STUDIES IN LOGIC, GRAMMAR AND RHETORIC 28 (41) 2012

Halina Święczkowska
University of Bialystok

COGNITIVE FUNCTIONS OF LANGUAGE

ACCORDING TO G. W. LEIBNIZ

The Leibnizian study of language is an unusual phenomenon, not only

in comparison with the achievements of the thinkers in the seventeenth cen-
tury, but also among the issues tackled by the philosopher, as well as in
terms of the quality of the results presented by him. This is because Leib-
niz is a language theorist, showing the fundamental relationship between
language and the basics of human thinking in the algebraic form. The Leib-
nizian algebra of notions was not only a significant step in logic; it was also
the first attempt in history to construct the algebraic theory referring nei-
ther to numbers nor to space. As a language philosopher and logician Leibniz
was discovered only at the beginning of the twentieth century. To some ex-
tent, it was caused by E. Husserl, G. Frege and G. Peano. Undoubtedly,
the publication of the selection of logical-philosophical writings Opuscules
et Fragmentes Inédits which constituted an important supplement to the
monumental edition of Leibniz’s work published by L. Couturat in 1903
consisting of seven volumes of philosophical writings and seven volumes of
mathematical works written over nearly forty years of the second half of the
nineteenth century contributed to the popularization of the philosopher’s
legacy. The Leibnizian inspiration underlies the appearance of one of the
most important mathematical works of the early twentieth century – Prin-
cipia Mathematica, written by B. Russell and A. Whitehead. One can argue
that the Russelian doctrine of logical atomism remains in a strong relation
with the solutions provided by Leibniz in De Arte Combinatoria. Similar in-
spirations in the theory of meaning can be found in the writings of G. Frege,
where the Leibnizian theory of identity is compared to Frege’s contextual
theory of meaning (bedeutung).1

1 See H. Ishiguro, Leibniz’s Philosophy of Logic and Language, second edition, Cam-
bridge University Press 1990, p. 8–16.

ISBN 978–83–7431–350–6 ISSN 0860-150X 45

Halina Święczkowska

Leibniz’s achievements in the field of the formal theory of language

recognized after centuries are closely related to his position regarding the
philosophical status of language which, according to Leibniz, has an innate
character similarly to the ability to think under the principle of striving
which updates the ability to think and creates language due to external
stimuli.2 This ability has essentially the same character as N. Chomsky’s
model of universal grammar in conjunction with his theory of linguistic
competence although Chomsky’s reference to its Cartesian lineage is not
quite right. A similar abuse is committed by K. Devlin in his famous book
Goodbye, Descartes: the End of Logic and the Search for a New Cosmology
of the mind. It is necessary to agree with the author’s thesis that reflec-
tion on language and human thinking played a huge role in the history
of philosophy and science. Today, in the age of artificial intelligence re-
search and information technology development, the works of psychologists,
philosophers of language, sociologists and linguists are becoming particu-
larly important. Answers to the question: what is the human mind and how
we think, are essential to the fundamental problems of computer science.
The birth of the new discipline, cognitive science, dealing with the struc-
ture of the mind, thought and consciousness, has become a challenge to
the tradition of rationalist philosophy, as well as an important factor in the
development of computer and communication technologies. Devlin settles
accounts with the tradition whose shape, according to him, is defined by
the figure of Descartes, his philosophy and, above all, his methodology. Cer-
tainly, Descartes can be regarded as a symbol of the rationalism heritage,
but it seems that, despite his huge impact on the modern philosophy, it is
not Descartes but Leibniz who should become the main hero of the endless
goodbye in the issue of the relations between language and cognition for
a full consideration of the philosopher’s idea can provide inspiration for new
solutions in this secret land.

Functions of the language sign

According to Leibniz, language signs and, more broadly, all symbolic

systems, are involved in the thinking processes and have a supporting func-
tion in the whole intellectual process. This conclusion is confirmed by the
numerous statements of Leibniz, especially where the object of his atten-

2 See H. Święczkowska, O metafizycznym statusie języka w filozofii Leibniza, in:

H. Jakuszko, L. Kopeć (ed.), W kręgu zagadnień filozofii XVII wieku, Lublin 2009.

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 Cognitive Functions of Language according to G. W. Leibniz

tion is the system of natural language.3 In Unvorgreiffliche Gedancken... the

philosopher writes that words are not merely symbols for thoughts but also
for things, and that we need symbols not only to transmit our opinion to
others but also to support our own thinking.4
The idea expressed in Unvorgreiffliche Gedancken... is approached by
Leibniz precisely in New Essays...,5 but in fact he refers to the general
definition of sign presented in the table of definitions prepared around 1672:
A sign is what we see (and understand) at the moment and, in addition to
this, what we consider as united with something else under our or someone
else’s experience.6

Leibniz, as Dascal notes,7 defines here a multiargumental predicate x

being the sign y for z in time i (where x is a variable for signs or rather
medium of signs; y replaces what is being indicated; z refers to the users
of signs; t refers to time parameters). To state that something functions as
a sign, the definition requires the fulfillment of the following two conditions:

3 Let us quote here the fragment of Leiniz’s manuscript which remains in Leibniz’s
Archives in Niedersächsischen Landensbibliothek in Hannover, sign. IV, VII, B, 3,16 r
where the author explains what he means by the function of sign: “La plus part de nos
raisonnemens, sur tout ceux qui s’entremelent dans les principales veues, se font par un
jeu de caractères, comme on joue du clavesin pr coustume en partie, sans que l’ame en
cela s’en apperçoive assez, et forge les raisons avec reflexion. Autrement on parleroit trop
lentement. Cela sert a mieux entendre comment (l’ame) le corps exprime par ses propres
loix tout ce qui passe dans l’ame. Car ce jeu de caractères peult aller loin et va loin
en effect, jusqu’à un point qu’on ne pourrait penser des choses abstraites sans aide de
caractères arbitraires”. Quoted after M. Dascal, Leibniz. Language, Signs and Thought,
Foreword, s. VII, John Benjamis Publishing Company, Amsterdam/Philadelphia 1990.
4 G. W. Leibniz, Unvorgeiffliche Gedancken betreffend die Ausubung und Verbessrung
der Teutschen Sprache, in: G. W. Leibniz, Collectanea Etymologica, Hanoverae 1717, § 5:
“Es ist aber bey dem Gebrauch der Sprache, auch dieses sonderlich zu betrachten, dass
die Worte nicht nur der Gedancken, sondern auch der Dinge Zeichen seyn, und dass
wir Zeichen nötchig haben, nicht nur unsere Meynung andern anzudeuten, sondern auch
unsern Gedancken selbst zu helffen. Den gleichwie man in grossen Handels-Städten, auch
im Spiel und sonsten nicht allezeit Geld zahlet, sondern sich an dessen Statt der Zeddel
oder Marcken, biss zur letzen Abrechnung oder Zahlung bedienet; also thut auch der
Verstand mit den Bildnissen der Dinge, zumahl wenn er viel zu dencken hat, dass er
nehmlich Zeichen dafür brauchet, damit er nicht nöthig habe, die Sache iedesmahl so offt
sie vorkomt, von neuen zu bedencken. Daher wenn es sie einmahl wohl geftasset, begnügt
er sich hernach offt, nicht nur in äusserrlichen Reden, sondern auch in den Gedancken
und innerlichen Selbst-Gespräch das Wort and die Stelle der Sache zu setzen”.
5 See G. W. Leibniz, New Essays Concerning Human Understanding (Ed. A. G. Lan-
gley), The Macmillan Company, London 1896, Book III, Ch. ix, p. 370.
6 G. W. Leibniz, Sämtliche Schriften und Briefe 6 Reihen, Darmstadt 1923, Berlin
1950, Leipzig 1983, later in the text referred to as AA (and quoted as volume, part, page)
VI ii, 500: “Signum est quod nunc sentimus et alioquin cum aliquo connexum esse ex priore
experientia nostra vel aliena judicamus”. See also G. W. Leibniz Opuscules et Fragments
Inédits de Leibniz, L. Couturat (ed.) Paris 1903 (later in the text referred to as C), p. 497.
7 M. Dascal, Leibniz. Language, Signs and Thought, op. cit., p. 31.

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– x must be seen (experienced) by z,

– x must cause y (in the mind of z), under certain existing link between
x and y, on the part of z. The whole process in situated in the time i.
According to this definition, the primary function of each sign is re-
calling its reference (meaning) in the mind of the interpreter (user) of the
sign. Staying within this basic function and taking into account the differ-
ences between users of signs and the things to which they refer as well as
differences of time parameters, it is possible, however, to distinguish several
additional features of the signs. The first distinction introduced by Leibniz
immediately after the introduction of the above definition is the difference
between “informative” and “mnemonic” function of the sign. Signs that
have an informative function are referred to as signs, whereas those with
a mnemonic function are called concepts. According to Leibniz, words were
invented primarily to support human memory, so they are marks (notae)
for us on the same terms as they are sings for others.8
While making this distinction, Leibniz refers directly to Hobbes.9 There-
fore, it is useful to present the source of the difference between the sign and
the concept in order to understand their different functions. According to
Hobbes, philosophy consists of the knowledge achieved (acquired) by rea-
soning. Reasoning is a type of account whose basic operations are the sum
and difference of ideas, concepts and thoughts. However, human thoughts
are fluid and transient. Thus the mind encounters a basic difficulty to col-
lect them in a whole, organize them or compare them. The process of the
thought analysis, and thus the acquisition of knowledge, must be accompa-
nied by some tools – meaningful signs allowing us to return to past thoughts,
reproduce their order and connections.10 Hobbes calls such signs concepts.
But the use of concepts is highly individualized and private. That is, they
support only a memory unit and disappear with the death of their users.
A real progress of science is seen as the accumulation of knowledge acquired
over generations and it requires a system of signs which are common to
many individuals. Such signs are called signs in the strict sense.11

8 AA VI ii, 500.
9 AA VI i, 278: “Verba enim non tantúm signa sunt cogitationis meae praesentis ad
alios, sed et notae cogitationis meae praeteritae ad me ipsum, ut demonstravit Th. Hobbes
principio Elementorum de Corpore”.
10 T. Hobbes, De Corpore, 1,1,3 – subsequent numbers represent chapter, part and frag-
ment, in: T. Hobbes, The English works of Thomas Hobbes of Malmesbury, W. Molesworth
(ed.) London 1839–1845, vol. IV. See M. Dascal, Leibniz. Language, Signs and Thougth,
op. cit.
11 T. Hobbes, De Corpore, I, 2, 2. See M. Dascal, Leibniz. Language, Signs and Thought,
op. cit., p. 32 and following.

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 Cognitive Functions of Language according to G. W. Leibniz

For Hobbes, the difference between the signs and concepts comes down
to the difference of function.12 Signs serve to reveal our thoughts to oth-
ers whereas concepts are to refer to themselves or to recall themselves to
ourselves. Although both functions are very clearly distinguished, it appears
that they are not independent for Hobbes. The mnemonic-recalling function
of the concept is in some sense basic. While we can easily realize the con-
cepts that are not signs, or those we use only for our personal use, without
any communicative value, a reverse process is not possible. Therefore, to
have a communicative function each sign should be a concept itself or it has
to be connected with the concept which “fixes” the thought transmitted by
that sign.
Priority or superiority of the mnemonic function over a communicative
one is illustrated, according to Hobbes, by natural languages. Words or,
precisely, names have a dual function of signs and concepts, but most of
all they are concepts, and then signs. He claims that no name taken in
isolation can fulfill a communicative function. It is simply lacking. Only
when words and names come together in a sentence, they begin to fulfill
their sign function, that is, they transmit the thought of its recipient.13
It is worth noting here that Hobbes takes a particular point of view.
Signs and concepts are treated by him as tools in the development of sci-
ence and philosophy. In this sense, he concentrates rather on the language
of science than on everyday language. Of course, he also indicates the use
of language for pleasure and decoration, but it is a marginal use. However,
a social function of language, conditioned by the existence of the social con-
sensus as to how to apply signs, is nothing more but a transfer of knowledge
necessary for functioning of the society from one generation to another.14
According to Hobbes, there is a certain hierarchy of sign functions, sub-
ordinated to the development of science. In order to achieve the advance-
ment of knowledge, transmission of information is needed, because only in

12 T. Hobbes, De Corpore, I, 2, 3.
13 T. Hobbes, De Corpore, I, 2, 3: “[...] nomina per se singula notae sunt, nam cogitata
revocant etiam solas, signa vore non sunt, nisi quatenus in oratione disponuntur et partes
ejus sunt. Verbi gratia, vox homo excitât quidem in audiente ideam hominis, non tamen
(nisi quis addat, est animal, vel aliud aliquid aequivalens) significat aliquam ideam fuisse
in animo loquentis, sed voluisse eum aliquid dicere, quod potuit quidem incipere a voce
homo, potuit vero etiam a voce homogeneum. Natura itaque nominis consistit primario in
eo quod serviat quoque significandis, demonstrandisque ils rebus quas memoria tenemus”.
Let us note that Hobbes recognizes the correct unit of communication, which is a sentence,
not a name or a word. This discovery could provide a starting point for the semantics of
sentences, radically different from the traditional semantics, which focuses mainly on the
word. Unfortunately, neither Hobbes nor his succesors developed this idea.
14 T. Hobbes, Lewiathan, eBooks@Adelaide 2007, I, 4, 5.

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this way the experience of the past eras can be accumulated. But fragments
of knowledge are acquired in reasoning. Therefore, it is necessary to be capa-
ble of indicating our thoughts and recalling their relationship. A hierarchy
of sign functions can be represented as follows:
– advancement of knowledge,
– information, communication,
– discovery by reasoning,
– indication and recalling thoughts.
In accordance with the above-mentioned considerations, concepts, for
Hobbes, have only the last function. This mnemonic function is essential
for the remaining ones and in this sense all the others, especially reason-
ing, depend on the use of meaningful concepts. However, concepts, though
necessary, serve a supportive role in the very reasoning. Reasoning (con-
version) directly affects ideas and thoughts evoked by concepts – (...an-
imo, sine verbis, tacita cogitationes ratiocinando addere et substrahere sole-
mus).15 The use of concepts in reasoning is therefore indispensable in the
sense that in the mind they evoke the content that is necessary to start this
process and sustain it. The reasoning in itself is a process of thinking in
which there is no room for the use of any meaningful signs.16
It is only in this context that Hobbes’s attack on algebraic symbolism
is understood. He writes in De Corpore: “The so-called ‘symbolics’ used
by many scholars who believe that it is truly analytical, is neither ana-
lytic nor symbolic. It is only a simple shortcut of mathematical accounts,
but not geometric, because it does not add anything to the learning or
teaching of geometry, and is just a quick and short summary of what has
already been discovered by geometricians. Even if the use of symbols can
facilitate the discourse of the judgements distant from each other, I am not
sure whether this symbolic discourse could be cosnidered as useful if things
corresponding to the idea are taken into account”.17 Therefore, Hobbes ar-

15 T. Hobbes, De Corpore, I, 1, 3.
16 The interpretation of Hobbes presented here is proposed by M. Dascal (Leibniz.
Language, Signs and Thought, op. cit., s. 34); it differs from the interpretation presented
by W. Kneale and M. Kneale in: Developement of Logic, The Clarendon Press, Oxford
1962, p. 312 and others assuming that for Hobbes thinking is merely an operation on
signs. The reason for these differences is a lack of certainty on this issue on Hobbes’s part.
In Leviathan, op. cit., Part I, Chapter 5, he actually presents thinking as an operation
on general names and adds that science is nothing more but the acquisition of knowledge
being the consequence derived from names in the subject. Although at the beginning of
the same part of Leviathan he shows this type of reasoning as a possible rather than
necessary characteristic of all types of reasoning. Moreover, he assumes the existence of
a purely mental discourse, different and completely independent of verbal discourse.
17 T. Hobbes, De Corpore, III, 20.

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 Cognitive Functions of Language according to G. W. Leibniz

gues that algebraic symbols allow only to shorten reasoning; their didactic
value is also questionable. A symbolic discourse is secondary to the pro-
cess of thought whose constitutive elements include ideas or performance,
and that, in his opinion, is sufficient to challenge the cognitive usefulness
of symbolism itself, its role is purely marginal. A sign does not constitute
thinking being only capable of its acceleration; a mnemonic function is its
basic function.
There is no doubt that Leibniz’s views on the functions of the language
sign were shapened by the critical analysis of Hobbes’s works. In Nova
Methodus Docendaeque Jurisprudentiae he lists mnemonics as one of the
disciplines treating about human ‘habits’ which has to do with memory.
Analitics and topos respectively deal with judging and discovering. To keep
order, he also adds methodology; all these disciplines make didactics.18 Leib-
niz accepts the existence of some objects of thought called judgements typ-
ical for men which we can recall, judge, discover and organize. Signs are
only considered in terms of recalling. Thus, the analysis of signs is treated
as part of mnemonics. It is interesting that what was said in the first edi-
tion (1667) is repeated by Leibniz in the second edition (1697). The only
novelty is the inclusion of natural languages in the semiotic systems assign-
ing them a mnemonic function as their primary function. Hence, linguistics
is subordinated to mnemonics.
However, in his studies on mnemonics Leibniz is original and goes
beyond his contemporaries. He draws attention to specific techniques of
memorizing linking the sign with the sound, encoding information with
the use of cryptograms; moreover, he analyzes signs and stylistic figures
in terms of their suitability for archiving data. The sign constitutes the ba-
sis for mnemonics, being a sensuous object remaining in a definite relation
to things.19

Symbolic thinking

The basic principle of mnemonics is the principle of economics. Our

ability to memorize is limited, so we have to manage memory in the most
efficient manner. A proper use of signs is the most important way to achieve
this goal. For example, when Leibniz offers a compilation of the Brewis of

18 Nova Methodus..., AA VI i, 277.

19 Nova Methodus..., AA VI i, 277–278.

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discussion, he recommends the use of special signs that indicate how each
argument for and against is part of the law elements and other laws. Thus,
if the argument is based on the opposition, the suggested marking looks as
follows: )( when it relates to the similarity: (), causes: 0-; effects: -0 etc.20
The function of these signs is to point out the obvious relationship between
the premises and the conclusion, the user is experiencing this kind of ob-
vious relationship immediately, and symbolism allows him to capture all
the dependencies immediately and without any effort. The word ‘intuition’
is a key concept here which captures the essence of such an approach. The
possibility of obtaining such a result by means of the signs makes symbolsim
an essential tool of reasoning.
Leibniz explains the essence of this mechanism by referring to arith-
metic symbolism: “Suppose someone learns Arithmetic, including, e.g., the
pythagorean table. What does he learn? Does he learn something new, ex-
cept the words? When I learn that two multiplied by two is four, do I learn
more than a numeral name, whose use – afterwards – in speaking and cal-
culating is more economical? And Yet, without such words, or any other
constant signs in their places, Arithmetic would be completely useless for
us Therefore, it is true to say that he who learns only matters of reason,
theorems, and definitions, does not in fact learn anything but how to use
what is already known. Thus, nobody could calculate, especially with very
large numbers, without names or numerical signs, i.e., if he had to imagine
distinctly, for each number, all the units comprised in it. Who intended,
could imagine distinctly the units contained in 1.000.000.000.000 in a time
shorter than the age of Methuselach? And even if he could, he would forget
the first units as he progressed towards the end.”21
Therefore no long argumentation can do without the use of certain
names or symbolism. It is thanks to them, according to Leibniz, that a huge
number of things can be covered in the way that makes it possible to run
through them very quickly, which would be impossible, if their definitions
were used instead of the names and symbols. However, it is essential to
note that a necessary condition for the correctness of the whole process
of reasoning is the knowledge of the meaning of the symbols used, that
is the ability to provide their appropriate definitions. The intellectual pro-
cess, whose integral part is the operation on symbols, is called blind or

20 Nova Methodus..., AA VI i, 346.

21 G. W. Leibniz, On the demonstration of primary propositions, in: M. Dascal, Leibniz,
Language, Signs and Thought, op. cit. p. 149.

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 Cognitive Functions of Language according to G. W. Leibniz

symbolic thinking by Leibniz. “We use it in algebra and arithmetic, indeed

everywhere”.22 There is nothing, in his opinion, what would be more com-
mon and necessary for all people. “If we were simultaneously aware of the
arrangement of words clearly and consistently, blind reasoning itself would
be sufficient for clear reasoning. That is why modern Analysis Symbolica,
despite Hobbes’s criticism, is so useful for quick and reliable reasoning”.23
Analyzing the mechanism of thought, Leibniz indicates at least two
types: idea processing and definition and sign processing: (Differentur inter
processum per ideas ed processum per definitiones vel caracteres).24 In his
opinion, the use of signs results in the following benefits: by marking ideas
signs get rid of the ideas’ liquidity which can make proper reasoning difficult
and allow to take one simple look (of the mind) at a whole chain of thoughts
(totus noster cogitandi processus uno obtutu perspici).25 If it is true that the
one who speaks, thinks (qui loquitur cogitât),26 it follows that each opera-
tion on signs, any use of language is in a certain relationship, or even causes
an operation on ideas. Let us recall that in accordance with the Leibnizian
theory of representation “speech expresses thoughts and truth [...], provided
some analogy of relations has been preserved”.27 According to Leibniz, the
analysis of thoughts itself is sufficient to discover and prove the truth. And
if the analysis is consistent with the analysis of signs (characters) which we
use to mark thoughts, some thought corresponds to each sign. It is possi-
ble, therefore, to provide an analysis of thought in a sensual way, leading
it according to some mechanical thread, since the analysis of signs is sen-
sual as well.28
That mechanical thread that takes a man through the maze of hu-
man thoughts, which Leibniz metaphorically calls Ariadne’s therad, is the
only true way, “some sensual and simple tool to manage the mind, as lines

22 G. W. Leibniz, Meditationes de cognitione, veritate et ideis, in: G. W. Leibniz,

Philosophische Schriften von G. W. Leibniz, VII vol., C. I. Gerhardt (ed.), Halle 1846
(repr. Hildesheim 1960), assigned as GP, Volume IV, p. 423.
23 Demonstratio propositionum primarum, AA VI ii, 481.
24 G. W. Leibniz, Leibnitiana. Elementa philosophieale arcanae de summa rerum, ed.
I. Jagodinski, Kazań 1904, p. 2.
25 Ibid., p. 4.
26 Ibid., p. 4.
27 Quid sit idea, GP VII, 263–264.
28 Analysis linguarum, C, 351: “Ad inventionem ac demonstrationem veiitatum opus
est analysi cogitationum, quae quia respondet analysi characterum, [...] hinc analysin
cogitationum possumus sensibilem reddere, et velut quodam filo mechanico dirigere; quia
analysis characterum quiddam sensibile est”.

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outlined in geometry and forms of action given to arithmetic learners”.29

According to Leibniz, syllogisms have such a property. He even considers
that “the invention of the form of syllogisms was one of the most beautiful,
and also one of the most important products made by human mind. It is
a species of universal mathematics (...) and it maybe said that infallible art
is therein contained.”30 For Leibniz, however, algebra is a perfect example
of usefulness. In the algebraic reasoning ideas corresponding to symbolism
are neither caused nor present to the mind at any stage of arguing for it
would make the process of reasoning impossible. The mind would be busy
just with the ideas all the time which would block reasoning by being con-
stantly invoked. This means that the mind is focused solely on signs and
operations performed on them without directing the attention to what they
relate to. In this sense, algebraic reasoning is just a mere transformation
of signs. This is possible only when there is a well-defined system of rules,
which guarantees the truth of the results of such operations. Analyzing this
standard way of thinking, Leibniz highlights several functions of signs. Signs
present our thoughts to others having an informative function; they solidify
those thoughts in our memory revealing a mnemonic function; they allow
to shorten thoughts reducing their number to a few only – so it is possible
to say that signs have a “compression” function as well as an arrangement
function allowing one to grasp the whole chain of thoughts uno obtutu.31

29 List Leibniza do Jean’a Gallois z września 1677, AA II i, 381: “La veritable methode
nous doit fournir un filum Ariadnes, c’est à dire un certain moyen sensibile et grossier, qvi
conduise l’esprit comme sont les lignes tracées en geometrie, et les formes des operations
qu’on prescrit aux apprentifs en Arithmetiqve”.
30 G. W. Leibniz, New Essays..., Book IV, Ch. XVI, p. 559.
31 See Leibniz’s letter to Walter von Tschirnaus written in May 1678, in: G. W. Leibniz,
Philosophical Papers and Letters, L. E. Loemker (ed.) D. Reidel Publisching Company,
Dordrecht 1965, p. 193. See also H. Święczkowska, La perspective platonicienne sur la
langue chez Descartes et chez Leibniz, in: “Idea. Studia nad strukturą i rozwojem pojęć
filozoficznych” VII, Białystok 1996. To understand why symbolism can play such an im-
portant role in reasoning, let us refer to modern psychology and the study of memory. The
first model of memory is represented as consisting of two distinct mechanisms of storage.
One is short time memory (STM) that captures information from the senses and keeps
it for a very short period of time. This ability is limited so that the unit of information
is only stored until it is replaced by another information unit. STM capabilities are esti-
mated numerically: approximately it can accommodate seven such units. While stored in
STM, such units of information can be encoded and transmitted to another mechanism or
tool of memory – long time memory, whose possibilities are immesurably greater. If this
process of transfer has been made, units of information are stored long enough. STM is
limited to seven units of information, which are stored at the moment, but this restriction
does not apply to the amount of information the unit contains. If we refer to the informa-
tion theory, STM can accomodate not 7 bits, but rather 7 chunks of information. Bits and
chunks differ in that the chunk may comprise many bits. For example, the number of six
digits – 101101 – contains six bits of information. If each digit is considered as a separate

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Compendia loquendi and dispute over universals

Although, according to Leibniz, the usefulness of signs fully reveals itself

in mathematics, “blind or symbolic thinking” (caeca vel symbolica cogitatió)
accopmanies all the reasoning processes.32 An important role of supporting
or improving the thought process is assigned to general and abstract. Leib-
niz even writes that he treats all of them per modum loquendi compendiosum
for production (fiction) of the mind useful while calculating.33 For it is “the
art of classifying things into genere et species is of no little importance
and of much use both to the judgment and memory.”34 As Benson Mates
notes, Leibniz did not believe in the existence of numbers, geometric figures
or other mathematical objects; what is more, he did not accept abstract
things such as heat, light, justice, goodness, beauty, time and space; he did
not allow the existence of metaphysical objects such as concepts, judgments,
properties etc. The only units of his ontology were substances and their at-
tributes, but sometimes he doubted even the existence of attributes. Such
ontology reinforces a certain perspective on language; Mates claims that, ba-
sically, Leibniz was a nominalist.35 Leibniz himself seemed to confirm that
opinion writing that he saw no other way to avoid the difficulty in deter-
mining whether the characteristics of the substance should be considered
separately as part of a reality rather than the treatment of abstracts not
as the real thing (res), but as shortcuts of speaking (compendia loquendi).36
However, there are other statements made by Leibniz which contradict his
nominalistic declarations. In New Essays... he writes that virtues, truth and
species should not be dependent on us. “They exist in nature whether we

bit or chunk, storing the total number covers almost the entire STM. But if you group the
numbers in pairs, each chunk now contains two bits, while STM is used only up to some
degree. See E. R. Hilgard, R. C. Atkinson, Introduction to Psychology, Harcourt, Brace
and World, New York 1967, p. 328 and following and G. R. Miller, The magical number
seven, plus or minus two: some limits on our capacity for processing information, in: The
Psychology of Communication, Allen Lane, The Penquin Press, London 1967, p. 33 and
following. Referring to this data, M. Dascal claims that the Leibnizian uno obtutu can be
identified with STM. See M. Dascal, Leibniz. Language, Signs and Thought, op. cit., p. 38.
32 Meditationes de cognitione, veritate et ideis, GP IV, 423.
33 Leibniz’s letter to des Bosses March, 1706, GP II, 305: “Utrasque enim per modum
loquendi compendiosum pro mentis fictionibus habeo, ad calculus aptis...”
34 G. W. Leibniz, New Essays..., Book III, Ch. iii, p. 311.
35 Benson Mates, The Philosophy of Leibniz. Metaphysic and Language, Oxford Uni-
versity Press, New York, Oxford 1986, p. 171 and following.
36 G. W. Leibniz, De accidentibus, in: G. W. Leibniz, Textes inédits d’apres les
manuscrits de la bibliothèque provincial de Hanovre, G. Grua (ed.), II Vol., Presses Uni-
versitaires de France, Paris 1948, Volume II, p. 574.

55
Halina Święczkowska

know it and approve or not.”37 A little earlier he notes that “it is true you
do not see justice as you see a horse, but you understand it no less, or rather
you understand it better, it is no less in acts than directness or obliqueness
is in motion, whether you consider it or not.”38 For generality depends on
the similarity of specific things and this similarity is, according to Leibniz,
reality. In similar subjects we detect their mutual feature which is noth-
ing more but an apriori possibility of their existence.39 Leibniz calls these
creatures real abstracts and they are accidens that is, entities added to the
substance.40
However, it is difficult to find Leibniz’s clear program declarations. Re-
ferring to the medieval dispute over universals, he wrote that realists’ axiom
is as good as nominalists’ axiom as long as they are properly understood.41
It is possible to get the impression that Leibniz deliberately avoids radical
decisions in the dispute regarding the ontological status of universals di-
recting his attention rather to purely grammatical or linguistic properties
of phrases which mark abstracts or universals. He wrote in Characteris-
tica verbalis: “Words are signs either concepts, as in the case of nouns, or
of modes of conceiving, as in the case of the other parts of speech. Con-
cepts are viewed either in themselves or by accident”.42 Those that are
taken in themselves, apart from the metaphysical object or subject, as well
as the time, place and event are abstract concepts (formalitates), such as
humanity, beauty and being triplelegged. Concepts taken per accidens ex-
press the convergence of many ‘forms’ in the same subject when it happens,
for example, that the same subject has poetic and juridical abilities. Thus
names, depending on the terms they cover, fall into the abstract ones, such
as ‘warmth’, ‘humanity’ and precise ones, such as ‘man’, ‘hot’.43 There-
fore one can say that the grammatical division of names into precise and
abstract ones corresponds to the semantic division of terms into per se

37 G. W. Leibniz, New Essays..., Book III, Ch. vi, p. 360.

38 Ibid., Book III, Ch. v. p. 329.
39 Ibid., Book III., Ch. iii, p. 313.
40 G. W. Leibniz, New Essays..., Book III, Ch. viii, p. 368. Leibniz clearly distinguishes
between modifications and attributes. The ability to perceive and act, extent and perma-
nence are, according to him, the attributes of the substance or, in other words, eternal and
basic judgments. Thus, modifications of these attributes are: thinking, violence, shapes
and movements. See. G. W. Leibniz, New Essays..., Preface, p. 58.
41 G. W. Leibniz, This ambiguous position of Leibniz on the issue of universals reveals
clearly in New Essays..., in Book III, Ch. vi, p. 356.
42 G. W. Leibniz, Verbal characteristic, in: M. Dascal, Leibniz, Language, Signs and
Thought, op. cit. p. 175.
43 C, 437.

56
 Cognitive Functions of Language according to G. W. Leibniz

and per accidens. In the table of definitions once again Leibniz defines ab-
stracts as entities (entia) which differentiate various predicates within the
same subject. Concretum is where entia are included and what contains
no contradiction.44
In his division of names into precise and abstract ones, Leibniz noticed
some ambiguity accompanying different uses of precise names. Precise names
such as ‘man’ or ‘horse’ may have different references. In Intoduction to
Nizolius, commenting on the position of nominalists on universals who, as for
instance Nizolius, claim that universals are nothing more but taking all the
entities collectively and at the same time so that they are collective wholes,
Leibniz agrees that when we say ‘every man is an animal’ it means that all
people are animals. However, in his opinion, it does not mean that universals
are collective wholes as Nizolius claims for a whole (totum) marked by the
phrase ‘every man’ has a distributive sense apart from a collective one. If,
as Nizolius wishes, the phrases ‘omnis homo’ or ‘omnes homines’ meant the
same thing as the human species, it would lead to absurd substitutions such
as ‘The human species is an animal’.45
According to Leibniz, this confusion of terms results in more serious
consequences. If universals were nothing more but a collection of individu-
als which, as Nizolius claims, being precise totals are sets in the collective
sense, it would be impossible to arrive at any knowledge on the basis of
arguments; induction becomes the only possible way to increase knowledge.
And on that basis, according to Leibniz, it is impossible to accept any per-
fect general sentence for it is necessary to stop at the judgment that all
investigated cases are such and just such. Leibniz claims that true knowl-
edge can only be achieved through the analysis of general sentences whose
truth does not depend on induction, but on a general idea or a definition
of terms. As he writes, practical and moral certainty of the sentence ‘fire
burns’ is guaranteed by the following principles: 1. If in all cases the cause
is the same, or similar, the effect will be similar or the same. 2. The exis-
tence of the thing that is not understood is not assumed. 3. Whatever is not
assumed should be ignored in practice until you can prove it.46 Defending
the so-called general rhetoric against the Aristotelian logic and Renaissance
dialectic, Marius Nizolius sought to exclude arguing as the acknowledged
way of the explanation of the nature of things (as it was taught by Aris-
totle). Nizolius wrote that if universals are false as it was said and proved,

44 C. 437.
45 AA VI ii, 430.
46 AA VI ii, 431.

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Halina Święczkowska

one can say that the whole dialectic they support fall down with them.47
Leibniz’s answer to this question is: This is false! Nominalists as well as
others used the dialectic of Aristotle and they were right. Although there
is seldom some truth in what people attribute to things in their names, the
thing itself is always preserved when we use names to explain things.48
In other words, for arguing it would be enough if universals were pure
names of things.49
Leibniz agrees, therefore, that the names of universals may not in fact
have any relevance, but even as compendia loquendi they are helpful in
proving and explaining the properties of things. By adopting this solution,
Leibniz meant the nominalist definition of truth, especially in the version
formulated by Hobbes. Indeed, Hobbes claimed that because truths of the
mind result from definition, definitions have a purely arbitrary character;
therefore, the same character is revealed by truths. Arbitrary definitions
are nominal definitions. According to Leibniz, they refer only to the fea-
tures necessary to differentiate a given thing from other things and they
are not sufficient to obtain certain knowledge unless it is somehow known
that the defined thing is possible.50 But although the definitions of names
are dependent on our designation, the use and link of signs, according to
Leibniz, is no longer optional. There is a constant correspondence between
signs and things, which is the “foundation of truth”.51
What does it really mean that it would be sufficient for proving if uni-
versals were pure names? It seems that Leibniz assumes that proving does
not depend on the assumptions of semantic or ontological nature and can
be built on the purely syntactic basis. Definitions of names, as nominal def-
initions, would have to meet only one condition that the defined thing is
possible. Leibniz categorically states that we cannot have an idea of the
circle. We can imagine it; we can have its definition and the idea of ev-
ery property that a circle should have. But since we cannot imagine all

47 AA VI ii, 451: “Nam Si universalia ista falsa sunt, ut nos dicimus, et probaturi
sumus, continuo una cum univesalibus Cadet pene tota Dialectica, quae in illis tanquam
columinisd fundata est...”
48 AA VI ii 451: “Hoc fal sum Est. Neque enim minus Nominales quam caeteri, Di-
alectica Aristotelis usi sunt, et recte quidem. Nam etsi in nominibus saltem vera sint
quae vulgo rebus tribuebantur, salva re est; quando nominibus istis in explicandis rebus
utimur.”
49 AA VI ii, 429: “...quod Universalia non sint in rerum natura (cum tamen sufficiat
ad demonstrandum:nomina esse universalia)...”
50 Meditationes de cognitione, veritate et ideis, GP IV, 424.
51 G. W. Leibniz, Dialogus, in: G. W. Leibniz, Phiolosophical Papers and Letters
(ed. L. Loemker), D. Reidel Publishing Company, Dordrecht 1969, p. 184.

58
 Cognitive Functions of Language according to G. W. Leibniz

of them simultaneously, we cannot have the idea of it. Only God has the
insight into the complex ideas of things because he can think of every-
thing at the same time. Because of its limitations, the human mind is only
capable of recognizing the essence of the circle and other complex things
only partly. But how can we be sure of the possibility of such an idea,
that is the agreement of all the ingredients present in it, if we take into
account our intrinsic limitations? Leibniz explains that “When we do not
have an idea, its functions are performed by sensual or by definition that
is, a collection of signs. The place of idea is always filled by certain per-
ception (phantasma), which is at the same time completely understood”.52
Therefore, Leibniz assumes that the possession of these sensory percep-
tions and definitions of the circle has the same value as the statement
by experience that a circular object exists. In this sense, the formation
and transformation of signs replaces the experience if it is not available.
Therefore, signs allow to present our abstract thoughts in a ‘visible’ and
‘static’ way, and their juxtaposition is purely mechanical. Thus, argumen-
tation conducted like this is a kind of calculation where definitions can
be treated as syntactic rules allowing for the replacement of one chain of
signs by the other. With this method we are able to make decisions about
possibilities or, in other words, the consistency of such terms as infinity,
perfection or set. Thus, according to Leibniz, to discover and prove the
truth the analysis of signs itself is sufficient, provided that the signs express
some thoughts.53
However, the truth obtained in this way has the status of rational truth
which, similarly to the intuitive truth, does not require any proof. It is
necessary to remember that, according to Leibniz, all rational truths refer
to the sphere of possibility. Hence it means that they are not existential
judgments. Rational truths state what would be true in any possible case,
whereas true existential judgments depend on God’s choice of some possible
world. So when we say that ‘a triangle has three sides’ we do not state that
there are triangular bodies, as well as when we predicate that ‘a man is an
animal’, we say nothing about the existence of man or animals although
surely these statements relate to beings or universals. In fact, by treat-
ing them as possibility sentences Leibniz avoids decisions regarding their

52 G. W. Leibniz, Leibnitiana. Elementa..., op. cit., p. 6: “Ideam defectam in nobis

supplet imago aliqua sensibilis, aut definitio, sive aggregatum characterum, in quibus
nulla opus est similitudine. Semper ideae locum supplet phantasma aliquod, quod totum
simul sentitur”. See M. Dascal, Leibniz. Langue, Signs and Thought, op. cit., p. 51.
53 Analysis linguarum, C, 351 and GP VII, 11–15.

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Halina Święczkowska

existence. Let us recall that professing ontological individualism Leibniz

was a nominalist in ontology. If the world is made up, as he claimed, of the
substances and their attributes, universals do not exist in nature. But also
there are no such objects as bodies, rainbow or sea. These are, according to
Leibniz, aggregates which are the accumulation of substances, having the
status of well-established phenomena. In fact they are constructions of the
mind which attribute their foundation to the coexistence of monads, remain-
ing their aggregates. For Leibniz, time and space are similar mental entities.
Consequently, there is no obstacle to say that the same rational character
is revealed by sets. In language the attributes of substances and their mod-
ifications are corresponded by the predicates: is a man, is an animal, is
thinking. Thus, the mind classifies objects according to the criteria whether
the object fulfills the propositional function: x is such and such, dividing
the objects into, for example, sets of people or animals. Such classification
has its basis in the existence of property, which corresponds to the specified
predicate; consequently, although universals do not really exist, they have
their foundation in reality, and they are, as Leibniz calls them, entia ra-
tionis.54 This interpretation seems to be confirmed by Leibniz’s remarks on
syntactic functions of general names: Nomen Universale est vel subjectum,
quod dicitur species vel praedicatum.55 Commenting on Book IV written by
Nizolius, he wrote that when omnis is applied to the (specific) name in the
singular, the sentence is a figurative sentence, for example omnis homo est
animal and it is synonymous with the right sentence: omnes homines sunt
animalia. Therefore, as he writes, “the supposition that universals in com-
bination with singulars are real results from language”.56 One can assume
that Leibniz inclined to the contextual analysis in which a sentence is the
basic unit of the analysis. It is clear in case of such sentences that a gram-
matical subject is not a logical subject, and the name homo is a predicate,
like animal.
It seems that in the so-called dispute over universals Leibniz takes
a pragmatic stand. In fact, he was concerned about the precise use of lan-
guage and adapting it to the needs of science. Arguing with Nizolius, he
highlighted the ambiguity of terms which, when used inappropriately, may
lead to absurd substitutions. To avoid this, he even postulated the elimi-

54 See Hans Burkhardt, Adam’s Mind and Body, in: M. Dascal, E. Yakira (ed.), Leibniz
and Adam, University Publishing Project Ltd., Tel Aviv 1993, p. 46.
55 AA VI ii, 453.
56 AA VI ii, 448: “Universalium igitur imaginaria realitas extra singularia a sermone
figura to orta”.

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 Cognitive Functions of Language according to G. W. Leibniz

nation of abstract terms from the language of science.57 He did not claim,
however, that they are completely useless – abstraction is not a mistake,
as long as one knows that it contains what is hidden.58 In other words, if
we use a term, we have to give its definition. Treating general and abstract
terms as compendia loquendi, Leibniz, however, assigns them a particular
function. If they are properly defined, as the signs of concepts present in
our minds, they allow us to derive the truth about the nature of things. By
“grabbing” the thought, a sign allows us to approach the idea of the thing
or even replaces it when that idea is not available. It becomes essential and
sometimes even the only tool in the process of cognition.
Signs and operations performed on them have a cognitive value only
when they reflect the inner order of the idea or ‘imitate’ it on the basis of
the assumption that the thing under consideration is possible. Nonetheless,
this condition is not always fulfilled. Indeed, there are signs and actions
that have no relation to the perfect order and these, as we know, are the
main cause of erroneous thoughts and judgments. How to get certainty that
when we make some judgment, it is compatible with any part of this inner
structure? Leibniz was aware of this difficulty when he wrote: “When I think
of something and I cannot imagine anything bigger than this, what is it
I am thinking about apart from separate thoughts about singular ideas
(things) contained in the words ‘something’, ‘bigger’, ‘imagine’, ‘no’, ‘can’ ?
Separately, I have an idea of what I call ‘something’, what I call ‘bigger’,
what I call ‘thought’ and I can think of them one after the other. But
I have no idea of all of these things together. I link only words or signs and
I only imagine that I have an idea of something of which nothing bigger can
be conceived”.59 The same problem was tackled by him in New Essays....
Analyzing the imperfection of words, Leibniz talks “of our uncertainty as to
whether ideas are consistent when experience does not provide us with them
being linked in the same subject”. In this case it is necessary to recognize

57 Leibniz was quite consistent in questioning the usefulness of abstract names, es-
pecially in philosophy. This fact could lead to assigning him a nominalistic attitude.
L. Couturat in La Logique de Leibniz, Presse Universitaires de France, Paris 1901, p. 470
argues against such an interpretation, even when it comes to early ideas of Leibniz.
C. S. Peirce shows the evolution of Leibniz’s ideas from nominalism to realism. See
M. Fisch, Peirce and Leibniz, “Journal of the History of Ideas” 33, 1972, p. 485–496.
58 G. W. Leibniz, New Essays..., Book III, viii.
59 G. W. Leibniz, Leibnitiana. Elementa..., op. cit., p. 4: “Cum cogito aliquid, quo
majus cogitare non potest, quid aliud cogito, quam separatim ideas singulorum, quae sub
his vodbus continentur, ut: aliquid, majus cogitare, non, posse. Separatim habeo ideam
eius quod voco cogitationem, itaque unum post alteram cogitans. Non ideas horum inter
se, sed postea vocabula tantum seu characteres conjungo et fingo me ideam habere eius,
quo majus cogitare non potest”.

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the need for “temporary definitions of sensual things when the experience
is not sufficient to obtain fuller definitions”.60
Leibniz says that in constructing this type of definition we should take
into consideration our intrinsic imperfection, but also negligence and lazi-
ness, which, in his opinion, is a direct cause of errors.61 This ‘imperfection’
can be reducible through the analysis and definitions of the terms included
in each language. According to Leibniz, “Everything doubtless returns to
definitions which may extend even to primitive ideas. One and the same sub-
ject may have several definitions, but the knowledge that they agree with
themselves must be learned by reason, by demonstrating one definition by
another or by experience, by proving that they constantly together”.62 It
can therefore be concluded that the ability to get to know goes hand in
hand with the ability to define. Improving cognitive abilities is conditioned
by perfect mastery of the language. Bearing this in mind, Leibniz called
for the review of the German language dictionary resources, the creation
of specialized dictionaries covering the specialist vocabulary, etymological
dictionaries, and establishment of the standards of linguistic correctness.
He believed that “in time all languages of the World will be recorded and
placed in the dictionaries and grammars, and compared together: this will
be of very great use both for knowledge of things, (...) and for the knowledge
of our mind.”63

SUMMARY
This article is an attempt to critically analyze Leibniz’s views on the
cognitive value of natural language and other symbolic systems involved in
the processes of thought. Confronting his position regarding the linguistic
sign function with the position of Hobbes, Leibniz presents his own solu-
tion which is consistent with the results of modern research in the field
of cognitive psychology. Analyzing symbolic thinking, Leibniz positions it
in the context of the dispute over universals consciously avoiding taking
a position for or against. That makes him a precursor to the modern con-
cept in which the ‘realism – nominalism’ dichotomy loses its justification.

60 G. W. Leibniz, New Essays..., Book III, Ch. ix, p. 373.

61 Ibidem, p. 376–378.
62 Ibidem, p. 392.
63 Ibidem, p. 372.

62