V.

WHO IMPLEMENTS THE LAW AND RUNS THE and vice-president for the entire nation must remain in
GOVERNMENT? (EXECUTIVE DEPARTMENT) the hands of Congress.

Art. VII – Executive Department Congressman Lopez v. Senate and House [G.R. No.
163556, June 4, 2004]
PRESIDENT AND VICE-PRESIDENT
Petition for prohibition and mandamus seeking to
Article VII, Sections. 2-13
nullify Section 13, Rule VIII of the Rules of the Joint
[Section 4] Public Session of Congress, creating a Joint Committee
which shall preliminarily canvass the votes of the
Macalintal v. COMELEC (2003) candidates for President and Vice-President during the
Is Section 18.5 of R.A. No. 9189 in relation to Section 4 May 10, 2004 elections.
of the same Act in contravention of Section 4, Article VII Even if the court stated that it has jurisdiction over the
of the Constitution? petition as it alleges violations on the Constitution, it
Sec. 18.4 of The Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003 however dismissed the petition as it failed to show that
provides that: Congress gravely abused its discretion in creating the
Joint Committee.
“18.4. ...Immediately upon the completion of the
canvass, the chairman of the Special Board of Sec. 4 of Art. VII of the Constitution expressly empowers
Canvassers shall transmit via facsimile, electronic mail, the Congress to "to promulgate its rules for the
or any other means of transmission equally safe and canvassing of the certificates.", citing Arroyo v. De
reliable the Certificates of Canvass and the Statements Venecia and Santiago v. Guingona wherein the Court
of Votes to the Commission..” ruled that under the doctrine of separation of powers, it
had no power to review or interfere with internal
Indeed, the phrase, proclamation of winning proceedings of the Congress, unless there is a clear
candidates, in Section 18.5 of R.A. No. 9189 is far too violation of the Constitution. Thus, the court has no
sweeping that it necessarily includes the proclamation authority to restrict or limit the exercise of
of the winning candidates for the presidency and the congressional prerogative granted by the Constitution.
vice-presidency.
In the case at bar, the creation of the Joint Committee
Court ruled that it appears to be repugnant to Section 4, does not constitute grave abuse and cannot be said to
Article VII of the Constitution only insofar as said have deprived petitioner and the other members of
Section totally disregarded the authority given to Congress of their congressional prerogatives, because
Congress by the Constitution to proclaim the winning under the very Rules under attack, the decisions and
candidates for the positions of president and vice- final report of the said Committee shall be subject to
president. the approval of the joint session of both Houses of
Thus, it clashes with paragraph 4, Section 4, Article VII Congress, voting separately.
of the Constitution which provides that the returns of Pimentel v. Joint Canvassing Committee [June 22,
every election for President and Vice-President shall be 2004]
certified by the board of canvassers to Congress.
Senator Pimentel, Jr. seeks a judgment declaring null
Congress could not have allowed the COMELEC to usurp and void the continued existence of the Joint
a power that constitutionally belongs to it or, as aptly Committee to determine the authenticity and due
stated by petitioner, to encroach "on the power of execution of the certificates of canvass and preliminarily
Congress to canvass the votes for president and vice- canvass the votes cast for Presidential and Vice-
president and the power to proclaim the winners for Presidential candidates in the May 10, 2004 elections
the said positions." The provisions of the Constitution as following the adjournment of Congress sine die on June
the fundamental law of the land should be read as part 11, 2004.
of The Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003 and
hence, the canvassing of the votes and the According to him, due to the adjournment of regular
proclamation of the winning candidates for president sessions of the 12th Congress on 11 June 2004, it already
“passed out of legal existence”. Thus, “all pending
matters and proceedings terminate upon the expiration EDSA I EDSA II
of … Congress.” He relies on the rules of both Houses of involves the exercise of is an exercise of people
Congress. the people power of power of freedom of
revolution which speech and freedom of
The Court ruled that Sen. Pimentel’s argument is overthrew the whole assembly to petition the
contradicted by the very rules which he relies on which government government for redress
clearly provides that the “Senate shall convene in joint of grievances which only
session during any voluntary or compulsory recess to affected the office of the
canvass the votes for President and Vice-President not President
later than thirty days after the day of the elections in EDSA I is extra EDSA II is intra
accordance with Section 4, Article VII of the constitutional and the constitutional and the
Constitution.” legitimacy of the new resignation of the sitting
government that resulted President that it caused
Even though the legislative functions of the Twelfth from it cannot be the and the succession of the
Congress may have come to a close upon the final subject of judicial review Vice President as
adjournment of its regular sessions on June 11, 2004, it President are subject to
this does not affect its non-legislative functions, such as judicial review
that of being the National Board of Canvassers. In fact, presented a political involves legal questions
the joint public session of both Houses of Congress question
convened by express directive of Section 4, Article VII of
A brief discourse on freedom of speech and of the
the Constitution to canvass the votes for and to
freedom of assembly to petition the government for
proclaim the newly elected President and Vice-
redress of grievance which are the cutting edge of EDSA
President has not, and cannot, adjourn sine die until it People Power II is not inappropriate.
has accomplished its constitutionally mandated tasks.
For only when a board of canvassers has completed its Needless to state, the cases at bar pose legal and not
functions is it rendered functus officio. Its membership political questions. The principal issues for resolution
may change, but it retains its authority as a board until require the proper interpretation of certain provisions
it has accomplished its purposes. in the 1987 Constitution, notably section 1 of Article II,
74 and section 8 75 of Article VII, and the allocation of
Since the Twelfth Congress has not yet completed its governmental powers under section 11 76 of Article VII.
non-legislative duty to canvass the votes and proclaim The issues likewise call for a ruling on the scope of
the duly elected President and Vice-President, its presidential immunity from suit. They also involve the
existence as the National Board of Canvassers, as well correct calibration of the right of petitioner against
as that of the Joint Committee to which it referred the prejudicial publicity. As early as the 1803 case of
preliminary tasks of authenticating and canvassing the Marbury v. Madison, the doctrine has been laid down
certificates of canvass, has not become functus officio. that "it is emphatically the province and duty of the
judicial department to say what the law is . . ." Thus,
In sum, despite the adjournment sine die of Congress, respondent's invocation of the doctrine of political
there is no legal impediment to the Joint Committee question is but a foray in the dark.
completing the tasks assigned to it and transmitting its
report for the approval of the joint public session of Should Pres. Estrada be considered resigned as of Jan.
both Houses of Congress, which may reconvene without 20, 2001 when GMA took her oath as the 14 th President
need of call by the President to a special session. of the Republic?

Vacancy situations during the term [Section 8] Petitioner denies he resigned as President or that he
suffers from a permanent disability. Hence, he submits
Estrada v. Desierto [02 Mar. 2001]
that the office of the President was not vacant when
respondent Arroyo took her oath as President.
EDSA II cases involved are subject to judicial review.
The court held that resignation has two elements:
Legal distinctions between EDSA I and EDSA II:
(1) there must be an intent to resign
 (2) the intent must be coupled by acts of without transgressing the principle of separation of
relinquishment. powers.

The validity, according to the Court, is not governed by In fine, even if the petitioner can prove that he did not
any formal requirement. As long as it is clear, it must be resign, still, he cannot successfully claim that he is a
given legal effect. President on leave on the ground that he is merely
unable to govern temporarily. That claim has been laid
Using the totality test, by the totality of prior, to rest by Congress and the decision that respondent
contemporaneous and posterior facts and Arroyo is the de jure President made by a co-equal
circumstantial evidence bearing a material relevance on branch of government cannot be reviewed by this
the issues, the Court ruled that Estrada resigned as Court.
president. His resignation cannot be disputed and he
cannot feign ignorance of this fact. WON Estrada enjoys immunity from suit, whether civil
and criminal.
It is, however, urged that the petitioner did not resign
but only took a temporary leave of absence due to his The cases filed against petitioner Estrada are criminal in
inability to govern. character. They involve plunder, bribery and graft and
corruption. By no stretch of the imagination can these
To say the least, the letter is wrapped in mystery. Under crimes, especially plunder which carries the death
any circumstance, however, the mysterious letter penalty, be covered by the alleged mantle of immunity
cannot negate the resignation of the petitioner. of a non-sitting president. He cannot cite any decision of
Petitioner's resignation from the presidency cannot be this Court licensing the President to commit criminal
the subject of a changing caprice nor of a whimsical will acts and wrapping him with post-tenure immunity from
especially if the resignation is the result of his liability. It will be anomalous to hold that immunity is an
repudiation by the people. inoculation from liability for unlawful acts and
omissions. The rule is that unlawful acts of public
WON Estrada is only temporarily unable to act as
officials are not acts of the State and the officer who
president.
acts illegally is not acting as such but stands in the same
Petitioner argues that GMA as VP has no power to footing as any other trespasser.
adjudge the inability of the petitioner to discharge the
There are more reasons not to be sympathetic to
powers and duties of the presidency. His significant
appeals to stretch the scope of executive immunity in
submittal is that "Congress has the ultimate authority
our jurisdiction. One of the great themes of the 1987
under the Constitution to determine whether the
Constitution is that a public office is a public trust. The
President is incapable of performing his functions in the
constitutional policies will be devalued if we sustain
manner provided for in section 11 of Article VII." Thus,
petitioner's claim that a non-sitting president enjoys
he is a president on leave and GMA is an acting
immunity from suit for criminal acts committed during
president.
his incumbency.
Court ruled that both houses of Congress have
Prohibitions [Section 13]
recognized respondent Arroyo as the President.
Implicitly clear in that recognition is the premise that Doromal v. Sandiganbayan, 177 SCRA 354 (1989)
the inability of petitioner Estrada is no longer
Quintin S. Doromal, a former Commissioner of PCGG,
temporary. Congress has clearly rejected petitioner's
for violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act
claim of inability.
(RA 3019), Sec. 3(h), in connection with his
Moreover, the Court cannot pass upon petitioner's shareholdings and position as president and director of
claim of inability to discharge the powers and duties of the Doromal International Trading Corporation (DITC)
the presidency. The question is political in nature and which submitted bids to supply P61 million worth of
addressed solely to Congress by constitutional fiat. It is electronic, electrical, automotive, mechanical and
a political issue which cannot be decided by this Court airconditioning equipment to DECS and the NMYC.
Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution provides President, members of the Cabinet, their deputies or
that "the President, Vice-President, the members of the assistants from holding during their tenure multiple
Cabinet and their deputies or assistants shall not . . . offices or employment in the government, except in
during (their) tenure, . . . directly or indirectly . . . those cases specified in the Constitution itself and as
participate in any business." The constitutional ban is above clarified with respect to posts held without
similar to the prohibition in the Civil Service Law (PD No. additional compensation in an ex-officio (by virtue of
807, Sec. 36, subpar. 24) that "pursuit of private one’s position or status) capacity as provided by law and
business . . . without the permission required by Civil as required by the primary functions of their office, the
Service Rules and Regulations" shall be a ground for citation of Cabinet members (then called Ministers) as
disciplinary action against any officer or employee in the examples during the debate and deliberation on the
civil service. general rule laid down for all appointive officials should
be considered as mere personal opinions which cannot
Thus, he "can rightfully be charged . . . with having
override the constitution’s manifest intent and the
participated in a business which act is absolutely
people’s understanding thereof.
prohibited by Section 13 of Article VII of the
Constitution" because "the DITC remained a family In the light of the construction given to Sec 13, Art 7 in
corporation in which Doromal has at least an indirect relation to Sec 7, par. (2), Art IX-B of the 1987
interest." Constitution, EO 284 is unconstitutional. Ostensibly
restricting the number of positions that Cabinet
Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary, 194 SCRA
members, undersecretaries or assistant secretaries may
317 (1991)
hold in addition to their primary position to not more
In July 1987, then President Corazon Aquino issued than 2 positions in the government and government
Executive Order No. 284 which allowed members of the corporations, EO 284 actually allows them to hold
Cabinet, their undersecretaries and assistant secretaries multiple offices or employment in direct contravention
to hold other government offices or positions in of the express mandate of Sec 13, Art 7 of the 1987
addition to their primary positions subject to limitations Constitution prohibiting them from doing so, unless
set therein. The Civil Liberties Union (CLU) assailed this otherwise provided in the 1987 Constitution itself.
EO averring that such law is unconstitutional. The
Bitonio Jr. v. COA, G.R. No. 147392, March 12, 2004
constitutionality of EO 284 is being challenged by CLU
on the principal submission that it adds exceptions to The issue in this case is whether or not the COA correctly
Sec 13, Article 7 of the Constitution which provides: disallowed the per diems received by the petitioner for
his attendance in the PEZA Board of Directors' meetings
“Sec. 13. The President, Vice-President, the Members of
as representative of the Secretary of Labor.
the Cabinet, and their deputies or assistants shall not,
unless otherwise provided in this Constitution, hold The Court ruled in the affirmative. Bitonio's presence in
any other office or employment during their tenure.xxx the PEZA Board meetings is solely by virtue of his
capacity as representative of the Secretary of Labor.
CLU avers that by virtue of the phrase “unless otherwise
There was no separate or special appointment for such
provided in this Constitution“, the only exceptions
position. Since the Secretary of Labor is prohibited from
against holding any other office or employment in
receiving compensation for his additional office or
Government are those provided in the Constitution,
employment, such prohibition likewise applies to the
namely: (i) The Vice-President may be appointed as a
petitioner who sat in the Board only in behalf of the
Member of the Cabinet under Sec 3, par. (2), Article 7;
Secretary of Labor.
and (ii) the Secretary of Justice is an ex-officio member
of the Judicial and Bar Council by virtue of Sec 8 (1), We cannot allow Bitonio who sat as representative of
Article 8. the Secretary of Labor in the PEZA Board to have a
better right than his principal. As the representative of
ISSUE: Whether or not EO 284 is constitutional.
the Secretary of Labor, the he sat in the Board in the
HELD: No, it is unconstitutional. It is clear that the 1987 same capacity as his principal. Whatever laws and rules
Constitution seeks to prohibit the President, Vice- the member in the Board is covered, so is the
representative; and whatever prohibitions or of the bar and a defender of the Constitution, assailed
restrictions the member is subjected, the representative the constitutionality of the said law as he averred that it
is, likewise, not exempted. Thus, his position as Director only interferes with the control power of the president.
IV of the DOLE which he claims is not covered by the
He advances the view that RA 6975 weakened the
constitutional prohibition set by the Civil Liberties Union
National Police Commission (NAPOLCOM) by limiting its
case is of no moment. He attended the board meetings
power “to administrative control” over the PNP thus,
by the authority given to him by the Secretary of Labor
“control” remained with the Department Secretary
to sit as his representative. If it were not for such
under whom both the NPC and the PNP were placed;
designation, the he would not have been in the Board at
that the system of letting local executives choose local
all.
police heads also undermine the power of the
Soliven v. Makasiar, 167 SCRA 393 (1988) president.

Beltran contends that if criminal proceedings ensue by

virtue of the President's filing of her complaint-affidavit,
Whether or not the president abdicated its control
she may subsequently have to be a witness for the
power over the PNP and NPC by virtue of RA 6975.
prosecution, bringing her under the trial court's
jurisdiction. This would in an indirect way defeat her HELD: No. The President has control of all executive
privilege of immunity from suit, as by testifying on the departments, bureaus, and offices. This presidential
witness stand, she would be exposing herself to possible power of control over the executive branch of
contempt of court or perjury. government extends over all executive officers from
Cabinet Secretary to the lowliest clerk. Equally well
The court explained that the reason for the Presidential
accepted, as a corollary rule to the control powers of
immunity is to assure that his or her duties and
the President, is the “Doctrine of Qualified Political
functions are free from any hindrance or distraction,
Agency”. As the President cannot be expected to
considering that being the Chief Executive of the
exercise his control powers all at the same time and in
Government is a job that, aside from requiring all of the
person, he will have to delegate some of them to his
office-holder's time, also demands undivided attention.
Cabinet members.
However, only the President may invoke such privilege
Under this doctrine, which recognizes the establishment
and not by any other person in the President’s behalf.
of a single executive, “all executive and administrative
As in the case at bar, Beltran cannot raise the
organizations are adjuncts of the Executive Department,
presidential immunity as a defense to prevent the case
the heads of the various executive departments are
from proceeding against him.
assistants and agents of the Chief Executive, and, except
Moreover, there is nothing in our laws that would in cases where the Chief Executive is required by the
prevent the President from waiving such privilege. The Constitution or law to act in person on the exigencies of
choice rests solely on the President’s prerogative. It is a the situation demand that he act personally, the
decision which cannot be assumed and imposed by any multifarious executive and administrative functions of
other person. the Chief Executive are performed by and through the
executive departments, and the acts of the Secretaries
POWERS AND FUNCTIONS OF THE PRESIDENT [Article
of such departments, performed and promulgated in
VII, Sections 1, 13-23]
the regular course of business, are, unless disapproved
Executive Power (Section 1) or reprobated by the Chief Executive presumptively the
acts of the Chief Executive.”
Carpio v. Executive Secretary [206 SCRA 290 (1992)]
Thus, and in short, “the President’s power of control is
In 1990, Republic Act No. 6975 entitled “AN ACT directly exercised by him over the members of the
ESTABLISHING THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE Cabinet who, in turn, and by his authority, control the
UNDER A REORGANIZED DEPARTMENT OF THE bureaus and other offices under their respective
INTERIOR AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT, AND FOR OTHER jurisdictions in the executive department.”
PURPOSES” was passed. Antonio Carpio, as a member
Additionally, the circumstance that the NAPOLCOM and on the duty of the President, as steward of the people.
the PNP are placed under the reorganized DILG is To paraphrase Theodore Roosevelt, it is not only the
merely an administrative realignment that would power of the President but also his duty to do anything
bolster a system of coordination and cooperation not forbidden by the Constitution or the laws that the
among the citizenry, local executives and the integrated needs of the nation demand. The President is not only
law enforcement agencies and public safety agencies clothed with extraordinary powers in times of
created under the assailed Act, the funding of the PNP emergency, but is also tasked with attending to the day-
being in large part subsidized by the national to-day problems of maintaining peace and order and
government. ensuring domestic tranquillity in times when no foreign
foe appears on the horizon. Wide discretion, within the
Marcos v. Manglapus [177 SCRA 668 (1989)]
bounds of law, in fulfilling presidential duties in times of
WON, in the exercise of the powers granted by the peace is not in any way diminished by the relative want
Constitution, the President may prohibit the Marcoses of an emergency specified in the commander-in-chief
from returning to the Philippines. provision.

Powers of the President under Art. VII: Thus, it must be treated as a matter that is
appropriately addressed to those residual unstated
(1) the power of control over all executive powers of the President which are implicit in and
departments, bureaus and offices, correlative to the paramount duty residing in that office
(2) the power to execute the laws, to safeguard and protect general welfare. In that
(3) the appointing power, context, such request or demand should submit to the
(4) the powers under the commander-in-chief exercise of a broader discretion on the part of the
clause, President to determine whether it must be granted or
(5) the power to grant reprieves, commutations denied.
and pardons,
(6) the power to grant amnesty with the Pichay Jr. v. Office of the Deputy Executive Secretary
concurrence of Congress, for Legal Affairs [GR No. 196425, 24 July 2012]
(7) the power to contract or guarantee foreign
The President has Continuing Authority to Reorganize
loans,
the Executive Department under Admin Code of 1987.
(8) the power to enter into treaties or international
agreements, It vests in the President the continuing authority to
(9) the power to submit the budget to Congress, reorganize the offices under him in order to achieve
and simplicity, economy and efficiency. It sanctions the
(10) the power to address Congress [Art. VII, Secs. following actions undertaken for such purpose:
14-23]
(1) Restructure the internal organization of the Office of
Consideration of tradition and the development of the President Proper, by abolishing, consolidating, or
presidential power under the different constitutions are merging units thereof or transferring functions from
essential for a complete understanding of the extent of one unit to another;
and limitations to the President's powers under the
(2) Transfer any function under the Office of the
1987 Constitution. Although the 1987 Constitution
President to any other Department or Agency; and
imposes limitations on the exercise of specific powers of
the President, it maintains intact what is traditionally (3) Transfer any agency under the Office of the
considered as within the scope of "executive power." President to any other Department or Agency
Corollarily, the powers of the President cannot be said
to be limited only to the specific powers enumerated in Clearly, the abolition of the PAGC and the transfer of its
the Constitution. In other words, executive power is functions to a division specially created within the
more than the sum of specific powers so enumerated. ODESLA is properly within the prerogative of the
President under his continuing "delegated legislative
The power involved is the President's residual power to authority to reorganize" his own office pursuant to E.O.
protect the general welfare of the people. It is founded 292.
Moreover, the President's authority to issue E.O. 13 and Saguisag v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 212426, Jan.
constitute the IAD-ODESLA as his fact-finding 12, 2016
investigator cannot be doubted. After all, as Chief
I. BROAD CONSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT ON THE
Executive, he is granted full control over the Executive
POWERS OF THE PRESIDENT: Defense, Foreign
Department to ensure the enforcement of the laws.
Relations, and EDCA
Section 17, Article VII of the Constitution provides: A. Prime duty of the State and the
“The President shall have control of all the executive consolidation of executive power in the
departments, bureaus and offices. He shall ensure that President
 Constitution vested vast
the laws be faithfully executed.”
executive powers in the
The obligation to see to it that laws are faithfully President
executed necessitates the corresponding power in the  With its prime duty to serve and
President to conduct investigations into the conduct of protect the people, the
officials and employees in the executive department. government may call upon
people to defend the State, and
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 citizens may be required, under
(1952) conditions provided by law, to
render military or civil service
In 1951, a labor dispute arose between the United B. The duty to protect the territory and
States steel companies and their employees. In 1952, the citizens, the power to call upon the
the employees union gave notice of a nationwide strike. people to defend the State, and the
Thereupon, fearful that such a work stoppage would President as Commander-in-Chief
jeopardize our national defense, President Truman  Power is limited by the
issued an order directing the Secretary of Commerce to Constitution: President may call
take possession of the nation’s steel mills. After obeying out the Armed Forces of the
the orders under protest, the steel companies brought Philippines (AFP) to
prevent/suppress lawless
suit in District Court. The District Court issued a
violence, invasion or rebellion,
temporary restraining order against the government,
but not suspend privilege of
which the Court of Appeals stayed.
writ of habeas corpus of place
Did President Truman have the authority to order the Philippines under martial law
seizure of the steel mills? for more than 60 days
C. The power and duty to conduct foreign
No. The judgment of the District Court is affirmed. relations
Justice Hugo Black stated that there was no statute that  President carries the mandate
expressly conferred upon President Truman the power of being the sole organ in
to seize the mills. There are no provisions of the conduct of foreign relation, but
Constitution, or combination of provisions thereof, is qualified by the Constitution
o Sec. 2, Art. II on
which gave the President the authority to take
conduct of war; Sec. 20-
possession of property as he did.
21, Art VII on foreign
The President’s power, if any, to issue an order must loans; Sec. 4(2) & 5(2)
stem from an act of Congress or the United States (a) of Art VIII on judicial
Constitution. review of executive
acts; Sec. 4 & 25 of Art.
In his concurring opinion, J. Jackson said that when the XVIII on treaties and
President takes actions inconsistent with the will of international
Congress, his powers are at their lowest level. Then, he agreements and
can only rely on his own constitutional powers minus presence of foreign
any powers given to Congress on the same matter. military troops, bases or
facilities
 D. The relationship between the 2 major 2. The plain meaning of the Constitution prohibits
presidential functions and the role of the entry of foreign military bases, troops or
the Senate facilities, except by way of a treaty concurred in
 Power to defend State and acts by the Senate - a clear limitation on the
as its representative in President’s dual role as defender of the State
international sphere does not and as sole authority in foreign relations
crystallize into absolute a. Despite President’s roles as defender of
discretion to craft whatever the State and sole authority in foreign
instrument the Chief Executive relations, the 1987 Constitution
desires expressly limits his ability in instances
 Senate has role in ensuring when it involves the entry of foreign
treaties or international military bases, troops, or facilities
agreements obtain approval of i. Sec. 21, Art. VII: “No treaty or
⅔ of its members international agreement shall
 Petitioners claim that this be valid and effective unless
shared role of the President and concurred in by at least ⅔ of all
Senate is bypassed by EDCA the Members of the Senate.”
Whether the President may enter into an executive b. Specific limitation is given by Sec. 25,
agreement on foreign military bases, troops, or facilities Art. XVIII Transitory Provisions
3. The President may enter into an executive
1. The role of the President as the executor of the agreement on foreign military bases, troops, or
law includes the duty to defend the State, for facilities, if (a) it is not the instrument that
which purpose he may use that power in the allows the presence of foreign military bases,
conduct of foreign relations troops, or facilities; or (b) it merely aims to
a. Most important self-executory implement an existing law or treaty
constitutional power of the President is a. Sec. 25, Art. XVIII: After the expiration in
the President’s constitutional duty and 1991 of the Agreement between the
mandate to “ensure that the laws be Republic of the Philippines and the
faithfully executed” United States of America concerning
i. The President can execute the Military Bases, foreign military bases,
law without any delegation of troops, or facilities shall not be allowed
power from the legislature in the Philippines except under a treaty
ii. Manner of the President’s duly concurred in by the Senate and,
execution of the law, even if not when the Congress so requires, ratified
expressly granted by the law, is by a majority of the votes cast by the
justified by necessity and people in a national referendum held
limited only by law, since the for that purpose, and recognized as a
President must “take necessary treaty by the other contracting State.”
and proper steps to carry into b. The court ruled that the concept of
execution the law” executive agreement is well-entrenched
b. It is the President’s prerogative to do in the Court’s pronouncements on the
whatever is legal and necessary for power of the President. When the Court
Philippine defense interests validated the concept of “executive
i. It would be repugnant to the agreement”, it did so with full
faithful-execution clause of the knowledge of the Senate’s role in
Constitution to do nothing concurring in treaties.
when the call of the moment c. MDT has not been rendered
requires increasing the obsolescent, considering that as late as
military’s defensive capabilities, 2009, the Court recognized its validity
including forging alliances with d. A plain textual reading of Sec. 25, Art.
states that hold a common XVIII leads to the conclusion that the
interest with the Philippines constitutional restriction refers solely to
the initial entry of the foreign military
 bases, troops, or facilities. Once entry is agreement involves merely implements
authorized, the subsequent acts are changes in PH national already existing treaty
therefore subject only to the limitations policy, and the obligations, laws or
provided by the rest of the Constitution agreement must policy, an executive
and Philippine law, and not to the Sec. therefore be submitted agreement will suffice.
25 requirement of validity through a to the Senate for
treaty ratification
4. The President may generally enter into
executive agreements subject to limitations 5. The President had the choice to enter into
defined by the Constitution and may be in EDCA by way of an executive agreement or a
furtherance of a treaty already concurred in by treaty.
the Senate.  No court can tell the President to desist from
 Section 5(2)(a), Article VIII of the choosing an executive agreement over a treaty
Constitution, to embody an international agreement, unless
2) Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal the case falls squarely within Article VIII, Section
or certiorari, as the law or the Rules of Court may 25.
provide, final judgments and orders of lower courts in:  Section 9 of Executive Order No. 459, or the
(a) All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of Guidelines in the Negotiation of International
any treaty, international or executive agreement, law, Agreements and its Ratification, thus, correctly
presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction, reflected the inherent powers of the President
ordinance, or regulation is in question. when it stated that the DFA "shall determine
 One of the distinguishing features of executive whether an agreement is an executive
agreements is that their validity and effectivity agreement or a treaty."
are not affected by a lack of Senate  The task of the Court is to determine whether
concurrence. the international agreement is consistent with
 The framers specifically deliberated on whether the applicable limitations.
the general term "international agreement" 6. Executive agreements may cover the matter of
included executive agreements, and whether it foreign military forces if it merely involves
was necessary to include an express proviso detail adjustments.
that would exclude executive agreements from
the requirement of Senate concurrence.  Respondents carry the burden of proving that it
o Decided that the term "international is a mere implementation of existing laws and
agreements" as contemplated in treaties concurred in by the Senate
Section 21, Article VII, does not include  EDCA must thus be carefully dissected to
executive agreements, and that a ascertain if it remains within the legal
proviso is no longer needed. parameters of a valid executive agreement.
7. EDCA is consistent with the content, purpose,
Treaties Executive Agreements and framework of the MDT and the VFA
Products of the acts of Solely executive actions
the Executive and the (between heads of  VFA allowed construction for the benefit of U.S.
Senate states) forces during their temporary visits.
Both types of international agreement are  the VFA clearly allows the same kind of
nevertheless subject to the supremacy of the equipment, vehicles, vessels, and aircraft to be
Constitution brought into the country. Articles VII and VIII of
“No treaty or Not subject to the same the VFA contemplates that U.S. equipment,
international agreement requirement as that of materials, supplies, and other property are
shall be valid and treaties. They become imported into or acquired in the Philippines by
effective unless binding through or on behalf of the U.S. Armed Forces;
concurred in by at least executive action without  Even if EDCA was borne of military necessity, it
two-thirds of all the need of a vote by the cannot be said to have strayed from the intent
members of the Senate.” Senate or Congress. of the VFA since EDCA's combat-related
components are allowed under the treaty.
Required only when an When an agreement
  Terms and details used by an implementing the office. Appointing persons to a public office is
agreement need not be found in the mother essentially executive. To extend the power of Congress
treaty. They must be sourced from the authority into allowing it, through the Senate President and the
derived from the treaty, but are not necessarily House Speaker, to appoint members of the NCC is
expressed word-for-word in the mother treaty. already an invasion of executive powers.
 Both the VFA and EDCA ensure Philippine
jurisdiction in all instances contemplated by However, the legislature may appoint persons to fill
both agreements, public office if they relate to the selection of Secretaries
of Departments, of officers and employees for the
In brief, the Court ruled that EDCA is an executive Legislature, and of Resident Commissioners, from which
agreement that is consistent with existing laws and it would naturally be inferred that no other officers and
treaties it purports to implement. The petition was employees may be chosen by it.
dismissed.
Bermudez v. Executive Secretary, 213 SCRA 733 (1999)
Power to Appoint and Prohibited Appointments
(Section 16) The validity and legality of the appointment of
respondent Conrado Quiaoit to the post of Provincial
Government v. Springer, 50 Phil. 259 (1927) Prosecutor of Tarlac by then President Fidel V. Ramos
was assailed in this petition for review on certiorari on a
Does the power to appoint resides solely with the pure question of law.
Executive? YES.
WON the absence of a recommendation of the
While the Philippine Organic Act does not provide a Secretary of Justice can be held fatal to the appointment
general distributing clause, it is clearly deducible that of respondent Conrado Quiaoit
there is a distribution of powers among the Executive,
Legislative and the Judiciary. Revised Administrative Code of 1987: "All provincial and
city prosecutors and their assistants shall be appointed
Thus, it is beyond the power of any branch to exercise by the President upon the recommendation of the
its functions in any way other than that provided under Secretary."
the Organic Law.
Appointment - to a public office is the unequivocal act
The Organic Act vests the supreme executive power in of designating or selecting by one having the authority
the GG: therefor of an individual to discharge and perform the
(1) He is given general supervision and duties and functions of an office or trust; it is deemed
control of all departments and bureaus complete once the last act required of the appointing
of the government authority has been complied with and its acceptance
(2) He is also made responsible for the thereafter by the appointee in order to render it
faithful execution of laws effective; it necessarily calls for an exercise of discretion
(3) This was also enunciated in the Admin on the part of the appointing authority
Code.
Because of the separation of powers, the legislature has Therefore, the right of choice is the heart of the power
no authority to execute or construe the law, the to appoint. In the exercise of the power of
executive has no authority to make or construe the law, appointment, discretion is an integral part thereof.
and the judiciary has no power to make or execute the
law. When Sec. 16 or the RAC of 1987 clothes the President
with the power to appoint a subordinate officer, such
Can the Senate President as well as the House Speaker conferment must be understood as necessarily carrying
can validly elect the Board Members of NCC? NO. E.O. with it an ample discretion of whom to appoint. It
No 37 is valid. should be here pertinent to state that the President is
the head of government whose authority includes the
In accordance with the doctrine of separation of power of control over all "executive departments,
powers, the legislature creates the public office but it bureaus and offices.”
has nothing to do with designating the persons to fill
The Court ruled that "upon recommendation of the Appointments to first confirm ad interim appointees
Secretary”, should be interpreted should be interpreted before the appointees can assume office will negate the
to be a mere advise, exhortation or endorsement, which President’s power to make ad interim appointments.
is essentially persuasive in character and not binding or This is contrary to the rule on statutory construction to
obligatory upon the party to whom it is made. The give meaning and effect to every provision of the law. It
recommendation was nothing really more than advisory will also run counter to the clear intent of the framers of
in nature. The President, being the head of the the Constitution. The original draft of Section 16, Article
Executive Department, could very well disregard or do VII of the Constitution – on the nomination of officers
away with the action of the departments, bureaus or subject to confirmation by the Commission on
offices even in the exercise of discretionary authority, Appointments – did not provide for ad interim
and in so opting, he cannot be said as having acted appointments. The original intention of the framers of
beyond the scope of his authority. In the instant case, the Constitution was to do away with ad interim
the recommendation of the Secretary of Justice and the appointments because the plan was for Congress to
appointment of the President were acts of the Executive remain in session throughout the year except for a brief
Department itself, and there was no sharing of power to 30-day compulsory recess. However, because of the
speak of, the latter being merely an extension of the need to avoid disruptions in essential government
personality of the President. The petition was denied. services, the framers of the Constitution thought it wise
to reinstate the provisions of the 1935 Constitution on
Matibag v. Benipayo, G.R. No. 149036, 2 April 2002. ad interim appointments. Clearly, the reinstatement in
the present Constitution of the ad interim appointing
Matibag was appointed by the COMELEC en banc as power of the President was for the purpose of avoiding
“Acting Director IV” of the EID and was reappointed interruptions in vital government services that
twice for the same position in a temporary capacity. otherwise would result from prolonged vacancies in
Meanwhile, then PGMA also made appointments, ad government offices, including the three constitutional
interim, of herein respondents Benipayo, Borra and commissions.
Tuason, as COMELEC Chairman and Commissioners,
respectively. Their appointments were renewed thrice Evidently, the exercise by the President in the instant
by PGMA, the last one during the pendency of the case, case of her constitutional power to make ad interim
all due to the failure of the Commission of appointments prevented the occurrence of the very evil
Appointments to act upon the confirmation of their sought to be avoided by the second paragraph of
appointments. Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution. This power to
make ad interim appointments is lodged in the
Respondent Benipayo, acting on his capacity as President to be exercised by her in her sound judgment.
COMELEC Chairman, issued a memorandum removing Under the second paragraph of Section 16, Article VII of
petitioner as Acting Director IV and reassigning her to the Constitution, the President can choose either of two
the Law Department. Petitioner requested for modes in appointing officials who are subject to
reconsideration but was denied. Thus, petitioner filed confirmation by the Commission on Appointments:
the instant petition questioning the appointment and 1) First, while Congress is in session, the
the right to remain in office of herein respondents, President may nominate the
claiming that their ad interim appointments violate the prospective appointee, and pending
constitutional provisions on the independence of the consent of the Commission on
COMELEC, as well as on the prohibitions on temporary Appointments, the nominee cannot
appointments and reappointments of its Chairman and qualify and assume office.
members. 2) Second, during the recess of Congress,
the President may extend an ad interim
Whether the ad interim appointments made by PGMA appointment which allows the
were prohibited under the Constitution appointee to immediately qualify and
assume office.
NO. While the Constitution mandates that the COMELEC Whether the President chooses to nominate the
“shall be independent”, this provision should be prospective appointee or extend an ad interim
harmonized with the President’s power to extend ad appointment is a matter within the prerogative of the
interim appointments. To hold that the independence President because the Constitution grants her that
of the COMELEC requires the Commission on power. This Court cannot inquire into the propriety of
the choice made by the President in the exercise of her Commissions, COMELEC
constitutional power, absent grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on her part, In the instant case, the President did in fact appoint
which has not been shown in the instant case. permanent Commissioners to fill the vacancies in the
COMELEC, subject only to confirmation by the
In fine, we rule that the ad interim appointments Commission on Appointments. Benipayo, Borra and
extended by the President to Benipayo, Borra and Tuason were extended permanent appointments during
Tuason, as COMELEC Chairman and Commissioners, the recess of Congress. They were not appointed or
respectively, do not constitute temporary or acting designated in a temporary or acting capacity. The ad
appointments prohibited by Section 1 (2), Article IX-C of interim appointments of Benipayo, Borra and Tuason
the Constitution. are expressly allowed by the Constitution which
authorizes the President, during the recess of Congress,
Whether the ad interim appointments made by PGMA to make appointments that take effect immediately.
were temporary in character
De Castro v. JBC; GR No. 191002, March 17,2010
An ad interim appointment is a permanent
appointment because it takes effect immediately and Notes:
can no longer be withdrawn by the President once the
appointee has qualified into office. The fact that it is Locus standi – As defined by Black is the “right the right
subject to confirmation by the Commission on of appearance in a court of justice on a given question.”;
Appointments does not alter its permanent character. it is required that the petitioner must have a personal
The Constitution itself makes an ad interim stake in the outcome of the controversy
appointment permanent in character by making it Direct injury test – “a personal and substantial interest
effective until disapproved by the Commission on in the case such that he sustained, or will sustain direct
Appointments or until the next adjournment of injury as a result.
Congress. The second paragraph of Section 16, Article
VII of the Constitution provides as follows: EXPN: when the case has transcendental importance
due to far-reaching implications even if the petitioner
“The President shall have the power to make does not have personality to file the suit (liberal
appointments during the recess of the Congress, approach); enough that he sufficiently demonstrates in
whether voluntary or compulsory, but such his petition that he is entitled to the Court’s protection
appointments shall be effective only until disapproval by or relief in vindication of a public right.
the Commission on Appointments or until the next
adjournment of the Congress.” Taxpayer’s suit - the plaintiff is affected by the
expenditure of public funds, while in the latter, he is but
Thus, the ad interim appointment remains effective the mere instrument of the public concern; It is at least
until such disapproval or next adjournment, signifying the right, if not the duty, of every citizen to interfere
that it can no longer be withdrawn or revoked by the and see that a public offence be properly pursued and
President. punished, and that a public grievance be remedied.

Ad interim appointment Appointment/designation Citizen’s suit - he is but the mere instrument of the
in temporary or acting public concern; the right of a citizen and a taxpayer to
capacity maintain an action in courts to restrain the unlawful use
Permanent and Can be withdrawn or of public funds to his injury cannot be denied.
irrevocable except as revoked at the pleasure
provided by law of the appointing power Petitioners in this case have locus standi since the issues
Appointee enjoys Appointee does not enjoy are of transcendental importance to the people as a
security of tenure any security of tenure, no whole, regardless of one’s personal interest.
matter how briefly
Allowed by virtue of Art. President is prohibited As to justiciability, the Court rules that there is a
16 of the Constitution from making under the justiciable controversy since the JBC already
Constitution to the commenced the proceedings for the selection of the
Constitutional
nominees for the next CJ. It thus makes the situation Funa v. Executive Secretary, G.R. No. 184740, February
ripe for determination. 11, 2010

First. The case of Valenzuela wherein the court ruled Undersecretary Bautista’s designation as MARINA OIC
that the prohibition under Sec. 15 of Art. VII (midnight falls under the stricter prohibition under Sec. 13, Art. VII
appointments) extends to Sec. 4(1) of Art. VIII (that the of the Constitution
vacancy should be filled within 90 days from the
occurrence thereof) was revisited by the Court. It ruled Section 7, paragraph (2), Article IX-B – “Unless
that such interpretation should not be accepted and otherwise allowed by law or the primary functions of his
that it defeats the intent of the framers to purposely position, no appointive official shall hold any other
reflect the organization and arrangement of the office or employment in the Government or any
provisions of the Constitution (that is Art. VII is devoted subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including
to the Executive Department and Art. VIII to the Judicial government-owned or controlled corporations or their
Department). subsidiaries.”

Second. Sec. 15, Art. VII does not apply as well to all Sec. 13, Art. VII - prohibition imposed on the President
other appointments in the Judiciary. and his official family is all-embracing, the
disqualification was held to be absolute, as the holding
Two kinds of prohibited appointments under Sec. 15: of "any other office" is not qualified by the phrase "in
(1) Those made in two months preceding a the Government”
Presidential election;
(2) Midnight appointments Sec. 13, Art. VI - prohibiting Senators and Members of
EXPN: making of temporary appointments to executive the House of Representatives from holding "any other
positions when continued vacancies will prejudice office or employment in the Government”
public service or endanger public safety (thus, only In other words, Section 7, Article IX-B is meant to lay
confined in the Executive Department). down the general rule applicable to all elective and
appointive public officials and employees, while Section
The establishment of JBC and their process of 13, Article VII is meant to be the exception applicable
nomination and screening to candidates ensured that only to the President, the Vice-President, Members of
there will no longer be midnight appointments in the the Cabinet, their deputies and assistants.
Judiciary.
Respondent Bautista being then the appointed
Third. According to former Justice Regalado, Undersecretary of DOTC, she was thus covered by the
"constitutionality of . . . appointments" to the Court of stricter prohibition under Section 13, Article VII and
Appeals in light of the forthcoming presidential consequently she cannot invoke the exception provided
elections. He assured that "on the basis of the in Section 7, paragraph 2, Article IX-B where holding
(Constitutional) Commission's records, the election ban another office is allowed by law or the primary
had no application to appointments to the Court of functions of the position. Neither was she designated
Appeals.” OIC of MARINA in an ex-officio capacity, which is the
exception recognized in Civil Liberties Union.
Fourth. 23 Secs. Of Art. VII concern the appointing
powers of the President. Facts:

Sec. 14 – cannot extend to the Judiciary as temporary or On October 4, 2006, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo
acting appointments will undermine the independence appointed respondent Maria Elena H. Bautista
of the Judiciary due to their being revocable at will. (Bautista) as Undersecretary of the Department of
Transportation and Communications (DOTC)
Sec. 16 - covers only the presidential appointments that
require confirmation by the Commission on Bautista was designated as Undersecretary for Maritime
Appointments. By virtue of Sec. 9 of Art. VIII, however,
it did not include appointments to the Judiciary. Transport of the department under Special Order No.
2006-171 dated October 23, 2006
On September 1, 2008, following the resignation of then for Maritime Transport to which she had been
MARINA Administrator Vicente T. Suazo, Jr., Bautista appointed, violated the constitutional proscription
was designated as Officer-in-Charge (OIC), Office of the against dual or multiple... offices for Cabinet Members
Administrator, MARINA, in concurrent capacity as DOTC and their deputies and assistants.
Undersecretary
Ruling: These sweeping, all-embracing prohibitions
On October 21, 2008, Dennis A. B. Funa in his capacity imposed on the President and his official family, which
as taxpayer, concerned citizen and lawyer, filed the prohibitions are not similarly imposed on other public
instant petition challenging the constitutionality of officials or employees such as the Members of
Bautista's appointment/designation, which is proscribed Congress, members of the civil service in general and
by the prohibition on the President, Vice-President, the members of... the armed forces, are proof of the intent
of the 1987 Constitution to treat the President and his
Members of the Cabinet, and their deputies and official family as a class by itself and to impose upon
assistants to hold any other office or employment said class stricter prohibitions.

Issues: Thus, while all other appointive officials in the civil

service are allowed to hold other office or employment
Petitioner argues that Bautista's concurrent positions as in the government during their tenure when such is
DOTC Undersecretary and MARINA OIC is in violation of allowed by law or by the primary functions of their
Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution positions, members of the Cabinet, their deputies and...
assistants may do so only when expressly authorized by
He points out that while it was clarified in Civil Liberties the Constitution itself.
Union that the prohibition does not apply to those...
positions held in ex-officio capacities, the position of Since the evident purpose of the framers of the 1987
MARINA Administrator is not ex-officio to the post of Constitution is to impose a stricter prohibition on the
DOTC Undersecretary President, Vice-President, members of the Cabinet,
their deputies and assistants with respect to holding
The fact that Bautista was extended an appointment multiple offices or employment in the government
naming her as OIC of MARINA shows that she does not during... their tenure, the exception to this prohibition
occupy it in an ex-officio capacity since an ex-officio must be read with equal severity. On its face, the
position does not require any "further warrant or language of Section 13, Article VII is prohibitory so that
appoint. it must be understood as intended to be a positive and
unequivocal negation of the privilege of holding
Petitioner further contends that even if Bautista's multiple... government offices or employment.
appointment or designation as OIC of MARINA was
intended to be merely temporary, still, such designation Respondent Bautista being then the appointed
must not violate a standing constitutional prohibition Undersecretary of DOTC, she was thus covered by the
stricter prohibition under Section 13, Article VII and
Petitioner likewise asserts the incompatibility between consequently she cannot invoke the exception provided
the posts of DOTC Undersecretary and MARINA in Section 7, paragraph 2, Article IX-B where holding
Administrator... respondents submit that the petition another... office is allowed by law or the primary
should still be dismissed for being unmeritorious functions of the position.
considering that Bautista's concurrent designation as
MARINA OIC and DOTC Undersecretary was... WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The designation
constitutional. There was no violation of Section 13, of respondent Ma. Elena H. Bautista as Officer-in-
Article VII of the 1987 Constitution because respondent Charge, Office of the Administrator, Maritime Industry
Bautista was merely designated acting head of MARINA Authority, in a concurrent capacity with her position as
on September 1, 2008. She was designated MARINA DOTC Undersecretary for Maritime Transport, is...
OIC, not appointed MARINA Administrator. hereby declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL for being violative
of Section 13, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution and
The sole issue to be resolved is whether or not the therefore, NULL and VOID.
designation of respondent Bautista as OIC of MARINA,
concurrent with the position of DOTC Undersecretary Calderon v. Carale, G.R. No. 91636, 23 April 1992.
 specifically under the "third groups" of appointees
Citing various jurisprudence, the court deduced the referred to in Mison, i.e. those whom the President may
following doctrines: be authorized by law to appoint. Undeniably, the
Chairman and Members of the NLRC are not among the
1. Confirmation by the CA is required only for officers mentioned in the first sentence of Section 16,
presidential appointees mentioned in the first sentence Article VII whose appointments requires confirmation
of Section 16, Article VII, including, those officers whose by the Commission on Appointments.
appointments are expressly vested by the Constitution
itself in the president (like sectoral representatives to Undeniably, the Chairman and Members of the NLRC
Congress and members of the constitutional are not among the officers mentioned in the first
commissions of Audit, Civil Service and Election). sentence of Section 16, Article VII whose appointments
require confirmation by the Commission on
2. Confirmation is not required when the President Appointments. To the extent that RA 6715 requires
appoints other government officers whose confirmation by the Commission on Appointments of
appointments are not otherwise provided for by law or the appointments of respondents Chairman and
those officers whom he may be authorized by law to Members of the National Labor Relations Commission,
appoint (like the Chairman and Members of the it is unconstitutional because:
Commission on Human Rights). Also, as observed in
Mison, when Congress creates inferior offices but omits 1) it amends by legislation, the first
to provide for appointment thereto, or provides in an sentence of Sec. 16, Art. VII of the
unconstitutional manner for such appointments, the Constitution by adding thereto
officers are considered as among those whose appointments requiring confirmation by
appointments are not otherwise provided for by law. the Commission on Appointments
Whether or not Congress may, by law, require 2) it amends by legislation the second
confirmation by the Commission on Appointments of sentence of Sec. 16, Art. VII of the
appointments extended by the President to government Constitution, by imposing the
officers additional to those expressly mentioned in the confirmation of the Commission on
first sentence of Sec. 16, Art. VII of the Constitution Appointments on appointments which
whose appointments require confirmation by the are otherwise entrusted only with the
Commission on Appointments. President

Mison – four kinds of officers which the President may Rufino v. Endriga, G.R. No. 139554, 21 July 2006.
appoint:
Interpreting Section 6(b) and (c) of PD 15
1) the heads of the executive
departments, ambassadors, other The clear and categorical language of Section 6(b) of PD
public ministers and consuls, officers of 15 states that vacancies in the CCP Board shall be filled
the armed forces from the rank of by a majority vote of the remaining trustees. Should
colonel or naval captain, and other only one trustee survive, the vacancies shall be filled by
officers whose appointments are vested the surviving trustee acting in consultation with the
in him in this Constitution ranking officers of the CCP. Should the Board become
2) all other officers of the Government entirely vacant, the vacancies shall be filled by the
whose appointments are not otherwise President of the Philippines acting in consultation with
provided for by law the same ranking officers of the CCP. Thus, the
3) those whom the President may be remaining trustees, whether one or more, elect their
authorized by law to appoint fellow trustees for a fixed four-year term. On the other
4) officers lower in rank whose hand, Section 6(c) of PD 15 does not allow trustees to
appointments the Congress may by law reelect fellow trustees for more than two consecutive
vest in the President alone terms.

As in the case at bar, the NLRC Chairman and Power of Appointment

Commissioners fall within the second sentence of
Section 16, Article VII of the Constitution, more
Under Section 16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, Undersecretary, acting as such Undersecretary, to
the President appoints 3 groups of officers: appoint lower-ranked officers in the Executive
department. In an agency, the power is vested in the
1) heads of the Executive departments, head of the agency for it would be preposterous to vest
ambassadors, other public ministers it in the agency itself. In a commission, the head is the
and consuls, officers of the armed chairperson of the commission. In a board, the head is
forces from the rank of colonel or naval also the chairperson of the board. In the last three
captain, and other officers whose situations, the law may not also authorize officers other
appointments are vested in the than the heads of the agency, commission, or board to
President by the Constitution (w/ appoint lower-ranked officers. Thus, the Constitution
consent of COA) authorizes Congress to vest the power to appoint lower-
2) those whom the President may be ranked officers specifically in the "heads" of the
authorized by law to appoint (w/o specified offices, and in no other person.
consent of COA)
3) all other officers of the Government The head of the CCP is the Chairperson of its Board.
whose appointments are not otherwise Thus, the Chairman of the CCP Board is the "head" of
provided by law (w/o consent of COA); the CCP who may be vested by law, under Section 16,
applied when the law is silent on who is Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, with the power to
the appointing power or if the law appoint lower-ranked officers of the CCP.
authorizing the head of a department,
agency, commission, or board to President’s Power of Control
appoint is declared unconstitutional.
Sec. 17, Art. VII of the Constitution gives the presidential
Last sentence of first par of Sec. 16 provides a fourth power of control over the Executive branch of
group: “xxxThe Congress may, by law, vest the government which extends to all executive employees
appointment of other officers lower in rank in the from the Department Secretary to the lowliest clerk.
President alone, in the courts, or in the heads of This constitutional power of the President is self-
departments, agencies, commissions, or boards.xxx” executing and does not require any implementing law.
Congress cannot limit or curtail the President's power of
The present case involves the interpretation of Section control over the Executive branch.
16, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution with respect to
the appointment of this fourth group of officers (group In short, the President sits at the apex of the Executive
of lower-ranked officers whose appointments Congress branch, and exercises "control of all the executive
may by law vest in the heads of departments, agencies, departments, bureaus, and offices.”
commissions, or boards)
The CCP is part of the Executive branch. No law can cut
Thus, if Section 6(b) and (c) of PD 15 is found off the President's control over the CCP in the guise of
unconstitutional, the President shall appoint the insulating the CCP from the President's influence. By
trustees of the CCP Board because the trustees fall stating that the "President shall have control of all the
under the third group of officers. executive . . . offices," the 1987 Constitution empowers
the President not only to influence but even to control
The Scope of the Appointment Power of the Heads of all offices in the Executive branch, including the CCP.
Departments, Agencies, Commissions, or Boards Control is far greater than, and subsumes, influence.

The express language of the Constitution and the clear Luego v. Civil Service Commission, G.R. No. 69137, 5
intent of its framers point to only one conclusion — the August 1986.
officers whom the heads of departments, agencies,
commissions, or boards may appoint must be of lower Is the Civil Service Commission authorized to disapprove
rank than those vested by law with the power to a permanent appointment on the ground that another
appoint. person is better qualified than the appointee and, on
the basis of this finding, ordering his replacement by the
In a department in the Executive branch, the head is the latter?
Secretary. The law may not authorize the
When the appointee is qualified and all the other legal
requirements are satisfied, the Commission has no
choice but to attest to the appointment in accordance
with the Civil Service Laws.

A full reading of the provision under the Civil Service

Decree, will make it clear that all the Commission is
actually allowed to do is check whether or not the
appointee possesses the appropriate civil service
eligibility or the required qualifications. If he does, his
appointment is approved; if not, it is disapproved. No
other criterion is permitted by law to be employed by
the Commission when it acts on — or as the Decree
says, "approves" or "disapproves" — an appointment
made by the proper authorities.

In this case, the Commission on Civil Service

acknowledged that both the petitioner and the private
respondent were qualified for the position in
controversy. That recognition alone rendered it functus
officio in the case and prevented it from acting further
thereon except to affirm the validity of the petitioner's
appointment. To be sure, it had no authority to revoke
the said appointment simply because it believed that
the private respondent was better qualified for that
would have constituted an encroachment on the
discretion vested solely in the city mayor.

In preferring the private respondent to the petitioner,

the Commission was probably applying its own Rule V,
Section 9, of Civil Service Rules on Personnel Actions
and Policies, which provides that "whenever there are
two or more employees who are next-in-rank,
preference shall be given to the employee who is most
competent and qualified and who has the appropriate
civil service eligibility." This rule is inapplicable,
however, because neither of the claimants is next in
rank. Moreover, the next-in rank rule is not absolute as
the Civil Service Decree allows vacancies to be filled by
transfer of present employees, reinstatement,
reemployment, or appointment of outsiders who have
the appropriate eligibility.