Financial Derivatives - A Brief Introduction: Tony Ware
Financial Derivatives - A Brief Introduction: Tony Ware
Tony Ware
Outline
Introduction
History
Outline
Introduction
Markets and risk
Options
History
Leverage
I Some people trade in options because want to reduce their
exposure to risk. Others, because they want to take on extra
risk and gain an advantage from the increased leverage.
I Here is our example call option struck at $50:
Risk transfer
I Financial derivatives come in many varieties
I puts, calls, american/european/asian/bermudan options,
I butterfly spreads, bull/bear spreads, condors,
I digital options, up-and-out/down-and-out options,
I futures, swaptions, passport options, swing options. . .
I They all involve the exchange of risk (or uncertainty).
I The key question we are always trying to answer is:
How much is that uncertainty worth?
Outline
Introduction
History
Options trading
Bachelier
Gaining understanding
A long,disreputable history
I 1600s - Holland. Tulip dealing is big business, and growers
and dealers are trading in options to guarantee prices.
I Soon speculators are joining in and a thriving options market is
born. But the market crashes, many speculators fail to honour
their commitments, and the Dutch economy is brought to its
knees.
I 1700s - London. Options are declared illegal!
I 1934 - USA. Investment act legitimises options. Annual
volume < 300, 000 contracts by 1968.
I April 1973 - Chigaco. The CBOT starts trading listed call
options on 16 stocks, with a first-day volume of 911 contracts.
I 1974 - Chigaco. The daily volume grows from 20,000 to over
200,000 contracts.
So what happened to cause this explosive growth? - Mathematics!
Brownian motion
I In 1827 Robert Brown had observed pollen particles floating in
water under the microscope and noted their jittery behaviour.
In order to make sure that the motion was not due to the
pollen being alive he did the same thing with dust particles.
I Bachelier models bond price movements in the same way
Einstein later models the motion of particles under
‘bombardment’.(In fact he derives his results in three different
ways.)
I Between any two points in time (t and t + ∆t), the change in
the bond price is a normally-distributed random
variable—following a ‘bell-curve’ law.
I Any non-overlapping changes are independent.
I For times that are close together, the curve is peaked, and for
longer times it is smeared out.
I This produces random, infinitely-long, but continuous curves.
Tony Ware Financial derivatives - a brief introduction
Introduction History Revolution Aftermath Options trading Bachelier Gaining understanding
The hunt is on
In the period 1955-1970, people were working very hard indeed to
try to solve the option pricing problem. Perhaps they had an
inkling of how important such a discovery might be.
I Paul Samuelson - almost gets there.
I Guynemer Giguere - figures out ‘boundary conditions’
I Case Sprenkle - his model requires estimates of growth rates
and investors risk-aversion.
I James Boness - translated Bachelier’s thesis, creates an option
model based on a discounted expected payoff.
I Henry McKean - writes a book with Itô, a paper with
Samuelson. He figures out the mathematical formulae.
I Ed Thorp - he’s even closer, building on Boness.
Almost there
Outline
Introduction
History
Convergence
I In the late 1965 Fischer Black makes the journey from physics
to finance, joining the consulting firm Arthur D. Little. A
couple of years later, Myron Scholes joins the faculty at MIT,
and meets Black.
I Black and Scholes work on the option pricing problem. They
realise that risk is the key - it is what is at the root of all the
problems others are having, and it is what options are all
about.
I They work on the idea of creating a small portfolio, consisting
of just three items:
I S—the stock.
I B—a risk-free bond (a costless bank account).
I V —the option.
Make it go away. . .
Their idea is to try to balance this porfolio (S, B and V ) so that
the risk goes away. If the worth of the option is independent of
individual preferences, then it just might be possible. . . .
Here’s what you can do.
I Start out by borrowing some money (i.e. a negative B) and
investing it in S and V in some ratio. (Zero net investment.)
I Tomorrow, or when you next come to trade, the values of B,
S and V have all changed. Your portfolio could be worth
anything.
I But. . . if you choose your initial balance to minimise the
uncertainty (the risk), could you get rid of it altogether?
I If you could, then you would know for sure the value of your
portfolio ‘tomorrow’. Given that you invested nothing in it
today, if its value is going to be anything but zero, you have
found a money-making machine.
Tony Ware Financial derivatives - a brief introduction
Introduction History Revolution Aftermath Convergence Balance The formula Publication Nobel prizes
Easy street?
Your money-making machine is what is known as an arbitrage
opportunity. The problem is that once word gets around,
everybody wants a piece, and the effect of this is to push prices the
other way. The gap closes, and your machine does not work any
more.
Black and Scholes adopted the standard assumptions:
I that the grapevine works perfectly and instantaneously
I that there are no barriers to anyone entering into a trade, no
matter how small or how often.
The result is that these arbitrage opportunities do not exist.
But this means that your perfectly-balanced portfolio
must still be worth nothing tomorrow. This is going to
give you a handle on how the value of your option is
changing with time.
Perfect balance
Consider a simplified model with these ingredients:
I a stock, which is
currently at $50 and can
move up to $60 or down
to $30.
I a call option with strike
price $45.
I a zero interest rate.
In continuous time
In the previous example, we created a portfolio that was perfectly
balanced - in all eventualities its value stayed at zero. Can we do
this with a more realistic model? Well, the answer is ‘no’. Here’s
the best you can do if you rebalance once a day. . .
Robert Merton
Merton arrived on the scene in 1968 and brought with him
expertise in Itô calculus, and an understanding of continuous-time
‘stochastic processes’.
He met Scholes in 1969 and it was he who figured out that their
dream of perfect balance could be achieved by continuously
adjusting their portfolio.
Here’s the result of our previous experiment, rebalancing every
minute of the year. . .
The formula
The value of a call option on an asset S, expiring at time T , with
strike price K is
Getting it out
I Black and Scholes had a little trouble getting their paper
published. They had to try three times—the first two times
the paper was rejected without even being reviewed! (The
suspicion is that Black’s non-academic position may have had
something to do with it.)
I Merton had written his own version, more general than Black
and Scholes’, but he graciously delayed the publication of his
until their paper appeared.
Outline
Introduction
History
Binomial trees
I If we repeat our simple model recursively, we can construct a
binomial tree.
Binomial trees
I Each branch on the tree corresponds to a change from an
asset price S to either uS (up step) or dS (down step) over a
time interval ∆t.
I If Vjm is the option price after n steps of which j are up steps,
then
h i er ∆t − d
Vjm = e−r ∆t pVj+1
m+1
+ (1 − p)Vjm+1 , with p = .
u−d
Here r is the risk-free interest rate.
I The computation starts from the payoff at the final time and
works backwards.
Death of a dream
Merton and Scholes wanted to see their ideas in practice. They
teamed up with some of the top investors from Wall Street to form
a new company - Long Term Capital Management.
They raised $3 billion from investors, including many of the major
banks, on the promise of using dynamic hedging (a.k.a. continuous
rebalancing) on a huge scale to form a ‘gigantic vacuum cleaner
sucking up nickels from around the world.’
They were enormously successful - returning 20%, 43% and 41%
to their investors in the first three years.
Death of a dream
But at the tail end of the century things started to go wrong. The
trouble started in asia - markets were collapsing and deviating
significantly from their historical norms. LTCM carried on as
normal, convinced that things would stabilize. When Russia
defaulted, the game was up.
In order to prevent the global economic collapse that would have
resulted from the failure of LTCM, the Federal Reserve had no
choice but to bail them out - to the tune of $3 billion.
Summing up