CASES DIGESTs

GR NO. 75362

1. JESUS ESTACIO Y ESTRELLA, petitioner,

FACTS

Petitioner Jesus Estacio y Estrella moves to reconsider Our Resolution dated January 27, 1987, dismissing for
lack of merit his petition to review, set aside and reverse the Decision of respondent Sandiganbayan in
Criminal Case No. 6603 finding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt as a co-principal of the crime of Estafa
thru Falsification of Public/Commercial Documents and sentencing him to suffer an indeterminate penalty
ranging from Two (2) years, Four (4) months and One (1) day of prision correccional as minimum to eight (8)
years and one (1) day of prision mayor as maximum; to pay a fine of P5,000.00; to indemnify Solid Bank,
Lucena Branch and/or the Central Bank of the Philippines in the sum of P648,564.70 representing the
amount defrauded and to pay the proportionate costs.

The facts upon which judgment of conviction rests are summarized by the respondent court as follows:

 The evidence for the prosecution is to the effect that on August 26, 1981, accused Romero Villasanta
(still-at-large) opened a Current Account with the Lucena City Branch of the Solid Bank. In his
information sheet (Exhs. A and A-1), Villasanta represented himself as engaged in the construction
business. Villasanta deposited an initial amount of P1,500.00. His current account number is 37-574. His
check books carried the numbers 107301 to 107325.
 As part of the sinister plot, Villasanta opened another current account with the Cubao Branch of the
Solid Bank under date of August 27, 1981. Villasanta represented himself anew as a businessman and
owner of the Romero Villasanta Construction located at 14 P. Tuazon Blvd., Cubao, Quezon City.
Villasanta deposited initially a check for P10,000.00 and cash in the amount of P10,020.00. His Current
Account Number is 115-02543-3.
 Evidence further shows that on August 25, 1981, accused Romero Villasanta opened a current account
with the Traders Royal Bank, Pasig Branch. He presented himself as engaged in the construction
business. He made an initial deposit in the amount of P2,000.00. His current account number is 72-
700934-6. His checkbooks carried the numbers 176931 to 177000.
 After having opened three current accounts with three different banks, Villasanta and the syndicate
began their insidious operations. On August 28, 1981, Villasanta deposited three checks with his
Current Account No. 72-700934-6 at the Traders Royal Bank, Pasig Branch totalling P653,485.70 (Exh.
T). Two of these checks were drawn against his Current Account No. 37-574 with the Solid Bank, Lucena
City Branch, namely: AA-37-107302 for P269,200.00 and AA-37-107304 for P379,285.70 or a total of
P648,485.70. It bears emphasizing that at the time these checks were issued, Villasanta had a mere
P1,500.00 deposited with his Current Account No. 37-574 with the Solid Bank, Lucena City.
 On the same day of August 28, 1981, the deposited checks AA-37-107302 and AA-37-107304 were
forwarded to the Clearing House of the Central Bank for the standard clearing thereof. At the Central
Bank Clearing House were accused Manuel Valentino (who later on became a state witness), a
bookkeeper detailed at the Clearing Office, Central Bank of the Philippines and accused Jesus Estacio,
janitor-messenger of the Central Bank of the Philippines who were then waiting for the demand
envelope containing the checks deposited by accused Villasanta. As soon as the demand envelope
arrived, Estacio got the same, placed it inside his push cart and brought the envelope inside the
comfort room at the fourth floor of the Central Bank Building. Accused Estacio then waited for state
witness Valentino and accused Villasanta. When state witness Valentino and Villasanta arrived, the
former took the demand envelope and pulled out the checks in question and thereafter gave the same
to accused Villasanta. State witness Valentino got hold of the attached bank clearing statement of Solid
Bank, Lucena Branch. The amount of "P628,564.00" under the column "Amount Received" opposite the
words "Traders Royal Bank", was thereafter crossed out to make it appear that the same was not
received while the total amount of "P992,723.99" appearing in the clearing statement was likewise
crossed out and replaced by the figures "P344,238.29" (Exh. G).
 After the accused had altered the bank clearing statement, accused Valentino, the CB bookkeeper,
prepared a Central Bank Manifest (Exh. H) and in the column "Amount" he placed the correct figures
P992,723.99 in the line opposite the Consolidated Bank and Trust Company. As soon as this Manifest
was signed by prosecution witness Alfonso Magsalin, CB Chief of Division, accused Valentino
superimposed thereon the amount of "P344,238.29" thereby making it appear that such was the only
amount received for Solid Bank, Lucena Branch.
 The demand envelope for Solid Bank, Lucena Branch, together with the altered Central Bank Manifest
and the altered bank clearing statement, were thereafter sent to the Regional Central Bank Clearing
House at Lucena City. The Regional Central Bank Clearing House official, Adriano Valenzena, testified
that he noticed nothing irregular when he received the demand envelope for Solid Bank, Lucena,
including the banking clearing statement and the Central Bank Manifest. He explained that he saw the
 alteration but did not consider the same unusual because the balances in the bank clearing statement
and in the Central Bank Manifest are the same.
 CB rules and regulations provide that out of town checks are cleared within three working days from
date of presentation. Accordingly, the Traders Royal Bank, Pasig Branch, considered as regular the
deposits made by accused Villasanta in his Account No. 37-574 drawn against his current account with
Solid Bank, Lucena Branch, because no objection or notice of refusal was received by Traders Royal
Bank from Solid Bank, Lucena Branch, within the prescribed time, and understandably so, as there were
no checks received by the Solid Bank, Lucena Branch. Account No. 37-574 in the name of Romero
Villasanta was accordingly credited with the amount of P653,485.70. This represents the amount of the
two (2) checks in the total sum of P648,564.70, while the P500,000.00 represented the third check
deposited by accused Villasanta with Traders Royal Bank on August 28, 1981.
 Under date of September 4, 1981, accused Villasanta issued TRB Check No. 176954 in the amount of
P500,000.00 and made payable to cash. This check was deposited with his Current Account No.
11502543-3 with Solid Bank, Cubao Branch. This amount of P500,000.00 was drawn against the current
account of Villasanta with the Traders Royal Bank, Pasig. As of September 4, 1981, the balance of
Account No. 72-700934-6 of Romero Villasanta with Traders Royal Bank, after deducting the said
P500,000.00 was P184,485.70.
 On September 7, 1981, Villasanta encashed with the Traders Royal Bank, Pasig Branch, TRB Check No.
176956 in the amount of P69,000.00. The following day, he encashed with the Traders Royal Bank,
Pasig Branch, TRB Check No. 176958 in the Amount of P84,500.00.

After accused Villasanta deposited the earlier mentioned TRB Check No. 176954 for P500,000.00 with his
Current Account No. 115-2543-2 with Solid Bank, Cubao, his balance as stated in his ledger was P500,512.02
(Exh. M-1).

After the foregoing withdrawals and/or encashments, the balance of Account No. 115-02543-3 of accused
Villasanta with the Solid Bank, Cubao Branch as of September 8, 1981 was P l,012.04 (Exh. M-1).

All told, the syndicate was able to defraud the Solid Bank, Lucena City Branch and/or the Central in the total
amount of P648,564.70. This syndicate was able to achieve by falsifying the Central Bank Manifest of August
28, 1981 (Exh. H) and the clearing statement for Solid Bank, Lucena, dated August 28, 1981 (Exh. G). (pp. 25-
30, Rollo).

ISSUES

In seeking a reconsideration of aforesaid Resolution, petitioner claims that:

1) his extra-judicial statements dated May 4 and 5, 1982 (Exhs. E and E-1) are inadmissible in evidence as
he was not properly informed of his constitutional rights, and there was no valid waiver on his part of
such rights prior to the taking of those statements; that the statements were extracted through force
and intimidation;
2) the evidence adduced by the prosecution did not link him to the conspiracy.

RULINGS

In the alternative, petitioner asserts that if he was indeed guilty, his criminal liability should only be as an
accessory or an accomplice; and he should be credited with the mitigating circumstance of voluntary
surrender.

The foregoing grounds now relied upon by petitioner were the same grounds of his petition which had
already considered when We issued our subject Resolution. Re-examination of the evidence has yielded
nothing to impel the Court to reconsider its previous dismissal of the petition.

We first pass upon the question of whether or not petitioner's extra-judicial confession (Exh. E) is admissible
in evidence.

The extra-judicial statement of petitioner clearly shows that the investigator had advised petitioner of his
constitutional rights.

Relying very heavily on the case of People v. Galit, (135 SCRA 465) petitioner now contends that there was
no valid waiver of his right to remain silent and to counsel because the same was not made with the
assistance of counsel.

We agree with the petitioner that the prevailing rule is still that laid down by this Court in the said Galit case
as follows:

This Court, in the case of Morales v. Ponce Enrile, laid down the correct procedure for peace officers to
follow when making an arrest and in conducting a custodial investigation, and which we reiterate:
At the time the person is arrested, it shall be the duty of the arresting officer to inform him of the reason for
the arrest and he must show the warrant of arrest, if any. He shall be informed of his constitutional rights to
remain silent and to counsel, and that any statement he might make could be used against him. The person
arrested shall have the right to communicate with his lawyer, a relative or any one who chooses by the
most expedient means — by telephone if possible — or by letter or messenger. It shall be the responsibility
of the arresting officer to see to it that this is accomplished. No custodial investigation shall be conducted
unless it be in the presence of counsel engaged by the person arrested by any person in his behalf, or
appointed by the court upon petition either of the detainee himself or by any one on his behalf. The right to
counsel may be waived but the waiver shall not be valid unless made with the assistance of counsel. Any
statement obtained in violation of the procedure herein laid down, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, in
whole or in part shall be inadmissible in evidence.

But while it is true that petitioner's waiver of his right to remain silent and to assistance by counsel was not
made in the presence of counsel, the defect was cured and the requirement laid down in the Galit case was
substantially complied with when Estacio's lawyer, one Atty. Madarietta, arrived at the closing stage of the
interrogation.

As respondent court aptly ruled, if the accused had not voluntarily waived his constitutional rights prior to
the investigation or had wanted to change his mind by availing of his right to remain silent after his counsel
arrived and read the statement before the accused signed it, he could easily have refused to sign the same
and demand possession of the unsigned statement.

The repudiation by petitioner of his confession on the ground that it was extracted through force and
intimidation is negated by the fact that the confession contained details which only petitioner could have
known.

In People v.  Tintero, 111 SCRA 714, We ruled: . . . According to our jurisprudence, details disclosed in the
confession which could have been known only by the declarant indicate the voluntariness in executing the
same (People v. Bautista, 92 SCRA 465). Voluntariness in the execution of and details narrated in the extra-
judicial confession render the claim by the appellant of duress in its execution incredible. (People v. Limoso,
91 SCRA 364). And in People v. Villa, 93 SCRA 716, We held that the confessions of the accused cannot be
totally ignored even if they repudiated all of them on the ground of alleged extraction by force and
intimidation, because the narrations contained in them coincide with the narration given by the eye
witnesses. And where the narration of the defendant tends to explain his conduct or shift the blame to
others, this is a circumstance that may be demonstrative of voluntariness and freedom than of
compulsion (People v. Santalani, 93 SCRA 313; See also People v. Nillos, 127 SCRA 207 [1984]; Emphasis
supplied.)

Thus, the respondent Sandiganbayan aptly ruled: With the foregoing as backdrop, we find it difficult to give
credit to Estacio's assertion that his statement given to the NBI was taken under duress, compulsion, force
or intimidation. The statement of Estacio contained intimate details of the conspiracy and the syndicate's
operations which could only have been known to him alone and which could not have been known to his
interrogator. This is not to mention that the same contained exculpatory statements in certain portions
thereof which are indicative of voluntariness and freedom of expression (People v. Balana, 123 SCRA 614).
(pp. 36-37, Rollo)

Be this as it may, the point sought to be made by petitioner is of no moment. Even without the extra-judicial
confession, the evidence on record is sufficient to sustain petitioner's culpability as a co-conspirator in the
defraudation of the bank.

Manuel Valentino, petitioner's co-accused turned state witness, positively and categorically testified on the
knowledge and participation of petitioner in the felonious act.

Anent petitioner's claim that respondent Sandiganbayan erred when it held that he (Estacio) was part of the
conspiracy, suffice it to say that petitioner's culpability as a co-conspirator in the defraudation of the bank
was amply demonstrated and established by the evidence on record. His presence at the Ramada Hotel
where he and his co-conspirators discussed the mechanics of their sinister plot and each conspirator's role
defined, and his execution of his role thereafter, unquestionably demonstrates his conspiratorial designs.

We held in People v. Dalusag, 133 SCRA 15, that: There is conspiracy where several accused by their acts
aimed at the same object, one performing one part and another performing another part so as to complete
it with view to the attainment of the same object, and their acts, though apparently independent are in fact
concerted action and concurrence of petitioners. (Cited in People v. Petenia, 143 SCRA 361)

Finally, petitioner's claim of voluntary surrender, was correctly disregarded by the court a quo. We held
in People v.  Hanasan, 29 SCRA 534 that the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender may properly be
appreciated in favor of the accused when the following requisites concur: (a) the offender has not been
actually arrested; (b) the offender surrendered himself to a person in authority or to an agent of a person in
authority; and (c) the surrender was voluntary. (People v. Canamo, 138 SCRA 141).
The foregoing requisites are not present in the case at bar. The evidence on record discloses that petitioner
went to the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) on February 16, 1982 upon the instruction of his superior
and not of his own accord. Neither did he go to the NBI to place himself at the disposal of the authorities.

Indeed, on this point the respondent Sandiganbayan correctly ruled that: Estacio cannot invoke the
mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender. When he went to the NBI on February 16, 1982, it was in
obedience to the order of his superior, Atty. Agapito Fajardo, the then officer-in-charge of the Anti-Bank
Fraud Unit of the Central Bank. In other words, he went there not spontaneously with intent to submit
himself unconditionally to the authorities because he acknowledged his guilt or wished to save the
authorities the time and trouble of searching for him.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration is hereby DENIED with FINALITY.

SO ORDERED.