Padua vs. People, G.R. No.

220913, February 04, 2019

Facts:

 Juanito A. Tio (Tio), in his capacity as representative of Family Choice Grains Processing Center of
Cabatuan, Isabela filed a complaint for estafa against now petitioners Allen Padua ( Padua), Emelita
Pimentel (Pimentel) and Dante Frialde (Frialde), as officials of Nviro Filipino Corporation (Nviro). A Warrant
of Arrest dated August 6, 2010 was issued. Four years after, petitioners Padua and Pimentel filed an
Omnibus Motion Ex-Abundante Ad Cautelam (to Quash Warrant of Arrest and to Fix Bail).

 Respondents asserted that while petitioners were indeed charged with estafa under par. 2(a), Art. 315 of
the RPC which is bailable, bail cannot still be granted to them who are at large. They claimed that under
the law, accused must be in the custody of the law regardless of whether bail is a matter of right or
discretion.

Issue: Is an accused, who is at-large, allowed to file a “Motion to Quash Warrant of Arrest and to Fix Bail”?

Ruling: YES

 It must be clarified that petitioners' Omnibus Motion Ex- Abundante Ad Cautelam (to Quash Warrant of
Arrest and to Fix Bail) is not an application for bail. They were neither applying for bail, nor were they
posting bail. In filing the subject Omnibus Motion Ex-Abundante Ad Cautelam (to Quash Warrant of Arrest
and to Fix Bail), petitioners are questioning the court's jurisdiction with precaution and praying that the
court fix the amount of bail because they believed that their right to bail is a matter of right, by operation
of law. They are not applying for bail, therefore, custody of the law, or personal appearance is not
required. To emphasize, custody of the law is required before the court can act upon the application for
bail but it is not required for the adjudication of other reliefs sought by the accused, as in the instant
omnibus motion to quash warrant of arrest and to fix bail.

NOTES:

 To recapitulate, in the instant case, petitioners filed an Omnibus Motion Ex Abundante Ad Cautelam (to
Quash Warrant of Arrest and to Fix Bail) wherein it is not required that petitioners be in the custody of the
law, because the same is not an application for bail where custody of the law is required. Moreover, to
reiterate, when bail is a matter of right, the fixing of bail is ministerial on the part of the trial judge even
without the appearance of the accused. They must be admitted to bail as they are entitled to it as a
matter of right.
 However, it must be further clarified that after the amount of bail has been fixed, petitioners, when
posting the required bail, must be in the custody of the law. They must make their personal appearance in
the posting of bail. It must be emphasized that bail, whether a matter of right or of discretion, cannot be
posted before custody of the accused has been acquired by the judicial authorities either by his arrest or
voluntary surrender, or personal appearance. This is so because if We allow the granting of bail to persons
not in the custody of the law, it is foreseeable that many persons who can afford the bail will remain at
large, and could elude being held to answer for the commission of the offense if ever he is proven guilty.
Fernandez vs, People, G.R. No. 241557, December 11, 2019

Facts:

 A case of frustrated murder was filed against Fernandez.

 Garino and an unknown companion were seated inside a jeepney which was parked in front of
Fernandez's house, when Garino saw someone go out of the gate. When they heard a gunshot, they
immediately alighted from the jeepney, and it was then that Garino saw that the person who fired the
shot was Fernandez, though he did not know the latter's name at the time. As the two ran away,
Fernandez fired his gun a second time, hitting Garino on his right gluteal area, or "buttocks" in layman's
terms. Garino was then brought to the Ospital ng Makati.
 The RTC then convicted Fernandez which the CA affirmed.

Issue: Has the prosecution overcome the presumption of innocence or is the accused entitled to an acquittal on
reasonable doubt?

Ruling: The accused is entitled to an acquittal on reasonable doubt.

 The tale of this case's tape is that the prosecution relied solely on Garino's testimony that Fernandez was
the one who shot him. Aside from his positive identification, which the Court finds too unconvincing, no
legitimate and convincing evidence was offered to prove the veracity of the events as Garino alleges. With
this, Fernandez's justification of alibi finds stronger ground, and the Court is thus obliged to favor it while
taking into absolute consideration the promise that reasonable doubt is sufficient to acquit an accused
individual of the crime.

 Our laws proscribe the conviction of the accused if doubt taints the circumstances of the crime. And, for
good reason. A man's life and liberty are not aspects to be trifled with, which is why only the most
exacting standard is required in order to find a person criminally liable. In this case, more than just
reasonable doubt is attendant to the circumstances of the crime alleged. While the Court does not deny
that Garino indeed suffered a grievous injury, the Court does heavily question if Fernandez was the one
who inflicted it. This doubt is enough to sway the mind of the Court and acquit Fernandez. Fernandez is
entitled to an acquittal, as a matter of right, because the prosecution has failed to prove his guilt beyond
reasonable doubt.
People vs Parojinog, G.R. No. 233063, February 11, 2019

Facts:

 In an anonymous letter dated August 23, 2010, the Ombudsman was requested to conduct an
investigation against respondents Reynaldo 0. Parojinog, Sr., then Mayor of Ozamiz City, Misamis
Occidental, and Nova Princess E. Parojinog-Echavez, Mayor Parojinog's daughter, for possible violation of
Section 3(h) of Republic Act No. (RA) 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
Six years later, an Information for violation of Section 3(h) of RA 3019 against respondents was filed with
the Sandiganbayan. Respondent Mayor Parojinog filed his Motion to Quash contending that the facts
alleged in the Information did not constitute an offense warranting the quashal thereof and that their
right to a speedy disposition of cases had been violated.

 The Sandiganbayan dismissed the case because there was a violation of respondents' right to a speedy
disposition of cases. It took into consideration the period from the receipt by the Office of the
Ombudsman Mindanao of the anonymous letter complaint up to the filing of the Information in this case,
which amounted to a total of five (5) years and eleven (11) months; that the delay could not be ignored by
separating the fact-finding investigation from the conduct of preliminary investigations as all stages to
which the accused was exposed should be included; that there was no explanation offered for such delay.
The Sandiganbayan found that respondents had raised the issue of the violation of their right to a speedy
disposition of cases in their motion for reconsideration of the Resolution finding probable cause; and even
if they did not, there was no need to follow up their case.

Issue: Was respondent’s constitutional right to the speedy disposition of cases violated?

Ruling: NO

 The doctrinal rule is that in the determination of whether that right has been violated, the factors that
may be considered and balanced are as follows: (1) the length of delay; (2) the reasons for the delay; (3)
the assertion or failure to assert such right by the accused; and (4) the prejudice caused by the delay.

 The period devoted for fact-finding investigations before the filing of the formal complaint is not included
in the determination of whether there has been inordinate delay. Hence, in this case, the period from the
receipt of the anonymous complaint by the Office of the Ombudsman Mindanao, on August 23, 2010,
until December 7, 2014 should not be considered in the determination of the presence of inordinate
delay.

 The reckoning point to determine if there had been inordinate delay should start to run from the filing of
the formal complaint with the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao, on December 8, 2014, up to the filing
of the Information on November 23, 2016.

 We find that the period from the filing of the formal complaint to the subsequent conduct of the
preliminary investigation was not attended by vexatious, capricious, and oppressive delays as would
constitute a violation of respondents' right to a speedy disposition of cases. We find the period of less
than two years not to be unreasonable or arbitrary. In fact, respondents did not raise any issue as to the
violation of their right to a speedy disposition of cases until the Issuance of the Ombudsman's Resolution
finding probable cause.