[ G.R. No.

183409, June 18, 2010 ] Agricultural Lands to Non-agricultural Uses," amending and updating the previous
rules on land use conversion.  Its coverage includes the following agricultural lands,
CHAMBER OF REAL ESTATE AND BUILDERS ASSOCIATIONS, INC. (CREBA), to wit: (1) those to be converted to residential, commercial, industrial, institutional
PETITIONER, VS. THE SECRETARY OF AGRARIAN REFORM, RESPONDENT. and other non-agricultural purposes; (2) those to be devoted to another type of
agricultural activity such as livestock, poultry, and fishpond ─ the effect of which
DECISION is to exempt the land from the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP)
coverage; (3) those to be converted to non-agricultural use other than that
previously authorized; and (4) those reclassified to residential, commercial,
PEREZ, J.:
industrial, or other non-agricultural uses on or after the effectivity of Republic Act
No. 6657[5] on 15 June 1988 pursuant to Section 20[6] of Republic Act No. 7160[7] and
This case is a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition (with application for temporary other pertinent laws and regulations, and are to be converted to such uses.
restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction) under Rule 65 of the 1997
Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, filed by herein petitioner Chamber of Real Estate On 28 February 2002, the Secretary of Agrarian Reform issued another
and Builders Associations, Inc. (CREBA) seeking to nullify and prohibit the Administrative Order, i.e., DAR AO No. 01-02, entitled "2002 Comprehensive Rules
enforcement of Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) Administrative Order (AO) on Land Use Conversion," which further amended DAR AO No. 07-97 and DAR AO
No. 01-02, as amended by DAR AO No. 05-07,[1] and DAR Memorandum No. 88, No. 01-99, and repealed all issuances inconsistent therewith. The aforesaid DAR AO
[2]
 for having been issued by the Secretary of Agrarian Reform with grave abuse of No. 01-02 covers all applications for conversion from agricultural to non-
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction as some provisions of the agricultural uses or to another agricultural use.
aforesaid administrative issuances are illegal and unconstitutional.
Thereafter, on 2 August 2007, the Secretary of Agrarian Reform amended certain
Petitioner CREBA, a private non-stock, non-profit corporation duly organized and provisions[8] of DAR AO No. 01-02 by formulating DAR AO No. 05-07, particularly
existing under the laws of the Republic of the Philippines, is the umbrella addressing land conversion in time of exigencies and calamities.
organization of some 3,500 private corporations, partnerships, single
proprietorships and individuals directly or indirectly involved in land and housing To address the unabated conversion of prime agricultural lands for real estate
development, building and infrastructure construction, materials production and development, the Secretary of Agrarian Reform further issued Memorandum No.
supply, and services in the various related fields of engineering, architecture, 88 on 15 April 2008, which temporarily suspended the processing and approval of
community planning and development financing.  The Secretary of Agrarian Reform all land use conversion applications.
is named respondent as he is the duly appointive head of the DAR whose
administrative issuances are the subject of this petition. By reason thereof, petitioner claims that there is an actual slow down of housing
projects, which, in turn, aggravated the housing shortage, unemployment and
The Antecedent Facts illegal squatting problems to the substantial prejudice not only of the petitioner
and its members but more so of the whole nation.
The Secretary of Agrarian Reform issued, on 29 October 1997, DAR AO No. 07-97,
[3]
 entitled "Omnibus Rules and Procedures Governing Conversion of Agricultural Hence, this petition.
Lands to Non-Agricultural Uses," which consolidated all existing implementing
guidelines related to land use conversion.  The aforesaid rules embraced all private The Issues
agricultural lands regardless of tenurial arrangement and commodity produced,
and all untitled agricultural lands and agricultural lands reclassified by Local In its Memorandum, petitioner posits the following issues:
Government Units (LGUs) into non-agricultural uses after 15 June 1988.
I.
Subsequently, on 30 March 1999, the Secretary of Agrarian Reform issued DAR AO
No. 01-99,[4] entitled "Revised Rules and Regulations on the Conversion of WHETHER THE DAR SECRETARY HAS JURISDICTION OVER LANDS THAT HAVE BEEN
RECLASSIFIED AS RESIDENTIAL, COMMERCIAL, INDUSTRIAL, OR FOR OTHER NON- practices performed by a farmer in conjunction with such farming operations done
AGRICULTURAL USES. by a person whether natural or juridical, and not classified by the law as mineral,
forest, residential, commercial or industrial land."  When the Secretary of Agrarian
II. Reform, however, issued DAR AO No. 01-02, as amended, he included in the
definition of agricultural lands "lands not reclassified as residential, commercial,
WHETHER THE DAR SECRETARY ACTED IN EXCESS OF HIS JURISDICTION AND industrial or other non-agricultural uses before 15 June 1988." In effect, lands
GRAVELY ABUSED HIS DISCRETION BY ISSUING AND ENFORCING [DAR AO NO. 01- reclassified from agricultural to residential, commercial, industrial, or other non-
02, AS AMENDED] WHICH SEEK TO REGULATE RECLASSIFIED LANDS. agricultural uses after 15 June 1988 are considered to be agricultural lands for
purposes of conversion, redistribution, or otherwise. In so doing, petitioner avows
III. that the Secretary of Agrarian Reform acted without jurisdiction as he has no
authority to expand or enlarge the legal signification of the term agricultural lands
WHETHER [DAR AO NO. 01-02, AS AMENDED] VIOLATE[S] THE LOCAL AUTONOMY through DAR AO No. 01-02.  Being a mere administrative issuance, it must conform
OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT UNITS. to the statute it seeks to implement, i.e., Republic Act No. 6657, or to the
Constitution, otherwise, its validity or constitutionality may be questioned.
IV.
In the same breath, petitioner contends that DAR AO No. 01-02, as amended, was
WHETHER [DAR AO NO. 01-02, AS AMENDED] VIOLATE[S] THE DUE PROCESS AND made in violation of Section 65[11] of Republic Act No. 6657 because it covers all
EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE[S] OF THE CONSTITUTION. applications for conversion from agricultural to non-agricultural uses or to other
agricultural uses, such as the conversion of agricultural lands or areas that have
V. been reclassified by the LGUs or by way of Presidential Proclamations, to
residential, commercial, industrial or other non-agricultural uses on or after 15 June
WHETHER MEMORANDUM NO. 88 IS A VALID EXERCISE OF POLICE POWER. [9] 1988.  According to petitioner, there is nothing in Section 65 of Republic Act No.
6657 or in any other provision of law that confers to the DAR the jurisdiction or
authority to require that non-awarded lands or reclassified lands be submitted to
The subject of the submission that the DAR Secretary gravely abused his discretion its conversion authority.  Thus, in issuing and enforcing DAR AO No. 01-02, as
is AO No. 01-02, as amended, which states: amended, the Secretary of Agrarian Reform acted with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
Section 3.  Applicability of Rules. - These guidelines shall apply to all applications for
conversion, from agricultural to non-agricultural uses or to another agricultural use, Petitioner further asseverates that Section 2.19,[12] Article I of DAR AO No. 01-02, as
such as: amended, making reclassification of agricultural lands subject to the requirements
and procedure for land use conversion, violates Section 20 of Republic Act No.
xxxx 7160, because it was not provided therein that reclassification by LGUs shall be
subject to conversion procedures or requirements, or that the DAR's approval or
3.4 Conversion of agricultural lands or areas that have been reclassified by the LGU clearance must be secured to effect reclassification.  The said Section 2.19 of DAR
or by way of a Presidential Proclamation, to residential, commercial, industrial, or AO No. 01-02, as amended, also contravenes the constitutional mandate on local
other non-agricultural uses on or after the effectivity of RA 6657 on 15 June 1988, autonomy under Section 25,[13] Article II and Section 2,[14] Article X of the 1987
x x x.  [Emphasis supplied]. Philippine Constitution.

Petitioner holds that under Republic Act No. 6657 and Republic Act No. 8435, [10] the Petitioner similarly avers that the promulgation and enforcement of DAR AO No.
term agricultural lands refers to "lands devoted to or suitable for the cultivation of 01-02, as amended, constitute deprivation of liberty and property without due
the soil, planting of crops, growing of fruit trees, raising of livestock, poultry or fish, process of law.  There is deprivation of liberty and property without due process of
including the harvesting of such farm products, and other farm activities and law because under DAR AO No. 01-02, as amended, lands that are not within DAR's
jurisdiction are unjustly, arbitrarily and oppressively prohibited or restricted from precious time of this Court; and (b) it would cause an inevitable and resultant delay,
legitimate use on pain of administrative and criminal penalties. More so, there is intended or otherwise, in the adjudication of cases, which in some instances had to
discrimination and violation of the equal protection clause of the Constitution be remanded or referred to the lower court as the proper forum under the rules of
because the aforesaid administrative order is patently biased in favor of the procedure, or as better equipped to resolve the issues because this Court is not a
peasantry at the expense of all other sectors of society. trier of facts.[19]

As its final argument, petitioner avows that DAR Memorandum No. 88 is not a valid This Court thus reaffirms the judicial policy that it will not entertain direct resort to
exercise of police power for it is the prerogative of the legislature and that it is it unless the redress desired cannot be obtained in the appropriate courts, and
unconstitutional because it suspended the land use conversion without any basis. exceptional and compelling circumstances, such as cases of national interest and of
serious implications, justify the availment of the extraordinary remedy of writ
The Court's Ruling of certiorari, calling for the exercise of its primary jurisdiction. [20]

Exceptional and compelling circumstances were held present in the following cases:
This petition must be dismissed. (a) Chavez v. Romulo,[21] on citizens' right to bear arms; (b) Government of [the]
United States of America v. Hon. Purganan,[22] on bail in extradition proceedings;
Primarily, although this Court, the Court of Appeals and the Regional Trial Courts (c) Commission on Elections v. Judge Quijano-Padilla, [23] on government contract
have concurrent jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari, involving modernization and computerization of voters' registration list; (d) Buklod
prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus and injunction, such ng Kawaning EIIB v. Hon. Sec. Zamora,[24] on status and existence of a public office;
concurrence does not give the petitioner unrestricted freedom of choice of court and (e) Hon. Fortich v. Hon. Corona,[25] on the so-called "Win-Win Resolution" of the
forum.[15]  In Heirs of Bertuldo Hinog v. Melicor,[16] citing People v. Cuaresma,[17] this Office of the President which modified the approval of the conversion to agro-
Court made the following pronouncements: industrial area.[26]

This Court's original jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari is not exclusive. It is In the case at bench, petitioner failed to specifically and sufficiently set forth
shared by this Court with Regional Trial Courts and with the Court of Appeals. This special and important reasons to justify direct recourse to this Court and why this
concurrence of jurisdiction is not, however, to be taken as according to parties Court should give due course to this petition in the first instance, hereby failing to
seeking any of the writs an absolute, unrestrained freedom of choice of the court fulfill the conditions set forth in  Heirs of Bertuldo Hinog v. Melicor.[27]  The present
to which application therefor will be directed. There is after all a hierarchy of petition should have been initially filed in the Court of Appeals in strict observance
courts. That hierarchy is determinative of the venue of appeals, and also serves as a of the doctrine on the hierarchy of courts.  Failure to do so is sufficient cause for
general determinant of the appropriate forum for petitions for the extraordinary the dismissal of this petition.
writs. A becoming regard for that judicial hierarchy most certainly indicates that
petitions for the issuance of extraordinary writs against first level ("inferior") courts Moreover, although the instant petition is styled as a Petition for Certiorari, in
should be filed with the Regional Trial Court, and those against the latter, with the essence, it seeks the declaration by this Court of the unconstitutionality or illegality
Court of Appeals. A direct invocation of the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction of the questioned DAR AO No. 01-02, as amended, and Memorandum No. 88.  It,
to issue these writs should be allowed only when there are special and important thus, partakes of the nature of a Petition for Declaratory Relief over which this
reasons therefor, clearly and specifically set out in the petition. This is [an] Court has only appellate, not original, jurisdiction. [28] Section 5, Article VIII of the
established policy. It is a policy necessary to prevent inordinate demands upon the 1987 Philippine Constitution provides:
Court's time and attention which are better devoted to those matters within its
exclusive jurisdiction, and to prevent further over-crowding of the Court's docket. Sec. 5.  The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
[18]
  (Emphasis supplied.)
(1)  Exercise original jurisdiction over cases affecting ambassadors, other public
ministers and consuls, and over petitions for certiorari, prohibition,
The rationale for this rule is two-fold: (a) it would be an imposition upon the
mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas corpus.
 In the case before this Court, the petitioner fails to meet the above-mentioned
(2)  Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari as the law or requisites for the proper invocation of a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65.  The
the Rules of Court may provide, final judgments and orders of lower courts in: Secretary of Agrarian Reform in issuing the assailed DAR AO No. 01-02, as
amended, as well as Memorandum No. 88 did so in accordance with his mandate
(a)  All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, international to implement the land use conversion provisions of Republic Act No. 6657.  In the
or executive agreement, law, presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction, process, he neither acted in any judicial or quasi-judicial capacity nor assumed unto
ordinance, or regulation is in question.  (Emphasis supplied.) himself any performance of judicial or quasi-judicial prerogative.  A Petition
for Certiorari is a special civil action that may be invoked only against a tribunal,
board, or officer exercising judicial functions.  Section 1, Rule 65 of the 1997
With that, this Petition must necessarily fail because this Court does not have
Revised Rules of Civil Procedure is explicit on this matter, viz.:
original jurisdiction over a Petition for Declaratory Relief even if only questions of
law are involved.
SECTION 1.  Petition for certiorari. - When any tribunal, board or officer exercising
Even if the petitioner has properly observed the doctrine of judicial hierarchy, this judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of its or his
Petition is still dismissible. jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, nor any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in
The special civil action for certiorari is intended for the correction of errors of the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition
jurisdiction only or grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment
jurisdiction.  Its principal office is only to keep the inferior court within the must be rendered annulling or modifying the proceedings of such tribunal, board or
parameters of its jurisdiction or to prevent it from committing such a grave abuse officer.
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. [29]
A tribunal, board, or officer is said to be exercising judicial function where it has
The essential requisites for a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 are: (1) the writ is the power to determine what the law is and what the legal rights of the parties are,
directed against a tribunal, a board, or an officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial and then undertakes to determine these questions and adjudicate upon the rights
functions; (2) such tribunal, board, or officer has acted without or in excess of of the parties.  Quasi-judicial function, on the other hand, is "a term which applies
jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of to the actions, discretion, etc., of public administrative officers or bodies x x x
jurisdiction; and (3) there is no appeal or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy required to investigate facts or ascertain the existence of facts, hold hearings, and
in the ordinary course of law.[30] draw conclusions from them as a basis for their official action and to exercise
discretion of a judicial nature."[34]
Excess of jurisdiction as distinguished from absence of jurisdiction means that an
act, though within the general power of a tribunal, board or officer, is not Before a tribunal, board, or officer may exercise judicial or quasi-judicial acts, it is
authorized and invalid with respect to the particular proceeding, because the necessary that there be a law that gives rise to some specific rights of persons or
conditions which alone authorize the exercise of the general power in respect of it property under which adverse claims to such rights are made, and the controversy
are wanting.[31]  Without jurisdiction means lack or want of legal power, right or ensuing therefrom is brought before a tribunal, board, or officer clothed with
authority to hear and determine a cause or causes, considered either in general or power and authority to determine the law and adjudicate the respective rights of
with reference to a particular matter.  It means lack of power to exercise authority. the contending parties.[35]
[32]
  Grave abuse of discretion implies such capricious and whimsical exercise of
judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction or, in other words, where the The Secretary of Agrarian Reform does not fall within the ambit of a tribunal,
power is exercised in an arbitrary manner by reason of passion, prejudice, or board, or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions.  The issuance and
personal hostility, and it must be so patent or gross as to amount to an evasion of a enforcement by the Secretary of Agrarian Reform of the questioned DAR AO No.
positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in 01-02, as amended, and Memorandum No. 88 were done in the exercise of his
contemplation of law.[33] quasi-legislative and administrative functions and not of judicial or quasi-judicial
functions. In issuing the aforesaid administrative issuances, the Secretary of
Agrarian Reform never made any adjudication of rights of the parties.  As such, it Agrarian Reform merely acted within the scope of his authority stated in the
can never be said that the Secretary of Agrarian Reform had acted with grave abuse aforesaid sections of Executive Order No. 129-A, which is to promulgate rules and
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing and enforcing regulations for agrarian reform implementation and that includes the authority to
DAR AO No. 01-02, as amended, and Memorandum No. 88 for he never exercised define agricultural lands for purposes of land use conversion.  Further, the
any judicial or quasi-judicial functions but merely his quasi-legislative and definition of agricultural lands under DAR AO No. 01-02, as amended, merely refers
administrative functions. to the category of agricultural lands that may be the subject for conversion to non-
agricultural uses and is not in any way confined to agricultural lands in the context
Furthermore, as this Court has previously discussed, the instant petition in essence of land redistribution as provided for under Republic Act No. 6657.
seeks the declaration by this Court of the unconstitutionality or illegality of the
questioned DAR AO No. 01-02, as amended, and Memorandum No. 88.  Thus, the More so, Department of Justice Opinion No. 44, Series of 1990, which Opinion has
adequate and proper remedy for the petitioner therefor is to file a Petition for been recognized in many cases decided by this Court, clarified that after the
Declaratory Relief, which this Court has only appellate and not original jurisdiction.  effectivity of Republic Act No. 6657 on 15 June 1988 the DAR has been given the
It is beyond the province of certiorari to declare the aforesaid administrative authority to approve land conversion. [38]  Concomitant to such authority, therefore,
issuances unconstitutional and illegal because certiorari is confined only to the is the authority to include in the definition of agricultural lands "lands not
determination of the existence of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or reclassified as residential, commercial, industrial or other non-agricultural
excess of jurisdiction.  Petitioner cannot simply allege grave abuse of discretion uses before 15 June 1988" for purposes of land use conversion.
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction and then invoke certiorari to declare the
aforesaid administrative issuances unconstitutional and illegal.  Emphasis must be In the same vein, the authority of the Secretary of Agrarian Reform to include
given to the fact that the writ of certiorari dealt with in Rule 65 of the 1997 Revised "lands not reclassified as residential, commercial, industrial or other non-
Rules of Civil Procedure is a prerogative writ, never demandable as a matter of agricultural uses before 15 June 1988" in the definition of agricultural lands finds
right, "never issued except in the exercise of judicial discretion."[36] basis in jurisprudence.  In Ros v. Department of Agrarian Reform,[39] this Court has
enunciated that after the passage of Republic Act No. 6657, agricultural
At any rate, even if the Court will set aside procedural infirmities, the instant lands, though reclassified, have to go through the process of conversion,
petition should still be dismissed. jurisdiction over which is vested in the DAR.  However, agricultural lands, which are
already reclassified before the effectivity of Republic Act No. 6657 which is 15 June
Executive Order No. 129-A[37] vested upon the DAR the responsibility of 1988, are exempted from conversion. [40]  It bears stressing that the said date of
implementing the CARP.  Pursuant to the said mandate and to ensure the effectivity of Republic Act No. 6657 served as the cut-off period for automatic
successful implementation of the CARP, Section 5(c) of the said executive order reclassifications or rezoningof agricultural lands that no longer require any DAR
authorized the DAR to establish and promulgate operational policies, rules and conversion clearance or authority.[41]  It necessarily follows that any reclassification
regulations and priorities for agrarian reform implementation.  Section 4(k) made thereafter can be the subject of DAR's conversion authority.  Having
thereof authorized the DAR to approve or disapprove the conversion, recognized the DAR's conversion authority over lands reclassified after 15 June
restructuring or readjustment of agricultural lands into non-agricultural uses.  1988, it can no longer be argued that the Secretary of Agrarian Reform was
Similarly, Section 5(l) of the same executive order has given the DAR the exclusive wrongfully given the authority and power to include "lands not reclassified as
authority to approve or disapprove conversion of agricultural lands for residential, commercial, industrial or other non-agricultural uses before 15 June
residential, commercial, industrial, and other land uses as may be provided for by 1988" in the definition of agricultural lands.  Such inclusion does not unduly expand
law.  Section 7 of the aforesaid executive order clearly provides that "the authority or enlarge the definition of agricultural lands; instead, it made clear what are the
and responsibility for the exercise of the mandate of the [DAR] and the discharge of lands that can be the subject of DAR's conversion authority, thus, serving the very
its powers and functions shall be vested in the Secretary of Agrarian Reform x x x." purpose of the land use conversion provisions of Republic Act No. 6657.

Under DAR AO No. 01-02, as amended, "lands not reclassified as residential, The argument of the petitioner that DAR AO No. 01-02, as amended, was made in
commercial, industrial or other non-agricultural uses before 15 June 1988" have violation of Section 65 of Republic Act No. 6657, as it covers even those non-
been included in the definition of agricultural lands.  In so doing, the Secretary of awarded lands and reclassified lands by the LGUs or by way of Presidential
Proclamations on or after 15 June 1988 is specious.  As explained in Department of way of Presidential Proclamations because either way they must still undergo
Justice Opinion No. 44, series of 1990, it is true that the DAR's express power over conversion process.  It bears stressing that the act of reclassifying agricultural lands
land use conversion provided for under Section 65 of Republic Act No. 6657 is to non-agricultural uses simply specifies how agricultural lands shall be utilized for
limited to cases in which agricultural lands already awarded have, after five years, non-agricultural uses and does not automatically convert agricultural lands to non-
ceased to be economically feasible and sound for agricultural purposes, or the agricultural uses or for other purposes. As explained in DAR Memorandum Circular
locality has become urbanized and the land will have a greater economic value for No. 7, Series of 1994, cited in the 2009 case of Roxas & Company, Inc. v. DAMBA-
residential, commercial or industrial purposes. To suggest, however, that these are NFSW and the Department of Agrarian Reform,[47] reclassification of lands denotes
the only instances that the DAR can require conversion clearances would open a their allocation into some specific use and providing for the manner of their
loophole in Republic Act No. 6657 which every landowner may use to evade utilization and disposition or the act of specifying how agricultural lands shall be
compliance with the agrarian reform program. It should logically follow, therefore, utilized for non-agricultural uses such as residential, industrial, or commercial, as
from the said department's express duty and function to execute and enforce the embodied in the land use plan.  For reclassified agricultural lands, therefore, to be
said statute that any reclassification of a private land as a residential, commercial used for the purpose to which they are intended there is still a need to change the
or industrial property, on or after the effectivity of Republic Act No. 6657 on 15 current use thereof through the process of conversion.  The authority to do so is
June 1988 should first be cleared by the DAR.[42] vested in the DAR, which is mandated to preserve and maintain agricultural lands
with increased productivity.  Thus, notwithstanding the reclassification of
This Court held in Alarcon v. Court of Appeals[43] that reclassification of lands does agricultural lands to non-agricultural uses, they must still undergo conversion
not suffice.  Conversion and reclassification differ from each other.  Conversion is before they can be used for other purposes.
the act of changing the current use of a piece of agricultural land into some other
use as approved by the DAR while reclassification is the act of specifying how Even reclassification of agricultural lands by way of Presidential Proclamations to
agricultural lands shall be utilized for non-agricultural uses such as residential, non-agricultural uses, such as school sites, needs conversion clearance from the
industrial, and commercial, as embodied in the land use plan, subject to the DAR.  We reiterate that reclassification is different from conversion. Reclassification
requirements and procedures for land use conversion.  In view thereof, a mere alone will not suffice and does not automatically allow the landowner to change its
reclassification of an agricultural land does not automatically allow a landowner to use.  It must still undergo conversion process before the landowner can use such
change its use.  He has to undergo the process of conversion before he is permitted agricultural lands for such purpose.[48]  Reclassification of agricultural lands is one
to use the agricultural land for other purposes. [44] thing, conversion is another. Agricultural lands that are reclassified to non-
agricultural uses do not ipso facto allow the landowner thereof to use the same for
It is clear from the aforesaid distinction between reclassification and conversion such purpose. Stated differently, despite having reclassified into school sites, the
that agricultural lands though reclassified to residential, commercial, industrial or landowner of such reclassified agricultural lands must apply for conversion before
other non-agricultural uses must still undergo the process of conversion before the DAR in order to use the same for the said purpose.
they can be used for the purpose to which they are intended.
Any reclassification, therefore, of agricultural lands to residential, commercial,
Nevertheless, emphasis must be given to the fact that DAR's conversion authority industrial or other non-agricultural uses either by the LGUs or by way of
can only be exercised after the effectivity of Republic Act No. 6657 on 15 June Presidential Proclamations enacted on or after 15 June 1988 must undergo the
1988.[45]  The said date served as the cut-off period for automatic reclassification or process of conversion, despite having undergone reclassification, before
rezoning of agricultural lands that no longer require any DAR conversion clearance agricultural lands may be used for other purposes.
or authority.[46]  Thereafter, reclassification of agricultural lands is already subject to
DAR's conversion authority.  Reclassification alone will not suffice to use the It is different, however, when through Presidential Proclamations public
agricultural lands for other purposes. Conversion is needed to change the current agricultural lands have been reserved in whole or in part for public use or
use of reclassified agricultural lands. purpose, i.e., public school, etc., because in such a case, conversion is no longer
necessary.  As held in Republic v. Estonilo,[49] only a positive act of the President is
It is of no moment whether the reclassification of agricultural lands to residential, needed to segregate or reserve a piece of land of the public domain for a public
commercial, industrial or other non-agricultural uses was done by the LGUs or by purpose. As such, reservation of public agricultural lands for public use or purpose
in effect converted the same to such use without undergoing any conversion "The Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law," shall not be affected by the said
process and that they must be actually, directly and exclusively used for such public reclassification and the conversion of such lands into other purposes shall be
purpose for which they have been reserved, otherwise, they will be segregated governed by Section 65 of said Act.
from the reservations and transferred to the DAR for distribution to qualified
beneficiaries under the CARP.[50]  More so, public agricultural lands already reserved xxxx
for public use or purpose no longer form part of the alienable and disposable lands
of the public domain suitable for agriculture. [51]  Hence, they are outside the (e) Nothing in this Section shall be construed as repealing, amending, or modifying
coverage of the CARP and it logically follows that they are also beyond the in any manner the provisions of R.A. No. 6657.
conversion authority of the DAR.
The aforequoted provisions of law show that the power of the LGUs to reclassify
Clearly from the foregoing, the Secretary of Agrarian Reform did not act without
agricultural lands is not absolute.  The authority of the DAR to approve conversion
jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting
of agricultural lands covered by Republic Act No. 6657 to non-agricultural uses has
to lack or excess of jurisdiction in (1) including lands not reclassified as residential,
been validly recognized by said Section 20 of Republic Act No. 7160 by explicitly
commercial, industrial or other non-agricultural uses before 15 June 1988 in the
providing therein that, "nothing in this section shall be construed as repealing or
definition of agricultural lands under DAR AO No. 01-02, as amended, and; (2)
modifying in any manner the provisions of Republic Act No. 6657."
issuing and enforcing DAR AO No. 01-02, as amended, subjecting to DAR's
jurisdiction for conversion lands which had already been reclassified as residential,
DAR AO No. 01-02, as amended, does not also violate the due process clause, as
commercial, industrial or for other non-agricultural uses on or after 15 June 1988.
well as the equal protection clause of the Constitution.  In providing administrative
and criminal penalties in the said administrative order, the Secretary of Agrarian
Similarly, DAR AO No. 01-02, as amended, providing that the reclassification of
Reform simply implements the provisions of Sections 73 and 74 of Republic Act No.
agricultural lands by LGUs shall be subject to the requirements of land use
6657, thus:
conversion procedure or that DAR's approval or clearance must be secured to
effect reclassification, did not violate the autonomy of the LGUs.
Sec. 73.  Prohibited Acts and Omissions. - The following are prohibited:
Section 20 of Republic Act No. 7160 states that:
xxxx
SECTION 20.  Reclassification of Lands. - (a) A city or municipality may, through an
(c) The conversion by any landowner of his agricultural land into any non-
ordinance passed by the sanggunian after conducting public hearings for the
agricultural use with intent to avoid the application of this Act to his landholdings
purpose, authorize the reclassification of agricultural lands and provide for the
and to disposes his tenant farmers of the land tilled by them;
manner of their utilization or disposition in the following cases: (1) when the land
ceases to be economically feasible and sound for agricultural purposes as
xxxx
determined by the Department of Agriculture or (2) where the land shall have
substantially greater economic value for residential, commercial, or industrial
(f) The sale, transfer or conveyance by a beneficiary of the right to use or any other
purposes, as determined by the sanggunian concerned: Provided, That such
usufructuary right over the land he acquired by virtue of being a beneficiary, in
reclassification shall be limited to the following percentage of the total agricultural
order to circumvent the provisions of this Act.
land area at the time of the passage of the ordinance:
xxxx
xxxx
Sec. 74. Penalties. ─ Any person who knowingly or willfully violates the provisions
(3) For fourth to sixth class municipalities, five percent (5%): Provided, further, That
of this Act shall be punished by imprisonment of not less than one (1) month to not
agricultural lands distributed to agrarian reform beneficiaries pursuant to Republic
more than three (3) years or a fine of not less than one thousand pesos (P1,000.00)
Act Numbered Sixty-six hundred fifty-seven (R.A. No. 6657), otherwise known as
and not more than fifteen thousand pesos (P15,000.00), or both, at the discretion
of the court. WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant Petition for Certiorari is DISMISSED. 
Costs against petitioner.
If the offender is a corporation or association, the officer responsible therefor shall
be criminally liable. SO ORDERED.

And Section 11 of Republic Act No. 8435, which specifically provides:

[ G.R. NO. 132477, August 31, 2005 ]
Sec. 11. Penalty for Agricultural Inactivity and Premature Conversion. - x x x.
JOSE LUIS ROS, ANDONI F. ABOITIZ, XAVIER ABOITIZ, ROBERTO E. ABOITIZ,
Any person found guilty of premature or illegal conversion shall be penalized with ENRIQUE ABOITIZ, MATTHIAS G. MENDEZONA, CEBU INDUSTRIAL PARK
imprisonment of two (2) to six (6) years, or a fine equivalent to one hundred DEVELOPERS, INC. AND FBM ABOITIZ MARINE, INC., PETITIONERS, VS.
percent (100%) of the government's investment cost, or both, at the discretion of DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM, HON. ERNESTO GARILAO, IN HIS CAPACITY
the court, and an accessory penalty of forfeiture of the land and any improvement AS DAR SECRETARY, AND DIR. JOSE LLAMES, IN HIS CAPACITY AS DIRECTOR OF
thereon. DAR-REGIONAL 7, RESPONDENTS.

In addition, the DAR may impose the following penalties, after determining, in an DECISION
administrative proceedings, that violation of this law has been committed:
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
a. Consolation or withdrawal of the authorization for land use conversion; and

b. Blacklisting, or automatic disapproval of pending and subsequent conversion Petitioners are the owners/developers of several parcels of land located in Arpili,
applications that they may file with the DAR. Balamban, Cebu. By virtue of Municipal Ordinance No. 101 passed by the Municipal
Council of Balamban, Cebu, these lands were reclassified as industrial lands. [1] On
03 April 1995, the Provincial Board of Cebu approved Balamban's land use plan and
Contrary to petitioner's assertions, the administrative and criminal penalties adopted en toto Balamban's Municipal Ordinance No. 101 with the passage of
provided for under DAR AO No. 01-02, as amended, are imposed upon the illegal or Resolution No. 836-95 and Provincial Ordinance No. 95-8, respectively. [2] As part of
premature conversion of lands within DAR's jurisdiction, i.e., "lands not their preparation for the development of the subject lands as an industrial park,
reclassified as residential, commercial, industrial or for other non-agricultural petitioners secured all the necessary permits and appropriate government
uses before 15 June 1998." certifications.[3]

The petitioner's argument that DAR Memorandum No. 88 is unconstitutional, as it Despite these permits and certifications, petitioner Matthias Mendezona received a
suspends the land use conversion without any basis, stands on hollow ground. letter from Mr. Jose Llames, Director of the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR)
Regional Office for Region 7, informing him that the DAR was disallowing the
It bears emphasis that said Memorandum No. 88 was issued upon the instruction conversion of the subject lands for industrial use and directed him to cease and
of the President in order to address the unabated conversion of prime agricultural desist from further developments on the land to avoid the incurrence of civil and
lands for real estate development because of the worsening rice shortage in the
criminal liabilities.[4]
country at that time. Such measure was made in order to ensure that there are
enough agricultural lands in which rice cultivation and production may be carried
into.  The issuance of said Memorandum No. 88 was made pursuant to the general Petitioners were thus constrained to file with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
welfare of the public, thus, it cannot be argued that it was made without any basis. Toledo City a Complaint dated 29 July 1996 for Injunction with Application for
Temporary Restraining Order and a Writ of Preliminary Injunction, docketed as Civil
Case No. T-590.[5] In an order[6] dated 12 August 1996, the RTC, ruling that it is the Petition for Review on Certiorari with application for Temporary Restraining Order
DAR which has jurisdiction, dismissed the Complaint for lack of jurisdiction. [7] It and Writ of Preliminary Injunction. [10] In a resolution[11] dated 11 November 1996,
justified the dismissal in this wise: this Court referred the petition to the Court of Appeals. [12] Petitioners moved for a
reconsideration of the said resolution but the same was denied in a resolution
A perusal of Section 20 of the Local Government Code expressly provides that the dated 27 January 1997.[13]
Municipalities through an Ordinance by the Sanggunian may authorize the
reclassification of the agricultural land within their area into non-agricultural. At the Court of Appeals, the public respondents were ordered [14] to file their
Paragraph (e) of the aforesaid Section, provides further: that nothing in this Section Comments on the petition. Two sets of comments from the public respondents,
shall be construed as repealing or modifying in any manner the provision of one from the Department of Agrarian Reform Provincial Office [15] and another from
Republic Act 6657. In an opinion of the Secretary of Justice, quoted: With respect of the Office of the Solicitor General,[16] were submitted, to which petitioners filed
(sic) conversion of agricultural land to non-agricultural uses the authority of the their Consolidated Reply.[17]
DAR to approve the same may be exercise (sic) only from the date of the effectivity
of the Agrarian Reform Law on June 15, 1988. It appears that the petitioners had On 02 December 1997, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision [18] affirming the
applied for conversion on June 13, 1995 and therefore the petitioner (sic) are Order of Dismissal issued by the RTC.[19] A motion for reconsideration filed by the
estopped from questioning the authority and jurisdiction of the Department of petitioners was denied in a resolution dated 30 January 1998.[20]
Agrarian Reform. The application having been filed after June 15, 1988, the
reclassification by the Municipal Council of Balamban was just a step in the Hence, this petition.
conversion of the aforestated lands according to its purpose. Executive Order No.
129-A, Section 5, "The Department shall be responsible for implementing The following issues[21] are raised by the petitioners for resolution:
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform and for such purpose it is authorized to (J)
approve or disapprove the conversion, restructuring or readjustment of agricultural (a) Whether or not the reclassification of the subject lands to industrial use by the
land into non-agricultural uses." Said Executive Order amended Section 36 of Municipality of Balamban, Cebu pursuant to its authority under Section 20(a) of
Republic Act No. 3644 which clearly mandates that the DAR Secretary (sic) approve Republic Act No. 7160 or the Local Government Code of 1991 (the "LGC") has the
or disapprove conversion are not impliedly repealed. In fact, under Section 75 of effect of taking such lands out of the coverage of the CARL and beyond the
Republic Act 6657 the above laws and other laws not inconsistent of (sic) this act jurisdiction of the DAR;
shall have suppletory effect. Further, Section 68 of Republic Act 6657 provides: No
injunction, restraining order, prohibition or mandamus shall be issued by the lower (b) Whether or not the Complaint for Injunction may be dismissed under the
court against the Department of Agrarian Reform, DENR and Department of Justice doctrine of primary jurisdiction;
in their implementation of the program. With this provision, it is therefore clear
(sic) when there is conflict of laws determining whether the Department of (c) Whether or not the Complaint for Injunction is an appropriate remedy against
Agrarian Reform has been exclusively empowered by law to approve land the order of the DAR enjoining development works on the subject lands;
conversion after June 15, 1988 and (sic) the final ruling falls only with the Supreme
Court or Office of the President. (d) Whether or not the Regional Trial Court of Toledo City had authority to issue a
writ of injunction against the DAR.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Application for Restraining Order is
hereby ordered DENIED and the main case is DISMISSED, this Court having no In sum, petitioners are of the view that local governments have the power to
jurisdiction over the same.[8] reclassify portions of their agricultural lands, subject to the conditions set forth in
Section 20[22][23]of the Local Government Code. According to them, if the agricultural
In an order dated 18 September 1996, the trial court denied the motion for land sought to be reclassified by the local government is one which has already
reconsideration filed by the petitioners. [9] Petitioners filed before this Court a been brought under the coverage of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law
(CARL) and/or which has been distributed to agrarian reform beneficiaries, then In the case at bar, there is no final order of conversion. The subject landholding was
such reclassification must be confirmed by the DAR pursuant to its authority under merely reclassified. Conversion is different from reclassification. Conversion is the
Section 6522 of the CARL, in order for the reclassification to become effective. If, act of changing the current use of a piece of agricultural land into some other use
however, the land sought to be reclassified is not covered by the CARL and not as approved by the Department of Agrarian Reform. Reclassification, on the other
distributed to agrarian reform beneficiaries, then no confirmation from the DAR is hand, is the act of specifying how agricultural lands shall be utilized for non-
necessary in order for the reclassification to become effective as such case would agricultural uses such as residential, industrial, commercial, as embodied in the
not fall within the DAR's conversion authority. Stated otherwise, Section 65 of the land use plan, subject to the requirements and procedure for land use conversion.
CARL does not, in all cases, grant the DAR absolute, sweeping and all-encompassing Accordingly, a mere reclassification of agricultural land does not automatically
power to approve or disapprove reclassifications or conversions of all agricultural allow a landowner to change its use and thus cause the ejectment of the tenants.
lands. Said section only grants the DAR exclusive authority to approve or He has to undergo the process of conversion before he is permitted to use the
disapprove conversions of agricultural lands which have already been brought agricultural land for other purposes.
under the coverage of the CARL and which have already been distributed to farmer
beneficiaries. Rep. Act No. 6657 took effect on 15 June 1988. Municipal Ordinance No. 101 of
Balamban, Cebu, which reclassified the subject lands, was passed on 25 March
The petition lacks merit. 1992, and Provincial Ordinance No. 95-8 of the Provincial Board of Cebu, which
adopted Municipal Ordinance No. 101, was passed on 03 April 1995, long after Rep.
After the passage of Republic Act No. 6657, otherwise known as Comprehensive Act No. 6657 has taken effect. Section 4 of Rep. Act No. 6657 provides:
Agrarian Reform Program, agricultural lands, though reclassified, have to go SEC. 4. Scope. - The Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988 shall cover,
through the process of conversion, jurisdiction over which is vested in the DAR. regardless of tenurial arrangement and commodity produced, all public and private
However, agricultural lands already reclassified before the effectivity of Rep. Act agricultural lands as provided in Proclamation No. 131 and Executive Order No.
No. 6657 are exempted from conversion. 229, including other lands of the public domain suitable for agriculture.

Department of Justice Opinion No. 44, Series of 1990, provides: ...

". . . True, the DAR's express power over land use conversion is limited to cases in
which agricultural lands already awarded have, after five years, ceased to be (d) All private lands devoted to or suitable for agriculture regardless of the
economically feasible and sound for agricultural purposes, or the locality has agricultural products raised or that can be raised thereon.
become urbanized and the land will have a greater economic value for residential, To further clarify any doubt on its authority, the DAR issued Administrative Order
commercial or industrial purposes. But to suggest that these are the only instances No. 12 dated October 1994 which reads:
when the DAR can require conversion clearances would open a loophole in R.A. No.
6657, which every landowner may use to evade compliance with the agrarian Administrative Order No. 12
reform program. Hence, it should logically follow from the said department's Series of 1994
express duty and function to execute and enforce the said statute that any
reclassification of a private land as a residential, commercial or industrial property SUBJECT: CONSOLIDATED AND REVISED RULES AND PROCEDURES GOVERNING
should first be cleared by the DAR." CONVERSION OF ARICULTURAL LANDS TO NON-AGRICULTURAL USES

The requirement that agricultural lands must go through the process of conversion I. PREFATORY STATEMENT
despite having undergone reclassification was underscored in the case of Alarcon v.
Court of Appeals,[24] where it was held that reclassification of land does not suffice: The guiding principles on land use conversion is to preserve prime agricultural
lands. On the other hand, conversion of agricultural lands, when coinciding with the
objectives of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law to promote social justice, A. Agricultural land refers to land devoted to agricultural activity and not
industrialization, and the optimum use of land as a national resource for public classified as mineral, forest, residential, commercial or industrial land
welfare, shall be pursued in a speedy and judicious manner. (Section 3[c], R.A. No. 6657).

To rationalize these principles, and by virtue of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3844, as B. Conversion is the act of changing the current use of a piece of agricultural
amended, Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 27, P.D. No. 946, Executive Order (E.O.) land into some other use.
No. 129-A and R.A. No. 6657, the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) has issued
several policy guidelines to regulate land use conversion. This Administrative Order C. Reclassification of agricultural lands is the act of specifying how
agricultural lands shall be utilized for non-agricultural uses such as
consolidates and revises all existing implementing guidelines issued by the DAR,
residential, industrial, commercial, as embodied in the land use plan. It
taking into consideration, other Presidential issuances and national policies related
also includes the reversion of non-agricultural lands to agricultural use.
to land use conversion.

II. LEGAL MANDATE ...

V. COVERAGE
A. The Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) is mandated to "approve or These rules shall cover all private agricultural lands as defined herein regardless of
disapprove applications for conversion, restructuring or readjustment of
tenurial arrangement and commodity produced. It shall also include agricultural
agricultural lands into non-agricultural uses," pursuant to Section 4(i) of
lands reclassified by LGUs into non-agricultural uses, after June 15, 1988, pursuant
Executive Order No. 129-A, Series of 1987.
to Memorandum Circular (M.C.) No. 54, Series of 1993 of the Office of the
B. Section 5(i) of E.O. No. 129-A, Series of 1987, vests in the DAR, exclusive President and those proposed to be used for livestock, poultry and swine raising as
authority to approve or disapprove applications for conversion of provided in DAR Administrative Order No. 9, Series of 1993.
agricultural lands for residential, commercial, industrial, and other land
In the case of Advincula-Velasquez v. Court of Appeals,[25] we held:
uses.
Our ruling in the Natalia case was reiterated in National Housing Authority v.
C. Section 65 of R.A. No. 6657, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Allarde (318 SCRA 22 [1999]).
Agrarian Reform Law of 1988, likewise empowers the DAR to authorize
under certain conditions, the reclassification or conversion of agricultural
The Court of Appeals' reliance on DOJ Opinion No. 44, Series of 1990, is in order. In
lands.
the said opinion, the Secretary of Justice declared, viz:
D. Section 4 of Memorandum Circular No. 54, Series of 1993 of the Office of
Based on the foregoing premises, we reiterate the view that with respect to
the President, provides that "action on applications for land use
conversion on individual landholdings shall remain as the responsibility of conversions of agricultural lands covered by R.A. No. 6657 to non-agricultural uses,
the DAR, which shall utilize as its primary reference, documents on the the authority of DAR to approve such conversions may be exercised from the date
comprehensive land use plans and accompanying ordinances passed of the law's effectivity on June 15, 1988. This conclusion is based on a liberal
upon and approved by the local government units concerned, together interpretation of R.A. No. 6657 in the light of DAR's mandate and extensive
with the National Land Use Policy, pursuant to R.A. No. 6657 and E.O. No. coverage of the agrarian reform program.
129-A."
Following the DOJ opinion, the DAR issued Administrative Order No. 6, Series of
III. DEFINITION OF TERMS 1994, stating that lands already classified as non-agricultural before the enactment
of Rep. Act No. 6657 no longer needed any conversion clearance:
 exclusive original jurisdiction of the Department of Agriculture and the Department
I. Prefatory Statement of Environment and Natural Resources. This law divested the regional trial courts of
their general jurisdiction to try agrarian reform matters.
In order to streamline the issuance of exemption clearances, based on DOJ Opinion
No. 44, the following guidelines are being issued for the guidance of the DAR and Under Republic Act 6657, the DAR retains jurisdiction over all agrarian reform
the public in general. matters. The pertinent provision reads:

II. Legal Basis "Section 50. Quasi-Judicial Powers of the DAR. - The DAR is hereby vested with the
primary jurisdiction to determine and adjudicate agrarian reform matters and shall
Sec. 3(c) of RA 6657 states that agricultural lands refers to the land devoted to have exclusive original jurisdiction over all matters involving the implementation of
agricultural activity as defined in this act and not classified as mineral, forest, agrarian reform, except those falling under the exclusive jurisdiction of the
residential, commercial or industrial land. Department of Agriculture and the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources.
Department of Justice Opinion No. 44, series of 1990 has ruled that, with respect to
the conversion of agricultural lands covered by RA No. 6657 to non-agricultural "It shall not be bound by technical rules of procedure and evidence but shall
uses, the authority of DAR to approve such conversion may be exercised from the proceed to hear and decide all cases, disputes or controversies in a most
date of its effectivity, on June 15, 1988. Thus, all lands that are already classified as expeditious manner, employing all reasonable means to ascertain the facts of every
commercial, industrial, or residential before 15 June 1988 no longer need any case in accordance with justice and equity and the merits of the case. Toward this
conversion clearance. end, it shall adopt a uniform rule of procedure to achieve a just, expeditious and
inexpensive determination of every action or proceeding before it. . . ."
The authority of the DAR to approve conversions of agricultural lands covered by
Rep. Act No. 6657 to non-agricultural uses has not been pierced by the passage of Finally, the third and fourth issues which may be summed up into whether or not
the Local Government Code. The Code explicitly provides [26] that "nothing in this an injunction is the appropriate remedy against the order of the DAR enjoining
section shall be construed as repealing or modifying in any manner the provisions petitioners in developing the subject land, we rule in the negative. Section 68 of
of Rep. Act No. 6657." Rep. Act No. 6657 provides:

It being settled that jurisdiction over conversion of land is vested in the DAR, the SEC. 68. Immunity of Government Agencies from Undue Interference. - No
complaint for injunction was correctly dismissed by the trial and appellate courts injunction, restraining order, prohibition or mandamus shall be issued by the lower
under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction. This Court, in Bautista v. Mag-isa Vda. courts against the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR), the Department of
De Villena,[27] found occasion to reiterate the doctrine of primary jurisdiction - Agriculture (DA), the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR),
and the Department of Justice (DOJ) in their implementation of the program.
The doctrine of primary jurisdiction precludes the courts from resolving a
controversy over which jurisdiction has initially been lodged with an administrative Wherefore, premises considered, the instant petition is Denied for lack of merit.
body of special competence. For agrarian reform cases, jurisdiction is vested in the The decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 42666 dated 02 December
Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR); more specifically, in the Department of 1997 affirming the order dated 12 August 1996 of the Regional Trial Court of
Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB). Toledo City, Branch 29, in Civil Case No. T-590 is AFFIRMED. Costs against
petitioners.
Executive Order 229 vested the DAR with (1) quasi-judicial powers to determine
and adjudicate agrarian reform matters; and (2) jurisdiction over all matters SO ORDERED.
involving the implementation of agrarian reform, except those falling under the
 [ G.R. No. 152085, July 08, 2003 ] Philippines.

MARCIANA ALARCON, ERENCIO AUSTRIA, JUAN BONIFACIO, PETRONILA DELA On July 28, 1997, Regional Adjudicator Fe Arche-Manalang rendered a decision
CRUZ, RUFINA DELA CRUZ, CELESTINO LEGASPI, JOSE MAYONDAG AND DAVID holding that under Metro Manila Zoning Ordinance No. 81-01, issued in 1981, the
SANTOS, PETITIONERS, VS. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS AND PASCUAL AND subject saltbeds have been reclassified to residential lands. Consequently, the
SANTOS, INC., RESPONDENTS. juridical tie between petitioners and respondent was severed, for no tenurial
relationship can exist on a land that is no longer agricultural. This notwithstanding,
DECISION petitioners are entitled to disturbance compensation, pursuant to Section 36, par. 1
of R.A. 3844,[5] as amended.
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
On the other hand, the Regional Adjudicator held that the DAR had no jurisdiction
over the complaint against Mayor Pablo Olivares, and dismissed the same. The
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to set aside the decision dispositive portion of the decision reads:
dated September 28, 2001 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 63680, [1] which WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered:
reversed the decision dated January 10, 2001 of the Department of Agrarian
Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB).
1. Directing the Respondent Pascual and Santos Inc., to pay to
each complainant as and by way of disturbance compensation
The facts are undisputed.
1,500 cavans of salt or their money equivalent at the prevailing
market value;
Respondent corporation, Pascual and Santos, Inc., is the owner of several saltbeds
with an area of 4.1763 hectares, situated in Barangay San Dionisio, Manuyo,
2. Dismissing all other claims for lack of basis;
Parañaque. In 1950, it instituted petitioners as tenants of the saltbeds under a fifty-
fifty share tenancy agreement.
3. Without pronouncement as to costs.
The harmonious tenurial relationship between petitioners and private respondent
was interrupted in 1994, when the city government of Parañaque, represented by SO ORDERED.[6]
then Mayor Pablo Olivares, authorized the dumping of garbage on the adjoining lot. On appeal, the DARAB affirmed in toto the above decision of the RARAD. Aggrieved,
The garbage polluted the main source of salt water, which adversely affected salt respondent filed a petition for review with the Court of Appeals, which was
production on the subject landholding. docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 63680. On September 28, 2001, the appellate court
rendered the assailed judgment reversing the decision of the DARAB, [7] and
Petitioners informed respondent of this development, but it failed to take any step ordering the dismissal of petitioners' complaint against respondent. Petitioners'
to stop the dumping of garbage on the adjoining lot. This prompted petitioners to motion for reconsideration was denied.
file a formal protest with the City Government of Parañaque. However, their
complaint was likewise ignored. Hence, the instant petition based on the following arguments:

Thus petitioners were constrained to file with the Regional Agrarian Reform
Adjudicator of Region IV (RARAD-IV) a complaint against respondent and Mayor I. THAT A LANDOWNER IS NOT LIABLE TO PAY DISTURBANCE
Pablo Olivares for maintenance of peaceful possession and security of tenure with COMPENSATION TO A TENANT ON A MERE RECLASSIFICATION
damages. Subsequently, they amended their complaint to one for damages and WITHOUT THE ACTIVE PARTICIPATION OF THE LANDOWNER
disturbance compensation, with prayer for temporary restraining order and BECAUSE IT WOULD RENDER NUGATORY SECTION 31, PAR. 1
injunction. Petitioners invoked Sections 7,[2] 30(1)[3] and 31(1)[4] of Republic Act No. OF RA 3844.
3844, as amended, otherwise known as the Agricultural Land Reform Code of the
 II. THAT METRO MANILA ZONING ORDINANCE NO. 81-01, SERIES such a petition, he has no obligation to pay disturbance compensation because the
OF 1981, DID NOT EXTINGUISH THE TENURIAL RELATIONSHIP mere reclassification of the land does not ipso facto  extinguish the tenancy
OF LANDLORD AND TENANT AND RECLASSIFICATION OF THE relationship between tenant and landowner. Hence, when the subject landholding
LAND DOES NOT ENTITLE THE TENANTS TO DISTURBANCE was reclassified in 1981 by the enactment of Metro Manila Zoning Ordinance No.
COMPENSATION FOR PARTIES CAN CONTINUE WITH THEIR 81-01, petitioners and private respondent continued with their tenancy
TENURIAL RELATIONS EVEN AFTER RECLASSIFICATION.[8] relationship. It was only in 1994 that their relationship was disturbed due to the
dumping of garbage by the city government which polluted the source of saltwater.
At the core of the controversy is the issue of whether or not a mere reclassification
of the land from agricultural to residential, without any court action by the The petition is devoid of merit.
landowner to eject or dispossess the tenant, entitles the latter to disturbance
compensation. A tenancy relationship, once established, entitles the tenant to a security of tenure.
[12]
 He can only be ejected from the agricultural landholding on grounds provided by
Before we address the above issue, we need to resolve a procedural issue raised by law. This is clearly stated in Section 7 of RA 3844, which provides:
private respondent regarding the law that must govern the instant case. Is it SEC. 7. Tenure of Agricultural Leasehold Relation. -  The agricultural leasehold
Republic Act No. 1199, otherwise known as the Agricultural Tenancy Act of the relation once established shall confer upon the agricultural lessee the right to
Philippines, which allows a share tenancy system for landlord-tenant relationship, continue working on the landholding until such leasehold relation is extinguished.
or RA 3844, as amended, which declares share tenancy as contrary to public policy The agricultural lessee shall be entitled to security of tenure on his landholding and
and provides for the automatic conversion of landlord-tenant relationship from cannot be ejected therefrom unless authorized by the Court for causes herein
agricultural share tenancy to agricultural leasehold? Respondent contends that RA provided.
1199 must govern the instant petition because Section 35 of RA 3844 clearly Section 36 provides the different grounds and manner by which a tenant can be
exempts the saltbeds from leasehold and provides that the provisions of RA 1199 lawfully ejected or dispossessed of his landholding. One of them is the
shall govern the consideration as well as the tenancy system prevailing on saltbeds. reclassification of the landholding from agricultural to non-agricultural. For
The said provision reads: purposes of this petition, the pertinent provision of said Section 36 reads:
Section 35. Notwithstanding the provisions of the preceding Sections, in the case of SEC. 36. Possession of Landholding; Exceptions. - Notwithstanding any agreement
fishponds, saltbeds, and land principally planted to citrus, coconuts, cacao, coffee, as to the period or future surrender of the land, an agricultural lessee shall
durian, and other similar permanent trees at the time of the approval of this Code, continue in the enjoyment and possession of his landholding except when his
the consideration as well as the tenancy system prevailing, shall be governed by the dispossession has been authorized by the Court in a judgment that is final and
provisions of Republic Act Number Eleven Hundred and Ninety-Nine, as amended. executory if after due hearing it is shown that:
We do not agree. Section 76 of Republic Act No. 6657, or the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Law,[9] expressly repealed Section 35 of RA 3844. It therefore 1. The landholding is declared by the department head upon
abolished the exemption applied to saltbeds and provided that all tenanted recommendation of the National Planning Commission to be
agricultural lands shall be subject to leasehold. Consequently, RA 3844, not RA suited for residential, commercial, industrial or some other
1199, must govern the instant petition. urban purposes: Provided, That the agricultural lessee shall be
entitled to disturbance compensation equivalent to five times
Coming now to the main issue, petitioners argue that they are entitled to the average of the gross harvests on his landholding during the
disturbance compensation for being dispossessed of their tenancy. last five preceding calendar years; x x x.

Respondent counters that under Sections 30[10] and 31(1)[11] of RA 3844, a It is clear that a tenant can be lawfully ejected only if there is a court authorization
landowner of agricultural land is liable to pay disturbance compensation only when in a judgment that is final and executory and after a hearing where the
he petitioned the court to eject or dispossess the tenant on the ground that the reclassification of the landholding was duly determined. If the court authorizes the
land has already been reclassified from agricultural to non-agricultural. Without ejectment, the tenant who is dispossessed of his tenancy is entitled to disturbance
compensation. merely reclassified. Conversion is different from reclassification. Conversion is the
act of changing the current use of a piece of agricultural land into some other use
Petitioners argue that the RARAD decision, which was affirmed by the DARAB, was as approved by the Department of Agrarian Reform. [16] Reclassification, on the
the court judgment required by law. other hand, is the act of specifying how agricultural lands shall be utilized for non-
agricultural uses such as residential, industrial, commercial, as embodied in the
The argument is not well-taken. The RARAD decision is not yet final and executory. land use plan, subject to the requirements and procedure for land use conversion.
[17]
It was made the subject of a petition for review with the Court of Appeals and is  Accordingly, a mere reclassification of agricultural land does not automatically
pending with this Court. allow a landowner to change its use and thus cause the ejectment of the tenants.
He has to undergo the process of conversion before he is permitted to use the
Petitioners likewise contend that the dispossession of the tenant need not be at agricultural land for other purposes.
the instance of the landowner for him to be entitled to disturbance compensation.
Since in this case, there is neither a final order of conversion by the DAR nor a court
The contention is without merit. judgment authorizing the tenants' ejectment on the ground of reclassification, as a
result of the landowner's court action, there is no legal basis to make respondent
Section 37[13] of RA 3844 expressly imposes on the landowner or agricultural lessor liable to pay disturbance compensation. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals
the burden of proof to show the existence of the grounds enumerated in Section 36 committed no error in ordering the dismissal of the complaint before the DARAB.
thereof. It is settled that one who alleges a fact has the burden of proving it. [14] This
implies that the action which resulted in the tenant's dispossession was WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing disquisitions, the instant petition for review
commenced by the landowner, who therefore has the burden of proof to show the is DENIED and the decision dated September 28, 2001 of the Court of Appeals in
existence of any of the grounds for the ejectment of the tenant. CA-G.R. SP No. 63680, ordering the dismissal of DARAB Case No. 6408 (Reg. Case
No. IV-MM-0083-94), is AFFIRMED.
Moreover, contrary to petitioners' claim, the reclassification of the land is not
enough to entitle them to disturbance compensation. The law is clear that court SO ORDERED.
proceedings are indispensable where the reclassification of the landholding is duly
determined before ejectment can be effected, which in turn paves the way for the G.R. No. 103125 May 17, 1993
payment of disturbance compensation. As held by the Court of Appeals, the parties
can still continue with their tenurial relationship even after such reclassification. In
PROVINCE OF CAMARINES SUR, represented by GOV. LUIS R. VILLAFUERTE and
fact, it is undisputed that in this case, the parties continued with their landlord-
HON. BENJAMIN V. PANGA as Presiding Judge of RTC Branch 33 at Pili, Camarines
tenant relationship even after the enactment of Metro Manila Zoning Ordinance
Sur, petitioners,
No. 81-01. It was only in 1994 when this relationship was interrupted because of
vs.
the dumping of garbage by the Parañaque City Government. Clearly, it was this
THE COURT OF APPEALS (THIRD DIVISION), ERNESTO SAN JOAQUIN and EFREN
latter event which caused petitioner's dispossession, and it would be unfair to
SAN JOAQUIN, respondents.
oblige respondent to pay compensation for acts it did not commit.

Finally, the case of Bunye v. Aquino,[15] does not apply in the instant case. We In this appeal by certiorari  from the decision of the Court of Appeals in AC-G.R. SP
allowed the payment of disturbance compensation in the said case because there No. 20551 entitled "Ernesto N. San Joaquin, et al., v. Hon. Benjamin V. Panga, et
was an order of conversion issued by the Department of Agrarian Reform of the al.," this Court is asked to decide whether the expropriation of agricultural lands by
landholding from agricultural to residential. The decree was never questioned and local government units is subject, to the prior approval of the Secretary of the
thus became final. Consequently, the tenants were ejected from the land and were Agrarian Reform, as the implementator of the agrarian reform program.
thus awarded disturbance compensation.
On December 22, 1988, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the Province of
In the case at bar, there is no final order of conversion. The subject landholding was Camarines Sur passed Resolution No. 129, Series of 1988, authorizing the Provincial
Governor to purchase or expropriate property contiguous to the provincial capitol to take possession of the property upon the deposit with the Clerk of Court of the
site, in order to establish a pilot farm for non-food and non-traditional agricultural amount of P5,714.00, the amount provisionally fixed by the trial court to answer
crops and a housing project for provincial government employees. for damages that private respondents may suffer in the event that the
expropriation cases do not prosper. The trial court issued a writ of possession in an
The "WHEREAS" clause o:f the Resolution states: order dated January18, 1990.

WHEREAS, the province of Camarines Sur has adopted a five- The San Joaquins filed a motion for relief from the order, authorizing the Province
year Comprehensive Development plan, some of the vital of Camarines Sur to take possession of their property and a motion to admit an
components of which includes the establishment of model and amended motion to dismiss. Both motions were denied in the order dated
pilot farm for non-food and non-traditional agricultural crops, February 1990.
soil testing and tissue culture laboratory centers, 15 small scale
technology soap making, small scale products of plaster of In their petition before the Court of Appeals, the San Joaquins asked: (a) that
paris, marine biological and sea farming research center,and Resolution No. 129, Series of 1988 of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan be declared
other progressive feasibility concepts objective of which is to null and void; (b) that the complaints for expropriation be dismissed; and (c) that
provide the necessary scientific and technology know-how to the order dated December 6, 1989 (i) denying the motion to dismiss and (ii)
farmers and fishermen in Camarines Sur and to establish a allowing the Province of Camarines Sur to take possession of the property subject
housing project for provincial government employees; of the expropriation and the order dated February 26, 1990, denying the motion to
admit the amended motion to dismiss, be set aside. They also asked that an order
WHEREAS, the province would need additional land to be be issued to restrain the trial court from enforcing the writ of possession, and
acquired either by purchase or expropriation to implement the thereafter to issue a writ of injunction.
above program component;
In its answer to the petition, the Province of Camarines Sur claimed that it has the
WHEREAS, there are contiguous/adjacent properties to be (sic) authority to initiate the expropriation proceedings under Sections 4 and 7 of Local
present Provincial Capitol Site ideally suitable to establish the Government Code (B.P. Blg. 337) and that the expropriations are for a public
same pilot development center; purpose.

WHEREFORE . . . . Asked by the Court of Appeals to give his Comment to the petition, the Solicitor
General stated that under Section 9 of the Local Government Code (B.P. Blg. 337),
there was no need for the approval by the Office of the President of the exercise by
Pursuant to the Resolution, the Province of Camarines Sur, through its Governor,
the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the right of eminent domain. However, the
Hon. Luis R.Villafuerte, filed two separate cases for expropriation against Ernesto N.
Solicitor General expressed the view that the Province of Camarines Sur must first
San Joaquin and Efren N. San Joaquin, docketed as Special Civil Action Nos. P-17-89
secure the approval of the Department of Agrarian Reform of the plan to
and P-19-89 of the Regional Trial Court, Pili, Camarines Sur, presided by the Hon.
expropriate the lands of petitioners for use as a housing project.
Benjamin V. Panga.

The Court of Appeals set aside the order of the trial court, allowing the Province of
Forthwith, the Province of Camarines Sur filed a motion for the issuance of writ of
Camarines Sur to take possession of private respondents' lands and the order
possession. The San Joaquins failed to appear at the hearing of the motion.
denying the admission of the amended motion to dismiss. It also ordered the trial
court to suspend the expropriation proceedings until after the Province of
The San Joaquins moved to dismiss the complaints on the ground of inadequacy of Camarines Sur shall have submitted the requisite approval of the Department of
the price offered for their property. In an order dated December 6, 1989, the trial Agrarian Reform to convert the classification of the property of the private
court denied the motion to dismiss and authorized the Province of Camarines Sur respondents from agricultural to non-agricultural land.
Hence this petition. requires the approval of the Department of Agrarian Reform before a parcel of land
can be reclassified from an agricultural to a non-agricultural land.
It must be noted that in the Court of Appeals, the San Joaquins asked for: (i) the
dismissal of the complaints for expropriation on the ground of the inadequacy of The Court of Appeals, following the recommendation of the Solicitor General, held
the compensation offered for the property and (ii) the nullification of Resolution that the Province of Camarines Sur must comply with the provision of Section 65 of
No. 129, Series of 1988 of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the Province of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law and must first secure the approval of the
Camarines Sur. Department of Agrarian Reform of the plan to expropriate the lands of the San
Joaquins.
The Court of Appeals did not rule on the validity of the questioned resolution;
neither did it dismiss the complaints. However, when the Court of Appeals ordered In Heirs of Juancho Ardana v. Reyes, 125 SCRA 220, petitioners raised the issue of
the suspension of the proceedings until the Province of Camarines Sur shall have whether the Philippine Tourism Authority can expropriate lands covered by the
obtained the authority of the Department of Agrarian Reform to change the "Operation Land Transfer" for use of a tourist resort complex. There was a finding
classification of the lands sought to be expropriated from agricultural to non- that of the 282 hectares sought to be expropriated, only an area of 8,970 square
agricultural use, it assumed that the resolution is valid and that the expropriation is meters or less than one hectare was affected by the land reform program and
for a public purpose or public use. covered by emancipation patents issued by the Ministry of Agrarian Reform. While
the Court said that there was "no need under the facts of this petition to rule on
Modernly, there has been a shift from the literal to a broader interpretation of whether the public purpose is superior or inferior to another purpose or engage in
"public purpose" or "public use" for which the power of eminent domain may be a balancing of competing public interest," it upheld the expropriation after noting
exercised. The old concept was that the condemned property must actually be that petitioners had failed to overcome the showing that the taking of 8,970 square
used by the general public (e.g. roads, bridges, public plazas, etc.) before the taking meters formed part of the resort complex. A fair and reasonable reading of the
thereof could satisfy the constitutional requirement of "public use". Under the new decision is that this Court viewed the power of expropriation as superior to the
concept, "public use" means public advantage, convenience or benefit, which tends power to distribute lands under the land reform program.
to contribute to the general welfare and the prosperity of the whole community,
like a resort complex for tourists or housing project (Heirs of Juancho Ardano v. The Solicitor General denigrated the power to expropriate by the Province of
Reyes, 125 SCRA 220 [1983]; Sumulong v. Guerrero, 154 SC.RA 461 [1987]). Camarines Sur by stressing the fact that local government units exercise such
power only by delegation. (Comment, pp. 14-15; Rollo, pp. 128-129)
The expropriation of the property authorized by the questioned resolution is for a
public purpose. The establishment of a pilot development center would inure to It is true that local government units have no inherent power of eminent domain
the direct benefit and advantage of the people of the Province of Camarines Sur. and can exercise it only when expressly authorized by the legislature (City of
Once operational, the center would make available to the community invaluable Cincinnati v. Vester, 28l US 439, 74 L.ed. 950, 50 SCt. 360). It is also true that in
information and technology on agriculture, fishery and the cottage industry. delegating the power to expropriate, the legislature may retain certain control or
Ultimately, the livelihood of the farmers, fishermen and craftsmen would be impose certain restraints on the exercise thereof by the local governments (Joslin
enhanced. The housing project also satisfies the public purpose requirement of the Mfg. Co. v. Providence, 262 US 668 67 L. ed. 1167, 43 S Ct. 684). While such
Constitution. As held in Sumulong v. Guerrero, 154 SCRA 461, "Housing is a basic delegated power may be a limited authority, it is complete within its limits.
human need. Shortage in housing is a matter of state concern since it directly and Moreover, the limitations on the exercise of the delegated power must be clearly
significantly affects public health, safety, the environment and in sum the general expressed, either in the law conferring the power or in other legislations.
welfare."
Resolution No. 129, Series of 1988, was promulgated pursuant to Section 9 of B.P.
It is the submission of the Province of Camarines Sur that its exercise of the power Blg. 337, the Local Government Code, which provides:
of eminent domain cannot be restricted by the provisions of the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Law (R.A. No. 6657), particularly Section 65 thereof, which
 A local government unit may, through its head and acting Statutes conferring the power of eminent domain to political subdivisions cannot
pursuant to a resolution of its sanggunian exercise the right of be broadened or constricted by implication (Schulman v. People, 10 N.Y. 2d. 249,
eminent domain and institute condemnation proceedings for 176 N.E. 2d. 817, 219 NYS 2d. 241).
public use or purpose.
To sustain the Court of Appeals would mean that the local government units can no
Section 9 of B.P. Blg. 337 does not intimate in the least that local government, units longer expropriate agricultural lands needed for the construction of roads, bridges,
must first secure the approval of the Department of Land Reform for the schools, hospitals, etc, without first applying for conversion of the use of the lands
conversion of lands from agricultural to non-agricultural use, before they can with the Department of Agrarian Reform, because all of these projects would
institute the necessary expropriation proceedings. Likewise, there is no provision in naturally involve a change in the land use. In effect, it would then be the
the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law which expressly subjects the Department of Agrarian Reform to scrutinize whether the expropriation is for a
expropriation of agricultural lands by local government units to the control of the public purpose or public use.
Department of Agrarian Reform. The closest provision of law that the Court of
Appeals could cite to justify the intervention of the Department of Agrarian Reform Ordinarily, it is the legislative branch of the local government unit that shall
in expropriation matters is Section 65 of the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law, determine whether the use of the property sought to be expropriated shall be
which reads: public, the same being an expression of legislative policy. The courts defer to such
legislative determination and will intervene only when a particular undertaking has
Sec. 65. Conversion of Lands. — After the lapse of five (5) years no real or substantial relation to the public use (United States Ex Rel Tennessee
from its award, when the land ceases to be economically Valley Authority v. Welch, 327 US 546, 90 L. ed. 843, 66 S Ct 715; State ex rel Twin
feasible and sound for, agricultural purposes, or the locality has City Bldg. and Invest. Co. v. Houghton, 144 Minn. 1, 174 NW 885, 8 ALR 585).
become urbanized and the land will have a greater economic
value for residential, commercial or industrial purposes, the There is also an ancient rule that restrictive statutes, no matter how broad their
DAR, upon application of the beneficiary or the landowner, with terms are, do not embrace the sovereign unless the sovereign is specially
due notice to the affected parties, and subject to existing laws, mentioned as subject thereto (Alliance of Government Workers v. Minister of Labor
may authorize the reclassification or conversion of the land and and Employment, 124 SCRA 1 [1983]). The Republic of the Philippines, as sovereign,
its disposition: Provided, That the beneficiary shall have fully or its political subdivisions, as holders of delegated sovereign powers, cannot be
paid his obligation. bound by provisions of law couched in general term.

The opening, adverbial phrase of the provision sends signals that it applies to lands The fears of private respondents that they will be paid on the basis of the valuation
previously placed under the agrarian reform program as it speaks of "the lapse of declared in the tax declarations of their property, are unfounded. This Court has
five (5) years from its award." declared as unconstitutional the Presidential Decrees fixing the just compensation
in expropriation cases to be the value given to the condemned property either by
The rules on conversion of agricultural lands found in Section 4 (k) and 5 (1) of the owners or the assessor, whichever was lower ([Export Processing Zone
Executive Order No. 129-A, Series of 1987, cannot be the source of the authority of Authority v. Dulay, 149 SCRA 305 [1987]). As held in Municipality of Talisay v.
the Department of Agrarian Reform to determine the suitability of a parcel of Ramirez, 183 SCRA 528 [1990], the rules for determining just compensation are
agricultural land for the purpose to which it would be devoted by the expropriating those laid down in Rule 67 of the Rules of Court, which allow private respondents
authority. While those rules vest on the Department of Agrarian Reform the to submit evidence on what they consider shall be the just compensation for their
exclusive authority to approve or disapprove conversions of agricultural lands for property.
residential, commercial or industrial uses, such authority is limited to the
applications for reclassification submitted by the land owners or tenant WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the questioned decision of the Court of
beneficiaries. Appeals is set aside insofar as it (a) nullifies the trial court's order allowing the
Province of Camarines Sur to take possession of private respondents' property; (b)
orders the trial court to suspend the expropriation proceedings; and (c) requires 1996 DECISION OF THE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT COULD NOT AS YET BECOME
the Province of Camarines Sur to obtain the approval of the Department of FINAL AND EXECUTORY AS TO BE BEYOND MODIFICATION.
Agrarian Reform to convert or reclassify private respondents' property from
agricultural to non-agricultural use. "II.

The decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED insofar as it sets aside the order THE PROPER REMEDY OF PETITIONERS IS A PETITION FOR REVIEW UNDER RULE 43
of the trial court, denying the amended motion to dismiss of the private AND NOT A PETITION FOR CERTIORARI UNDER RULE 65 OF THE RULES OF COURT.
respondents.
"III.
SO ORDERED.
THE FILING OF A MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION IS A CONDITION SINE QUA NON
BEFORE A PETITION FOR CERTIORARI MAY BE FILED BECAUSE THE QUESTIONED
RESOLUTION IS NOT PATENTLY ILLEGAL.
SECOND DIVISION
"IV.
[ G.R. No. 131457, November 17, 1998 ]
PETITIONERS ARE GUILTY OF FORUM-SHOPPING BECAUSE ULTIMATELY
HON. CARLOS O. FORTICH, PROVINCIAL GOVERNOR OF BUKIDNON, HON. REY B. PETITIONERS SEEK THE SAME RELIEF, WHICH IS TO RESTRAIN THE DEPARTMENT OF
BAULA, MUNICIPAL MAYOR OF SUMILAO, BUKIDNON, NQSR MANAGEMENT AND AGRARIAN REFORM FROM PLACING THE SUBJECT 144-HECTARE PROPERTY UNDER
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, PETITIONERS, VS. HON. RENATO C. CORONA, THE COMPREHENSIVE AGRARIAN REFORM LAW (CARL)." [1]
DEPUTY EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, HON. ERNESTO D. GARILAO, SECRETARY OF THE
DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM, RESPONDENTS. For their part, the grounds relied upon by the applicants for intervention are as
follows:
OPINION
"I.
MARTINEZ, J.:
THE INTERVENORS POSSESS A RIGHT TO INTERVENE IN THESE PROCEEDINGS.
This pertains to the two (2) separate motions for reconsideration filed by herein
respondents and the applicants for intervention, seeking a reversal of our April 24, "II.
1998 Decision nullifying the so-called "win-win" Resolution dated November 7,
1997, issued by the Office of the President in O.P. Case No. 96-C-6424, and denying THE MODIFICATION BY THE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT (OP) OF ITS 29 MARCH 1996
the applicants' Motion For Leave To Intervene. DECISION, THROUGH THE 7 NOVEMBER 1997 'WIN-WIN' RESOLUTION, WAS NOT
ERRONEOUS BUT WAS A VALID EXERCISE OF ITS POWERS AND PREROGATIVES.
Respondents' motion is based on the following grounds:
"III.
"I.
THE 'WIN-WIN' RESOLUTION PROPERLY ADDRESSES THE SUBSTANTIAL ISSUES
THE SO-CALLED WIN-WIN RESOLUTION DATED NOVEMBER 7, 1997 IS NOT A VOID RELATIVE TO THIS CASE."[2]
RESOLUTION AS IT SEEKS TO CORRECT AN ERRONEOUS RULING. THE MARCH 29,
Both movants also ask that their respective motions be resolved by this Court en is subject to the approval of the DAR is no longer novel, this having been decided
banc since the issues they raise are, described by the respondents, "novel," [3] or, as by this Court in the case of Province of Camarines Sur, et al. vs. Court of
characterized by the applicants for intervention, of "transcendental Appeals[5] wherein we held that local government units need not obtain the
significance."[4] Most specifically, movants are presenting the issue of whether or approval of the DAR to convert or reclassify lands from agricultural to non-
not the power of the local government units to reclassify lands is subject to the agricultural use. The dispositive portion of the Decision in the aforecited case
approval of the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR). states:

The instant motions are being opposed vehemently by herein petitioners. "WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the questioned decision of the Court
of Appeals is set aside insofar as it (a) nullifies the trial court's order allowing the
The grounds raised here were extensively covered and resolved in our challenged Province of Camarines Sur to take possession of private respondent's property; (b)
Decision. A minute resolution denying the instant motions with finality would have orders the trial court to suspend the expropriation proceedings; and (c) requires
been sufficient, considering that the same follows as a matter of course if the Province of Camarines Sur to obtain the approval of the Department of
warranted under the circumstances as in other equally important cases. However, Agrarian Reform to convert or reclassify private respondent's property from
in view of the wide publicity and media coverage that this case has generated, in agricultural to non-agricultural use.
addition to the demonstrations staged at the perimeter of this Court, as well as the
many letters coming from different sectors of society (the religious and the NGOs) "x x x                             x x x                         x x x" (Emphasis supplied)
and even letters from abroad, we deem it necessary to write an extended Moreover, the Decision sought to be reconsidered was arrived at by
resolution to again reiterate the basis for our April 24, 1998 Decision, and hopefully a unanimous vote of all five (5) members of the Second Division of this Court.
write finis to this controversy. Stated otherwise, this Second Division is of the opinion that the matters raised by
movants are nothing new and do not deserve the consideration of the Court en
To support their request that their motions be referred to the Court en banc, the banc. Thus, the participation of the full Court in the resolution of movants' motions
movants cited the Resolutions of this Court dated February 9, 1993, in Bar Matter for reconsideration would be inappropriate.
No. 209, which enumerates the cases that may be resolved en banc, among which
are the following: We shall now resolve the respondents' motion for reconsideration.
"x x x                              x x x                         x x x
In our Decision in question, we struck down as void the act of the Office of the
3. Cases raising novel questions of law; President (OP) in reopening the case in O.P. Case No. 96-C-6424 through the
issuance of the November 7, 1997 "win-win" Resolution which substantially
x x x                               x x x                         x x x modified its March 29, 1996 Decision that had long become final and
executory, being in gross disregard of the rules and basic legal precept that
8. Cases assigned to a division which in the opinion of at least three (3) members accord finality to administrative determinations. It will be recalled that the March
thereof merit the attention of the Court en banc and are acceptable to a majority of 29, 1996 OP Decision was declared by the same office as final and executory in its
the actual membership of the Court en banc; and Order dated June 23, 1997 after the respondents DAR's motion for reconsideration
of the said decision was denied in the same order for having been filed beyond the
x x x                               x x x                         x x x" 15-day reglementary period.

Regrettably, the issues presented before us by the movants are matters of no In their instant motion, the respondents contend that the "win-win" Resolution of
extraordinary import to merit the attention of the Court en banc. Specifically, the November 7, 1997 "is not a void resolution as it seeks to correct an erroneous
issue of whether or not the power of the local government units to reclassify lands ruling," hence, "(t)he March 29, 1996 decision of the Office of the President could
not as yet become final and executory as to be beyond modification."[6] arduous process of preparing the said motion involving several departments of
the administrative agency.
The respondents explained that the DAR's failure to file on time the motion for
reconsideration of the March 29, 1996 OP Decision was "excusable:" The respondents then faulted the Office of the President when they further
stressed that it should have resolved "the (DAR's) motion for reconsideration on
"The manner of service of the copy of the March 29, 1996 decision also made it the merits in the interest of substantial justice," instead of simply denying the
impossible for DAR to file its motion for reconsideration on time. The copy was same for having been filed late,[9] adding that "technicalities and procedural
received by the Records Section of the DAR, then referred to the Office of the lapses" should be "subordinated to the established merits of the
Secretary and then to the Bureau of Agrarian Legal Assistance. By the time it was case."[10] Respondents thus plead for a relaxation in the application of the rules by
forwarded to the litigation office of the DAR, the period to file the motion for overlooking procedural lapses committed by the DAR.
reconsideration had already lapsed. Instead of resolving the motion for
reconsideration on the merits in the interest of substantial justice, the Office of the We are persuaded.
President denied the same for having been filed late."[7] (Emphasis supplied)

We cannot agree with the respondents' contention that the June 23, 1997 OP Procedural rules, we must stress, should be treated with utmost respect and due
Order which denied the DAR's motion for reconsideration of the March 29, 1996 regard since they are designed to facilitate the adjudication of cases to remedy the
OP Decision for having been filed late was "an erroneous ruling" which had to be worsening problem of delay in the resolution of rival claims and in the
corrected by the November 7, 1997 "win-win" Resolution. The said denial of the administration of justice. The requirement is in pursuance to the bill of rights
DAR's motion for reconsideration was in accordance with Section 7 of inscribed in the Constitution which guarantees that "all persons shall have a right to
Administrative Order No. 18, dated February 12, 1987, which mandates that the speedy disposition of their before all judicial, quasi-judicial and administrative
"decisions/resolutions/orders of the Office of the President shall, except as bodies,"[11] the adjudicatory bodies and the parties to a case are thus enjoined to
otherwise provided for by special laws, become final after the lapse of fifteen (15) abide strictly by the rules.[12] While it is true that a litigation is not a game of
days from receipt of a copy thereof x x x, unless a motion for technicalities, it is equally true that every case must be prosecuted in accordance
reconsideration thereof is filed within such period."[8] with the prescribed procedure to ensure an orderly and speedy administration of
justice.[13] There have been some instances wherein this Court allowed a relaxation
Contrary to the respondents' submission, the late filing by the DAR of its motion for in the application of the rules, but this flexibility was "never intended to forge a
reconsideration of the March 29, 1996 OP Decision is not excusable. The bastion for erring litigants to violate the rules with impunity." [14] A liberal
respondents' explanation that the DAR's office procedure after receiving the copy interpretation and application of the rules of procedure can be resorted to only in
of the March 29, 1996 OP Decision "made it impossible foe DAR to file its motion proper cases and under justifiable causes and circumstances.
for reconsideration on time" since the said decision had to be referred to the
different departments of the DAR, cannot be considered a valid justification. There In the instant case, we cannot grant respondents the relief prayed for since they
is nothing wrong with referring the decision to the departments concerned for the have not shown a justifiable for a relaxation of the rules. As we have discussed
preparation of the motion for reconsideration, but in doing so, the DAR must not earlier, the DAR/s late filing of its motion for reconsideration of the March 29, 1996
disregard the reglementary period fixed by law, rule or regulation. In other words, OP Decision was not justified. Hence, the final and executory character of the said
the DAR must develop a system of procedure that would enable it to comply with OP Decision can no longer be disturbed, much less substantially modified. Res
the reglementary period for filing said motion. For, the rules relating to judicata has set in and the adjudicated thing or affair should forever be put to rest.
reglementary period should not be made subservient to the internal office It is in this sense that we, in our decision under reconsideration, declared as void
procedure of an administrative body. Otherwise, the noble purpose of the rules and of no binding effect the "win-win" Resolution of November 7, 1997 which
prescribing a definite period for filing a motion for reconsideration of a decision substantially modified the March 29, 1996 Decision, the said resolution having
can easily be circumvented by the mere expediency of claiming a long and been issued in excess of jurisdiction and in arrant violation of the fundamental and
time-honored principle of finality to administrative determinations. Artemio V. Panganiban in the case of Videogram Regulatory Board vs. Court of
Appeals, et al.,[16] "(j)ust as a losing party has the right to file an appeal within the
The movants, however, complain that the case was decided by us on the basis of a prescribed period, the winning party also has the correlative right to enjoy the
"technicality," and, this has been the rallying cry of some newspaper columnists finality of the resolution of his/her case."
who insists that we resolve this case not on mere "technical" grounds.
Another matter which the movants bring to our attention is that when the DAR's
We do not think so. Order denying petitioners' application for conversion was first brought by
petitioner Carlos O. Fortich to the Office of the President, the appropriate
It must be emphasized that a decision/resolution/order of an administrative body, administrative rules were not complied with. We wish to point out that, apparently,
court or tribunal which is declared void on the ground that the same was movants had the opportunity to questions this alleged lapsed in procedure but
rendered without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion, is chose not to avail of the same. For the "win-win" Resolution itself never mentioned
by no means a mere technicality of law or procedure. It is elementary this supposed procedural lapse as an issue. Here, the issue which has been brought
that jurisdiction of a body, court or tribunal is to the fore is the validity of the "win-win" Resolution of November 7, 1997, not
an essential and mandatory requirement before it can act on a case or that of any other previous proceedings. The movants cannot now question the
controversy. And even if said body, court or tribunal has jurisdiction over a case, supposed procedural lapse for the first time before us. it should have been raised
but has acted in excess of its jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion, such act and resolved at the first opportunity, that is, at the administrative level.
is still invalid. The decision nullifying the questioned act is an adjudication on the
merits. The other grounds raised by respondents in their instant motion for
reconsideration concerning the propriety of petitioners' remedy, the absence of a
In the instant case, several fatal violations of the law were committed, namely: (1) motion for reconsideration of the "win-win" Resolution before resorting to the
the DAR filed its motion for reconsideration of the March 29, 1996 OP Decision way present petition for certiorari, and forum shopping have already been extensively
beyond reglementary period; (2) after the said motion for reconsideration was dealt with in our challenged decision. We need not further elaborate on these
denied for having been filed late, the March 29, 1996 Decision was declared final grounds except to state that the same lacks merit.
and executory, but the DAR still filed a second motion for reconsideration which
is prohibited by the rules;[15] (3) despite this, the second motion for reconsideration With respect to the motion for reconsideration filed by the applicants for
was entertained by herein respondent, then Deputy Executive Secretary Renato C. intervention, we likewise find the same unmeritorious. The issue of the applicants'
Corona, and on the basis thereof, issued the "win-win" Resolution dated November right to intervene in this proceedings should be laid to rest. The rule in this
7, 1997, substantially modifying the March 29, 1996 Decision which had long jurisdiction is that a party who wishes to intervene must have a "certain right" or
become final and executory; and (4) the reopening of the same case through the "legal interest" in the subject matter of the litigation. [17] Such interest must be
issuance of the November 7, 1997 "win-win" resolution was in flagrant "actual, substantial, material, direct and immediate, and not simply contingent and
infringement of the doctrine of res judicata. These grave breaches of the law, rules expectant."[18]
and settled jurisprudence are clearly substantial, not of technical nature.
Here, the applicants for intervention categorically admitted that they were not
It should be stressed that when the March 29, 1996 OP Decision was declared final tenants of petitioner NQSR Management and Development Corporation, but were
and executory, vested rights were acquired by the herein petitioners, namely, the merely seasonal farmworkers in a pineapple plantation on the subject land which
province of Bukidnon, the municipality of Sumilao, Bukidnon, and the NQSR was under lease for ten (10) years to the Philippine Packing Corporation.
[19]
Management and Development Corporation, and all others who should be  Respondent, then DAR Secretary Ernesto Garilao, also admitted in his Order of
benefited by the said decision. Thus, we repeat, the issue here is not a question of June 7, 1995 that "the subject land is neither tenanted nor validity covered for
technicality but that of substance and merit. In the words of the learned Justice compulsory acquisition xxx."[20]
 unnecessary to pass upon it at this time.
Under Section 4, Article XIII of the 1987 Constitution, the right to own directly or
collectively the land they till belongs to the farmers and regular farmworkers who "SO ORDERED."[22] (Emphasis supplied)
are landless, and in the case of other farmworkers, the latter are entitled "to
receive a just share of the fruits" of the land. The pertinent portion of the These are all that are necessary to dispose of the instant separate motions for
aforecited constitutional provision mandates: reconsideration considering that the crucial issue in the present petitioner for
certiorari is simply the validity of the "win-win" resolution.
"Sec. 4. The State shall, by law, undertake an agrarian reform program founded on
the right of farmers and regular farmworkers, who are landless, to own directly or But even if we tackle the other issues which the movants describe as "substantial,"
collectively the lands they till or, in the case of other farmworkers, to receive a namely: (1) whether the subject land is considered a prime agricultural land with
just share of the fruits thereof. x x x" (Emphasis supplied) irrigation facility; (2) whether the land has long been covered by a Notice of
Compulsory Acquisition (NCA); (3) whether the land is tenanted, and if not,
Commenting on the above-quoted provision, the eminent constitutionalist, Fr. whether the applicants for intervention are qualified to become beneficiaries
Joaquin G. Bernas, S.J., one of the framers of the 1987 Constitution, declares that thereof; and (4) whether the Sangguniang Bayan of Sumilao has the legal authority
under the agrarian reform program the equitable distribution of the land is a right to reclassify the land into industrial/institutional use, to our mind, the March 29,
given to landless farmers and regular farmworkers to own the land they till, while 1996 OP Decision has thoroughly and properly disposed of the aforementioned
the other or seasonal farmworkers are only entitled to a just share of the fruits of issues. We quote the pertinent portions of the said Decision:
the land.[21] Being merely seasonal farmerworkers without a right to own, the
applicants' motion for intervention must necessarily fail as they have no legal or "After a careful evaluation of the petition vis-avis the grounds upon which the
actual and substantial interest over the subject land. denial thereof by Secretary Garilao was based, we find that the instant application
for conversion by the Municipality of Sumilao, Bukidnon is impressed with merit. To
It is noteworthy that even the "win-win" Resolution of November 7, 1997 which the be sure, converting the land in question from agricultural to agro-industrial would
herein respondents and the applicants for intervention seek to uphold did not open great opportunities for employment and bring real development in the area
recognize the latter as proper parties to intervene in the case simply because the towards a sustained economic growth of the municipality. On the other hand,
qualified farmer-beneficiaries have yet to be meticulously determined as ordered distributing the land to would-be beneficiaries (who are not even tenants, as there
in the said resolution. The dispositive portion of the "win-win" Resolution reads: are none) does not guarantee such benefits.

"WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision of the Office of the President, "Nevertheless, on the issue that the land is considered a prime agricultural land
through Executive Secretary Ruben Torres, dated March 29, 1996, is hereby with irrigation facility it maybe appropriate to mention that, as claimed by
MODIFIED as follows: petitioner, while it is true that there is, indeed, an irrigation facility in the area, the
same merely passes thru the property (as a right of way) to provide water to the
x x x                               x x x                         x x x ricelands located on the lower portion thereof. the land itself, subject of the instant
petition, is not irrigated as the same was, for several years, planted with pineapple
"(3) The Department of Agrarian Reform is hereby directed to carefully and by the Philippine-Packing Corporation.
meticulously determine who among the claimants are qualified beneficiaries.
"On the issue that the land has long been covered by a Notice of Compulsory
x x x                               x x x                         x x x Acquisition (NCA) and that the existing policy on withdrawal or lifting on areas
covered by NCA is not applicable, suffice it to state that the said NCA was declared
"We take note of the Memorandum in Intervention filed by 113 farmers on null and void by the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) as
October 10, 1997 without ruling on the propriety or merits thereof since it is early as March 1, 1992. Deciding in favor of NQSRMDC, the DARAB correctly
pointed out that under Section 8 R.A. No. 6657, the subject property could not of the late President Ramon Magsaysay that "those who have less in life should
validly be the subject of compulsory acquisition until after the expiration of the have more in law." Our affirmation of the finality of the March 29, 1996 OP
lease contract with Del Monte Philippines, a Multi-National Company, or until April Decision is precisely pro-poor considering that more of the impoverished of society
1994, and ordered the DAR Regional Office and the land Bank of the Philippines, will be benefited by the agro-economical development of the disputed land which
both in Butuan City, to desist from pursuing any activity or activities covering the province of Bukidnon and the municipality of Sumilao, Bukidnon intend to
petitioner's land. undertake. To our mind, the OP Decision of March 29, 1996 was for the eventual
benefit of the many, not just of the few. This is clearly shown from the
"On this score, we take special notice of the fact that the Quisumbing family has development plan on the subject land as conceived by the petitioners. The said
already contributed substantially to the land reform program of the government, as plan is supposed to have the following components as indicated in the OP Decision
follows: 300 hectares of rice land in Nueva Ecija in the 70's and another 100 of March 29, 1996:
hectares in the nearby Municipality of Impasugong, Bukidnon, ten (10) years ago,
for which they have not received 'just compensation' up to this time. "1. The Development Academy of Mindanao which constitutes the following:
Institute for Continuing Higher Education; Institute for Livelihood Science
"Neither can the assertion that 'there is no clear and tangible compensation (Vocational and Technical School); Institute for Agribusiness Research; Museum,
package arrangements for the beneficiaries' hold water as, in the first place, there Library, Cultural Center, and Mindanao Sports Developments Complex which covers
are no beneficiaries to speak about, for the land is not tenanted as already stated. an area of 24 hectares;

"Nor can procedural lapses in the manner of identifying/reclassifying the subject "2. Bukidnon Agro-Industrial Park which consists of corn processing for corn oil,
property for agro-industrial purposes be allowed to defeat the very purpose of the corn starch, various corn products; rice processing for wine, rice-based snacks,
law granting autonomy to local government units in the management of their local exportable rice; cassava processing for starch, alcohol and food delicacies;
affairs. Stated more simply, the language of Section 20 of R.A. No. 7160, supra, is processing plants, fruits and fruit products such as juices; processing plants for
clear and affords no room for any other interpretation. By unequivocal legal vegetables processed and prepared for market; cold storage and ice plant; cannery
mandate, it grants local government units autonomy in their affairs including the system; commercial stores; public market; and abattoir needing about 67 hectares;
power to convert portions of their agricultural lands and provide for the manner of
their utilization and disposition to enable them to attain their fullest development "3. Forest development which includes open spaces and parks for recreation,
as self-reliant communities. horse-back riding, memorial and mini-zoo estimated to cover 33 hectares; and

"WHEREFORE, in pursuant of the spirit and intent of the said legal mandate and in "4. Support facilities which comprise the construction of a 360-room hotel,
view of the favorable recommendations of the various government agencies restaurants, dormitories and a housing covering an area of 20 hectares." [25]
abovementioned, the subject Order, dated November 14, 1994 of the Hon. Expressing full support for the proposed project, the Sangguniang Bayan of
Secretary, Department of Agrarian Reform, is hereby SET ASIDE and the instant Sumilao, Bukidnon, on March 4, 1993, enacted Ordinance No. 24 converting or re-
application of NQSRMDC/BAIDA is hereby APPROVED." [23] (Emphasis supplied) classifying the subject 144-hectare land from agricultural to industrial/institutional
It is axiomatic that factual findings of administrative agencies which have acquired use with a view of providing an opportunity to attract investors who can inject
expertise in their field are binding and conclusive on the Court, [24] considering that new economic vitality, provide more jobs and raise the income of its people. The
the Office of the President is presumed to be most competent in matters falling said project was also supported by the Bukidnon Provincial Board which, on the
within its domain. basis of a Joint Committee Report submitted by its Committee on Laws, Committee
on Agrarian Reform and Socio-Economic Committee, approved the said ordinance
The interest of justice is invoked by movants. We are aware of that famous adage on February 1, 1994, now docketed as Resolution No. 94-95.
Impressed with the proposed project, several government agencies and a private pursuit of justice and the rule of law.
cooperative, including the people of the affected barangay, recommended the
same. Again, we quote the pertinent portion of the OP Decision of March 29, 1996: Finally, for those who refuse to understand, no explanation is possible, but for
those who understand, no explanation is necessary.
"The said NQSRMDC Proposal was, per Certification dated January 4,
1995, adopted by the Department of Trade and Industry, Bukidnon Provincial WHEREFORE, the separate motions for reconsideration of the April 24, 1998
Office, as one of its flagship projects. The same was likewise favorably Decision of this Court, filed by the respondents and the applicants for intervention,
recommended by the Provincial Development Council of Bukidnon; the municipal, are hereby DENIED with FINALITY.
provincial and regional office of the DAR; the Regional Office (Region X) of the
DENR (which issued an Environmental Compliance Certificate on June 5, 1995); the SO ORDERED.
Executive Director, signing 'By Authority of PAUL G. DOMINGUEZ,' Office of the
President - Mindanao; the Secretary of DILG; and Undersecretary of DECS Wilfredo
D. Clemente.

"In the same vein, the Natioal Irrigation Administration, Provincial Irrigation Office,
Bagontaas Valencia, Bukidnon, thru Mr. Juluis S. Maquiling, Chief, Provincial
Irrigation Office, interposed NO OBJECTION to the proposed conversion x x x.
Also, the Kisolom-San Vicente Irrigators Multi Purpose Cooperative, San Vicente,
Sumilao, Bukidnon, interposed no objection to the proposed conversion of the
land in question 'as it will provide more economic benefits to the community in
terms of outside investments that will come and employment opportunities that
will be generated by the projects to be put up x x x.'

"On the same score, it is represented that during the public consultation held at

the Kisolan Elementary School on 18 March 1995 with Director Jose Macalindong of
DAR Central Office and DECS Undersecretary Clemente, the people of the affected
barangay rallied behind their respective officials in endorsing the
project."[26] (Emphasis supplied)

In this regard, the petitioners gave this assurance: "The proposed project is
petitioners' way of helping insure food, shelter and lifetime security of the greater
majority of Sumilao's 22,000 people. It is capable of employing thousands of
residents, enabling them to earn good income ranging about P40,000.00 to
P50,000.00 for each."[27]

We express our grave concern with the manner some sectors of society have been
trying to influence this Court into resolving this case on the basis of considerations
other than the applicable law, rules and settled jurisprudence and the evidence on
record. We wish to emphasize that withstanding the previous adverse comments
by some columnists in the print media, the assailed Decision was arrived at in the