.
"But things are different now. More and more the interests of the public have become involved in
what are supposed to be still private agreements, which have as a result been removed from the
protection of the impairment clause. These agreements have come within the embrace of the
police power, that obtrusive protector of the public interest. It is a ubiquitous policeman indeed.
As long as the contract affects the public welfare one way or another so as to require the
interference of the State, then must the police power be asserted, and prevail, over the
impairment clause."cralaw virtua1aw library
The decision of the Court of Appeals in Breta and Hamor v. Lao, Et. Al. 7, penned by then Court
of Appeals Associate Justice Jose A. R. Melo, now a respected member of this Court is
persuasive, the factual circumstances therein being of great similarity to the antecedent facts of
the case at bench:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Protection must be afforded small homeowners who toil and save if only to purchase on
installment a tiny home lot they can call their own. The consuming dream of every Filipino is to
be able to buy a lot, no matter how small, so that he may somehow build a house. It has,
however, been seen of late that these honest, hard-living individuals are taken advantage of,
with the delivery of titles delayed, the subdivision facilities, including the most essential such as
water installations not completed, or worse yet, as in the instant case, after almost completing
the payments for the property and after constructing a house, the buyer is suddenly confronted
by the stark reality, contrived or otherwise, in which another person would now appear to be
owner.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
x x x
"We cannot over emphasize the fact that the BANK cannot barefacedly argue that simply
because the title or titles offered as security were clean of any encumbrance or lien, that it was
thereby relieved of thing any other step to verify the over-reaching implications should the
subdivision be auctioned on foreclosure. The BANK could not have closed its eyes that it was
dealing over a subdivision where there were already houses constructed. Did it not enter the
mind of the responsible officers of the BANK that there may even be subdivision residents who
have almost completed their installment payments?" (Id., pp. 7 & 9)
By the foregoing citation, this Court thus adopts by reference the foregoing as part of this
Decision.
The real estate mortgage in the above cited case although constituted in 1975 and outside the
beneficial aegis of P.D. 957, was struck down by the Court of Appeals which found in favor of
subdivision lot buyers when the rights of the latter clashed with the mortgagee bank’s right to
foreclose the property. The Court of Appeals in that case upheld the decision of the trial court
declaring the real estate mortgage as null and void.chanroblesvirtual|awlibrary
As to the second issue of non-privity, petitioner avers that, in view of the provisions of Article
1311 of the Civil Code, PNB, being a "total stranger to the land purchase agreement," cannot be
made to take the developer’s place.
We disagree. P.D. 957 being applicable, Section 18 of said law obliges petitioner Bank to accept
the payment of the remaining unpaid amortization tendered by private respondents.
"SEC. 18. Mortgages. — No mortgage on any unit or lot shall be made by the owner or developer
without prior written approval of the Authority. Such approval shall not be granted unless it is
shown that the proceeds of the mortgage loan shall be used for the development of the
condominium or subdivision project and effective measures have been provided to ensure such
utilization. The loan value of each lot or unit covered by the mortgage shall be determined and
the buyer thereof, if any, shall be notified before the release of the loan. The buyer may, at his
option, pay his installment for the lot or unit directly to the mortgagee who shall apply the
payments to the corresponding mortgage indebtedness secured by the particular lot or unit being
paid for, with a view to enabling said buyer to obtain title over the lot or unit promptly after full
payment thereof ." (Emphasis supplied)chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Privity of contracts as a defense does not apply in this case for the law explicitly grants to the
buyer the option to pay the installment payment for his lot or unit directly to the mortgagee
(petitioner, which is required to apply such payments to reduce the corresponding portion of the
mortgage indebtedness secured by the particular lot or unit being paid for. And, as stated earlier,
this is without prejudice to petitioner Bank’s seeking relief against the subdivision developer.
Finally, before closing this Resolution, we enjoin petitioner Bank to focus not only on the strictly
legal issues involved in this case but also to take another look at the larger issues including
social justice and the protection of human rights as enshrined in the Constitution, firstly, because
legal issues are raised and decided not in a vacuum but within the context of existing social,
economic and political conditions, law being merely a brick in the up-building of the social
edifice; and secondly, Petitioner, being THE state bank, is for all intents and purposes an
instrument for the implementation of state policies so cherished in our fundamental law. These
consideration are obviously far more weighty than the winning of any particular suit or the
acquisition of any specific property. Thus, as the country strives to move ahead towards
economic self-sufficiency and to achieve dreams of "NIC-blood" and social well-being for the
majority of our countrymen, we hold that petitioner Bank, the premier bank in the country,
which has in recent years made record earnings and acquired an enable international stature,
with branches and subsidiaries in key financial centers around the world, should be equally as
happy with the disposition of this case as the private respondents, who were almost deprived
and dispossessed of their very homes purchased through their hard work and with their meager
savings.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing considerations, the petition is hereby DENIED, petitioner
having failed to show any REVERSIBLE ERROR or GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION in the assailed
decision. No costs.chanrobles.com : virtual lawlibrary
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Davide, Jr., Melo and Francisco, JJ., concur.
Endnotes:
1. Preamble, Presidential Decree No. 957.
2. 86 Phil. 50 (April 8, 1950).
3. Vol. II, Sutherland, Statutory Construction, pp. 693-95.
4. Comment filed by the Solicitor General on behalf of the public respondent, p. 9; Rollo, p. 78.
5. J. Isagani A. Cruz, Constitutional Law, 1991 edition, p. 242, citing Home Building and Loan
Assn. v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398.
6. 214 SCRA 475, 480 (October 7, 1992).
7. CA-C.R. No. 587280-R, promulgated on November 11, 1981.
9. Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Philippine Health Care Providers, Inc., G.R. No.
168129, 24 April 2007
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. NO. 168129 : April 24, 2007]
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Petitioner, v. PHILIPPINE HEALTH CARE

PROVIDERS, INC., Respondent.
DECISION
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
For our resolution is the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules
of Civil Procedure, as amended, seeking to reverse the Decision 1 dated February 18, 2005 and
Resolution dated May 9, 2005 of the Court of Appeals (Fifteenth Division) in CA-G.R. SP No.
76449.
The factual antecedents of this case, as culled from the records, are:
The Philippine Health Care Providers, Inc., herein respondent, is a corporation organized and
existing under the laws of the Republic of the Philippines. Pursuant to its Articles of
Incorporation,2 its primary purpose is "To establish, maintain, conduct and operate a prepaid
group practice health care delivery system or a health maintenance organization to take care of
the sick and disabled persons enrolled in the health care plan and to provide for the
administrative, legal, and financial responsibilities of the
organization."ςηαñrοblεš νιr†υαl lαω lιbrαrÿ
On July 25, 1987, President Corazon C. Aquino issued Executive Order (E.O.) No. 273, amending
the National Internal Revenue Code of 1977 (Presidential Decree No. 1158) by imposing Value-
Added Tax (VAT) on the sale of goods and services. This E.O. took effect on January 1, 1988.
Before the effectivity of E.O. No. 273, or on December 10, 1987, respondent wrote the
Commissioner of Internal Revenue (CIR), petitioner, inquiring whether the services it provides to
the participants in its health care program are exempt from the payment of the VAT.
On June 8, 1988, petitioner CIR, through the VAT Review Committee of the Bureau of Internal
Revenue (BIR), issued VAT Ruling No. 231-88 stating that respondent, as a provider of medical
services, is exempt from the VAT coverage. This Ruling was subsequently confirmed by Regional
Director Osmundo G. Umali of Revenue Region No. 8 in a letter dated April 22, 1994.
Meanwhile, on January 1, 1996, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7716 (Expanded VAT or E-VAT Law) took
effect, amending further the National Internal Revenue Code of 1977. Then on January 1, 1998,
R.A. No. 8424 (National Internal Revenue Code of 1997) became effective. This new Tax Code
substantially adopted and reproduced the provisions of E.O. No. 273 on VAT and R.A. No. 7716
on E-VAT.
In the interim, on October 1, 1999, the BIR sent respondent a Preliminary Assessment Notice for
deficiency in its payment of the VAT and documentary stamp taxes (DST) for taxable years 1996
and 1997.
On October 20, 1999, respondent filed a protest with the BIR.
On January 27, 2000, petitioner CIR sent respondent a letter demanding payment of "deficiency
VAT" in the amount of P100,505,030.26 and DST in the amount of P124,196,610.92, or a total
of P224,702,641.18 for taxable years 1996 and 1997. Attached to the demand letter were four
(4) assessment notices.
On February 23, 2000, respondent filed another protest questioning the assessment notices.
Petitioner CIR did not take any action on respondent's protests. Hence, on September 21, 2000,
respondent filed with the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA) a Petition for Review, docketed as CTA
Case No. 6166.
On April 5, 2002, the CTA rendered its Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant Petition for Review is PARTIALLY GRANTED.
Petitioner is hereby ORDERED TO PAY the deficiency VAT amounting to P22,054,831.75 inclusive
of 25% surcharge plus 20% interest from January 20, 1997 until fully paid for the 1996 VAT
deficiency and P31,094,163.87 inclusive of 25% surcharge plus 20% interest from January 20,
1998 until paid for the 1997 VAT deficiency.
Accordingly, VAT Ruling No. 231-88 is declared void and without force and effect. The 1996 and
1997 deficiency DST assessment against petitioner is hereby CANCELLED AND SET ASIDE.
Respondent is ORDERED to DESIST from collecting the said DST deficiency tax.
SO ORDERED.
Respondent filed a motion for partial reconsideration of the above judgment concerning its
liability to pay the deficiency VAT.
In its Resolution3 dated March 23, 2003, the CTA granted respondent's motion, thus:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant Motion for Partial Reconsideration is
GRANTED. Accordingly, the VAT assessment issued by herein respondent against petitioner for
the taxable years 1996 and 1997 is hereby WITHDRAWN and SET ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.
The CTA held:
Moreover, this court adheres to its conclusion that petitioner is a service contractor subject to
VAT since it does not actually render medical service but merely acts as a conduit between the
members and petitioner's accredited and recognized hospitals and clinics.
However, after a careful review of the facts of the case as well as the Law and jurisprudence
applicable, this court resolves to grant petitioner's "Motion for Partial Reconsideration." We are in
accord with the view of petitioner that it is entitled to the benefit of non-retroactivity of rulings
guaranteed under Section 246 of the Tax Code, in the absence of showing of bad faith on its
part. Section 246 of the Tax Code provides:
Sec. 246. Non-Retroactivity of Rulings. - Any revocation, modification or reversal of any of

the rules and regulations promulgated in accordance with the preceding Sections or any of the
rulings or circulars promulgated by the Commissioner shall not be given retroactive application if
the revocation, modification or reversal will be prejudicial to the taxpayers, x x x.
Clearly, undue prejudice will be caused to petitioner if the revocation of VAT Ruling No. 231-88
will be retroactively applied to its case. VAT Ruling No. 231-88 issued by no less than the
respondent itself has confirmed petitioner's entitlement to VAT exemption under Section 103 of
the Tax Code. In saying so, respondent has actually broadened the scope of "medical services"
to include the case of the petitioner. This VAT ruling was even confirmed subsequently by
Regional Director Ormundo G. Umali in his letter dated April 22, 1994 (Exhibit M). Exhibit P,
which served as basis for the issuance of the said VAT ruling in favor of the petitioner sufficiently
described the business of petitioner and there is no way BIR could be misled by the said
representation as to the real nature of petitioner's business. Such being the case, this court is
convinced that petitioner's reliance on the said ruling is premised on good faith. The facts of the
case do not show that petitioner deliberately committed mistakes or omitted material facts when
it obtained the said ruling from the Bureau of Internal Revenue. Thus, in the absence of such
proof, this court upholds the application of Section 246 of the Tax Code. Consequently, the
pronouncement made by the BIR in VAT Ruling No. 231-88 as to the VAT exemption of petitioner
should be upheld.
Petitioner seasonably filed with the Court of Appeals a Petition for Review, docketed as CA-G.R.
SP No. 76449.
In its Decision dated February 18, 2005, the Court of Appeals affirmed the CTA Resolution.
Petitioner CIR filed a motion for reconsideration, but it was denied by the appellate court in its
Resolution4 dated May 9, 2005.
Hence, the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari raising these two issues: (1) whether
respondent's services are subject to VAT; and (2) whether VAT Ruling No. 231-88 exempting
respondent from payment of VAT has retroactive application.
On the first issue, respondent is contesting petitioner's assessment of its VAT liabilities for
taxable years 1996 and 1997.
Section 1025 of the National Internal Revenue Code of 1977, as amended by E.O. No. 273 (VAT
Law) and R.A. No. 7716 (E-VAT Law), provides:
SEC. 102. Value-added tax on sale of services and use or lease of properties. - (a) Rate and
base of tax. - There shall be levied, assessed and collected, a value-added tax equivalent to 10%
of gross receipts derived from the sale or exchange of services, including the use or lease of
properties.
The phrase "sale or exchange of service" means the performance of all kinds of services in the
Philippines for a fee, remuneration or consideration, including those performed or rendered by
construction and service contractors x x x.
Section 1036 of the same Code specifies the exempt transactions from the provision of Section
102, thus:
SEC. 103. Exempt Transactions. - The following shall be exempt from the value-added tax:
xxx
(l) Medical, dental, hospital and veterinary services except those rendered by professionals
xxx
The import of the above provision is plain. It requires no interpretation. It contemplates the
exemption from VAT of taxpayers engaged in the performance of medical, dental, hospital, and
veterinary services. In Commissioner of International Revenue v. Seagate Technology
(Philippines),7 we defined an exempt transaction as one involving goods or services which, by
their nature, are specifically listed in and expressly exempted from the VAT, under the Tax Code,
without regard to the tax status of the party in the transaction. In Commissioner of Internal
Revenue v. Toshiba Information Equipment (Phils.) Inc.,8 we reiterated this definition.
In its letter to the BIR requesting confirmation of its VAT-exempt status, respondent described
its services as follows:
Under the prepaid group practice health care delivery system adopted by Health Care, individuals
enrolled in Health Care's health care program are entitled to preventive, diagnostic, and
corrective medical services to be dispensed by Health Care's duly licensed physicians, specialists,
and other professional technical staff participating in said group practice health care delivery
system established and operated by Health Care. Such medical services will be dispensed in a
hospital or clinic owned, operated, or accredited by Health Care. To be entitled to receive such
medical services from Health Care, an individual must enroll in Health Care's health care
program and pay an annual fee. Enrollment in Health Care's health care program is on a year-to-
year basis and enrollees are issued identification cards.
From the foregoing, the CTA made the following conclusions:
a) Respondent "is not actually rendering medical service but merely acting as a conduit
between the members and their accredited and recognized hospitals and clinics."
b) It merely "provides and arranges for the provision of pre-need health care services to
its members for a fixed prepaid fee for a specified period of time."
c) It then "contracts the services of physicians, medical and dental practitioners, clinics

and hospitals to perform such services to its enrolled members;" and
d) Respondent "also enters into contract with clinics, hospitals, medical professionals

and then negotiates with them regarding payment schemes, financing and other
procedures in the delivery of health services."
We note that these factual findings of the CTA were neither modified nor reversed by the Court
of Appeals. It is a doctrine that findings of fact of the CTA, a special court exercising particular
expertise on the subject of tax, are generally regarded as final, binding, and conclusive upon this
Court, more so where these do not conflict with the findings of the Court of Appeals. 9 Perforce,
as respondent does not actually provide medical and/or hospital services, as provided
under Section 103 on exempt transactions, but merely arranges for the same, its
services are not VAT-exempt.
Relative to the second issue, Section 246 of the 1997 Tax Code, as amended, provides that
rulings, circulars, rules and regulations promulgated by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue
have no retroactive application if to apply them would prejudice the taxpayer. The exceptions to
this rule are: (1) where the taxpayer deliberately misstates or omits material facts from his
return or in any document required of him by the Bureau of Internal Revenue; (2) where the
facts subsequently gathered by the Bureau of Internal Revenue are materially different from the
facts on which the ruling is based, or (3) where the taxpayer acted in bad faith.
We must now determine whether VAT Ruling No. 231-88 exempting respondent from paying its
VAT liabilities has retroactive application.
In its Resolution dated March 23, 2003, the CTA found that there is no showing that respondent
"deliberately committed mistakes or omitted material facts" when it obtained VAT Ruling No.
231-88 from the BIR. The CTA held that respondent's letter which served as the basis for the
VAT ruling "sufficiently described" its business and "there is no way the BIR could be misled by
the said representation as to the real nature" of said business.
In sustaining the CTA, the Court of Appeals found that "the failure of respondent to refer to itself
as a health maintenance organization is not an indication of bad faith or a deliberate attempt to
make false representations." As "the term health maintenance organization did not as yet have
any particular significance for tax purposes," respondent's failure "to include a term that has yet
to acquire its present definition and significance cannot be equated with bad faith."
We agree with both the Tax Court and the Court of Appeals that respondent acted in good faith.
In Civil Service Commission v. Maala,10 we described good faith as "that state of mind denoting
honesty of intention and freedom from knowledge of circumstances which ought to put the
holder upon inquiry; an honest intention to abstain from taking any unconscientious advantage
of another, even through technicalities of law, together with absence of all information, notice, or
benefit or belief of facts which render transaction unconscientious."
According to the Court of Appeals, respondent's failure to describe itself as a "health

maintenance organization," which is subject to VAT, is not tantamount to bad faith. We note that
the term "health maintenance organization" was first recorded in the Philippine statute books
only upon the passage of "The National Health Insurance Act of 1995" (Republic Act No. 7875).
Section 4 (o) (3) thereof defines a health maintenance organization as "an entity that provides,
offers, or arranges for coverage of designated health services needed by plan members for a
fixed prepaid premium." Under this law, a health maintenance organization is one of the classes
of a "health care provider."
It is thus apparent that when VAT Ruling No. 231-88 was issued in respondent's favor, the term
"health maintenance organization" was yet unknown or had no significance for taxation
purposes. Respondent, therefore, believed in good faith that it was VAT exempt for the taxable
years 1996 and 1997 on the basis of VAT Ruling No. 231-88.
In ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corp. v. Court of Tax Appeals,11 this Court held that under Section 246
of the 1997 Tax Code, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue is precluded from adopting
a position contrary to one previously taken where injustice would result to the
taxpayer. Hence, where an assessment for deficiency withholding income taxes was made,
three years after a new BIR Circular reversed a previous one upon which the taxpayer had relied
upon, such an assessment was prejudicial to the taxpayer. To rule otherwise, opined the Court,
would be contrary to the tenets of good faith, equity, and fair play.
This Court has consistently reaffirmed its ruling in ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corp. in the later cases
of Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Borroughs, Ltd.,12 Commissioner of Internal Revenue v.
Mega Gen. Mdsg. Corp.13 Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Telefunken Semiconductor
(Phils.) Inc.,14 and Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Court of Appeals.15 The rule is that the
BIR rulings have no retroactive effect where a grossly unfair deal would result to the prejudice of
the taxpayer, as in this case.
More recently, in Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Benguet Corporation,16 wherein the

taxpayer was entitled to tax refunds or credits based on the BIR's own issuances but later was
suddenly saddled with deficiency taxes due to its subsequent ruling changing the category of the
taxpayer's transactions for the purpose of paying its VAT, this Court ruled that applying such
ruling retroactively would be prejudicial to the taxpayer.
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition and AFFIRM the assailed Decision and Resolution of the

Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 76449. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Endnotes:
1
Rollo, pp. 36-43. Penned by Associate Justice Rosmari D. Carandang and concurred in by
Associate Justice Remedios Salazar-Fernando and Associate Justice Monina Arevalo-Zenarosa.
2
Id., pp. 86-99.
3
Id., pp. 46-57.
4
Id., p. 45.
5
Now Section 108 of the National Internal Revenue Code of 1997.
6
Now Section 109 (l) of the National Internal Revenue Code of 1997.
7
G.R. No. 153866, February 11, 2005, 451 SCRA 132.
8
G.R. No. 150154, August 9, 2005, 466 SCRA 211.
9
Far East Bank and Trust Co. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 129130, December 9, 2005, 477
SCRA 49, 52, citing Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Court of Appeals, 301 SCRA 152
(1999).
10
G.R. No. 165523, August 18, 2005, 467 SCRA 390.
11
G.R. No. 52306, October 12, 1981, 108 SCRA 142.
12
G.R. No. 66653, June 19, 1986, 142 SCRA 324.
13
G.R. No. 59315, September 30, 1988, 166 SCRA 166.
14
15
G.R. No. 117982, February 6, 1997, 267 SCRA 557.
16
G.R. NOS. 134587-88, July 8, 2005, 463 SCRA 28.
10. D.M. Consunji vs. CA, G.R. No. 137873, April 20, 2001
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. 137873. April 20, 2001.]
D.M. CONSUNJI, INC., Petitioner, v. COURT OF APPEALS and MARIA J.

JUEGO, Respondents.
DECISION
KAPUNAN, J.:
At around 1:30 p.m., November 2, 1990, Jose Juego, a construction worker of D.M. Consunji,
Inc., fell 14 floors from the Renaissance Tower, Pasig City to his death.cralaw : red
PO3 Rogelio Villanueva of the Eastern Police District investigated the tragedy and filed a report
dated November 25, 1990, stating that:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
. . . . [The] [v]ictim was rushed to [the] Rizal Medical Center in Pasig, Metro Manila where he
was pronounced dead on arrival (DOA) by the attending physician, Dr. Errol de Yzo[,] at around
2:15 p.m. of the same date.
Investigation disclosed that at the given time, date and place, while victim Jose A. Juego
together with Jessie Jaluag and Delso Destajo [were] performing their work as carpenter[s] at
the elevator core of the 14th floor of the Tower D, Renaissance Tower Building on board a
[p]latform made of channel beam (steel) measuring 4.8 meters by 2 meters wide with pinulid
plywood flooring and cable wires attached to its four corners and hooked at the 5 ton chain
block, when suddenly, the bolt or pin which was merely inserted to connect the chain block with
the [p]latform, got loose . . . causing the whole [p]latform assembly and the victim to fall down
to the basement of the elevator core, Tower D of the building under construction thereby
crushing the victim to death, save his two (2) companions who luckily jumped out for safety.
It is thus manifest that Jose A. Juego was crushed to death when the [p]latform he was then on
board and performing work, fell. And the falling of the [p]latform was due to the removal or
getting loose of the pin which was merely inserted to the connecting points of the chain block
and [p]latform but without a safety lock. 1
On May 9, 1991, Jose Juego’s widow, Maria, filed in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig a
complaint for damages against the deceased’s employer, D.M. Consunji, Inc. The employer
raised, among other defenses, the widow’s prior availment of the benefits from the State
Insurance Fund.
After trial, the RTC rendered a decision in favor of the widow Maria Juego. The dispositive portion
of the RTC decision reads:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered ordering defendant to pay plaintiff, as

follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
1. P50,000.00 for the death of Jose A. Juego.
2. P10,000.00 as actual and compensatory damages.
3. P464,000.00 for the loss of Jose A. Juego’s earning capacity.
4. P100,000.00 as moral damages.
5. P20,000.00 as attorney’s fees, plus the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED. 2
On appeal by D.M. Consunji, the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the decision of the RTC in toto.
D.M. Consunji now seeks the reversal of the CA decision on the following grounds:chanrob1es
virtual 1aw library
§ THE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE POLICE REPORT WAS ADMISSIBLE
EVIDENCE OF THE ALLEGED NEGLIGENCE OF PETITIONER.
§ THE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE DOCTRINE OF RES IPSA LOQUITOR
[sic] IS APPLICABLE TO PROVE NEGLIGENCE ON THE PART OF PETITIONER.
§ THE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT PETITIONER IS PRESUMED NEGLIGENT

UNDER ARTICLE 2180 OF THE CIVIL CODE, AND
§ THE APPELLATE COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT RESPONDENT IS NOT PRECLUDED FROM
RECOVERING DAMAGES UNDER THE CIVIL CODE. 3
Petitioner maintains that the police report reproduced above is hearsay and, therefore,
inadmissible. The CA ruled otherwise. It held that said report, being an entry in official records,
is an exception to the hearsay rule.
The Rules of Court provide that a witness can testify only to those facts which he knows of his
personal knowledge, that is, which are derived from his perception. 4 A witness, therefore, may
not testify as what he merely learned from others either because he was told or read or heard
the same. Such testimony is considered hearsay and may not be received as proof of the truth of
what he has learned. 5 This is known as the hearsay rule.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
Hearsay is not limited to oral testimony or statements; the general rule that excludes hearsay as
evidence applies to written, as well as oral statements. 6
The theory of the hearsay rule is that the many possible deficiencies, suppressions, sources of
error and untrustworthiness, which lie underneath the bare untested assertion of a witness, may
be best brought to light and exposed by the test of cross-examination. 7 The hearsay rule,
therefore, excludes evidence that cannot be tested by cross-examination. 8
The Rules of Court allow several exceptions to the rule, 9 among which are entries in official
records. Section 44, Rule 130 provides:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Entries in official records made in the performance of his duty made in the performance of his
duty by a public officer of the Philippines, or by a person in the performance of a duty specially
enjoined by law are prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated.
In Africa, Et. Al. v. Caltex (Phil.), Inc., Et Al., 10 this Court, citing the work of Chief Justice
Moran, enumerated the requisites for admissibility under the above rule:chanrob1es virtual 1aw
library
(a) that the entry was made by a public officer or by another person specially enjoined by law to
do so;
(b) that it was made by the public officer in the performance of his duties, or by such other
person in the performance of a duty specially enjoined by law; and
(c) that the public officer or other person had sufficient knowledge of the facts by him stated,
which must have been acquired by him personally or through official information.
The CA held that the police report meets all these requisites. Petitioner contends that the last
requisite is not present.
The Court notes that PO3 Villanueva, who signed the report in question, also testified before the
trial court. In Rodriguez v. Court of Appeals, 11 which involved a Fire Investigation Report, the
officer who signed the fire report also testified before the trial court. This Court held that the
report was inadmissible for the purpose of proving the truth of the statements contained in the
report but admissible insofar as it constitutes part of the testimony of the officer who executed
the report.
. . . . Since Major Enriquez himself took the witness stand and was available for cross-
examination, the portions of the report which were of his personal knowledge or which consisted
of his perception and conclusions were not hearsay. The rest of the report, such as the summary
of the statements of the parties based on their sworn statements (which were annexed to the
Report) as well as the latter, having been included in the first purpose of the offer [as part of the
testimony of Major Enriquez], may then be considered as independently relevant statements
which were gathered in the course of the investigation and may thus be admitted as such, but
not necessarily to prove the truth thereof. It has been said that:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Where regardless of the truth or falsity of a statement, the fact that it has been made is
relevant, the hearsay rule does not apply, but the statement may be shown. Evidence as to the
making of such statement is not secondary but primary, for the statement itself may constitute a
fact in issue, or be circumstantially relevant as to the existence of such a fact."cralaw virtua1aw
library
When Major Enriquez took the witness stand, testified for petitioners on his Report and made
himself available for cross-examination by the adverse party, the Report, insofar as it proved
that certain utterances were made (but not their truth), was effectively removed from the ambit
of the aforementioned Section 44 of Rule 130. Properly understood, this section does away with
the testimony in open court of the officer who made the official record, considers the matter as
an exception to the hearsay rule and makes the entries in said official record admissible in
evidence as prima facie evidence of the facts therein stated. The underlying reasons for this
exceptionary rule are necessity and trustworthiness, as explained in Antillon v. Barcelon.
The litigation is unlimited in which testimony by officials is daily needed; the occasions in which
the officials would be summoned from his ordinary duties to declare as a witness are
numberless. The public officers are few in whose daily work something is not done in which
testimony is not needed from official sources. Were there no exception for official statements,
hosts of officials would be found devoting the greater part of their time to attending as witnesses
in court or delivering deposition before an officer. The work of administration of government and
the interest of the public having business with officials would alike suffer in consequence. For
these reasons, and for many others, a certain verity is accorded such documents, which is not
extended to private documents. (3 Wigmore on Evidence, Sec. 1631).chanrob1es virtua1 1aw
1ibrary
The law reposes a particular confidence in public officers that it presumes they will discharge
their several trusts with accuracy and fidelity; and, therefore, whatever acts they do in discharge
of their duty may be given in evidence and shall be taken to be true under such a degree of
caution as to the nature and circumstances of each case may appear to require.
It would have been an entirely different matter if Major Enriquez was not presented to testify on
his report. In that case the applicability of Section 44 of Rule 143 would have been ripe for
determination, and this Court would have agreed with the Court of Appeals that said report was
inadmissible since the aforementioned third requisite was not satisfied. The statements given by
the sources of information of Major Enriquez failed to qualify as "official information," there being
no showing that, at the very least, they were under a duty to give the statements for record.
Similarly, the police report in this case is inadmissible for the purpose of proving the truth of the
statements contained therein but is admissible insofar as; it constitutes part of the testimony of
PO3 Villanueva.
In any case, the Court holds that portions of PO3 Villanueva’s testimony which were of his
personal knowledge suffice to prove that Jose Juego indeed died as a result of the elevator crash.
PO3 Villanueva had seen Juego’s remains at the morgue, 12 making the latter’s death beyond
dispute. PO3 Villanueva also conducted an ocular inspection of the premises of the building the
day after the incident 13 and saw the platform for himself. 14 He observed that the platform was
crushed 15 and that it was totally damaged. 16 PO3 Villanueva also required Garcia and Fabro to
bring the chain block to the police headquarters. Upon inspection, he noticed that the chain was
detached from the lifting machine, without any pin or bolt. 17
What petitioner takes particular exception to is PO3 Villanueva’s testimony that the cause of the
fall of the platform was the loosening of the bolt from the chain block. It is claimed that such
portion of the testimony is mere opinion. Subject to certain exceptions, 18 the opinion of a
witness is generally not admissible. 19
Petitioner’s contention, however, loses relevance in the face of the application of res ipsa loquitur
by the CA. The effect of the doctrine is to warrant a presumption or inference that the mere fall
of the elevator was a result of the person having charge of the instrumentality was negligent. As
a rule of evidence, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is peculiar to the law of negligence which
recognizes that prima facie negligence may be established without direct proof and furnishes a
substitute for specific proof of negligence. 20
The concept of res ipsa loquitur has been explained in this wise:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
While negligence is not ordinarily inferred or presumed, and while the mere happening of an
accident or injury will not generally give rise to an inference or presumption that it was due to
negligence on defendant’s part, under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, which means, literally,
the thing or transaction speaks for itself, or in one jurisdiction, that the thing or instrumentality
speaks for itself, the facts or circumstances accompanying an injury may be such as to raise a
presumption, or at least permit an inference of negligence on the part of the defendant, or some
other person who is charged with negligence.
. . . where it is shown that the thing or instrumentality which caused the injury complained of
was under the control or management of the defendant, and that the occurrence resulting in the
injury was such as in the ordinary course of things would not happen if those who had its control
or management used proper care, there is sufficient evidence, or, as sometimes stated,
reasonable evidence, in the absence of explanation by the defendant, that the injury arose from
or was caused by the defendant’s want of care. 21
One of the theoretical bases for the doctrine is its necessity, i.e., that necessary evidence is
absent or not available. 22
The res ipsa loquitur doctrine is based in part upon the theory that the defendant in charge of
the instrumentality which causes the injury either knows the cause of the accident or has the
best opportunity of ascertaining it and that the plaintiff has no such knowledge, and therefore is
compelled to allege negligence in general terms and to rely upon the proof of the happening of
the accident in order to establish negligence. The inference which the doctrine permits is
grounded upon the fact that the chief evidence of the true cause, whether culpable or innocent,
is practically accessible to the defendant but inaccessible to the injured person.
It has been said that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur furnishes a bridge by which a plaintiff,
without knowledge of the cause, reaches over to defendant who knows or should know the
cause, for any explanation of care exercised by the defendant in respect of the matter of which
the plaintiff complains. The res ipsa loquitur doctrine, another court has said, is a rule of
necessity, in that it proceeds on the theory that under the peculiar circumstances in which the
doctrine is applicable, it is within the power of the defendant to show that there was no
negligence on his part, and direct proof of defendant’s negligence is beyond plaintiff’s power.
Accordingly, some courts add to the three prerequisites for the application of the res ipsa
loquitur doctrine the further requirement that for the res ipsa loquitur doctrine to apply, it must
appear that the injured party had no knowledge or means of knowledge as to the cause of the
accident, or that the party to be charged with negligence has superior knowledge or opportunity
for explanation of the accident. 23
The CA held that all the requisites of res ipsa loquitur are present in the case at bar:chanrob1es
virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
There is no dispute that appellee’s husband fell down from the 14th floor of a building to the
basement while he was working with appellant’s construction project, resulting to his death. The
construction site is within the exclusive control and management of appellant. It has a safety
engineer, a project superintendent, a carpenter leadman and others who are in complete control
of the situation therein. The circumstances of any accident that would occur therein are
peculiarly within the knowledge of the appellant or its employees. On the other hand, the
appellee is not in a position to know what caused the accident. Res ipsa loquitur is a rule of
necessity and it applies where evidence is absent or not readily available, provided the following
requisites are present: (1) the accident was of a kind which does not ordinarily occur unless
someone is negligent; (2) the instrumentality or agency which caused the injury was under the
exclusive control of the person charged with negligence; and (3) the injury suffered must not
have been due to any voluntary action or contribution on the part of the person injured. . . . .
No worker is going to fall from the 14th floor of a building to the basement while performing
work in a construction site unless someone is negligent[;] thus, the first requisite for the
application of the rule of res ipsa loquitur is present. As explained earlier, the construction site
with all its paraphernalia and human resources that likely caused the injury is under the
exclusive control and management of appellant[;] thus[,] the second requisite is also present.
No contributory negligence was attributed to the appellee’s deceased husband[;] thus[,] the last
requisite is also present. All the requisites for the application of the rule of res ipsa loquitur are
present, thus a reasonable presumption or inference of appellant’s negligence arises. . . . 24
Petitioner does not dispute the existence of the requisites for the application of res ipsa loquitur,
but argues that the presumption or inference that it was negligent did not arise since it "proved
that it exercised due care to avoid the accident which befell respondent’s husband."cralaw
virtua1aw library
Petitioner apparently misapprehends the procedural effect of the doctrine. As stated earlier, the
defendant’s negligence is presumed or inferred 25 when the plaintiff establishes the requisites
for the application of res ipsa loquitur. Once the plaintiff makes out a prima facie case of all the
elements, the burden then shifts to defendant to explain. 26 The presumption or inference may
be rebutted or overcome by other evidence and, under appropriate circumstances a disputable
presumption, such as that of due care or innocence, may outweigh the inference. 27 It is not for
the defendant to explain or prove its defense to prevent the presumption or inference from
arising. Evidence by the defendant of say, due care, comes into play only after the circumstances
for the application of the doctrine has been established.
In any case, petitioner cites the sworn statement of its leadman Ferdinand Fabro executed
before the police investigator as evidence of its due care. According to Fabro’s sworn statement,
the company enacted rules and regulations for the safety and security of its workers. Moreover,
the leadman and the bodegero inspect the chain block before allowing its use.
It is ironic that petitioner relies on Fabro’s sworn statement as proof of its due care but, in
arguing that private respondent failed to prove negligence on the part of petitioner’s employees,
also assails the same statement for being hearsay.
Petitioner is correct. Fabro’s sworn statement is hearsay and inadmissible. Affidavits are
inadmissible as evidence under the hearsay rule, unless the affiant is placed on the witness stand
to testify thereon. 28 The inadmissibility of this sort of evidence is based not only on the lack of
opportunity on the part of the adverse party to cross-examine the affiant, but also on the
commonly known fact that, generally, an affidavit is not prepared by the affiant himself but by
another who uses his own language in writing the affiant’s statements which may either be
omitted or misunderstood by the one writing them. 29 Petitioner, therefore, cannot use said
statement as proof of its due care any more than private respondent can use it to prove the
cause of her husband’s death. Regrettably, petitioner does not cite any other evidence to rebut
the inference or presumption of negligence arising from the application of res ipsa loquitur, or to
establish any defense relating to the incident.
Next, petitioner argues that private respondent had previously availed of the death benefits
provided under the Labor Code and is, therefore, precluded from claiming from the deceased’s
employer damages under the Civil Code.
Article 173 of the Labor Code states:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
ARTICLE 173. Extent of liability. — Unless otherwise provided, the liability of the State Insurance
Fund under this Title shall be exclusive and in place of all other liabilities of the employer to the
employee, his dependents or anyone otherwise entitled to receive damages on behalf of the
employee or his dependents. The payment of compensation under this Title shall not bar the
recovery of benefits as provided for in Section 699 of the Revised Administrative Code, Republic
Act Numbered Eleven hundred sixty-one, as amended, Republic Act Numbered Six hundred ten,
as amended, Republic Act Numbered Forty-eight hundred sixty-four as amended, and other laws
whose benefits are administered by the System or by other agencies of the government.
The precursor of Article 173 of the Labor Code, Section 5 of the Workmen’s Compensation Act,
provided that:chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
SECTION 5. Exclusive right to compensation. — The rights -and remedies granted by this Act to
an employee by reason of a personal injury entitling him to compensation shall exclude all other
rights and remedies accruing to the employee, his personal representatives, dependents or
nearest of kin against the employer under the Civil Code and other laws because of said injury . .
..
Whether Section 5 of the Workmen’s Compensation Act allowed recovery under said Act as well
as under the Civil Code used to be the subject of conflicting decisions. The Court finally settled
the matter in Floresca v. Philex Mining Corporation, 30 which involved a cave-in resulting in the
death of the employees of the Philex Mining Corporation. Alleging that the mining corporation, in
violation of government rules and regulations, failed to take the required precautions for the
protection of the employees, the heirs of the deceased employees filed a complaint against
Philex Mining in the Court of First Instance (CFI). Upon motion of Philex Mining, the CFI
dismissed the complaint for lack of jurisdiction. The heirs sought relief from this Court.
Addressing the issue of whether the heirs had a choice of remedies, majority of the Court En
Banc, 31 following the rule in Pacaña v. Cebu Autobus Company, held in the affirmative.
WE now come to the query as to whether or not the injured employee or his heirs in case of
death have a right of selection or choice of action between availing themselves of the worker’s
right under the Workmen’s Compensation Act and suing in the regular courts under the Civil
Code for higher damages (actual, moral and exemplary) from the employers by virtue of the
negligence or fault of the employers or whether they may avail themselves cumulatively of both
actions, i.e., collect the limited compensation under the Workmen’s Compensation Act and sue in
addition for damages in the regular courts.
In disposing of a similar issue, this Court in Pacaña v. Cebu Autobus Company, 32 SCRA 442,
ruled that an injured worker has a choice of either to recover from the employer the fixed
amounts set by the Workmen’s Compensation Act or to prosecute an ordinary civil action against
the tort-feasor for higher damages but he cannot pursue both courses of action simultaneously.
[Emphasis supplied.]
Nevertheless, the Court allowed some of the petitioners in said case to proceed with their suit
under the Civil Code despite having availed of the benefits provided under the Workmen’s
Compensation Act. The Court reasoned:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
With regard to the other petitioners, it was alleged by Philex in its motion to dismiss dated May
14, 1968 before the court a quo, that the heirs of the deceased employees, namely Emerito
Obra, Larry Villar, Jr., Aurelio Lanuza, Lorenzo Isla and Saturnino submitted notices and claims
for compensation to the Regional Office No. 1 of the then Department of Labor and all of them
have been paid in full as of August 25, 1967, except Saturnino Martinez whose heirs decided that
they be paid in installments . . . . Such allegation was admitted by herein petitioners in their
opposition to the motion to dismiss dated May 27, 1968 . . . in the lower court, but they set up
the defense that the claims were filed under the Workmen’s Compensation Act before they
learned of the official report of the committee created to investigate the accident which
established the criminal negligence and violation of law by Philex, and which report was
forwarded by the Director of Mines to then Executive Secretary Rafael Salas in a letter dated
October 19, 1967 only . . . .
WE hold that although the other petitioners had received the benefits under the Workmen’s
Compensation Act, such may not preclude them from bringing an action before the regular court
because they became cognizant of the fact that Philex has been remiss in its contractual
obligations with the deceased miners only after receiving compensation under the Act. Had
petitioners been aware of said violation of government rules and regulations by Philex, and of its
negligence, they would not have sought redress under the Workmen’s Compensation
Commission which awarded a lesser amount for compensation. The choice of the first remedy
was based on ignorance or a mistake of fact, which nullifies the choice as it was not an intelligent
choice. The case should therefore be remanded to the lower court for further proceedings.
However, should the petitioners be successful in their bid before the lower court, the payments
made under the Workmen’s Compensation Act should be deducted from the damages that may
be decreed in their favor. [Emphasis supplied.]
The ruling in Floresca providing the claimant a choice of remedies was reiterated in Ysmael
Maritime Corporation v. Avelino, 32 Vda. de Severo v. Feliciano-Go, 33 and Marcopper Mining
Corp. v. Abeleda. 34 In the last case, the Court again recognized that a claimant who had been
paid under the Act could still sue under the Civil Code. The Court said:chanrob1es virtua1 1aw
1ibrary
In the Robles case, it was held that claims for damages sustained by workers in the course of
their employment could be filed only under the Workmen’s Compensation Law, to the exclusion
of all further claims under other laws. In Floresca, this doctrine was abrogated in favor of the
new rule that the claimants may invoke either the Workmen’s Compensation Act or the
provisions of the Civil Code, subject to the consequence that the choice of one remedy will
exclude the other and that the acceptance of compensation under the remedy chosen will
preclude a claim for additional benefits under the other remedy. The exception is where a
claimant who has already been paid under the Workmen’s Compensation Act may still sue for
damages under the Civil Code on the basis of supervening facts or developments occurring after
he opted for the first remedy. (Emphasis supplied.)
Here, the CA held that private respondent’s case came under the exception because private
respondent was unaware of petitioner’s negligence when she filed her claim for death benefits
from the State Insurance Fund. Private respondent filed the civil complaint for damages after she
received a copy of the police investigation report and the Prosecutor’s Memorandum dismissing
the criminal complaint against petitioner’s personnel. While stating that there was no negligence
attributable to the respondents in the complaint, the prosecutor nevertheless noted in the
Memorandum that, "if at all," the "case is civil in nature." The CA thus applied the exception in
Floresca:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
. . . We do not agree that appellee has knowledge of the alleged negligence of appellant as early
as November 25, 1990, the date of the police investigator’s report. The appellee merely executed
her sworn statement before the police investigator concerning her personal circumstances, her
relation to the victim, and her knowledge of the accident. She did not file the complaint for
"Simple Negligence Resulting to Homicide" against appellant’s employees. It was the investigator
who recommended the filing of said case and his supervisor referred the same to the
prosecutor’s office. This. is a standard operating procedure for police investigators which
appellee may not have even known. This may explain why no complainant is mentioned in the
preliminary statement of the public prosecutor in her memorandum dated February 6, 1991, to
wit: "Respondent Ferdinand Fabro . . . are being charged by complaint of "Simple Negligence
Resulting to Homicide." It is also possible that the appellee did not have a chance to appear
before the public prosecutor as can be inferred from the following statement in said
memorandum: "Respondents who were notified pursuant to Law waived their rights to present
controverting evidence," thus there was no reason for the public prosecutor to summon the
appellee. Hence, notice of appellant’s negligence cannot be imputed on appellee before she
applied for death benefits under ECC or before she received the first payment therefrom. Her
using the police investigation report to support her complaint filed on May 9, 1991 may just be
an afterthought after receiving a copy of the February 6, 1991 Memorandum of the Prosecutor’s
Office dismissing the criminal complaint for insufficiency of evidence, stating therein that: "The
death of the victim is not attributable to any negligence on the part of the respondents. If at all
and as shown by the records this case is civil in nature." (Emphasis supplied.) Considering the
foregoing, We are more inclined to believe appellee’s allegation that she learned about
appellant’s negligence only after she applied for and received the benefits under ECC. This is a
mistake of fact that will make this case fall under the exception held in the Floresca ruling. 35
The CA further held that not only was private respondent ignorant of the facts, but of her rights
as well:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
. . . . Appellee [Maria Juego] testified that she has reached only elementary school for her
educational attainment; that she did not know what damages could be recovered from the death
of her husband; and that she did not know that she may also recover more from the Civil Code
than from the ECC. . . . . 36
Petitioner impugns the foregoing rulings. It contends that private respondent "failed to allege in
her complaint that her application and receipt of benefits from the ECC were attended by
ignorance or mistake of fact. Not being an issue submitted during the trial, the trial court had no
authority to hear or adjudicate that issue."cralaw virtua1aw library
Petitioner also claims that private respondent could not have been ignorant of the facts because
as early as November 28, 1990, private respondent was the complainant in a criminal complaint
for "Simple Negligence Resulting to Homicide" against petitioner’s employees. On February 6,
1991, two months before the filing of the action in the lower court, Prosecutor Lorna Lee issued a
resolution finding that, although there was insufficient evidence against petitioner’s employees,
the case was "civil in nature." These purportedly show that prior to her receipt of death benefits
from the ECC on January 2, 1991 and every month thereafter, private respondent also knew of
the two choices of remedies available to her and yet she chose to claim and receive the benefits
from the ECC.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
When a party having knowledge of the facts makes an election between inconsistent remedies,
the election is final and bars any action, suit, or proceeding inconsistent with the elected remedy,
in the absence of fraud by the other party. The first act of election acts as a bar. 37 Equitable in
nature, the doctrine of election of remedies is designed to mitigate possible unfairness to both
parties. It rests on the moral premise that it is fair to hold people responsible for their choices.
The purpose of the doctrine is not to prevent any recourse to any remedy, but to prevent a
double redress for a single wrong. 38
The choice of a party between inconsistent remedies results in a waiver by election. Hence, the
rule in Floresca that a claimant cannot simultaneously pursue recovery under the Labor Code and
prosecute an ordinary course of action under the Civil Code. The claimant, by his choice of one
remedy, is deemed to have waived the other.
Waiver is the intentional relinquishment of a known right. 39
[It] is an act of understanding that presupposes that a party has knowledge of its rights, but
chooses not to assert them. It must be generally shown by the party claiming a waiver that the
person against whom the waiver is asserted had at the time knowledge, actual or constructive,
of the existence of the party’s rights or of all material facts upon which they depended. Where
one lacks knowledge of a right, there is no basis upon which waiver of it can rest. Ignorance of a
material fact negates waiver, and waiver cannot be established by a consent given under a
mistake or misapprehension of fact.
A person makes a knowing and intelligent waiver when that person knows that a right exists and
has adequate knowledge upon which to make an intelligent decision. Waiver requires a
knowledge of the facts basic to the exercise of the right waived, with an awareness of its
consequences. That a waiver is made knowingly and intelligently must be illustrated on the
record or by the evidence. 40
That lack of knowledge of a fact that nullifies the election of a remedy is the basis for the
exception in Floresca.
It is in light of the foregoing principles that we address petitioner’s contentions.
Waiver is a defense, and it was not incumbent upon private respondent, as plaintiff, to allege in
her complaint that she had availed of benefits from the ECC. It is, thus, erroneous for petitioner
to burden private respondent with raising waiver as an issue. On the contrary, it is the defendant
who ought to plead waiver, as petitioner did in pages 2-3 of its Answer; 41 otherwise, the
defense is waived. It is, therefore, perplexing for petitioner to now contend that the trial court
had no jurisdiction over the issue when petitioner itself pleaded waiver in the proceedings before
the trial court.
Does the evidence show that private respondent knew of the facts that led to her husband’s
death and the rights pertaining to a choice of remedies?
It bears stressing that what negates waiver is lack of knowledge or a mistake of fact. In this
case, the "fact" that served as a basis for nullifying the waiver is the negligence of petitioner’s
employees, of which private respondent purportedly learned only after the prosecutor issued a
resolution stating that there may be civil liability. In Floresca, it was the negligence of the mining
corporation and its violation of government rules and regulations. Negligence, or violation of
government rules and regulations, for that matter, however, is not a fact, but a conclusion of
law, over which only the courts have the final say. Such a conclusion binds no one until the
courts have decreed so. It appears, therefore, that the principle that ignorance or mistake of fact
nullifies a waiver has been misapplied in Floresca and in the case at bar.
In any event, there is no proof that private respondent knew that her husband died in the
elevator crash when on November 15, 1990 she accomplished her application for benefits from
the ECC. The police investigation report is dated November 25, 1990, 10 days after the
accomplishment of the form. Petitioner filed the application in her behalf on November 27, 1990.
There is also no showing that private respondent knew of the remedies available to her when the
claim before the ECC was filed. On the contrary, private respondent testified that she was not
aware of her rights.
Petitioner, though, argues that under Article 3 of the Civil Code, ignorance of the law excuses no
one from compliance therewith. As judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the
Constitution form part of the Philippine legal system (Article 8, Civil Code), private respondent
cannot claim ignorance of this Court’s ruling in Floresca allowing a choice of
remedies.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
The argument has no merit. The application of Article 3 is limited to mandatory and prohibitory
laws. 42 This may be deduced from the language of the provision, which, notwithstanding a
person’s ignorance, does not excuse his or her compliance with the laws. The rule in Floresca
allowing private respondent a choice of remedies is neither mandatory nor prohibitory.
Accordingly, her ignorance thereof cannot be held against her.
Finally, the Court modifies the affirmance of the award of damages. The records do not indicate
the total amount private respondent ought to receive from the ECC, although it appears from
Exhibit "K" 43 that she received P3,581.85 as initial payment representing the accrued pension
from November 1990 to March 1991. Her initial monthly pension, according to the same Exhibit
"K," was P596.97 and present total monthly pension was P716.40. Whether the total amount she
will eventually receive from the ECC is less than the sum of P644,000.00 in total damages
awarded by the trial court is subject to speculation, and the case is remanded to the trial court
for such determination. Should the trial court find that its award is greater than that of the ECC,
payments already received by private respondent under the Labor Code shall be deducted from
the trial court’s award of damages. Consistent with our ruling in Floresca, this adjudication aims
to prevent double compensation.
WHEREFORE, the case is REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City to determine
whether the award decreed in its decision is more than that of the ECC. Should the award
decreed by the trial court be greater than that awarded by the ECC, payments already made to
private respondent pursuant to the Labor Code shall be deducted therefrom. In all other
respects, the Decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno, Pardo and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.
Endnotes:
1. Exhibit "A," Records, pp. 60-61.
2. Rollo, pp. 79-80.
3. Id., at 19.
4. Sec. 36, Rule 130.
5. People v. Ramos, 122 SCRA 312 (1983).
6. 31A C.J.S. Evidence §194. See also Philippine Home Assurance Corp. v. Court of Appeals, 257
SCRA 479 (1996).
7. 5 J. H. WIGMORE, A TREATISE ON THE ANGLO-AMERICAN SYSTEM OF EVIDENCE IN TRIALS

AT COMMON LAW 3 (3RD ED.).
8. San Sebastian College v. Court of Appeals, 197 SCRA 138 (1991).
9. See RULES OF COURT, RULE 130, SECTIONS 37-47.
10. 16 SCRA 448 (1966). See also People v. San Gabriel, 253 SCRA 84(1996).
11. 273 SCRA 607(1997).
12. TSN, December 20, 1991, p. 9.
13. Id., at 28; TSN, January 6, 1992, p. 29.
14. Id., at 29; Ibid.
15. Id., at 33.
16. Id., at 34.
17. Id., at 24 and 28.
18. RULES OF COURT, RULE 130, SECTIONS 49-50.
19. Id., Sec. 48.
20. Layugan v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 167 SCRA 363 (1988). See also Batiquin v. Court
of Appeals, 258 SCRA 334 (1996); Radio Communications of the Philippines, Inc. v. Court of
Appeals, 143 SCRA 657 (1986).
21. 57B Am Jur 2d, Negligence §1819.

22. Id., at 1824.
23. Id., at 1914.
24. Rollo, pp. 87-88.
25. Whether the doctrine raises a presumption or merely an inference is subject to debate. See
57B Am Jur 2d, Negligence §§ 1925-1928.
26. Id., at 1920.
27. Id., at 1947.
28. People v. Milleza, 127 SCRA 349 (1984); People v. Quidato, 297 SCRA 1 (1998).
29. People v. Ramos, supra.
30. 136 SCRA 141(1985).
31. Justices Aquino, Melencio-Herrera, and Gutierrez dissented.
32. 151 SCRA 333 (1987).
33. 157 SCRA 446 (1988).
34. 164 SCRA 317 (1988).
35. Rollo, pp. 90-91. Emphasis by the Court of Appeals.
36. Id., at 90. Emphasis by the Court of Appeals.
37. Id., at § 5.
38. Id., at § 2.
39. Castro v. Del Rosario, Et Al., 19 SCRA 196 (1967).
40. 28 Am Jur 2d, Estoppel and Waiver §202.
41. Records, pp. 17-18.
42. I TOLENTINO, A.M. COMMENTARIES AND JURISPRUDENCE ON THE CIVIL CODE OF THE
PHILIPPINES 19 (1995).
43. Records, p. 100.

11. Cui vs. Arellano University 2 SCRA 205
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-15127 May 30, 1961
EMETERIO CUI, Plaintiff-Appellant, vs. ARELLANO UNIVERSITY, Defendant-Appellee.
G.A.S. Sipin, Jr., for plaintiff-appellant.

E. Voltaire Garcia for defendant-appellee.
CONCEPCION, J.:chanrobles virtual law library
Appeal by plaintiff Emeterio Cui from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila, absolving
defendant Arellano University from plaintiff's complaint, with costs against the plaintiff, and
dismissing defendant's counter claim, for insufficiency of proof
thereon.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
In the language of the decision appealed from:
The essential facts of this case are short and undisputed. As established by the agreement of
facts Exhibits X and by the respective oral and documentary evidence introduced by the parties,
it appears conclusive that plaintiff, before the school year 1948-1949 took up preparatory law
course in the defendant University. After finishing his preparatory law course plaintiff enrolled in
the College of Law of the defendant from the school year 1948-1949. Plaintiff finished his law
studies in the defendant university up to and including the first semester of the fourth year.
During all the school years in which plaintiff was studying law in defendant law college, Francisco
R. Capistrano, brother of the mother of plaintiff, was the dean of the College of Law and legal
counsel of the defendant university. Plaintiff enrolled for the last semester of his law studies in
the defendant university but failed to pay his tuition fees because his uncle Dean Francisco R.
Capistrano having severed his connection with defendant and having accepted the deanship and
chancellorship of the College of Law of Abad Santos University, plaintiff left the defendant's law
college and enrolled for the last semester of his fourth year law in the college of law of the Abad
Santos University graduating from the college of law of the latter university. Plaintiff, during all
the time he was studying law in defendant university was awarded scholarship grants, for
scholastic merit, so that his semestral tuition fees were returned to him after the ends of
semester and when his scholarship grants were awarded to him. The whole amount of tuition
fees paid by plaintiff to defendant and refunded to him by the latter from the first semester up to
and including the first semester of his last year in the college of law or the fourth year, is in total
P1,033.87. After graduating in law from Abad Santos University he applied to take the bar
examination. To secure permission to take the bar he needed the transcripts of his records in
defendant Arellano University. Plaintiff petitioned the latter to issue to him the needed
transcripts. The defendant refused until after he had paid back the P1,033 87 which defendant
refunded to him as above stated. As he could not take the bar examination without those
transcripts, plaintiff paid to defendant the said sum under protest. This is the sum which plaintiff
seeks to recover from defendant in this case.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law
library
Before defendant awarded to plaintiff the scholarship grants as above stated, he was made to
sign the following contract covenant and agreement:chanr
"In consideration of the scholarship granted to me by the University, I hereby waive my right to
transfer to another school without having refunded to the University (defendant) the equivalent
of my scholarship cash.
(Sgd.) Emeterio Cui".
It is admitted that, on August 16, 1949, the Director of Private Schools issued Memorandum No.
38, series of 1949, on the subject of "Scholarship," addressed to "All heads of private schools,
colleges and universities," reading:
1. School catalogs and prospectuses submitted to this, Bureau show that some schools offer full
or partial scholarships to deserving students - for excellence in scholarship or for leadership in
extra-curricular activities. Such inducements to poor but gifted students should be encouraged.
But to stipulate the condition that such scholarships are good only if the students concerned
continue in the same school nullifies the principle of merit in the award of these
scholarships.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
2. When students are given full or partial scholarships, it is understood that such scholarships
are merited and earned. The amount in tuition and other fees corresponding to these
scholarships should not be subsequently charged to the recipient students when they decide to
quit school or to transfer to another institution. Scholarships should not be offered merely to
attract and keep students in a school.chanrobles
3. Several complaints have actually been received from students who have enjoyed scholarships,
full or partial, to the effect that they could not transfer to other schools since their credentials
would not be released unless they would pay the fees corresponding to the period of the
scholarships. Where the Bureau believes that the right of the student to transfer is being denied
on this ground, it reserves the right to authorize such transfer.
that defendant herein received a copy of this memorandum; that plaintiff asked the Bureau of
Private Schools to pass upon the issue on his right to secure the transcript of his record in
defendant University, without being required to refund the sum of P1,033.87; that the Bureau of
Private Schools upheld the position taken by the plaintiff and so advised the defendant; and that,
this notwithstanding, the latter refused to issue said transcript of records, unless said refund
were made, and even recommended to said Bureau that it issue a written order directing the
defendant to release said transcript of record, "so that the case may be presented to the court
for judicial action." As above stated, plaintiff was, accordingly, constrained to pay, and did pay
under protest, said sum of P1,033.87, in order that he could take the bar examination in 1953.
Subsequently, he brought this action for the recovery of said amount, aside from P2,000 as
moral damages, P500 as exemplary damages, P2,000 as attorney's fees, and P500 as expenses
of litigation.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
In its answer, defendant reiterated the stand it took, vis-a-vis the Bureau of Private Schools,
namely, that the provisions of its contract with plaintiff are valid and binding and that the
memorandum above-referred to is null and void. It, likewise, set up a counterclaim for
P10,000.00 as damages, and P3,000 as attorney's fees.chanro
The issue in this case is whether the above quoted provision of the contract between plaintiff and
the defendant, whereby the former waived his right to transfer to another school without
refunding to the latter the equivalent of his scholarships in cash, is valid or not. The lower court
resolved this question in the affirmative, upon the ground that the aforementioned memorandum
of the Director of Private Schools is not a law; that the provisions thereof are advisory, not
mandatory in nature; and that, although the contractual provision "may be unethical, yet it was
more unethical for plaintiff to quit studying with the defendant without good reasons and simply
because he wanted to follow the example of his uncle." Moreover, defendant maintains in its
brief that the aforementioned memorandum of the Director of Private Schools is null and void
because said officer had no authority to issue it, and because it had been neither approved by
the corresponding department head nor published in the official
gazette.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
We do not deem it necessary or advisable to consider as the lower court did, the question
whether plaintiff had sufficient reasons or not to transfer from defendant University to the Abad
Santos University. The nature of the issue before us, and its far reaching effects, transcend
personal equations and demand a determination of the case from a high impersonal plane.
Neither do we deem it essential to pass upon the validity of said Memorandum No. 38, for,
regardless of the same, we are of the opinion that the stipulation in question is contrary to public
policy and, hence, null and void. The aforesaid memorandum merely incorporates a sound
principle of public policy. As the Director of Private Schools correctly pointed, out in his letter,
Exhibit B, to the defendant,
There is one more point that merits refutation and that is whether or not the contract entered
into between Cui and Arellano University on September 10, 1951 was void as against public
policy. In the case of Zeigel vs. Illinois Trust and Savings Bank, 245 Ill. 180, 19 Ann. Case 127,
the court said: 'In determining a public policy of the state, courts are limited to a consideration
of the Constitution, the judicial decisions, the statutes, and the practice of government officers.'
It might take more than a government bureau or office to lay down or establish a public policy,
as alleged in your communication, but courts consider the practices of government officials as
one of the four factors in determining a public policy of the state. It has been consistently held in
America that under the principles relating to the doctrine of public policy, as applied to the law of
contracts, courts of justice will not recognize or uphold a transaction which its object, operation,
or tendency is calculated to be prejudicial to the public welfare, to sound morality or to civic
honesty (Ritter vs. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 169 U.S. 139; Heding vs. Gallaghere 64 L.R.A. 811;
Veazy vs. Allen, 173 N.Y. 359). If Arellano University understood clearly the real essence of
scholarships and the motives which prompted this office to issue Memorandum No. 38, s. 1949,
it should have not entered into a contract of waiver with Cui on September 10, 1951, which is a
direct violation of our Memorandum and an open challenge to the authority of the Director of
Private Schools because the contract was repugnant to sound morality and civic honesty. And
finally, in Gabriel vs. Monte de Piedad, Off. Gazette Supp. Dec. 6, 1941, p. 67 we read: 'In order
to declare a contract void as against public policy, a court must find that the contract as to
consideration or the thing to be done, contravenes some established interest of society, or
is inconsistent with sound policy and good morals or tends clearly to undermine the security of
individual rights. The policy enunciated in Memorandum No. 38, s. 1949 is sound
policy. Scholarship are awarded in recognition of merit not to keep outstanding students in
school to bolster its prestige. In the understanding of that university scholarships award is a
business scheme designed to increase the business potential of an education institution. Thus
conceived it is not only inconsistent with sound policy but also good morals. But what is morals?
Manresa has this definition. It is good customs; those generally accepted principles of morality
which have received some kind of social and practical confirmation. The practice of awarding
scholarships to attract students and keep them in school is not good customs nor has it received
some kind of social and practical confirmation except in some private institutions as in Arellano
University. The University of the Philippines which implements Section 5 of Article XIV of the
Constitution with reference to the giving of free scholarships to gifted children, does not require
scholars to reimburse the corresponding value of the scholarships if they transfer to other
schools. So also with the leading colleges and universities of the United States after which our
educational practices or policies are patterned. In these institutions scholarships are granted not
to attract and to keep brilliant students in school for their propaganda mine but to reward merit
or help gifted students in whom society has an established interest or a first lien. (Emphasis
supplied.)
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby reversed and another one shall be entered
sentencing the defendant to pay to the plaintiff the sum of P1,033.87, with interest thereon at
the legal rate from September 1, 1954, date of the institution of this case, as well as the costs,
and dismissing defendant's counterclaim. It is so ordered.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles
virtual law library
Bengzon, C.J., Padilla, Labrador, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Parades, Dizon, De Leon and Natividad,
JJ., concur.
Bautista Angelo, J., reserves his vote.
12. Mecano v. COA, G.R. No. 103982, 11 December 1992
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 103982. December 11, 1992.]
ANTONIO A. MECANO, Petitioner, v. COMMISSION ON AUDIT, Respondent.
SYLLABUS
1. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION; STATUTES; KINDS OF REPEALS. — The question of whether a

particular law has been repealed or not by a subsequent law is a matter of legislative intent. The
lawmakers may expressly repeal a law by incorporating therein a repealing provision which
expressly and specifically cites the particular law or laws, and portions thereof, that are intended
to be repealed. A declaration in a statute, usually in its repealing clause, that a particular and
specific law, identified by its number or title, is repealed is an express repeal; all others are
implied repeals.
2. ID.; ID.; REPEALS BY IMPLICATION; NECESSITY OF A CLEAR INDICATION OF LEGISLATIVE

PURPOSE TO REPEAL. — The fact that a later enactment may relate to the same subject matter
as that of an earlier statute is not of itself sufficient to cause an implied repeal of the prior act,
since the new statute may merely be cumulative or a continuation of the old one. What is
necessary is a manifest indication of legislative purpose to repeal. Repeal by implication proceeds
on the premise that where a statute of later date clearly reveals an intention on the part of the
legislature to abrogate a prior act on the subject, that intention must be given effect. Hence,
before there can be a repeal, there must be a clear showing on the part of the lawmaker that the
intent in enacting the new law was to abrogate the old one. The intention to repeal must be clear
and manifest; otherwise, at least, as a general rule, the later act is to be construed as a
continuation of, and not a substitute for, the first act and will continue so far as the two acts are
the same from the time of the first enactment.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; CATEGORIES THEREOF. — There are two categories of repeal by implication.
The first is where provisions in the two acts on the same subject matter are in an irreconcilable
conflict, The later act to the extent of the conflict constitutes an implied repeal of the earlier one.
The second is if the later act covers the whole subject of the earlier one and is clearly intended
as a substitute, it will operate to repeal the earlier law. Implied repeal by irreconcilable
inconsistency takes place when the two statutes cover the same subject matter; they are so
clearly inconsistent and incompatible with each other that they cannot be reconciled or
harmonized; and both cannot be given effect, that is, that one law cannot he enforced without
nullifying the other. The second category of repeal — the enactment of a statute revising or
codifying the former laws on the whole subject matter. This is only possible if this revised statute
or code was intended to cover the whole subject to be a complete and perfect system in itself. It
is the rule that a subsequent statute is deemed to repeal a prior law if the former revises the
whole subject matter of the former statute. When both intent and scope clearly evince the idea
of a repeal, then all parts and provisions of the prior act that are omitted from the revised act
are deemed repealed. Furthermore, before there can be an implied repeal under this category, it
must be the clear intent of the legislature that the later act be the substitute to the prior act.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; NOT IMPLIED REPEAL OF SECTION 699 OF THE REVISED ADMINISTRATIVE
CODE BY ADMINISTRATIVE CODE OF 1987; CASE AT BAR. — Comparing the two Codes, it is
apparent that the new Code does not cover nor attempt to cover the entire subject matter of the
old Code. There are several matters treated in the old Code which are not found in the new
Code, such as the provisions on notaries public, the leave law, the public bonding law, military
reservations, claims for sickness benefits under Section 699, and still others. Moreover, the COA
failed to demonstrate that the provisions of the two Codes on the matter of the subject claim are
in an irreconcilable conflict. In fact, there can be no such conflict because the provision on
sickness benefits of the nature being claimed by petitioner has not been restated in the
Administrative Code of 1987.
5. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW; ADMINISTRATIVE CONSTRUCTION AND INTERPRETATION OF LAWS;

WEIGHT OF OPINIONS OF THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE ON STATUTES IN PARI MATERIAL; CASE
AT BAR. — According to Opinion No. 73, S. 1991 of the Secretary of Justice, what appears clear
is the intent to cover only those aspects of government that pertain to administration,
organization and procedure, understandably because of the many changes that transpired in the
government structure since the enactment of the RAC decades of years ago. The COA challenges
the weight that this opinion carries in the determination of this controversy inasmuch as the
body which had been entrusted with the implementation of this particular provision has already
rendered its decision. The COA relied on the rule in administrative law enunciated in the case of
Sison v. Pangramuyen that in the absence of palpable error or grave abuse of discretion, the
Court would be loathe to substitute its own judgment for that of the administrative agency
entrusted with the enforcement and implementation of the law. This will not hold water. This
principle is subject to limitations. Administrative decisions may be reviewed by the courts upon a
showing that the decision is vitiated by fraud, imposition or mistake. It has been held that
Opinions of the Secretary and Undersecretary of Justice are material in the construction of
statutes in pari materia.
6. STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION; REPEALS BY IMPLICATION NOT FAVORED. — Lastly, it is a well-

settled rule of statutory construction that repeals of statutes by implication are not favored. The
presumption is against inconsistency and repugnancy for the legislature is presumed to know the
existing laws on the subject and not to have enacted inconsistent or conflicting statutes. This
Court, in a case, explains the principle in detail as follows: "Repeals by implication are not
favored, and will not be decreed unless it is manifest that the legislature so intended. As laws are
presumed to be passed with deliberation with full knowledge of all existing ones on the subject,
it is but reasonable to conclude that in passing a statute it was not intended to interfere with or
abrogate any former law relating to some matter, unless the repugnancy between the two is not
only irreconcilable, but also clear and convincing, and flowing necessarily from the language
used, unless the later act fully embraces the subject matter of the earlier, or unless the reason
for the earlier act is beyond peradventure renewed. Hence, every effort must be used to make all
acts stand and if, by any reasonable construction, they can be reconciled, the later act will not
operate as a repeal of the earlier."cralaw virtua1aw library
7. LABOR CODE; ARTICLE 173 THEREOF; EMPLOYEES COMPENSATION; PAYMENT OF

COMPENSATION THEREUNDER NOT A BAR TO RECOVERY OF BENEFITS UNDER SEC. 699 OF THE
REVISED ADMINISTRATIVE CODE. — Regarding respondent’s contention that recovery under this
subject section shall bar the recovery of benefits under the Employees’ Compensation Program,
the same cannot be upheld. The second sentence of Article 173, Chapter II, Title II (dealing on
Employees’ Compensation and State Insurance Fund), Book IV of the Labor Code, as amended
by P.D. 1921, expressly provides that "the payment of compensation under this Title shall not
bar the recovery of benefits as provided for in Section 669 of the Revised Administrative Code . .
. whose benefits are administered by the system (meaning SSS or GSIS) or by other agencies of
the government."
DECISION
CAMPOS, JR., J.:
Antonio A. Mecano, through a petition for certiorari, seeks to nullify the decision of the
Commission on Audit (COA, for brevity) embodied in its 7th Indorsement, dated January 16,
1992, denying his claim for reimbursement under Section 699 of the Revised Administrative
Code (RAC), as amended, in the total amount of P40,831.00.
Petitioner is a Director II of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI). He was hospitalized for
cholecystitis from March 26, 1990 to April 7, 1990, on account of which he incurred medical and
hospitalization expenses, the total amount of which he is claiming from the COA.
On May 11, 1990, in a memorandum to the NBI Director, Alfredo S. Lim (Director Lim, for
brevity), he requested reimbursement for his expenses on the ground that he is entitled to the
benefits under Section 699 1 of the RAC, the pertinent provisions of which
read:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"SECTION 699. Allowances in case of injury, death, or sickness incurred in performance of duty.
— When a person in the service of the national government or in the service of the government
of a province, city, municipality or municipal district is so injured in the performance of duty as
thereby to receive some actual physical hurt or wound, the proper Head of Department may
direct that absence during any period of disability thereby occasioned shall be on full pay, though
not more than six months, and in such case he may in his discretion also authorize the payment
of the medical attendance, necessary transportation, subsistence and hospital fees of the injured
person. Absence in the case contemplated shall be charged first against vacation leave, if any
there be.
x x x
"In case of sickness caused by or connected directly with the performance of some act in the line
of duty, the Department head may in his discretion authorize the payment of the necessary
hospital fees." chanrobles virtualawlibrary chanrobles.com:chanrobles.com.ph
Director Lim then forwarded petitioner’s claim, in a 1st Indorsement dated June 22, 1990, to the
Secretary of Justice, along with the comment, bearing the same date, of Gerarda Galang, Chief,
LED of the NBI, "recommending favorable action thereof." Finding petitioner’s illness to be
service -connected, the Committee on Physical Examination of the Department of Justice
favorably recommended the payment of petitioner’s claim.
However, then Undersecretary of Justice Silvestre H. Bello III, in a 4th Indorsement dated
November 21, 1990, returned petitioner’s claim to Director Lim, having considered the
statements of the Chairman of the COA in its 5th Indorsement dated 19 September 1990, to the
effect that the RAC being relied upon was repealed by the Administrative Code of 1987.
Petitioner then re-submitted his claim to Director Lim, with a copy of Opinion No. 73, S. 1991 2
dated April 26, 1991 of then Secretary of Justice Franklin M. Drilon (Secretary Drilon, for brevity)
stating that "the issuance of the Administrative Code did not operate to repeal or abrogate in its
entirety the Revised Administrative Code, including the particular Section 699 of the
latter."cralaw virtua1aw library
On May 10, 1991, Director Lim, under a 5th Indorsement transmitted anew Mecano’s claim to
then Undersecretary Bello for favorable consideration. Under a 6th Indorsement, dated July 2,
1991, Secretary Drilon forwarded petitioner’s claim to the COA Chairman, recommending
payment of the same. COA Chairman Eufemio C. Domingo, in his 7th Indorsement of January
16, 1992, however denied petitioner’s claim on the ground that Section 699 of the RAC has been
repealed by the Administrative Code of 1987, solely for the reason that the same section was not
restated nor re-enacted in the Administrative Code of 1987. He commented, however, that the
claim may be filed with the Employees’ Compensation Commission, considering that the illness of
Director Mecano occurred after the effectivity of the Administrative Code of 1987.
Eventually, petitioner’s claim was returned by Undersecretary of Justice Eduardo Montenegro to

Director Lim under a 9th Indorsement dated February 7, 1992, with the advice that petitioner
"elevate the matter to the Supreme Court if he so desires."cralaw virtua1aw library
On the sole issue of whether or not the Administrative Code of 1987 repealed or abrogated
Section 699 of the RAC, this petition was brought for the consideration of this Court.chanrobles
virtual lawlibrary
Petitioner anchors his claim on Section 699 of the RAC, as amended, and on the aforementioned
Opinion No. 73, S. 1991 of Secretary Drilon. He further maintains that in the event that a claim
is filed with the Employees’ Compensation Commission, as suggested by respondent, he would
still not be barred from filing a claim under the subject section. Thus, the resolution of whether
or not there was a repeal of the Revised Administrative Code of 1917 would decide the fate of
petitioner’s claim for reimbursement.
The COA, on the other hand, strongly maintains that the enactment of the Administrative Code
of 1987 (Exec. Order No. 292) operated to revoke or supplant in its entirety the Revised
Administrative Code of 1917. The COA claims that from the "whereas" clauses of the new
Administrative Code, it can be gleaned that it was the intent of the legislature to repeal the old
Code. Moreover, the COA questions the applicability of the aforesaid opinion of the Secretary of
Justice in deciding the matter. Lastly, the COA contends that employment-related sickness,
injury or death is adequately covered by the Employees’ Compensation Program under P.D. 626,
such that to allow simultaneous recovery of benefits under both laws on account of the same
contingency would be unfair and unjust to the government.
The question of whether a particular law has been repealed or not by a subsequent law is a
matter of legislative intent. The lawmakers may expressly repeal a law by incorporating therein a
repealing provision which expressly and specifically cites the particular law or laws, and portions
thereof, that are intended to be repealed. 3 A declaration in a statute, usually in its repealing
clause, that a particular and specific law, identified by its number or title, is repealed is an
express repeal; all others are implied repeals. 4
In the case of the two Administrative Codes in question, the ascertainment of whether or not it
was the intent of the legislature to supplant the old Code with the new Code partly depends on
the scrutiny of the repealing clause of the new Code. This provision is found in Section 27, Book
VII (Final Provisions) of the Administrative Code of 1987 which reads:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"SECTION 27. Repealing Clause. — All laws, decrees, orders, rules and regulations, or portions
thereof, inconsistent with this Code are hereby repealed or modified accordingly."cralaw
virtua1aw library
The question that should be asked is: What is the nature of this repealing clause? It is certainly
not an express repealing clause because it fails to identify or designate the act or acts that are
intended to be repealed. 5 Rather, it is an example of a general repealing provision, as stated in
Opinion No. 73, S. 1991. It is a clause which predicates the intended repeal under the condition
that a substantial conflict must be found in existing and prior acts. The failure to add a specific
repealing clause indicates that the intent was not to repeal any existing law, unless an
irreconcilable inconsistency and repugnancy exist in the terms of the new and old laws. 6 This
latter situation falls under the category of an implied repeal.
Repeal by implication proceeds on the premise that where a statute of later date clearly reveals
an intention on the part of the legislature to abrogate a prior act on the subject, that intention
must be given effect. 7 Hence, before there can be a repeal, there must be a clear showing on
the part of the lawmaker that the intent in enacting the new law was to abrogate the old one.
The intention to repeal must be clear and manifest; 8 otherwise, at least, as a general rule, the
later act is to be construed as a continuation of, and not a substitute for, the first act and will
continue so far as the two acts are the same from the time of the first enactment. 9
There are two categories of repeal by implication. The first is where provisions in the two acts on
the same subject matter are in an irreconcilable conflict, The later act to the extent of the
conflict constitutes an implied repeal of the earlier one. The second is if the later act covers the
whole subject of the earlier one and is clearly intended as a substitute, it will operate to repeal
the earlier law. 10
Implied repeal by irreconcilable inconsistency takes place when the two statutes cover the same
subject matter; they are so clearly inconsistent and incompatible with each other that they
cannot be reconciled or harmonized; and both cannot be given effect, that is, that one law
cannot he enforced without nullifying the other. 11cralawnad
Comparing the two Codes, it is apparent that the new Code does not cover nor attempt to cover
the entire subject matter of the old Code. There are several matters treated in the old Code
which are not found in the new Code, such as the provisions on notaries public, the leave law,
the public bonding law, military reservations, claims for sickness benefits under Section 699, and
still others.
Moreover, the COA failed to demonstrate that the provisions of the two Codes on the matter of
the subject claim are in an irreconcilable conflict. In fact, there can be no such conflict because
the provision on sickness benefits of the nature being claimed by petitioner has not been
restated in the Administrative Code of 1987. However, the COA would have Us consider that the
fact that Section 699 was not restated in the Administrative Code of 1987 meant that the same
section had been repealed. It further maintained that to allow the particular provisions not
restated in the new Code to continue in force argues against the Code itself. The COA anchored
this argument on the whereas clause of the 1987 Code, which states:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"WHEREAS, the effectiveness of the Government will be enhanced by a new Administrative Code
which incorporates in a unified document the major structural, functional and procedural
principles and rules of governance; and
x x x"
It argues, in effect, that what is contemplated is only one Code — the Administrative Code of
1987. This contention is untenable.
The fact that a later enactment may relate to the same subject matter as that of an earlier
statute is not of itself sufficient to cause an implied repeal of the prior act, since the new statute
may merely be cumulative or a continuation of the old one. 12 What is necessary is a manifest
indication of legislative purpose to repeal. 13
We come now to the second category of repeal — the enactment of a statute revising or
codifying the former laws on the whole subject matter. This is only possible if this revised statute
or code was intended to cover the whole subject to be a complete and perfect system in itself. It
is the rule that a subsequent statute is deemed to repeal a prior law if the former revises the
whole subject matter of the former statute. 14 When both intent and scope clearly evince the
idea of a repeal, then all parts and provisions of the prior act that are omitted from the revised
act are deemed repealed. 15 Furthermore, before there can be an implied repeal under this
category, it must be the clear intent of the legislature that the later act be the substitute to the
prior act. 16
According to Opinion No. 73, S. 1991 of the Secretary of Justice, what appears clear is the intent
to cover only those aspects of government that pertain to administration, organization and
procedure, understandably because of the many changes that transpired in the government
structure since the enactment of the RAC decades of years ago. The COA challenges the weight
that this opinion carries in the determination of this controversy inasmuch as the body which had
been entrusted with the implementation of this particular provision has already rendered its
decision. The COA relied on the rule in administrative law enunciated in the case of Sison v.
Pangramuyen 17 that in the absence of palpable error or grave abuse of discretion, the Court
would be loathe to substitute its own judgment for that of the administrative agency entrusted
with the enforcement and implementation of the law. This will not hold water. This principle is
subject to limitations. Administrative decisions may be reviewed by the courts upon a showing
that the decision is vitiated by fraud, imposition or mistake. 18 It has been held that Opinions of
the Secretary and Undersecretary of Justice are material in the construction of statutes in pari
materia. 19
Lastly, it is a well-settled rule of statutory construction that repeals of statutes by implication are
not favored. 20 The presumption is against inconsistency and repugnancy for the legislature is
presumed to know the existing laws on the subject and not to have enacted inconsistent or
conflicting statutes. 21
This Court, in a case, explains the principle in detail as follows: "Repeals by implication are not
favored, and will not be decreed unless it is manifest that the legislature so intended. As laws are
presumed to be passed with deliberation with full knowledge of all existing ones on the subject,
it is but reasonable to conclude that in passing a statute it was not intended to interfere with or
abrogate any former law relating to some matter, unless the repugnancy between the two is not
only irreconcilable, but also clear and convincing, and flowing necessarily from the language
used, unless the later act fully embraces the subject matter of the earlier, or unless the reason
for the earlier act is beyond peradventure renewed. Hence, every effort must be used to make all
acts stand and if, by any reasonable construction, they can be reconciled, the later act will not
operate as a repeal of the earlier. 22
Regarding respondent’s contention that recovery under this subject section shall bar the
recovery of benefits under the Employees’ Compensation Program, the same cannot be upheld.
The second sentence of Article 173, Chapter II, Title II (dealing on Employees’ Compensation
and State Insurance Fund), Book IV of the Labor Code, as amended by P.D. 1921, expressly
provides that "the payment of compensation under this Title shall not bar the recovery of
benefits as provided for in Section 669 of the Revised Administrative Code xxx whose benefits
are administered by the system (meaning SSS or GSIS) or by other agencies of the
government."cralaw virtua1aw library
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court resolves to GRANT the petition; respondent is,
hereby ordered to give due course to petitioner’s claim for benefits. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Cruz, Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Griño-Aquino, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero,
Nocon, Bellosillo and Melo, JJ., concur.
Gutierrez, Jr., J., concurs in the result.
Endnotes:
1. As amended by R.A. No. 1232 dated June 7, 1955.
2. Rollo, pp. 26-30.
3. School Dist. No. 45 v. Board of County of Comira, 141 Kan. 108.
4. AGPALO, STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION 289 (1986).
5. Iloilo Palay and Corn Planters Association, Inc. v. Feliciano, 13 SCRA 377 (1965).
6. CRAWFORD, CONSTRUCTION OF STATUTE 631 (1940 ed.).
7. Posadas v. National City Bank, 296 U.S. 497, 80 L. Ed. 351 (1935).
8. Maceda v. Macaraig, 197 SCRA 771 (1991).
9. Supra, note 7.
10. Supra, note 4.
11. Villegas v. Subido, 41 SCRA 190 (1971).
12. Valera v. Tuason, 80 Phil 823 (1948).
13. Jalandoni v. Endaya, 55 SCRA 261 1974).
14. People v. Almuete, 69 SCRA 410, 414 (1976).
15. People v. Benuya, 61 Phil. 208 (1916).
16. Supra, note 9.
17. 84 SCRA 364 (1978).
18. Jaculina v. National Police Commission, 200 SCRA 489 (1991); Greenhills Mining Co. v. Office
of the President, 163 SCRA 350 (1988).
19. Philippine Global Communications, Inc. v. Relova, 145 SCRA 385 (1986).
20. National Power Corporation v. Hon. Zain B. Angas, G.R. Nos. 60225-26, May 8, 1992;
Maceda v. Macaraig, 197 SCRA 771 (1991); Maddumba v. Government Service Insurance
System, 192 SCRA 281 (1990); Larga v. Ranada, Jr., 164 SCRA 18 (1988); De Jesus v. People,
120 SCRA 760 (1983).
21. U.S. v. Palacio, 33 Phil. 208 (1916).
22. Smith, Bell & Co. v. Estate of Maronilla, 41 Phil. 557 (1916).
13. People v. Licera G.R. No. L-39990, July 2, 1975
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. No. L-39990. July 22, 1975.]
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. RAFAEL LICERA, Defendant-

Appellant.
Solicitor General Felix Q. Antonio, Assistant Solicitor General Crispin V. Bautista and
Solicitor Pedro A. Ramirez for Plaintiff-Appellee.
Romeo Mercado (Counsel de Oficio), for Defendant-Appellant.
SYNOPSIS
In the municipal court, defendant was charged with the offenses of illegal possession of firearm
and assault upon an agent of a person in authority. Found guilty of the first charge, he appealed
to the Court of First Instance of the province. The second case against him was forwarded to the
same court where the parties agreed to a joint trial of the two cases but was only convicted of
illegal possession of firearm. Plaintiff brought the case to the Court of Appeals invoking as his
legal jurisdiction for his possession of firearm his appointment as a secret agent by the Governor
of Batangas. He claimed that as secret agent he was a "peace officer" and, thus, pursuant to
People v. Macarandang (L-12081, Dec. 23, 1959), he was exempt from the requirements relating
to issuance of license to possess. He alleged that the lower court erred in relying on the later
case of People v. Mapa (L-22301, Aug. 30, 1967), which held that Section 879 of the Revised
Administrative Code provides no exemption for persons appointed as secret agents by provincial
governors for the requirements relating to firearms licenses. The case was certified to this Court
on the ground that a question of law was involved.
The Supreme Court held that pursuant to the Macarandang rule obtaining not only at the time of
defendant’s appointment as secret agent, which appointment included a grant of authority to
possess the firearm, but as well as at the time of his apprehension, defendants incurred no
criminal liability for possession of the said rifle, notwithstanding his non-compliance with the
legal requirements relating to firearm licenses.
SYLLABUS
1. COURT DECISIONS; PRINCIPLE OF STARE DECISIS. — Article 8 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines decrees that judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws of the Constitution
form part of this jurisdiction’s legal system. These decisions, although in themselves are not
laws, constitute evidence of what the laws mean. The application or interpretation merely
establishes the contemporaneous legislative intent that the construed law purports to carry into
effect.
2. ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF FIREARMS; DOCTRINE EXEMPTING SECRET AGENTS FROM THE

FIREARM LICENSE REQUIREMENT, ABANDONED. — The rule enunciated in Macarandang (106
Phil. 713) to the effect that the appointment of a civilian as a "secret agent to assist in the
maintenance of peace and order campaigns and detection of crimes sufficiently puts him within
the category of a ‘peace officer’ equivalent to a member of the municipal police" whom Section
879 of the Revised Administrative Code exempts from the requirements relating to firearms
licenses, had been revoked by the rule in Mapa (L-22301, August 30, 1967) which held that said
section provides no exemption for persons appointed as secret agents by provincial governors
from the firearm license requirement.
3. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; EX POST FACTO LAW; CONSTITUTIONAL GUARANTEE AGAINST EX

POST FACTO LAW APPLIED TO JUDICIAL DOCTRINES. — Where a new doctrine abrogates an old
rule, the new doctrine should operate prospectively only and should not adversely affect those
favored by the old rule, especially those who relied thereon and acted on the faith thereof. This
holds more especially true in the application or interpretation of statutes in the field of penal law,
for, in this area, more than in any other it is imperative that the punishability of an act be
reasonably foreseen for the guidance of society.
4. ID.; ID.; ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF FIREARMS; DOCTRINE OBTAINING AT THE TIME OF

POSSESSION OF FIREARM BY SECRET AGENT APPLIES. — Where the rule obtaining not only at
the time of his appointment as secret agent, but as well as at the time of his
apprehension, Accused as such secret agent was exempt from the firearm license requirements
under Section 879 of the Revised Administrative Code and therefore incurred no criminal liability
for possession of the firearm, a subsequent rule holding that said law does not exempt a secret
agent from the firearm license requirement shall not adversely affect said accused who was
favored by the abandoned doctrine.
DECISION
CASTRO, J.:
This is an appeal, on a question of law, by Rafael Licera from the judgment dated August 14,
1968 of the Court of First Instance of Occidental Mindoro convicting him of the crime of illegal
possession of firearm and sentencing him to imprisonment of five (5) years. We reverse the
judgment of conviction, for the reasons hereunder stated.
On December 3, 1965 the Chief of Police of Abra de Ilog, Occidental Mindoro, filed a complaint,
subscribed and sworn to by him, with the municipal court of the said municipality, charging
Rafael Licera with illegal possession of a Winchester rifle, Model 55, Caliber .30. On August 13,
1966 the municipal court rendered judgment finding Licera guilty of the crime charged,
sentencing him to suffer an indeterminate penalty ranging five years and one day to six years
and eight months of imprisonment. Licera appealed to the Court of First Instance of Occidental
Mindoro.
In the Court of First Instance, the parties agreed to the joint trial of the case for illegal
possession of firearm and another case, likewise filed against Licera with the municipal court but
already forwarded to the said Court of First Instance, for assault upon an agent of a person in
authority, the two offenses having arisen from the same occasion: apprehension of Licera by the
Chief of Police and a patrolman of Abra de Ilog on December 2, 1965 for possession of the
Winchester rifle without the requisite license or permit therefor.
On August 14, 1968 the court a quo rendered judgment acquitting Licera of the charge of assault
upon an agent of a person in authority, but convicting him of illegal possession of firearm,
sentencing him to suffer five years of imprisonment, and ordering the forfeiture of the
Winchester rifle in favor of the Government.
Licera’s appeal to the Court of Appeals was certified on October 16, 1974 to this Court as
involving only one question of law.
Licera invokes as his legal justification for his possession of the Winschester rifle his appointment
as secret agent on December 11, 1961 by Governor Feliciano Leviste of Batangas. He claims that
as secret agent, he was a "peace officer" and, thus, pursuant to People v. Macarandang, 1 was
exempt from the requirements relating to the issuance of license to possess firearms. He alleges
that the court a quo erred in relying on the later case of People v. Mapa 2 which held that section
879 of the Revised Administrative Code provides no exemption for persons appointed as secret
agents by provincial governors from the requirements relating to firearm licenses.
The principal question thus posed calls for a determination of the rule that should be applied to
the case at bar — that enunciated in Macarandang or that in Mapa.
The appointment given to Licera by Governor Leviste which bears the date "December 11, 1961"
includes a grant of authority to Licera to possess the Winchester rifle in these terms: "In
accordance with the decision of the Supreme Court in G.R. No. L-12088 dated December 23,
1959, you will have the right to bear a firearm . . . for use in connection with the performance of
your duties." Under the rule then prevailing enunciated in Macarandang, 3 the appointment of a
civilian as a "secret agent to assist in the maintenance of peace and order campaigns and
detection of crimes sufficiently put[s] him within the category of a ‘peace officer’ equivalent even
to a member of the municipal police" whom section 879 of the Revised Administrative Code
exempts from the requirement relating to firearm licenses.
Article 8 of the Civil Code of the Philippines decrees that judicial decisions applying or
interpreting the laws or the Constitution form part of this jurisdiction’s legal system. These
decisions, although in themselves not laws, constitute evidence of what the laws mean. The
application or interpretation placed by the Court upon a law is part of the law as of the date of
the enactment of the said law since the Court’s application or interpretation merely establishes
the contemporaneous legislative intent that the construed law purports to carry into effect. 4
At the time of Licera’s designation as secret agent in 1961 and at the time of his apprehension
for possession of the Winchester rifle without the requisite license or permit therefor in 1965, the
Macarandang rule — the Courts interpretation of section 879 of the Revised Administrative Code
— formed part of our jurisprudence and, hence, of this jurisdiction’s legal system. Mapa revoked
the Macarandang precedent only in 1967. Certainly, where a new doctrine abrogates an old rule,
the new doctrine should operate prospectively only and should not adversely affect those favored
by the old rule, especially those who relied thereon and acted on the faith thereof. This holds
more especially true in the application or interpretation of statutes in the field of penal law, for,
in this area, more than in any other, it is imperative that the punishability of an act be
reasonably foreseen for the guidance of society. 5
Pursuant to the Macarandang rule obtaining not only at the time of Licera’s appointment as
secret agent, which appointment included a grant of authority to possess the Winchester rifle,
but as well at the time as of his apprehension, Licera incurred no criminal liability for possession
of the said rifle, notwithstanding his non-compliance with the legal requirements relating to
firearm licenses.
ACCORDINGLY, the judgment a quo is reversed, and Rafael Licera is hereby acquitted. Costs de
oficio.
Makasiar, Esguerra, Muñoz, Palma and Martin, JJ., concur.
Teehankee, J., is on leave.
Endnotes:
1. L-12088, December 23, 1959, 106 Phil. 713.
2. L-22301, August 30, 1967, 20 SCRA 1164.
3. Vide People v. Lucero, L-10845, April 28, 1958, 103 Phil. 500.
4. People v. Jabinal, L-30061, February 27, 1974, 55 SCRA 607. Vide Senarillos v. Hermosisima,
L-10662, December 14, 1956, 100 Phil. 501.
5. People v. Jabinal, ibid.
14. Chu Jan vs. Bernas, 34 Phil 631 (1916)
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-10010 August 1, 1916
CHU JAN, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. LUCIO BERNAS, Defendant-Appellant.
Sulpicio V. Cea for appellant.
ARAULLO, J.:
On the afternoon of June 26, 1913, a match was held in the cockpit of the municipality of
Tabaco, Albay, between two cocks belonging to the plaintiff and to the defendant respectively.
Each of said persons had put up a wager of P160; and as the referee of the cockpit had declared
the defendant's cock the winner in the bout, the plaintiff brought suit against the defendant in
the justice of the peace court of the said pueblo, asking that his own rooster be declared the
winner. The justice of the peace court decided that the bout was a draw. From this judgment the
defendant appealed to the Court of First Instance of the province. For the purposes of the
appeal, the plaintiff filed his complaint and prayed this court to render judgment ordering the
defendant to abide by and comply with the rules and regulations governing cockfights, to pay the
stipulated wager of P160; to return the other like amount (both sums of wager being held for
safe-keeping by the cockpit owner, Tomas Almonte) and to assess the costs of both instances
against the defendant.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
The defendant denied each and all of the allegations of the complaint and moved to dismiss with
the costs against the plaintiff. On September 11, 1913, the said Court of First Instance rendered
judgment dismissing the appeal without special finding as to costs. The defendant excepted to
this judgment as well as to an order dictated by the same court on November 8th of the same
year, on the plaintiff's motion, ordering the provincial treasurer of Albay and, if necessary, the
municipal treasurer of Tabaco of the same province, to release the deposit of P160 and return it
to its owner, the plaintiff Chinaman, Chu Jan. These proceedings have come before us on appeal
by means of the proper bill of exceptions.chanroblesvirtual
The grounds for the dismissal pronounced by the lower court in the judgment appealed from ere
that the court has always dismissed cases of this nature, that he is not familiar with the rules
governing cockfights and the duties of referees thereof; that he does not know where to find the
law on the subject and, finally, that he knows of no law whatever that governs the rights to the
plaintiff and the defendant in questions concerning
cockfights.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
The ignorance of the court or his lack of knowledge regarding the law applicable to a case
submitted to him for decision, the fact that the court does not know the rules applicable to a
certain matter that is the subject of an appeal which must be decided by him and his not
knowing where to find the law relative to the case, are not reasons that can serve to excuse the
court for terminating the proceedings by dismissing them without deciding the issues. Such an
excuse is the less acceptable because, foreseeing that a case might arise to which no law would
be exactly applicable, the Civil Code, in the second paragraph of article 6, provides that the
customs of the place shall be observed, and, in the absence thereof, the general principles of
law.chanrobles
Therefore the judgment and the order appealed from, hereinbefore mentioned, are reversed and
to record of the proceedings shall remanded to the court from whence they came for due trial
and judgment as provided by law. No special finding is made with regard to costs. So
ordered.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Arellano, C. J., Torres, Johnson, and Trent, JJ., concur.

Moreland, J., took no part.
15. People vs. Purisima, G.R. Nos. L-42050-66, L-46229-32, L-46313-16, L-46997, 20
November 1978
EN BANC
[G.R. Nos. L-42050-66. November 20, 1978.]
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, v. HONORABLE JUDGE AMANTE P.

PURISIMA, COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF MANILA, BRANCH VII, and PORFIRIO
CANDELOSAS, NESTOR BAES, ELIAS L. GARCIA, SIMEON BUNDALIAN, JR., JOSEPH C.
MAISO, EDUARDO A. LIBORDO, ROMEO L. SUGAY, FEDERICO T. DIZON, GEORGE M.
ALBINO, MARIANO COTIA, JR., ARMANDO L. DIZON, ROGELIO B. PAREÑO, RODRIGO V.
ESTRADA, ALFREDO A. REYES, JOSE A. BACARRA, REYNALDO BOGTONG, and EDGARDO
M. MENDOZA, Respondents.
[G.R. No. L-46229-32. November 20, 1978.]
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, v. JUDGE MAXIMO A. MACEREN, COURT

OF FIRST INSTANCE OF MANILA, BRANCH XVIII, and REYNALDO LAQUI Y AQUINO,
ELPIDIO ARPON, VICTOR EUGENIO Y ROQUE and ALFREDO VERSOZA, Respondents.
[G.R. No. L-46313-16. November 20, 1978.]
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, v. JUDGE MAXIMO A. MACEREN, COURT

OF FIRST INSTANCE OF MANILA, BRANCH XVIII, and JUANITO DE LA CRUZ Y NUÑEZ,
SABINO BUENO Y CACAL, TIRSO ISAGAN Y FRANCISCO and BEN CASTILLO Y
UBALDO, Respondents.
[G.R. No. L-46997. November 20, 1978.]
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, v. THE HONORABLE WENCESLAO M.

POLO, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Samar, and PANCHITO
REFUNCION, Respondents.
Jose L. Gamboa, Fermin Martin, Jr. & Jose D. Cajucom, Office of the City of Fiscal of
Manila and the Office of Provincial Fiscal of Samar for petitioners. Norberto Parto for
respondents Candelosas, Baes and Garcia.
Amado C . de la Marced for respondents Simeon Bundalian Jr ., Et. Al.
Manuel F . de Jesus for all the respondents in L-46229-32 and L-46313-16.
Norberto L. Apostol for respondent Panchito Refuncion.
Hon. Amante P. Purisima for and in his own behalf.
DECISION
MUÑOZ PALMA, J.:
These twenty-six (26) Petitions for Review filed by the People of the Philippines represented,
respectively, by the Office of the City Fiscal of Manila, the Office of the Provincial Fiscal of Samar,
and joined by the Solicitor General, are consolidated in this one Decision as they involve one
basic question of law.
These Petitions or appeals involve three Courts of First Instance, namely: the Court of First
Instance of Manila, Branch VII, presided by Hon. Amante P. Purisima (17 Petitions), the Court of
First Instance of Manila, Branch XVIII, presided by Hon. Maximo A. Maceren (8 Petitions) and,
the Court of First Instance of Samar, with Hon. Wenceslao M. Polo, presiding, (1 Petition).
Before those courts, Informations were filed charging the respective accused with "illegal
possession of deadly weapon" in violation of Presidential Decree No. 9. On a motion to quash
filed by the accused, the three Judges mentioned above issued in the respective cases filed
before them — the details of which will be recounted below — an Order quashing or dismissing
the Informations, on a common ground, viz, that the Information did not allege facts which
constitute the offense penalized by Presidential Decree No. 9 because it failed to state one
essential element of the crime.
Thus, are the Informations filed by the People sufficient in form and substance to constitute the
offense of "illegal possession of deadly weapon" penalized under Presidential Decree (PD for
short) No. 9? This is the central issue which we shall resolve and dispose of, all other corollary
matters not being indispensable for the moment.
A — The Information filed by the People —
1. In L-42050-66, one typical Information filed with the Court presided by Judge Purisima
"THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff, versus PORFIRIO CANDELOSAS Y DURAN, Accused.
Crim. Case No. 19639
VIOLATION OF PAR. 3, PRES. DECREE No. 9 OF PROCLAMATION 1081.
"INFORMATION
"The undersigned accuses PORFIRIO CANDELOSAS Y DURAN of a violation of paragraph 3,

Presidential Decree No. 9 of Proclamation 1081, committed as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"That on or about the 14th day of December, 1974, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said
accused did then and there wilfully, unlawfully, feloniously and knowingly have in his possession
and under his custody and control one (1) carving knife with a blade of 6-1/2 inches and a
wooden handle of 5-1/4 inches, or an overall length of 11-3/4 inches, which the said accused
carried outside of his residence, the said weapon not being used as a tool or implement
necessary to earn his livelihood nor being used in connection therewith.
"Contrary to law." (p. 32, rollo of L-42050-66)
The other Informations are similarly worded except for the name of the accused, the date and
place of the commission of the crime, and the kind of weapon involved.chanrobles virtual
lawlibrary
2. In L-46229-32 and L-46313-16, the Information filed with the Court presided by Judge
Maceren follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff, versus REYNALDO LAQUI Y AQUINO, Accused.
CRIM. CASE NO. 29677
VIOL. OF PAR. 3,
PD 9 IN REL. TO LOI
No. 266 of the Chief
Executive dated April 1, 1975
"INFORMATION
"The undersigned accuses REYNALDO LAQUI Y AQUINO of a VIOLATION OF PARAGRAPH 3,

PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 9 in relation to Letter of Instruction No. 266 of the Chief Executive
dated April 1, 1975, committed as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"That on or about the 28th day of January, 1977, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said
accused did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and knowingly carry outside of his residence a
bladed and pointed weapon, to wit: an ice pick with an overall length of about 8 1/2 inches, the
same not being used as a necessary tool or implement to earn his livelihood nor being used in
connection therewith.
"Contrary to law." (p. 14, rollo of L-46229-32).
The other Informations are likewise similarly worded except for the name of the accused, the
date and place of the commission of the crime, and the kind of weapon involved.
3. In L-46997, the Information before the Court of First Instance of Samar is quoted
hereunder:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, complainant, versus PANCHITO REFUNCION, Accused.
CRIM. CASE NO. 933
For:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF
DEADLY WEAPON
(VIOLATION OF PD NO. 9)
"INFORMATION
"The undersigned First Assistant Provincial Fiscal of Samar, accuses PANCHITO REFUNCION of
the crime of ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF DEADLY WEAPON or VIOLATION OF PD NO. 9 issued by
the President of the Philippines on Oct. 2, 1972, pursuant to Proclamation No. 1081 dated Sept.
21 and 23, 1972, committed as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"That on or about the 6th day of October, 1976, in the evening at Barangay Barruz, Municipality
of Matuginao, Province of Samar Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the abovenamed accused, knowingly, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously carried with him outside
of his residence a deadly weapon called socyatan, an instrument which from its very nature is no
such as could be used as a necessary tool or instrument to earn a livelihood, which act
committed by the accused is a Violation of Presidential Decree No. 9.
"CONTRARY TO LAW." (p. 8, rollo of L-46997)
B — The Orders of dismissal —
In dismissing or quashing the Informations the trial courts concurred with the submittal of the
defense that one essential element of the offense charged is missing from the Information, viz:
that the carrying outside of the accused’s residence of a bladed, pointed or blunt weapon is in
furtherance or on the occasion of, connected with or related to subversion, insurrection, or
rebellion, organized lawlessness or public disorder.
1. Judge Purisima reasoned out, inter alia, in this manner:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
". . . the Court is of the opinion that in order that possession of bladed weapon or the like outside
residence may be prosecuted and tried under P.D. No. 9, the information must specifically allege
that the possession of bladed weapon charged was for the purpose of abetting, or in furtherance
of the conditions of rampant criminality, organized lawlessness, public disorder, etc. as are
contemplated and recited in Proclamation No. 1081, as justification therefor. Devoid of this
specific allegation, not necessarily in the same words, the information is not complete, as it does
not allege sufficient facts to constitute the offense contemplated in P.D. No. 9. The information in
these cases under consideration suffer from this defect.
"x x x
"And while there is no proof of it before the Court, it is not difficult to believe the murmurings of
detained persons brought to Court upon a charge of possession of bladed weapons under P.D.
No. 9, that more than ever before, policemen — of course not all can be so heartless — now
have in their hands P.D. No. 9 as a most convenient tool for extortion, what with the terrifying
risk of being sentenced to imprisonment of five to ten years for a rusted kitchen knife or a pair of
scissors, which only God knows where it came from. Whereas before martial law an extortion-
minded peace officer had to have a stock of the cheapest paltik, and even that could only convey
the coercive message of one year in jail, now anything that has the semblance of a sharp edge
or pointed object, available even in trash cans, may already serve the same purpose, and yet
five to ten times more incriminating than the infamous paltik.
"For sure, P.D. No. 9 was conceived with the best of intentions and wisely applied, its necessity
can never be assailed. But it seems it is back-firing, because it is too hot in the hands of
policemen who are inclined to backsliding.
"The checkvalves against abuse of P.D. No. 9 are to be found in the heart of the Fiscal and the
conscience of the Court, and hence this resolution, let alone technical legal basis, is prompted by
the desire of this Court to apply said checkvalves." (pp. 55-57, rollo of L-42050-66).
2. Judge Maceren in turn gave his grounds for dismissing the charges as
"x x x
"As earlier noted the ‘desired result’ sought to be attained by Proclamation No. 1081 is the
maintenance of law and order throughout the Philippines and the prevention and suppression of
all forms of lawless violence as well as any act of insurrection or rebellion. It is therefore
reasonable to conclude from the foregoing premises that the carrying of bladed, pointed or blunt
weapons outside of one’s residence which is made unlawful and punishable by said par. 3 of P.D.
No. 9 is one that abets subversion, insurrection or rebellion, lawless violence, criminality, chaos
and public disorder or is intended to bring about these conditions. This conclusion is further
strengthened by the fact that all previously existing laws that also made the carrying of similar
weapons punishable have not been repealed, whether expressly or impliedly. It is noteworthy
that Presidential Decree No. 9 does not contain any repealing clause or provisions.
"x x x
"The mere carrying outside of one’s residence of these deadly weapons if not concealed in one’s
person and if not carried in any of the aforesaid specified places, would appear to be not unlawful
and punishable by law.
"With the promulgation of Presidential Decree No. 9, however, the prosecution, through Assistant
Fiscal Hilario H. Laqui, contends in his opposition to the motion to quash, that this act is now
made unlawful and punishable, particularly by paragraph 3 thereof, regardless of the intention of
the person carrying such weapon because the law makes it ‘mala prohibita’. If the contention of
the prosecution is correct, then if a person happens to be caught while on his way home by law
enforcement officers carrying a kitchen knife that said person had just bought from a store in
order that the same may be used by one’s cook for preparing the meals in one’s home, such
person will be liable for punishment with such a severe penalty as imprisonment from five to ten
years under the decree. Such person cannot claim that said knife is going to be used by him to
earn a livelihood because he intended it merely for use by his cook in preparing his meals.
"This possibility cannot be discounted if Presidential Decree No. 9 were to be interpreted and
applied in the manner that the prosecution wants it to be done. The good intentions of the
President in promulgating this decree may thus be perverted by some unscrupulous law
enforcement officers. It may be used as a tool of oppression and tyranny or of extortion.
"x x x
"It is therefore the considered and humble view of this Court that the act which the President
intended to make unlawful and punishable by Presidential Decree No. 9, particularly by
paragraph 3 thereof, is one that abets or is intended to abet subversion, rebellion, insurrection,
lawless violence, criminality, chaos and public disorder." (pp. 28-30, rollo of L-46229-32)
3. Judge Polo of the Court of First Instance of Samar expounded his order dismissing the
Information filed before him, thus:chanrobles law library : red
". . . We believe that to constitute an offense under the aforecited Presidential Decree, the same
should be or there should be an allegation that a felony was committed in connection or in
furtherance of subversion, rebellion, insurrection, lawless violence and public disorder. Precisely
Proclamation No. 1081 declaring a state of martial law throughout the country was issued
because of wanton destruction to lives and properties widespread lawlessness and anarchy. And
in order to restore the tranquillity and stability of the country and to secure the people from
violence and loss of lives in the quickest possible manner and time, carrying firearms, explosives
and deadly weapons without a permit unless the same would fall under the exception is
prohibited. This conclusion becomes more compelling when we consider the penalty imposable,
which is from five years to ten years. A strict enforcement of the provision of the said law would
mean the imposition of the Draconian penalty upon the accused.
"x x x
"It is public knowledge that in rural areas, even before and during martial law, as a matter of
status symbol, carrying deadly weapons is very common, not necessarily for committing a crime
nor as their farm implement but for self-preservation or self-defense if necessity would arise
specially in going to and from their farm." (pp. 18-19, rollo of L-46997)
In most if not all of the cases, the orders of dismissal were given before arraignment of the
accused. In the criminal case before the Court of (First Instance of Samar the accused was
arraigned but at the same time moved to quash the Information. In all the cases where the
accused were under arrest, the three Judges ordered their immediate release unless held on
other charges.
C — The law under which the Informations in question were filed by the People.
As seen from the Informations quoted above, the accused are charged with illegal possession of
deadly weapon in violation of Presidential Decree No. 9, Paragraph 3.
We quote in full Presidential Decree No. 9, to wit:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"PRESIDENTIAL DECREE NO. 9
"DECLARING VIOLATIONS OF GENERAL ORDERS NO. 6 and NO. 7 DATED SEPTEMBER 22, 1972,
AND SEPTEMBER 23, 1972, RESPECTIVELY, TO BE UNLAWFUL AND PROVIDING PENALTIES
THEREFORE.
"WHEREAS, pursuant to Proclamation No. 1081 dated September 21, 1972, the Philippines has
been placed under a state of martial law;
"WHEREAS, by virtue of said Proclamation No. 1081, General Order No. 6 dated September 22,
1972 and General Order No. 7 dated September 23, 1972, have been promulgated by me;
"WHEREAS, subversion, rebellion, insurrection, lawless violence, criminality, chaos and public
disorder mentioned in the aforesaid Proclamation No. 1081 are committed and abetted by the
use of firearms, explosives and other deadly weapons;
"NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, Commander-in-Chief of all the Armed Forces of

the Philippines, in order to attain the desired result of the aforesaid Proclamation No. 1081 and
General Orders Nos. 6 and 7, do hereby order and decree that:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"1. Any violation of the aforesaid General Orders Nos. 6 and 7 is unlawful and the violator shall,
upon conviction suffer:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
(a) The mandatory penalty of death by a firing squad or electrocution as a Military

Court/Tribunal/Commission may direct, if the firearm involved in the violation is unlicensed and
is attended by assault upon, or resistance to persons in authority or their agents in the
performance of their official functions resulting in death to said persons in authority or their
agent; or if such unlicensed firearm is used in the commission of crimes against persons,
property or chastity causing the death of the victim, or used in violation of any other General
Orders and/or Letters of Instructions promulgated under said Proclamation No. 1081:chanrob1es
virtual 1aw library
(b) The penalty of imprisonment ranging from twenty years to life imprisonment as a Military
Court/Tribunal/Commission may direct, when the violation is not attended by any of the
circumstances enumerated under the preceding paragraph;
(c) The penalty provided for in the preceding paragraphs shall be imposed upon the owner,
president, manager, members of the board of directors or other responsible officers of any public
or private firms, companies, corporations or entities who shall willfully or knowingly allow any of
the firearms owned by such firm, company, corporation or entity concerned to be used in
violation of said General Orders Nos. 6 and 7.
"2. It is unlawful to possess deadly weapons, including hand grenades, rifle grenades and other
explosives, including, but not limited to, ‘pill box bombs,’ ‘molotov cocktail bombs,’ ‘fire bombs,’
or other incendiary device consisting of any chemical, chemical compound, or detonating agents
containing combustible units or other ingredients in such proportion, quantity, packing, or
bottling that ignites by fire, by friction, by concussion, by percussion, or by detonation of all or
part of the compound or mixture which may cause such a sudden generation of highly heated
gases that the resultant gaseous pressures are capable of producing destructive effects on
continguous objects or of causing injury or death of a persons and any person convicted thereof
shall be punished by imprisonment ranging from ten to fifteen years as a Military
Court/Tribunal/Commission may direct.
"3. It is unlawful to carry outside of residence any bladed, pointed or blunt weapon such as ‘fan
knife,’ ‘spear,’ ‘dagger,’ ‘bolo,’ ‘balisong,’ ‘barong,’ ‘kris,’ or club, except where such articles are
being used as necessary tools or implements to earn a livelihood and while being used in
connection therewith; and any person found guilty thereof shall suffer the penalty of
imprisonment ranging from five to ten years as a Military Court/Tribunal/Commission may direct.
"4. When the violation penalized in the preceding paragraphs 2 and 3 is committed during the
commission of or for the purpose of committing, any other crime, the penalty shall be imposed
upon the offender in its maximum extent, in addition to the penalty provided for the particular
offenses committed or intended to be committed.
"Done in the City of Manila, this 2nd day of October in the year of Our Lord, nineteen hundred
and seventy-two.
"(SGD) FERDINAND E. MARCOS
President
Republic of the Philippines"
D — The arguments of the People —
In the Comment filed in these cases by the Solicitor General who as stated earlier joins the City
Fiscal of Manila and the Provincial Fiscal of Samar in seeking the setting aside of the questioned
orders of dismissal, the main argument advanced on the issue now under consideration is that a
perusal of paragraph 3 of P.D. 9 shows that the prohibited acts need not be related to subversive
activities; that the act proscribed is essentially a malum prohibitum penalized for reasons of
public policy. 1
The City Fiscal of Manila in his brief adds further that in statutory offenses the intention of the
accused who commits the act is immaterial; that it is enough if the prohibited act is voluntarily
perpetuated; that P.D. 9 provides and condemns not only the carrying of said weapon in
connection with the commission of the crime of subversion or the like, but also that of criminality
in general, that is, to eradicate lawless violence which characterized pre-martial law days. It is
also argued that the real nature of the criminal charge is determined not from the caption or
preamble of the information nor from the specification of the provision of law alleged to have
been violated but by the actual recital of facts in the complaint or information. 2
E — Our Ruling on the matter —
1. It is a constitutional right of any person who stands charged in a criminal prosecution to be

informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. 3
Pursuant to the above, Section 5, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court, expressly requires that for a
complaint or information to be sufficient it must, inter alia, state the designation of the offense
by the statute, and the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense. This is
essential to avoid surprise on the accused and to afford him the opportunity to prepare his
defense accordingly. 4
To comply with these fundamental requirements of the Constitution and the Rules on Criminal
Procedure, it is imperative for the specific statute violated to be designated or mentioned in the
charge. In fact, another compelling reason exists why a specification of the statute violated is
essential in these cases. As stated in the order of respondent Judge Maceren the carrying of so-
called "deadly weapons" is the subject of another penal statute and a Manila city ordinance.
Thus, Section 26 of Act No. 1780 provides:chanrobles virtual lawlibrary
"SECTION 26. It should be unlawful for any person to carry concealed about his person any
bowie knife, dirk, dagger, kris, or other deadly weapon: . . . Any person violating the provisions
of this section shall, upon conviction in a court of competent jurisdiction, be punished by a fine
not exceeding five hundred pesos, or by imprisonment for a period not exceeding six months, or
both such fine and imprisonment, in the discretion of the court."cralaw virtua1aw library
Ordinance No. 3820 of the City of Manila as amended by Ordinance No. 3928 which took effect
on December 4, 1957, in turn penalizes with a fine of not more than P200.00 or imprisonment
for not more than one months, or both, at the discretion of the court, anyone who shall carry
concealed in his person in any manner that would disguise its deadly character any kind of
firearm, bowie knife, or other deadly weapon . . . in any public place. Consequently, it is
necessary that the particular law violated be specified as there exists a substantial difference
between the statute and city ordinance on the one hand and P.D. 9 (3) on the other regarding
the circumstances of the commission of the crime and the penalty imposed for the offense.
We do not agree with petitioner that the above-mentioned statute and the city ordinance are
deemed repealed by P.D. 9 (3). 5 P. D. 9(3) does not contain any repealing clause or provision,
and repeal by implication is not favored. 6 This principle holds true with greater force with
regards to penal statutes which as a rule are to be construed strictly against the state and
liberally in favor of the accused. 7 In fact, Article 7 of the New Civil Code provides that laws are
repealed only by subsequent ones and their violation or non-observance shall not be excused by
disuse, or custom or practice to the contrary.
Thus we are faced with the situation where a particular act may be made to fall, at the discretion
of a police officer or a prosecuting fiscal, under the statute, or the city ordinance, or the
presidential decree. That being the case, the right becomes more compelling for an accused to
be confronted with the facts constituting the essential elements of the offense charged against
him, if he is not to become an easy pawn of oppression and harassment, or of negligent or
misguided official action - a fear understandably shared by respondent Judges who by the nature
of their judicial functions are daily exposed to such dangers.
2. In all the Informations filed by petitioner the accused are charged in the caption as well as in
the body of the Information with a violation of paragraph 3, P.D. 9. What then are the elements
of the offense treated in the presidential decree in question?
We hold that the offense carries two elements: first, the carrying outside one’s residence of any
bladed, blunt, or pointed weapon, etc. not used as a necessary tool or implement for a
livelihood; and second, that the act of carrying the weapon was either in furtherance of, or to
abet, or in connection with subversion, rebellion, insurrection, lawless violence, criminality,
chaos, or public disorder.
It is the second element which removes the act of carrying a deadly weapon, if concealed,
outside of the scope of the statute or the city ordinance mentioned above. In other words, a
simple act of carrying any of the weapons described in the presidential decree is not a criminal
offense in itself. What makes the act criminal or punishable under the decree is the motivation
behind it. Without that motivation, the act falls within the purview of the city ordinance or some
statute when the circumstances so warrant.
Respondent Judges correctly ruled that this can be the only reasonably, logical, and valid
construction given to P.D. 9(3).
3. The position taken by petitioner that P.D. 9(3) covers one and all situations where a person
carries outside his residence any of the weapons mentioned or described in the decree
irrespective of motivation, intent, or purpose, converts these cases into one of "statutory
construction." That there is ambiguity in the presidential decree is manifest from the conflicting
views which arise from its implementation. When ambiguity exists, it becomes a judicial task to
construe and interpret the true meaning and scope of the measure, guided by the basic principle
that penal statutes are to be construed and applied liberally in favor of the accused and strictly
against the state.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary
4. In the construction or interpretation of a legislative measure — a presidential decree in these

cases — the primary rule is to search for and determine the intent and spirit of the law.
Legislative intent is the controlling factor, for in the words of this Court in Hidalgo v. Hidalgo, per
Mr. Justice Claudio Teehankee, whatever is within the spirit of a statute is within the statute, and
this has to be so if strict adherence to the letter would result in absurdity, injustice and
contradictions. 8
There are certain aids available to Us to ascertain the intent or reason for P.D. 9(3).
First, the presence of events which led to or precipitated the enactment of P.D. 9. These events
are clearly spelled out in the "Whereas" clauses of the presidential decree, thus: (1) the state of
martial law in the country pursuant to Proclamation 1081 dated September 21, 1972; (2) the
desired result of Proclamation 1081 as well as General Orders Nos. 6 and 7 which are particularly
mentioned in P.D. 9; and (3) the alleged fact that subversion, rebellion, insurrection, lawless
violence, criminality, chaos, and public disorder mentioned in Proclamation 1081 are committed
and abetted by the use of firearms and explosives and other deadly weapons.
The Solicitor General however contends that a preamble of a statute usually introduced by the
word "whereas", is not an essential part of an act and cannot enlarge or confer powers, or cure
inherent defects in the statute (p. 120, rollo of L-42050-66); that the explanatory note or
enacting clause of the decree, if it indeed limits the violation of the decree, cannot prevail over
the text itself inasmuch as such explanatory note merely states or explains the reason which
prompted the issuance of the decree. (pp. 114-115, rollo of 46997)
We disagree with these contentions. Because of the problem of determining what acts fall within
the purview of P.D. 9, it becomes necessary to inquire into the intent and spirit of the decree and
this can be found among others in the preamble or "whereas" clauses which enumerate the facts
or events which justify the promulgation of the decree and the stiff sanctions stated therein.
"A ‘preamble’ is the key of the statute, to open the minds of the makers as to the mischiefs
which are to be remedied, and objects which are to be accomplished, by the provisions of the
statute." (West Norman Timber v. State, 224 P. 2d 635, 639, cited in Words and Phrases,
"Preamble" ; Emphasis supplied).
"While the preamble of a statute is not strictly a part thereof, it may, when the statute is in itself
ambiguous and difficult of interpretation, be resorted to, but not to create a doubt or uncertainty
which otherwise does not exist." (James v. Du Bois, 16 N.J.L. (1 Har.) 285, 294, cited in Words
and Phrases, "Preamble").
In Aboitiz Shipping Corporation, Et Al., v. The City of Cebu, Et Al., this Court had occasion to
state that" (L)egislative intent must be ascertained from a consideration of the statute as a
whole, and not of an isolated part or a particular provision alone. This is a cardinal rule of
statutory construction. For taken in the abstract, a word or phrase might easily convey a
meaning quite different from the one actually intended and evident when the word or phrase is
considered with those with which it is associated. Thus, an apparently general provision may
have a limited application if read together with other provisions." 9
Second, the result or effects of the presidential decree must be within its reason or intent.
In the paragraph immediately following the last "Whereas" clause, the presidential decree
states:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, Commander-in-Chief of all the Armed Forces of

the Philippines, in order to attain the desired result of the aforesaid Proclamation No. 1081 and
General Orders Nos. 6 and 7, do hereby order and decree that:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"x x x
From the above it is clear that the acts penalized in P.D. 9 are those related to the desired result
of Proclamation 1081 and General Orders Nos. 6 and 7. General Orders Nos. 6 and 7 refer to
firearms and therefore have no relevance to P.D. 9(3) which refers to blunt or bladed weapons.
With respect to Proclamation 1081 some of the underlying reasons for its issuance are quoted
hereunder:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"WHEREAS, these lawless elements having taken up arms against our duly constituted
government and against our people, and having committed and are still committing acts of
armed insurrection and rebellion consisting of armed raids, forays, sorties, ambushes, wanton
acts of murders, spoilage, plunder, looting, arsons, destruction of public and private buildings,
and attacks against innocent and defenseless civilian lives and property, all of which activities
have seriously endangered and continue to endanger public order and safety and the security of
the nation, . . . ."cralaw virtua1aw library
"x x x
"WHEREAS, it is evident that there is throughout the land a state of anarchy and lawlessness,
chaos and disorder, turmoil and destruction of a magnitude equivalent to an actual war between
the forces of our duly constituted government and the New People’s Army and their satellite
organizations because of the unmitigated forays, raids, ambuscades, assaults, violence, murders,
assassinations, acts of terror, deceits, coercions, threats, intimidations, treachery, machinations,
arsons, plunders and depredations committed and being committed by the aforesaid lawless
elements who have pledged to the whole nation that they will not stop their dastardly effort and
scheme until and unless they have fully attained their primary and ultimate purpose of forcibly
seizing political and state power in this country by overthrowing our present duly constituted
government, . . . ." (See Book I, Vital Documents on the Declaration of Martial Law in the
Philippines by the Supreme Court of the Philippines, pp. 13-39).
It follows that it is only that act of carrying a blunt or bladed weapon with a motivation
connected with or related to the afore-quoted desired result of Proclamation 1081 that is within
the intent of P.D. 9(3), and nothing else.
"Statutes are to be construed in the light of purposes to be achieved and the evils sought to be
remedied." (U.S. v. American Tracking Association, 310 U.S. 534, cited in LVN Pictures v.
Philippine Musicians Guild, 110 Phil. 725, 731; Emphasis supplied)
"When construing a statute, the reason for its enactment should be kept in mind, and the statute
should be construed with reference to its intended scope and purpose." (Statutory Construction
by E.T. Crawford, pp. 604-605, cited in Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Filipinas Compañia
de Seguros, 107 Phil. 1055, 1060; Emphasis supplied)
5. In the construction of P.D. 9(3) it becomes relevant to inquire into the consequences of the
measure if a strict adherence to the letter of the paragraph is followed.chanrobles
virtualawlibrary chanrobles.com:chanrobles.com.ph
It is a salutary principle in statutory construction that there exists a valid presumption that
undesirable consequences were never intended by a legislative measure, and that a construction
of which the statute is fairly susceptible is favored, which will avoid all objectionable,
mischievous, indefensible, wrongful, evil, and injurious consequences. 9a
It is to be presumed that when P.D. 9 was promulgated by the President of the Republic there
was no intent to work a hardship or an oppressive result, a possible abuse of authority or act of
oppression, arming one person with a weapon to impose hardship on another, and so on. 10
At this instance We quote from the order of Judge Purisima the following:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"And while there is no proof of it before the Court, it is not difficult to believe the murmurings of
detained persons brought to Court upon a charge of possession of bladed weapons under P.D.
No. 9, that more than ever before, policemen — of course not all can be so heartless — now
have in their hands P.D. No. 9 as a most convenient tool for extortion, what with the terrifying
risk of being sentenced to imprisonment of five to ten years for a rusted kitchen knife or a pair of
scissors, which only God knows where it came from. Whereas before martial law an extortion-
minded peace officer had to have a stock of the cheapest paltik, and even that could only convey
the coercive message of one year in jail, now anything that has the semblance of a sharp edge
or pointed object, available even in trash cans, may already serve the same purpose, and yet
five to ten times more incriminating than the infamous paltik." (pp. 72-73, rollo L-42050-66)
And as respondent Judge Maceren points out, the people’s interpretation of P.D. 9(3) results in
absurdity at times. To his example We may add a situation where a law-abiding citizen, a lawyer
by profession, after gardening in his house remembers to return the bolo used by him to his
neighbor who lives about 30 meters or so away and while crossing the street meets a policeman.
The latter upon seeing the bolo being carried by that citizen places him under arrest and books
him for a violation of P.D. 9(3). Could the presidential decree have been conceived to produce
such absurd, unreasonable, and insensible results?
6. Penal statutes are to be construed strictly against the state and liberally in favor of an
accused.
American jurisprudence sets down the reason for this rule to be "the tenderness of the law of the
rights of individuals; the object is to establish a certain rule by conformity to which mankind
would be safe, and the discretion of the court limited." 11 The purpose is not to enable a guilty
person to escape punishment through a technicality but to provide a precise definition of
forbidden acts. 12
Our own decisions have set down the same guidelines in this manner, viz:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Criminal statutes are to be construed strictly. No person should be brought within their terms
who is not clearly within them, nor should any act be pronounced criminal which is not made
clearly so by the statute." (U.S. v. Abad Santos, 36 Phil. 243, 246).
"The rule that penal statutes are given a strict construction is not the only factor controlling the
interpretation of such laws, instead, the rule merely serves as an additional, single factor to be
considered as an aid in determining the meaning of penal laws." (People v. Manantan, 5 SCRA
684, 692).
F. The Informations filed by petitioner are fatally defective.
The two elements of the offense covered by P.D. 9(3) must be alleged in the Information in
order that the latter may constitute a sufficiently valid charged. The sufficiency of an Information
is determined solely by the facts alleged therein. 13 Where the facts are incomplete and do not
convey the elements of the crime, the quashing of the accusation is in order.
Section 2(a), Rule 117 of the Rules of Court provides that the defendant may move to quash the
complaint or information when the facts charged do not constitute an offense.
In U.S. v. Gacutan, 1914, it was held that where an accused is charged with knowingly rendering
an unjust judgment under Article 204 of the Revised Penal Code, failure to allege in the
Information that the judgment was rendered knowing it to be unjust, is fatal. 14
In People v. Yadao, 1954, this Court through then Justice Cesar Bengzon who later became Chief
Justice of the Court affirmed an order of the trial court which quashed an Information wherein
the facts recited did not constitute a public offense as defined in Section 1, Republic Act 145. 15
G — The filing of these Petitions was unnecessary because the People could have availed itself of
other available remedies below.
Pertinent provisions of the Rules of Court follow:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"RULE 117, SECTION 7. Effect of sustaining the motion to quash. — If the motion to quash is
sustained the court may order that another information be filed. If such order is made the
defendant, if in custody, shall remain so unless he shall be admitted to bail. If such order is not
made or if having been made another information is not filed withuntime to be specified in the
order, or within such further time as the court may allow for good cause shown, the defendant, if
in custody, shall be discharged therefrom, unless he is in custody on some other charge."cralaw
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"RULE 110, SECTION 13. Amendment. — The information or complaint may be amended, in
substance or form, without leave of court, at any time before the defendant pleads; and
thereafter and during the trial as to all matters of form, by leave and at the discretion of the
court, when the same can be done without prejudice to the rights of the defendant."cralaw
virtua1aw library
x x x
Two courses of action were open to Petitioner upon the quashing of the Informations in these
cases, viz:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
First, if the evidence on hand so warranted, the People could have filed an amended Information
to include the second element of the offense as defined in the disputed orders of respondent
Judges. We have ruled that if the facts alleged in the Information do not constitute a punishable
offense, the case should not be dismissed but the prosecution should be given an opportunity to
amend the Information. 16
Second, if the facts so justified, the People could have filed a complaint either under Section 26
of Act No. 1780, quoted earlier, or Manila City Ordinance No. 3820, as amended by Ordinance
No. 3928, especially since in most if not all of the cases, the dismissal was made prior to
arraignment of the accused and on a motion to quash.chanrobles.com : virtual law library
Section 8. Rule 117 states that:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"An order sustaining the motion to quash is not a bar to another prosecution for the same
offense unless the motion was based on the grounds specified in section 2, subsections (f) and
(h) of this rule."cralaw virtua1aw library
Under the foregoing, the filing of another complaint or Information is barred only when the
criminal action or liability had been extinguished (Section 2[f]) or when the motion to quash was
granted for reasons of double jeopardy. (ibid., [h]).
As to whether or not a plea of double jeopardy may be successfully invoked by the accused in all
these cases should new complaints be filed against them, is a matter We need not resolve for the
present.
H — We conclude with high expectations that police authorities and the prosecuting arm of the
government true to the oath of office they have taken will exercise utmost circumspection and
good faith in evaluating the particular circumstances of a case so as to reach a fair and just
conclusion if a situation falls within the purview of P.D. 9(3) and the prosecution under said
decree is warranted and justified. This obligation becomes a sacred duty in the face of the severe
penalty imposed for the offense.
On this point, We commend the Chief State Prosecutor Rodolfo A. Nocon on his letter to the City
Fiscal of Manila on October 15, 1975, written for the Secretary, now Minister of Justice, where he
stated the following:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"In any case, please study well each and every case of this nature so that persons accused of
carrying bladed weapons, specially those whose purpose is not to subvert the duly constituted
authorities, may not be unduly indicted for the serious offenses falling under P.D. No. 9." 17
Yes, while it is not within the power of courts of justice to inquire into the wisdom of a law, it is
however a judicial task and prerogative to determine if official action is within the spirit and
letter of the law and if basic fundamental rights of an individual guaranteed by the Constitution
are not violated in the process of its implementation. We have to face the fact that it is an
unwise and unjust application of a law, necessary and justified under prevailing circumstances,
which renders the measure an instrument of oppression and evil and leads the citizenry to lose
their faith in their government.
WHEREFORE, We DENY these 26 Petitions for Review and We AFFIRM the Orders of respondent
Judges dismissing or quashing the Information concerned, subject however to Our observations
made in the preceding pages 23 to 25 of this Decision regarding the right of the State or
Petitioner herein to file either an amended Information under Presidential Decree No. 9,
paragraph 3, or a new one under other existing statute or city ordinance as the facts may
warrant.
Without costs.
SO ORDERED.
Fernando, Teehankee, Santos, Fernandez and Guerrero, JJ., concur.
Castro, C.J., and Antonio, J., concur in the result.
Aquino, J., took no part.
Separate Opinions
BARREDO, J., concurring:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
[I] concur(s) with the qualification that under existing jurisprudence conviction is possible,
without the need of amending the information, for violation of other laws or ordinances on
concealment of deadly weapons.
MAKASIAR, J., concurring:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
[I] concur(s) with Justice Barredo in that under the information, the accused can be validly
convicted of violating Sec. 26 of Act No. 1780 or the city or town ordinances on carrying
consuled weapons.
CONCEPCION JR., J., concurring:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
[I] concur(s) with the additional observation that accused could properly be convicted of a
violation of Act 1780 of the Philippine Commission or of the ordinance.
Endnotes:
1. p. 118, rollo of L-42050-66.
2. pp. 10-11, brief of Petitioner at p. 218, ibid.
3. Art. IV, Sec. 19, 1973 Constitution.
4. Francisco on the Revised Rules of Court, 1969 Ed., Vol. on Criminal Procedure, p. 86.
5. pp. 33-34 brief of Petitioner filed by the City Fiscal of Manila.
6. Valera v. Tuason, Jr., Et Al., 80 Phil. 823, citing U.S. v. Palacio, 33 Phil. 208; Quimsing v.
Lachica, 2 SCRA 182; Almeda v. Florentino, 15 SCRA 514; Lechoco v. Civil Aeronautics Board, 43
SCRA 670.
7. People v. Elkanish, 1951, 90 Phil. 53, 57 People v. Yadao, 1954, 94 Phil. 726, 728.
8. 33 SCRA 105. See also 73 Am Jur 2d 351 citing: United States v. N.E. Rosenblum Truck Lines,
Inc., 315 US 50, 86 L Ed 671; United States v. Stone & Downer Co., 274 US 225, 71 L Ed 1013;
Ebert v. Poston, 266 US 548, 69 L Ed 435; Wisconsin C.R. Co. v. Forsythe, 159 US 46, 40 L Ed
71.
9. 13 SCRA 449, 453; Emphasis supplied.
9a 73 Am Jur 2d 428.
10. See 73 Am Jur 2d 432-433 for cases on the foregoing undesirable consequences.
11. United States v. Harris, 177 US 305, 44 L Ed 780, 20 S Ct 609; Braffith v. Virgin Islands
(CA3) 26 F2d 646; Caudill v. State, 224 Ind 531, 69 NE2d 549; Jennings v. Commonwealth, 109
Va 821, 63 SE 1080, all cited in 73 Am Jur 2d 452.
12. State v. Zazzaro, 20 A 2d 737, quoted in Martin’s Handbook on Statutory Construction, Rev.
Ed. pp. 183-184.
13. People v. Supnad, 7 SCRA 603, 606.
14. 28 Phil. See Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, 1970 Ed., Vol. 4, p. 222.
15. 94 Phil. 726.
16. People v. Plaza, 7 SCRA 617.
17. This letter which was addressed to the City Fiscal of Manila referred to a decision of the Court
of First Instance of Manila, Branch III, in Criminal Case No. 21178, "People v. Conrado C.
Petate," for violation of Presidential Decree No. 9.
Articles 11-18
16. Martinez vs. Van Buskirk, 18 Phil 79 (1910)
EN BANC
[G.R. No. L-5691. December 27, 1910. ]
S. D. MARTINEZ and his wife, CARMEN ONG DE MARTINEZ, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v.

WILLIAM VAN BUSKIRK, Defendant-Appellant.
Lionel D. Hargis for Appellant.
Sanz and Oppisso for Appellee.
SYLLABUS
1. MASTER AND SERVANT; DRIVERS OF HORSES; CUSTOM AND USAGE; NEGLIGENCE. — A
coachman or driver, who had driven the horses composing his team for a considerable time,
during which the animals has shown no disposition to become unruly, left his team as usual and
was assisting in unloading the wagon when the horses bolted and running into the plaintiffs’
carriage caused personal injuries to the plaintiff and damage to the vehicle. It was further shown
that, to leave teams under like circumstances and to assist in unloading the wagon, is the
custom of drivers in the city and that the custom is sanctioned by employers. Held: That acts,
the performance of which has not proven destructive or injurious and which have been generally
acquiesced in by society for so long a time as to have ripened into a custom, can not be held to
be unreasonable or imprudent and that, under the circumstances, the driver was not guilty of
negligence in so leaving his team while assisting in unloading his wagon.
DECISION
MORELAND, J. :
The facts found by the trial court are undisputed by either party in this case. They are —
"That on the 11th day of September, 1908, the plaintiff, Carmen Ong de Martinez, was riding in
a carromata on Calle Real, district of Ermita, city of Manila, P.I., along the left-hand side of the
street as she was going, when a delivery wagon belonging to the defendant used for the purpose
of transportation of fodder by the defendant, and to which was attached a pair of horses, came
along the street in the opposite direction to that the in which said plaintiff was proceeding, and
that thereupon the driver of the said plaintiff’s carromata, observing that the delivery wagon of
the defendant was coming at great speed, crowded close to the sidewalk on the left-hand side of
the street and stopped, in order to give defendant’s delivery wagon an opportunity to pass by,
but that instead of passing by the defendant’s wagon and horses ran into the carromata occupied
by said plaintiff with her child and overturned it, severely wounding said plaintiff by making a
serious cut upon her head, and also injuring the carromata itself and the harness upon the horse
which was drawing it.
x x x
"These facts are not dispute, but the defendant presented evidence to the effect that the
cochero, who was driving his delivery wagon at the time the accident occurred, was a good
servant and was considered a safe and reliable cochero; that the delivery wagon had sent to
deliver some forage at Paco Livery Stable on Calle Herran, and that for the purpose of delivery
thereof the cochero driving the team as defendant’s employee tied the driving lines of the horses
to the front end of the delivery wagon and then went back inside of the wagon for the purpose of
unloading the forage to be delivered; that while unloading the forage and in the act of carrying
some of it out, another vehicle drove by, the driver of which cracked a whip and made some
other noises, which frightened the horses attached to the delivery wagon and they ran away, and
the driver was thrown from the inside of the wagon out through the rear upon the ground and
was unable to stop the horses; that the horses then ran up and on which street they came into
collision with the carromata in which the plaintiff, Carmen Ong de Martinez, was riding."cralaw
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The defendant himself was not with the vehicle on the day in question.
Upon these facts the court below found the defendant guilty of negligence and gave judgment
against him for P442.50, with interest thereon at the rate of 6 per cent per annum from the 17th
day of October, 1908, and for the costs of the action. The case is before us on an appeal from
that judgment.
There is no general law of negligence in the Philippine Islands except that embodied in the Civil
Code. The provisions of that code pertinent to this case are —
"Art. 1902. A person who by an act or omission causes damage to another when there is fault or
negligence shall be obliged to repair the damage so done.
"Art. 1903. The obligation imposed by preceding article is demandable, not only for personal acts
and omissions, but also for those of the persons for whom they should be responsible.
"The father, and on his death or incapacity the mother, is liable for the damages caused by the
minors who live with them.
"Guardians are liable for the damages caused by minors or incapacitated persons who are under
their authority and live with them.
"Owners of directors of an establishment or enterprise are equally liable for the damages caused
by the employees in the service of the branches in which the latter may be employed or on
account of their duties.
"The State is liable in this sense when it acts through a special agent, but not when the damages
should have been caused by the official to whom properly it pertained to do the act performed, in
which case the provisions of the preceding article shall be applicable.
"Finally, masters or directors of arts and trades are liable for the damages caused by their pupils
or apprentices while they are under their custody.
"The liability referred to in this article shall cease when the persons mentioned therein prove that
they employed all the diligence of a good father of a family to avoid the damage."cralaw
virtua1aw library
Passing the question whether or not an employer who has furnished a gentle and tractable team
and a trusty and capable driver is, under the last paragraph of the above provisions, liable for
the negligence of such driver in handling the team, we are of the opinion that the judgment must
be reversed upon the ground that the evidence does not disclose that the cochero was negligent.
While the law relating to negligence in this jurisdiction may possibly be some what different from
that in Anglo-Saxon countries, a question we do not now discuss, the rules under which the fact
of negligence is determined are, nevertheless, generally the same. That is to say, while the law
designating the person responsible for a negligent act may not be the same here as in many
jurisdictions, the law determining what is a negligent act is the same here, generally speaking,
as elsewhere. (Supreme court of Spain, 4 December, 1903; 16 May, 1893; 27 June, 1894; 9
April, 1896; 14 March, 1901; 2 March, 1904; 7 February, 1905; 16 June, 1905; 23 June, 1905;
13 April, 1903; 7 March, 1902; 12 June, 1900; 2 March, 1907; 18 March, 1898; 3 June, 1901.)
It appears from the undisputed evidence that the horses which caused the damage were gentle
and tractable; that the cochero was experienced and capable; that he had driven one of the
horses several years and the other five or six months; that he had been in the habit, during all
that time, of leaving them in the condition in which they were left on the day of the accident;
that they had never run away up to that time and there had been, therefore, no accident due to
such practice; that to leave the horses and assist in unloading the merchandise in the manner
described on the day of the accident was the custom of all cochero who delivered merchandise of
the character of that which was being delivered by the cochero of the defendant on the day in
question, which custom was sanctioned by their employers.
In our judgment, the cochero of the defendant was not negligent in leaving the horses in the
manner described by the evidence in this case, either under Spanish or American jurisprudence.
(Lynch v. Nurdin, 1 Q. B., 422; Rumsey v. Nelson, 58 Vt., 590; Drake v. Mount, 33 N. J. L., 442;
Hoboken Land and Improvement Co. v. Lally, 48 N. J. L., 604; Wasmer v. D. L. & W. R. R. Co.,
80 N. Y., 212.)
In the case of Hayman v. Hewitt (Peake N. P. Cas., pt. 2, p. 170), Lord Kenyon
said:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"He was performing his duty while removing the goods into the house, and, if every person who
suffered a cart to remain in the street while he took goods out of it was obliged to employ
another to look after the horses, it would be impossible for the business of the metropolis to go
on.
In the case of Griggs v. Fleckenstein (14 Minn., 81), the court said:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"The degree of care required of the plaintiff, or those in charged of his horse, at the time of the
injury, is that which would be exercised by a person of ordinary care and prudence under like
circumstances. It can not be said that the fact of leaving the horse unhitched is in itself
negligence. Whether it is negligence to leave a horse unhitched must be depend upon the
disposition of the horse; whether he was under the observation and control of some person all
the time, and many other circumstances; and is a question to be determined by the jury from
the facts of each case."cralaw virtua1aw library
In the case of Belles v. Kellner (67 N. J. L., 255), it was held that it was error on the part of the
trial court to refuse to charge that "it is not negligence for the driver of a quite, gentle horse to
leave him unhitched and otherwise unattended on the side of a public highways while the driver
is upon the sidewalk loading goods on the wagon." The said court closed its opinion with these
words:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"There was evidence which could have fully justified the jury in finding that the horse was quite
and gentle, and that the driver was upon the sidewalk loading goods on the wagon, at time of
the alleged injury, and that the horse had been used for years in that way without accident. The
refusal of the trial court to charge as requested left the jury free to find was verdict against the
defendant, although the jury was convinced that these facts were proven.
In the case of Southworth v. Ry. Co. (105 Mass., 342), it was held:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"That evidence that a servant, whom traders employed to deliver goods, upon stopping with his
horse and wagon to deliver a parcel at a house from fifty to a hundred rods from a railroad
crossing, left the horse unfastened for four or five minutes while he was in the house, knowing
that it was not afraid of cars, and having used it for three or four months without ever hitching it
or knowing it to start, is not conclusive, as a matter of law, of a want of due care on his
part."cralaw virtua1aw library
The duty, a violation of which is claimed to be negligence in the respect in question, is to

exercise reasonable care and prudence. Where reasonable care is employed in doing an act not
itself illegal or inherently likely to produce damage to others, there will be no liability, although
damage in fact ensues. (Milwaukee Ry. Co. v. Arms, 91 U. S., 489; Parrott v. Wells, 15 Wall.,
524; Brown v. Kendall, 6 Cushing, 292; Jackson Architectural Iron Works v. Hurlbut, 158 N. Y.,
34 Westerfield v. Levis, 43 La. An., 63; Niosi v. Empire Steam Laundry, 117 Cal., 257.)
The act of defendant’s driver in leaving the horses in the manner proved was not unreasonable
or imprudent. Acts the performance of which has not proved destructive or injurious and which
have, therefore, been acquiesced in by society for so long a time that they have ripened into
custom, can not be held to be themselves unreasonable or imprudent. Indeed the very reason
why they have been permitted by society is that they beneficial rather than prejudicial. Accidents
sometimes happen and injuries result from the most ordinary acts of life. But such are not their
natural or customary results. To hold that, because such an act once resulted in accident or
injury, the actor is necessarily negligent, is to go far. The fact that the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur is sometimes successfully invoked in such a case, does not in any sense militate against
the reasoning presented. That maxim at most only creates a prima facie case, and that only in
the absence of proof of the circumstances under which the act complained of was performed. It
is something invoked in favor of the plaintiff before defendant’s case showing the conditions and
circumstances under which the injury occurred, the creative reason for the doctrine of res ipsa
loquitur disappears. This is demonstrated by the case of Inland and Seaboard Costing Co. v.
Tolson (139 U.S., 551), where the court said (p. 554):jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
". . . The whole effect of the instruction in question, as applied to the case before the jury, was
that if the steamboat, on a calm day and in smooth water, was thrown with such force against a
wharf properly built, as to tear up some of the planks of the flooring, this would be prima facie
evidence of negligence on the part of the defendant’s agent in making the landing, unless upon
the whole evidence in the case this prima facie evidence was rebutted. As such damage to a
wharf is not ordinarily done by a steamboat under control of her officers and carefully managed
by them, evidence that such damage was done in this case was prima facie, and, if unexplained,
sufficient evidence of negligence on their part, and the jury might properly be so
instructed."cralaw virtua1aw library
There was presented in this case, and by the plaintiffs themselves, not only the fact of the
runway and the accident resulting therefrom, but also the conditions under which the runaway
occurred. Those conditions showing of themselves that the defendant’s cochero was not
negligent in the management of the horse, the prima facie case in plaintiffs’ favor, if any, was
destroyed as soon as made.
It is a matter of common knowledge as well as proof that it is the universal practice of merchants
to deliver merchandise of the kind of that being delivered at the time of the injury, in the manner
in which that was then being delivered; and that it is the universal practice to leave the horses in
the manner in which they were left at the time of the accident. This is the custom in all cities. It
has not been productive of accidents or injuries. The public, finding itself unprejudiced by such
practice, has acquiesced for years without objection. Ought the public now, through the courts,
without prior objection or notice, to be permitted to reverse the practice of decades and thereby
make culpable and guilty one who had every reason and assurance to believe that he was acting
under the sanction of the strongest of all civil forces, the custom of a people? We think not.
The judgment is reversed, without special finding as to costs. So ordered.
Arellano, C.J., Mapa, Johnson, Carson and Trent, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
TORRES, J., dissenting:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
I am of the opinion that the judgment should be affirmed.
17. Yao Kee vs. Sy-Gonzales, G.R. No. 55960, November 24, 1988
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. L-55960. November 24, 1988.]
YAO KEE, SZE SOOK WAH, SZE LAI CHO, and SY CHUN YEN, Petitioners, v. AIDA SY-
GONZALES, MANUEL SY, TERESITA SY-BERNABE, RODOLFO SY, and HONORABLE
COURT OF APPEALS, Respondents.
Montesa, Albon & Associates for Petitioner.
De Lapa, Salonga, Fulgencio & De Lunas for Respondents.
SYLLABUS
1. CIVIL LAW; CUSTOM, DEFINED. — Custom is defined as "a rule of conduct formed by
repetition of acts, uniformly observed (practiced) as a social rule, legally binding and obligatory"
[In the Matter of the Petition for Authority to Continue Use of the Firm Name "Ozaeta, Romulo,
de Leon, Mabanta and Reyes", July 30, 1979, 92 SCRA 3, 12].
2. ID.; ID.; MUST BE PROVED ACCORDING TO THE RULES ON EVIDENCE. — The law requires
that "a custom must be proved as a fact, according to the rules of evidence" [Article 12, Civil
Code.] On this score the Court had occasion to state that "a local custom as a source of right can
not be considered by a court of justice unless such custom is properly established by competent
evidence like any other fact" [Patriarca v. Orate, 7 Phil. 390, 395 (1907).] The same evidence, if
not one of a higher degree, should be required of a foreign custom.
3. ID.; FOREIGN MARRIAGE; HOW PROVED. — To establish a valid foreign marriage two things
must be proven, namely: (1) the existence of the foreign law as a question of fact; and (2) the
alleged foreign marriage by convincing evidence [Adong v. Cheong Seng Gee, 43 Phil. 43, 49
(1922)].
4. REMEDIAL LAE; EVIDENCE; PROOF OF WRITTEN FOREIGN LAW; TESTIMONY OF COMPETENT

WITNESS, INCLUDED. — In proving a foreign law the procedure is provided in the Rules of Court.
Proof of a written foreign law, on the other hand, is provided for under Rule 132 Section 25. The
Court has interpreted section 25 to include competent evidence like the testimony of a witness to
prove the existence of a written foreign law [Collector of Internal Revenue v. Fisher 110 Phil.
686, 700-701 (1961) citing Willamette Iron and Steel Works v. Muzzal, 61 Phil. 471 (1935).]
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; MARRIAGE CONTRACTED PURSUANT TO A FOREIGN LAW MUST BE PROVED TO
BE RECOGNIZED; CASE AT BAR. — Accordingly, in the absence of proof of the Chinese law on
marriage, it should be presumed that it is the same as ours . . . [Wong Woo Yiu v. Vivo, G.R. No.
L-21076, March 31, 1965, 13 SCRA 552, 555.] Since Yao Kee admitted in her testimony that
there was no solemnizing officer as is known here in the Philippines [See Article 56, Civil Code]
when her alleged marriage to Sy Kiat was celebrated it therefore follows that her marriage to Sy
Kiat, even if true, cannot be recognized in this jurisdiction [Wong Woo Yiu v. Vivo, supra., pp.
555-556.]
6. ID.; PHILIPPINE COURTS CANNOT TAKE JUDICIAL NOTICE OF FOREIGN LAWS. — Philippine
courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws. They must be alleged and proved as any other
fact [Yam Ka Lim v. Collector of Customs, 30 Phil. 46, 48 (1915); Fluemer v. Hix, 54 Phil. 610
(1930).]
7. ID.; EVIDENCE; PROOF OF WRITTEN FOREIGN LAW; RULING IN MEMORACION CASE, NOT
APPLICABLE TOP CASE AT BAR. — The Memoracion case however is not applicable to the case at
bar as said case did not concern a foreign marriage and the issue posed was whether or not the
oral testimony of a spouse is competent evidence to prove the fact of marriage in a complaint for
adultery.
8. CIVIL LAW; PERSONS; PATERNITY AND FILIATION; FAILURE TO ESTABLISH CELEBRATION OF

MARRIAGE ACCORDING TO THE LAWS OF CHINA; EFFECT ON STATUS OF CHILDREN. — Failure
to establish the marriage of Yao Kee with Sy Kiat according to the laws of China, they cannot be
accorded the status of legitimate children but only that of acknowledged natural children.
Petitioners are natural children, it appearing that at the time of their conception Yao Kee and Sy
Kiat were not disqualified by any impediment to marry one another [See Art. 269, Civil Code.]
And they are acknowledged children of the deceased because of Sy Kiat’s recognition of Sze
Sook Wah.
9. ID.; ID.; ID.; RECOGNITION OF NATURAL CHILDREN; ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF ONE NATURAL

CHILD BENEFITS HER SISTERS AND BROTHERS OF THE FULL BLOOD. — The acknowledgment of
Sze Sook Wah extends to Sze Lai Cho and Sy Chun yen who are her sisters of the full blood [See
Art. 271, Civil Code].
10. ID.; ID.; ID.; COMPROMISE AGREEMENT ACKNOWLEDGING THEIR NATURAL CHILDREN AND
PROVIDING FOR THEIR SUPPORT CONSTITUTES A STATEMENT BEFORE A COURT OF RECORD. —
Compromise agreement entered into by their parents acknowledging their five (5) natural
children and providing for their support approved by the by the Court of First Instance
constitutes a statement before a court of record by which a child may be voluntarily
acknowledged [See Art. 278, Civil Code].
11. REMEDIAL LAW; BATAS PAMBANSA BLG. 129; FUNCTIONS AND JURISDICTION OF THE
JUVENILE AND DOMESTIC RELATIONS COURTS, VESTED NOW WITH THE REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT. — With the enactment of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, otherwise known as the Judiciary
Reorganization Act of 1980, the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Courts were abolished. Their
functions and jurisdiction are now vested with the Regional Trial Courts [See Section 19 (7), B.P.
Blg. 129 and Divinagracia v. Belosillo, G.R. No. L-47407, August 12, 1986, 143 SCRA 356, 360]
12. ID.; ACTIONS; ISSUE ON PATERNITY AND FILIATION MAY BE PASSED UPON IN A TESTATE
OF INTESTATE PROCEEDING; REASON. — A case involving paternity and acknowledgment may
be ventilated as an incident in the intestate or testate proceeding (See Baluyot v. Ines Luciano,
L-42215, July 13, 1976). But that legal provision presupposes that such an administration
proceeding is pending or existing and has not been terminated. The reason for this rule is not
only "to obviate the rendition of conflicting rulings on the same issue by the Court of First
Instance and the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court" [Vda. de Baluyut v. Luciano, G.R. No.
L-42215, July 13, 1976, 72 SCRA 52, 63] but more importantly to prevent multiplicity of suits.
DECISION
CORTES, J.:
Sy Kiat, a Chinese national, died on January 17, 1977 in Caloocan City where he was then
residing, leaving behind real and personal properties here in the Philippines worth P300,000.00
more or less.
Thereafter, Aida Sy-Gonzales, Manuel Sy, Teresita Sy-Bernabe and Rodolfo Sy filed a petition for
the grant of letters of administration docketed as Special Proceedings Case No. C-699 of the then
Court of First Instance of Rizal Branch XXXIII, Caloocan City. In said petition they alleged among
others that (a) they are the children of the deceased with Asuncion Gillego; (b) to their
knowledge Sy Kiat died intestate; (c) they do not recognize Sy Kiat’s marriage to Yao Kee nor
the filiation of her children to him; and, (d) they nominate Aida Sy-Gonzales for appointment as
administratrix of the intestate estate of the deceased [Record on Appeal, pp. 4-9; Rollo, p. 107.]
The petition was opposed by Yao Kee, Sze Sook Wah, Sze Lai Cho and Sy Yun Chen who alleged
that: (a) Yao Kee is the lawful wife of Sy Kiat whom he married on January 19, 1931 in China;
(b) the other oppositors are the legitimate children of the deceased with Yao Kee; and, (c) Sze
Sook Wah is the eldest among them and is competent, willing and desirous to become the
administratrix of the estate of Sy Kiat [Record on Appeal, pp. 12-13; Rollo, p. 107.]
After hearing, the probate court, finding among others that:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
(1) Sy Kiat was legally married to Yao Kee [CFI decision, pp. 12-27; Rollo, pp. 49-64;]
(2) Sze Sook Wah, Sze Lai Cho and Sze Chum Yen are the legitimate children of Yao Kee with Sy
Kiat [CFI decision, pp. 28-31; Rollo. pp. 65-68;] and,
(3) Aida Sy-Gonzales, Manuel Sy, Teresita Sy-Bernabe and Rodolfo Sy are the acknowledged
illegitimate offsprings of Sy Kiat with Asuncion Gillego [CFI decision, pp. 27-28; Rollo, pp. 64-
65.]
held if favor of the oppositors (petitioners herein) and appointed Sze Sook Wah as the
administratrix of the intestate estate of the deceased [CFI decision, pp. 68-69; Rollo, pp. 106.]
On appeal the Court of Appeals rendered a decision modifying that of the probate court, the
dispositive portion of which reads:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the decision of the lower Court is hereby MODIFIED and SET
ASIDE and a new judgment rendered as follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
(1) Declaring petitioners Aida Sy-Gonzales, Manuel Sy, Teresita Sy-Bernabe and Rodolfo Sy
acknowledged natural children of the deceased Sy Kiat with Asuncion Gillego, an unmarried
woman with whom he lived as husband and wife without benefit of marriage for many
years:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
(2) Declaring oppositors Sze Sook Wah, Sze Lai Chu and Sze Chun Yen, the acknowledged
natural children of the deceased Sy Kiat with his Chinese wife Yao Kee, also known as Yui Yip,
since the legality of the alleged marriage of Sy Kiat to Yao Kee in China had not been proven to
be valid to the laws of the Chinese People’s Republic of China (sic);
(3) Declaring the deed of sale executed by Sy Kiat on December 7, 1976 in favor of Tomas Sy
(Exhibit "G-1", English translation of Exhibit "G") of the Avenue Tractor and Diesel Parts Supply
to be valid and accordingly, said property should be excluded from the estate of the deceased Sy
Kiat; and
(4) Affirming the appointment by the lower court of Sze Sook Wah as judicial administratrix of
the estate of the deceased. [CA decision, pp. 11-12; Rollo, pp. 36-37.]
From said decision both parties moved for partial reconsideration, which was however denied by
respondent court. They thus interposed their respective appeals to this Court.
Private respondents filed a petition with this Court docketed as G.R. No. 56045 entitled "Aida Sy-
Gonzales, Manuel Sy, Teresita Sy-Bernabe and Rodolfo Sy v. Court of Appeals, Yao Kee, Sze
Sook Wah, Sze Lai Cho and Sy Chun Yen" questioning paragraphs (3) and (4) of the dispositive
portion of the Court of Appeals’ decision. The Supreme Court however resolved to deny the
petition and the motion for reconsideration. Thus on March 8, 1982 entry of judgment was made
in G.R. No. 56045. **
The instant petition, on the other hand, questions paragraphs (1) and (2) of the dispositive
portion of the decision of the Court of Appeals. This petition was initially denied by the Supreme
Court on June 22, 1981. Upon motion of the petitioners the Court in a resolution dated
September 16, 1981 reconsidered the denial and decided to give due course to this petition.
Herein petitioners assign the following as errors:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
I. RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN DECLARING THE MARRIAGE OF SY

KIAT TO YAO YEE AS NOT HAVE (sic) BEEN PROVEN VALID IN ACCORDANCE WITH LAWS OF THE
PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA.
II. RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN DECLARING AIDA SY-GONZALES,

MANUEL SY, TERESITA SY-BERNABE AND RODOLFO SY AS NATURAL CHILDREN OF SY KIAT
WITH ASUNCION GILLEGO. [Petition, p. 2; Rollo, p. 6.]
I. Petitioners argue that the marriage of Sy Kiat to Yao Kee in accordance with Chinese law and
custom was conclusively proven. To buttress this argument they rely on the following testimonial
and documentary evidence.
First, the testimony of Yao Kee summarized by the trial court as follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw
library
Yao Kee testified that she was married to Sy Kiat on January 19, 1931 in Fookien, China; that
she does not have a marriage certificate because the practice during that time was for elders to
agree upon the betrothal of their children, and in her case, her elder brother was the one who
contracted or entered into [an] agreement with the parents of her husband; that the agreement
was that she and Sy Kiat would be married, the wedding date was set, and invitations were sent
out; that the said agreement was complied with; that she has five children with Sy Kiat, but two
of them died; that those who are alive are Sze Sook Wah, Sze Lai Cho, and Sze Chun Yen, the
eldest being Sze Sook Wah who is already 38 years old; that Sze Sook Wah was born on
November 7, 1939; that she and her husband, Sy Kiat, have been living in Fookien, China before
he went to the Philippines on several occasions; that the practice during the time of her marriage
was a written document [is exchanged] just between the parents of the bride and the parents of
the groom, or any elder for that matter; that in China, the custom is that there is a go-between,
a sort of marriage broker who is known to both parties who would talk to the parents of the
bride-to-be; that if the parents of the bride-to-be agree to have the groom-to-be their son-in-
law, then they agree on a date as an engagement day; that on engagement day, the parents of
the groom would bring some pieces of jewelry to the parents of the bride-to-be, and then one
month after that, a date would be set for the wedding, which in her case, the wedding date to Sy
Kiat was set on January 19, 1931; that during the wedding the bridegroom brings with him a
couch (sic) where the bride would ride and on that same day, the parents of the bride would give
the dowry for her daughter and then the document would be signed by the parties but there is
no solemnizing officer as is known in the Philippines; that during the wedding day, the document
is signed only by the parents of the bridegroom as well as by the parents of the bride; that the
parties themselves do not sign the document; that the bride would then be placed in a carriage
where she would be brought to the town of the bridegroom and before departure the bride would
be covered with a sort of a veil; that upon reaching the town of the bridegroom, the bridegroom
takes away the veil; that during her wedding to Sy Kiat (according to said Chinese custom),
there were many persons present; that after Sy Kiat opened the door of the carriage, two old
ladies helped her go down the carriage and brought her inside the house of Sy Kiat; that during
her wedding, Sy Chiok, the eldest brother of Sy Kiat, signed the document with her mother; that
as to the whereabouts of that document, she and Sy Kiat were married for 46 years already and
the document was left in China and she doubt if that document can still be found now; that it
was left in the possession of Sy Kiat’s family; that right now, she does not know the whereabouts
of that document because of the lapse of many years and because they left it in a certain place
and it was already eaten by the termites; that after her wedding with Sy Kiat, they lived
immediately together as husband and wife, and from then on, they lived together; that Sy Kiat
went to the Philippines sometime in March or April in the same year they were married; that she
went to the Philippines in 1970, and then came back to China; that again she went back to the
Philippines and lived with Sy Kiat as husband and wife; that she begot her children with Sy Kiat
during the several trips by Sy Kiat made back to China. [CFI decision, pp. 13-15; Rollo, pp. 50-
52.]
Second, the testimony of Gan Ching, a younger brother of Yao Kee who stated that he was
among the many people who attended the wedding of his sister with Sy Kiat and that no
marriage certificate is issued by the Chinese government, a document signed by the parents or
elders of the parties being sufficient [CFI decision, pp. 15-16; Rollo, pp. 52-53.]
Third, the statements made by Asuncion Gillego when she testified before the trial court to the
effect that (a) Sy Kiat was married to Yao Kee according to Chinese custom; and, (b) Sy Kiat’s
admission to her that he has a Chinese wife whom he married according to Chinese custom [CFI
decision, p. 17; Rollo, p. 54.]
Fourth, Sy Kiat’s Master Card of Registered Alien issued in Caloocan City on October 3, 1972
where the following entries are found: "Marital status — Married" ; "If married give name of
spouse — Yao Kee" ; "Address — China" ; "Date of marriage — 1931" ; and "Place of marriage —
China" [Exhibit "SS-1." ]
Fifth, Sy Kiat’s Alien Certificate of Registration issued in Manila on January 12, 1968 where the
following entries are likewise found: "Civil status — Married" ; and, "If married, state name and
address of spouse — Yao Kee Chingkang, China" [Exhibit "4." ]
And lastly, the certification issued in Manila on October 28, 1977 by the Embassy of the People’s
Republic of China to the effect that "according to the information available at the Embassy Mr. Sy
Kiat a Chinese national and Mrs. Yao Kee alias Yui Yip also Chinese were married on January 19,
1931 in Fukien, the People’s Republic of China" [Exhibit "5." ]
These evidence may very well prove the fact of marriage between Yao Kee and Sy Kiat.
However, the same do not suffice to establish the validity of said marriage in accordance with
Chinese law or custom.
Custom is defined as "a rule of conduct formed by repetition of acts, uniformly observed
(practiced) as a social rule, legally binding and obligatory" [In the Matter of the Petition for
Authority to Continue Use of the Firm Name "Ozaeta, Romulo, de Leon, Mabanta and Reyes",
July 30, 1979, SCRA 3, 12 citing JBL Reyes & RC Puno, Outline of Phil. Civil Law, Fourth Ed. Vol.
1, p. 7.] The law requires that "a custom must be proved as a fact, according to the rules of
evidence" [Article 12, Civil Code.] On this score the Court had occasion to state that "a local
custom as a source of right can not be considered by a court of justice unless such custom is
properly established by competent evidence like any other fact" [Patriarca v. Orate, 7 Phil. 390,
395 (1907).] The same evidence, if not one of a higher degree, should be required of a foreign
custom.
The law on foreign marriages is provided by Article 71 of the Civil Code which states
that:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Art. 71. All marriages performed outside the Philippines in accordance with the laws in force in
the country where they were performed, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this
country, except bigamous, polygamous, or incestuous marriages, as determined by Philippine
law. (Emphasis supplied.) ***
Construing this provision of law the Court has held that to establish a valid foreign marriage two
things must be proven, namely: (1) the existence of the foreign law as a question of fact; and
(2) the alleged foreign marriage by convincing evidence [Adong v. Cheong Seng Gee, 43 Phil.
43, 49 (1922).]
In proving a foreign law the procedure is provided in the Rules of Court. With respect to an
unwritten foreign law, Rule 130 section 45 states that:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
SEC. 45. Unwritten law. — The oral testimony of witnesses, skilled therein, is admissible as
evidence of the unwritten law of a foreign country, as are also printed and published books of
reports of decisions of the courts of the foreign country, if proved to be commonly admitted in
such courts.
Proof of a written foreign law, on the other hand, is provided for under Rule 132 section 25,
thus:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
SEC. 25. Proof of public or official record. — An official record or an entry therein, when
admissible for any purpose, may be evidenced by an official publication thereof or by a copy
attested by the officer having the legal custody of the record, or by his deputy, and
accompanied, if the record is not kept in the Philippines, with a certificate that such officer has
the custody. If the office in which the record is kept is in a foreign country, the certificate may be
made by a secretary of embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice consul, or consular
agent or by any officer in the foreign service of the Philippines stationed in the foreign country in
which the record is kept and authenticated by the seal of his office.
The Court has interpreted section 25 to include competent evidence like the testimony of a
witness to prove the existence of a written foreign law [Collector of Internal Revenue v. Fisher
110 Phil. 686, 700-701 (1961) citing Willamette Iron and Steel Works v. Muzzal, 61 Phil. 471
(1935).]
In the case at bar petitioners did not present any competent evidence relative to the law and
custom of China on marriage. The testimonies of Yao and Gan Ching cannot be considered as
proof of China’s law or custom on marriage not only because they are self-serving evidence, but
more importantly, there is no showing that they are competent to testify on the subject matter.
For failure to prove the foreign law or custom, and consequently, the validity of the marriage in
accordance with said law or custom, the marriage between Yao Kee and Sy Kiat cannot be
recognized in this jurisdiction.
Petitioners contend that contrary to the Court of Appeals’ ruling they are not duty bound to prove
the Chinese law on marriage as judicial notice thereof had been taken by this Court in the case
of Sy Joc Lieng v. Sy Quia [16 Phil. 137 (1910).]
This contention is erroneous. Well-established in this jurisdiction is the principle that Philippine
courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws. They must be alleged and proved as any other
fact [Yam Ka Lim v. Collector of Customs, 30 Phil. 46, 48 (1915); Fluemer v. Hix, 54 Phil. 610
(1930).]
Moreover a reading of said case would show that the party alleging the foreign marriage
presented a witness, one Li Ung Bieng, to prove that matrimonial letters mutually exchanged by
the contracting parties constitute the essential requisite for a marriage to be considered duly
solemnized in China. Based on his testimony, which as found by the Court is uniformly
corroborated by authors on the subject of Chinese marriage, what was left to be decided was the
issue of whether or not the fact of marriage in accordance with Chinese law was duly proven [Sy
Joc Lieng v. Sy Quia, supra., at p. 160.]
Further, even assuming for the sake of argument that the Court has indeed taken judicial notice
of the law of China on marriage in the aforecited case, petitioners however have not shown any
proof that the Chinese law or custom obtaining at the time the Sy Joc Lieng marriage was
celebrated in 1847 was still the law when the alleged marriage of Sy Kiat to Yao Kee took place
in 1931 or eighty-four (84) years later.
Petitioners moreover cite the case of U.S. v. Memoracion [34 Phil. 633 (1916)] as being
applicable to the instant case. They aver that the judicial pronouncement in the Memoracion
case, that the testimony of one of the contracting parties is competent evidence to show the fact
of marriage, holds true in this case.
The Memoracion case however is not applicable to the case at bar as said case did not concern a
foreign marriage and the issue posed was whether or not the oral testimony of a spouse is
competent evidence to prove the fact of marriage in a complaint for adultery.
Accordingly, in the absence of proof of the Chinese law on marriage, it should be presumed that
it is the same as ours **** [Wong Woo Yiu v. Vivo, G.R. No. L-21076, March 31, 1965, 13 SCRA
552, 555.] Since Yao Kee admitted in her testimony that there was no solemnizing officer as i6
known here in the Philippines [See Article 56, Civil Code] when her alleged marriage to Sy Kiat
was celebrated [CFI decision, p. 14; Rollo, p. 51], it therefore follows that her marriage to Sy
Kiat, even if true, cannot be recognized in this jurisdiction [Wong Woo Yiu v. Vivo, supra., pp.
555-556.]
II. The second issue raised by petitioners concerns the status of private respondents.
Respondent court found the following evidence of petitioners’ filiation:chanrob1es virtual 1aw
library
(1) Sy Kiat’s Master Card of Registered Alien where the following are entered: "Children if any:
give number of children — Four" ; and, "Name — All living in China" [Exhibit "SS-1" ;]
(2) the testimony of their mother Yao Kee who stated that she had five children with Sy Kiat,
only three of whom are alive namely, Sze Sook Wah Sze Lai Chu and Sze Chin Yan [TSN,
December 12, 1977, pp. 9-11;] and,
(3) an affidavit executed on March 22, 1961 by Sy Kiat for presentation to the Local Civil
Registrar of Manila to support Sze Sook Wah’s application for a marriage license, wherein Sy Kiat
expressly stated that she is his daughter [Exhibit "3." ]
Likewise on the record is the testimony of Asuncion Gillego that Sy Kiat told her he has three
daughters with his Chinese wife, two of whom — Sook Wah and Sze Kai Cho — she knows, and
one adopted son [TSN, December 6, 1977, pp. 87-88.]
However, as petitioners failed to establish the marriage of Yao Kee with Sy Kiat according to the
laws of China, they cannot be accorded the status of legitimate children but only that of
acknowledged natural children. Petitioners are natural children, it appearing that at the time of
their conception Yao Kee and Sy Kiat were not disqualified by any impediment to marry one
another [See Art. 269, Civil Code.] And they are acknowledged children of the deceased because
of Sy Kiat’s recognition of Sze Sook Wah [Exhibit "3" ] and its extension to Sze Lai Cho and Sy
Chun Yen who are her sisters of the full blood [See Art. 271, Civil Code.]
Private respondents on the other hand are also the deceased’s acknowledged natural children
with Asuncion Gillego, a Filipina with whom he lived for twenty-five (25) years with out the
benefit of marriage. They have in their favor their father’s acknowledgment, evidenced by a
compromise agreement entered into by and between their parents and approved by the Court of
First Instance on February 12, 1974 wherein Sy Kiat not only acknowledged them as his children
by Asuncion Gillego but likewise made provisions for their support and future inheritance,
thus:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
x x x
2. The parties also acknowledge that they are common-law husband and wife and that out of
such relationship, which they have likewise decided to definitely and finally terminate effective
immediately, they begot five children, namely: Aida Sy, born on May 30, 1950; Manuel Sy, born
on July 1, 1953; Teresita Sy, born on January 28, 1955; Ricardo Sy now deceased, born on
December 14, 1956; and Rodolfo Sy, born on May 7, 1958.
3. With respect to the AVENUE TRACTOR AND DIESEL PARTS SUPPLY . . ., the parties mutually
agree and convenant that —
(a) The stocks and merchandise and the furniture and equipments . . ., shall be divided into two
equal shares between, and distributed to, Sy Kiat who shall own one-half of the total and the
other half to Asuncion Gillego who shall transfer the same to their children, namely, Aida Sy,
Manuel Sy, Teresita Sy, and Rodolfo Sy.
(b) the business name and premises . . . shall be retained by Sy Kiat. However, it shall be his
obligation to give to the aforenamed children an amount of One Thousand Pesos (P1,000;00)
monthly out of the rental of the two doors of the same building now occupied by Everett
Construction.
x x x
(5) With respect to the acquisition, during the existence of the common-law husband-and-wife
relationship between the parties, of the real estates and properties registered and/or appearing
in the name of Asuncion Gillego . . ., the parties mutually agree and convenant that the said real
estates and properties shall be transferred in equal shares to their children, namely, Aida Sy,
Manuel Sy, Teresita Sy, and Rodolfo Sy, but to be administered by Asuncion Gillego during her
lifetime. . . . [Exhibit "D." ] (Emphasis supplied.)
x x x
This compromise agreement constitutes a statement before a court of record by which a child
may be voluntarily acknowledged [See Art. 278, Civil Code.]
Petitioners further argue that the questions on the validity of Sy Kiat’s marriage to Yao Kee and
the paternity and filiation of the parties should have been ventilated in the Juvenile and Domestic
Relations Court.
Specifically, petitioners rely on the following provision of Republic Act No. 5502, entitled "An Act
Revising Rep. Act No. 3278, otherwise known as the Charter of the City of Caloocan" ; with
regard to the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
SEC. 91-A. Creation and Jurisdiction of the Court. —
x x x
The provisions of the Judiciary Act to the contrary notwithstanding, the court shall have exclusive
original jurisdiction to hear and decide the following cases;
x x x
(2) Cases involving custody, guardianship, adoption, revocation of adoption, paternity and
acknowledgment;
(3) Annulment of marriages, relief from marital obligations legal separation of spouses, and
actions for support;
(4) Proceedings brought under the provisions of title six and title seven, chapters one to three of
the civil code;
x x x
and the ruling in the case of Bartolome v. Bartolome [G.R. No. L-23661, 21 SCRA 1324]
reiterated in Divinagracia v. Rovira [G.R. No. L-42615, 72 SCRA 307.]
With the enactment of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, otherwise known as the Judiciary
Reorganization Act of 1980, the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Courts were abolished. Their
functions and jurisdiction are now vested with the Regional Trial Courts [See Section 19 (7), B.P.
Blg. 129 and Divinagracia v. Belosillo, G.R. No. L-47407, August 12, 1986, 143 SCRA 356, 360]
hence it is no longer necessary to pass upon the issue of jurisdiction raised by petitioners.
Moreover, even without the enactment of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 we find in Rep. Act No. 5502
sec. 91-A last paragraph that:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
x x x
If any question involving any of the above matters should arise as an incident in any case
pending in the ordinary court, said incident shall be determined in the main case.
x x x
As held in the case of Divinagracia v. Rovira [G.R. No. L-42615. August 10, 1976, 72 SCRA
307]:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
x x x
It is true that under the aforequoted section 1 of Republic Act No. 4834 ***** a case involving
paternity and acknowledgment may be ventilated as an incident in the intestate or testate
proceeding (See Baluyot v. Ines Luciano, L-42215, July 13, 1976). But that legal provision
presupposes that such an administration proceeding is pending or existing and has not been
terminated. [at pp. 313-314.] (Emphasis supplied.)
x x x
The reason for this rule is not only "to obviate the rendition of conflicting rulings on the same
issue by the Court of First Instance and the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court" [Vda. de
Baluyut v. Luciano, G.R. No. L-42215, July 13, 1976, 72 SCRA 52, 63] but more importantly to
prevent multiplicity of suits.
Accordingly, this Court finds no reversible error committed by respondent court.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan, C.J., Gutierrez, Jr., Feliciano and Bidin, JJ., concur.
Endnotes:
** The petition for review in G.R. No. 56045 was denied for lack of merit on March 9, 1981.
Counsel for the petitioners then filed a Motion for Consolidation and for Extension of Time to File
Motion for Reconsideration which was granted on July 8, 1981. On February 17, 1982, however,
petitioners’ motion for reconsideration of the resolution of March 9, 1981 was denied.
*** Other than the exceptions contained in this article, this provision of law is derived from
Section 19, Act No. 3613 and Section IV, General Order No. 68.
**** The presumption that, in the absence of proof, the foreign law is the same as the law of
the forum, is known as processual presumption which has been applied by this Court in the cases
of Lim v. The Insular Collector of Customs, 36 Phil. 472 (1917); International Harvester Co. in
Russia v. Hamburg-American Line, 42 Phil. 845 (1918); Miciano v. Brimo, 50 Phil. 867 (1924);
and Rayray v. Chae Kyung Lee, G.R. No. L-18176, October 26, 1966, 18 SCRA 450.
***** Rep. Act 4834 created the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Iloilo. Section 1 of
said Act is the exact copy of section 19-A of Rep. Act 5502.
18. CIR vs. Primetown, G.R. 162155, August 28, 2007
FIRST DIVISION
[G.R. NO. 162155 : August 28, 2007]
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE and ARTURO V. PARCERO in his official

capacity as Revenue District Officer of Revenue District No. 049
(Makati), Petitioners, v. PRIMETOWN PROPERTY GROUP, INC., Respondent.
DECISION
CORONA, J.:
This Petition for Review on Certiorari 1 seeks to set aside the August 1, 2003 decision2 of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 64782 and its February 9, 2004 resolution denying
reconsideration.3
On March 11, 1999, Gilbert Yap, vice chair of respondent Primetown Property Group, Inc.,
applied for the refund or credit of income tax respondent paid in 1997. In Yap's letter to
petitioner revenue district officer Arturo V. Parcero of Revenue District No. 049 (Makati) of the
Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR),4 he explained that the increase in the cost of labor and
materials and difficulty in obtaining financing for projects and collecting receivables caused the
real estate industry to slowdown.5 As a consequence, while business was good during the first
quarter of 1997, respondent suffered losses amounting to P71,879,228 that year.6
According to Yap, because respondent suffered losses, it was not liable for income
taxes.7 Nevertheless, respondent paid its quarterly corporate income tax and remitted creditable
withholding tax from real estate sales to the BIR in the total amount
of P26,318,398.32.8 Therefore, respondent was entitled to tax refund or tax credit. 9
On May 13, 1999, revenue officer Elizabeth Y. Santos required respondent to submit additional
documents to support its claim.10 Respondent complied but its claim was not acted upon. Thus,
on April 14, 2000, it filed a Petition for Review 11 in the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA).
On December 15, 2000, the CTA dismissed the petition as it was filed beyond the two-year
prescriptive period for filing a judicial claim for tax refund or tax credit.12 It invoked Section 229
of the National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC):
Sec. 229. Recovery of Taxes Erroneously or Illegally Collected. - - No suit or proceeding shall be

maintained in any court for the recovery of any national internal revenue tax hereafter alleged to
have been erroneously or illegally assessed or collected, or of any penalty claimed to have been
collected without authority, or of any sum alleged to have been excessively or in any manner
wrongfully collected, until a claim for refund or credit has been duly filed with the Commissioner;
but such suit or proceeding may be maintained, whether or not such tax, penalty, or sum has
been paid under protest or duress.
In any case, no such suit or proceeding shall be filed after the expiration of two (2)
years from the date of payment of the tax or penalty regardless of any supervening
cause that may arise after payment: Provided, however, That the Commissioner may, even
without a claim therefor, refund or credit any tax, where on the face of the return upon which
payment was made, such payment appears clearly to have been erroneously paid. (emphasis
supplied)
The CTA found that respondent filed its final adjusted return on April 14, 1998. Thus, its right to
claim a refund or credit commenced on that date.13
The tax court applied Article 13 of the Civil Code which states:
Art. 13. When the law speaks of years, months, days or nights, it shall be understood that years
are of three hundred sixty-five days each; months, of thirty days; days, of twenty-four
hours, and nights from sunset to sunrise.
If the months are designated by their name, they shall be computed by the number of days
which they respectively have.
In computing a period, the first day shall be excluded, and the last included. (emphasis supplied)
Thus, according to the CTA, the two-year prescriptive period under Section 229 of the NIRC for
the filing of judicial claims was equivalent to 730 days. Because the year 2000 was a leap year,
respondent's petition, which was filed 731 days14 after respondent filed its final adjusted return,
was filed beyond the reglementary period.15
Respondent moved for reconsideration but it was denied.16 Hence, it filed an appeal in the CA.17
On August 1, 2003, the CA reversed and set aside the decision of the CTA.18 It ruled that Article
13 of the Civil Code did not distinguish between a regular year and a leap year. According to the
CA:
The rule that a year has 365 days applies, notwithstanding the fact that a particular year is a
leap year.19
In other words, even if the year 2000 was a leap year, the periods covered by April 15, 1998 to
April 14, 1999 and April 15, 1999 to April 14, 2000 should still be counted as 365 days each or a
total of 730 days. A statute which is clear and explicit shall be neither interpreted nor
construed.20
Petitioners moved for reconsideration but it was denied.21 Thus, this appeal.
Petitioners contend that tax refunds, being in the nature of an exemption, should be strictly
construed against claimants.22 Section 229 of the NIRC should be strictly applied against
respondent inasmuch as it has been consistently held that the prescriptive period (for the filing
of tax refunds and tax credits) begins to run on the day claimants file their final adjusted
returns.23 Hence, the claim should have been filed on or before April 13, 2000 or within 730
days, reckoned from the time respondent filed its final adjusted return.
The conclusion of the CA that respondent filed its Petition for Review in the CTA within the two-
year prescriptive period provided in Section 229 of the NIRC is correct. Its basis, however, is not.
The rule is that the two-year prescriptive period is reckoned from the filing of the final adjusted
return.24 But how should the two-year prescriptive period be computed?cralaw library
As already quoted, Article 13 of the Civil Code provides that when the law speaks of a year, it is
understood to be equivalent to 365 days. In National Marketing Corporation v. Tecson,25 we ruled
that a year is equivalent to 365 days regardless of whether it is a regular year or a leap year. 26
However, in 1987, EO27 292 or the Administrative Code of 1987 was enacted. Section 31,
Chapter VIII, Book I thereof provides:
Sec. 31. Legal Periods. - "Year" shall be understood to be twelve calendar

months; "month" of thirty days, unless it refers to a specific calendar month in which case it
shall be computed according to the number of days the specific month contains; "day", to a day
of twenty-four hours and; "night" from sunrise to sunset. (emphasis supplied)
A calendar month is "a month designated in the calendar without regard to the number of days it
may contain."28 It is the "period of time running from the beginning of a certain numbered day
up to, but not including, the corresponding numbered day of the next month, and if there is not
a sufficient number of days in the next month, then up to and including the last day of that
month."29 To illustrate, one calendar month from December 31, 2007 will be from January 1,
2008 to January 31, 2008; one calendar month from January 31, 2008 will be from February 1,
2008 until February 29, 2008.30
A law may be repealed expressly (by a categorical declaration that the law is revoked and
abrogated by another) or impliedly (when the provisions of a more recent law cannot be
reasonably reconciled with the previous one).31 Section 27, Book VII (Final Provisions) of the
Administrative Code of 1987 states:
Sec. 27. Repealing clause. - All laws, decrees, orders, rules and regulation, or portions thereof,
inconsistent with this Code are hereby repealed or modified accordingly.
A repealing clause like Sec. 27 above is not an express repealing clause because it fails to
identify or designate the laws to be abolished.32 Thus, the provision above
only impliedly repealed all laws inconsistent with the Administrative Code of 1987.chanrobles
virtual law library
Implied repeals, however, are not favored. An implied repeal must have been clearly and
unmistakably intended by the legislature. The test is whether the subsequent law encompasses
entirely the subject matter of the former law and they cannot be logically or reasonably
reconciled.33
Both Article 13 of the Civil Code and Section 31, Chapter VIII, Book I of the Administrative Code
of 1987 deal with the same subject matter - the computation of legal periods. Under the Civil
Code, a year is equivalent to 365 days whether it be a regular year or a leap year. Under the
Administrative Code of 1987, however, a year is composed of 12 calendar months. Needless to
state, under the Administrative Code of 1987, the number of days is irrelevant.
There obviously exists a manifest incompatibility in the manner of computing legal periods under
the Civil Code and the Administrative Code of 1987. For this reason, we hold that Section 31,
Chapter VIII, Book I of the Administrative Code of 1987, being the more recent law, governs the
computation of legal periods. Lex posteriori derogat priori.
Applying Section 31, Chapter VIII, Book I of the Administrative Code of 1987 to this case, the
two-year prescriptive period (reckoned from the time respondent filed its final adjusted
return34 on April 14, 1998) consisted of 24 calendar months, computed as follows:
Year 1 1st calendar April 15, 1998 to May 14, 1998

month
2nd calendar May 15, 1998 to June 14, 1998

month
3rd calendar June 15, 1998 to July 14, 1998

month
4th calendar July 15, 1998 to August 14, 1998

month
5th calendar August 15, 1998 to September 14,

month 1998
6th calendar September 15, to October 14, 1998

month 1998
7th calendar October 15, 1998 to November 14,

month 1998
8th calendar November 15, to December 14,

month 1998 1998
9th calendar December 15, to January 14, 1999

month 1998
10th calendar January 15, 1999 to February 14, 1999

month
11th calendar February 15, 1999 to March 14, 1999

month
12th calendar March 15, 1999 to April 14, 1999

month
Year 2 13th calendar April 15, 1999 to May 14, 1999

month
14th calendar May 15, 1999 to June 14, 1999

month
15th calendar June 15, 1999 to July 14, 1999

month
16th calendar July 15, 1999 to August 14, 1999

month
17th calendar August 15, 1999 to September 14,

month 1999
18th calendar September 15, to October 14, 1999

month 1999
19th calendar October 15, 1999 to November 14,

month 1999
20th calendar November 15, to December 14,

month 1999 1999
21st calendar December 15, to January 14, 2000
month 1999
22nd calendar January 15, 2000 to February 14, 2000

month
23rd calendar February 15, 2000 to March 14, 2000

month
24th calendar March 15, 2000 to April 14, 2000

month
We therefore hold that respondent's petition (filed on April 14, 2000) was filed on the last day of
the 24th calendar month from the day respondent filed its final adjusted return. Hence, it was
filed within the reglementary period.
Accordingly, the petition is hereby DENIED. The case is REMANDED to the Court of Tax Appeals
which is ordered to expeditiously proceed to hear C.T.A. Case No. 6113 entitled Primetown
Property Group, Inc. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue and Arturo V. Parcero.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Endnotes:
1
Under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
2
Penned by Associate Justice Marina L. Buzon and concurred in by Associate Justices Rebecca de
Guia-Salvador and Jose C. Mendoza of the Special Fifteenth Division of the Court of
Appeals. Rollo, pp. 21-25.
3
Penned by Associate Justice Marina L. Buzon and concurred in by Associate Justices Rebecca de
Guia-Salvador and Jose C. Mendoza of the Former Special Fifteenth Division of the Court of
Appeals. Id., pp. 26-28.
4
Id., pp. 37-42.
5
Id., pp. 39-40.
6
Id. This was the period of economic slowdown known as the "Asian (Financial) Crisis" which
started in mid-1997.
7
Id., p. 41.
8
Summary of Tax/Payments for 1997:
Creditable
Quarter Corporate Income Tax TOTAL
Withholding Tax
1st P 3,440,082.00 P 687,783.00 P 4,127,865.00

2nd 15,694,502.00 633,175.00 16,327,677.00
3rd 2,419,868.81 3,154,506.51 5,574,375.32
4th 288,481.00 288,481.00
P 21,554,452.81 P 4,763,945.51 P 26,318,398.32
Id., p. 40.
9
Id., p. 41.
10
Id., pp. 78-79.
11
Docketed as C.T.A. Case No. 6113. Id., pp. 192-199.
12
Penned by Presiding Judge Ernesto D. Acosta and concurred in by Associate Judges Amancio Q.
Saga (retired) and Ramon O. de Veyra (retired). Dated December 15, 2000. Id., pp. 187-190.
13
CIR v. CA, 361 Phil. 359, 364-365 (1999).
14
The computation was as follows:
April 15, 1998 to April 14, 1999 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 365 days
April 15, 1999 to April 14, 2000 (leap year) - - - - - - - - - - 366 days
TOTAL 731 days
15
Rollo, p. 190.
16
Id., p. 191.
17
Docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 64782. Id., pp. 180-186. (This case observes the procedure in RA
1125 prior to the amendments of RA 9282.)
18
Id., pp. 21-25. Under RA 9282 which took effect on April 22, 2004, decisions of the CTA are
now appealable to the Supreme Court.
19
Id., p. 24.
20
Id.
21
Id., pp. 26-28.
22
Id., p. 13.
23
Id., p. 15.
24
Tax Code, Sec. 229 and supra note 12 at 367. See also ACCRA Investments Corporation v.
CA., G.R. No. 96322, 20 December 1991, 204 SCRA 957. See also CIR v. Philippine American
Life Insurance Co., G.R. No. 105208, 29 May 1995, 244 SCRA 446.
25
139 Phil. 584 (1969).
26
Id., pp. 588-589 citing People v. del Rosario, 97 Phil 70, 71 (1955).
27
Executive Order
28
Gutierrez v. Carpio, 53 Phil. 334, 335-336 (1929).
29
Section 9, Time, 74 AmJur 2d 593 citing Re Lynch's Estate, 123 Utah 57, 254 P2d 454.
30
This is pursuant to Article 13(3) of the Civil Code which provides that "[i]n computing a period,
the first day shall be excluded, and the last day included."
Cf. Rules of Court, Rule 22, Sec. 1. The section provides:
Section 1. How to compute time. In computing any period of time prescribed or allowed by this
Rules, or by the order of the court, or by any applicable statute, the day of the act or event
from which the designated period of time begins to run is to be excluded and the date
of performance included. If the last day of the period, as thus computed, falls on a Saturday,
a Sunday or a legal holiday in the place where the court sits, the time shall not run until the next
working day. (emphasis supplied)
31
Jose Jesus G. Laurel, Statutory Construction: Cases and Materials, 1999 ed., 176 citing Black's
Law Dictionary, 4th ed., 1463.
32
Agujetas v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 106560, 23 August 1996, 261 SCRA 17, 32.
33
David v. Commission on Election, G.R. No. 127116, 08 April 1997, 271 SCRA 90, 103.
34
Supra note 25.
19. Van Dorn vs. Ronillo, Jr. et al., 139 SCRA 139
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. L-68470 October 8, 1985
ALICE REYES VAN DORN, Petitioner, vs. HON. MANUEL V. ROMILLO, JR., as Presiding

Judge of Branch CX, Regional Trial Court of the National Capital Region Pasay City and
RICHARD UPTON Respondents.chanrobles virtual law library
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:\
In this Petition for certiorari and Prohibition, petitioner Alice Reyes Van Dorn seeks to set aside
the Orders, dated September 15, 1983 and August 3, 1984, in Civil Case No. 1075-P, issued by
respondent Judge, which denied her Motion to Dismiss said case, and her Motion for
Reconsideration of the Dismissal Order, respectively.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
virtual law library
The basic background facts are that petitioner is a citizen of the Philippines while private
respondent is a citizen of the United States; that they were married in Hongkong in 1972; that,
after the marriage, they established their residence in the Philippines; that they begot two
children born on April 4, 1973 and December 18, 1975, respectively; that the parties were
divorced in Nevada, United States, in 1982; and that petitioner has re-married also in Nevada,
this time to Theodore Van Dorn.chanroble
Dated June 8, 1983, private respondent filed suit against petitioner in Civil Case No. 1075-P of
the Regional Trial Court, Branch CXV, in Pasay City, stating that petitioner's business in Ermita,
Manila, (the Galleon Shop, for short), is conjugal property of the parties, and asking that
petitioner be ordered to render an accounting of that business, and that private respondent be
declared with right to manage the conjugal property. Petitioner moved to dismiss the case on the
ground that the cause of action is barred by previous judgment in the divorce proceedings before
the Nevada Court wherein respondent had acknowledged that he and petitioner had "no
community property" as of June 11, 1982. The Court below denied the Motion to Dismiss in the
mentioned case on the ground that the property involved is located in the Philippines so that the
Divorce Decree has no bearing in the case. The denial is now the subject of this certiorari
proceeding.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Generally, the denial of a Motion to Dismiss in a civil case is interlocutory and is not subject to
appeal. certiorari and Prohibition are neither the remedies to question the propriety of an
interlocutory order of the trial Court. However, when a grave abuse of discretion was patently
committed, or the lower Court acted capriciously and whimsically, then it devolves upon this
Court in a certiorari proceeding to exercise its supervisory authority and to correct the error
committed which, in such a case, is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. 1 Prohibition would then lie
since it would be useless and a waste of time to go ahead with the proceedings. 2 We consider
the petition filed in this case within the exception, and we have given it due course.
For resolution is the effect of the foreign divorce on the parties and their alleged conjugal
property in the Philippines.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Petitioner contends that respondent is estopped from laying claim on the alleged conjugal
property because of the representation he made in the divorce proceedings before the American
Court that they had no community of property; that the Galleon Shop was not established
through conjugal funds, and that respondent's claim is barred by prior
judgment.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
For his part, respondent avers that the Divorce Decree issued by the Nevada Court cannot
prevail over the prohibitive laws of the Philippines and its declared national policy; that the acts
and declaration of a foreign Court cannot, especially if the same is contrary to public policy,
divest Philippine Courts of jurisdiction to entertain matters within its
jurisdiction.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
For the resolution of this case, it is not necessary to determine whether the property relations
between petitioner and private respondent, after their marriage, were upon absolute or relative
community property, upon complete separation of property, or upon any other regime. The
pivotal fact in this case is the Nevada divorce of the parties.chanroblesv
The Nevada District Court, which decreed the divorce, had obtained jurisdiction over petitioner
who appeared in person before the Court during the trial of the case. It also obtained jurisdiction
over private respondent who, giving his address as No. 381 Bush Street, San Francisco,
California, authorized his attorneys in the divorce case, Karp & Gradt Ltd., to agree to the
divorce on the ground of incompatibility in the understanding that there were neither community
property nor community obligations. 3As explicitly stated in the Power of Attorney he executed in
favor of the law firm of KARP & GRAD LTD., 336 W. Liberty, Reno, Nevada, to represent him in
the divorce proceedings:
xxx xxx xxxchanrobles virtual law library
You are hereby authorized to accept service of Summons, to file an Answer, appear on my behalf
and do an things necessary and proper to represent me, without further contesting, subject to
the following: chanrobles virtual law library
1. That my spouse seeks a divorce on the ground of incompatibility.chanroblesvirtualaw
2. That there is no community of property to be adjudicated by the

Court.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
3. 'I'hat there are no community obligations to be adjudicated by the

court.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
xxx xxx xxx 4chanrobles virtual law library
There can be no question as to the validity of that Nevada divorce in any of the States of the
United States. The decree is binding on private respondent as an American citizen. For instance,
private respondent cannot sue petitioner, as her husband, in any State of the Union. What he is
contending in this case is that the divorce is not valid and binding in this jurisdiction, the same
being contrary to local law and public policy.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law
library
It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, 5 only
Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorces the same being
considered contrary to our concept of public police and morality. However, aliens may obtain
divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to
their national law. 6 In this case, the divorce in Nevada released private respondent from the
marriage from the standards of American law, under which divorce dissolves the marriage. As
stated by the Federal Supreme Court of the United States in Atherton vs. Atherton, 45 L. Ed.
794, 799:
The purpose and effect of a decree of divorce from the bond of matrimony by a court of
competent jurisdiction are to change the existing status or domestic relation of husband and
wife, and to free them both from the bond. The marriage tie when thus severed as to one party,
ceases to bind either. A husband without a wife, or a wife without a husband, is unknown to the
law. When the law provides, in the nature of a penalty. that the guilty party shall not marry
again, that party, as well as the other, is still absolutely freed from the bond of the former
marriage.
Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the husband of petitioner. He
would have no standing to sue in the case below as petitioner's husband entitled to exercise
control over conjugal assets. As he is bound by the Decision of his own country's Court, which
validly exercised jurisdiction over him, and whose decision he does not repudiate, he is estopped
by his own representation before said Court from asserting his right over the alleged conjugal
property.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
To maintain, as private respondent does, that, under our laws, petitioner has to be considered
still married to private respondent and still subject to a wife's obligations under Article 109, et.
seq. of the Civil Code cannot be just. Petitioner should not be obliged to live together with,
observe respect and fidelity, and render support to private respondent. The latter should not
continue to be one of her heirs with possible rights to conjugal property. She should not be
discriminated against in her own country if the ends of justice are to be served.chanroblesv
WHEREFORE, the Petition is granted, and respondent Judge is hereby ordered to dismiss the
Complaint filed in Civil Case No. 1075-P of his Court.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual
law library
Without costs.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee (Chairman), Plana, Relova, Gutierrez, Jr., De la Fuente and Patajo, JJ., concur.
Endnotes:
1 Sanchez vs. Zosa, 68 SCRA 171 (1975); Malit vs. People, 114 SCRA 348 (1982).chanrobles
virtual law library
2 U.S.T. vs. Hon. Villanueva, et al., 106 Phil. 439 (1959).chanrobles virtual law library
3 Annex "Y", Petition for Certiorari.chanrobles virtual law library
4 p. 98, Rollo.chanrobles virtual law library
5 "Art. 15. Laws relating to family rights and duties or to the status, condition and legal capacity
of persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad.chanrobles
virtual law library
6 cf. Recto vs. Harden, 100 Phil. 427 [1956]; Paras, Civil Code, 1971 ed., Vol. I, p. 52; Salonga,
Private International Law, 1979 ed., p. 231."
20. Pilapil vs. Ibay-Somera 174 SCRA 653
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 80116 June 30, 1989
IMELDA MANALAYSAY PILAPIL, Petitioner, vs. HON. CORONA IBAY-SOMERA, in her

capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch XXVI; HON.
LUIS C. VICTOR, in his capacity as the City Fiscal of Manila; and ERICH EKKEHARD
GEILING, Respondents.
REGALADO, J.:
An ill-starred marriage of a Filipina and a foreigner which ended in a foreign absolute divorce,
only to be followed by a criminal infidelity suit of the latter against the former, provides Us the
opportunity to lay down a decisional rule on what hitherto appears to be an unresolved
jurisdictional question.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
On September 7, 1979, petitioner Imelda Manalaysay Pilapil, a Filipino citizen, and private
respondent Erich Ekkehard Geiling, a German national, were married before the Registrar of
Births, Marriages and Deaths at Friedensweiler in the Federal Republic of Germany. The marriage
started auspiciously enough, and the couple lived together for some time in Malate, Manila where
their only child, Isabella Pilapil Geiling, was born on April 20, 1980.
Thereafter, marital discord set in, with mutual recriminations between the spouses, followed by a
separation de facto between them.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
After about three and a half years of marriage, such connubial disharmony eventuated in private
respondent initiating a divorce proceeding against petitioner in Germany before the Schoneberg
Local Court in January, 1983. He claimed that there was failure of their marriage and that they
had been living apart since April, 1982. 2 chanrobles virtual law library
Petitioner, on the other hand, filed an action for legal separation, support and separation of
property before the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch XXXII, on January 23, 1983 where the
same is still pending as Civil Case No. 83-15866. 3 chanrobles virtual law library
On January 15, 1986, Division 20 of the Schoneberg Local Court, Federal Republic of Germany,
promulgated a decree of divorce on the ground of failure of marriage of the spouses. The custody
of the child was granted to petitioner. The records show that under German law said court was
locally and internationally competent for the divorce proceeding and that the dissolution of said
marriage was legally founded on and authorized by the applicable law of that foreign jurisdiction.
On June 27, 1986, or more than five months after the issuance of the divorce decree, private
respondent filed two complaints for adultery before the City Fiscal of Manila alleging that, while
still married to said respondent, petitioner "had an affair with a certain William Chia as early as
1982 and with yet another man named Jesus Chua sometime in 1983". Assistant Fiscal Jacinto A.
de los Reyes, Jr., after the corresponding investigation, recommended the dismissal of the cases
on the ground of insufficiency of evidence. 5 However, upon review, the respondent city fiscal
approved a resolution, dated January 8, 1986, directing the filing of two complaints for adultery
against the petitioner. 6 The complaints were accordingly filed and were eventually raffled to two
branches of the Regional Trial Court of Manila. The case entitled "People of the Philippines vs.
Imelda Pilapil and William Chia", docketed as Criminal Case No. 87-52435, was assigned to
Branch XXVI presided by the respondent judge; while the other case, "People of the Philippines
vs. Imelda Pilapil and James Chua", docketed as Criminal Case No. 87-52434 went to the sala of
Judge Leonardo Cruz, Branch XXV, of the same court.
On March 14, 1987, petitioner filed a petition with the Secretary of Justice asking that the
aforesaid resolution of respondent fiscal be set aside and the cases against her be dismissed. 8 A
similar petition was filed by James Chua, her co-accused in Criminal Case No. 87-52434. The
Secretary of Justice, through the Chief State Prosecutor, gave due course to both petitions and
directed the respondent city fiscal to inform the Department of Justice "if the accused have
already been arraigned and if not yet arraigned, to move to defer further proceedings" and to
elevate the entire records of both cases to his office for review. 9 chanrobles virtual law library
Petitioner thereafter filed a motion in both criminal cases to defer her arraignment and to
suspend further proceedings thereon. 10 As a consequence, Judge Leonardo Cruz suspended
proceedings in Criminal Case No. 87-52434. On the other hand, respondent judge merely reset
the date of the arraignment in Criminal Case No. 87-52435 to April 6, 1987. Before such
scheduled date, petitioner moved for the cancellation of the arraignment and for the suspension
of proceedings in said Criminal Case No. 87-52435 until after the resolution of the petition for
review then pending before the Secretary of Justice. 11 A motion to quash was also filed in the
same case on the ground of lack of jurisdiction, 12 which motion was denied by the respondent
judge in an order dated September 8, 1987. The same order also directed the arraignment of
both accused therein, that is, petitioner and William Chia. The latter entered a plea of not guilty
while the petitioner refused to be arraigned. Such refusal of the petitioner being considered by
respondent judge as direct contempt, she and her counsel were fined and the former was
ordered detained until she submitted herself for arraignment. 13 Later, private respondent
entered a plea of not guilty.
On October 27, 1987, petitioner filed this special civil action for certiorari and prohibition, with a
prayer for a temporary restraining order, seeking the annulment of the order of the lower court
denying her motion to quash. The petition is anchored on the main ground that the court is
without jurisdiction "to try and decide the charge of adultery, which is a private offense that
cannot be prosecuted de officio (sic), since the purported complainant, a foreigner, does not
qualify as an offended spouse having obtained a final divorce decree under his national law prior
to his filing the criminal complaint." 15 chanrobles virtual law library
On October 21, 1987, this Court issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the respondents
from implementing the aforesaid order of September 8, 1987 and from further proceeding with
Criminal Case No. 87-52435. Subsequently, on March 23, 1988 Secretary of Justice Sedfrey A.
Ordoñez acted on the aforesaid petitions for review and, upholding petitioner's ratiocinations,
issued a resolution directing the respondent city fiscal to move for the dismissal of the
complaints against the petitioner. 16 chanrobles virtual law library
We find this petition meritorious. The writs prayed for shall accordingly
issue.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Under Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code, 17 the crime of adultery, as well as four other
crimes against chastity, cannot be prosecuted except upon a sworn written complaint filed by
the offended spouse. It has long since been established, with unwavering consistency, that
compliance with this rule is a jurisdictional, and not merely a formal, requirement. 18 While in
point of strict law the jurisdiction of the court over the offense is vested in it by the Judiciary
Law, the requirement for a sworn written complaint is just as jurisdictional a mandate since it is
that complaint which starts the prosecutory proceeding 19 and without which the court cannot
exercise its jurisdiction to try the case.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Now, the law specifically provides that in prosecutions for adultery and concubinage the person
who can legally file the complaint should be the offended spouse, and nobody else. Unlike the
offenses of seduction, abduction, rape and acts of lasciviousness, no provision is made for the
prosecution of the crimes of adultery and concubinage by the parents, grandparents or guardian
of the offended party. The so-called exclusive and successive rule in the prosecution of the first
four offenses above mentioned do not apply to adultery and concubinage. It is significant that
while the State, as parens patriae, was added and vested by the 1985 Rules of Criminal
Procedure with the power to initiate the criminal action for a deceased or incapacitated victim in
the aforesaid offenses of seduction, abduction, rape and acts of lasciviousness, in default of her
parents, grandparents or guardian, such amendment did not include the crimes of adultery and
concubinage. In other words, only the offended spouse, and no other, is authorized by law to
initiate the action therefor.
Corollary to such exclusive grant of power to the offended spouse to institute the action, it
necessarily follows that such initiator must have the status, capacity or legal representation to do
so at the time of the filing of the criminal action. This is a familiar and express rule in civil
actions; in fact, lack of legal capacity to sue, as a ground for a motion to dismiss in civil cases, is
determined as of the filing of the complaint or petition.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
virtual law library
The absence of an equivalent explicit rule in the prosecution of criminal cases does not mean
that the same requirement and rationale would not apply. Understandably, it may not have been
found necessary since criminal actions are generally and fundamentally commenced by the
State, through the People of the Philippines, the offended party being merely the complaining
witness therein. However, in the so-called "private crimes" or those which cannot be
prosecuted de oficio, and the present prosecution for adultery is of such genre, the offended
spouse assumes a more predominant role since the right to commence the action, or to refrain
therefrom, is a matter exclusively within his power and
option.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
This policy was adopted out of consideration for the aggrieved party who might prefer to suffer
the outrage in silence rather than go through the scandal of a public trial. 20Hence, as cogently
argued by petitioner, Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code thus presupposes that the marital
relationship is still subsisting at the time of the institution of the criminal action for, adultery.
This is a logical consequence since the raison d'etre of said provision of law would be absent
where the supposed offended party had ceased to be the spouse of the alleged offender at the
time of the filing of the criminal case. 21 chanrobles virtual law library
In these cases, therefore, it is indispensable that the status and capacity of the complainant to
commence the action be definitely established and, as already demonstrated, such status or
capacity must indubitably exist as of the time he initiates the action. It would be absurd if his
capacity to bring the action would be determined by his status before or subsequent to the
commencement thereof, where such capacity or status existed prior to but ceased before, or was
acquired subsequent to but did not exist at the time of, the institution of the case. We would
thereby have the anomalous spectacle of a party bringing suit at the very time when he is
without the legal capacity to do so.
To repeat, there does not appear to be any local precedential jurisprudence on the specific issue
as to when precisely the status of a complainant as an offended spouse must exist where a
criminal prosecution can be commenced only by one who in law can be categorized as possessed
of such status. Stated differently and with reference to the present case, the inquiry ;would be
whether it is necessary in the commencement of a criminal action for adultery that the marital
bonds between the complainant and the accused be unsevered and existing at the time of the
institution of the action by the former against the latter.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
virtual law library
American jurisprudence, on cases involving statutes in that jurisdiction which are in pari
materia with ours, yields the rule that after a divorce has been decreed, the innocent spouse no
longer has the right to institute proceedings against the offenders where the statute provides
that the innocent spouse shall have the exclusive right to institute a prosecution for adultery.
Where, however, proceedings have been properly commenced, a divorce subsequently granted
can have no legal effect on the prosecution of the criminal proceedings to a
conclusion. 22 chanrobles virtual law library
In the cited Loftus case, the Supreme Court of Iowa held that -
'No prosecution for adultery can be commenced except on the complaint of the husband or wife.'
Section 4932, Code. Though Loftus was husband of defendant when the offense is said to have
been committed, he had ceased to be such when the prosecution was begun; and appellant
insists that his status was not such as to entitle him to make the complaint. We have repeatedly
said that the offense is against the unoffending spouse, as well as the state, in explaining the
reason for this provision in the statute; and we are of the opinion that the unoffending spouse
must be such when the prosecution is commenced. (Emphasis supplied.)
We see no reason why the same doctrinal rule should not apply in this case and in our
jurisdiction, considering our statutory law and jural policy on the matter. We are convinced that
in cases of such nature, the status of the complainant vis-a-vis the accused must be determined
as of the time the complaint was filed. Thus, the person who initiates the adultery case must be
an offended spouse, and by this is meant that he is still married to the accused spouse, at the
time of the filing of the complaint.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
In the present case, the fact that private respondent obtained a valid divorce in his country, the
Federal Republic of Germany, is admitted. Said divorce and its legal effects may be recognized in
the Philippines insofar as private respondent is concerned 23 in view of the nationality principle in
our civil law on the matter of status of persons.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law
library
Thus, in the recent case of Van Dorn vs. Romillo, Jr., et al., 24 after a divorce was granted by a
United States court between Alice Van Dornja Filipina, and her American husband, the latter filed
a civil case in a trial court here alleging that her business concern was conjugal property and
praying that she be ordered to render an accounting and that the plaintiff be granted the right to
manage the business. Rejecting his pretensions, this Court perspicuously demonstrated the error
of such stance, thus:
There can be no question as to the validity of that Nevada divorce in any of the States of the
United States. The decree is binding on private respondent as an American citizen. For instance,
private respondent cannot sue petitioner, as her husband, in any State of the Union.
...chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual law library
It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only
Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorces the same being
considered contrary to our concept of public policy and morality. However, aliens may obtain
divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to
their national law.
Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the husband of petitioner. He
would have no standing to sue in the case below as petitioner's husband entitled to exercise
control over conjugal assets. ... 25
Under the same considerations and rationale, private respondent, being no longer the husband
of petitioner, had no legal standing to commence the adultery case under the imposture that he
was the offended spouse at the time he filed suit.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual
law library
The allegation of private respondent that he could not have brought this case before the decree
of divorce for lack of knowledge, even if true, is of no legal significance or consequence in this
case. When said respondent initiated the divorce proceeding, he obviously knew that there would
no longer be a family nor marriage vows to protect once a dissolution of the marriage is decreed.
Neither would there be a danger of introducing spurious heirs into the family, which is said to be
one of the reasons for the particular formulation of our law on adultery, 26 since there would
thenceforth be no spousal relationship to speak of. The severance of the marital bond had the
effect of dissociating the former spouses from each other, hence the actuations of one would not
affect or cast obloquy on the other.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
The aforecited case of United States vs. Mata cannot be successfully relied upon by private
respondent. In applying Article 433 of the old Penal Code, substantially the same as Article 333
of the Revised Penal Code, which punished adultery "although the marriage be afterwards
declared void", the Court merely stated that "the lawmakers intended to declare adulterous the
infidelity of a married woman to her marital vows, even though it should be made to appear that
she is entitled to have her marriage contract declared null and void, until and unless she actually
secures a formal judicial declaration to that effect". Definitely, it cannot be logically inferred
therefrom that the complaint can still be filed after the declaration of nullity because such
declaration that the marriage is void ab initio is equivalent to stating that it never existed. There
being no marriage from the beginning, any complaint for adultery filed after said declaration of
nullity would no longer have a leg to stand on. Moreover, what was consequently contemplated
and within the purview of the decision in said case is the situation where the criminal action for
adultery was filed before the termination of the marriage by a judicial declaration of its nullity ab
initio. The same rule and requisite would necessarily apply where the termination of the marriage
was effected, as in this case, by a valid foreign divorce.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
virtual law library
Private respondent's invocation of Donio-Teves, et al. vs. Vamenta, hereinbefore cited, 27 must

suffer the same fate of inapplicability. A cursory reading of said case reveals that the offended
spouse therein had duly and seasonably filed a complaint for adultery, although an issue was
raised as to its sufficiency but which was resolved in favor of the complainant. Said case did not
involve a factual situation akin to the one at bar or any issue determinative of the controversy
herein.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
WHEREFORE, the questioned order denying petitioner's motion to quash is SET ASIDE and
another one entered DISMISSING the complaint in Criminal Case No. 87-52435 for lack of
jurisdiction. The temporary restraining order issued in this case on October 21, 1987 is hereby
made permanent.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
SO ORDERED.
Melencio-Herrera, Padilla and Sarmiento, JJ., concur.chanroblesvirtualawlibrarychanrobles virtual

law library
Separate Opinions
PARAS, J., concurring: chanrobles virtual law library
It is my considered opinion that regardless of whether We consider the German absolute divorce
as valid also in the Philippines, the fact is that the husband in the instant case, by the very act of
his obtaining an absolute divorce in Germany can no longer be considered as the offended party
in case his former wife actually has carnal knowledge with another, because in divorcing her, he
already implicitly authorized the woman to have sexual relations with others. A contrary ruling
would be less than fair for a man, who is free to have sex will be allowed to deprive the woman
of the same privilege.ch
In the case of Recto v. Harden (100 Phil. 427 [1956]), the Supreme Court considered the
absolute divorce between the American husband and his American wife as valid and binding in
the Philippines on the theory that their status and capacity are governed by their National law,
namely, American law. There is no decision yet of the Supreme Court regarding the validity of
such a divorce if one of the parties, say an American, is married to a Filipino wife, for then two
(2) different nationalities would be involved.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law
library
In the book of Senate President Jovito Salonga entitled Private International Law and precisely
because of the National law doctrine, he considers the absolute divorce as valid insofar as the
American husband is concerned but void insofar as the Filipino wife is involved. This results in
what he calls a "socially grotesque situation," where a Filipino woman is still married to a man
who is no longer her husband. It is the opinion however, of the undersigned that very likely the
opposite expresses the correct view. While under the national law of the husband the absolute
divorce will be valid, still one of the exceptions to the application of the proper foreign law (one
of the exceptions to comity) is when the foreign law will work an injustice or injury to the people
or residents of the forum. Consequently since to recognize the absolute divorce as valid on the
part of the husband would be injurious or prejudicial to the Filipino wife whose marriage would
be still valid under her national law, it would seem that under our law existing before the new
Family Code (which took effect on August 3, 1988) the divorce should be considered void both
with respect to the American husband and the Filipino wife.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles
virtual law library
The recent case of Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. (139 SCRA [1985]) cannot apply despite the fact that
the husband was an American can with a Filipino wife because in said case the validity of the
divorce insofar as the Filipino wife is concerned was NEVER put in issue.
Separate Opinions
PARAS, J., concurring:
It is my considered opinion that regardless of whether We consider the German absolute divorce
as valid also in the Philippines, the fact is that the husband in the instant case, by the very act of
his obtaining an absolute divorce in Germany can no longer be considered as the offended party
in case his former wife actually has carnal knowledge with another, because in divorcing her, he
already implicitly authorized the woman to have sexual relations with others. A contrary ruling
would be less than fair for a man, who is free to have sex will be allowed to deprive the woman
of the same privilege.chanrobles virtual law library
In the case of Recto v. Harden (100 Phil. 427 [1956]), the Supreme Court considered the
absolute divorce between the American husband and his American wife as valid and binding in
the Philippines on the theory that their status and capacity are governed by their National law,
namely, American law. There is no decision yet of the Supreme Court regarding the validity of
such a divorce if one of the parties, say an American, is married to a Filipino wife, for then two
(2) different nationalities would be involved.chanrobles virtual law library
In the book of Senate President Jovito Salonga entitled Private International Law and precisely
because of the National law doctrine, he considers the absolute divorce as valid insofar as the
American husband is concerned but void insofar as the Filipino wife is involved. This results in
what he calls a "socially grotesque situation," where a Filipino woman is still married to a man
who is no longer her husband. It is the opinion however, of the undersigned that very likely the
opposite expresses the correct view. While under the national law of the husband the absolute
divorce will be valid, still one of the exceptions to the application of the proper foreign law (one
of the exceptions to comity) is when the foreign law will work an injustice or injury to the people
or residents of the forum. Consequently since to recognize the absolute divorce as valid on the
part of the husband would be injurious or prejudicial to the Filipino wife whose marriage would
be still valid under her national law, it would seem that under our law existing before the new
Family Code (which took effect on August 3, 1988) the divorce should be considered void both
with respect to the American husband and the Filipino wife.chanrobles virtual law library
The recent case of Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. (139 SCRA [1985]) cannot apply despite the fact that
the husband was an American can with a Filipino wife because in said case the validity of the
divorce insofar as the Filipino wife is concerned was NEVER put in issue.
Endnotes:
1 Rollo, 5, 29.chanrobles virtual law library
2 Ibid., 6, 29.chanrobles virtual law library
3 Ibid., 7.chanrobles virtual law library
4 Ibid., 7, 29-30; Annexes A and A-1, Petition.chanrobles virtual law library
5 Ibid., 7, 178.chanrobles virtual law library
6 Ibid., 8; Annexes B, B-1 and B-2, id.
7 Ibid., 8-9, 178.chanrobles virtual law library
8 Ibid., 9, 178; Annex C, id.
9 Ibid., 9-10, 178; Annex D, id.
10 Ibid., 9; Annexes E and E-1, id.
11 Ibid., 10; Annex F, id.
12 Ibid., 9, 179; Annex G, id.
13 Ibid., 10 Annex H, id.
14 Ibid, 105.chanrobles virtual law library
15 Ibid., 11.chanrobles virtual law library
16 Ibid., 311-313.chanrobles virtual law library
17 Cf. Sec. 5, Rule 110, Rules of Court.chanrobles virtual law library

18 People vs. Mandia, 60 Phil. 372, 375 (1934); People vs. Zurbano, 37 SCRA 565, 569
(1971); People vs. Lingayen, G.R. No. 64556, June 10, 1988.chanrobles virtual law
library
19 Valdepeñas vs. People, 16 SCRA 871 (1966); People vs. Babasa, 97 SCRA 672
(1980).chanrobles virtual law library
20 Samilin vs. Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, 57 Phil. 298 (1932); Donio-Teves,
et al. vs. Vamenta, et al., 133 SCRA 616 (1984).chanrobles virtual law library
21 Rollo, 289.chanrobles virtual law library
22 2 Am. Jur. 2d., 973 citing State vs. Loftus, 104 NW 906, 907; Re Smith, 2 Okla. 153,
37 p. 1099; State vs. Russell, 90 Iowa 569, 58 NW 915.chanrobles virtual law library
23 Recto vs. Harden, 100 Phil. 427 (1956).chanrobles virtual law library
24 139 SCRA 139,140 (1985).chanrobles virtual law library
25 The said pronouncements foreshadowed and are adopted in the Family Code of the
Philippines (Executive Order No. 209, as amended by Executive Order No. 227,
effective on August 3, 1988), Article 26 whereof provides that "(w)here marriage
between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is
thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to
remarry, the Filipino spouse shall likewise have capacity to re under Philippine
law.chanrobles virtual law library
26 U.S. vs. Mata, 18 Phil. 490 (1911).chanrobles virtual law library
27 Footnote 20, ante.
21. San Luis v. San Luis, G.R. Nos. 133743 & 134029, February 6, 2007
THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. NO. 133743 : February 6, 2007]
EDGAR SAN LUIS, Petitioner, v. FELICIDAD SAN LUIS, Respondent.
[G.R. NO. 134029 : February 6, 2007]
RODOLFO SAN LUIS, Petitioner, v. FELICIDAD SAGALONGOS alias FELICIDAD SAN

LUIS, Respondent.
DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
Before us are consolidated petitions for review assailing the February 4, 1998
Decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 52647, which reversed and set
aside the September 12, 19952 and January 31, 19963 Resolutions of the Regional Trial
Court of Makati City, Branch 134 in SP. Proc. No. M-3708; and its May 15, 1998
Resolution4 denying petitioners' motion for reconsideration.
The instant case involves the settlement of the estate of Felicisimo T. San Luis
(Felicisimo), who was the former governor of the Province of Laguna. During his
lifetime, Felicisimo contracted three marriages. His first marriage was with Virginia
Sulit on March 17, 1942 out of which were born six children, namely: Rodolfo, Mila,
Edgar, Linda, Emilita and Manuel. On August 11, 1963, Virginia predeceased Felicisimo.
Five years later, on May 1, 1968, Felicisimo married Merry Lee Corwin, with whom he
had a son, Tobias. However, on October 15, 1971, Merry Lee, an American citizen, filed
a Complaint for Divorce5 before the Family Court of the First Circuit, State of Hawaii,
United States of America (U.S.A.), which issued a Decree Granting Absolute Divorce
and Awarding Child Custody on December 14, 1973.6
On June 20, 1974, Felicisimo married respondent Felicidad San Luis, then surnamed
Sagalongos, before Rev. Fr. William Meyer, Minister of the United Presbyterian at
Wilshire Boulevard, Los Angeles, California, U.S.A.7 He had no children with respondent
but lived with her for 18 years from the time of their marriage up to his death on
December 18, 1992.
Thereafter, respondent sought the dissolution of their conjugal partnership assets and
the settlement of Felicisimo's estate. On December 17, 1993, she filed a petition for
letters of administration8 before the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, docketed as
SP. Proc. No. M-3708 which was raffled to Branch 146 thereof.
Respondent alleged that she is the widow of Felicisimo; that, at the time of his death,
the decedent was residing at 100 San Juanico Street, New Alabang Village, Alabang,
Metro Manila; that the decedent's surviving heirs are respondent as legal spouse, his
six children by his first marriage, and son by his second marriage; that the decedent
left real properties, both conjugal and exclusive, valued at P30,304,178.00 more or
less; that the decedent does not have any unpaid debts. Respondent prayed that the
conjugal partnership assets be liquidated and that letters of administration be issued
to her.
On February 4, 1994, petitioner Rodolfo San Luis, one of the children of Felicisimo by
his first marriage, filed a motion to dismiss 9 on the grounds of improper venue and
failure to state a cause of action. Rodolfo claimed that the petition for letters of
administration should have been filed in the Province of Laguna because this was
Felicisimo's place of residence prior to his death. He further claimed that respondent
has no legal personality to file the petition because she was only a mistress of
Felicisimo since the latter, at the time of his death, was still legally married to Merry
Lee.
On February 15, 1994, Linda invoked the same grounds and joined her brother Rodolfo
in seeking the dismissal10 of the petition. On February 28, 1994, the trial court issued
an Order11 denying the two motions to dismiss.
Unaware of the denial of the motions to dismiss, respondent filed on March 5, 1994 her
opposition12 thereto. She submitted documentary evidence showing that while
Felicisimo exercised the powers of his public office in Laguna, he regularly went home
to their house in New Alabang Village, Alabang, Metro Manila which they bought
sometime in 1982. Further, she presented the decree of absolute divorce issued by the
Family Court of the First Circuit, State of Hawaii to prove that the marriage of
Felicisimo to Merry Lee had already been dissolved. Thus, she claimed that Felicisimo
had the legal capacity to marry her by virtue of paragraph 2,13 Article 26 of the Family
Code and the doctrine laid down in Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. 14
Thereafter, Linda, Rodolfo and herein petitioner Edgar San Luis, separately filed
motions for reconsideration from the Order denying their motions to dismiss. 15 They
asserted that paragraph 2, Article 26 of the Family Code cannot be given retroactive
effect to validate respondent's bigamous marriage with Felicisimo because this would
impair vested rights in derogation of Article 25616 of the Family Code.
On April 21, 1994, Mila, another daughter of Felicisimo from his first marriage, filed a
motion to disqualify Acting Presiding Judge Anthony E. Santos from hearing the case.
On October 24, 1994, the trial court issued an Order17 denying the motions for
reconsideration. It ruled that respondent, as widow of the decedent, possessed the
legal standing to file the petition and that venue was properly laid. Meanwhile, the
motion for disqualification was deemed moot and academic 18 because then Acting
Presiding Judge Santos was substituted by Judge Salvador S. Tensuan pending the
resolution of said motion.
Mila filed a motion for inhibition19 against Judge Tensuan on November 16, 1994. On
even date, Edgar also filed a motion for reconsideration20 from the Order denying their
motion for reconsideration arguing that it does not state the facts and law on which it
was based.
On November 25, 1994, Judge Tensuan issued an Order21 granting the motion for
inhibition. The case was re-raffled to Branch 134 presided by Judge Paul T. Arcangel.
On April 24, 1995,22 the trial court required the parties to submit their respective
position papers on the twin issues of venue and legal capacity of respondent to file the
petition. On May 5, 1995, Edgar manifested23 that he is adopting the arguments and
evidence set forth in his previous motion for reconsideration as his position paper.
Respondent and Rodolfo filed their position papers on June 14,24 and June 20,25 1995,
respectively.
On September 12, 1995, the trial court dismissed the petition for letters of
administration. It held that, at the time of his death, Felicisimo was the duly elected
governor and a resident of the Province of Laguna. Hence, the petition should have
been filed in Sta. Cruz, Laguna and not in Makati City. It also ruled that respondent
was without legal capacity to file the petition for letters of administration because her
marriage with Felicisimo was bigamous, thus, void ab initio. It found that the decree of
absolute divorce dissolving Felicisimo's marriage to Merry Lee was not valid in the
Philippines and did not bind Felicisimo who was a Filipino citizen. It also ruled that
paragraph 2, Article 26 of the Family Code cannot be retroactively applied because it
would impair the vested rights of Felicisimo's legitimate children.
Respondent moved for reconsideration26 and for the disqualification27 of Judge

Arcangel but said motions were denied. 28
Respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals which reversed and set aside the orders
of the trial court in its assailed Decision dated February 4, 1998, the dispositive portion
of which states:
WHEREFORE, the Orders dated September 12, 1995 and January 31, 1996 are hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE; the Orders dated February 28 and October 24, 1994 are
REINSTATED; and the records of the case is REMANDED to the trial court for further
proceedings.29
The appellante court ruled that under Section 1, Rule 73 of the Rules of Court, the term
"place of residence" of the decedent, for purposes of fixing the venue of the settlement
of his estate, refers to the personal, actual or physical habitation, or actual residence
or place of abode of a person as distinguished from legal residence or domicile. It
noted that although Felicisimo discharged his functions as governor in Laguna, he
actually resided in Alabang, Muntinlupa. Thus, the petition for letters of administration
was properly filed in Makati City.
The Court of Appeals also held that Felicisimo had legal capacity to marry respondent
by virtue of paragraph 2, Article 26 of the Family Code and the rulings in Van Dorn v.
Romillo, Jr.30 and Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera.31 It found that the marriage between
Felicisimo and Merry Lee was validly dissolved by virtue of the decree of absolute
divorce issued by the Family Court of the First Circuit, State of Hawaii. As a result,
under paragraph 2, Article 26, Felicisimo was capacitated to contract a subsequent
marriage with respondent. Thus'
With the well-known rule - express mandate of paragraph 2, Article 26, of the Family
Code of the Philippines, the doctrines in Van Dorn, Pilapil, and the reason and
philosophy behind the enactment of E.O. No. 227, - there is no justiciable reason to
sustain the individual view - sweeping statement - of Judge Arc[h]angel, that "Article
26, par. 2 of the Family Code, contravenes the basic policy of our state against divorce
in any form whatsoever." Indeed, courts cannot deny what the law grants. All that the
courts should do is to give force and effect to the express mandate of the law. The
foreign divorce having been obtained by the Foreigner on December 14, 1992,32 the
Filipino divorcee, "shall x x x have capacity to remarry under Philippine laws". For this
reason, the marriage between the deceased and petitioner should not be denominated
as "a bigamous marriage.
Therefore, under Article 130 of the Family Code, the petitioner as the surviving spouse
can institute the judicial proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased. x
x x33
Edgar, Linda, and Rodolfo filed separate motions for reconsideration 34 which were
denied by the Court of Appeals.
On July 2, 1998, Edgar appealed to this Court via the instant Petition for Review
on Certiorari .35 Rodolfo later filed a manifestation and motion to adopt the said
petition which was granted.36
In the instant consolidated petitions, Edgar and Rodolfo insist that the venue of the
subject petition for letters of administration was improperly laid because at the time of
his death, Felicisimo was a resident of Sta. Cruz, Laguna. They contend that pursuant
to our rulings in Nuval v. Guray37 and Romualdez v. RTC, Br. 7, Tacloban
City,38 "residence" is synonymous with "domicile" which denotes a fixed permanent
residence to which when absent, one intends to return. They claim that a person can
only have one domicile at any given time. Since Felicisimo never changed his domicile,
the petition for letters of administration should have been filed in Sta. Cruz, Laguna.
Petitioners also contend that respondent's marriage to Felicisimo was void and
bigamous because it was performed during the subsistence of the latter's marriage to
Merry Lee. They argue that paragraph 2, Article 26 cannot be retroactively applied
because it would impair vested rights and ratify the void bigamous marriage. As such,
respondent cannot be considered the surviving wife of Felicisimo; hence, she has no
legal capacity to file the petition for letters of administration.
The issues for resolution: (1) whether venue was properly laid, and (2) whether
respondent has legal capacity to file the subject petition for letters of administration.
The petition lacks merit.
Under Section 1,39 Rule 73 of the Rules of Court, the petition for letters of
administration of the estate of Felicisimo should be filed in the Regional Trial Court of
the province "in which he resides at the time of his death." In the case of Garcia Fule
v. Court of Appeals,40 we laid down the doctrinal rule for determining the residence - as
contradistinguished from domicile - of the decedent for purposes of fixing the venue of
the settlement of his estate:
[T]he term "resides" connotes ex vi termini "actual residence" as distinguished from

"legal residence or domicile." This term "resides," like the terms "residing" and
"residence," is elastic and should be interpreted in the light of the object or purpose of
the statute or rule in which it is employed. In the application of venue statutes and
rules - Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court is of such nature - residence
rather than domicile is the significant factor. Even where the statute uses the word
"domicile" still it is construed as meaning residence and not domicile in the technical
sense. Some cases make a distinction between the terms "residence" and "domicile"
but as generally used in statutes fixing venue, the terms are synonymous, and convey
the same meaning as the term "inhabitant." In other words, "resides" should be
viewed or understood in its popular sense, meaning, the personal, actual or physical
habitation of a person, actual residence or place of abode. It signifies physical
presence in a place and actual stay thereat. In this popular sense, the term means
merely residence, that is, personal residence, not legal residence or domicile.
Residence simply requires bodily presence as an inhabitant in a given place, while
domicile requires bodily presence in that place and also an intention to make it one's
domicile. No particular length of time of residence is required though; however, the
residence must be more than temporary.41 (Emphasis supplied)cralawlibrary
It is incorrect for petitioners to argue that "residence," for purposes of fixing the
venue of the settlement of the estate of Felicisimo, is synonymous with "domicile." The
rulings in Nuval and Romualdez are inapplicable to the instant case because they
involve election cases. Needless to say, there is a distinction between "residence" for
purposes of election laws and "residence" for purposes of fixing the venue of actions.
In election cases, "residence" and "domicile" are treated as synonymous terms, that
is, the fixed permanent residence to which when absent, one has the intention of
returning.42 However, for purposes of fixing venue under the Rules of Court, the
"residence" of a person is his personal, actual or physical habitation, or actual
residence or place of abode, which may not necessarily be his legal residence or
domicile provided he resides therein with continuity and consistency. 43 Hence, it is
possible that a person may have his residence in one place and domicile in another.
In the instant case, while petitioners established that Felicisimo was domiciled in Sta.
Cruz, Laguna, respondent proved that he also maintained a residence in Alabang,
Muntinlupa from 1982 up to the time of his death. Respondent submitted in evidence
the Deed of Absolute Sale44 dated January 5, 1983 showing that the deceased
purchased the aforesaid property. She also presented billing statements45 from the
Philippine Heart Center and Chinese General Hospital for the period August to
December 1992 indicating the address of Felicisimo at "100 San Juanico, Ayala
Alabang, Muntinlupa." Respondent also presented proof of membership of the
deceased in the Ayala Alabang Village Association 46 and Ayala Country Club,
Inc.,47 letter-envelopes48 from 1988 to 1990 sent by the deceased's children to him at
his Alabang address, and the deceased's calling cards49 stating that his home/city
address is at "100 San Juanico, Ayala Alabang Village, Muntinlupa" while his
office/provincial address is in "Provincial Capitol, Sta. Cruz, Laguna."
From the foregoing, we find that Felicisimo was a resident of Alabang, Muntinlupa for
purposes of fixing the venue of the settlement of his estate. Consequently, the subject
petition for letters of administration was validly filed in the Regional Trial
Court50 which has territorial jurisdiction over Alabang, Muntinlupa. The subject petition
was filed on December 17, 1993. At that time, Muntinlupa was still a municipality and
the branches of the Regional Trial Court of the National Capital Judicial Region which
had territorial jurisdiction over Muntinlupa were then seated in Makati City as per
Supreme Court Administrative Order No. 3.51 Thus, the subject petition was validly filed
before the Regional Trial Court of Makati City.
Anent the issue of respondent Felicidad's legal personality to file the petition for
letters of administration, we must first resolve the issue of whether a Filipino who is
divorced by his alien spouse abroad may validly remarry under the Civil Code,
considering that Felicidad's marriage to Felicisimo was solemnized on June 20, 1974,
or before the Family Code took effect on August 3, 1988. In resolving this issue, we
need not retroactively apply the provisions of the Family Code, particularly Art. 26, par.
(2) considering that there is sufficient jurisprudential basis allowing us to rule in the
affirmative.
The case of Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr.52 involved a marriage between a foreigner and his
Filipino wife, which marriage was subsequently dissolved through a divorce obtained
abroad by the latter. Claiming that the divorce was not valid under Philippine law, the
alien spouse alleged that his interest in the properties from their conjugal partnership
should be protected. The Court, however, recognized the validity of the divorce and
held that the alien spouse had no interest in the properties acquired by the Filipino
wife after the divorce. Thus:
In this case, the divorce in Nevada released private respondent from the marriage
from the standards of American law, under which divorce dissolves the marriage. As
stated by the Federal Supreme Court of the United States in Atherton v. Atherton, 45 L.
Ed. 794, 799:
"The purpose and effect of a decree of divorce from the bond of matrimony by a
competent jurisdiction are to change the existing status or domestic relation of
husband and wife, and to free them both from the bond. The marriage tie, when thus
severed as to one party, ceases to bind either. A husband without a wife, or a wife
without a husband, is unknown to the law. When the law provides, in the nature of a
penalty, that the guilty party shall not marry again, that party, as well as the other, is
still absolutely freed from the bond of the former marriage."
Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the husband of
petitioner. He would have no standing to sue in the case below as petitioner's husband
entitled to exercise control over conjugal assets. As he is bound by the Decision of his
own country's Court, which validly exercised jurisdiction over him, and whose decision
he does not repudiate, he is estopped by his own representation before said Court from
asserting his right over the alleged conjugal property. 53
As to the effect of the divorce on the Filipino wife, the Court ruled that she should no
longer be considered married to the alien spouse. Further, she should not be required
to perform her marital duties and obligations. It held:
To maintain, as private respondent does, that, under our laws, petitioner has to be
considered still married to private respondent and still subject to a wife's
obligations under Article 109, et. seq. of the Civil Code cannot be just. Petitioner
should not be obliged to live together with, observe respect and fidelity, and render
support to private respondent. The latter should not continue to be one of her heirs
with possible rights to conjugal property. She should not be discriminated against in
her own country if the ends of justice are to be served.54 (Emphasis added)
This principle was thereafter applied in Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera 55 where the Court
recognized the validity of a divorce obtained abroad. In the said case, it was held that
the alien spouse is not a proper party in filing the adultery suit against his Filipino
wife. The Court stated that "the severance of the marital bond had the effect of
dissociating the former spouses from each other, hence the actuations of one would
not affect or cast obloquy on the other."56
Likewise, in Quita v. Court of Appeals,57 the Court stated that where a Filipino is

divorced by his naturalized foreign spouse, the ruling in Van Dorn applies.58 Although
decided on December 22, 1998, the divorce in the said case was obtained in 1954
when the Civil Code provisions were still in effect.
The significance of the Van Dorn case to the development of limited recognition of

divorce in the Philippines cannot be denied. The ruling has long been interpreted as
severing marital ties between parties in a mixed marriage and capacitating the Filipino
spouse to remarry as a necessary consequence of upholding the validity of a divorce
obtained abroad by the alien spouse. In his treatise, Dr. Arturo M. Tolentino cited Van
Dorn stating that "if the foreigner obtains a valid foreign divorce, the Filipino spouse
shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine law." 59 In Garcia v. Recio,60 the Court
likewise cited the aforementioned case in relation to Article 26.61
In the recent case of Republic v. Orbecido III,62 the historical background and

legislative intent behind paragraph 2, Article 26 of the Family Code were discussed, to
wit:
Brief Historical Background
On July 6, 1987, then President Corazon Aquino signed into law Executive Order No.
209, otherwise known as the "Family Code," which took effect on August 3, 1988.
Article 26 thereof states:
All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance with the laws in force
in the country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid
in this country, except those prohibited under Articles 35, 37, and 38.
On July 17, 1987, shortly after the signing of the original Family Code, Executive Order
No. 227 was likewise signed into law, amending Articles 26, 36, and 39 of the Family
Code. A second paragraph was added to Article 26. As so amended, it now provides:
ART. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance with the laws
in force in the country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also
be valid in this country, except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6),
36, 37 and 38.
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a
divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or
her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine
law. (Emphasis supplied)cralawlibrary
xxxx
Legislative Intent
Records of the proceedings of the Family Code deliberations showed that the intent of
Paragraph 2 of Article 26, according to Judge Alicia Sempio-Diy, a member of the Civil
Code Revision Committee, is to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse
remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer
married to the Filipino spouse.
Interestingly, Paragraph 2 of Article 26 traces its origin to the 1985 case of Van Dorn
v. Romillo, Jr. The Van Dorn case involved a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a
foreigner. The Court held therein that a divorce decree validly obtained by the alien
spouse is valid in the Philippines, and consequently, the Filipino spouse is capacitated
to remarry under Philippine law.63 (Emphasis added)
As such, the Van Dorn case is sufficient basis in resolving a situation where a divorce is
validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse. With the enactment of the Family Code
and paragraph 2, Article 26 thereof, our lawmakers codified the law already
established through judicial precedent.Ï‚Î·Î±Ã±rÎ¿blÎµÅ¡ Î½Î¹râ€ Ï…Î±l lÎ±Ï‰
lÎ¹brÎ±rÃ¿
Indeed, when the object of a marriage is defeated by rendering its continuance

intolerable to one of the parties and productive of no possible good to the community,
relief in some way should be obtainable.64 Marriage, being a mutual and shared
commitment between two parties, cannot possibly be productive of any good to the
society where one is considered released from the marital bond while the other
remains bound to it. Such is the state of affairs where the alien spouse obtains a valid
divorce abroad against the Filipino spouse, as in this case.
Petitioners cite Articles 1565 and 1766 of the Civil Code in stating that the divorce is void
under Philippine law insofar as Filipinos are concerned. However, in light of this
Court's rulings in the cases discussed above, the Filipino spouse should not be
discriminated against in his own country if the ends of justice are to be served. 67 In
Alonzo v. Intermediate Appellate Court,68 the Court stated:
But as has also been aptly observed, we test a law by its results; and likewise, we may
add, by its purposes. It is a cardinal rule that, in seeking the meaning of the law, the
first concern of the judge should be to discover in its provisions the intent of the
lawmaker. Unquestionably, the law should never be interpreted in such a way as to
cause injustice as this is never within the legislative intent. An indispensable part of
that intent, in fact, for we presume the good motives of the legislature, is to render
justice.
Thus, we interpret and apply the law not independently of but in consonance with
justice. Law and justice are inseparable, and we must keep them so. To be sure, there
are some laws that, while generally valid, may seem arbitrary when applied in a
particular case because of its peculiar circumstances. In such a situation, we are not
bound, because only of our nature and functions, to apply them just the same, in
slavish obedience to their language. What we do instead is find a balance between the
word and the will, that justice may be done even as the law is obeyed.
As judges, we are not automatons. We do not and must not unfeelingly apply the law
as it is worded, yielding like robots to the literal command without regard to its cause
and consequence. "Courts are apt to err by sticking too closely to the words of a law,"
so we are warned, by Justice Holmes again, "where these words import a policy that
goes beyond them."
xxx
More than twenty centuries ago, Justinian defined justice "as the constant and
perpetual wish to render every one his due." That wish continues to motivate this
Court when it assesses the facts and the law in every case brought to it for decision.
Justice is always an essential ingredient of its decisions. Thus when the facts warrants,
we interpret the law in a way that will render justice, presuming that it was the
intention of the lawmaker, to begin with, that the law be dispensed with justice. 69
Applying the above doctrine in the instant case, the divorce decree allegedly obtained
by Merry Lee which absolutely allowed Felicisimo to remarry, would have vested
Felicidad with the legal personality to file the present petition as Felicisimo's surviving
spouse. However, the records show that there is insufficient evidence to prove the
validity of the divorce obtained by Merry Lee as well as the marriage of respondent and
Felicisimo under the laws of the U.S.A. In Garcia v. Recio, 70 the Court laid down the
specific guidelines for pleading and proving foreign law and divorce judgments. It held
that presentation solely of the divorce decree is insufficient and that proof of its
authenticity and due execution must be presented. Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule
132, a writing or document may be proven as a public or official record of a foreign
country by either (1) an official publication or (2) a copy thereof attested by the officer
having legal custody of the document. If the record is not kept in the Philippines, such
copy must be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or
consular officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign country in
which the record is kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of his office. 71
With regard to respondent's marriage to Felicisimo allegedly solemnized in California,

U.S.A., she submitted photocopies of the Marriage Certificate and the annotated
text72 of the Family Law Act of California which purportedly show that their marriage
was done in accordance with the said law. As stated in Garcia, however, the Court
cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws as they must be alleged and proved. 73
Therefore, this case should be remanded to the trial court for further reception of
evidence on the divorce decree obtained by Merry Lee and the marriage of respondent
and Felicisimo.
Even assuming that Felicisimo was not capacitated to marry respondent in 1974,
nevertheless, we find that the latter has the legal personality to file the subject
petition for letters of administration, as she may be considered the co-owner of
Felicisimo as regards the properties that were acquired through their joint efforts
during their cohabitation.
Section 6,74 Rule 78 of the Rules of Court states that letters of administration may be
granted to the surviving spouse of the decedent. However, Section 2, Rule 79 thereof
also provides in part:
SEC. 2. Contents of petition for letters of administration. - A petition for letters of

administration must be filed by an interested person and must show, as far as known
to the petitioner: x x x.
An "interested person" has been defined as one who would be benefited by the estate,
such as an heir, or one who has a claim against the estate, such as a creditor. The
interest must be material and direct, and not merely indirect or contingent. 75
In the instant case, respondent would qualify as an interested person who has a direct
interest in the estate of Felicisimo by virtue of their cohabitation, the existence of
which was not denied by petitioners. If she proves the validity of the divorce and
Felicisimo's capacity to remarry, but fails to prove that her marriage with him was
validly performed under the laws of the U.S.A., then she may be considered as a co-
owner under Article 14476 of the Civil Code. This provision governs the property
relations between parties who live together as husband and wife without the benefit of
marriage, or their marriage is void from the beginning. It provides that the property
acquired by either or both of them through their work or industry or their wages and
salaries shall be governed by the rules on co-ownership. In a co-ownership, it is not
necessary that the property be acquired through their joint labor, efforts and industry.
Any property acquired during the union is prima faciepresumed to have been obtained
through their joint efforts. Hence, the portions belonging to the co-owners shall be
presumed equal, unless the contrary is proven.77
Meanwhile, if respondent fails to prove the validity of both the divorce and the
marriage, the applicable provision would be Article 148 of the Family Code which has
filled the hiatus in Article 144 of the Civil Code by expressly regulating the property
relations of couples living together as husband and wife but are incapacitated to
marry.78 In Saguid v. Court of Appeals,79 we held that even if the cohabitation or the
acquisition of property occurred before the Family Code took effect, Article 148
governs.80 The Court described the property regime under this provision as follows:
The regime of limited co-ownership of property governing the union of parties who are
not legally capacitated to marry each other, but who nonetheless live together as
husband and wife, applies to properties acquired during said cohabitation in proportion
to their respective contributions. Co-ownership will only be up to the extent of the
proven actual contribution of money, property or industry. Absent proof of the extent
thereof, their contributions and corresponding shares shall be presumed to be equal.
xxx
In the cases of Agapay v. Palang, and Tumlos v. Fernandez, which involved the issue of
co-ownership of properties acquired by the parties to a bigamous marriage and an
adulterous relationship, respectively, we ruled that proof of actual contribution in the
acquisition of the property is essential. x x x
As in other civil cases, the burden of proof rests upon the party who, as determined by
the pleadings or the nature of the case, asserts an affirmative issue. Contentions must
be proved by competent evidence and reliance must be had on the strength of the
party's own evidence and not upon the weakness of the opponent's defense. x x x81
In view of the foregoing, we find that respondent's legal capacity to file the subject
petition for letters of administration may arise from her status as the surviving wife of
Felicisimo or as his co-owner under Article 144 of the Civil Code or Article 148 of the
Family Code.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals reinstating
and affirming the February 28, 1994 Order of the Regional Trial Court which denied
petitioners' motion to dismiss and its October 24, 1994 Order which dismissed
petitioners' motion for reconsideration is AFFIRMED. Let this case be REMANDED to the
trial court for further proceedings.
SO ORDERED.
Endnotes:
1
Rollo of G.R. No. 133743, pp. 45-66. Penned by Associate Justice Artemon D. Luna
and concurred in by Associate Justices Godardo A. Jacinto and Roberto A. Barrios.
2
Records, pp. 335-338. Penned by Judge Paul T. Arcangel.
3
Id. at 391-393.
4
Rollo of G.R. No. 133743, p. 68. Penned by Associate Justice Artemon D. Luna and
concurred in by Associate Justices Demetrio G. Demetria and Roberto A. Barrios.
5
Records, p. 125.
6
Id. at 137.
7
Id. at 116.
8
Id. at 1-5.
9
Id. at 10-24.
10
Id. at 30-35.
11
Id. at 38.
12
Id. at 39-138.
13
When a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and
a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or
her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine law.
14
G.R. No. L-68470, October 8, 1985, 139 SCRA 139.
15
See Records, pp. 155-158, 160-170 and 181-192.
16
This Code shall have retroactive effect insofar as it does not prejudice or impair
vested rights or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws.
17
Records, p. 259.
18
Id. at 260.
19
Id. at 262-267.
20
Id. at 270-272.
21
Id. at 288.
22
Id. at 301.
23
Id. at 302-303.
24
Id. at 306-311.
25
Id. at 318-320.
26
Id. at 339-349.
27
Id. at 350-354.
28
Id. at 391-393.
29
Rollo of G.R. No. 133743, p. 66.
30
Supra note 14.
31
G.R. No. 80116, June 30, 1989, 174 SCRA 653.
32
Parenthetically, it appears that the Court of Appeals proceeded from a mistaken
finding of fact because the records clearly show that the divorce was obtained on
December 14, 1973 (not December 14, 1992) and that the marriage of Gov. San Luis
with respondent was celebrated on June 20, 1974. These events both occurred before
the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988.
33
Rollo of G.R. No. 133743, p. 65.
34
See CA rollo, pp. 309-322, 335-340, and 362-369.
35
Rollo of G.R. No. 133743, pp. 8-42.
36
Id. at 75.
37
52 Phil. 645 (1928).
38
G.R. No. 104960, September 14, 1993, 226 SCRA 408.
39
SECTION 1. Where estate of deceased persons be settled. - If the decedent is an
inhabitant of the Philippines at the time of his death, whether a citizen or an alien, his
will shall be proved, or letters of administration granted, and his estate settled, in the
Court of First Instance in the province in which he resides at the time of his death, x x
x. (Underscoring supplied)cralawlibrary
40
G.R. NOS. L-40502 & L-42670, November 29, 1976, 74 SCRA 189.
41
Id. at 199-200.
42
Romualdez v. RTC, Br. 7, Tacloban City, supra note 38 at 415.
43
See Boleyley v. Villanueva, 373 Phil. 141, 146 (1999); Dangwa Transportation Co.
Inc. v. Sarmiento, G.R. No. L-22795, January 31, 1977, 75 SCRA 124, 128-129.
44
Records, pp. 76-78.
45
Id. at 60-75.
46
Id. at 79.
47
Id. at 80.
48
Id. at 81-83.
49
Id. at 84.
50
The Regional Trial Court and not the Municipal Trial Court had jurisdiction over this
case because the value of Gov. San Luis' estate exceeded P200,000.00 as provided for
under B.P. Blg 129, Section 19(4).
51
SC Administrative Order No. 3 dated January 19, 1983 states in part:
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 18 of B.P. Blg. 129, and Section 4 of the
Executive Order issued by the President of the Philippines on January 17, 1983,
declaring the reorganization of the Judiciary, the territorial jurisdiction of the Regional
Trial Courts in the National Capital Judicial Region are hereby defined as follows:
xxx
5. Branches CXXXII to CL, inclusive, with seats at Makati - over the municipalities of
Las Pinas, Makati, Muntinlupa and ParaÃ±aque. x x x
52
Supra note 14.
53
Id. at 139, 143-144.
54
Id. at 144.
55
Supra note 31.
56
Id. at 664.
57
G.R. No. 124862, December 22, 1998, 300 SCRA 406.
58
Id. at 414; See also Republic v. Orbecido III, G.R. No. 154380, October 5, 2005, 472
SCRA 114, 121.
59
Tolentino, Arturo M., Commentaries and Jurisprudence on the Civil Code of the
Philippines, Vol. I, 1990 ed., p. 263.
60
61
Id. at 447.
62
Supra note 58.
63
Id. at 119-121.
64
Goitia v. Campos Rueda, 35 Phil. 252, 254-255 (1916).
65
ART. 15. Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and
legal capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though
living abroad.
66
Art. 17. x x x Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and those
which have for their object public order, public policy and good customs shall not be
rendered ineffective by laws or judgments promulgated, or by determinations or
conventions agreed upon in a foreign country.
67
Supra note 14 at 144.
68
G.R. No. L-72873, May 28, 1987, 150 SCRA 259.
69
Id. at 264-265, 268.
70
Supra note 60.
71
Id. at 448-449.
72
Records, pp. 118-124.
73
Supra note 60 at 451.
74
SEC. 6. When and to whom letters of administration granted. - If x x x a person dies
intestate, administration shall be granted:
(a) To the surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or both, in the
discretion of the court, or to such person as such surviving husband or wife, or next of
kin, requests to have appointed, if competent and willing to serve; x x x.
75
Saguinsin v. Lindayag,116 Phil. 1193, 1195 (1962).
76
Article 144 of the Civil Code reads in full:
When a man and a woman live together as husband and wife, but they are not married,
or their marriage is void from the beginning, the property acquired by either or both of
them through their work or industry or their wages and salaries shall be governed by
the rules on co-ownership.
77
Valdes v. RTC, Br. 102, Quezon City, 328 Phil. 1289, 1297 (1996).
78
Francisco v. Master Iron Works & Construction Corporation, G.R. No. 151967,
February 16, 2005, 451 SCRA 494, 506.
79
G.R. No. 150611, June 10, 2003, 403 SCRA 678.
80
Id. at 686.
81
Id. at 679, 686-687.

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Effect and Application of Laws (Arts.

1-18, New Civil Code)

[G.R. No. L-63915. December 29, 1986.]

LORENZO M. TAÑADA, ABRAHAM F. SARMIENTO, and MOVEMENT OF ATTORNEYS FOR

FERNAN, J., concurring:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

1. What is meant by "law of public nature" or "general applicability" ?

3. What is meant by "publication" ?

4. Where is the publication to be made?

5. When is the publication to be made?

The subject of contention is Article 2 of the Civil Code providing as

Teehankee, C.J., Feria, Yap, Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Alampay, Gutierrez, Jr ., and Paras, JJ.,

FERNAN, J., concurring:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

FELICIANO, J., concurring:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

1. Rollo, pp. 242-250.

2. Ibid., pp. 244-248.

3. Id., pp. 271-280.

5. Id., pp. 320-322.

6. 136 SCRA 27, 46.

8. Justices Venicio Escolin (ponente), Claudio Teehankee, Ameurfina Melencio-Herrera, and

10. Justice Hugo E. Gutierrez, Jr.

11. Justice B. S. de la Fuente.

2. De Roy v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 80718, 29 January 1988

[G.R. No. L-80718. January 29, 1988.]

FELISA P. DE ROY and VIRGILIO RAMOS, Petitioners, v. COURT OF APPEALS and LUIS

Fernan (Chairman), Gutierrez, Jr., Feliciano and Bidin, JJ., concur.

4. NPC v. Pinatubo Commercial, G.R. No. 176006, 26 March 2010.

[G.R. No. 176006 : March 26, 2010]

NATIONAL POWER CORPORATION, PETITIONER, VS. PINATUBO COMMERCIAL,

The claim for attorney's fees is denied for lack of merit.

The questions that need to be resolved in this case are:

(1) whether NPC Circular No. 99-75 must be published; and

(a) violated the equal protection clause of the Constitution and

TaÃ±ada, however, qualified that:

Velasco, Jr., Peralta, Bersamin, and Mendoza, JJ., concur.

Represented by the Office of the Solicitor General.

Aluminum conductor steel-reinforced.

Docketed as Civil Case No. MC-03-2179.

Rollo, pp. 56-59.

Id., pp. 37-40.

Id., pp. 22-30.

G.R. No. L-63915, 24 April 1985, 146 SCRA 446.

Items 5 to 8 and subsections.

Section 3 (a)(1) to (4), in relation to Section 3 (b)(2).

Rollo, pp. 288-289.

Supra, J.G. Summit Holdings, Inc., note 20.

Republic of the Philippines

SENATE COMMITTEE ON ACCOUNTABILITY OF PUBLIC

On November 13, 2007, respondent Committees issued a subpoena ad testificandum to Neri

Strict Observance Of Rules Of Procedure Governing Legislative Inquiries

Section 21, Article VI of the Constitution provides:

Absence Of Power To Order Arrest

Lack Of Sanction On Refusal Or Failure To Obey Subpoena Ad Testificandum

Sec. 18. Contempt

The absence of a provision penalizing refusal or failure to comply with a subpoena ad

Limited Scope Of Power To Punish For Contempt

In relation to legislative investigations, the contempt power of Congress or its committees is

Accordingly, I vote to GRANT the petition.

[1] Arnault v. Nazareno, 87 Phil. 29 (1950), Justice Pedro Tuason, dissenting.