Contract Law (2014)

(2014) 15 SAL Ann Rev Contract Law 217
12. CONTRACT LAW
GOH Yihan
LLB (Hons) (National University of Singapore), LLM (Harvard);
Advocate and Solicitor (Singapore);
Associate Professor, Singapore Management University,
School of Law.
LEE Pey Woan

LLB (Hons) (London), BCL (Oxford);
Barrister (Middle Temple), Advocate and Solicitor (Singapore);
School of Law.
THAM Chee Ho
LLB (Hons) (National University of Singapore), BCL (Oxford);
Solicitor (England and Wales), Advocate and Solicitor (Singapore),
Attorney and Counsellor-at-Law (New York State);
School of Law.
Formation of contract
Offer and acceptance
Offer and acceptance in different fact patterns
12.1 The rules relating to contractual formation are easy to state but
apply with different degrees of difficulty in the varied circumstances of
practice. Indeed, as Andrew Phang Boon Leong JA pertinently noted in
RBC Properties Pte Ltd v Defu Furniture Pte Ltd [2015] 1 SLR 997
(at [1]):
… [w]hilst the law to be applied is objective and universal, the facts
that the law is applied to are varied and specific … therefore, the
decision or result of a case is heavily dependent (in the final analysis)
on the specific facts concerned.
2014 saw several cases in which the courts had to apply the rules relating
to contractual formation, specifically those to do with offer and
acceptance, to different fact patterns. It suffices for the purposes of this
review to highlight two of such cases.
12.2 The first case is the Court of Appeal’s decision of Woo Kah
Wai v Chew Ai Hua Sandra [2014] 4 SLR 166 (“Woo Kah Wai”) (noted
in Alvin W-L See, “Contract for the Grant of a Compliant Option to
© 2015 Contributor(s) and Singapore Academy of Law.
No part of this document may be reproduced without permission from the copyright holders.
218 SAL Annual Review (2014) 15 SAL Ann Rev
Purchase” Sing JLS (forthcoming)), which raised several issues of

contractual formation in the context of an option to purchase. This
section deals with the issues to do with offer and acceptance, and other
sections will deal with other aspects of contractual formation. Woo Kah
Wai concerned the sale of an apartment unit. The purchaser had made a
written offer dated 10 February 2010 to the vendors to purchase the
property. This written offer was handed over to the vendors’ agent on
11 February 2010. Much of the appeal turned on the existence of this
“pre-option” contract, as well as the actual duration of the option period,
which was stated in the written offer to be “three days”.
12.3 An option to purchase was prepared by the vendors’ agent and

dated 11 February 2010. The date of exercise stated in the option was on
or before 4.00pm on 13 February 2010, which was three calendar days
from 11 February 2010. The purchaser’s agent went to collect the option
from the vendors’ agent on 12 February 2010. He complained that the
option period was too short and left the option with the vendors’ agent.
Eventually, the vendors refused to amend the option and the purchaser’s
agent collected the option and finally passed it to the purchaser on
13 February 2010. However, by this time, the option had expired. The
next three days were a Sunday and two public holidays. The purchaser
tried to exercise the option on 17 February 2010, but the vendors
refused this on the ground that the option had already expired.
12.4 The purchaser began proceedings against the vendors to

specifically perform the sale of the apartment or for damages. The High
Court found in favour of the purchaser, and the vendors appealed to the
Court of Appeal.
12.5 The Court of Appeal dismissed the vendors’ appeal. It held that
the elements of offer and acceptance were present. First, there was an
offer to purchase the apartment since this was clearly stated in the
purchaser’s written offer. Indeed, the written offer expressly provided
that the vendors must “either accept or reject this offer”, which showed
that the purchaser intended to be bound provided that his promise was
accepted by the vendors. Secondly, there was an acceptance of the
purchaser’s offer since the vendors had signed on an acknowledgment
block indicating acceptance, and had left the rejection block blank. This
signified the vendors’ final and unqualified expression of assent to the
terms of an offer. This case shows that while the elements of offer and
acceptance will not be difficult to find, they must still be established
with reference to the particular facts of a given case. In this regard,
express references to “offer” and “acceptance” may go some way towards
finding their existence as a legal matter.
12.6 The second case in which the court had to apply the rules
relating to contractual formation is the High Court decision of Siemens
Industry Software v Lion Global Offshore Pte Ltd [2014] SGHC 251
(“Siemens Industry Software”). This was an appeal by the defendant,
Lion Global Offshore Pte Ltd, against the assistant registrar’s decision to
enter summary judgment in favour of the plaintiff, Siemens Industry
Software Pte Ltd. Owing to a copyright dispute over the use of the
plaintiff ’s software by the defendant, the parties entered into a
settlement arrangement. This arrangement involved a full and final
settlement of the copyright dispute on a no-fault basis, conditional upon
the defendant paying $267,500 (including taxes) under a licensed
software designation agreement (“LSDA”) for six software licences.
Accordingly, two documents were concluded: a settlement agreement
(“SA”), and the LSDA. When the defendant refused to pay the $267,500,
the plaintiff considered that refusal to be a repudiatory breach of the
LSDA. The plaintiff elected to continue with the LSDA and delivered six
software licences to the defendant. It then issued a letter of demand to
the defendant for the $267,500. When the defendant still refused to pay,
the plaintiff succeeded in obtaining summary judgment in its favour.
The defendant argued on appeal that it should be given leave to defend
as there were several triable issues.
12.7 One of those triable issues concerned issues of offer and

acceptance: whether the plaintiff was precluded from proceeding with
its claim based only on the LSDA. Essentially, the defendant’s argument
was that since the SA was made conditional upon the completion of the
LSDA, the SA needed to be considered as well.
12.8 Whether this was a triable issue requires the consideration of

basic offer and acceptance principles. The law adopts an objective
approach towards such ascertainment. Thus, whether a contract is
formed (and its constituent terms) depends not on the parties’
subjective assertions, but on how a reasonable person would understand
the situation.
12.9 Although not expressly stated by the court in Siemens Industry

Software, it is clear that it applied these principles. It held that the fact of
the SA being conditional on the sale of the six software licences
pursuant to the LSDA did not mean that the LSDA was conditional on
the SA. The defendant’s own subjective assertions on a contrary effect of
the SA and the LSDA was thus irrelevant. In any case, the evidence
contradicted this assertion as the defendant had stated in an e-mail that
it understood that an agreement had been concluded. It was at that
point that the coincidence of offer and acceptance occurred. As such,
there was no need to consider the SA, and this first alleged triable issue
was not in fact triable.

Silence as valid acceptance?
12.10 The rules of offer and acceptance admit of more specific issues
apart from that requiring their coincidence. One such issue, considered
by the Court of Appeal in R1 International Pte Ltd v Lonstroff AG [2015]
1 SLR 521 (“R1 International”), is whether there can be a valid
acceptance by silence. It must be said that R1 International also
concerned other issues of contractual formation, all of which will be
dealt with below (at paras 12.10–12.13). The case concerned whether a
set of terms to arbitrate in Singapore, found in a detailed contract note
which had been sent by the appellant to the respondent shortly after
their deal was concluded, was incorporated as part of the contract
between the parties. The answer to this issue would determine whether
the High Court was correct in dismissing the appellant’s application for
a permanent anti-suit injunction.
12.11 The deal between the parties had come about in the following
way. Between January and December 2012, the respondent purchased
rubber from the appellant over several transactions. In one of those
transactions, the respondent notified the appellant that the rubber it had
taken delivery of emitted a foul smell. The appellant did not dispute the
presence of the smell, but said that as “smell” was not a contractually
specified parameter of the rubber, it was not in breach of contract.
12.12 The respondent commenced proceedings in Switzerland against

the appellant, and the appellant responded by commencing proceedings
in Singapore. The appellant sought an anti-suit injunction to prevent the
respondent from continuing with the Swiss proceedings. The appellant’s
basis for doing so was that the respondent was in breach of an
agreement found in a contract note to arbitrate any disputes in
Singapore.
12.13 Although the respondent never countersigned and returned the

contract note, it is important to note the particular way in which each
transaction was concluded. First, the parties would negotiate the sale of
rubber by e-mail or telephone. Secondly, after the basic terms had been
concluded, the appellant would send an “e-mail confirmation” to the
respondent. The respondent would then send a “purchase order” to the
appellant. Thirdly, the appellant would send the respondent a contract
note, with a request that the respondent countersign and return a copy.
The appellant would then deliver the rubber and issue an invoice, which
the respondent would accept and pay for.
12.14 The appellant argued on appeal that it was typical in commodity

trading transactions for parties to negotiate and agree on key
commercial terms over telephone. This would be recorded in an e-mail
sent by the sellers to confirm the trade and key terms. A more detailed
set of terms would follow to supplement those key terms. It was

therefore said that the respondent, being an experienced buyer in the
rubber commodities market, would thus have expected the appellant’s
further terms, as contained in the contract note, to follow. In so far as
offer and acceptance are concerned, the appellant argued that the
respondent’s failure to countersign the contract note could not be
construed as equivocal silence that invalidated acceptance, since the
respondent had paid the invoiced amount thereafter. On the contrary,
the respondent’s payment objectively constituted acceptance of the
terms in the contract note, binding it to the agreement to arbitrate in
Singapore.
12.15 The Court of Appeal agreed with this argument and found that
silence is not necessarily fatal to a finding that terms have been
accepted. The effect of silence is context-dependent; indeed, the High
Court had held in Midlink Development Pte Ltd v The Stansfield Group
Pte Ltd [2004] 4 SLR(R) 258 that whether silence amounted to
acceptance depended on whether the conduct of the parties, objectively
ascertained, supported the existence of a contract.
12.16 On the facts, the Court of Appeal regarded as important that the
respondent did not ever demur from the applicability of the appellant’s
contract note. Thus, the respondent’s payment of the invoice for the
contract note without protest was taken as unequivocal acceptance of its
terms. While a party may request that a countersigned copy of a
document be returned, this may not be an essential act to constitute a
contract. Indeed, on the facts, the contract note did not state that it
could only be accepted after it was countersigned and returned.
Whether acceptance needs to be communicated
12.17 Another specific rule relating to the rules of offer and

acceptance is whether an acceptance needs to be communicated for it to
be effective. This issue arose for the High Court’s consideration in
Brader Daniel John v Commerzbank AG [2014] 2 SLR 81 (“Brader Daniel
John”). The case concerned an alleged promise made by Dresdner
Kleinwort (“DKIB”), the global investment banking division of
Dresdner Bank AG (“Dresdner Bank”), that there would be a minimum
pool of €400m from which the DKIB’s employees would be paid their
bonuses in 2008. An initial announcement was made on 18 August 2008
(“the 18 August announcement”). This was followed by DKIB sending
out letters to all eligible employees, including the plaintiffs, on
19 December 2008. When DKIB announced later that it was reducing
the bonuses payable, the plaintiffs sued to enforce the balance sum
promised in the 19 December letter as damages.

12.18 In considering whether a valid contract was concluded between

the parties, the court considered whether the fact that none of the
plaintiffs communicated their acceptance of the 18 August
announcement precluded such a finding. The court held that while
usually acceptance has no effect until it has been communicated to the
offeror, this is not without exceptions. In particular, the offer may
expressly or impliedly waive the requirement that the acceptance be
communicated. This was applicable to the present case since there was
no indication that Dresdner Bank asked employees to indicate their
acceptance of the minimum bonus pool. This constituted a waiver of the
need for the plaintiffs to communicate their acceptance. Alternatively,
the court construed the 18 August announcement as a unilateral
contract, which obliged DKIB to pay the bonus in return for the
plaintiffs’ continued employment and performance. Once the plaintiffs
had commenced such employment and performance, Dresdner Bank
would come under an obligation not to revoke the offer.
Consideration
12.19 In Woo Kah Wai (above, para 12.2), the vendor argued that
there was no consideration since the cheque was for the option to
purchase and not in support of the pre-option contract. The Court of
Appeal, on the facts as described above at paras 12.2–12.5, had no
difficulty rejecting this argument. It found that there was consideration
to support the pre-option contract since the purchaser had provided a
cheque in exchange for the provision of an option to purchase. It also
held that the vendor’s argument was far too technical a view of the entire
transaction.
12.20 This demonstrates that the Singapore courts will not adopt an
overly technical reading of the requirement of consideration that might
avoid the finding of a contract. This is especially true if the transaction
concerned commercial entities or exchanges. As has been said in many
cases (see, eg, Chwee Kin Keong v Digilandmall.com Pte Ltd [2004]
2 SLR(R) 594 at [139]), the courts will look at the substantive content of
a transaction in discerning consideration, and will not easily accept the
breaking down of a transaction into artificially minor parts to avoid the
finding of consideration.
12.21 Indeed, the High Court in Brader Daniel John (above,

para 12.17) noted that consideration remains a standard requirement for
the formation of a valid contract notwithstanding heavy criticism of it.
On the facts as described above at paras 12.17–12.18, and applying the
benefit-detriment analysis, the court found that the consideration
sought in the 18 August announcement was the plaintiffs’ continued

employment and forebearance from resigning. There was therefore

consideration on the facts.
12.22 Alternatively, the court also found consideration on the “more

modern” analysis set out in Williams v Roffey Bros & Nicholls
(Contractors) Ltd [1991] 1 QB 1. That case recognised the concept of
practical benefit to the promisor that can constitute valid consideration
even though the promisor had paid more for the same promise. The
court in Brader Daniel John found that this analysis also applied on the
present facts since the plaintiffs were not obliged to continue in their
employment in the first place; by continuing their employment, they
had conferred on Dresdner Bank a practical benefit in terms of
employee stability. This analysis simply shows that the courts very easily
find consideration in commercial contexts.
Promissory estoppel
12.23 The doctrine of promissory estoppel, usually used to enforce

promises otherwise unsupported by consideration, arose for the High
Court’s consideration in Bank of China Ltd (Singapore Branch) v Huang
Ziqiang [2014] SGHC 245. In this case, the plaintiff bank sued the first
defendant to recover the sums on the basis of him being the guarantor
of a loan granted to the borrower. The first defendant resisted this
claim, saying that the bank had falsely represented to him that it
would not enforce its rights under the guarantee. Those fraudulent
misrepresentations allegedly induced the first defendant to execute the
guarantee. In conjunction with his claim of fraudulent misrepresentation,
the first defendant also argued that those same misrepresentations gave
rise to the defence of promissory estoppel.
12.24 The High Court found that promissory estoppel did not apply
on the facts. First, it held that the first defendant’s reliance on the
doctrine was inconsistent with his plea of fraudulent misrepresentation.
This was because, for promissory estoppel to apply, there must be a legal
relationship giving rise to rights and duties between the parties. Such a
legal relationship would not arise from the first defendant’s insistence
that the bank’s fraudulent misrepresentation prevented the guarantee
from arising in the first place. Secondly, the court also found that, even
if made out, the effect of promissory estoppel was suspensory only and
was founded on the bank’s inequitable conduct. There was nothing on
the facts that pointed to such inequitable conduct. Thus, this case
reminds us of the usual elements of promissory estoppel, namely, the
existence of a legal relationship and conduct that would make it
inequitable for the insistence of strict legal rights.

Intention to create legal relations
12.25 The High Court in Brader Daniel John regarded the intention to
create legal relations as the very marrow of contractual relationships.
Contrary to the plaintiffs’ submissions, the court rightly found that the
burden was on the party seeking to establish the existence of the
contract to prove an intention to create legal relations. On the facts as
described above at paras 12.17–12.18, an inference of an intention to be
bound can be drawn from the subject matter of the announcement in
the present case, which was the remuneration of an employee by the
employer.
Certainty and completeness
12.26 It is clear that a contract must be certain and complete before it

can be enforceable. Put another way, before there can be a concluded
contract in law, its terms must be certain and the agreement must
similarly be complete. A term that is “uncertain” exists but is otherwise
incomprehensible. On the other hand, an agreement that is
“incomplete” has certain terms that do not (but should) exist and the
non-existence of these terms make the agreement incomprehensible.
A contract may be unenforceable for uncertainty or incompleteness
even though there has otherwise been both offer and acceptance
between the parties: see Brader Daniel John at [82].
12.27 Even if a contract is uncertain or incomplete, that can be

remedied by a previous course of dealing between the parties. This was
exactly the situation in Brader Daniel John, in which the defendant
argued that the 18 August announcement was uncertain since it did not
provide for the specific bonus to be given to each employee. However,
the court found that the parties’ past conduct on how such bonuses were
to be paid remedied this gap.
12.28 The degree of certainty and completeness required becomes

relevant when parties conclude an interim agreement with the intention
of adding more detailed terms later on. The question then becomes
whether the interim agreement is sufficiently certain and complete,
given that it is explicitly not meant to be detailed. The Court of Appeal
had occasion in R1 International (above, para 12.10) to deal with such a
situation. It found that it is not uncommon for parties to first agree on a
set of essential terms that they are bound as a matter of law, even though
there may be ongoing discussions and further incorporation of the other
more detailed terms.
12.29 On the facts as described above at paras 12.10–12.13, the Court

of Appeal in R1 International found that the key terms in the e-mail

confirmation would have been sufficient to satisfy the requirements of

certainty and completeness and hence constitute a valid contract.
However, the Court of Appeal also noted that, given the size and scope
of the subject matter of the deal, it was improbable that the parties
intended to contract on the bare bones of the e-mail confirmation.
Indeed, the e-mail confirmation was silent on a few potentially
important matters that were dealt with in the contract note. This gave
rise to the issue of whether terms dealing with these matters may be
incorporated into the parties’ agreement, an issue dealt with below
(at paras 12.37–12.40).
12.30 The question of certainty and completeness also featured in

Siemens Industry Software (above, para 12.6). The plaintiff argued on
appeal that the LSDA was sufficiently complete and certain to be
enforceable. The defendant argued that the LSDA could not be enforced
as there was, first, no agreed terms for payment, and secondly,
vagueness relating to the words “valid through: June 30, 2014”.
12.31 The High Court found that uncertainty as to the time of

payment may render an agreement unenforceable when it is determined
to be vital to the agreement. Indeed, such was the case in T2 Networks
Pte Ltd v Nasioncom Sdn Bhd [2008] 2 SLR(R) 1 (“T2 Networks”), where
the High Court found that a settlement agreement was not legally
binding because the payment terms were not certain. In contrast, the
court in Siemens Industry Software found that there was no evidence
that time of payment was vital to the transaction. Thus, while the court
accepted that there was indeed an uncertainty as to the time of payment,
this did not render the contract unenforceable because the time of
payment terms was not vital to the transaction.
12.32 With respect, it may be unclear why time of payment is not vital
in the present case. Similar to T2 Networks, Siemens Industry Software
concerned a settlement agreement. Thus, it ought to be a valid
consideration to all parties when the settlement is to be effected. Indeed,
contrary to the court’s conclusion that time of payment was a minor
term compared to the other terms of the agreement, such as the quantity
of products to be purchased and the price of sale, it is respectfully
submitted that, without agreement of the time of payment, the LSDA
would be an essentially “empty” agreement. It would be “empty” because
it did not stipulate when the defendant must perform its obligations,
thereby nullifying the other terms that the court did regard as
important, such as those to do with quantity and price.
12.33 However, the court was, with respect, correct that the words
“valid through: June 30, 2014” simply meant that the LSDA was open for
acceptance until that date. This therefore did not render the LSDA
uncertain and unenforceable.
The terms of the contract
Distinguishing representations from terms in an oral contract
12.34 The issue of distinguishing representations from terms in the

context of an oral contract arose in the High Court decision of Low Kin
Kok (alias Low Kong Song Song) v Lee Chiow Seng [2014] SGHC 208
(“Low Kin Kok”). The case concerned a failed investment project
undertaken by the plaintiffs and the defendants. The plaintiffs’ claim in
breach of contract was confined to a supposed subsequent agreement
between the parties to enable the plaintiffs to recover their investments.
This could be characterised as either being an agreement to vary the
original contract, or an agreement to rescind the original contract and
enter into a new contract. However, because no written agreement had
been entered into by the parties throughout the course of their entire
working relationship, the court had to consider the oral accounts and
ascertain the exact ambit of agreement, if any.
12.35 The High Court’s decision in Low Kin Kok contains a valuable
discussion of the identification of the contractual terms where there had
only been an oral agreement between the parties. The court found that,
apart from the evidential difficulty in reconstructing exactly what
transpired between the parties, there is also the challenge of
distinguishing representations and terms. The court held that an
objective test is to be used to ascertain whether a statement is a mere
representation or a term, and the test is concerned with what would
appear to a reasonable person to be the parties’ intention in the
particular circumstances of the case.
12.36 Of course, distinguishing representations from terms is only

one of the many challenges where there is only an oral agreement
between the parties. The more substantive challenge involves actually
finding agreement, though that is again approached by an objective test.
Such a test may allow the ascertainment of agreement from a course of
conduct or dealings between the parties or from correspondence or all
relevant circumstances. Needless to say, the requirements for the
formation of a contract, such as offer and acceptance, consideration,
intention to create legal relations and certainty of terms must be
satisfied before the court would find the existence of a contract.
Incorporation of terms
12.37 Whether the terms contained in a separate document are

incorporated into a present agreement may be important, especially
when contracting parties intend to supplement an otherwise bare
agreement with more detailed terms subsequently. On the facts, as
detailed above (at paras 12.10–12.13), the Court of Appeal in

R1 International (above, para 12.10) held that both parties did
contemplate that the basic terms of the e-mail confirmations would be
supplemented by a set of standard terms. In doing so, it laid down some
important principles to do with the incorporation of terms.
12.38 First, the Court of Appeal held that the law adopts an objective
approach towards questions dealing with incorporation of terms. Thus,
when the deal had come into being and whether the terms of the
contract note had supplemented (or was incorporated) into the deal
turned on ascertaining the parties’ objective intentions as gleaned from
their correspondence and conduct in light of the relevant background as
disclosed by the evidence. Importantly, the Court of Appeal noted that
the relevant background includes the parties’ industry, the character of
the document that contained the terms in question, as well as the course
of dealings between the parties.
12.39 Applying these principles to the case, the Court of Appeal found
that it was indeed the practice in the international rubber commodities
market for parties to initially only discuss the key terms of each trade,
such as the specific product, quantity, price and destination at the time
the trade was confirmed. The remaining terms would generally be
concluded later. Thus, the respondent ought to have been aware of this
practice and contemplated that the terms within the contract note could
supplement those key terms in the e-mail confirmation.
12.40 It is important that the Court of Appeal found as a matter of fact

that the respondent ought to have expected, in line with industrial
norms, that the key terms of the e-mail confirmation would be
supplemented by the terms of the contract note. Without this finding, it
might have been difficult for a court to hold that a bare bones contract
must always be supplemented by more detailed terms. Indeed, as the
Court of Appeal itself noted in R1 International, it would have been
possible, though inconvenient, for the parties to proceed on just the key
terms of the e-mail confirmation. However, construed objectively from
industrial norms and their own previous dealings, it was clear that the
parties’ objective intentions were that more detailed terms were expected
and indeed incorporated via the contract note.
Implication of terms
Implication of terms in fact
12.41 In 2013, the Court of Appeal in Sembcorp Marine Ltd v PPL

Holdings Pte Ltd [2013] 4 SLR 193 (“Sembcorp Marine”) prescribed a
new three-step process for the implication of terms in fact. The first step

requires the court to ascertain that a gap in the contract had arisen
because the parties had not contemplated the gap; it is only in such a
situation that a term can be implied. Next, the court is to consider
whether it is necessary in the business or commercial sense to imply a
term in order to give the contract efficacy. Finally, the court is to
consider the specific term to be implied. A term is only to be implied if it
passes the “officious bystander” test, that is, the contracting parties,
having regard to the need for business efficacy, would have responded
positively to the suggestion of the term to be implied. In the one year
since, the courts have had various occasions to apply the test for
implication as spelt out in Sembcorp Marine.
12.42 The first occasion is the High Court decision of Quek Kwee Kee
Victoria v Quek Khuay Chuah [2014] 4 SLR 1 (“Quek Kwee Kee
Victoria”). The parties to the action had disputed the bequests made by
the deceased to various beneficiaries, including themselves. Eventually,
both parties agreed to settle the disputes. Under the terms of the
settlement agreement, the defendant was to sell his one-sixth share in
two properties to the first plaintiff at market value, which was to be
determined by Knight Frank Pte Ltd (“Knight Frank”). Knight Frank
valued the properties at $4.2m, with the result that the first plaintiff had
to pay $700,000 for the defendant’s one-sixth share.
12.43 The defendant was not satisfied with Knight Frank’s valuation
and appointed other valuers, who on average valued the properties at
$7.5m. The defendant argued that the higher valuation should be used
because there was an implied term that Knight Frank’s valuation would
be at market value and/or fair or reasonable. The first plaintiff refused to
accept this new valuation and sued to enforce the previous valuation
and for the specific performance of the settlement agreement.
12.44 The High Court found for the plaintiffs. Although the relevant
clause calling for Knight Frank’s valuation was not stated to be final and
binding, the court was satisfied that the parties intended this to be the
case. In so far as the defendant’s argument of implication was concerned,
the court found that the parties had agreed on a formula, that is, at
“market price”, for the sale of the one-sixth interest. There was thus no
gap and hence no room for any implication that the price would be “fair
and reasonable” or that the “market price” would be a price either party
considered to be fair and reasonable. Moreover, since the parties had
named Knight Frank, which was well known and well respected in the
Singapore property market, as the valuer, there was nothing strange in
the choice that might lead to any ambiguity or any implication that the
valuation obtained would have to be supplemented in any way.
12.45 Although the High Court in Quek Kwee Kee Victoria did not
refer to the three-step process for the implication of terms in fact in
Sembcorp Marine, it is evident that it had that process in mind. It first

reasoned that there was no “gap”, an express consideration the Court of
Appeal laid down in the first step. Next, the court also found that there
was no ambiguity; again, another consideration arguably found in the
remaining steps of the Sembcorp Marine three-step process. It is,
however, respectfully submitted that the three-step process might be
explicitly applied so as to ensure consistency and clarity in cases
concerning the implication of terms in fact.
12.46 A second occasion in which the courts had to consider the

Sembcorp Marine three-step process is the High Court decision of
The One Suites Pte Ltd v Pacific Motor Credit (Pte) Ltd [2014] 4 SLR 806
(“The One Suites Pte Ltd”). Unlike Quek Kwee Kee Victoria, the court in
this case did expressly apply the Sembcorp Marine three-step process to
the facts, which involved an option to purchase (“OTP”) a property at
11 Leng Kee Road. The OTP provided that the property was to be sold
“subject to the existing approved use”. The purchaser was to apply for
the written approvals from the Housing and Development Board
(“HDB”) and other relevant authorities for the sale of the property. The
completion date was set at 12 weeks from the date the OTP was
exercised, or three weeks from the date of approval of the sale of the
property by HDB, whichever was later. The OTP also provided that if
HDB did not approve of the sale, then the sale would be rescinded.
12.47 Pursuant to its obligations, the purchaser applied to the relevant

authorities for approval. However, the National Environment Agency
(“NEA”) refused the application because the purchaser’s proposed use of
the property did not fit with its long-term land use plan. The HDB was
thus unable to approve of the sale as well. The purchaser thereafter
regarded the sale of the property to be rescinded and sought a refund of
the deposit. The vendor refused to refund the deposit but wrote to the
NEA without the purchaser’s knowledge and persuaded the NEA to
reconsider its earlier decision on the premise that there was to be no
change to the use of the property. Although the vendor urged the
purchaser to apply to the HDB again given that the NEA had changed
its mind, the purchaser refused and sued the vendor for the return of the
deposit.
12.48 The High Court noted that, in the absence of any implied terms,
the OTP could continue indefinitely as there was no obligation on the
purchaser to pursue the relevant authorities for approval beyond the
submission of its applications in the first place. It considered whether it
should intervene by implying a term in fact to stipulate an end date for
the OTP. Applying the first step of the Sembcorp Marine three-step
process, it found that there was a glaring gap in the OTP regarding such
a deadline. Since the parties had not contemplated such a gap, the next
step of the three-step process was invoked. Applying the second step, the
court found that it was necessary in the business or commercial sense to

imply a term in order to give the OTP efficacy so as not to leave both
parties in limbo if the relevant approvals were not forthcoming.
12.49 In relation to the third step, the court regarded the real dispute
to be about how the gap should be filled. Having considered the overall
context of the OTP, the court found that there was an implied term that
the purchaser had to use all reasonable endeavours to obtain the HDB’s
written approval and such other relevant authority for the sale of the
property within a reasonable time. If no such approval was forthcoming
after a reasonable time had lapsed, then either party may give notice to
rescind. On the facts, the court found that the purchaser had not taken
such reasonable steps; hence, its claim for the deposit failed. It should be
noted that the High Court’s decision has been reversed on appeal
([2015] SGCA 21), but its application of the Sembcorp Marine test may
still be used as an illustration of such application.
12.50 A third instance of the courts applying the Sembcorp Marine

three-step process for the implication of terms in fact is the High Court
decision of TYC Investment Pte Ltd v Tay Yun Chwan Henry [2014]
4 SLR 1149. The case concerned whether the two directors of the first
plaintiff company had properly exercised their right to approve
payments made by the company to its creditors. This right had come
about due to a divorce settlement agreement between the two directors,
who had been married to each other. As part of the settlement
agreement, a payment clause obliged either party to approve the other’s
payment on behalf of the company to its creditors. The plaintiffs
commenced the present action against the two directors for a
declaration that the cheques signed by the husband were valid despite
the absence of the wife’s approval. The plaintiffs additionally asked for
the wife to specifically perform her contractual obligations under the
settlement agreement, in particular the obligation based on an implied
term that prevented her from exercising her right of approval for an
improper purpose, capriciously or arbitrarily.
12.51 The High Court found that the purported implied term did not
satisfy the Sembcorp Marine three-step process. Applying the first step,
the court found that there was a gap in the settlement agreement as it
was silent on what should happen if either director paralysed the
company by declining to approve any payments. However, the second
step was not satisfied because the gap caused by the right to approve
payments did not undermine the efficacy of the settlement agreement
because that gap was adequately covered by the existing directors’ duties
imposed on the two directors in their capacities as directors of the
company. There was thus no need to imply a term that prevented any of
the directors, in this case the wife, from exercising the right of approval
for an improper purpose, capriciously or arbitrarily.
12.52 A fourth instance of the courts applying the Sembcorp Marine

three-step process for the implication of terms in fact is Culindo
Livestock (1994) Pte Ltd v Ananda UK (China) Ltd [2014] SGHC 178
(“Culindo Livestock”), the main facts of which are covered below in
relation to the implication of terms in sale of goods: see paras 12.57–
12.58. For present purposes, the relevant argument is that of the
defendant, who submitted that there was an implied term that the
source of the goods in question, ceftiofur sodium sterile (“CSS”), would
be specifically from Chem Tec Incorporated (“Chemtec”). The
defendant had argued this in order to show that Chemtec’s certificate of
analysis would be sufficient to certify the suitability and quality of the
CSS delivered, and so escape liability under the Sale of Goods Act
(Cap 393, 1999 Rev Ed) (“SOGA”). Relatedly, the defendant also argued
for the implication of a term that the quality of the CSS supplied should
be assessed with regard to the Chemtec standard, which was entirely
dependent on the sample supplied by Chemtec.
12.53 In considering whether the first term can be implied, the High
Court held that the defendant failed to prove that the presumed
intention of both parties was to purchase CSS from Chemtec. Thus,
applying the first step of the Sembcorp Marine three-step process, the
court did not think that there was any gap in the contract that needed to
be filled. This therefore rendered the next two steps unnecessary,
although the court did consider that the second step would not be
satisfied because there was no need to imply any term to give the
contract efficacy. The third step also failed since there was no evidence
that both parties would have thought it obvious that the sale was
restricted to the particular source from Chemtec.
12.54 The court also held that the second term could not be implied.
It cited Sembcorp Marine for the proposition that a term that is not
reasonable, not equitable, unclear or that contradicts an express term of
the contract will not be implied. Applying this proposition, the court
thought that a term holding the defendant to the Chemtec standard
would be wholly subjective and run counter to the purpose of a
scientifically objective test. This would also contradict the express term
that CSS was to be delivered, since the defendant could then deliver any
goods that fit the Chemtec standard, which may not actually be CSS.
12.55 A final instance is the High Court decision of Rotol Projects Pte
Ltd v CCM Industrial Pte Ltd [2014] SGHC 72 (“Rotol Projects”), where
the court used the Sembcorp Marine three-step process to reject the
implication of a binding claims procedure argued for by the defendant.
Although the court said that the three steps would all fail (at [48]), it
appears that its ultimate decision was grounded on the fact that there
was no gap in the contract to be filled.

Implication of terms by law
12.56 The High Court decision of Rotol Projects also contains a short
but important reminder (at [49]) that terms should not lightly be
implied by law since such a term, once implied, will also be implied in
all contracts of that particular type. In order for such implication to
occur, there needs to be very strong reasons provided, which was
certainly not the case in Rotol Projects.
Implication of terms in sale of goods
12.57 The implication of terms in the context of the sale of goods

arose in the High Court decision of Culindo Livestock. The case
concerned the sale of CSS, an antibiotic for livestock, from the
defendant to the plaintiff. Such a sale took place over 11 sales contracts
entered into between the parties from 2009 to 2011. The dispute in the
present case concerned the tenth and 11th contracts, in which the CSS
supplied by the defendant was found to be below the requisite quality
standard. This in turn led the plaintiff to claim the defendant had
supplied cefotaxime sodium (“CFX”), a substantially cheaper
compound, in place of CSS. The plaintiff thereafter sued the defendant
for breach of the implied condition under s 13 of the SOGA, in that the
goods (allegedly CFX) did not correspond with the description (CSS).
The plaintiff further asserted that the CSS delivered was not fit for its
intended purpose pursuant to ss 14(1) and 14(2) of the SOGA.
12.58 The High Court considered that it needed to ascertain the

nature of the sale transaction to decide which of the implied terms
under the SOGA would apply. As to whether the implied term under
s 13 would apply, the court considered that where the contract is for
unascertained goods, the sale must be by description since the buyer
must have some means of knowing whether the goods supplied by the
seller are the goods supplied in the sale contract. In the present case, the
plaintiff would state the description of the goods, the quantity required,
the unit price, and the amount to be paid in the purchase order. The
defendant would in return reply with a sales contract to confirm the
conditions of sale, which described the commodity required as CSS.
12.59 While this showed that the sale of goods from the defendant to
the plaintiff was a sale by description, this was not enough since s 13(2)
of the SOGA provides that it is not sufficient that the bulk of the goods
corresponds with the sample if the goods do not also correspond with
the description in the event that “the sale is by sample as well as by
description”. Section 15(1) in turn provides that a contract of sale is a
contract for sale by sample where there is an express or implied term to
that effect. However, the court found that there was nothing on the facts
that suggested the sales were by sample. Indeed, up to the point when
the parties concluded the sales contract, there was no mention of any
sample being used as the reference standard for the purpose of the sale.
Moreover, a sample that was agreed as a reference standard after the
contract had been concluded would usually not be relevant to a contract
for sale by sample: see Compact Metal Industries Ltd v PPG Industries
(Singapore) Ltd [2006] SGHC 242 (“Compact Metal Industries Ltd”). The
court therefore found that there was an implied condition that the goods
will correspond with the description, pursuant to s 13(1) of the SOGA.
12.60 The High Court considered that it was of crucial importance

that s 13(1) classified every description of the contract as a “condition”.
Citing Chai Cher Watt v SDL Technologies Pte Ltd [2012] 1 SLR 152, the
court also noted that there are generally two types of cases where goods
have been held not to correspond with their description. The first type is
where there is some small discrepancy from the description in the
contract. The second type comprises cases where in the absence of
detailed commercial description, the goods supplied are to be regarded
as not being the goods ordered in a general sense. In the present case,
the court found that the evidence showed the defendant had supplied
CFX rather than CSS, thereby breaching its implied term under s 13(1)
of the SOGA.
12.61 In relation to the plaintiff ’s argument that the defendant was

also in breach of the condition of satisfactory quality implied under
s 14(2) of the SOGA, the court relied again on Compact Metal Industries
Ltd, which elucidated the relevant governing principles: Culindo
Livestock at [102]. Applying those principles, the court held that the
plaintiff had proved its case under s 14(2). This was also because
s 14(2A) provides that goods are of satisfactory quality if they meet the
standard that a reasonable person would regard as satisfactory, taking
into account the relevant circumstances. In the present case, the goods
supplied were clearly described as CSS but the goods supplied were CFX
instead, which were of a lower market price than CSS. There was also
evidence that CFX differed from CSS in its usage, and might not have
successfully treated the plaintiff ’s livestock.
Implied term of mutual trust and confidence
12.62 In 2013, the High Court held in Cheah Peng Hock v Luzhou Bio-
Chem Technology Ltd [2013] 2 SLR 577 that unless there were express
terms to the contrary, there was a term, implied by law, that an employer
owed an employee a duty not to undermine or destroy mutual trust and
confidence. This included a duty of fidelity, that is, a duty to act honestly
and faithfully, although the content of such a duty would vary
depending on the facts of the case. 2014 saw some cases discussing this
implied term of mutual trust and confidence.

12.63 In the Court of Appeal decision of Wee Kim San Lawrence

Bernard v Robinson & Co (Singapore) Pte Ltd [2014] 4 SLR 357, the
court held that the concept of constructive dismissal and the implied
term of mutual trust and confidence were distinct but related. Thus,
a breach of the implied term of mutual trust and confidence, being the
breach of a fundamental term of the employment contract, would entitle
the employee to terminate the contract. If the employee elected to
terminate, he would be treated as having been “constructively”
dismissed. Where this occurred, the employee would be able to claim
“premature termination losses”, that is, losses that were causally
connected to the premature termination of the employment contract.
This was to be measured by the amount the employee would have
received under the contract had the employer lawfully terminated the
contract by giving the required notice or paying salary in lieu of such
notice. Thus, in most cases, damages from a breach of the implied term
of mutual trust and confidence would be tied to constructive dismissal,
unless the consequence of the breach was something other than the
premature termination of the employment contract, such as impairment
of future employment prospects.
12.64 The High Court in Brader Daniel John (above, para 12.17)
considered that breach of an implied term of trust and confidence can
only be established on proof that the employer’s conduct was without
reasonable cause and such conduct was calculated and likely to destroy
or seriously damage the relationship of trust and confidence. The court
noted that it would take quite extreme behaviour on the part of the
employer to satisfy these requirements: Brader Daniel John at [114].
Non-absolute obligations clauses
12.65 The Court of Appeal decision of KS Energy Services Ltd v BR

Energy (M) Sdn Bhd [2014] 2 SLR 905 (“KS Energy”) (noted in Yip
Man & Goh Yihan, “Default Standards for Non-absolute Obligation
Clauses” [2014] LMCLQ 320) raised some important points relating to
non-absolute obligations clauses. In the case, BR Energy (M) Sdn Bhd
(“BRE”) was awarded a charter for an oil rig to Petronas Carigali Sdn
Bhd (“Petronas”) by 21 March 2006. It eventually approached KS Energy
Services Ltd (“KSE”) to supply the rig. KSE engaged a third party
contract, Oderco Inc (“Oderco”), to build the rig. KSE also formed a
joint venture company with BRE to charter the rig. The key provision in
the joint venture agreement provided that KSE was to:
… use all reasonable endeavours to procure the [oil rig] is constructed
and ready for delivery in Abu Dhabi or other location specified by KSE
within six months after the Charter Agreement is executed.

12.66 As it turned out, Oderco could not meet its deadline and the rig
was not constructed in time. Petronas terminated its charter agreement
with BRE. BRE then purported to terminate the joint venture agreement
with KSE on the ground that KSE had failed to use all reasonable
endeavours to procure the construction of the oil rig. The case therefore
turned on the interpretation of the “all reasonable endeavours” clause. In
this regard, the Court of Appeal provided some valuable guidance on
the interpretation of such clauses, as well as other non-absolute
obligations clauses.
12.67 First, an “all reasonable endeavours” clause required the obligor

to act as a prudent and determined person in the interest of the obligee
and anxious to procure the contractual outcome within the stipulated
timeframe. On the facts, KSE’s conduct satisfied this requirement since
they were persistent in pushing for Oderco’s compliance, within
reasonable boundaries.
12.68 Second, there was a need to distinguish between an obligation

to use all reasonable endeavours to procure a third party’s performance
and an obligation to do the same oneself. The former required a lesser
degree of reasonable endeavour as compared to the latter since the
procurement of a third party’s performance might involve some
uncertainty. Applied to the present case, KSE could not be expected to
deploy permanent staff to supervise Oderco. Indeed, this would be an
intrusive right in relation to a third party builder.
12.69 Third, there was little or no difference between the standard

imposed by an “all reasonable endeavours” clause and a “best
endeavours” clause. There was, however, a distinction between these
clauses and a simple “reasonable endeavours” clause, which simply
requires the obligor to act reasonably to procure the contractual
outcome.
12.70 With respect, the Court of Appeal’s decision in KS Energy is

sensible in avoiding the thin distinction that had hitherto existed in
foreign cases concerning the distinction between an “all reasonable
endeavours” and “best endeavours” clause. Perhaps the most practical
lesson from the case is that parties should spell out completely the exact
non-absolute obligations they require of the other party, failing which,
they leave it to the courts to construe such clauses for them. This, being
an objective exercise, may not meet the subjectively intended obligations
held by parties at the time the non-absolute obligation was entered into.
12.71 The High Court case of The One Suites Pte Ltd (above,
para 12.46) also involved the application of a non-absolute obligations
clause, albeit an implied one. Notwithstanding, the principles laid down
by the Court of Appeal in KS Energy apply with equal force. On the facts
as described above (at paras 12.46–12.48), the court found that an “all
reasonable endeavours” clause was implied in the OTP, which obliged
the purchaser to use such endeavours to obtain the written approval of
the HDB and other relevant authorities within a reasonable time. What
was reasonable would depend on each situation. Thus, if the relevant
authority had already considered all the possible arguments and made a
clear decision, then it may not be reasonable to expect a purchaser to
appeal. However, if a purchaser, as was the case in The One Suites Pte
Ltd, knew that there were realistic prospects of success on appeal, then it
should try. In doing so, it did not have to sacrifice its own commercial
interests and change its business plans to ensure that it got the approval,
but it had to try. If it failed to try, it might breach its obligation to use all
reasonable endeavours. However, on appeal to the Court of Appeal
([2015] SGCA 21), this aspect of the High Court’s decision was reversed.
The Court of Appeal held that it was not necessarily the case that there
was the obligation to use all reasonable endeavours to secure approval
after an initial rejection, especially if there was a clause that ended the
contract upon initial rejection, which the court found to be the case
here.
Vitiating factors
Misrepresentation
12.72 The law concerning misrepresentation is not generally thought

to be obscure but there are still aspects of it that are not well understood.
These gaps or misconceptions surfaced in the important case of RBC
Properties Pte Ltd v Defu Furniture Pte Ltd [2015] 1 SLR 997 (“RBC
Properties”), where the Court of Appeal took the opportunity to restate
the relevant legal principles, with particular focus on s 2(1) of the
Misrepresentation Act (Cap 390, 1994 Rev Ed) (“MA”). The pertinent
facts are as follows. On 11 March 2011, the respondent (“Defu”) entered
into a lease agreement (“the Lease”) with the appellant lessor (“RBC”) to
use the leased premises (“the Premises”) as a furniture showroom. The
Premises formed part of a building (“the Property”) leased by the State
to a company known as RLG Development Pte Ltd (“the State Lease”) in
2007, which in turn granted a ten-year lease of the same property to
RBC in 2008 (“the Head Lease”). Defu took possession of the Premises
in April 2011 and commenced fitting out works. Soon after, however,
RBC was informed by the Singapore Land Authority (“SLA”) that the
use of the Premises as a showroom constituted a “change of use” under
the terms of the State Lease for which a differential premium for the
enhancement of land value was chargeable. RBC then sought to pass the
burden of this charge to Defu, which not only refused to accept the
obligation but also instituted legal action to rescind the Lease and
seek damages on the ground of misrepresentation. The alleged

misrepresentation was that RBC had represented to it that it could use

the Premises as a showroom without further approvals from the
authorities other than that granted by the Urban Redevelopment
Authority (“URA”).
12.73 In the High Court (Defu Furniture Pte Ltd v RBC Properties Pte
Ltd [2014] SGHC 1), the trial judge found that RBC had misrepresented
as alleged without any reasonable ground for believing the
representation to be true. Defu could therefore rescind the Lease and
recover its loss under s 2(1) of the MA. This finding was partially
reversed by the Court of Appeal which, whilst agreeing that the false
representation had been made, nevertheless found it to be innocent as
RBC did have a reasonable basis for believing it to be true.
Consequently, though Defu was entitled to rescind the Lease along with
an indemnity for all sums incurred thereunder, it could not claim
damages under s 2(1) of the MA.
12.74 Evidently, a significant part of the dispute turned on the

application of s 2(1) of the MA when the matter came before the Court
of Appeal. This necessitated a review of the principles governing the
application of this provision. In a detailed and thorough analysis,
Andrew Phang Boon Leong JA (delivering the court’s judgment) set
forth the relevant principles, which we would endeavour to summarise
as follows:
(a) Section 2(1) of the MA was enacted to fill a remedial
lacuna in the law. It allows a person who had been induced by a
false representation to contract with another to seek damages in
addition to the remedy of rescission. For this purpose, it is not
necessary, unlike the position at common law, for the
representation to have been fraudulently made.
(b) However, a representor may avoid liability under s 2(1)
of the MA if he proves that “he had reasonable ground to
believe and did believe up to the time the contract was made
that the facts represented were true” (the “reasonable belief
test”). The representor bears the burden of proving that he held
such belief.
(c) The inquiry for determining whether the representor
met the reasonable belief test involves two stages:
(i) The first is to ascertain the representor’s
subjective state of mind. However, while the subject of
inquiry is the representor’s subjective belief, such belief
can only be established by an objective assessment of
the evidence before the court. Were it otherwise, it
would be all too easy for the representor to assert that
he honestly believed what he represented.
(ii) Having established the representor’s subjective

belief, it is then necessary to assess whether the
representor had reasonable grounds for that belief. This
is “an objective enquiry undertaken with regard to all
the considerations that were subjectively present in the
mind of that person” [emphasis in original]: RBC
Properties at [77]. In other words, the test is not
whether his belief was reasonable having regard to what
a reasonable person would have known, but whether it
was reasonable having regard to what he subjectively
knew. However, a representor will not be allowed, for
this purpose, to plead innocence if he wilfully turned a
blind eye to obvious sources of information.
Furthermore, in a case where the representor had
recourse to conflicting sources of information, “the
touchstone is whether he possessed objectively
reasonable reasons to prefer one source over another”:
RBC Properties at [77].
(d) Moreover, to avoid liability under s 2(1) of the MA, the
representor must have held the reasonable belief over an
operative time frame that commences from the time the
representation was made to the time the contract was entered
into. Consistently with this requirement, the objective
assessment of the reasonableness of his belief must also be
assessed over the same time frame, so that if the reasonable
grounds had existed at the time of the representation but ceased
to exist by the time of the contract, the representor would not be
regarded as having satisfied the test of reasonable belief under
s 2(1) of the MA.
(e) As for the measure of damages recoverable under s 2(1)
of the MA, Phang JA observed (obiter, and doubting the
correctness of Royscot Trust Ltd v Rogerson [1991] 2 QB 297 in
this aspect) that it is the measure applicable to negligence
(rather than fraud) that appears more appropriate in this
context given that s 2(1) of the MA is really intended as the
statutory analogue of negligent misrepresentation at common
law.
12.75 As already mentioned, the Court of Appeal had concluded that

RBC did in fact have a reasonable basis for its representation. The
pivotal consideration was the need to assess the reasonableness of RBC’s
belief – not from the perspective of what it ought (objectively) to have
done – but by reference to the factors that were subjectively operating on
its mind. Before the Court of Appeal, it was argued for the appellant that
it did have reasonable ground for its belief because even if RBC had
examined the terms of the State Lease (which appeared ambiguous as to
the precise circumstances in which the differential premium would have

been chargeable), it would still reasonably have concluded that no
approval other than that of URA was required for the use of the
Premises as a showroom. Phang JA expressed sympathy for this
argument. Nevertheless, this was ultimately not a relevant consideration
because RBC had not in fact checked the terms of the State Lease. It was
not, therefore, a factor that was subjectively present in its mind when
the representation was made. Rather, the correct approach was to assess
the reasonableness of RBC’s belief in light of the fact that it had not in
fact checked the State Lease.
12.76 Fortunately for the appellant, the Court of Appeal found that
the reasonableness of its belief could be established even without taking
into account the ambiguity in the terms of the State Lease. The court
came to this conclusion after taking into account all the circumstances
that existed from the time the Property was developed to the time the
Lease was signed. Critically, it noted that although SLA had (belatedly)
asserted that its right to charge a differential premium in respect of the
showroom had accrued at the inception when the Property was being
developed, yet there was no explanation why it had not levied the charge
at that time, or why it had taken no step to collect it for almost
four years thereafter. In the meantime, there was no event or other
evidence that would have put RBC on notice of the need for SLA’s
approval. In those circumstances, it would not have been reasonable to
expect RBC to check for SLA’s approval. Nor was the requirement for
such approval so “obvious or apparent” that the mere failure to check for
it would automatically render the appellant’s belief unreasonable: RBC
Properties at [102].
12.77 Having concluded that the misrepresentation was innocent, and

that Defu could not claim damages under s 2(1) of the MA, the court
then had to consider what losses it could recover on an indemnity basis.
It clarified, in this regard, that the purpose of an indemnity was not to
place the representee (RBC Properties at [118]):
… in the same position as before in all respects, but only as regards
those obligations which have been created by the contract into which
he has been induced to enter by the misrepresentation. [emphasis in
original]
Further, the court stressed that (RBC Properties at [126]):

… [t]he indemnity for innocent misrepresentation applies to both
parties, … and it follows that the representee can recover only those
benefits which he was obliged to give, and in return the representor
re-assumes those burdens which he was obliged to pass under the
contract, and vice versa. [emphasis in original]

This means, on the facts, that Defu could recover those expenditure
mandated by the Lease (such as the security deposit and pre-paid rent)
but not the larger sum incurred in fitting out the Premises. The latter
could only have been recoverable by way of a claim for damages though,
as we have seen, this avenue was not open to Defu under s 2(1) of the
MA.
12.78 More generally, where a misrepresentation was innocently

made, the court is entitled to exercise its discretion under ss 2(2) and
2(3) of the MA to award damages in lieu of rescission. This is so even if
a claimant had not specifically pleaded to recover on this basis. In
Phang JA’s view, however (RBC Properties at [130]):
… this discretion is to be exercised only in accordance with established
principles, the foremost of which is that, where the misrepresentation
is slight or relatively unimportant in the circumstances of the case, so
that rescission may be disproportionately harsh on the representor,
damages may be awarded in lieu thereof. [emphasis in original]
On the facts, it was clear that there was no room for the exercise of this
discretion as the misrepresentation was neither slight nor unimportant,
but in fact “went to the heart of the contract” [emphasis in original]: RBC
12.79 Finally, it should be mentioned, in the interests of completeness,

that RBC had also argued that its liability for misrepresentation was
excluded under cl 6.9 of the Lease. This argument was, however, rejected
because the court found that cl 6.9 was clearly an entire agreement
clause in that its intention was to stipulate that “no representations or
promises except those expressed in the Lease can have contractual
effect” [emphasis in original], which therefore had no application to pre-
contractual representations leading to claims in misrepresentation: RBC
Mistake
12.80 In Olivine Capital Pte Ltd v Chia Chin Yan [2014] 2 SLR 1371,
the Court of Appeal briefly restated the law relating to common and
unilateral mistakes. However, the court did not in fact have to consider
the application of these principles to the facts as the only issue in this
connection was whether the issue was one that was suitable for
summary determination under O 14 r 12 of the Rules of Court
(Cap 322, R 5, 2006 Rev Ed). For that reason, it is not proposed to
reproduce those statements here except to note that the court once again
affirmed its earlier holding in Chwee Kin Keong v Digilandmall.com Pte
Ltd [2005] 1 SLR(R) 502 that there continues to exist in Singapore a

doctrine of common mistake in equity even though this doctrine has

been abolished in England.
12.81 Although it is well established that non est factum is a doctrine

of extremely limited application, an attempt was nevertheless made to
invoke it in Mahidon Nichiar bte Mohd Ali v Dawood Sultan Kamaldin
[2014] 4 SLR 1309. Here, a dispute had arisen amongst members of a
family concerning the ownership of a property. A weakness in the
plaintiffs’ case lay in the fact that they had signed a deed (“the Deed”)
renouncing their beneficial interest in the property in favour of the
defendant and their mother. To escape the effects of the Deed, the
plaintiffs pleaded non est factum. Unsurprisingly, the High Court
rejected the plea. In his reasons, Lee Kim Shin JC reiterated the
traditional understanding that the doctrine would only apply where a
person signing the document was, without any negligence on his part,
fundamentally mistaken as to its character or effect. The ambit of the
doctrine is particularly narrow because it is devised primarily for the
protection of (at [186]):
… those who are permanently or temporarily unable, through no fault
of their own, to have without explanation any real understanding of
the purport of a particular document. This was a narrow class of
persons who are typically unable to read owing to blindness or
illiteracy and who therefore had to trust someone to tell them what
they were signing.
That being the case, the doctrine clearly did not assist the plaintiffs, who
had the benefit of proper professional explanation prior to executing the
Deed. To hold thus would not, in the learned judge’s view, lead to a
harsh result, for it had to be borne in mind that (at [185]):
… [t]he doctrine of non est factum is not meant to give contracting
parties an easy way out of a bargain, especially one that was entered
into irresponsibly.
Illegality
12.82 In last year’s edition of this Ann Rev, the authors discussed
Boon Lay Choo v Ting Siew May [2013] 4 SLR 820, which concerned a
dispute arising from an attempt to circumvent certain property cooling
measures. On 13 October 2012, the plaintiff-respondents entered into
an option to purchase the defendant-appellant’s property (“the Option”).
However, the Monetary Authority of Singapore had on 5 October 2012
announced a spate of measures to cool the residential property market,
one of which was to reduce, in certain circumstances, the amount of
loan that a bank could extend for the purchase of residential properties
(“the 5 October Notice”). To circumvent this restriction, the respondents
requested to backdate the Option to 4 October 2012. The appellant
initially acceded to the request but subsequently withdrew her offer on

the ground that the backdated agreement constituted an “illegality”.
After various unsuccessful attempts to exercise the Option (including an
offer to proceed on the basis that the agreement was dated 13 October
2012), the respondents instituted legal action to enforce the agreement
and succeeded in the High Court. The judge found that the Option was
not void for statutory illegality as it was neither expressly nor implicitly
prohibited by the relevant statutory provision. He also found that it was
not void at common law as the illegality in question (the illegal mode of
obtaining financing) was merely incidental to, and thus too remote
from, the Option.
12.83 Whilst agreeing with the High Court that the Option was
neither expressly nor implicitly prohibited by the relevant statutory
provisions, the Court of Appeal nevertheless concluded in Ting Siew
May v Boon Lay Choo [2014] 3 SLR 609 (“Ting Siew May”) that the
agreement was void at common law as an agreement entered into with
the object of committing an illegal act. In reaching this conclusion,
Andrew Phang Boon Leong JA (who delivered the court’s judgment)
helpfully analysed the legal principles relevant for identifying this form
of illegality. His Honour clarified that the distinctive feature of this
category of illegal contracts lay in the parties’ intention to use the
contract for the furtherance of some unlawful objective. Thus, while the
contract may not by its terms oblige the parties to commit any unlawful
act, it may nevertheless be void for illegality as it would be an affront to
public policy to allow a party intending to use the contract for an
unlawful end to enforce it. Indeed, the same policy concern may render
a contract void at common law even if the unlawful objective is founded
on a breach of statute and that statute neither expressly nor impliedly
prohibits the formation of such contracts. This was in fact the case in
Ting Siew May, where the respondents’ purpose in backdating the
Option would, had it succeeded, constitute an offence under the
provisions of the Banking Act (Cap 19, 2008 Rev Ed). However, the
Option was not, as the courts found, prohibited by the provisions of that
Act. Even so, the agreement was vitiated for illegality at common law.
12.84 Ting Siew May thus makes it clear that so far as contracts
formed to commit unlawful acts are concerned, the illegality is premised
on the intention of the guilty party. Proof of such intent is therefore
necessary for establishing the “connection” between the contract and the
illegal act. This, however, then raises a notoriously difficult question –
for how strong does this connection have to be before the contract is
tainted by illegality? Or, put another way, when is the link so tenuous
that the contract should be left undisturbed? In Ting Siew May,
Phang JA located the answer in the “proportionality principle” (at [66]):

[Where] a contract is entered into with the object of committing an

illegal act, the general approach that the courts should undertake is to
examine the relevant policy considerations underlying the illegality
principle so as to produce a proportionate response to the illegality in
each case.
12.85 As is evident from the text just quoted, the proportionality

principle is not a single test, but rather an evaluative process that
involves weighing competing public policy concerns. This process
requires the court to consider a number of general factors including
(at [70]):
(a) whether allowing the claim would undermine the purpose of
the prohibiting rule;
(b) the nature and gravity of the illegality;
(c) the remoteness or centrality of the illegality to the contract;
(d) the object, intent and conduct of the parties; and
(e) the consequences of denying the claim.
12.86 The factors identified above are obviously not intended to be

conclusive. Nor should they be applied in a rigid or mechanistic fashion.
Rather, the evaluation is ultimately a fact-centric exercise. This means
that the application of the proportionality principle would inevitably
engender some uncertainty, but this cannot be avoided given the nature
of the enquiry.
12.87 When endorsing the “proportionality principle”, Phang JA also

clarified that this principle is in large measure similar to and not
inconsistent with the “remoteness test”. The latter appears to focus on
whether there is “sufficient proximity” between the illegal intention and
the contract to be vitiated by illegality. As the following passage explains,
however, the difference between the two approaches lies only in their
scope but not in their substance (at [64]):
In our view, there is, in substance, no real difference between the
approaches taken in ParkingEye [the proportionality principle] and
Madysen [the remoteness test]. For instance, if the illegal conduct is
too remote from the contract concerned, then it could be argued that
to find that that contract is rendered void and unenforceable because
of that illegal conduct would be to administer the doctrine of illegality
and public policy in a disproportionate manner. However, it seems to
us that the principle of proportionality is broader and more malleable
than that of remoteness. It is capable of encompassing not only the
concept of remoteness of the illegality but also considerations such as
the nature of the illegality (ie, whether the illegality was of a serious or
trivial nature) and the relative effects on the parties of rendering the
contract concerned unenforceable. [emphasis in original]

12.88 Though the two approaches are consistent, Phang JA clearly

preferred the proportionality principle for its greater breadth.
Ultimately, a broad approach is not only desirable, but actually
necessary, because the category of illegality under consideration is
ultimately identified by its substance and not its form, a point
emphasised by Phang JA (at [73]):
As we have already noted, this category is a rather broad and general
one. On one view, it can be seen as a kind of ‘bridging’ category which
focuses on the substance of the transaction instead of its form. To
elaborate, one or both of the contracting parties will not be permitted
to evade the law (whether in its statutory or common law form) by
simply structuring the transaction in a manner which renders the
contract lawful on its face – if the underlying purpose of the
transaction would constitute a general affront to public policy.
[emphasis in original]
12.89 With these principles in mind, Phang JA turned to examine the

facts. He located the illegality that could taint the Option in “the
Respondents’ intention (which was apparent on the face of the Option)
to use the Option itself (ie, its documentation) to circumvent and
contravene the 5 October Notice” [emphasis in original] (at [80]) and
concluded that it would not be disproportionate to refuse to enforce the
Option Agreement because (at [82]–[93]):
(a) There was no doubt that the buyer’s object and intent
from the outset was to falsify the date for an unlawful purpose.
(b) The nature of the illegal act that the respondents set out
to commit was neither trivial nor merely administrative as it
contravened a principal measure introduced by the 5 October
Notice to foster price stability of residential properties.
(c) To allow the buyer’s claim would undermine the policy
underlying the loan restriction, which was to foster price
stability.
(d) The respondents’ illegal purpose was not too remote
from the Option. Here, the court stressed the fact that that the
agreement itself contained an “overt act” – the falsification of
the date – was a key factor that helped to establish the closeness
of connection between the Option and the unlawful purpose.
(e) To deny the buyer’s enforcement of the agreement
would not lead to a disproportionate response as there was no
evidence that the buyer would suffer substantial loss as a result.
12.90 For completeness’ sake, Phang JA also rejected the respondents’

argument that the illegality had in fact been “cured” by the respondents’
subsequent abandonment of their original intention and offer to obtain

financing on the basis that the agreement was signed on the actual date.
There was no authority, in the learned judge’s view, for the proposition
that a contract formed with the intention to commit an illegal act would
cease to be illegal once the relevant party subsequently abandoned the
intended course of conduct.
12.91 Though it was not necessary given his conclusions on common

law illegality, Phang JA proceeded to consider the arguments founded
on statutory illegality. His Honour reiterated the well-established
proposition that whether or not the contravention of a statutory
provision would have the effect of invalidating a contract is a matter of
legislative intent, viz, whether the prohibition in question is intended
merely to prohibit a course of conduct, or to prohibit the contract as
well. The answer is obvious where the statute expressly prohibits the
formation of contract, but such express prohibition will likely be rare.
More often, the question is whether the statute impliedly prohibits a
contract the performance of which would have the effect of
contravening the statute. Where this is the question in issue, courts
should, Phang JA cautioned, generally be slow to imply the statutory
prohibition of contracts. This is because statutory illegality generally
does not take account of the parties’ subjective intention, their relative
culpability, as well as the gravity of infraction. A liberal approach to
implied prohibition may therefore result in contracts being vitiated for
trivial infractions.
12.92 But even if a contract were not expressly or impliedly prohibited

by statute, it may still be vitiated at common law, under the principle
that we have just considered, namely, that a contract formed with the
intention to commit an illegal act may be unenforceable by the party
with the illegal intention. In such a case, how that illegal intention
affects the contract would depend, not on the discovery of legislative
intention, but on the principle of proportionality, as we have discussed.
On these principles, Phang JA found that the relevant provisions of the
Banking Act neither expressly nor impliedly prohibited the Option,
although the agreement was, as we have seen, vitiated at common law.
12.93 A final point worth noting concerns the court’s observations on

the “reliance principle” that was raised by the respondents to buttress
their case. Rejecting this argument, Phang JA explained (at [126]) that
this principle traditionally operated only within a narrow ambit, for:
… [i]t is usually invoked only by a contracting party seeking to
recover (on a restitutionary basis) what it had transferred to the other
party pursuant to the (illegal) contract.
Moreover, such recovery will normally have to be “premised on an

independent cause of action – thereby avoiding the need to rely on the

(illegal) contract” [emphasis in original]. So understood, this principle

clearly did not assist the respondents since they were not in fact seeking
to recover property transferred under an illegal contract, nor were they
relying on an independent cause of action. In so far as the respondents’
arguments entailed an extension of the reliance principle (that is, that a
guilty party may enforce a (otherwise illegal) contract so long as it does
not involve any factual reliance on the illegal act), the court also
declined to countenance such development. In its view, such extension
would significantly undermine the very rationale and public policy on
which the doctrine of illegality is based.
12.94 As the most recent (and perhaps only) appellate decision that
extensively considers the effects of illegality on contracts, Ting Siew May
is of undoubted significance. Although the court’s observations were
made in relation to contracts formed to commit or facilitate illegal acts,
its observations on the need to rigorously evaluate the public policy
concerns that underlie each dispute are of general relevance. At the end
of the day, the question whether a contract or an obligation should be
enforced notwithstanding the presence of some illegal elements can only
be resolved by weighing the competing public policy concerns.
Depending on the facts, that process may be complex and multi-faceted.
Any attempt to reduce the doctrine to a single concept or test (such as
“remoteness” or “reliance”) will likely be unhelpful, and even dangerous.
12.95 The defence of illegality was also raised in Sheagar s/o T M

Veloo v Belfield International (Hong Kong) Ltd [2014] 3 SLR 524 in an
attempt to vitiate a loan by reference to the Moneylenders Act 2008
(Act 31 of 2008) (“MLA”). In this case, the respondent sued the
appellant under a deed of guarantee which the latter had signed to
guarantee the repayment of a loan made by the respondent to Blue Sea
Engineering Pte Ltd (“BSE”), a company controlled by the appellant. In
defence, the appellant argued that recovery under both the guarantee
and the underlying loan were prohibited by s 14(2) of the MLA as the
respondent had acted as an unlicensed moneylender. This defence
failed, for the evidence was that the respondent had only made
commercial loans to corporations, and hence qualified as an “excluded
moneylender” who was not prohibited by the MLA from making loans.
Importantly, the Court of Appeal clarified that where an issue arose as to
whether the lender was an excluded moneylender, the burden of
proving that he was not such a lender fell on the borrower (that is, the
appellant in this case). Another route by which the appellant sought to
avoid liability under the guarantee was to argue that the loan was made
in contravention of the Hong Kong Money Lenders Ordinance
(Cap 163); therefore, the guarantee should not be enforced as a matter of
international comity. However, this argument also failed as there was no
evidence that the respondent had either carried on moneylending
business or that it had an assumed place of business in Hong Kong.
12.96 In Poh Cheng Chew v K P Koh & Partners Pte Ltd [2014]
2 SLR 573, the parties to a construction dispute entered into a
settlement which contained, inter alia, an undertaking by the plaintiff to
refrain from lodging any complaint with the Professional Engineers
Board (“PEB”) (“cl 12”). When a dispute arose under the settlement,
however, the plaintiff commenced legal suit and filed a complaint with
the PEB against the defendants. At trial, one issue that arose was
whether the plaintiff had acted in breach of cl 12 when it complained to
the PEB. The High Court held that it had not. This was because cl 12
was in fact illegal and unenforceable in so far as it purported to allow a
professional engineer to contract out of the regulatory oversight of his
professional conduct by the PEB under the Professional Engineers Act
(Cap 253, 1992 Rev Ed). Lionel Yee JC arrived at this conclusion taking
into account various considerations, the most significant of which was
the legislative intent underpinning the relevant regulation, that is
(at [96]):
… to make an engineer accountable for his professional conduct not
only to his client but also to a statutory body whose functions include
the maintenance of standards of professional conduct and ethics of the
engineering profession.
So although public access to the PEB is legislated as a facility rather than

a legal duty, the wider public interest in upholding professional standards
precludes its exclusion by way of private contracting. For the same
reason, cl 12 is not comparable to other contractual arrangements of
compromise or contracts which relate to offences or wrongs that pertain
only to private interest, which have been held to be enforceable.
Furthermore, a distinction has to be drawn between an undertaking not
to file a complaint in future and an undertaking to cease or withdraw a
complaint that has already been lodged. In the latter situation, the
disciplinary body, having been seised of jurisdiction, is at liberty to
continue with its disciplinary action. In the former situation, however,
the disciplinary body would likely have been deprived of an opportunity
to apprise itself of the misconduct in the first place. For these reasons,
Yee JC concluded that cl 12 was illegal. However, this illegality did not
affect the validity of the settlement agreement as the offending clause,
not being the main consideration, could be severed from the agreement.
Restraint of trade
12.97 In Lek Gwee Noi v Humming Flowers & Gifts Pte Ltd [2014]
3 SLR 27 (“Lek Gwee Noi”), the High Court considered a number of
important issues concerning the restraint of trade doctrine. The plaintiff
in this case was originally employed as a sales manager of Humming
House Flowers and Gifts Pte Ltd (“Humming House”) which, as its
name suggested, carried on a flower and gift business. In 2008,
Humming House sold its business to the defendant, a wholly owned

subsidiary of Noel Gifts International Ltd (“Noel Gifts”). Subsequent to
the sale, the plaintiff ’s employment was transferred to the defendant. At
the end of 2011, the plaintiff left the defendant’s employment and
informed it of her intention to set up a competing business. The
defendant objected, relying on a restrictive covenant contained in her
contract of employment. Instead of waiting to be sued, the plaintiff then
instituted pre-emptive legal action to seek a declaration that the
restrictive covenant was void and unenforceable in restraint of trade.
12.98 To decide if the restrictive covenant could be enforced, it is

necessary to first determine if a covenantee has any interest that it could
legitimately protect against the covenantor. For this purpose, it is
common to distinguish between covenants made in the context of a sale
of business and covenants made in employment contracts. A more
liberal view is generally taken of the former, as the goodwill of a
business is an important asset of the business that a purchaser may
legitimately protect through the use of post-sale covenants. In contrast,
an employer is generally able to extract the full value of the employee’s
services during the currency of the employment, so a post-employment
covenant may only be justified if it is shown to be necessary for the
protection of some other interest. In Lek Gwee Noi, Vinodh
Coomaraswamy J acknowledged (at [37]) that this categorisation would
often serve as a convenient means of identifying the interests that the
covenantee is seeking to protect, but warned against elevating it “as a
matter of law or logic into a threshold question for determining whether
a restrictive covenant is enforceable”. Instead (at [37]):
… [t]he true threshold question always is whether the restrictive
covenant is aimed at protecting a legitimate interest of the covenantee
as against the covenantor. The question of categorisation determines
the array of legitimate interests which a restrictive covenant may
protect. The question of categorisation is, therefore, logically
subsidiary to that threshold question and not logically prior to it.
12.99 It is clear, however, that Coomaraswamy J was not denying the

relevance of these categories, but only that a proper categorisation
cannot be achieved only by looking at the type of document that
contains the covenant. Instead, the relevant categorisation is determined
by the nature of the interest that the covenant purports to protect. This
may be illustrated by his analysis of the facts. Contrasting the covenant
undertaken by the plaintiff and those undertaken by her brothers (who
were shareholders of Humming House), the learned judge concluded
that the former was an employee covenant while the latter were vendor
covenants. In respect of the latter, the learned judge found that the
covenants, though contained in employment contracts, were really an
integral aspect of the sale of Humming House’s business to the
defendant. That being so, the defendant could legitimately invoke them
to protect the goodwill of the business. In contrast, the plaintiff had

never owned the business. She was not a party to the sale, nor did she
derive any financial benefit from it. Though she was offered
employment with the defendant, such employment was contracted on a
voluntary basis, and was not mandated as a condition precedent to the
sale. So while the defendant was entitled to protect the goodwill of the
business, such protection was available only against the parties from
whom the goodwill was acquired but did not extend to a person – such
as the plaintiff – who did not at any time own the goodwill.
12.100 Having determined that the restrictive covenant was formed in

the context of an employment relationship, the learned judge turned to
consider the defendant’s legitimate interests, and concluded that it was
entitled to protect its trade connection as against the plaintiff. Being a
senior sales personnel, the plaintiff had sufficient knowledge of the
defendant’s customers to influence them and the defendant was entitled
to protect against such influence after the end of the plaintiff ’s
employment. Indeed, the defendant’s interest extended to protect any
pre-existing trade connection that the plaintiff established prior to
joining the defendant. Coomaraswamy J made it clear, however, that this
would not be so in every case, for whether an employer had any
legitimate interest in an employee’s pre-existing trade connection is a
question of fact. In the present case, what tilted the balance in the
defendant’s favour was the fact that it had clearly bargained for and
acquired such pre-existing trade connection – such custom being part
and parcel of the goodwill that was sold by Humming House to the
defendant.
12.101 In addition to trade connection, the defendant also argued that

the restrictive covenant was needed to protect against the disclosure of
confidential information (such as client information, sales data, cost
structures and business model) by the plaintiff. However, this argument
met with the difficulty that in Stratech Systems Ltd v Nyam Chiu Shin
[2005] 2 SLR(R) 579 (“Stratech”), the Court of Appeal had held that an
employer’s interests in protecting confidential information is not a
sufficient justification for imposing a restraint of trade clause where
such information is separately protected by a clause imposing on the
employee a duty of confidentiality. Where that is so, a non-compete
clause may only be justified if the employer is able to demonstrate that it
has some other interest, over and above the protection of confidential
information, that warrants protection. As the defendant in Lek Gwee Noi
was in fact comprehensively protected by a confidentiality clause,
Coomaraswamy J felt bound by Stratech to conclude that the defendant’s
interests in confidential information could not justify the restraint
imposed on the plaintiff. However, the learned judge acknowledged that
this aspect of Stratech was problematic because (as Woo Bih Li J noted
in Centre for Creative Leadership (CCL) Pte Ltd v Byrne Roger Peter
[2013] 2 SLR 193 (“CCL”) at [92]) it would compel the illogical

conclusion that an employer who has done more to protect its
confidential information (by incorporating both a non-compete
covenant and a confidentiality clause) is ultimately put to a greater
burden of proof than one who has not. For this reason, Coomaraswamy J
thought (as Woo J did in CCL) that the restriction laid down in Stratech
warranted further consideration by the Court of Appeal.
12.102 Given that the defendant had legitimate interests in protecting

its trade connection, it was then necessary to consider the
reasonableness of the relevant covenant, which was found in cl 13
(reproduced in para 12.110 below) of the plaintiff ’s employment
contract. The court construed this provision as comprising two distinct
restrictions: the first enjoined the plaintiff from undertaking any
business or employment similar to that of the defendant (the “non-
compete restriction”), while the second prohibited her from soliciting
the defendant’s customers (the “non-solicitation restriction”). Both
restrictions were, however, found to be unreasonable. This is because
cl 13 had employed the concept of “the relevant Company” to define
both the restricted activities as well as their geographical limits, and “the
relevant Company” was in turn defined too broadly to include related
companies and associates of Noel Gifts for which the plaintiff had
“performed duties or carried out work … at any time during the period
of nine (9) months prior to the date of termination of employment”. This
meant, in effect, that the plaintiff could be prohibited from competing
against a company related to Noel Gifts even if she had never been
employed by or seconded to such company, which, in the learned judge’s
view, rendered the restriction too broad. Similarly, the restrictions were
unreasonable in their geographical limits as they extended to Malaysia
and other countries in which the relevant company had offices, even
though the defendant itself did not operate, and thus had no relevant
interests to protect, in these countries. The court also found the two-
year duration of the non-solicitation covenant unreasonable as there was
no satisfactory evidence as to why the defendant would need such a long
time to rebuild its trade connection after the plaintiff ’s departure.
12.103 The last, but also the most significant, issue in Lek Gwee Noi
concerned the possible severance of the offending parts from cl 13.
Coomaraswamy J approached this issue by first reviewing the law on the
doctrine of severance, making a number of important observations in
the process. Beginning with the test for severance, the learned judge
noted that the approach now preferred in both England and Singapore is
that set out by P J Crawford QC in Sadler v Imperial Life Assurance Co of
Canada Ltd [1988] IRLR 388 (“Sadler”). It prescribes three prerequisites
to be satisfied before an offending clause or part thereof can be severed
(Lek Gwee Noi at [155]):

(a) the unenforceable provision must be capable of being

removed without adding to or modifying the wording of what remains
with the remainder continuing to make grammatical sense;
(b) the remaining contractual terms must continue to be
supported by adequate consideration; and
(c) the severance must not change the fundamental character of
the contract between the parties.
12.104 Importantly, Coomaraswamy J clarified that the Sadler test is of

general application. This means that it matters not whether severance is
pleaded to strike out a whole clause or to excise particular words from a
clause. The reason why this must be so lies in the fact that the doctrine
is founded on the divisibility of promises rather than of words. On this
view, severance will only be permitted when the clause or words to be
excised comprises a distinct promise separable from other promises.
Absent such distinctiveness, the mere fact that the sentence is still
grammatical after applying the “blue pencil” (to delete the objectionable
words) is not a sufficient reason for allowing severance in the first place.
Of course, where the illegality resides in a part (as opposed to the
whole) of a clause, severance is only possible if the clause that remains
after deleting the offending part still makes grammatical sense.
Nevertheless, whether a promise is drafted as a standalone clause or as
part of a collocation of promises packaged as one clause is usually a
question of drafting preference or accident, and thus cannot be the sole
criterion for determining severability. What ultimately has to be shown
is that the meaning of the remaining promises, or “contractual
meaning”, is unaltered by the severance. As Coomaraswamy J explained
(at [127]):
… the doctrine of severance can be applied only if the objectionable
promise is, on its proper construction, independent of the remaining
promises. If excising the objectionable promise would be to change the
meaning of the parties’ agreement to something ‘different in kind and
not only in extent’, the objectionable promise is not properly divisible
from the remainder of the contract. That is so even if the only change
to the wording consists of deletions, as mandated by the blue pencil
test, and even if the words which remain have grammatical
meaning. … Continuing grammatical meaning is a necessary
condition for severance, but it is not a sufficient condition. … It is an
equally necessary condition for severance that the parties’ agreement
be altered in extent but not in kind and, in that sense, contractual
meaning is preserved.
12.105 The learned judge found support for this view of the doctrine in
National Aerated Water Co Pte Ltd v Monarh Co, Inc [2000] 1 SLR(R) 74
(“Kickapoo JoyJuice”), a Court of Appeal decision. In that case, the court
had construed a covenant restraining the defendant from using the
name “Kickapoo Joy Juice” as one comprising distinct and separate
promises in respect of each of those words, so that the offending words

“Joy Juice” could be severed leaving unchanged the covenant in respect
of “Kickapoo”. So although the court was there dealing with the excision
of words from a restrictive covenant (and not the deletion of a whole
clause), its decision was ultimately based on the distinctiveness of the
promises, and not merely on the grammatical integrity of the remaining
covenant.
12.106 Turning to Man Financial (S) Pte Ltd v Wong Bark Chuan David
[2008] 1 SLR(R) 663 (“Man Financial”), Coomaraswamy J declined to
interpret this case as authority for the view that mere satisfaction of the
“blue pencil test” (or preservation of grammatical meaning) would
justify the severance of words from a clause. In his view, Man Financial
is consistent with both Sadler and Kickapoo Joy Juice, and rightly
emphasised the need to limit severance to instances where the
“contractual meaning” is preserved. The excision of the objectionable
words would not be justified by the mere fact that a sentence remains
grammatically sensible if in fact such severance would lead to a
contractually senseless outcome.
12.107 Having clarified the test for severance, the court in Lek Gwee
Noi then had to consider a further submission made by plaintiff ’s
counsel, which was that the doctrine ought to be of a much reduced
scope when applied to covenants between employer and employee, so
that severance is only permissible in this context when the words to be
excised are “of trivial importance, or merely technical, and not a part of
the main purport and substance of the clause”: Lek Gwee Noi at [158],
citing Mason v Provident Clothing and Supply Co Ltd [1913] AC 724
at 745, per Lord Moulton. The reason for this distinction lies in the risk
that a liberal doctrine of severance would perversely encourage
employers to impose harsh covenants in terrorem (Lek Gwee Noi
at [157]):
[A] liberal doctrine of severance would allow an employer effectively
to hold an employee hostage by exacting unreasonably wide restrictive
covenants at the outset of the employment, knowing: (a) that the
employee would not generally have the wherewithal or fortitude to
resist the covenant before, during and after the employment; and
(b) that if the employee did mount a challenge and were to succeed,
the worst that could happen from the employer’s point of view was
that the court would cut down the unreasonably wide covenant to
what was reasonable. A liberal doctrine of severance would permit,
indeed encourage, employers to extract oppressive restrictive
covenants and thereby undermine the policy underlying the law
striking down restrictive covenants: that of protecting employees as a
class against the inequality of bargaining power and inequality of
resources they face as against employers as a class.

12.108 Whilst acknowledging the legitimacy of this concern,

Coomaraswamy J nevertheless concluded that it did not necessitate a
bifurcation of the doctrine. In his view, the interests of employees may
be adequately safeguarded by requiring the court always to relate
severance to its underlying policy, which is that (Lek Gwee Noi at [171]):
… the doctrine cannot be applied if the result would be inconsistent
with the principles of public policy which mandate avoidance of the
excised words.
This may require the court to be more sceptical of attempts (such as the
use of cascading restrictive covenants) to take advantage of the doctrine
of severance.
12.109 To bolster its case that a more restrictive approach ought to be

applied to employee covenants, the plaintiff also relied on the fact that in
Canada, an equally restrictive approach has been adopted in the
application of the notional severance doctrine. This doctrine, it will be
recalled, essentially allows the court to “write down” an unlawful
restraint so as to “cure” it of its illegality. It is well established, however,
that the doctrine has no application to employment contracts, for much
the same policy reasons as those cited in para 12.107 above. Having
already decided that there was no necessity for a distinct and more
restrictive approach to severance in employment cases, Coomaraswamy J
held that these authorities did not further the plaintiff ’s case. More
generally, the learned judge noted that these cases are of no immediate
relevance since the doctrine of notional severance is not currently part
of our law, and further, that significant difficulties stand in the way of
any future attempt to incorporate this doctrine into our law (at [179]):
A doctrine of notional severance, which permits a thorough and
explicit rewriting of the parties’ contract, fundamentally defeats the
parties’ freedom of contract. It is true that the equitable doctrine of
rectification also permits a rewriting of the parties’ contract. But that
rewriting takes place to bring the parties’ written instrument into
alignment with the parties’ actual intention, proved to a very high
standard. Notional severance is quite different. Although it makes
reference to the parties’ intention, it takes place based on the intention
which the court imputes to both parties at the urging of one party after
a dispute has arisen. To that extent, notional severance amounts to a
unilateral variation of the parties’ obligations imposed by the court
with the benefit of hindsight. … For these reasons, therefore, it seems
to me that it is only with great difficulty that the doctrine of notional
severance as it is recognised in Canada can be accommodated within
our law of contract.
12.110 With the relevant principles clarified, the court could finally
consider their application to cl 13. For this purpose, it was necessary to

recall the District Judge’s holding that the offending parts of cl 13 could
be severed as follows:
Upon the termination of the Employee’s employment for any cause or
by any means whatsoever the employee shall not for a period of 2 years
next thereafter undertake or carry on either alone or in partnership
nor be employed or interested directly or indirectly in any capacity
whatever in the same or similar business as the relevant Company (as
hereunder defined), or in any other business carried on by the relevant
Company, in Singapore, and Malaysia and any other countries the
relevant Company has offices at the date of such termination within
the aforesaid areas and shall not during the like period and within the
same areas either personally or by Employee’s agent or by letters,
circulars or advertisements whether on Employee’s behalf or on behalf
of any other person, firm or company canvass or solicit orders from or
in any way interfere with any person, or company who shall at any
time during the continuance of the Employee’s employment hereunder
have been a customer or customers of the relevant Company & for any
cause whatever the Employee shall not canvass, solicit or endeavour to
take away from the relevant Company the business or any customers
or clients who have been customers or clients of the relevant company.
12.111 Coomaraswamy J rejected this attempt at saving cl 13 as it did

not meet the Sadler test. The learned judge noted that while the
offending words could indeed be deleted without adding to or
modifying the clause, the deletion did in fact fundamentally alter the
meaning of the clause by joining parts of two distinct promises
(the non-compete and non-solicitation promises) together and by
altogether removing the geographical limits of the surviving restraint.
The effect is a rewriting of cl 13, which is not permitted under the
second and third limbs of the Sadler test. In the final analysis, neither
the non-compete nor the non-solicitation obligation could, in the
learned judge’s view, be saved by severance. In so far as the defendant’s
trade connection constituted the only protectable interest, the
imposition of a blanket non-compete obligation was unreasonable, and
this was a fundamental defect that could not be saved by severance.
Severance of the non-solicitation clause was also precluded by the Sadler
requirements. First, the definition of the “relevant Company”, which
accounts for the restraint’s unreasonable width, cannot be tightened
without adding to or modifying it. Second, the restraint constituted the
principal consideration of the employment agreement so its removal
would leave the rest of the agreement unsupported by adequate
consideration. Third, any attempt to tamper with the definition of
“relevant Company” would amount to a rewriting of the contract as the
term was used not only in cl 13 but also in other parts of the agreement.
Finally, having regard to the particular context of an employment
relationship, the cascading non-solicitation restrictions contained in
cl 13 (by first prohibiting solicitation of the defendant’s customers
during the time of the plaintiff ’s employment, and subsequently

extending to all customers of the defendant) would have an in terrorem
effect on a reasonable employee in the plaintiff ’s position. To sever and
enforce the restraint in such circumstances would therefore be
inconsistent with the underlying policy of protecting the employee from
unreasonable restraints.
12.112 Total English Learning Global Pte Ltd v Kids Counsel Pte Ltd
[2014] SGHC 258 was another High Court decision that considered (but
only in obiter capacity) whether a number of non-compete and non-
solicitation clauses had been breached. The dispute arose in the context
of a number of franchise agreements originally entered into by Total
Literacy (Singapore) Pte Ltd (“TLS”) as franchisor and the defendants as
franchisees in relation to an English literacy and phonics programme
known as the “I Can Read” (“ICR”) system. In July 2012, TLS
purportedly assigned the agreements to Total English Learning Global
Pte Ltd (“TELG”) and its intellectual property rights to Total English
Learning International Pte Ltd (“TELI”). The defendants disputed the
validity of the assignments and terminated the franchise agreements.
Thereafter, some of the defendants carried on a similar business by
migrating to a competing English literacy programme known as the “My
English School” (“MES”) system. TELG and TELI then brought legal
actions against the defendants for, inter alia, breaches of non-compete
and non-solicitation terms in the franchise agreements. In the High
Court, Tay Yong Kwang J found that the assignment was invalid. As a
result, the plaintiffs had no standing to bring these actions and all their
claims were dismissed. Nevertheless, the learned judge went on to
consider whether the terms of the franchise agreements would have
been breached had the assignment been valid.
12.113 It was not disputed that the defendants had carried on a

competing business when they migrated to the MES system upon
terminating the franchise agreements. However, this would only breach
the relevant non-compete clause if the clause were not void for restraint
of trade in the first place. In respect of the second, third, fourth, fifth
and eighth defendants, the court found that the non-complete clauses
were indeed void on this ground: the restraints in question were far too
wide as they were not subject to any geographical limit at all. In respect
of the sixth, seventh and eighth defendants, however, the non-compete
clauses were reasonable as between the parties because they were
applicable only to activities conducted in Singapore and limited to a
period of 24 months. In arriving at this conclusion, Tay J took into
account (at [95]–[97]) the fact the franchise agreements were essentially
business contracts between parties of equal bargaining power. Unlike
restraints imposed in employment contracts, in respect of which a
stricter approach is applied because the covenantee’s livelihood is often
at stake, restraints in business contracts do not usually affect the
covenantee to the same degree. Hence, the court is more likely to accept
the parties’ agreement as reasonable.
12.114 Turning to the non-solicitation clauses, the court proceeded on

the assumption that these clauses were valid and binding as the
defendants had not in fact argued that these clauses were unlawful
restraints on trade. Tay J found that the non-solicitation clause as
applicable to customers was breached, as the evidence was that the
defendants had carried on the competing business with substantially the
same students who had previously subscribed for the ICR programme.
Interestingly, the franchise agreements also contained covenants against
the solicitation of the franchisee’s own employees. The plaintiffs therefore
argued that the defendants had breached these covenants in employing
the same teachers who had previously taught the ICR programme to
teach the MES programme. Tay J rejected this argument on the ground
that there was insufficient evidence of solicitation in the sense of having
encouraged, persuaded or even asked the employees to shift to the
competing programme. Although the judgment does not make it clear,
the assumption appears to be that the defendants would have had to
enter into fresh contracts of employment with these teachers before the
covenant is triggered in the first place. This is because the covenant was
not made against solicitation simpliciter but solicitation “for the purpose
of employing” such employee: at [91]. So if an existing employment
contract were already in place, it might have been argued that the mere
request to teach the competing programme was not a solicitation for the
purpose of employing that particular employee.
Discharge by breach of contract
Anticipatory repudiatory breach where the party not in breach has no

outstanding duties to perform under the terms of the contract
12.115 In The STX Mumbai [2014] 3 SLR 1116, the plaintiff, which was
a supplier of bunkers, arrested the defendant’s vessel, The STX Mumbai,
on 14 June 2013, two days before a sum which the defendant was to pay
to it would become due. The basis for the plaintiff ’s in rem action was a
purported anticipatory repudiatory breach by the defendant to pay that
sum in light of either, (a) the defendant’s failure to make payment in
response to an e-mail from the plaintiff demanding immediate payment
on 13 June 2013; or (b) the purported insolvency of the defendant’s
holding company, STX Pan Ocean Pte Ltd.
12.116 In this case, the court allowed the defendant’s application that
the plaintiff ’s in rem claim be struck out, holding that the arrest of the
STX Mumbai was wrongful. For one, even leaving aside the fact that the
defendant’s e-mail demanding immediate repayment had been sent, not
to the plaintiff, but to a company related to it, the defendant’s failure to

make payment in response to that e-mail could not be taken to evince
the requisite repudiatory intent as the plaintiff had no legal basis to
make such a demand: at [43]. As to the insolvency of the defendant’s
holding company, since the plaintiff had not made any attempt to lift the
corporate veil, given the doctrine of separate corporate personality, the
insolvency of the defendant’s holding company did not give rise to any
actionable repudiation on the part of the defendant: at [33]–[35].
Indeed, given the authority of Morgan v Bain (1874) LR 10 CP 15, even
if it had been asserted (which it had not) that the defendant had been
insolvent, the mere fact of insolvency did not, in itself, amount to a
repudiation by an insolvent corporation of its contractual duties:
at [38]–[43].
12.117 Despite having disposed of the dispute, the learned judge went
on to make a number of interesting observations in connection with the
ambit of the doctrine of anticipatory repudiatory breach. In obiter dicta
(at [54]–[74]), the learned judge suggested that as a matter of Singapore
law, it was undecided whether the doctrine of anticipatory repudiatory
breach ought to be applied equally to cases where, at the point of
repudiation, the party receiving that repudiation had fully executed all
its duties under the terms of the contract and had no outstanding duties
to perform under the terms of the contract.
12.118 As recounted by the learned judge, in contrast with the English

position, there is some authority in certain states within the US, as well
as in Canada and Australia that, exceptionally, the doctrine of
anticipatory repudiatory breach is not available where the only
outstanding duties under the contract which has been repudiated are
those of the repudiating party: at [57]–[68]; see also The Law of Contract
in Singapore (Andrew Phang Boon Leong gen ed) (Academy Publishing,
2012) at pp 1193–1194, fn 87.
12.119 Whilst recognising that there is significant academic opposition

in those jurisdictions to such exception (at [69]–[72]), the learned judge
suggested that the position in Singapore on the point was still open,
given that there appears to be no Singapore authority otherwise. In
particular, the learned judge suggested (at [73]) that although the case of
Tan Hock Keng v L & M Group Investments Ltd [2002] 1 SLR(R) 672
(“Tan Hock Keng”) has been said to be consistent with the view that no
such exception exists as a matter of Singapore law, since the Court of
Appeal in that case did not explicitly rule on the point, it remains an
open question. Alternatively, the learned judge took the view that it was
possible to distinguish Tan Hock Keng (The STX Mumbai at [73])
because:

… [t]hat case concerned an obligation to make payment by

instalments whereas the present case concerned a unilateral obligation
to make a one [sic] payment at a fixed date.
12.120 As to this point, it is helpful to revisit the decision in Tan Hock

Keng. The dispute in Tan Hock Keng arose from the acquisition by the
appellant (“Tan”) of all the shares in Khai Wah-Ferco Pte Ltd (“KWF”)
from the respondent company (“L&M”). KWF had been a wholly
owned subsidiary of L&M, and inter-company loans amounting to
$5.5m had been made to it prior to 1997 (when it was acquired by Tan)
pursuant to two share-acquisition agreements.
12.121 KWF was to repay the inter-company loans in 12 instalments,

each instalment being, “thirty percent (30%) of [KWF’s] consolidated
net profit after tax or $220,000.00 per annum, whichever [was] the
higher”, commencing from 15 April 1999, and on every anniversary
thereafter: Tan Hock Keng at [8].
12.122 Pursuant to a provision in the share-acquisition agreements

(“cl 15.1”), Tan undertook to “procure” the due repayment of the inter-
company loans by KWF. Accordingly, Tan was to “procure” that KWF
made annual repayments to L&M from 15 April 1999, with the last
payment becoming due and payable on 15 April 2010.
12.123 The report of the Court of Appeal’s decision suggests that of the
12 instalments which were to be paid, two were paid by KWF
(presumably for 1999 and 2000). When an action was commenced in
2000 by Tan against L&M in alleging it had breached certain terms
under the share acquisition agreements, L&M filed a counterclaim for a
total of $751,504.13, $440,000 of which pertained to non-payment by
KWF of two loan instalments.
12.124 Whilst Tan admitted liability as to $351,504.13 of the

$751,504.13 counterclaimed by L&M, he disputed his liability as to the
balance $440,000 on the basis that his only duty was to “procure” that
KWF paid the loan instalments, and that he had not undertaken
personal liability to pay the instalments if the company had failed to do
so: see [2001] 3 SLR(R) 47 at [20].
12.125 At first instance, L&M succeeded on its counterclaim, and this

was upheld on appeal, the Court of Appeal holding as follows (Tan Hock
Keng at [28]):
While we agree that ‘procure’ in cl 15.1 does not mean that Tan
undertakes to pay the loans himself but it does mean that Tan
undertakes to ensure that KWF would repay and when KWF does not
repay, Tan would have breached his obligation of ‘ensuring’ or ‘seeing
to it’ that KWF repay.
12.126 It is true that the Court of Appeal did not stipulate at any point
in its judgment whether Tan’s breach of his duty under cl 15.1 was an
actual or anticipatory breach. However, careful consideration of the facts
of the case and its progress through the courts reveals that the Court of
Appeal must have accepted that the counterclaim pertained, at least
partially, to an anticipatory breach on Tan’s part.
12.127 As mentioned above, since Tan’s claim against L&M was

numbered “Suit No 524 of 2000”, it would appear that Tan must have
filed his claim against L&M sometime in 2000. The first instance
judgment was, however, handed down on 3 September 2001. In respect
of the counterclaim, L&M claimed $440,000 comprising two instalments
that had not been paid by KWF. It would appear the first two
instalments of the total of 12 were paid. Presumably, these were the
instalments payable on 15 April 1999 and 2000. If so, assuming Tan filed
and served his statement of claim against L&M in 2000, at that point in
time, KWF could not have committed an actual breach of its duty to
make payment of the 15 April 2001 or any subsequent instalment, since
they would not have accrued due in 2000.
12.128 Neither of the reports of this case at first instance or on appeal

disclose when L&M filed its counterclaim. This could have been filed as
part of L&M’s defence to Tan’s statement of claim – which could well
have occurred in 2000 within a few weeks of service of Tan’s statement
of claim. However, given the power granted to the court to give liberty
to amend pleadings even at trial, a counterclaim encompassing the two
unpaid instalments making up the $440,000 disputed by Tan might have
been filed as late as 3 September 2001, being the date when the claim
and counterclaim between the parties were heard by Rajendran J at first
instance.
12.129 As at 3 September 2001, the third instalment would have

become due and payable on 15 April 2001. However, as at that date, the
fourth instalment would not have become due. Accordingly, though it
might be possible to conceive of KWF having actually breached its duty
to pay the third instalment due on 15 April 2001 to L&M, and therefore,
one might also conceive of Tan having actually breached his duty to
ensure that KWF did so as at that very same date, it is impossible to
conceive of KWF (and Tan) doing the same in respect of the fourth
instalment, given that payment of that instalment would only be due on
15 April 2002 (which would, incidentally, arise three days after the
appeal to the Court of Appeal was heard on 12 April 2002).
12.130 Accordingly, in so far as the Court of Appeal upheld the

decision below on L&M’s counterclaim, part of which related to two
unpaid instalments, close examination of these dates suggests that
L&M’s claims as to damages in respect of non-payment for at least one
of these instalments must be regarded as being in respect of an

anticipatory breach since it would have been impossible for Tan to
commit an actual breach of his duty to ensure that KWF performed its
duty to make payment for the fourth instalment due to be paid on
15 April 2002, prior to that date. Thus, at least as to part of the
counterclaim, the Court of Appeal must have accepted that Tan had
anticipatorily repudiated his duty to ensure that KWF would pay the
instalments when they became due. It is difficult to see how matters
could be otherwise. Further, given that L&M had fully disbursed the
inter-company loans to KWF prior to 1999 when KWF’s duty to make
repayments by instalment started to accrue due, under the terms of the
loan, it does not appear that L&M would have been subject to any
further outstanding duties vis-à-vis KWF; nor is there any mention in
either the first instance judgment or on appeal, that L&M was subject to
further outstanding duties vis-à-vis Tan so far as Tan was duty-bound to
L&M to ensure that KWF performed its duty to repay the loan in annual
instalments. It would seem, therefore, that the High Court and the
Court of Appeal must have accepted that the doctrine of anticipatory
repudiatory breach of contract is available even where the only
outstanding duties left to be performed under that contract are those of
the repudiating party.
12.131 It is of course open to the Court of Appeal to revisit the issue,

and to hold that Tan Hock Keng was wrongly decided on the point.
However, notwithstanding the obiter views put forward by the learned
judge in The STX Mumbai, it is unclear what purpose such an exception
might serve. As matters stand, it is suggested that though Tan Hock Keng
makes no explicit mention of Tan having committed any anticipatory
repudiatory breach of his obligations, the Court of Appeal’s affirmation
of the High Court’s decision on L&M’s counterclaim against Tan is
difficult to explain on any other basis. Consequently, Tan Hock Keng is
arguably best understood as providing implicit authority for the
proposition that, as a matter of Singapore law, an anticipatory
repudiatory breach may be invoked even by a contracting party who has
no further outstanding duties to perform under the contract.
Discharge by frustration
12.132 In Alliance Concrete Singapore Pte Ltd v Sato Kogyo (S) Pte Ltd
[2014] 3 SLR 857 (“Alliance Concrete”), the latest of the series of cases
triggered by the imposition of the sand export ban by the Indonesian
government, the Court of Appeal has provided further useful guidance
on the operation of the doctrine of discharge by frustration.
12.133 On appeal, reversing the decision at first instance ([2013]

SGHC 127), the Court of Appeal held that the imposition of the sand
export ban by the Indonesian government had discharged the contract

between the parties by frustration.
12.134 The most significant passage of this judgment, setting out the
general principles which are to be kept in mind when applying the
doctrine of discharge by frustration may, perhaps, be found below
(Alliance Concrete at [37]):
The ‘radical change in obligation’ test involves a multi-factorial
approach, as articulated by Rix LJ (with whom Wall and Hooper LJJ
agreed) in the English Court of Appeal decision of Edwinton
Commercial Corporation v Tsavliris Russ (Worldwide Salvage &
Towage) Ltd (The Sea Angel) [2007] 2 Lloyd’s Rep 517 (at [111]):
In my judgment, the application of the doctrine of frustration
requires a multi-factorial approach. Among the factors which
have to be considered are the terms of the contract itself, its
matrix or context, the parties’ knowledge, expectations,
assumptions and contemplations, in particular as to risk, as at
the time of contract, at any rate so far as these can be ascribed
mutually and objectively, and then the nature of the
supervening event, and the parties’ reasonable and objectively
ascertainable calculations as to the possibilities of future
performance in the new circumstances. Since the subject
matter of the doctrine of frustration is contract, and contracts
are about the allocation of risk, and since the allocation and
assumption of risk is not simply a matter of express or
implied provision but may also depend on less easily defined
matters such as ‘the contemplation of the parties’, the
application of the doctrine can often be a difficult one. In
such circumstances, the test of ‘radically different’ is
important: it tells us that the doctrine is not to be lightly
invoked; that mere incidence of expense or delay or
onerousness is not sufficient; and that there has to be as it
were a break in identity between the contract as provided for
and contemplated and its performance in the new
circumstances.
12.135 This offers some support for the proposition that has been made
elsewhere, that to decide whether a contract has indeed been frustrated
by the occurrence of a supervening event, the question as to whether the
occurrence of that supervening event had been or was foreseeable to a
“sufficiently high degree” should be seen to be merely one of a number
of possible factors, each of which is to be weighed and considered in an
exercise of construction of the terms of the contract. See, generally,
The Law of Contract in Singapore (Andrew Phang Boon Leong gen ed)
(Academy Publishing, 2012) at paras 19.116–19.124.

Remedies
No damages for breach of contract where there is no breach of that

contract
12.136 The proposition that no damages are available for breach of a

contract where there has been no breach of that contract appears
obvious. However, confusion may arise where there are two inter-related
contracts, of which breach of one gives rise to an entitlement to invoke a
contractual provision allowing for the termination of the other.
12.137 In Burgundy Global Exploration Corp v Transocean Offshore

International Ventures Ltd [2014] 3 SLR 381, inter alia, a dispute arose as
to whether damages were available with respect to a contract
(“the Drilling Contract”) which had been terminated pursuant to a
contractual provision (“cl 3.2”) set out in a separate agreement (“the
Escrow Agreement”). In the Escrow Agreement, the parties had agreed
that, if the appellant company (Burgundy Global Exploration Corp)
failed to deposit the sum stipulated therein into an escrow account in
accordance with a payment schedule set out in the Escrow Agreement,
the respondent company (Transocean Offshore International Ventures
Ltd) would be entitled to suspend work, and/or “terminate” the Drilling
Contract.
12.138 When the appellant company failed to deposit the stipulated

sum by way of escrow in accordance with the deadline stipulated in the
Escrow Agreement, the respondent company exercised its right under
the Escrow Agreement to terminate the Drilling Contract, whilst also
claiming that the appellant company had committed a repudiatory
breach of the Drilling Contract in failing to comply with the provisions
of the Escrow Agreement.
12.139 The Court of Appeal observed (at [44]–[46]) that:

… it must not be overlooked that the parties had deliberately carved
out escrow matters from the transaction and subjected it to a separate
agreement. The purpose of the Escrow Agreement, as Transocean says,
was to provide Transocean with security so that it could commit to
performing the Drilling Contract without having to fear that it might
end up being mired in delays if Burgundy defaulted on payment. In
other words, Transocean’s performance interest under the Escrow
Agreement was to obtain security for Burgundy’s performance of its
payment obligations under the Drilling Contract. This must not be
confused with Transocean’s performance interest under the Drilling
Contract, which was to make profits from carrying out the contracted
services.
Therefore, the true damage caused by Burgundy’s breach of the
Escrow Agreement was the loss of its security, and not the loss of
profits under the Drilling Contract. The latter loss was in fact the
result of Transocean’s decision not to perform the Drilling Contract
without security, and however reasonable a decision that might appear
to be, the proper cause of action for recovering those losses must be a
claim under the Drilling Contract. Having deliberately chosen to carve
out the security aspect of the parties’ business relationship and deal
with it in a separate contract, Transocean cannot now seek to vindicate
its performance interest under the Drilling Contract by bringing a
claim founded on breach of the Escrow Agreement.
The fact that cl 3.2 of the Escrow Agreement entitles Transocean to
terminate the Drilling Contract upon a breach of the Escrow
Agreement does not change the preceding analysis. A breach of the
Escrow Agreement is not necessarily a breach of the Drilling Contract,
and even if it were, there is no legal basis for allowing Transocean to
recover the losses it suffered from a breach of the Drilling Contract in
an action for breach of the Escrow Agreement. The contractual right to
terminate the Drilling Contract upon a breach of the Escrow
Agreement is just that – a right to terminate; it does not serve to
import all the obligations under Drilling Contract into the Escrow
Agreement and allow Transocean to treat them as a single composite
contract. This is a matter of some significance where, as here, each
contract has unique features including distinct dispute resolution
mechanisms.
12.140 Given the two contracts before it, the Court of Appeal
concluded, in effect, that though there had been a breach of the Escrow
Agreement, that breach merely gave the respondent company the
contractual power to terminate the Drilling Agreement; there was no
breach, repudiatory or otherwise, of the latter, though there was a
breach of the former. Consequently, there could be no damages in
respect of the non-existent breach of the latter, and the decision below
on this point had to be reversed, although the Court of Appeal went on
to allow damages in respect of Transocean’s wasted costs and expenses
in entering the Escrow Agreement: at [116].
Quantification of Wrotham Park damages
12.141 In Clearlab SG Pte Ltd v Ting Chong Chai [2015] 1 SLR 163,
a dispute arose between the plaintiff company and a number of its
ex-employees. Inter alia, the plaintiff claimed that its ex-employees had
breached the terms of a confidentiality clause in their contracts of
employment after leaving the employ of the plaintiff. Interim
injunctions had been obtained against the ex-employees with regard to
their ability to exploit information which they had gained during their
employment with the plaintiff, and on the conclusion of this action, Lee

Seiu Kin J granted the final injunctions against the ex-employees, as

sought by the plaintiff.
12.142 Interestingly, the plaintiff company also sought damages,

assessed on the Wrotham Park basis, from its ex-employees as
compensation in respect of its non-pecuniary losses arising from that
period of time between its ex-employees’ breach of their duties of
confidentiality, and the time when the interim injunction had been
granted: at [341].
12.143 Summarising the law on the point, Lee J observed as follows

(at [337]):
In the case of Wrotham Park Estate Co Ltd v Parkside Homes Ltd and
others [1974] 1 WLR 798 (‘Wrotham Park’), from which the term
Wrotham Park damages was derived, Brightman J awarded damages as
‘a just substitute for a mandatory injunction’: at 815D. Instead of
ordering a mandatory injunction for the demolition of buildings
developed in breach of a restrictive covenant, because that would have
been an ‘unpardonable waste of much needed houses’, Brightman J
had assessed damages as a sum which the plaintiffs might reasonably
have demanded from the defendant as quid pro quo for relaxing the
covenant. It assumes a hypothetical negotiation between parties to buy
out or to release the relevant obligation.
12.144 Lee J held that such damages were not available on the facts
before him. In his view (at [342]–[343]):
… the argument that Wrotham Park damages are available for that
specific timeframe is tenuous. It seems to have no regard for
commercial reality. The fact is that no agreement could hypothetically
have been struck between the parties for a limited use of confidential
information in Aquilus that can never come to fruition
(viz, production and sale of competing products by Aquilus). As
Sales J said in Duncan Edward Vercoe and others v Rutland Fund
Management Limited and others [2010] EWHC 424 (Ch) at [292]:
On my reading of the authorities, where damages are to be
awarded on a Wrotham Park type basis, what is required from
the court is an assessment of a fair price for release or
relaxation of the relevant negative covenant having regard to
(i) the likely parameters given by ordinary commercial
considerations bearing on each of the parties (it would not
usually be fair for the court to make an award of damages on
this basis by reference to a hypothetical agreement outside the
bounds of realistic commercial acceptability assessed on an
objective basis with reference to the position in which each
party is placed, and see Pell Frischmann Engineering Ltd
at [53]); (ii) any additional factors particularly affecting the
just balance to be struck between the competing interests of
the parties (see Brightman J’s reference to the conduct of the
beneficiary of the restrictive covenant in Wrotham Park at

815H–816B as a factor tending to moderate the award of
damages in its favour and the reference of the Privy Council
in Pell Frischmann Engineering Ltd at [54] to the relevance of
extraordinary and unexplained delay by the claimant); and
(iii) the court’s overriding obligation to ensure that an award
of damages for breach of contract – which falls to be assessed
in light of events which have now moved beyond the time the
breach of contract occurred and which may have worked
themselves out in a way which affects the balance of justice
between the parties – does not provide relief out of
proportion to the real extent of the claimant’s interest in
proper performance judged on an objective basis by reference
to the situation which presents itself to the court (see the
discussion in Experience Hendrix at [27]–[30] of the special
nature of the interest of the claimant which justified the
award of damages in Blake equivalent to the profits which
Blake had made in publishing his book about his treachery;
the general discussion by Lord Nicholls in Blake at 282A–
285H; and also compare Ruxley Electronics and Construction
Ltd v Forsyth [1996] AC 344). [emphasis added]
What Clearlab is essentially seeking are Wrotham Park damages
represented by a licence fee for the use of the confidential information
for such time and extent before the products are fully developed for
the market. It is a prime example of a hypothetical agreement that is
‘outside the bounds of realistic commercial acceptability’. The licensor,
Clearlab, has everything to gain, in terms of monetary compensation,
for loaning out the confidential information, whereas the licensee, the
defendants, are ultimately prevented from benefiting from the use of
the confidential information because the licence to use is retracted just
before they are ready to sell the products made using the confidential
information. The value of a licence for such temporary and restricted
use is zero.
[emphasis added by High Court]
Quantification of damages – “Breach-date rule” or mitigation?
12.145 In the case of Su Ah Tee v Allister Lim and Thrumurgan [2014]

SGHC 159 (“Su Ah Tee”), the High Court made certain observations in
connection with the application of the “breach-date” rule.
12.146 In this case, the plaintiffs had engaged the defendant firm to act
for them as their conveyancing solicitors in the purchase of a HDB
shophouse lease from one of the third parties (“Cheng”). Cheng had
fraudulently misrepresented to the plaintiffs that the shophouse had an
unexpired lease in excess of 60 years, when in reality, there were only
17 years left on the lease. Following the usual searches on title, the
defendant became aware that there were only 17 years left on the
shophouse lease which their clients proposed to purchase, but it failed to

relay this information to the plaintiffs.
12.147 Although the plaintiffs could have rescinded the contract of sale
in light of Cheng’s fraudulent misrepresentation, and brought an action
against Cheng in the tort of deceit, they elected to merely bring an
action against the defendant. As to this action, the learned trial judge
held that such failure amounted to a breach of the defendant’s duties to
its clients: it had failed to discharge its duty as conveyance solicitors for
the plaintiffs with reasonable care, such duty arising both as a matter of
contract and tort law. Accordingly, the defendant was liable to pay
damages to the plaintiffs in respect of its breach of duty. In awarding
damages, the court did not distinguish between whether it was awarded
contract damages or damages in tort, and rightly so, given that the
content of the defendant’s duty as a matter of contract or that in the tort
of negligence was the same.
12.148 The court took the view that the damages in respect of the
defendant’s breach were to be quantified by reference to the difference
between the price actually paid by the plaintiffs for the lease, and its
market value as at the time when the sale was completed. In so doing,
the learned judge asserted that she was applying the “breach-date” rule,
and was not convinced that it was appropriate to quantify damages by
reference to a different date: at [127]–[136].
12.149 This merits some expansion. For one, though the learned judge
appears to have assumed that the defendant’s breach of duty had
occurred at the time when the sale was completed, another view is
possible: arguably, the defendant firm could be taken to have breached
its duty when, having discovered that there were only 17 years
remaining on the lease of the shophouse, it failed to inform the plaintiffs
of this fact. If so, the point when the breach would have occurred would
have been a point in time prior to the date when the sale was completed.
Yet this would plainly not have been the appropriate date at which to
quantify the appropriate sum of damages to compensate the plaintiffs
for their loss since the plaintiffs sustained their claimed-for loss by
reason of the defendant’s breach only when the purchase of the
shophouse was completed at what, in light of the subsequent discovery
of the true length of the remaining lease, was an excessively high price.
12.150 In many cases involving contract breaches, actionable loss is

sustained upon breach, and this provides a reason why, in most cases,
contract damages are quantified by reference to the prevailing state of
affairs as at the date of breach. In contrast, in cases involving breaches of
tortious duties, unless the tort is actionable per se (as is the case with the
tort of libel where damage is presumed upon breach), since the victim of
such torts would have no cause of action until damage arises, and given
that in some instances, the damage arising from the tortfeasor’s breach
of duty may arise only some time after the occurrence of the breach,
damages are typically assessed in light of the state of affairs as at the date
when the damage (that is, loss) manifests itself.
12.151 On the facts in Su Ah Tee, however, though the defendant firm

had arguably breached its duties to the plaintiffs when it failed to bring
to the plaintiffs’ attention the very short period left on the shophouse
lease following their discovery of the same, at that point in time, the
plaintiffs had yet to sustain the loss which was subsequently claimed in
the action before the court. Therefore, without explicitly acknowledging
it, in electing to quantify the plaintiffs’ damages by reference to the
market value of the shophouse given it had only 17 years left on its lease
as at the date when the sale was completed, it might seem that the court
had already departed from the “breach-date” rule.
12.152 To address this quibble, one could characterise the defendant’s

breach as being continuing: that for each day following the defendant’s
discovery of the remaining length of the lease on the shophouse, the
defendant was committing a fresh breach of its contractual duty, and
that this was the case, right up until the date when the sale was
completed. So characterised, it would follow that whether the court was
quantifying damages in respect of the defendant’s breach of its
contractual or tortious duty, the appropriate reference date would
indeed be the date of completion of the sale as that would be the date
when the relevant breach had occurred, leading to the plaintiffs
sustaining loss/damage.
12.153 Even so, from the report, it seems unfortunate that insufficient
account appears to have been taken of the fact that, upon discovery of
the true state of affairs, the plaintiffs had initially planned to liquidate
their loss by auctioning off the shophouse, but had then decided to call
off the auction, such that they retained legal title to the shophouse as at
the time of the proceedings in Su Ah Tee.
12.154 In having elected not to liquidate their loss upon discovery of

the true length of the outstanding lease on the shophouse by selling it,
the plaintiffs’ retention of title to the lease on the shophouse meant that
by the time of the trial, due to the effects of a rising market, the market
value of the shophouse with its short remaining lease had appreciated by
around 30% over its market value as at the time of completion. Though
it could have been so argued, so far as one can tell from the report, it
would appear that counsel for the defendant did not present the
plaintiffs’ decision to hold off on liquidating their loss as being a
mitigatory step by way of alternative to his submission as to the
appropriateness of departing from the “breach-date rule” (which the
court rejected).
12.155 One might have looked at the problem in the following terms.
Having elected to mitigate their loss by postponing the sale of the
shophouse, and such election having actually reduced the plaintiffs’ loss
in light of the 30% appreciation in the market value of the shophouse as
at the time of the trial, since damages ought not to be awarded in respect
of loss actually avoided, the damages ordered ought to be discounted in
respect of such loss since the purpose of an award of damages is, “to
compensate [the plaintiff] for his loss, not to enrich him”: Longden v
British Coal Corp [1998] AC 653 at 662. Similar sentiments are
expressed with respect to tort damages: Dimond v Lovell [2002] 1 AC 384
at 401–402, per Lord Hoffmann.
12.156 Had the point been made, presumably, the court would have
had to consider whether the appreciation in the market value of the
shophouse in the period between completion and the time of judgment
was the “direct result of ”, or merely “collateral to”, the defendant’s breach,
a distinction highlighted in Lavarack v Woods of Colchester Ltd [1967]
1 QB 278. If the latter, it would be open to the court to ignore its effect
and no allowance would be given in respect of it, as was held to be the
case in Hussey v Eels [1990] 2 QB 227 (“Hussey”), where landed
property, which had been acquired by the plaintiffs due to the
defendant’s misrepresentation that it was not subject to subsidence, was
subsequently sold for one-and-a-half times the purchase price after the
house was demolished, and planning permission obtained by the
plaintiffs for the land to be redeveloped more intensively. In that case,
the court concluded that, even assuming the plaintiffs had generated a
profit from this resale, such profit was not to be taken into account to
reduce the damages to be awarded in respect of the defendant’s
misrepresentation since the resale was, “not … part of a continuous
transaction of which the purchase was … the inception”: Hussey at 241.
12.157 Not having been put to the court, one can only speculate how
the court would have responded to such a contention, though the court’s
acceptance that the appreciation in the market value of the shophouse
was reasonably foreseeable is suggestive. Ultimately, though, this case
probably stands as a cautionary tale to counsel, that though the “breach-
date” rule may well be a difficult one to displace, other avenues might
usefully be explored so as to honour the overriding principle set out in
Robinson v Harman (1848) 1 Ex 850 and Livingstone v Rawyards Coal
Co (1880) 5 App Cas 25, that damages are to be awarded to place the
plaintiff in the position he or she would have been in had the breach not
occurred.


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(2014) 15 SAL Ann Rev Contract Law 217

12. CONTRACT LAW

LEE Pey Woan

Offer and acceptance

Offer and acceptance in different fact patterns

Purchase” Sing JLS (forthcoming)), which raised several issues of

12.3 An option to purchase was prepared by the vendors’ agent and

12.4 The purchaser began proceedings against the vendors to

12.7 One of those triable issues concerned issues of offer and

12.8 Whether this was a triable issue requires the consideration of

12.9 Although not expressly stated by the court in Siemens Industry

© 2015 Contributor(s) and Singapore Academy of Law.

Silence as valid acceptance?

12.12 The respondent commenced proceedings in Switzerland against

12.13 Although the respondent never countersigned and returned the

12.14 The appellant argued on appeal that it was typical in commodity

set of terms would follow to supplement those key terms. It was

Whether acceptance needs to be communicated

12.17 Another specific rule relating to the rules of offer and

© 2015 Contributor(s) and Singapore Academy of Law.

12.18 In considering whether a valid contract was concluded between

12.21 Indeed, the High Court in Brader Daniel John (above,

© 2015 Contributor(s) and Singapore Academy of Law.

employment and forebearance from resigning. There was therefore

12.22 Alternatively, the court also found consideration on the “more

12.23 The doctrine of promissory estoppel, usually used to enforce

© 2015 Contributor(s) and Singapore Academy of Law.

Intention to create legal relations

Certainty and completeness

12.26 It is clear that a contract must be certain and complete before it

12.27 Even if a contract is uncertain or incomplete, that can be

12.28 The degree of certainty and completeness required becomes

12.29 On the facts as described above at paras 12.10–12.13, the Court

© 2015 Contributor(s) and Singapore Academy of Law.

confirmation would have been sufficient to satisfy the requirements of

12.30 The question of certainty and completeness also featured in

12.31 The High Court found that uncertainty as to the time of

The terms of the contract

Distinguishing representations from terms in an oral contract

12.34 The issue of distinguishing representations from terms in the

12.36 Of course, distinguishing representations from terms is only

12.37 Whether the terms contained in a separate document are

detailed above (at paras 12.10–12.13), the Court of Appeal in

12.40 It is important that the Court of Appeal found as a matter of fact

Implication of terms in fact

12.41 In 2013, the Court of Appeal in Sembcorp Marine Ltd v PPL

© 2015 Contributor(s) and Singapore Academy of Law.

Sembcorp Marine, it is evident that it had that process in mind. It first

12.46 A second occasion in which the courts had to consider the

12.47 Pursuant to its obligations, the purchaser applied to the relevant

court found that it was necessary in the business or commercial sense to

12.50 A third instance of the courts applying the Sembcorp Marine

12.52 A fourth instance of the courts applying the Sembcorp Marine

© 2015 Contributor(s) and Singapore Academy of Law.

Implication of terms by law

Implication of terms in sale of goods

12.57 The implication of terms in the context of the sale of goods

12.58 The High Court considered that it needed to ascertain the

12.60 The High Court considered that it was of crucial importance