Case Title:

GR Number:
Promulgation Date:
Ponente:
Nature of the Action:

Name of the parties: (and their respective role in the case):

Petitioner:
Respondent:
Third person (Mortgagor, Assignor): if available

Topic and Applicable Articles: See syllabus

Canon 5, Section 5 – Judges shall require lawyers in proceedings before the court to
refrain from manifesting, by words or conduct, bias or prejudice based on irrelevant
grounds, except such as are legally relevant to an issue in proceedings and may be the
subject of legitimate advocacy.

Doctrine/s:
1.
2.

Facts: (Instead of using respondent and petitioner use the name please :))
-

Contentions of the PETITIONER/PLAINTIFF (Indicate the name):

1.
2.

Contention of the RESPONDENT/DEFENDANT (Indicate the name):

1.
2.

Ruling of Lower Courts: Denied/Granted - brief basis

General Issue:

Whether or not………….. - YES.

Controlling Issue:

Whether or not………….. - YES.

Ruling:
Basis of the ruling. (Cite the law or previous jurisprudence):

Application of the ruling in the case:

Ratio:

CASE TITLE

1. Pesigan v, Angeles, 129 SCRA 174, April 30, 1984

2. People v. Veridiano, 132 SCRA 523, October 12, 1984

People vs. Veridiano II

G.R. No. L-62243
October 12, 1984
Relova, J.
Petition to review the order of the CFI Zambales

Petitioner: People of the Philippines

Respondents: Hon. Regino Veridiano II, Presiding Judge of CFI Zambales & Olongapo City, Br.
1 & Benito Go Bio, Jr.

Topic and Applicable Articles:

Article 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication
in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided. This Code shall take effect one year after
such publication.

Doctrine/s:
The penal statute was made public only on June 14, 1979 and not on the printed date April 9,
1979. June 14, 1979 was the date of publication of B.P. Blg. 22. Before the public may be bound
by its contents, especially its penal provisions, the law must be published and the people
officially informed of its contents and/or its penalties.

FACTS:
On the 2nd week of May 1979, Bio issued a check in the amount of P200,000.00 to Filipinas
Tan, but said check was dishonored for the reason that the Benitio Bio has no sufficient funds
with the said bank and despite repeated demands on Bio to redeem the said check or pay the
amount, the latter failed to pay.

Bio was charged with violation of BP 22 in Criminal Case No. 5396 in the then Court of First
Instance of Zambales, presided by judge Veridiano. Bio filed a Motion to Quash the information
on the ground that the information did not charge an offense, pointing out that at the alleged
commission of the offense, which was about 2nd week of May 1979, BP 22 has not yet taken
effect.

The prosecution opposed the motion contending, among others, that the date of the dishonor of
the check, which is on September 26, 1979, is the date of the commission of the offense; and that
assuming that the effectivity of the law — BP 22 — is on June 29, 1979, considering that the
offense was committed on September 26, 1979, the said law is applicable.

RULING OF CFI: Judge Veridiano granted Go Bio's motion and dismissed the criminal action.
Hence, this petition.

PROSECUTION’S CONTENTION:

BP 22 was published in the Official Gazette on April 4, 1979, and hence became
effective15 days thereafter or on April 24, 1979.

BIO’S CONTENTION:

He contends that said publication was only released on June 14, 1979 but since the
questioned check was issued about the second week of May 1979, then he could not have
violated BP 22 because it was not yet released for circulation at the time.

CONTROLLING ISSUE:

Whether or not BP 22 was already in effect at the time of the commission of the offense? No.

RULING:

A. BASIS OF THE RULING:

Article 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication
in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided. This Code shall take effect one year after
such publication.

B. APPLICATION OF THE RULING IN THE CASE:

The Solicitor General admitted the certification issued by Ms. Charito A. Mangubat, Copy Editor
of the Official Gazette Section of the Government Printing Office, stating therein that the
publication was released for circulation of June 14, 1979

It is therefore certain that the penal statute in question was made public only on June 14, 1979
and not on the printed date April 9, 1979. Differently stated, June 14, 1979 was the date of
publication of BP 22. Accordingly, before the public may be bound by its contents, especially
its penal provisions, the law must be published and the people officially informed of its contents
and/or its penalties. For, if a statute had not been published before its violation, then in the eyes
of the law there was no such law to be violated and, consequently, the accused could not have
committed the alleged crime.

The term "publication" in such clause should be given the ordinary accepted meaning, that is, to
make known to the people in general. If the Batasang Pambansa had intended to make the
printed date of issue of the Gazette as the point of reference in determining the effectivity of the
statute in question, then it could have so stated in the special effectivity provision of BP 22.

In this case, when Go Bio, Jr. committed the act, complained of in the Information as criminal, in
May 1979, there was then no law penalizing such act. Following the special provision of Batas
Pambansa Bilang 22, it became effective only on June 29, 1979. As a matter of fact, in May
1979, there was no law to be violated and, consequently, Go Bio, Jr. did not commit any
violation thereof.

Ratio:
Thus, the order of judge Veridiano II is hereby affirmed.

3. Tañada v. Tuvera, 136 SCRA 27 , April 24, 1985

TAÑADA vs. TUVERA
No. L-63915
24 April 1985
ESCOLIN, J.
Petition to review the decision of the Executive Assistant of the President
Petitioners: Lorenzo M. Tañada, Abrahim F. Sarmiento, and the Movement of Attorneys for
Brotherhood, Integrity and Nationalism, Inc. [MABINI]

Respondents: Hon. Juan C. Tuvera (Executive Assistant to the President), Hon. Joaquin Venus
(Deputy Executive Assistant to the President), Melquiades P. Dela Cruz (Director, Malacañang
Records Office), and Florendo S. Pablo (Director, Bureau of Printing).

Topic and Applicable Articles: When do laws take effect?; see Art. 2, NCC and EO 200,
sections 1 & 2.

Doctrine/s:

1. The publication of presidential issuances “of a public nature” or “of general applicability”
is a requirement of due process. It is a rule of law that before a person may be bound by
law, he must first be officially and specifically informed of its contents.
2. The very first clause of Section 1 of Commonwealth Act 638 reads: “There shall be
published in the Official Gazette x x x.” The word “shall” used therein imposes upon
Tuvera et al. an imperative duty. That duty must be enforced if the Constitutional right of
the people to be informed on matters of public concern is to be given substance and
reality. The law itself makes a list of what should be published in the Official Gazette.
Such listing, to our mind, leaves respondents with no discretion whatsoever as to what
must be included or excluded from such publication.

Facts:
Tañada et al. seek a writ of mandamus to compel Tuvera et al. who are all public
officials, to publish, and/or cause the publication in the Official Gazette of various presidential
decrees, letters of instructions, general orders, proclamations, executive orders, letter of
implementation and administrative orders. This is pursuant to the people’s right to be informed
on matters of public concern which is a right recognized in Section 6, Article IV of the 1972
Philippine Constitution, as well as the principle that laws in order to be valid and enforceable
must be published in the Official Gazette or otherwise effectively promulgated.

Contentions of the PETITIONERS (Tañada et al.):

1. Tañada et al. maintain that since the subject of the petition concerns a public right and its
object is to compel the performance of a public duty, they need not show any specific
interest for their petition to be given due course.
 1. Tañada et al. contend that the assailed various presidential decrees, letters of instructions,
general orders, proclamations, executive orders, letter of implementation and
administrative orders must be published in order to take effect.

Contention of the RESPONDENTS (Tuvera et al.):

1. Tuvera et al., though the SolGen, sought to dismiss the case outright on the ground that
Tañada et al. do not have legal personality or standing to institute the current petition,
stating that Tañada et al are not “aggrieved parties” within the meaning of Section 3, Rule
65 of the Rules of Court.

2. Tuvera et al., contend that publication in the Official Gazette is not a sine qua non requirement
for the effectivity of laws where the laws themselves provide for their own effectivity dates. It is
thus submitted that since the presidential issuances in question contain special provisions as to
the date they are to take effect, publication in the Official Gazette is not indispensable for their
effectivity.

Ruling of Lower Courts: N/A

General Issue:

Whether or not Tañada et al. have legal standing to institute the case at bar.
- YES

Controlling Issue:

Whether or not publication in the Official Gazette is a sine qua non requirement for the
effectivity of laws that also provide for their own dates of effectivity.
- YES.

Ruling - General Issue:

A. Basis of the ruling.

In Severino vs. Governor General (1910), the SC held that while the general rule is that “a writ
of mandamus would be granted to a private individual only in those cases where he has some
private or particular interest to be subserved, or some particular right to be protected,
independent of that which he holds with the public at large,” and “it is for the public officers
exclusively to apply for the writ when public rights are to be subserved nevertheless, “when the
question is one of public right and the object of the mandamus is to procure the enforcement of a
public duty, the people are regarded as the real party in interest and the relator at whose
instigation the proceedings are instituted need not show that he has any legal or special interest in
the result, it being sufficient to show that he is a citizen and as such interested in the execution of
the laws.

A. Application of the ruling in the case:

The reasons given by the Court in recognizing a private citizen’s legal personality in Severino
vs. Governor General, apply squarely to the present petition filed by Tañada et al. The right
sought to be enforced by Tañada et al., is a public right recognized by no less than the
fundamental law of the land. If Tañada et al. were not allowed to institute this proceeding, it
would indeed be difficult to conceive of any other person to initiate the same, considering that
the Solicitor General, the government officer generally empowered to represent the people, has
entered his appearance for respondents in this case.

Ruling - Controlling Issue:

A. Basis of the ruling.

The very first clause of Section 1 of Commonwealth Act 638 reads: “There shall be published in
the Official Gazette x x x.” The word “shall” used therein imposes upon Tuvera et al. an
imperative duty. That duty must be enforced if the Constitutional right of the people to be
informed on matters of public concern is to be given substance and reality. The law itself makes
a list of what should be published in the Official Gazette. Such listing, to our mind, leaves
respondents with no discretion whatsoever as to what must be included or excluded from such
publication.

In Peralta vs. COMELEC, the Court held that orders and letters of instructions which all form
part of the law of the land, the requirement of due process and the Rule of Law demand that the
Official Gazette as the official government repository promulgate and publish the texts of all
such decrees, orders and instructions so that the people may know where to obtain their official
and specific contents.

A. Application of the ruling in the case:

The publication of all presidential issuances “of a public nature” or “of general applicability” is
mandated by law. Obviously, presidential decrees that provide for fines, forfeitures or penalties
for their violation or otherwise impose a burden on the people, such as tax and revenue measures,
fall within this category. Other presidential issuances which apply only to particular persons or
class of persons such as administrative and executive orders need not be published on the
assumption that they have been circularized to all concerned.

It is needless to add that the publication of presidential issuances “of a public nature” or “of
general applicability” is a requirement of due process. It is a rule of law that before a person may
be bound by law, he must first be officially and specifically informed of its contents.

And so, the Court therefore declares that presidential issuances of general application, which
have not been published, shall have no force and effect.

Ratio: WHEREFORE, the Court hereby orders Tuvera et al. to publish in the Official Gazette all
unpublished presidential issuances which are of general application, and unless so published,
they shall have no binding force and effect.

4. Commissioner of Customs v. Hypermix Feeds, G.R. No. 179579, February 1, 2012

Commissioner of Customs v. Hypermix Feeds
G.R. No. 179579,
February 1, 2012
SERENO, J.
Petition for Review under Rule 45,
assailing the DecisioN of the Court CA, which nullified the Customs Memorandum Order
(CMO) on the tariff classification of wheat issued by petitioner Commissioner of Customs

Petitioner: COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS and the DISTRICT COLLECTOR OF THE

PORT OF SUBIC
Respondent: Hypermix Feeds Corporation

Topic and Applicable Articles:

When do laws take effect? NCC 2; RAC Secs. 18-24; Exec. Order 200 Sec. 1 & 2
Doctrine/s:
When an administrative rule is merely interpretative in nature, its applicability needs
nothing further than its bare issuance, for it gives no real consequence more than what the law
itself has already prescribed. When, on the other hand, the administrative rule goes beyond
merely providing for the means that can facilitate or render least cumbersome the
implementation of the law but substantially increases the burden of those governed, it behooves
the agency to accord at least to those directly affected a chance to be heard, and thereafter to be
duly informed, before that new issuance is given the force and effect of law.

Facts:
ON November 7 2003, Petitioner Commissioner of Customs issued CMO 27-2003
(Customs Memorandum Order). Under the memorandum, for tariff purposes, wheat is classified
according to: 1. Importer or consignee, 2. Country of origin, and 3. Port of discharge. Depending
on these factors wheat would be classified as either as food grade or food feed. The
corresponding tariff for food grade wheat was 3%, for food feed grade 7%.
A month after the issuance of CMO 27-200 respondent filed a petition for declaratory for
Relief with the RTC of Las Piñas City.

Petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss. They alleged that: 1. The RTC did not have jurisdiction
over the subject matter of the case, 2. an action for declaratory relief (Rule 63, Sec.1 “who may
file petition”) was improper, 3. CMO 27-2003 was internal administrative rule not legislative in
nature, and 4. The claims of respondent were speculative and premature, because the Bureau of
Customs had yet to examine respondent’s products.
RTC held that a petition for declaratory relief was proper remedy, and that respondent
was the proper party to file it.

Contentions of the RESPONDENT:

Hypermix Feeds Corporation contented that CMO 27-2003 was issued without following the
mandate of the Revised Administrative Code on public participation, prior notice, and
publication or registration with University of the Philippines Law Canter.
Respondent also alleged that the regulation summarily adjudged it to be a feed grade supplier
without the benefit of prior assessment and examination, despite having imported food grade
wheat, it would be subjected to the 7% tariff upon the arrival of the shipment, forcing to pay
133%.
Respondent also claimed that the equal protection clause of the Constitution was violated and
asserted that the retroactive application of the regulation was confiscatory in nature.

Contention of the RESPONDENT/DEFENDANT:

COMMISSIONER OF CUSTOMS filed a Motion to Dismiss.
They alleged that: The RTC did not have jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case, An
action for declaratory relief (Rule 63, Sec.1 “who may file petition”) was improper, CMO 27-
2003 was internal administrative rule not legislative in nature, and that the claims of respondent
were speculative and premature, because the Bureau of Customs had yet to examine respondent’s
products.
Ruling of Lower Courts:
RTC ruled in favor of the respondent declaring CMO 27-2003 as INVALID and OF NO FORCE
AND EFFECT, citing the petitioner’s failure to follow the basic requirements of hearing and
publication in the issuance of the CMO.
Petitioners appealed to the CA, raising the same allegations in defense of CMO 27-2003.
CA dismissed the appeal, holding that the regulation affected substantial rights of petitioners and
other importers and that the petitioners should have observed the requirements of notice, hearing
and publication.

General Issue:

Whether or not the CMO 27-2003 of the petitioner met the requirements under the Revised
Administrative Code on on public participation, prior notice, and publication or registration with
University of the Philippines Law Canter and may therefore enforce the CMO 27-2003 for tariff
on wheat?

Ruling:

Basis of the ruling.

The regulation affects the substantive rights of respondent, therefore petitioners should have
applied the pertinent provisions of Book VII, Chapter 2 of the Revised Administrative Code, to
wit:
“Section 3. Filing.—(1) Every agency shall file with the University of the Philippines Law
Center three (3) certified copies of every rule adopted by it. Rules in force on the date of
effectivity of this Code which are not filed within three (3) months from that date shall not
thereafter be the bases of any sanction against any party of persons.
Section 9. Public Participation.—(1) If not otherwise required by law, an agency shall, as far as
practicable, publish or circulate notices of proposed rules and afford interested parties the
opportunity to submit their views prior to the adoption of any rule.
(2) In the fixing of rates, no rule or final order shall be valid unless the proposed rates shall have
been published in a newspaper of general circulation at least two (2) weeks before the first
hearing thereon.
(3) In case of opposition, the rules on contested cases shall be observed.”

In Tañada v. Tuvera, we held:“The clear object of the above-quoted provision is to give

the general public adequate notice of the various laws which are to regulate their actions and
conduct as citizens. Without such notice and publication, there would be no basis for the
application of the maxim “ignorantia legis non excusat.” It would be the height of injustice to
punish or otherwise burden a citizen for the transgression of a law of which he had no notice
whatsoever, not even a constructive one.

Application of the ruling in the case:

SC denied the petition.
Petitioners failed to follow the requirements enumerated by the Revised Administrative
Code, the assailed regulation must be struck down.
When an administrative rule is merely interpretative in nature, its applicability needs
nothing further than its bare issuance, for it gives no real consequence more than what the law
itself has already prescribed. When, on the other hand, the administrative rule goes beyond
merely providing for the means that can facilitate or render least cumbersome the
implementation of the law but substantially increases the burden of those governed, it behooves
the agency to accord at least to those directly affected a chance to be heard, and thereafter to be
duly informed, before that new issuance is given the force and effect of law

5. Nagkakaisang Maralita v. Military Shrine Services, G. R. No. 187587, June 05, 2013
6. Kasilag v. Rodriques, 69 Phil 217

MARCIAL KASILAG, petitioner,

vs.

RAFAELA RODRIGUEZ, URBANO ROQUE, SEVERO MAPILISAN and

IGNACIO DEL ROSARIO, respondents.

GR Number: G.R. No. 46623

Promulgation Date: December 7, 1939

Ponente: J. Imperial

Nature of the Action

Name of the parties:

Petitioner: MARCIAL KASILAG

Respondent: RAFAELA RODRIGUEZ, URBANO ROQUE, SEVERO MAPILISAN and

IGNACIO DEL ROSARIO

Topic and Applicable Article: Article 3 – (Ignorance of the Law): Ignorance of the law excuses
no one from compliance therewith.

Doctrine: POSSESSION IN GOOD FAITH. — It is a fact that the petitioner is not conversant
with the laws because he is not a lawyer. In accepting the mortgage of the improvements he
proceeded on the well-grounded belief that he was not violating the prohibition regarding the
alienation of the land. In taking possession thereof and in consenting to receive its fruits, he did
not know, as clearly as a jurist does, that the possession and enjoyment of the fruits are attributes
of the contract of antichresis and that the latter, as a lien, was prohibited by section 116. These
considerations again bring us to the conclusion that, as to the petitioner, his ignorance of the
provisions of section 116 is excusable and may, therefore, be the basis of his good faith. We do
not give much importance to the change of the tax declaration, which consisted in making the
petitioner appear as the owner of the land, because such an act may only be considered as a
sequel to the change of possession and enjoyment of the fruits by the petitioner, about which we
have stated that the petitioner’s ignorance of the law is possible and excusable. We, therefore,
hold that the petitioner acted in good faith in taking possession of the land and enjoying its fruits.

Facts:

On May 16, 1932 Emiliana Ambrosio, in life, and the petitioner executed the following public
deed: "This agreement, made and entered into this 16th day of May, 1932, by and between
Emiliana Ambrosio, Filipino, of legal age, widow and resident of Limay, Bataan, P. I.,
hereinafter called the party of the first part, and Marcial Kasilag, Filipino, of legal age, married
to Asuncion Roces, and resident at 312 Perdigon Street, Manila, P. I., hereinafter called party of
the second part.

"WITNESSETH: That the parties hereto hereby covenant and agree to and with
each other as follows:

"ARTICLE I. That the party of the first part is the absolute registered owner of a
parcel of land in the barrio of Alañgan, municipality of Limay, Province of
Bataan, her title thereto being evidenced by homestead certificate of title No. 325
issued by the bureau of Lands on June 11, 1931, said land being lot No. 285 of the
Limay Cadastre, General Land Registration Office Cadastral Record No. 1054,
bounded and described as follows.

"ARTICLE II. That the improvements on the above described land consist of the
following:

"Four (4) mango trees, fruit bearing: one hundred ten (110) hills of bamboo trees;
one (1) tamarind and six (6) bonga trees.

"ARTICLE III. That the assessed value of the land is P940 and the assessed value
of the improvements is P860, as evidenced by tax declaration No. 3531 of the
municipality of Limay, Bataan.

"ARTICLE IV. That for and in consideration of the sum of one thousand pesos
(P1,000) Philippine currency, paid by the party of second part to the party of the
first part, receipt whereof is hereby acknowledged, the party of the first part
hereby encumbers and hypothecates, by way of mortgage, only the improvements
described in Articles II and III hereof, of which improvements the party of the
first part is the absolute owner.

"ARTICLE V. That the condition of said mortgage is such that if the party of the
first part shall well and truly pay, or cause to be paid to the party of the second
part, his heirs, assigns, or executors, on or before the 16th day of November,
1936, or four and one-half (41) years after date of the execution of this
instrument, the aforesaid sum of one thousand pesos (P1,000) with interest at 12
Per cent per annum, then said mortgage shall be and become null and void;
otherwise the same shall be and shall remain in full force and effect, and subject
to foreclosure in the manner and form provided by law for the amount due
thereunder, with costs and also attorney’s fees in the event of such foreclosure.

"ARTICLE VI. That the party of the first part shall pay all taxes and assessments
which are or may become due on the above described land and improvements
during the term of this agreement
 "ARTICLE VII. That within thirty (30) days after date of execution of this
agreement, the party of the first part shall file a motion before the Court of First
Instance at Balanga, Bataan, P. I., requesting cancellation of Homestead
Certificate of Title No. 325 referred to in Article I hereof and the issuance, in lieu
thereof, of a certificate of title under the provisions of Land Registration Act No.
496, as amended by Act 3901.

"ARTICLE VIII. It is further agreed that if upon the expiration of the period of
time (4½) years stipulated in this mortgage, the mortgagor should fail to redeem
this mortgage, she would execute a deed of absolute sale of the property herein
described for the same amount as this mortgage, including all unpaid interests at
the rate of 12 per cent per annum, in favor of the mortgagee.

"ARTICLE IX. That in the event the contemplated motion under Article VII
hereof is not approved by the Court, the foregoing contract of sale shall
automatically become null and void, and the mortgage stipulated under Article IV
and V shall remain in full force and effect. "In testimony whereof, the parties
hereto have hereunto set their hands the day and year first hereinbefore written.

One year after the execution of the aforequoted deed, that is, in 1933, it came to pass that
Emiliana Ambrosio was unable to pay the stipulated interest as well as the tax on the land and its
improvements. For this reason, she and the petitioner entered into another verbal contract
whereby she conveyed to the latter the possession of the land on condition that the latter would
not collect the interest on the loan, would attend to the payment of the land tax, would benefit by
the fruits of the land, and would introduce improvements thereon. By virtue of this verbal
contract, the petitioner entered upon the possession of the land, gathered the products thereof, did
not collect the interest on the loan, introduced improvements upon the land valued at P5,000,
according to him and on May 22, 1934 the tax declaration was transferred in his name and on
March 6, 1936 the assessed value of the land was in- creased from P1,020 to P2,180.

CA modified decision of CFI.

eld: that the contract, Exhibit "1" is entirely null and void and without effect; that the plaintiffs-
respondents, then appellants, are the owners of the disputed land, with its improvements, in
common ownership with their brother Gavino Rodriguez, hence, they are entitled to the
possession thereof; that the defendant-petitioner should yield possession of the land in their
favor, with all the improvements thereon and free from any lien; that the plaintiffs-respondents
jointly and severally pay to the defendant-petitioner the sum of P1,000 with interest at 6 per cent
per annum from the date of the decision; and absolved the plaintiffs-respondents from the cross-
complaint relative to the value of the improvements claimed by the defendant-petitioner. The
appealed decision also ordered the registrar of deeds of Bataan to cancel certificate of title No.
325, in the name of the deceased Emiliana Ambrosio and to issue in lieu thereof another
certificate of title in favor of the plaintiffs-respondents and their brother Gavino Rodriguez, as
undivided owners in equal parts, free of all liens and incumbrances except those expressly
provided by law, without special pronouncement as to the costs.

Contention of the Petitioner/Plaintiff: (indicate name)

1. Rafaela Rodriguez, Urbano Roque, Severo Mapilisan and Ignacio Del Rosario, children
and heirs of the deceased Emiliana Ambrosio, commenced the aforesaid civil case to the end that
they recover from the petitioner the possession of the land and its improvements granted by way
of homestead to Emiliana Ambrosio.

2. Petitioner, Marcial Kasilag, pay to above mentioned heirs the sum of P650 being the
approximate value of the fruits which the former received from the land; that the Kasilag sign all
the necessary documents to transfer the land and its possession to the respondents; that Kasilag
be restrained, during the pendency of the case, from conveying or encumbering the land and its
improvements; that the registrar of deeds of Bataan cancel certificate of title No. 325 and issue in
lieu thereof another in favor of the said heirs, and that Kasilag pay the costs of suit.

Contention of the Respondent/Defendant:

In Kasilag’s special defense alleged that he was in possession of the land and that he was
receiving the fruits thereof by virtue of a mortgage contract, entered into between him and the
deceased Emiliana Ambrosio on May 16, 1932, which was duly ratified by a notary public; and
in counterclaim asked that the respondents pay him the sum of P1,000 with 12 per cent interest
per annum which the deceased owed him and that, should the respondents be declared to have a
better right to the possession of the land, that they be sentenced to pay him the sum of P5,000 as
value of all the improvements which he introduced upon the land

Ruling of CFI: Granted – Basis

Ruling of Court of Appeals: Modified decision of CFI.

After an analysis of the conditions of Exhibit "1" the Court of Appeals came to the
conclusion and so held that the contract entered into by and between the parties, set out in the
said public deed, was one of absolute purchase and sale of the land and its improvements. And
upon this ruling it held null and void and without legal effect the entire Exhibit 1 as well as the
subsequent verbal contract entered into between the parties, ordering, however, the respondents
to pay to the petitioner, jointly and severally, the loan of P1,000, with legal interest at 6 per cent
per annum from the date of the decision

General Issue: W/N – Yes

Controlling Issue: W/N Kasilag is deemed in possessor in good faith of the land, based upon
Article 3 of the New Civil code: Ignorance of the law excuses no one from compliance
therewith.

Ruling

a. For all the foregoing considerations, the appealed decision is reversed, and we hereby
adjudge: (1) that the contract of mortgage of the improvements, set out in Exhibit 1, is valid and
binding (2) that the contract of antichresis agreed upon verbally by the parties is a real
incumbrance which burdens the land and, as such, is null and without effect; (3) that the
petitioner is a possessor in good faith; (4) that the respondents may elect to have the
improvements introduced by the petitioner by paying the latter the value thereof, P3,000, or to
compel the petitioner to buy and have the land where the improvements or plants are found, by
paying them its market value to be fixed by the court of origin, upon hearing the parties; (5) that
the respondents have a right to the possession of the land and to enjoy the mortgaged
improvements; and (6) that the respondents may redeem the mortgage of the improvements by
paying to the petitioner within three months the amount of P1,000, without interest, as that
stipulated is set off by the value of the fruits of the mortgaged improvements which the petitioner
received; and in default thereof the petitioner may ask for the public sale of said improvements
for the purpose of applying the proceeds thereof to the payment of his said credit. Without
special pronouncement as to the costs in all instances. So ordered

b. Application of the ruling in the case: The petitioner being a possessor in good faith
within the meaning of article 433 of the Civil Code and having introduced the improvements
upon the land as such, the provisions of article 361 of the same Code are applicable; wherefore,
the respondents are entitled to have the improvements and plants upon indemnifying the
petitioner the value thereof which we fix at P3,000, as appraised by the trial court; or the
respondents may elect to compel the petitioner to have the land by paying its market value to be
fixed by the court of origin.

Ratio:
REASONING: Sec 433 of the Civil Code of the Philippines provides “Every person who is
unaware of any flaw in his title or in the manner of its acquisition by which it is invalidated shall
be deemed a possessor of good faith.” And in this case, the petitioner acted in good faith. Good
faith maybe a basis of excusable ignorance of the law, the petitioner acted in good faith in his
enjoyment of the fruits of the land to which was done through his apparent acquisition thereof.

7. Uson v. Del Rosario, 92 Phil. 530

Case Title: Uson v. Del Rosario

GR Number: No. L-4963
Promulgation Date: Jan. 29,1953
Ponente: Justice Bautista Angelo
Nature of the Action: Recovery of Ownership and Possession

Name of the parties: (and their respective role in the case):

Petitioner: Maria Uson

Respondent: Maria Del Rosario, Concepcion Nebreda, Conrado Nebreda, Dominador Nebreda,
and Faustino Nebreda Jr.

Topic and Applicable Articles: See syllabus

1. Retroactivity – Art. 2253

Doctrine/s:
1. Rights declared for the first time shall have retroactive effect even though the event which
gave rise to them may have occurred under the former legislation, only when the new rights do
not prejudice any vested or acquired right of the same origin.

Facts: Maria Uson was the lawful wife of Faustino Nebreda, who upon his death left the lands
involved in this litigation. When he died in 1945 his common law wife Maria Del Rosario took
possession of said lands. Maria Uson filed an action for the recovery of the ownership and
possession of five (5) parcels of land against Maria Del Rosario and her four minor children
named Concepcion, Conrado, Dominador and Faustino, all surnamed Nebreda.

Contentions of the PETITIONER/PLAINTIFF (Maria Uson):

1. Maria Uson as Faustino’s legal wife is heir to the properties.
2. Maria Uson posited that Maria Del Rosario took possession illegally of said lands thus
depriving her of their possession and enjoyment.
Contention of the RESPONDENT/DEFENDANT (Maria Del Rosario):
1. Maria Del Rosario set up as a special defense that Maria Uson and her husband, the late
Faustino Nebreda, executed a public document whereby they agreed to separate at husband and
wife, and in consideration of their separation, Maria Uson was given a parcel of land by way of
alimony.
2. In return, Maria Uson was said to have renounced her right to inherit

Ruling of Lower Courts: Court ordered defendants to restore to Uson the ownership and
possession of the lands in dispute.

General Issue:
Whether or not Maria Uson had relinquished her right over the lands in question – No.

Controlling Issue:
Whether or not the illegitimate children of the late Faustino Nebreda are entitled to
successional rights, which the New Civil Code accords to them. - No

Ruling:
a. Basis of the ruling. (Cite the law or previous jurisprudence): Art. 2253
provides indeed that rights which are declared for the first time shall have
retroactive effect even though the event that gave rise to them may have
occurred under the former legislation, but only so when the new rights do no
prejudice any vested or acquired right of the same origin.

b. Application of the ruling in the case: In this case, Faustino Nebreda died in
1945 much prior to the effectivity of the new Civil Code. At the moment of
death the five (5) parcels of land passed to his only heir, his widow Maria
Uson. From that moment, the rights of inheritance of Maria Uson over the
lands in question became vested. The new right recognized in the new Civil
Code in favor of the illegitimate children of the deceased cannot be asserted to
the impairment of the vested right of Maria Uson over the lands in dispute.

Ratio: The new right in the new Civil Code that recognized illegitimate children of the
deceased cannot be asserted because the widow, Maria Uson, has vested rights over the
lands in dispute when her husband died before the effectivity of the new Civil Code, even if
the new Civil Code provides for retroactivity.
Decision of the lower court is affirmed.

8. Acosta v. Plan, 169 SCRA 591 , January 30, 1989

9. Spouses Dacudao v. Gonzales, G.R. No. 188056, January 8, 2013
10. BPI v. IAC 164 SCRA 630 , August 19, 1988

Case Title: BANK OF THE PHILIPPINE ISLANDS

vs.

THE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and ZSHORNACK

GR Number: G.R. No. L-66826

Promulgation Date: August 19, 1988

Ponente: CORTES, J.

Nature of the Action:

Name of the parties: (and their respective role in the case):

Petitioner: Bank of the Philippine Islands

Respondent: Intermediate Appellate Court and Rizaldy Zshornack

Topic and Applicable Articles:

1. Acts executed against Mandatory or Prohibitory Law- NCC Art. 5.

Doctrine/s:
1. The transaction between Zshornack and the bank was void having been executed against the
provisions of a mandatory law (CB Circ No. 20). Being in pari delicto, the law cannot afford
either of them remedy.

Facts:

● Rizaldy T. Zshornack and his wife maintained in COMTRUST a dollar savings account
and a peso current account. An application for a dollar draft was accomplished by
Virgillo Garcia branch manager of COMTRUST payable to a certain Leovigilda Dizon.
In the application, Garcia indicated that the amount was to be charged to the dollar
savings account of the Zshornacks. There was no indication of the name of the purchaser
of the dollar draft. COMTRUST issued a check payable to the order of Dizon. When
Zshornack noticed the withdrawal from his account, he demanded an explanation from
the bank. In its answer, COMTRUST claimed that the peso value of the withdrawal was
given to Atty. Ernesto Zshornack, brother of Rizaldy. When he encashed with
COMTRUST a cashiers check for P8,450.00 issued by the Manila Banking Corporation
payable to Ernesto.

Contentions of the PETITIONER SCHORNACK:

1. According to Zshornack, he delivered to the bank US $3,000 for safekeeping only.

Contention of the RESPONDENT BPI:

1. BPI comes to this Court praying that it be totally absolved from any liability to Zshornack.
The latter not having appealed the Court of Appeals decision, the issues facing this Court are
limited to the bank's liability with regard to the first and second causes of action and its liability
for damages.

Ruling of Lower Courts: Granted

Rizaldy Zshornack initiated proceedings on June 28,1976 by filing in the Court of First Instance
of Rizal — Caloocan City a complaint against COMTRUST alleging four causes of action.
Except for the third cause of action, the CFI ruled in favor of Zshornack. The bank appealed to
the Intermediate Appellate Court which modified the CFI decision absolving the bank from
liability on the fourth cause of action. The pertinent portions of the judgment, as modified, read:
 IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Court renders judgment as follows:

1. Ordering the defendant COMTRUST to restore to the dollar savings account of

plaintiff (No. 25-4109) the amount of U.S $1,000.00 as of October 27, 1975 to
earn interest together with the remaining balance of the said account at the rate
fixed by the bank for dollar deposits under Central Bank Circular 343;

2. Ordering defendant COMTRUST to return to the plaintiff the amount of U.S.

$3,000.00 immediately upon the finality of this decision, without interest for the
reason that the said amount was merely held in custody for safekeeping, but was
not actually deposited with the defendant COMTRUST because being cash
currency, it cannot by law be deposited with plaintiffs dollar account and
defendant's only obligation is to return the same to plaintiff upon demand;

xxx xxx xxx

5. Ordering defendant COMTRUST to pay plaintiff in the amount of P8,000.00 as

damages in the concept of litigation expenses and attorney's fees suffered by
plaintiff as a result of the failure of the defendant bank to restore to his (plaintiffs)
account the amount of U.S. $1,000.00 and to return to him (plaintiff) the U.S.
$3,000.00 cash left for safekeeping.

General Issue:

Whether or not the contract entered into is depositum - YES.

Controlling Issue:

Whether or not Zschornack can recover from the contract - YES.

Ruling:
a. Basis of the ruling.
Art. 1962. A deposit is constituted from the moment a person receives a thing belonging
to another, with the obligation of safely keeping it and of returning the same. If the
safekeeping of the thing delivered is not the principal purpose of the contract, there is no
deposit but some other contract.

Note that the object of the contract between Zshornack and COMTRUST was foreign exchange.
Hence, the transaction was covered by Central Bank Circular No. 20, Restrictions on Gold and
Foreign Exchange Transactions, promulgated on December 9, 1949, which was in force at the
time the parties entered into the transaction involved in this case. The circular provides:

xxx xxx xxx

2. Transactions in the assets described below and all dealings in them of whatever
nature, including, where applicable their exportation and importation, shall NOT
be effected, except with respect to deposit accounts included in sub-paragraphs (b)
and (c) of this paragraph, when such deposit accounts are owned by and in the
name of, banks.

(a) Any and all assets, provided they are held through, in, or with
banks or banking institutions located in the Philippines, including
money, checks, drafts, bullions bank drafts, deposit accounts
(demand, time and savings), all debts, indebtedness or obligations,
financial brokers and investment houses, notes, debentures, stocks,
bonds, coupons, bank acceptances, mortgages, pledges, liens or
other rights in the nature of security, expressed in foreign
currencies, or if payable abroad, irrespective of the currency in
which they are expressed, and belonging to any person, firm,
partnership, association, branch office, agency, company or other
unincorporated body or corporation residing or located within the
Philippines;

(b) Any and all assets of the kinds included and/or described in
subparagraph (a) above, whether or not held through, in, or with
banks or banking institutions, and existent within the Philippines,
which belong to any person, firm, partnership, association, branch
office, agency, company or other unincorporated body or
corporation not residing or located within the Philippines;

(c) Any and all assets existent within the Philippines including
money, checks, drafts, bullions, bank drafts, all debts, indebtedness
or obligations, financial securities commonly dealt in by bankers,
brokers and investment houses, notes, debentures, stock, bonds,
coupons, bank acceptances, mortgages, pledges, liens or other
rights in the nature of security expressed in foreign currencies, or if
payable abroad, irrespective of the currency in which they are
expressed, and belonging to any person, firm, partnership,
association, branch office, agency, company or other
 unincorporated body or corporation residing or located within the
Philippines.

xxx xxx xxx

4. (a) All receipts of foreign exchange shall be sold daily to the Central Bank by
those authorized to deal in foreign exchange. All receipts of foreign exchange by
any person, firm, partnership, association, branch office, agency, company or
other unincorporated body or corporation shall be sold to the authorized agents of
the Central Bank by the recipients within one business day following the receipt
of such foreign exchange. Any person, firm, partnership, association, branch
office, agency, company or other unincorporated body or corporation, residing or
located within the Philippines, who acquires on and after the date of this Circular
foreign exchange shall not, unless licensed by the Central Bank, dispose of such
foreign exchange in whole or in part, nor receive less than its full value, nor delay
taking ownership thereof except as such delay is customary; Provided, further,
That within one day upon taking ownership, or receiving payment, of foreign
exchange the aforementioned persons and entities shall sell such foreign exchange
to designated agents of the Central Bank.

xxx xxx xxx

8. Strict observance of the provisions of this Circular is enjoined; and any person,
firm or corporation, foreign or domestic, who being bound to the observance
thereof, or of such other rules, regulations or directives as may hereafter be issued
in implementation of this Circular, shall fail or refuse to comply with, or abide by,
or shall violate the same, shall be subject to the penal sanctions provided in the
Central Bank Act.

xxx xxx xxx

Paragraph 4 (a) above was modified by Section 6 of Central Bank Circular No. 281, Regulations
on Foreign Exchange, promulgated on November 26, 1969 by limiting its coverage to Philippine
residents only. Section 6 provides:

SEC. 6. All receipts of foreign exchange by any resident person, firm, company
or corporation shall be sold to authorized agents of the Central Bank by the
recipients within one business day following the receipt of such foreign exchange.
Any resident person, firm, company or corporation residing or located within the
Philippines, who acquires foreign exchange shall not, unless authorized by the
Central Bank, dispose of such foreign exchange in whole or in part, nor receive
 less than its full value, nor delay taking ownership thereof except as such delay is
customary; Provided, That, within one business day upon taking ownership or
receiving payment of foreign exchange the aforementioned persons and entities
shall sell such foreign exchange to the authorized agents of the Central Bank.

As earlier stated, the document and the subsequent acts of the parties show that they intended the
bank to safekeep the foreign exchange, and return it later to Zshornack, who alleged in his
complaint that he is a Philippine resident. The parties did not intend to sell the US dollars to the
Central Bank within one business day from receipt. Otherwise, the contract of depositum would
never have been entered into at all.

b. Application of the ruling in the case:

Since the mere safekeeping of the greenbacks, without selling them to the Central Bank
within one business day from receipt, is a transaction which is not authorized by CB
Circular No. 20, it must be considered as one which falls under the general class of
prohibited transactions. Hence, pursuant to Article 5 of the Civil Code, it is void, having
been executed against the provisions of a mandatory/prohibitory law. More importantly,
it affords neither of the parties a cause of action against the other. "When the nullity
proceeds from the illegality of the cause or object of the contract, and the act constitutes a
criminal offense, both parties being in pari delicto, they shall have no cause of action
against each other. . ." [Art. 1411, New Civil Code.] The only remedy is one on behalf of
the State to prosecute the parties for violating the law.

Ratio: Therefore, the decision appealed from is hereby MODIFIED. Petitioner is ordered to
restore to the dollar savings account of private respondent the amount of US$1,000.00 as of
October 27, 1975 to earn interest at the rate fixed by the bank for dollar savings deposits.
Petitioner is further ordered to pay private respondent the amount of P8,000.00 as damages. The
other causes of action of private respondent are ordered dismissed

11. De Borja v. De Borja, 46 SCRA 577

De Borja v. Vda. de de Borja

GR No. L-28040, No. L-28568, L-28611
August 18, 1972
 J. JBL Reyes
Appeal from a Decision of the CFI of Rizal
(1. L-28040 is an appeal by Tasiana de de Borja, special administratrix of the testate estate of
Francisco de Borja, from the approval of a compromise agreement by the CFI;
2. L-28568 is an appeal by administrator Jose de Borja from the disapproval of the same
compromise agreement by the CFI;
3. L-28611 is an appeal by administrator Jose de Borja from the Decision of the CFI)

Name of the parties: (and their respective role in the case):

Petitioner: Testate Estate of Josefa Tangco, Jose de Borja, administrator-appellee, et al
Respondent: Tasiana Vda. de de Borja, special Administratrix

Topic and Applicable Articles:

Waiver of Rights
1. NCC 6 – Rights may be waived, unless the waiver is contrary to law, public order,
public policy morals, or good customs or prejudicial to a third person with a right
recognized by law
2. NCC 301 – The right to receive support cannot be renounced; nor can it be
transmitted to a third person. Neither can it be compensated with what the recipient
owes the obligor.

Doctrine/s: A Compromise agreement selling the rights of a co-heir is valid.

- “If a sale of a hereditary right can be made to a stranger, then a fortiori sale thereof to a coheir
could not be forbidden.”

Facts:
- Francisco de Borja (Francisco), upon the death of his wife Josefa a Tangco on 6 Oct
1940, filed a petition for the probate of her will.
- Francisco was appointed executor and administrator with his son, Jose de Borja (Jose)
as appointed co-administrator. When Francisco, Jose became the sole administrator of
the testate estate of his mother, Josefa Tangco (Josefa).
- Upon Francisco’s death, Tasiana Ongsingco de de Borja (Tasiana), Francisco’s
second wife instituted testate proceedings in the CFI of Nueva Ecija where she was
appointed special administratrix.
 - The validity of Tasiana’s marriage to Francisco was questioned in the said
proceeding.
- The relationship between the children of the first marriage and Tasiana has been
plagued with several court suits and counter-suits; including the 3 cases at bar – some
18 cases remain pending determination in the courts.
- A compromise agreement was then entered into on 12 Oct 1963 by and between the
heir and son of Francisco by his first marriage, Jose, as administrator, AND the heir
and surviving spouse of Francisco by his second marriage, Tasiana.
(excerpt)
AGREEMENT
xxxx
1. That the parties agree to sell the Poblacion portion of the Jalajala properties etc
2. That Jose agrees to pay Tasiana P800,000.00 x x x – considered as full – complete payment –
settlement of her hereditary share in the estate of the late Francisco as well as the estate of Josefa, x
x x and to any properties bequeathed or devised in her favor by the late Francisco by Last Will and
Testament or by Donation Inter Vivos or Mortis Causa or purportedly conveyed to her for
consideration or otherwise.
(there are 7 of them)

- The Rizal court (where Jose submitted for approval), approved the compromise
agreement but the Nueva Ecija court declared it void and unenforceable.

Contentions of the PETITIONER/PLAINTIFF (Indicate the name):

Plaintiff Tasiana Ongisngo de de Borja (oppositor in the estate of Josefa) – attacks the validity of
the compromise agreement on the ground that:
1. The heirs cannot enter into such kind of agreement without first probating the will of
Francisco;
2. That the same involves a compromise on the validity of the marriage between Francisco
and Tasiana; and
3. Tasiana and the Probate Court of Nueva Ecija rely on Guevara v. Guevara wherein the
Court held that the presentation of a will for probate is mandatory and that the settlement
and distribution of an estate on the basis of intestacy when the decedent left a will, is
against the law and public policy.

Contention of the RESPONDENT/DEFENDANT (Indicate the name):

Jose de Borja:
1. stresses that at the time the compromise agreement was entered into, the governing provisions
was Rule 74, Section 1 of the original Rules of Court of 1940, which allowed the extrajudicial
settlement of the estate of a deceased person regardless of whether he left a will or not.

Ruling of Lower Courts:

CFI of Rizal approved the compromise agreement but the Nueva Ecija Court declared it void.

General Issue: Whether Tasiana could dispose her share in the estate of her late husband. Yes
– by virtue of
Art. 1088. Should any of the heirs sell his hereditary rights to a stranger before the partition, any or all of
the coheirs may be subrogated to the rights of the purchaser by reimbursing him for the price of the
sale, provided they do so within the period of one month from the time they were notified in writing of
the sale of the vendor.”
If a sale of a hereditary right can be made to a stranger, then a fortiori sale thereof to a coheir
could not be forbidden.

Controlling Issue: Whether a compromise agreement selling the rights of a co-heir is valid.
YES

Ruling:
a. Basis of the ruling.
The doctrine of Guevarra vs. Guevarra, which holds that the presentation of a will for
probate is mandatory and that the settlement and distribution of an estate on the basis of
intestacy when the decedent left a will is against the law and public policy, is not applicable
where the clear abject of the settlement was merely the conveyance by the heir of any and all
her individual share and interest, actual or eventual, in the estate of the decedent and not the
distribution of the said estate among the heirs before the probate of the will.

b. Application of the ruling in the case:

Guvara v. Guevara is not applicable because there was no attempt to settle or distribute
the estate of Francisco among the heirs thereto before the probate of his will. The clear object of
the contract was merely the conveyance by Tasiana of any and all her individual share and
interest, actual or eventual, in the estate of Francisco and Josefa.

There is no stipulation as to any other claimant, creditor or legatee. And as hereditary

share in a decedent’s estate is transmitted or vested immediately from the moment of the death of
such causante or predecessor in interest (NCC, Art. 777);
And there is no legal bar to a successor (with requisite contracting capacity) disposing of her or
his hereditary share immediately after such death, even if the actual extent of such share is not
determined until the subsequent liquidation of the estate.
Since the compromise contract was entered into by and between Jose personally and as
administrator of the Testate Estate of Josefa on the one hand, and on the other, the heir and
surviving spouse of Francisco by his second marriage, Tasiana, it is clear that the transaction was
binding on both in their individual capacities, upon the perfection of the contract, even without
previous authority of the Court to enter into the same.
The only difference between an extrajudicial compromise and one that is submitted and
approved by the Court, is that the latter can be enforced by execution proceedings.
Art. 2037. A compromise has upon the parties the effect and authority of res juicata; but
there shall be no execution except in compliance with a judicial compromise.

Ratio:
As owner of her individual share, an heir could dispose of it in favor of whomsoever she
chose, including another heir of the same defendant. Such alienation is expressly recognized
and provided for by Article 1088 of the present Civil Code.

Appealed order of the CFI of Rizal is affirmed; Costs against the appellant Tasiana
Ongsingo Vda. de Borja in all 3 cases.
 12. Asian Cathay Finance v. Sps. Gravador , G.R. No. 186550 July 5, 2010

Case Title: Asian Cathay Finance and Leasing Corporation, Petitioner, vs. Spouses Cesario
Gravador and Norma De Vera and Spouses Emma Concepcion G. Dumigpi and Federico L.
Dumigpi, Respondents.
GR Number: G.R. No. 186550
Promulgation Date: July 5, 2010
Ponente: Nachura, J.:
Nature of the Action:

Name of the parties: (and their respective role in the case):

Petitioner: Asian Cathay Finance and Leasing Corporation

Respondents: Spouses Cesario Gravador and Norma De Vera and Spouses Emma Concepcion G.
Dumigpi and Federico L. Dumigpi

Topic and Applicable Articles: Waiver of Rights

Article 6. Rights may be waived, unless the waiver is contrary to law, public order, public
policy, morals, or good customs, or prejudicial to a third person with a right recognized by law.

Doctrine/s:

Settled is the rule that for a waiver to be valid and effective, it must, in the first place, be couched
in clear and unequivocal terms which will leave no doubt as to the intention of a party to give up
a right or benefit which legally pertains to him. Additionally, the intention to waive a right or an
advantage must be shown clearly and convincingly. (Thomson v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
116631, October 28, 1998, 358 Phil. 761, 778 (1998).

Facts: (Instead of using respondent and petitioner use the name please :))

On October 22, 1999, petitioner Asian Cathay Finance and Leasing Corporation (ACFLC)
extended a loan of Eight Hundred Thousand Pesos (₱800,000.00)4 to respondent Cesario
Gravador, with respondents Norma de Vera and Emma Concepcion Dumigpi as co-makers. To
secure the loan, respondent Cesario executed a real estate mortgage5 over his property in Sta.
Maria, Bulacan, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-29234.
Respondents paid the initial installment due in November 1999. However, they were unable to
pay the subsequent ones. Petitioner filed a petition for extrajudicial foreclosure of mortgage with
the Office of the Deputy Sheriff of Malolos, Bulacan.

On 22 October 1999, Asian Cathay Finance and Leasing Corporation (ACFLC) extended a loan
to Cesario Gravador, Norma De Vera and Emma Dumigpi, secured by a real estate mortgage
executed by Cesario.

After non-payment of the installments other than the first, and a final demand letter, ACFLC
filed a petition for extrajudicial foreclosure with the Office of the Deputy Sheriff of Malolos,
Bulacan.

On 7 April 2000, respondents filed for annulment of the real estate mortgage before the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Malolos, alleging that the real estate mortgage contains a provision on the
waiver of the right of redemption, contrary to law and public policy.

The Regional Trial Court (RTC) ruled in favor of ACFLC in its decision. On appeal, the Court of
Appeals (CA) reversed the decision of the RTC. Hence the present appeal.

Contentions of the PETITIONER (Asian Cathay Finance and Leasing Corporation):

ACFLC next faults the CA for invalidating paragraph 14 of the real estate mortgage which
provides for the waiver of the mortgagor’s right of redemption. It argues that the right of
redemption is a privilege; hence, respondents are at liberty to waive their right of redemption, as
they did in this case.

Contention of the RESPONDENT (Spouses Cesario Gravador and Norma De Vera and
Spouses Emma Concepcion G. Dumigpi and Federico L. Dumigpi):

The real estate mortgage contains a provision on the waiver of the mortgagor’s right of
redemption, a provision that is contrary to law and public policy.

Ruling of Lower Courts: Denied/Granted - brief basis

The RTC rendered a decision, dismissing the complaint for lack of cause of action. The RTC
held that the alleged defects in the promissory note and in the deed of real estate mortgage are
too insubstantial to warrant the nullification of the mortgage. The RTC also upheld the waiver of
respondents’ right of redemption provided in the deed of real estate mortgage.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals (CA) reversed the decision of the RTC. The CA invalidated the
waiver of respondents’ right of redemption for reasons of public policy.

General Issue:

Whether or not the Real Estate Mortgage was valid? NO.

Controlling Issue:

Whether or not there was a valid waiver of the Right of Redemption.

Ruling: The petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals
are AFFIRMED.

a. Basis of the ruling. (Cite the law or previous jurisprudence): Settled is the
rule that for a waiver to be valid and effective, it must, in the first place, be
couched in clear and unequivocal terms which will leave no doubt as to the
intention of a party to give up a right or benefit which legally pertains to him.
Additionally, the intention to waive a right or an advantage must be shown
clearly and convincingly.

Moreover, to say that the mortgagor’s right of redemption may be waived through a
fine print in a mortgage contract is, in the last analysis, tantamount to placing at the
mortgagee’s absolute disposal the property foreclosed. It would render practically
nugatory this right that is provided by law for the mortgagor for reasons of public
policy. A contract of adhesion may be struck down as void and unenforceable for
being subversive to public policy, when the weaker party is completely deprived of
the opportunity to bargain on equal footing. (Thomson v. Court of Appeals, G.R.
No. 116631, October 28, 1998, 358 Phil. 761, 778 (1998).

b. Application of the ruling in the case: This ruling was upheld and applied.

Ratio:

ACFLC failed to convince us that respondents waived their right of redemption voluntarily.
The supposed waiver by the mortgagors was contained in a statement made in fine print in the
REM. It was made in the form and language prepared by [petitioner]ACFLC while the
[respondents] merely affixed their signatures or adhesion thereto. It thus partakes of the nature of
a contract of adhesion. It is settled that doubts in the interpretation of stipulations in contracts of
adhesion should be resolved against the party that prepared them. This principle especially holds
true with regard to waivers, which are not presumed, but which must be clearly and convincingly
shown. [Petitioner] ACFLC presented no evidence hence it failed to show the efficacy of this
waiver.

13. Guingona v. Carague,. 196 SCRA 221 , April 22, 1991

Guingona v. Carague
G.R. No. 94571
April 22, 1991
Gancayo J.:
Petition to review the decision of the Commission on Audit

Petitioner: Teofisto T. Guingona, Jr. and Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr.

Respondent: Hon. Guillermo Carague, in his capacity as Secretary, Budget & Management,
Hon. Rozalina s. Cajucom, in her capacity as National Treasurer and Commission on Audit

Topic and Applicable Articles:

Repeal of laws - NCC 7, 8, 10, 1987 Constitution, Art. XVIII Sec. 3

1. Art. 7. Laws are repealed only by subsequent ones, and their violation or non-
observance shall not be excused by disuse, or custom or practice to the contrary.
When the courts declared a law to be inconsistent with the Constitution, the former shall
be void and the latter shall govern. Administrative or executive acts, orders and
regulations shall be valid only when they are not contrary to the laws or the Constitution.
(5a)
2. Art. XVIII, Sec. 3. All existing laws, decrees, executive orders, proclamations, letters
of instructions, and other executive issuances not inconsistent with this Constitution
shall remain operative until amended, repealed, or revoked.

Doctrine/s:
1. Well-known is the rule that repeal or amendment by implication is frowned upon. Equally
fundamental is the principle that construction of the Constitution and law is generally applied
prospectively and not retrospectively unless it is so clearly stated.

Facts:
- Senator Guingona and Senator Pimentel seek the declaration of the
unconstitutionality of P.D. No. 81, Section 31 of P.D. No. 1177, and P.D. No. 1967.
The petition also seeks to restrain the disbursement for debt service under the 1990
budget pursuant to said decrees.

- Pres. Aquino’s P233.5 billion budget proposed for fiscal year 1990 will include the
contested existing appropriations of P98.4 billion from Automatic Appropriations and
P3.0 billion from Continuing Appropriations

Contentions of the Senators Guingona and Pimentel

1. Petitioners argue that the said automatic appropriations under the aforesaid decrees of then
President Marcos became functus oficio when he was ousted in February, 1986; that upon the
expiration of the one-man legislature in the person of President Marcos, the legislative power
was restored to Congress on February 2, 1987 when the Constitution was ratified by the people;
that there is a need for a new legislation by Congress providing for automatic appropriation.

2. That assuming arguendo that P.D. No. 81, P.D. No. 1177 and P.D. No. 1967 did not expire
with the ouster of President Marcos, after the adoption of the 1987 Constitution, the said decrees
are inoperative under Section 3, Article XVIII which provides—

“Sec. 3. All existing laws, decrees, executive orders, proclamations, letters of instructions, and
other executive issuances not inconsistent with this Constitution shall remain operative until
amended, repealed, or revoked.” (Emphasis supplied.)

Contention of Carague
1. Respondents contend that the petition involves a pure political question which is the repeal or
amendment of said laws addressed to the judgment, wisdom and patriotism of the legislative
body and not this Court.

General Issue:
Whether or not the automatic appropriation is unconstitutional? – NO.
Controlling Issue:
Whether or not PD no. 81, PD no. 1177 and PD no. 1967 still operative under the
constitution? – YES.

Ruling:
 a. Basis of the ruling.
Section 3, Article XVIII of the Constitution recognizes that “All existing laws, decrees,
executive orders, proclamations, letters of instructions and other executive issuances not
inconsistent with the Constitution shall remain operative until amended, repealed or revoked.”

This transitory provision of the Constitution has precisely been adopted by its framers to
preserve the social order so that legislation by the then President Marcos may be recognized.
Such laws are to remain in force and effect unless they are inconsistent with the Constitution or
are otherwise amended, repealed or revoked.

b. Application of the ruling in the case:

An examination of the aforecited presidential decrees show the clear intent that the amounts
needed to cover the payment of the principal and interest on all foreign loans, including those
guaranteed by the national government, should be made available when they shall become due
precisely without the necessity of periodic enactments of separate laws appropriating funds
therefor, since both the periods and necessities are incapable of determination in advance.

The argument of petitioners that the said presidential decrees did not meet the requirement and
are therefore inconsistent with Sections 24 and 27 of Article VI of the Constitution which
requires, among others, that “all appropriations, x x x bills authorizing increase of public debt”
must be passed by Congress and approved by the President is untenable. Certainly, the framers
of the Constitution did not contemplate that existing laws in the statute books including existing
presidential decrees appropriating public money are reduced to mere “bills” that must again go
through the legislative mill. The only reasonable interpretation of said provisions of the
Constitution which refer to “bills” is that they mean appropriation measures still to be passed by
Congress. If the intention of the framers thereof were otherwise they should have expressed their
decision in a more direct or express manner.

Ratio: The Court, therefor, finds that R.A. No. 4860, as amended by P.D. No. 81, Section 31 of
P.D. 1177 and P.D. No. 1967 constitute lawful authorizations or appropriations, unless they are
repealed or otherwise amended by Congress. The Executive was thus merely complying with the
duty to implement the same.

Petition is DISMISSED, without pronouncement as to costs.

Martinez v. Van Buskirk, 18 Phil. 79 , December 27, 1910

 Case Title: Martinez v. Buskirk

GR Number: G.R. No. L-5691

Promulgation Date: December 27, 1910

Ponente: Justice Moreland

Nature of the Action: Torts and Damages

Name of the parties: (and their respective role in the case):

Petitioner: Carmen de Martinez - plaintiff

Respondent: William Buskirk - defendant

Third person (Mortgagor, Assignor): if available

Topic and Applicable Articles: See syllabus

NCC

Article 11. Customs which are contrary to law, public order or public policy shall
not be countenanced. (n)

Article 12. A custom must be proved as a fact, according to the rules of evidence.
(n)

ARTICLE 12, SECTION 5 -CONSTITUTION

SECTION 5. The State, subject to the provisions of this Constitution and national
development policies and programs, shall protect the rights of indigenous
cultural communities to their ancestral lands to ensure their economic, social,
and cultural well-being.

RULES OF COURT: RULE129

Section 2. Judicial notice, when discretionary. — A court may take judicial notice
of matters which are of public knowledge, or are capable to unquestionable
demonstration, or ought to be known to judges because of their judicial
functions. (1a)

Section 3. Judicial notice, when hearing necessary. — During the trial, the court,
on its own initiative, or on request of a party, may announce its intention to take
judicial notice of any matter and allow the parties to be heard thereon.

Facts: (Instead of using respondent and petitioner use the name please :))

Carmen was riding a carromata together with her child. While traversing Calle
Real in Ermita Manila, a delivery wagon coming from the opposite direction and in
great speed collided with the carromata, the carromata overturned which resulted
to injuries of the plaintiff.

Buskirk contend that it was a common practice for the driver of the wagon to
leave the wagon, and help in the unloading of the cargo (feeds of domestic
animals), and because someone whipped the horse, the horse frightened and ran
uncontrollably which result to the injuries of the plaintiff.

Ruling of Lower Courts: Denied/Granted – The lower court granted the claim
asked by the plaintiff and awarded the sum of P400.00
Controlling Issue:

Whether or not the driver can be considered negligent for leaving the horses for
the purpose of unloading?

NO.

Ratio:

The act of defendant's driver in leaving the horses in the manner proved was not
unreasonable or imprudent. Acts the performance of which has not proved destructive
or injurious and which have, therefore, been acquiesced in by society for so long a time
that they have ripened into custom, cannot be held to be themselves unreasonable or
imprudent. Indeed the very reason why they have been permitted by society is that they
beneficial rather than prejudicial. Accidents sometimes happen and injuries result from
the most ordinary acts of life. But such are not their natural or customary results. To
hold that, because such an act once resulted in accident or injury, the actor is
necessarily negligent, is to go far.

14. Armigos v. Ca 179, SCRA 1 , November 6, 1989

15. Namarco v. Teczon, 29 SCRA 70 , August 27, 1969

National Marketing Corp. v Tecson

GR Number: L-291131
August 27, 1969
Concepcion. C.J.

Name of the parties:

Petitioner: National Marketing Corporation
Respondent: Miguel D. Tecson, et al.,

Topic and Applicable Articles: See syllabus

1. Art. 13, Civil Code: When the law speak of years, months, days or nights, It shall be
understood that years are of three hundred sixty-five days each; months, of thirty days; days, of
twenty-four hours; and nights from sunset to sunrise.

Doctrine/s:
1.A year Is counted as 365 days. When counting the prescriptive period this should be applied
rather than the calendar year

Facts:
- On Nov, 14, 1955, the CFI of Manila rendered judgement In a civil case entitled “Price
Stabilization Corporation vs. Miguel D. Tecson and Alto Surety and Insurance Co.” The court
ruled In favor of the petitioners In said case and held Tecson liable for Php 7,200. The decision
became final on Dec. 21, 1955
- National Marketing Corp. (Namarco) succeeded Price stabilization corp. for Its properties
and assets
- On Dec. 21, 1965, Namarco sought to revive the judgement In the previous civil case.
- Tecson moved to dismiss on the basis of prescription of the action.
- The center of the controversy Is the date when the action prescribed. What Is 10 years
from December 21, 1955.

Contentions of the National Marketing Corporation:

1. Namarco Is of the opinion that the action had prescribed precisely on Dec 21, 1965 or the date
which they filed their revival of judgement.
2. Namarco Is of the opino that a year should be counted as a calendar year and not by the
365 days

Contention of Miguel Tecson:

1. Tecson argues that according to Art. 18 of the Civil Code provides that each year Is
understood to be 365 days. Since 1960 and 1964 were leap years the actual date of prescription
was Dec. 19, 1965.

Ruling of Lower Courts: Dismissed the case and agreed with the view of Tecson.

General Issue:
Whether or not the computation of 10 years should Include leap years. Yes

Controlling Issue:

Whether or not the complaint for revival of judgement has prescribed. Yes

Ruling:
a. Basis of the ruling. (Cite the law or previous jurisprudence):
Art. 13 of the Civil code which provides that a year Is 365 days.

Art. 1144(3) of the Civil code, an action action upon a judgement “must be brought within ten
years from the time the right of action accrues.”
b. Application of the ruling in the case:

The court found that the theory reached by Namarco contravenes the explicit provision of Art 13
of the Civil Code. A year Is defined as 365 days under the civil code. When counting 10 years
from Dec 21, 1955, the 2 leap years would add 2 days to the actual computation hence the action
would have prescribed earlier or on December 19, 1965.
The court was of the opinion that this was not realistic but It can only be changed through
legislation.

Ratio:
The court ruled In favor of Tecson since the action had prescribed on Dec. 19, 1965.

16. Barreto-Gonzales v. Gonzales, 58 Phil. 67 , March 7, 1933

17. Tenchavez v. Escaño, 15 SCRA 355 , November, 29, 1965

Tenchavez v. Escaño
15 SCRA 355
November, 29, 1965
FACTS:

Vicenta Escaño, 27 years of age (scion of a well-to-do and socially prominent Filipino family of
Spanish ancestry and a "sheltered colegiala"), a 27-year old college student from the University
of San Carlos, Cebu City, exchanged marriage vows with Pastor Tenchavez, 32 years of age, an
engineer, ex-army officer and of undistinguished stock, without the knowledge of her parents,
before a Catholic chaplain, Lt. Moises Lavares, in the house of one Juan Alburo in the said city.
The marriage was duly registered with the local civil register. Pacita Noel was their matchmaker
and go-between.

They intended to elope. However, it did not materialize because when Vicente went back to her
classes after the marriage, her mother, who got wind of the intended nuptials, was already
waiting for her at the college. Vicenta was taken home where she admitted that she had already
married Pastor. Mamerto and Mena Escaño were surprised, because Pastor never asked for the
hand of Vicente, and were disgusted because of the great scandal that the clandestine marriage
would provoke. Vicenta’s family planned a recelebration of the marriage.

The recelebration did not take place, because Mamerto received a letter, handed by a maid,
whose name he claims he does not remember, purportedly coming from San Carlos college
students and disclosing an amorous relationship between Pastor Tenchavez and Pacita Noel.
Vicenta thereafter would not agree to a new marriage. Vicenta and Pastor met that day in the
house of Mrs. Pilar Mendezona. Thereafter, Vicenta continued living with her parents while
Pastor returned to his job in Manila. Her letter of 22 March 1948, while still solicitous of her
husband's welfare, was not as endearing as her previous letters when their love was aflame.

On 24 June 1950, without informing her husband, she applied for a passport, indicating in her
application that she was single, that her purpose was to study, and she was domiciled in Cebu
City, and that she intended to return after two years. The application was approved, and she left
for the United States. On 22 August 1950, she filed a verified complaint for divorce against the
herein plaintiff in the State of Nevada in and for the County of Washoe, on the ground of
"extreme cruelty, entirely mental in character." On 21 October 1950, a decree of divorce, "final
and absolute", was issued in open court by the said tribunal.

On 13 September 1954, Vicenta married an American, Russell Leo Moran, in Nevada. She now
lives with him in California, and, by him, has begotten children. She acquired American
citizenship on 8 August 1958.

On 30 July 1955, Tenchavez had initiated the proceedings at bar by a complaint in the CFI of
Cebu against Vicenta, her parents, Mamerto and Mena, whom he charged with having dissuaded
and discouraged Vicenta from joining her husband, and alienating her affections, and against the
Roman Catholic Church, for having, through its Diocesan Tribunal, decreed the annulment of the
marriage, and asked for legal separation and one million pesos in damages. Vicenta claimed a
valid divorce from plaintiff and an equally valid marriage to her present husband, Russell Leo
Moran; while her parents denied that they had in any way influenced their daughter's acts, and
counterclaimed for moral damages.

The appealed judgment did not decree a legal separation, but freed the plaintiff from supporting
his wife and to acquire property to the exclusion of his wife. It allowed the counterclaim of
Mamerto Escaño and Mena Escaño for moral and exemplary damages and attorney's fees against
the plaintiff-appellant, to the extent of P45,000.00, and plaintiff resorted directly to this Court.

ISSUE:

W/N the Decree of Divorce can be recognized in the Philippines. (SC: NO)

HELD:

It is equally clear from the record that the valid marriage between Pastor Tenchavez and Vicenta
Escaño remained subsisting and undissolved under Philippine law, notwithstanding the decree of
absolute divorce that the wife sought and obtained on 21 October 1950 in the State of Nevada. At
the time the divorce decree was issued, Vicenta Escaño, like her husband, was still a Filipino
citizen. She was then subject to Philippine law, and Article 15 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines, already in force at the time, expressly provided:

“Laws relating to family rights and duties or to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons
are binding upon the citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad.”

The Civil Code of the Philippines, now in force, does not admit absolute divorce, quo ad vinculo
matrimonii; and in fact does not even use that term, to further emphasize its restrictive policy on
the matter, in contrast to the preceding legislation that admitted absolute divorce on grounds of
adultery of the wife or concubinage of the husband (Act 2710). Instead of divorce, the present
Civil Code only provides for legal separation (Title IV, Book 1, Arts. 97 to 108), and, even in
that case, it expressly prescribes that "the marriage bonds shall not be severed" (Art. 106, subpar.
1).

For the Philippine courts to recognize and give recognition or effect to a foreign decree of
absolute divorce betiveen Filipino citizens could be a patent violation of the declared public
policy of the state, specially in view of the third paragraph of Article 17 of the Civil Code that
prescribes the following:
Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and those which have for their object
public order, policy and good customs, shall not be rendered ineffective by laws or judgments
promulgated, or by determinations or conventions agreed upon in a foreign country.

Even more, the grant of effectivity in this jurisdiction to such foreign divorce decrees would, in
effect, give rise to an irritating and scandalous discrimination in favor of wealthy citizens, to the
detriment of those members of our polity whose means do not permit them to sojourn abroad and
obtain absolute divorces outside the Philippines.

From the preceding facts and considerations, there flows as a necessary consequence that in this
jurisdiction Vicenta Escaño's divorce and second marriage are not entitled to recognition as
valid; for her previous union to plaintiff Tenchavez must be declared to be existent and
undissolved. It follows, likewise, that her refusal to perform her wifely duties, and her denial of
consortium and her desertion of her husband constitute in law a wrong caused through her fault,
for which the husband is entitled to the corresponding indemnity (Civil Code, Art. 2176). Neither
an unsubstantiated charge of deceit nor an anonymous letter charging immorality against the
husband constitute, contrary to her claim, adequate excuse. Wherefore, her marriage and
cohabitation with Russell Leo Moran is technically "intercourse with a person not her husband"
from the standpoint of Philippine Law, and entitles plaintiff-appellant Tenchavez to a decree of
"legal separation under our law, on the basis of adultery" (Revised Penal Code, Art. 333).

Except for the fact that the successional rights of the children, begotten from Vicenta's marriage
to Leo Moran after the invalid divorce, are not involved in the case at bar, such union is
adulterous in this jurisdiction, and, therefore, justifies an action for legal separation on the part of
the innocent consort of the first marriage, that stands undissolved in Philippine law. In not so
declaring, the trial court committed error.

The appellant's first assignment of error is, therefore, sustained.

18. Van Dorn v. Romillo, 139 SCRA 139 October 8, 1985

Van Dorn v. Romillo

G.R. No. L-68470
October 8, 1985
Melencio-Herrera, J.
Petition for certiorari and Prohibition

Name of the parties: (and their respective role in the case):

Petitioner: ALICE REYES VAN DORN
Respondent: HON. MANUEL V. ROMILLO, JR. as Presiding Judge of Branch CX, Regional
Trial Court of the National Capital Region Pasay City and RICHARD UPTON

Topic and Applicable Articles: See syllabus

Article 15, NCC - Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal
capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad.

Doctrine/s:
1. Absolute divorce obtained by an alien abroad may be recognized in the Philippines if
valid under the national law of such an alien.
2. An American granted absolute divorce with Filipina wife is cut of from marital and
successional rights with the latter. Hence, he is estopped from asserting his rights over
property allegedly held in the Philippines as conjugal property by him and his former
wife.

Facts: Alice Van Dorn is a citizen of the Philippines while Richard Upton is a citizen of the
United States. They were married in Hongkong in 1972 and established their residence in the
Philippines. The two begot two children born on April 4, 1973 and December 18, 1975,
respectively. However, the parties were divorced in Nevada, United States, in 1982 and that
Alice subsequently re-married also in Nevada, this time to Theodore Van Dorn.

On June 8, 1983, Richard Upton filed suit against Alice in RTC Pasay City, stating that Alice's
business in Ermita, Manila, (the Galleon Shop, for short), is conjugal property of the parties, and
asking that petitioner be ordered to render an accounting of that business, and that Richard be
declared with right to manage the conjugal property. Alice moved to dismiss the case on the
ground that the cause of action is barred by previous judgment in the divorce proceedings before
the Nevada Court wherein Richard had acknowledged that he and petitioner had "no community
property" as of June 11, 1982. The Court denied the Motion to Dismiss in the mentioned case on
the ground that the property involved is located in the Philippines so that the Divorce Decree has
no bearing in the case.

Contentions of the PETITIONER/PLAINTIFF (Indicate the name):

Alice Reyes Van Dorn contends that Richard Upton is estopped from laying claim on the alleged
conjugal property because of the representation he made in the divorce proceedings before the
American Court that they had no community of property; that the Galleon Shop was not
established through conjugal funds, and that Richard's claim is barred by prior judgment.
Contention of the RESPONDENT/DEFENDANT (Indicate the name):
Richard Upton avers that the Divorce Decree issued by the Nevada Court cannot prevail over the
prohibitive laws of the Philippines and its declared national policy; that the acts and declaration
of a foreign Court cannot, especially if the same is contrary to public policy, divest Philippine
Courts of jurisdiction to entertain matters within its jurisdiction.

Ruling of Lower Courts: RTC denied Alice Van Horn’s Motion to Dismiss the case filed by
Richard Upton, and her Motion for Reconsideration of the Dismissal Order.

General Issue:

Whether the divorce decree issued by the court of Nevada is valid and binding in
Philippine jurisdiction - YES.

Controlling Issue:

Whether Richard Upton has standing to sue in the present case as Alice Van Horn's
husband entitled to exercise control over conjugal assets. - NO.

Ruling:
a. Basis of the ruling. (Cite the law or previous jurisprudence):
Article 15. Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and
legal capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though
living abroad.

Application of the ruling in the case:

There can be no question as to the validity of that Nevada divorce in any of the
States of the United States. The decree is binding on private respondent as an American
citizen. For instance, private respondent cannot sue petitioner, as her husband, in any State
of the Union. What he is contending in this case is that the divorce is not valid and binding
in this jurisdiction, the same being contrary to local
law and public policy.

lt is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code,
only Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorces the same
being considered contrary to our concept of public policy and morality. However, aliens
may obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are
valid according to their national law. In this case, the divorce in Nevada released private
respondent from the marriage from the standards of American law, under which divorce
dissolves the marriage.

Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the husband of
petitioner. He would have no standing to sue in the case below as petitioner's husband
entitled to exercise control over conjugal assets. As he is bound by the Decision of his own
country's Court, which validly exercised jurisdiction over him, and whose decision he does
not repudiate, he is estopped by his own representation before said Court from asserting
his right over the alleged conjugal property.

To maintain, as private respondent does, that, under our laws, petitioner has to be
considered still married to private respondent and still subject to a wife's obligations under
Article 109, et. seq. of the Civil Code cannot be just. Petitioner should not be obliged to live
together with, observe respect and fidelity, and render support to private respondent. The
latter should not continue to be one of her heirs with possible rights to conjugal property.
She should not be discriminated against in her own country if the ends of justice are to be
served.

Ratio: WHEREFORE, the Petition is granted, and respondent Judge is hereby ordered to
dismiss the Complaint filed in Civil Case No. 1075-P of his Court.
19. Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera, 174 SCRA 653 June 30, 1989

Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera
G.R. No. 80116
June 30, 1989
Regalado J.:
Special Civil Action for certiorari and prohibition
to review the order of the RTC of Manila

Petitioner: Imelda Manalaysay Pilapil

Respondent: Hon. Corona Ibay-Somera, in her capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial
Court of Manila, Branch XXVI, Hon. Luis C. Victor, in his capacity as the City Fiscal of Manila;
and Erich Ekkehard Geiling

Topic and Applicable Articles: See syllabus

 1. Binding effect: Art. 15. Laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status,
condition and legal capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines,
even though living abroad. (9a)

Doctrine/s:
1. Divorce and its legal effects may be recognized in the Philippines insofar as private
respondent (foreigner) is concerned in view of the nationality principle in our civil law on the
matter of status of persons.
2. Lack of legal capacity to sue, as a ground for a motion to dismiss in civil cases, is determined
as of the filing of the complaint or petition.

Facts:
- Imelda Pilapil, Filipino, and Erich Ekkehard Geiling, German, got married in
Germany.
- After 3 1/2 years of marriage, Geiling initiated a divorce proceeding. German court
promulgated a divorce decree in 1986.
- Petitioner also filed an action for legal separation before RTC in Manila.
- 5 months after the issuance of divorce, Geiling filed 2 complaints for adultery.
- Motion to quash for lack of jurisdiction was also filed by petitioner but it was denied.
The arraignment of the case was directed but petitioner refused to be arraigned.
- Pilapil filed herein petition for certiorari and prohibition, assailing the jurisdiction the
lower court to try and decide the criminal cases

Contentions of Pilapil:
1. The court has no jurisdiction to try and decide the case since the complainant, a foreigner,
does not qualify as an offended spouse having obtained a final divorce decree under his national
law prior to the filing of criminal complaint.

Contention of the Geiling

1. He could not have brought this case before the decree of divorce for lack of knowledge

General Issue:
Whether or not Geiling qualifies as an offended spouse – NO.

Controlling Issue:
Whether or not the divorce decree by the German court may be recognized in the Philippines,
depriving respondent Geiling of his legal standing to file adultery cases? – YES.
Ruling:
a. Basis of the ruling.
American jurisprudence, on cases involving statutes in that jurisdiction which are in pari materia
with ours, yields the rule that after a divorce has been decreed, the innocent spouse no longer
has the right to institute proceedings against the offenders where the statute provides that the
innocent spouse shall have the exclusive right to institute a prosecution for adultery. We see no
reason why the same doctrinal rule should not apply in this case and in our jurisdiction

b. Application of the ruling in the case:

The fact that private respondent obtained a valid divorce in his country, the Federal Republic of
Germany, is admitted. Said divorce and its legal effects may be recognized in the Philippines
insofar as private respondent is concerned in view of the nationality principle in our civil law on
the matter of status of persons.

Thus, in the recent case of Van Dorn vs. Romillo, Jr., et al., after a divorce was granted by a
United States court.

“There can be no question as to the validity of that Nevada divorce in any of the States of the
United States. The decree is binding on private respondent as an American citizen. For instance,
private respondent cannot sue petitioner, as her husband, in any State of the Union, xxx.

Ratio:
Being no longer the husband of petitioner, had no legal standing to commence the adultery case
under the imposture that he was the offended spouse at the time he filed suit.

WHEREFORE, the questioned order denying petitioner’s motion to quash is SET ASIDE and
another one entered DISMISSING the complaint in Criminal Case No. 87-52435 for lack of
jurisdiction.

20. People v. Ritter, 194 SCRA 690 March 5, 1991

21. Ardiente v. Spouses Pastorfide, G.R. No. 161921, July 17, 2013
22. Donato v. Luna, 160 SCRA 441, April 15, 1988

Donato vs. Luna

G.R. No. L-53642
 April 15, 1988
Gancayco, J.
Petition for certiorari & prohibition with preliminary injunction

Petitioner: Leonilo Donato

Respondents: Hon. Artemon D. Luna, Presiding Judge of CFI Manila Br. 32, Hon. Jose
Flaminiano, City Fiscal of Manila & Paz B. Abayan

Topic and Applicable Articles:

Article 36. Pre-judicial questions, which must be decided before any criminal prosecution
may be instituted or may proceed, shall be governed by rules of court which the Supreme
Court shall promulgate and which shall not be in conflict with the provisions of this Code.

Doctrine/s:
A prejudicial question has been defined to be one which arises in a case, the resolution of which
question is a logical antecedent of the issue involved in said case, and the cognizance of which
pertains to another tribunal. It is one based on a fact distinct and separate from the crime but so
intimately connected with it that it determines the guilt or innocence of the accused, and for it to
suspend the criminal action, it must appear not only that said case involves facts intimately
related to those upon which the criminal prosecution would be based but also that in the
resolution of the issue or issues raised in the civil case, the guilt or innocence of the accused
would necessarily be determined. A prejudicial question usually comes into play in a situation
where a civil action and a criminal action may proceed, because howsoever the issue raised in
the civil action is resolved would be determinative juris et de jure of the guilt or innocence of the
accused in a criminal case.

Facts:
An information for bigamy against petitioner Leonilo Donato was filed on January 23, 1979 with
the lower court in Manila. This was based on the complaint of Paz Abayan. Before Donato‘s
arraignment on September 28, 1979, Paz filed with Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of
Manila, a civil action for declaration of nullity of her marriage with Donato contracted on
September 26, 1978. Said civil case was based on the ground that Paz consented to entering into
the marriage which was Donato‘s second since she had no previous knowledge that Donato was
already married to a certain Rosalinda Maluping on June 30, 1978. Donato’s defense was that his
second marriage was void since it was solemnized without a marriage license and that force,
violence, intimidation and undue influence were employed by Paz to obtain Donato's consent to
the marriage. Prior to the solemnization of the second marriage, Paz and Donato had lived
together as husband and wife without the benefit of wedlock for 5 years proven by a joint
affidavit executed by them on September 26, 1978 for which reason, the requisite marriage
license was dispensed with pursuant to Article 76 of the Civil Code. Donato continued to live
with Paz until November 1978 where Paz left their home upon learning that Donato already
previously married.

Prior to the date set for the trial on the merits of the Bigamy Case, Donato filed a motion to
suspend the proceedings of said case contending that the Civil Case seeking the annulment of his
second marriage filed by Paz raises a prejudicial question which must first be determined or
decided before the criminal case can proceed.

RULING OF CFI: Judge Luna denied the motion to suspend the proceedings in Criminal Case
for bigamy.

A motion for reconsideration was filed by Donato motion for reconsideration of the said order
but such was likewise denied, Hence, the present petition for certiorari and prohibition with
preliminary injunction.

Donato’s Contention:

He raised the argument that the second marriage should have been declared null and void on the
ground of force, threats and intimidation allegedly employed against him by Paz only sometime
later when he was required to answer the civil action for annulment of the second marriage.

GENERAL ISSUE:

Whether or not a criminal case for bigamy pending before the lower court be suspended in view
of a civil case for annulment of marriage pending before the juvenile and domestic relations
court on the ground that latter constitutes a prejudicial question?

-No.

RULING:

A. BASIS OF THE RULING:

A prejudicial question has been defined to be one which arises in a case, the resolution of which
question is a logical antecedent of the issue involved in said case, and the cognizance of which
pertains to another tribunal. It is one based on a fact distinct and separate from the crime but so
intimately connected with it that it determines the guilt or innocence of the accused, and for it to
suspend the criminal action, it must appear not only that said case involves facts intimately
related to those upon which the criminal prosecution would be based but also that in the
resolution of the issue or issues raised in the civil case, the guilt or innocence of the accused
would necessarily be determined. A prejudicial question usually comes into play in a situation
where a civil action and a criminal action may proceed, because howsoever the issue raised in
the civil action is resolved would be determinative juris et de jure of the guilt or innocence of the
accused in a criminal case.

B. APPLICATION OF THE RULING IN THE CASE:

Donato can‘t apply rule on prejudicial question since a case for annulment of marriage can only
be considered as a prejudicial question to the bigamy case against the accused if it was proved
that petitioners consent to such marriage and was obtained by means of duress violence and
intimidation to show that his act in the second marriage must be involuntary and cannot be the
basis of his conviction for the crime of bigamy.

In this case, Donato has not even sufficiently shown that his consent to the second marriage has
been obtained by the use of threats, force and intimidation. Moreover, Donato merely raised the
issue of prejudicial question to evade the prosecution of the criminal case. The records reveal
that prior to Donato’s 2nd marriage on September 26, 1978, he had been living with Paz as
husband and wife for more than five years without the benefit of marriage.

Accordingly, there being no prejudicial question shown to exit the order of denial issued by the
respondent judge dated April 14, 1980 should be sustained.

RATIO: In view of the foregoing, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.

23. Landicho v. Relova, 22 SCRA 731

LANDICHO vs. RELOVA

No. L-22579
23 February 1968
FERNANDO, J.
Original Petition in the Supreme Court;
Certiorari and Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction

Petitioner: Rolando Landicho

Respondent: Hon. Lorenzo Relova, Judge of the CFI of Batangas, Branch I and People of the
Philippines

Third party defendant: Elvira Makatangay

Topic and Applicable Articles:
Prejudicial Question in a pending suit; see Art. 36, NCC
Doctrine/s:

1. The mere fact that there are actions to annul the marriages entered into by the accused in
a bigamy case does not mean that "prejudicial questions" are automatically raised in civil
actions as to warrant the suspension of the criminal case. In order that the case of
annulment of marriage be considered a prejudicial question to the bigamy case against
the accused, it must be shown that the petitioner's consent to such marriage must be the
one that was obtained by means of duress, force and intimidation to show that his act in
the second marriage must be involuntary and cannot be the basis of his conviction for the
crime of bigamy.
2. The situation in the present case is markedly different. Assuming that the first marriage
was null and void on the ground alleged by petitioner, that fact would not be material to
the outcome of the criminal case. Parties to the marriage should not be permitted to judge
for themselves its nullity, for the same must be submitted to the judgment of the
competent courts and only when the nullity of the marriage is so declared can it be held
as void, and so long as there is no such declaration the presumption is that the marriage
exists. Therefore, he who contracts a second marriage before the judicial declaration of
nullity of the first marriage assumes the risk of being prosecuted for bigamy.

Facts:
On 27 February 1963, Rolando Landicho was charged before the CFI of Batangas with
the offense of Bigamy. It was alleged that Rolando was lawfully married to Elvira Makatangay
when he contracted a second marriage with Fe Lourdes Pasia.
On 15 March 1963, Fe filed an action before the same CFI in Batangas, seeking to
declare her marriage to Rolando as null and void ab initio because of the alleged use of force,
threats and intimidation allegedly employed by Rolando and because of their marriage’s alleged
bigamous character.
On 15 June 1963, Rolando filed filed a third-party complaint, against the Elvira
Makatangay, the first spouse, praying that their marriage be declared null and void on the ground
that by means of threats, force and intimidation, Elvira compelled Rolando to appear and
contract marriage with her before the Justice of the Peace of Makati, Rizal.
On October 7, 1963, Rolando moved to suspend the hearing of the criminal case pending
the decision on the question of the validity of the two marriages involved in the pending civil
suit.

Contention of the PETITIONER (Rolando):

1. Rolando filed a motion to suspend the hearing of the criminal case pending the decision on the
question of the validity of the two marriages involved in the pending civil suit.

Contentions of the RESPONDENT (Hon. Relova and People of the Philippines):

1. Motion to suspend the criminal case was DENIED for lack of merit.
2. The fact that there are actions to annul the marriages entered into by the accused in a
bigamy case does not mean that 'prejudicial questions are automatically raised in said
civil actions as to warrant the suspension of the criminal case for bigamy.
3. Even arguendo, that the first marriage was null and void on the ground alleged by
Rolando, the fact would not be material to the outcome of the criminal case.
4. Hon. Relova cited Viada stating that “parties to the marriage should not be permitted to
judge for themselves its nullity, for this.must be submitted to the judgment of competent
courts and only when the nullity of a marriage is so declared can it be held as void, and so
long as there is no such declaration the presumption is that the marriage exists” Hence,
according to Viada, he who contracts a second marriage before the judicial declaration of
nullity of the first marriage incurs the penalty provided for in this Article.

Ruling of Lower Courts: CFI (decided by Hon. Relova as presiding Judge) - Motion to suspend
the hearing of the criminal case pending the decision on the question of the validity of the two
marriages was DENIED for lack of merit. A Motion for Reconsideration was likewise DENIED.
General Issue (is the controlling issue as well):

Whether or not the criminal case for bigamy filed against Rolando should be suspended,
pending the decision on the question of the validity of his two marriages involved in the
pending civil suit.
- NO.

Ruling:
A. Basis of the ruling.
Viada states that parties to a marriage should not be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity,
only competent courts having such authority. Prior to such declaration of nullity, the validity of
the first marriage is beyond question. A party who contracts a second marriage then assumes the
risk of being prosecuted for bigamy.

B. Application of the ruling in the case:

The situation of Rolando is at par with the example and explanation provided by Viada, as cited
by Hon. Relova. There is no occasion to indulge in the probability that the third-party complaint
against the first wife brought almost five months after the prosecution for bigamy was started
could have been inspired by the thought that he could thus give color to a defense based on an
alleged prejudicial question.

Ratio: WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is denied and the writ of preliminary injunction
issued dissolved.

24. Roe v. Wade (US) January 22, 1973

Roe v. Wade (US)

January 22, 1973
A class action challenging the constitutionality of the Texas criminal abortion
laws

Petitioner: Jane Roe, a pregnant single woman

Respondent: County District Attorney Wade

Topic and Applicable Articles:

Commencement and termination of Civil Personality
Doctrine/s:
1. When pregnancy is a significant fact in the litigation, the normal 266-day human
gestation period is so short that the pregnancy will come to term before the usual
appellate process is complete. If that termination makes a case moot, pregnancy litigation
seldom will survive much beyond the trial stage, and appellate review will be effectively
denied. Laws should not be that rigid.
2. The Court held that litigation involving pregnancy, which is capable of repetition, yet
evading review, is an exception to the general rule that an actual controversy must exist at
each stage of judicial review, and not merely when the action was initiated.
3. Statutes that make criminal all abortions except when medically advised for the purpose
of saving the life of the mother are an unconstitutional invasion of privacy. However, it
does allow for regulation and proscription of abortion when the statute is narrowly
tailored to uphold a compelling state interest, such as the health of the mother or the
viable fetus. The court declined to address the question of when life begins.
4. 3-6 months (trimesters); stages of birth is equal to a child’s PERSONALITY
 5. In the US, a fetus is not a person, as compared to the Philippines

Fact:
Appellant Jane Roe, a pregnant mother who wished to obtain an abortion, brought a class
suit in an effort to prevent the enforcement of Texas statutes criminalizing all abortions except
those performed to save the life of the mother.
Texas statutes made it a crime to procure or attempt an abortion except when medically
advised for the purpose of saving the life of the mother.
Roe (petitioner), a pregnant single woman, brought a class action suit challenging the
constitutionality of the Texas abortion laws. These laws made it a crime to obtain or attempt an
abortion except on medical advice to save the life of the mother. Other plaintiffs in the lawsuit
included Hallford, a doctor who faced criminal prosecution for violating the state abortion laws;
and the Does, a married couple with no children, who sought an injunction against enforcement
of the laws on the grounds that they were unconstitutional. The defendant was county District
Attorney Wade (defendant).

Contentions of the PETITIONER:

Appellant Jane Roe sought a declaratory judgment that the statutes were unconstitutional on their
face and an injunction to prevent defendant Dallas County District Attorney from enforcing the
statutes. Appellant alleged that she was unmarried and pregnant, and that she was unable to
receive a legal abortion by a licensed physician because her life was not threatened by the
continuation of her pregnancy and that she was unable to afford to travel to another jurisdiction
to obtain a legal abortion. Appellant sued on behalf of herself and all other women similarly
situated, claiming that the statutes were unconstitutionally vague and abridged her right of
personal privacy, protected by the First, Fourth, Fifth, Ninth, and Fourteenth Amendments.

Contention of the RESPONDENT/DEFENDANT (Indicate the name):

Texas urges that, apart from the Fourteenth Amendment, life begins at conception and is
present throughout pregnancy, and that, therefore, the State has a compelling interest in
protecting that life from and after conception.

Ruling of Lower Courts:

A three-judge District Court panel tried the cases together and held that Roe and Hallford
had standing to sue and presented justiciable controversies, and that declaratory relief was
warranted. The court also ruled however that injunctive relief was not warranted and that the
Does‘ complaint was not justiciable.
Roe and Hallford won their lawsuits at trial. The district court held that the Texas
abortion statutes were void as vague and for overbroadly infringing the Ninth and Fourteenth
Amendment rights of the plaintiffs. The Does lost, however, because the district court ruled that
injunctive relief against enforcement of the laws was not warranted.
The Does appealed directly to the Supreme Court of the United States and Wade cross-
appealed the district court‘s judgment in favor of Roe and Hallford.

General Issues:
Do the Texas statutes improperly invade a right possessed by the appellant to terminate her
pregnancy embodied in the concept of personal liberty contained in the Fourteenth Amendment’s
Due Process Clause, in the personal marital, familial, and sexual privacy protected by the Bill of
Rights or its penumbras, or among the rights reserved to the people by the Ninth Amendment?
Do abortion laws that criminalize all abortions, except those required on medical advice to save
the life of the mother, violate the Constitution of the United States?
Does the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution
protect the right to privacy, including the right to obtain an abortion?
Are there any circumstances where a state may enact laws prohibiting abortion?

Main Issue relevant to the topic:

Did the fact that Roe‘s pregnancy had already terminated naturally before this case was decided
by the Supreme Court render her lawsuit moot?

Ruling:

1. The right to personal privacy includes the abortion decision, but the right is not unqualified
and must be considered against important state interests in regulation.
The abortion laws in effect in the majority of the States are of relatively recent vintage,
deriving from statutory changes generally enacted in the latter half of the 19th century. At
common law abortion performed before quickening (the first recognizable movement of the fetus
in utero) was not an indictable offense, and it is doubtful that abortion was ever a firmly
established common law crime even when it destroyed a quick fetus.
Three reasons have been advanced for the historical enactment of criminal abortion laws.
The first is that the laws are the product of a Victorian social concern to discourage illicit sexual
conduct, but this argument has been taken seriously by neither courts nor commentators. The
second reason is that the abortion procedure is hazardous, therefore the State’s concern is to
protect pregnant women. However, modern medical techniques have altered the situation, with
abortions being relatively safe particularly in the first trimester. The third reason is the State’s
interest is in protecting the prenatal life. However, this is somewhat negated by the fact that the
pregnant woman cannot be prosecuted for the act of abortion.
 For the stage prior to the approximate end of the first trimester, the abortion decision
must be left to the medical judgment of the pregnant woman’s attending physician, and may not
be criminalized by statute.
For the stage subsequent to the approximate end of the first trimester, the State may
regulate abortion in ways reasonably related to maternal health based upon the State’s interest in
promoting the health of the mother.
For the stage subsequent to viability, the State may regulate and even proscribe abortion,
except where necessary for the preservation of the mother’s life, based upon the State’s interest
in the potential of the potential life of the unborn child.
2. Yes. State criminal abortion laws that except from criminality only life-saving procedures on
the mother‘s behalf, and that do not take into consideration the stage of pregnancy and other
interests, are unconstitutional for violating the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment.
3. Yes. The Due Process Clause protects the right to privacy, including a woman‘s right to
terminate her pregnancy, against state action.
4. Yes. Though a state cannot completely deny a woman the right to terminate her pregnancy, it
has legitimate interests in protecting both the pregnant woman‘s health and the potentiality of
human life at various stages of pregnancy.
5. No. Roe has standing to sue; the Does and Hallford do not. The natural termination of Roe‘s
pregnancy did not render her suit moot. T
he Supreme Court held that litigation involving pregnancy, which is ―capable of
repetition, yet evading review, is an exception to the general rule that an actual controversy must
exist at each stage of judicial review, and not merely when the action is initiated.
The Court held that, in regard to abortions during the first trimester, the decision must be
left to the judgment of the pregnant woman‘s doctor. In regard to second trimester pregnancies,
states may promote their interests in the mother‘s health by regulating abortion procedures
related to the health of the mother. Regarding third trimester pregnancies, states may promote
their interests in the potentiality of human life by regulating or even prohibiting abortion, except
when necessary to preserve the life or health of the mother.
It is reasonable and appropriate for a State to decide that at some point in time another
interest, that of health of the mother or that of potential human life, becomes significantly
involved. The woman's privacy is no longer sole and any right of privacy she possesses must be
measured accordingly.
The State's important and legitimate interest in the health of the mother, the 'compelling'
point, in the light of present medical knowledge, is at approximately the end of the first trimester.
This is so because of the now-established medical fact, referred to above at 149, that until the
end of the first trimester mortality in abortion may be less than mortality in normal childbirth. It
follows that, from and after this point, a State may regulate the abortion procedure to the extent
that the regulation reasonably relates to the preservation and protection of maternal health.
Examples of permissible state regulation in this area are requirements as to the qualifications of
the person who is to perform the abortion; as to the licensure of that person; as to the facility in
which the procedure is to be performed, that is, whether it must be a hospital or may be a clinic
or some other place of less-than-hospital status; as to the licensing of the facility; and the like.
3-6 months (trimesters); stages of birth is equal to a child’s PERSONALITY
In the US, a fetus is not a person, as compared to the Philippines
The Constitution does not define 'person' in so many words. Section 1 of the Fourteenth
Amendment contains three references to 'person.' The first, in defining 'citizens,' speaks of
'persons born or naturalized in the United States.' The word also appears both in the Due Process
Clause and in the Equal Protection Clause. 'Person' is used in other places in the Constitution:But
in nearly all these instances, the use of the word is such that it has application only postnatally.
None indicates, with any assurance, that it has any possible prenatal application.
Supra, that throughout the major portion of the 19th century prevailing legal abortion
practices were far freer than they are today, persuades us that the word 'person,' as used in the
Fourteenth Amendment, does not include the unborn.

25. Geluz v. CA, . 2 SCRA 801 July 20, 1961

26. Quimiging v. Icao, 34 SCRA 13 , July 31, 1970

CARMEN QUIMIGUING, suing through her parents, ANTONIO

QUIMIGUING and JACOBA CABILIN, plaintiffs-appellants, vs.

FELIX ICAO, defendant-appellee.

GR Number: 26795.

Promulgation Date: July 31, 1970.

Ponente: REYES, J.B.L.,

Nature of the Action: Petition for Support

Name of the parties: (and their respective role in the case)

Petitioner: CARMEN QUIMIGUING, suing through her parents, ANTONIO

QUIMIGUING and JACOBA CABILIN

Respondent: FELIX ICAO

Third person (Mortgagor, Assignor): NA

Topic and Applicable Article: Commencement of Personality

Doctrine/s:

Facts:

Carmen Quisimbing and Felix Icao are neighbors in Dapitan city and had close and
confidential relations despite the latter being married. Both had carnal in having carnal
intercourse with plaintiff several times by force and intimidation, and without her consent (as
stated in the petition). As a result Carmen became pregnant, despite efforts and drugs supplied
by Felix, and had to stop studying. Carment Quisimbing, suing through her parents, Antonio and
Jacoba Quimiguing for support and damages.

Contention of the Petitioner/Plaintiff: Quisimbing is claiming for support and damages because
of the pregnancy.

Contention of the Respondent/Defendant: Icao wants to dismiss the action for lack of cause of
action because the complaint did not allege a that a child had been born.

Ruling of Lower Courts: Dismissing a complaint for support and damages, and did not allow
amendment of the complaint because the original complaint had no cause of action.
General Issue: W/N there was a cause of action?

Controlling Issue: W/N there was there an unborn child has civil personality?

Ruling

a. Basis of the ruling (Cite the law or previous jurisprudence)

Support; Right of unborn child to support.—A conceived child, although as yet unborn, is given
by law a provisional personality of its own for all purposes favorable to it, as explicitly provided
in Article 40 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. The unborn child, therefore, has a right to
support from its progenitors even if the said child is only “en ventre de samere”; just as a
conceived child, even if as yet unborn, may receive donations as prescribed by Article 742 of the
same Code, and its being ignored by the parent in his testament may result in preterition of a
forced heir that annuls the institution of the testamentary heir, even if such child should be born
after the death of the testator (Article 854, Civil Code).

Persons; Natural persons; Unborn child; Proviso of Article 40 of Civil Code explained.—Article
40 of the Civil Code prescribed that “the conceived child shall be considered born for all
purposes that are favorable to it” and adds further “provided it be born later with the conditions
specified in the following article (i.e., that the fetus be alive at the time it is

completely delivered from the mother’s womb). This proviso, however, is not a condition
precedent to the right of the conceived child; for if it were, the first part of Article 40 would
become entirely useless and ineffective.

Damages; Victim of rape may recover moral damages.—A woman forced to submit to the lust of
a man may recover damages under Article 21 of the Civil Code. The rule of Article 21 is
supported by Article 2219 of the same Code providing for moral damages in rape cases.

b. Application of the ruling in the case:

The petition has merit, thus amendment to the complaint is not necessary.
Ratio: It is true that Article 40 prescribing that “the conceived child shall be considered born for
all purposes that are favorable to it” adds further “provided it be born later with the conditions,
specified in the following article” (i.e., that the fetus be alive at the time it is completely
delivered from the mother’s womb). This proviso, however, is not a condition precedent to the
right of the conceived child; for if it were, the first part of Article 40 would become entirely
useless and ineffective.

A second reason for reversing the orders appealed from is that for a married man to force a
woman not his wife to yield to his lust (as averred in the original complaint in this case)
constitutes a clear violation of the rights of his victim that entitles her to claim compensation for
the damage caused. Says Article 21 of the Civil Code of the Philippines:

27. De Jesus v. Syquia, 58 Phil. 863 November 28, 1933

Case Title: De Jesus vs. Syquia

GR Number: No. 39110
Promulgation Date: November 28, 1933
Ponente: Justice Street
Nature of the Action: Recovery of damages resulting from breach of marriage promise, to
compel paternity and pay for maintenance

Name of the parties: (and their respective role in the case):

Petitioner: Antonia Loanco de Jesus, representative of Ismael and Pacita Loanco, infants
Respondent: Cesar Syquia

Topic and Applicable Articles: See syllabus

1. Commencement of personality

Doctrine/s:
1. It is a universal rule of jurisprudence that a child, upon being conceived, becomes a bearer of
legal rights and capable of being dealt with as a living person. The fact that it is yet unborn is no
impediment to the acquisition of rights.

Facts: Antonia Loanco de Jesus was taken on as a cashier at a barber shop where she met
Cesar Syquia and had gotten pregnant by him. During the early months of the pregnancy
he would visit Antonia. Before he left to China and Japan he wrote a note directed to the
padre expected to christen the baby that he wanted his name to be given to it. He wrote to
Antonia a few more times while he was abroad. When he came back he made arrangements
for the baby’s arrival and when the baby came, Cesar took Antonia, her mother and the
baby (christened Ismael Loanco instead of Cesar Syquira Jr as originally planned) and
lived together in a house in Manila for a year. When Antonia became pregnant a second
time Cesar left and married another woman. Antonia instituted this case for damages for
breach of promise to marry, to compel Cesar to recognize Ismael and Pacita as natural
children and to pay for the maintenance for Php500/month.

Ruling of Lower Courts: Trial court required Cesar Syquia to recognize Ismael Loanco as his
natural child and to pay maintenance for him at Php50/month. It dismissed the action in other
respects.

General Issue: Whether or not the child’s paternity has been acknowledged. YES
Controlling Issue: Whether or not an unborn child has legal rights and capable of being dealt
with as a living person. YES

Ruling:
a. Basis of the ruling. (Cite the law or previous jurisprudence): It is a universal
rule of jurisprudence that a child, upon being conceived, becomes a bearer of legal
rights and capable of being dealt with as a living person.
b. Application of the ruling in the case: The fact that it is yet unborn is no
impediment to the acquisition of rights. The problem here presented of the
recognition of unborn child is really not different from that presented in the
ordinary case of the recognition of a child already born and bearing a specific name.
Only the means and resources of identification are different. Even a bequest to a
living child requires oral evidence to connect the particular individual intended with
the name used.

Ratio: The SC held that Ismael Loanco had been in the uninterrupted possession of the
status of a natural child, justified by the conduct of the father himself (he having wrote
about his child prior to his birth as Junior and urging the mother to eat well for Junior’s
sake), and as a consequence he should be compelled to acknowledge the child under No. 2
of Article 135 of the Civil Code. The law fixes no period during which a child most (sic) be
in the continuous possession of the status of a natural child; and the period in this case was
long enough to evince the father’s resolution to concede the status.
The SC finds that Cesar Syquia has sufficiently acknowledged paternity of Ismael Loanco,
but not the second child. The promise to marry not satisfactorily proved, damages are not
awarded.

28. Limjoco v. Intestate Estate of Pio Fragante, 80 Phil. 776 April 27, 1948
29. Dumlao v. Quality Plastics, 70 SCRA 472 April 30, 1976
30. Eugenio, Sr. v. Velez, 185 SCRA 425 May 17, 1990

Case Title: TOMAS EUGENIO, SR., vs. HON. ALEJANDRO M. VELEZ, Presiding Judge,
Regional Trial Court, Branch 20, Cagayan de Oro City, DEPUTY SHERIFF JOHNSON TAN,
JR., Deputy Sheriff of Branch 20, Regional Trial Court, Cagayan de Oro City, and the Private
Respondents, the petitioners in Sp. Proc. No. 88-55, for "Habeas Corpus", namely: CRISANTA
VARGAS-SANCHEZ, SANTOS and NARCISA VARGAS-BENTULAN

GR Number: G.R. No. 85140

Promulgation Date: May 17, 1990

Ponente: PADILLA, J

Nature of the Action: Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition

Name of the parties: (and their respective role in the case):

Petitioner: TOMAS EUGENIO, SR.

Respondent: ALEJANDRO M. VELEZ, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 20,
Cagayan de Oro City, DEPUTY SHERIFF JOHNSON TAN, JR., Deputy Sheriff of Branch 20,
Regional Trial Court, Cagayan de Oro City and CRISANTA VARGAS-SANCHEZ, SANTOS
and NARCISA VARGAS-BENTULAN

Topic and Applicable Articles:

Commencement and Termination of Personality
1. Natural Persons NCC 40-43

Doctrine/s:
1. The Penal Code article, it is said, makes no distinction between a couple whose cohabitation is
sanctioned by a sacrament or legal tie and another who are husband and wife de facto.23 But this
view cannot even apply to the facts of the case at bar. We hold that the provisions of the Civil
Code, unless expressly providing to the contrary as in Article 144, when referring to a "spouse"
contemplate a lawfully wedded spouse. Petitioner vis-a-vis Vitaliana was not a lawfully-wedded
spouse to her; in fact, he was not legally capacitated to marry her in her lifetime.

Custody of the dead body of Vitaliana was correctly awarded to her surviving brothers and
sisters (the Vargases).

Facts:

● Unaware of the death on 28 August 1988 of (Vitaliana Vargas Vitaliana for brevity), her
full blood brothers and sisters, herein private respondents (Vargases', for brevity) filed on
27 September 1988, a petition for habeas corpus before the RTC of Misamis Oriental
(Branch 20, Cagayan de Oro City) alleging that Vitaliana was forcibly taken from her
residence sometime in 1987 and confined by herein petitioner in his palacial residence in
Jasaan, Misamis Oriental. Despite her desire to escape, Vitaliana was allegedly deprived
of her liberty without any legal authority. At the time the petition was filed, it was alleged
that Vitaliana was 25 years of age, single, and living with petitioner Tomas Eugenio.

The court in an order dated 28 September 1988 issued the writ of habeas corpus, but the
writ was returned unsatisfied. Eugenio Sr. refused to surrender the body of Vitaliana
(who had died on 28 August 1988) to the respondent sheriff, reasoning that a corpse
cannot be the subject of habeas corpus proceedings; besides, according to petitioner, he
had already obtained a burial permit from the Undersecretary of the Department of
Health, authorizing the burial at the palace quadrangle of the Philippine Benevolent
Christian Missionary, Inc. (PBCM), a registered religious sect, of which he (petitioner) is
the Supreme President and Founder.

Contentions of the PETITIONER EUGENIO SR:

1. Eugenio alleged that corpse cannot be subjected for a Habeas Corpus Proceedings and that he
has a legal custody over the corpse of Vitaliana as his common law spouse.

Contention of the RESPONDENT VARGASES’:

1. Vargases' alleged that petitioner Tomas Eugenia who is not in any way related to Vitaliana
was wrongfully interfering with their duty to bury her. Invoking Arts. 305 and 308 of the Civil
Code, the Vargases contended that, as the next of kin in the Philippines, they are the legal
custodians of the dead body of their sister Vitaliana.
Ruling of Lower Courts: Granted- The order of preference to give support under Art. 294 was
used as the basis of the award. Since there was no surviving spouse, ascendants or descendants,
the brothers and sisters were preferred over petitioner who was merely a common law spouse,
the latter being himself legally married to another woman.

General Issue:
Whether or not RTC has jurisdiction over the Petition for Habeas Corpus- YES

Controlling Issue:

Whether or not Tomas Eugenio Sr. can claim the custody over the corpse of Vitaliana Vargas-
NO.

Ruling:
Basis of the ruling.

Custody of the dead body of Vitaliana was correctly awarded to her surviving brothers and
sisters (the Vargases). Section 1103 of the Revised Administrative Code provides:

Sec. 1103. Persons charged with duty of burial. — The immediate duty of
burying the body of a deceased person, regardless of the ultimate liability for the
expense thereof, shall devolve upon the persons hereinbelow specified:

xxx xxx xxx

(b) If the deceased was an unmarried man or woman, or a child,

and left any kin, the duty of burial shall devolve upon the nearest
of kin of the deceased, if they be adults and within the Philippines
and in possession of sufficient means to defray the necessary
expenses.

Application of the ruling in the case:

Petitioner claims he is the spouse contemplated under Art. 294 of the Civil Code, the term spouse
used therein not being preceded by any qualification; hence, in the absence of such qualification,
he is the rightful custodian of Vitaliana's body. Vitaliana's brothers and sisters contend otherwise.
Indeed, Philippine Law does not recognize common law marriages. A man and woman not
legally married who cohabit for many years as husband and wife, who represent themselves to
the public as husband and wife, and who are reputed to be husband and wife in the community
where they live may be considered legally mauled in common law jurisdictions but not in the
Philippines.
While it is true that our laws do not just brush aside the fact that such relationships are present in
our society, and that they produce a community of properties and interests which is governed by
law, authority exists in case law to the effect that such form of co-ownership requires that the
man and woman living together must not in any way be incapacitated to contract marriage. In
any case, herein petitioner has a subsisting marriage with another woman, a legal impediment
which disqualified him from even legally marrying Vitaliana. In Santero vs. CFI of Cavite, ,the
Court, thru Mr. Justice Paras, interpreting Art. 188 of the Civil Code (Support of Surviving
Spouse and Children During Liquidation of Inventoried Property) stated: "Be it noted however
that with respect to 'spouse', the same must be the legitimate 'spouse' (not common-law
spouses)."

There is a view that under Article 332 of the Revised Penal Code, the term "spouse" embraces
common law relation for purposes of exemption from criminal liability in cases of theft,
swindling and malicious mischief committed or caused mutually by spouses. The Penal Code
article, it is said, makes no distinction between a couple whose cohabitation is sanctioned by a
sacrament or legal tie and another who are husband and wife de facto. But this view cannot even
apply to the facts of the case at bar. We hold that the provisions of the Civil Code, unless
expressly providing to the contrary as in Article 144, when referring to a "spouse" contemplate a
lawfully wedded spouse. Petitioner vis-a-vis Vitaliana was not a lawfully-wedded spouse to her;
in fact, he was not legally capacitated to marry her in her lifetime.

Ratio: The Court therefore affirmed the decision of the lower court and dismissed both Petitions.

31. Joaquin v. Navarro, 93 Phil. 257 May 29, 1953

Joaquin v. Navarro
GR No. L-5426-28
May 29, 1953
 J. Tuason
Petition for Review by Certiorari of a Decision of the CA

Name of the parties:

Petitioner: Ramon Joaquin – natural child of Angela Joaquin de Navarro (died before Joaquin
Navarro, Jr.)
Respondent: Auromo C. Navarro – son of Joaquin Navarro, Jr (by first marriage)

Topic and Applicable Articles:

1. NCC, Article 43 – If there is doubt, as between two or more persons who are called
to succeed each other, as to which of them died first, whoever alleges the death of
one prior to the other, shall prove the same; in the absence of proof, it is presumed
that they died at the same time and there shall be no transmission of rights from
one to the other.

Doctrine/s: The evidence of survivorship need not be direct; it may be indirect, circumstantial
or inferential.

Facts: (Instead of using respondent and petitioner use the name please :))
- During the battle of liberation of Manila on February 6, 1945, the following sought
refuge on the ground floor of German Club building: Joaquin Navarro Sr (70); Angela
Joaquin (67); daughter Pilar (32-33); daughter Concepcion (23-25); son Joaquin
Natividad Jr (30); and wife of Jr Adela Conde (--).

- The building was set on fire and Japanese started shooting the daughters who fell.
Sr. decided to leave the building.

- His wife didn’t want to leave so he left with his son, Jr., and Jr.’s wife and neighbor
Francisco Lopez. As they came out, Jr. was hit and fell on the ground and rest lay flat
on the ground to avoid bullets. German Club collapsed trapping many people
presumably including Angela Joaquin. Sr., Adela, and Francisco sought refuge in an
air aid shelter where they hid for 3 days.

- On February 10, 1945, on their way to St. Theresa Academy, they met Japanese
patrols. Sr. and Adela were hit and killed. The trial court ruled that Angela Joaquin
outlived her son while CA ruled that son outlived his mother.
Contentions of the PETITIONER/PLAINTIFF (Indicate the name):
1.Section 69 (ii) of Rule 123 of the Rules of Court did not repeal Article 43 of the NCC.
2. Joaquin Navarro, Jr. should, under Article 43, be held to have died at the same time.

Ruling of Lower Courts: Denied/Granted - brief basis

Trial Court found the deaths of these persons to have occurred in this order:
First: The Navarro girls, named Pilar, Concepcion and Natividad;
Second: Joaquin Navarro, Jr;
Third: Angela Joaquin de Navarro; and
Fourth: Joaquin Navarro, Sr.

CA: concurred with the trial court except that, with regard to Angeal Joaquin de Navarro and
Joaquin Navarro, Jr., the latter was declared to have survived his mother

General Issue: Whether Sec. 334 (37) of Act No. 190, now section 69 (ii) of Rule 123 of the
Rules of Court, has repealed Article 33 of the Civil Code of 1889, now Article 43 of the NCC. NO.

Controlling Issue: Whether the son/mother died first before the other.
(If the son died first, petitioner would reap the benefits of succession. If mother died first,
respondent Antonio, son of Jr. by his first marriage, would inherit)

Ruling: Neither Section 69 (ii) of Rule 123 of the Rules of Court, nor Article 43 of the NCC are
applicable in this case.
“Whenever a doubt arises as to which was the first to die of the two or more persons
who would inherit one from the other, the person who alleges the prior death of either must
prove the allegation; in the absence of proof the presumption shall be that they died at the
same time, and no transmission of rights from one to the other shall take place.”

Both provisions, as their language plainly implies, are intmded as a substitute for facts,
and so are not to be available when there are facts. With particular reference to section 69 (ii)
of Rule 123, "the situation which it represents is one in which the facts are not only unknown
but unknowable. By hypothesis, there is no specific evidence as to the time of death * * *". * *
*it is assumed thnt no evidence can be produced. * * *Since the facts are unknown and
unknowable, the law may apply the law of fairness appropriate to the different legal situations
that arises." (IX Wigmore on Evidence, 1940 ed., 483.)

a. Application of the ruling in the case:

Based on the story of Francisco Lopez, Jr. died before his mother did. This presumption was
based on speculations, not evidence. Gauged by the doctrine of preponderance of evidence on
which civil cases are to be decided, this inference should prevail. Evidence of survivorship may
be direct, indirect, circumstantial or inferential.

Ratio:
The Court is constrained to reverse the decision under review, and hold that the
distribution of the decedents' estates should be made in accordance with the decision of the
trial court. This result precludes the necessity of passing upon the question of "reserva troncal"
which was put forward on the hypothetical theory that Mrs. Joaquin Navarro's death preceded
that of her son. Without costs.
 32. Smith Bell v. Natividad, 40 Phil. 136 September 17, 1919

Case Title: SMITH, BELL & COMPANY (LTD.) vs. JOAQUIN NATIVIDAD, Collector of
Customs of the port of Cebu, respondent.
GR Number: G.R. No. 15574
Promulgation Date: September 17, 1919
Ponente: MALCOLM, J.:
Nature of the Action: Petition for Mandamus

Name of the parties: (and their respective role in the case):

Petitioner: SMITH, BELL & COMPANY (LTD.)

Respondent: JOAQUIN NATIVIDAD, Collector of Customs of the port of Cebu

Topic and Applicable Articles: See syllabus

Article 46. Juridical persons may acquire and possess property of all kinds, as well as incur
obligations and bring civil or criminal actions, in conformity with the laws and regulations of
their organization.

Doctrine/s:

1. Juridical persons are considered “Persons” who cannot be denied the Equal
Protection of the Laws.
2. Laws denying the right to register vessels in the Philippine coastwise trade fall within
authorized exceptions, notably, within the purview of police power, and so does not
offend against the constitutional provision.

Facts: (Instead of using respondent and petitioner use the name please :))

Smith Bell & Co. Ltd is a corporation organized under the laws of the Philippine Islands, with
the majority of the stockholders being British Subjects. Smith Bell applied for a Certificate of
Philippine Registry of its ship, the Bato, with the Collector of Customs. The Collector of
Customs denied the application, pursuant to the powers granted to him by Act No. 2761 which
amended the Administrative Code, and restricted the registration of Philippine vessels to "vessels
of domestic ownership".

Contentions of the PETITIONER/PLAINTIFF (Indicate the name):

Smith Bell contends that Act No. 2761 violates the equal protection of the laws, by denying the
registry of a vessel to corporations with alien stockholders.

Contention of the RESPONDENT/DEFENDANT (Indicate the name):

Collector of Customs contends that such denial is legal exercise of power delegated in the
Administrative Code, and does not violate equal protection of the laws.

Ruling of Lower Courts: N/A. Mandamus directly to SC En Banc

General Issue:

Whether or not corporations are entitled to equal protection of the laws? YES. They are
protected by the Constitution.

Controlling Issue:

Whether or not Act No. 2761 denying foreign-owned corporations’ registration of vessels as
Philippine vessels violates Equal Protection of the Laws? NO. It is a valid exception.

Ruling: The petition for a writ of mandamus is denied

a. Basis of the ruling. (Cite the law or previous jurisprudence):

That no law shall be enacted in said Islands which shall deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property without due process of law, or deny to any person therein the equal protection of the
laws… (Jones Law)

Current Equivalent: No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process
of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws. (Article III, Sec. 1, 1987
Constitution)
 b. Application of the ruling in the case:

Equal Protection of the Laws applies, but valid police power, such as Act No. 2761, is an
exception. There is no violation.

Ratio:

Justice Malcolm, in his decision, compared the provision of the Jones Law, to the Fourteenth
Amendment to the Constitution, which also guaranteed Equal Protection of the Laws, and cited
several US cases where the rights and privileges of aliens were validly restricted, particularly:
Tragesser vs. Gray [1890], 73 Md., 250, licenses to sell spirituous liquors denied to persons not
citizens of the United States; Commonwealth vs. Hana [1907], 195 Mass , 262, excluding aliens
from the right to peddle; Patsone vs. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania [1914], 232 U. S. , 138,
prohibiting the killing of any wild bird or animal by any unnaturalized foreign-born resident; Ex
parte Gilleti [1915], 70 Fla., 442, discriminating in favor of citizens with reference to the taking
for private use of the common property in fish and oysters found in the public waters of the
State; Heim vs. McCall [1915], 239 U. S.,.175, and Crane vs. New York [1915], 239 U. S., 195,
limiting employment on public works by, or for, the State or a municipality to citizens of the
United States.

33. Barlin v. Ramirez, 7 Phil. 41 November 24, 1906

Barlin v. Ramirez
7 Phil. 41
November 23, 1906
Willard J.:
Appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Ambos Camarines

Plaintiff, Appellee: Rev. Jorge Barlin in his capacity as apostolic administrator of this vacant
bishopric and legal representative of the general interests of the Roman Catholic Apostolic
Church in the diocese of Nueva Caceres,
Defendant, Appellant: P. Vicente Ramirez, ex-rector of the Roman Catholic Apostolic
Parochial Church of Lagonoy, and the Municipality of Lagonoy

Topic and Applicable Articles:

Juridical Persons, NCC 44- 47
Public corporations; Private corporations; Partnerships

Art. 46. Juridical persons may acquire and possess property of all kinds, as well as incur
obligations and bring civil or criminal actions, in conformity with the laws and regulations of
their organization. (38a)

Doctrine/s:

1. The Roman Catholic Church is a juridical person in the Philippine Islands.

Facts:
- Ramirez, having been appointed by the plaintiff parish priest, took possession of the
church on the 5th of July, 1901. He administered it as such under the orders of his
superiors until the 14th day of November, 1902.

- His successor Barlin having been then appointed, the latter made a demand on this
defendant for the delivery to him of the church, convent, and cemetery, and the sacred
ornaments, books, jewels, money, and other property of the church.

- Ramirez, by a written document of that date, refused to make such delivery.

- The municipality of Lagonoy filed a petition asking that it be allowed to intervene in

the case and join Ramirez, as a defendant therein. This petition having been granted,
the municipality on the 1st day of December filed an answer in which it alleged that
the defendant, Ramirez, was in possession of the property described in the complaint
under the authority and with the consent of the municipality of Lagonoy and that such
municipality was the owner thereof.

Contentions of the Barlin

1. That Roman Catholic Church was the owner of the church building, the convent, cemetery, the
books, money, and other property belonging thereto, and asking that it be restored to the
possession thereof and that the defendant render an account of the property which he had
received and which was retained by him, and for other relief.
Contention of the Ramirez and Municipality of Lagonoy
1. Ramirez admitted that he was in the possession and administration of the property
described therein with the authority of the municipality of Lagonoy and of the inhabitants
of the same, who were the lawful owners of the said property.

2. That the property in question belonged prior to the treaty of Paris to the Spanish
Government; that by the treaty of Paris the ownership thereof passed to the Government
of the United States; that by section 12 of the act of Congress of July 1, 1902, such
property was transferred to the Government of the Philippine Islands

General Issue: To whom did the church building belong? – Roman Catholic Church

Controlling Issue:
Whether or not the Roman Catholic Church has legal personality in the Philippine
Islands? - Yes

Ruling:
a. Basis of the ruling.
There is nothing in any one of the fifty-one laws which compose this title which in any way
indicates that the King of Spain was the owner of the churches in the Indies because he had
constructed them.

b. Application of the ruling in the case:

It, therefore, follows that in 1898, and prior to the treaty of Paris, the Roman Catholic Church
had by law the exclusive right to the possession of this church and it had the legal fight to
administer the same for the purposes for which the building was consecrated. It was then in the
full and peaceful possession of the church with the rights aforesaid. That these rights were fully
protected by the treaty of Paris is very clear. That treaty, in article 8, provides, among other
things, as follows:

"And it is hereby declared that the relinquishment or cession, as the case may be, to which the
preceding paragraph refers, cannot in any respect impair the property or rights which by law
belong to the peaceful possession of property of all kinds, of provinces, municipalities, public or
private establishments, ecclesiastical or civic bodies, or any other associations having legal
capacity to acquire and possess property in the aforesaid territories renounced or ceded, or of
private individuals, of whatsoever nationality such individuals may be."
Ratio: It is not necessary to show that the church as a juridical person was the owner of the
buildings. It is sufficient to say that this right to the exclusive possession and control of the same,
for the purposes of its creation, existed.

The petition is DISMISSED, without pronouncement as to costs.

34. Standard Oil Co. v. Arenas, 19 Phil. 363 July 25, 1911

Case Title: Standard Oil Comapany

GR Number: G.R. No. L-5921

Promulgation Date: July 25, 1911

Ponente: Justice Arellano

Nature of the Action: Annulment of bonds

Name of the parties: (and their respective role in the case):

Petitioner: Standard Oil Company

Respondent: Vicente Sixto and Elisa Villanueva

Third person (Mortgagor, Assignor): if available

Topic and Applicable Articles: See syllabus

PRESUMPTION OF CAPACITY
Facts: (Instead of using respondent and petitioner use the name please :))

On December 15, 1908, Juan Codina Arenas and Francisco Lara del Pino, as
principals, and Alipio Locso, Vicente Sixto Villanueva and the Chinaman, Siy Ho, as
sureties, assumed the obligation to pay, jointly and severally, to the corporation, The
Standard Oil Company of New York, the sum of P3,305. 76, at three months from date,
with interest at P1 per month.

Vicente Sixto Villanueva was declared by the lower court to be in default and sentenced
him and the other debtors to pay the Standard Oil, jointly and severally.

The wife of Vicente wants to annul the judgment made by the lower court, on the ground
that the at the time of the execution of the contract, Vicente was suffering from
monomania of wealth. The lower court ruled that Vicente was in his proper state of mind
when he entered the contract.

Ruling of Lower Courts: Denied/Granted – The lower court ruled that Vicente Sixto
Villanueva was not insane at the time of the execution of the bond.

Controlling Issue:

Whether or not Vicente Sixto Villanueva has the capacity to enter to contracts at
the time he executed the bond?

NO.
Ratio:

Capacity to act must be supposed to attach to a person who has not previously
been declared incapable, and such capacity is presumed to continue so long as
the contrary be not proved, that is, that at the moment of his acting he was
incapable, crazy, insane, or out his mind: which, in the opinion of this court, has
not been proved in this case.

In our present knowledge of the state of mental alienation such certainly has not
yet been reached as to warrant the conclusion, in a judicial decision, that he who
suffers the monomania of wealth, believing himself to be very wealthy when he is
not, is really insane and it is to be presumed, in the absence of a judicial
declaration, that he acts under the influence of a perturbed mind, or that his mind
is deranged when he executes an onerous contract .The bond, as aforesaid, was
executed by Vicente S. Villanueva on December 15, 1908, and his incapacity, for
the purpose of providing a guardian for him, was not declared until July 24,
1909.The bond, as aforesaid, was executed by Vicente S. Villanueva on December
15, 1908, and his incapacity, for the purpose of providing a guardian for him, was
not declared until July 24, 1909.

35. Mercado v. Espiritu, 37 Phil. 215 December 1, 1917

Mercado v Espiritu
GR no 11872
December 1, 1917
Torres, J

Petitioner: Domingo Mercado and Josefa Mercado

Respondent: Jose Espiritu, administrator of the estate of the deceased Luis Espiritu, defendants
and appellee.
Topic and Applicable Articles: See syllabus
1. Minority; Art. 38, Civil code: Minority, Insanity, or Imbecility, the state of being a deaf-
mute, prodigality and civil Interdiction are mere restrictions on capacity to act, and do not
exempt the Incapacitated person from certain obligations, as when the latter arise from his acts or
from property relations, such as easements.

Doctrine/s:
1. Sale of real estate made by those who represent themselves of legal age when they are In fact
not are valid, and the party cannot excuse themselves from said obligation or seek It’s
annulment.

Facts:
- On April 9, 1913, Both petitioners mercado filed this complaint against Luis Espiritu.
They alleged that they were the sole heirs of Margarita Espiritu who was the sister of Luis. When
Margarita died In 1897, she left a land of 48 hectares In Bulacan which their hereditary portion
had been held by their father. It was In 1910, which petitioners Mercado were allegedly Induced
to sign a deed of sale of the land for the sum of Php 400
- The Mercados are seeking the voiding of the sale and for the equivalent of Its product.

Contentions of the Domningo and Josefa Mercaod

1. Petitioners Mercado argue that at the time of the execution of the deed of sale, they were still
minors and 4 years had not passed since they reached the age of majority.

Contention of the administrator of Luis Espiritu

1. The administrator of the estate alleges that the mother with the authorization of her husband
sold a portion of the land to Luis Espiritu for the sum of 2000. That, on May 14, 1901, the father
as administrator of the children’s property sold under a pacto de retro sale the remainder of the
land to support his children.
2. The administrator alleges that on May 17, 1910, the Mercado sisters represented themselves to
be of legal age with their other sisters executed a notarial document ratifying the sale of their
father.

Ruling of Lower Courts: Dismissed the suit and agreed with the contentions of defendant

General Issue:
Whether or not the agreement executed by minors representing themselves of legal age Is valid -
YES.

Controlling Issue:

Whether or not the deed of sale was valid despite the alleged minority of the parties signing- Yes

Ruling:
a. Basis of the ruling. (Cite the law or previous jurisprudence):
Court relied on spanish jurisprudence at the time. Decisions of the supreme court of Spain, of
April 27, 1860, July 11, 1868, and March 1, 1875.)
b. Application of the ruling in the case:

There was no evidence In record that showed that petitioner’’s Mercado were In fact minor, for
no certified copies were presented of their respective baptismal certificates, or any other
evidence to show that Domingo was 19 and Josefa was 18 when they signed the May 17, 1910
agreement. Even In doubt If they were of legal age, the notarial document which they signed
specifically stated that they were of legal age when they signed It.
The courts, In their Interpretation of the law have laid down the rule that the sale of real
estate, made by minors who pretend to be of legal age, when In fact they are not, Is valid, and
they will not be permitted to excuse themselves from the fulfillment of the obligations contracted
by them, or to have them annulled (…)

Ratio:
The judgement of the lower court Is affirmed. The case Is dismissed since the petitioners cannot
seek the annulment of the sale.

36. Bambalan v. Maramba, 51 Phil. 417 January 30, 1928

37. Sia Suan & Gaw Chiao v. Alcantara, 85 Phil. 669 March 4, 1950
38. De Braganza v. De Villa- Abrille, 105 Phil 456 April 13, 1959

De Braganza v. De Villa- Abrille

105 Phil 456
 April 13, 1959

FACTS:

Rosario Braganza and her sons loaned from De Villa Abrille P70,000 in Japanese war notes and
in consideration thereof, promised in writing to pay him P10,00 + 2% per annum in legal
currency of the Philippines 2 years after the cessation of the war. Because they have no paid,
Abrille is sued them in March 1949. The Manila court of first instance and CA held the family
solidarily liable to pay according to the contract they signed. The family petitioned to review the
decision of the CA whereby they were ordered to solidarily pay De Villa Abrille P10,000 + 2%
interest, praying for consideration of the minority of the Braganza sons when they signed the
contract.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the boys, who were 16 and 18 respectively, are to be bound by the contract of
loan they have signed.

RULING:

The SC found that Rosario will still be liable to pay her share in the contract because they
minority of her sons does not release her from liability. She is ordered to pay 1/3 of P10,000 +
2% interest.

However with her sons, the SC reversed the decision of the CA which found them similarly
liable due to their failure to disclose their minority. The SC sustained previous sources in
Jurisprudence – ―in order to hold the infant liable, the fraud must be actual and not constructive.
It has been held that his mere silence when making a contract as to his age does not constitute a
fraud which can be made the basis of an action of deceit.

The boys, though not bound by the provisions of the contract, are still liable to pay the actual
amount they have profited from the loan. Art. 1340 states that even if the written contract is
unenforceable because of their non-age, they shall make restitution to the extent that they may
have profited by the money received. In this case, 2/3 of P70,00, which is P46,666.66, which
when converted to Philippine money is equivalent to P1,166.67.

39. US v. Vaquilar, 27 Phil. 88 March 13, 1914

 US v. Vaquilar
G.R. Nos. L-9471 and L-9472
March 13, 1914
TRENT, J.
Nature of the Action:

Name of the parties: (and their respective role in the case):

Plaintiff-appellee: THE UNITED STATES

Defendant-appellee: EVARISTO VAQUILAR

Topic and Applicable Articles: See syllabus

Article 38. Minority, insanity or imbecility, the state of being a deaf-mute, prodigality and
civil interdiction are mere restrictions on capacity to act, and do not exempt the incapacitated
person from certain obligations, as when the latter arise from his acts or from property
relations, such as easements.

Doctrine/s:
Testimony of eye-witnesses to a parricide, which goes no further than to indicate that the accused
was moved by a wayward or hysterical burst of anger or passion, and other testimony to the
effect that, while in confinement awaiting trial, defendant acted absent-mindedly at times, is not
sufficient to establish the defense of insanity. The conduct of the defendant while in confinement
appears to have been due to a morbid mental condition produced by remorse.

Facts: (Instead of using respondent and petitioner use the name please :))
The appellant, Evaristo Vaquilar, was charged in two separate informations with parricide, in one
for the killing of his wife and in the other for the killing of his daughter using a bolo. Several
witnesses have testified that Vaquilar, prior to the commission of the offense, would complain of
"pains in the head and the stomach." A prisoner confined in the same jail with him testified that
he had observed the appellant about five months and that sometimes "his head is not all right;"
that when the appellant returns from work he does not say a word; and that about every other
night he, the appellant, cries aloud, saying, "What kind of people are you to me, what are you
doing to me, you are beasts."

The health officer who examined the two deceased and the other wounded parties found that the
appellant's wife had five mortal wounds on the head, besides several other wounds on her hands;
and that the daughter's skull was split "through and through from one side to the other." The
witness stated that he made a slight examination of the defendant in the jail and that he did not
notice whether defendant in the jail and that he did not notice whether defendant was suffering
from any mental derangement or not.

Contentions of the PETITIONER/PLAINTIFF (Indicate the name):

Vaquilor alleges insanity

Contention of the RESPONDENT/DEFENDANT (Indicate the name):

The State avers sanity

Ruling of Lower Courts: Vaquilor was found guilty by the lower court and he was sentenced to
life imprisonment.

General Issue:

Whether the lower court erred in finding Vaquilor guilty of committing the crimes. - NO

Controlling Issue:

Is Vaquilor considered insane as defined under the law - NO.

Ruling:
Basis of the ruling. (Cite the law or previous jurisprudence):
Article 38. Minority, insanity or imbecility, the state of being a deaf-mute, prodigality and civil
interdiction are mere restrictions on capacity to act, and do not exempt the incapacitated person
from certain obligations, as when the latter arise from his acts or from property relations, such as
easements.

People vs. Foy (138 N. Y., 664), the court sad: "The court very properly continued with an
explanation to the jury that 'the heat of passion and feeling produced by motives of anger, hatred,
or revenge, is not insanity. The law holds the doer of the act, under such conditions, responsible
for the crime, because a large share of homicides committed are occasioned by just such motives
as these.'

Application of the ruling in the case:

There is vast difference between an insane person and one who has worked himself up into
such a frenzy of anger that he fails to use reason or good judgment in what he does.
Persons who get into a quarrel of fight seldom, if ever, act naturally during the fight. An
extremely angry man, often, if not always, acts like a madman. The fact that a person acts
crazy is not conclusive that he is insane. The popular meaning of the word "crazy" is not
synonymous with the legal terms "insane," "non compos mentis," "unsound mind,"
"idiot," or "lunatic." In this case as before indicated, one witness testified that "according
to my own eyes as he looked at me he was crazy because if he was not crazy he would not
have killed his family." That witness' conception of the word "crazy" evidently is the doing
of some act by a person which an ordinarily rational person would not think of doing.
Another witness testified that "he looked like a madman; crazy, because he would cut
everybody at random without paying any attention to who it was." It is not at all unnatural
for a murderer, caught in the act of killing his wife and child, to fly into a passion and
strike promiscuously at those who attempt to capture him. The appellant's sister said "he
must have been crazy because he cut me." This is another illustration of the popular
conception of the word "crazy," it being thus used to describe a person or an act unnatural
or out of the ordinary.

The conduct of the appellant after he was confined in jail as described by his fellow
prisoner is not inconsistent with the actions of a sane person. The reflection and remorse
which would follow the commission of such deeds as those committed by the appellant
might be sufficient to cause the person to cry out, "What kind of people are you to me;
what are you doing to me; you are beast," and yet such conduct could not be sufficient to
show that the person was insane at the time the deeds were committed.

Ratio: The appellant's conduct, as appears from the record, being consistent with the acts
of an enlarged criminal, and it not having been satisfactorily, shown that he was of
unsound mind at the time he committed the crimes, and the facts charged in each
information having been proven, and the penalty imposed being in accordance with the
law, the judgments appealed from are affirmed, with costs against the appellant.

40. People v. Rafanan, 204 SCRA 65 November 21, 1991

People of the Philippines v. Rafanan

G.R. No. 54135
November 21, 1991
Feliciano J.:
Appeal from the decision of the then Court of First Instance
of Villasis, Pangasinan, Br. 5.
Plaintiff-appellee: People of the Philippines
Defendant-appellant: Policarpio Rafanan

Topic and Applicable Articles:

1. Art. 12. Circumstances which exempt from criminal liability. — the following are
exempt from criminal liability:
An imbecile or an insane person, unless the latter has acted during a lucid interval.
When the imbecile or an insane person has committed an act which the law defines as a felony
(delito), the court shall order his confinement in one of the hospitals or asylums established for
persons thus afflicted, which he shall not be permitted to leave without first obtaining the
permission of the same court.

Doctrine/s:
1. Imbecility or insanity at the time of the commission of the act should absolutely deprive a
person of intelligence or freedom of will, because mere abnormality of his mental faculties does
not exclude imputability

2. The allegation of insanity or imbecility must be clearly proved—that the defendant had
previously lost his reason or was demented, a few moments prior to or during the perpetration of
the crime. If not, it will be presumed that he was in a normal condition.

Facts:
- Rafanan was charged with the crime of rape for having sexual intercourse against the
will of 14 year-old household helper Estelita Ronaya.
- He threatened her with a bolo and proceeded to have carnal knowledge of her inside
their sari-sari store.
- At arraignment, appellant entered a plea of not guilty.

- The trial court suspended the trial and ordered Rafanan confined at the National
Mental Hospital in Mandaluyong for observation and treatment.

- The hospital prepared 4 clinical reports, all concluding that Rafanan was indeed
schizophrenic.

- However, he was still convicted. Hence, this appeal.

Contentions of the Estrelita

1. After the sexual intercourse, Rafanan cautioned her not to report the matter to her mother or to
anybody in the house, otherwise he would kill her.
Contention of the Rafanan
1. He was suffering from a mental aberration characterized as schizophrenia when he inflicted
his violent intentions upon Estelita, based on Art. 12 RPC.

Controlling Issue:
Whether or not Rafanan was legally insane when he raped Estelita, and thus fell under the
exempting circumstance. NO.

Ruling:
a. Basis of the ruling. (Cite the law or previous jurisprudence):
A linguistic or grammatical analysis of those standards suggests that Formigones established two
(2) distinguishable tests: (a) the test of cognition—"complete deprivation of intelligence in
committing the [criminal] act,” and (b) the test of volition—"or that there be a total deprivation
of freedom of the will.”

b. Application of the ruling in the case:

Q: Now, is this insane person also capable of knowing what is right and what is wrong?

A: Well, there is no weakness on that part of the individual. They may know what is wrong but
yet there is no inhibition on the individual.

Q: Yes, but actually, they are mentally equipped with knowledge that an act they are going to
commit is wrong?

A: Yeah, they are equipped but the difference is, there is what we call they lost the inhibition.
The reasoning is weak and yet they understand but the volition is [not] there, the drive is [not]
there."

The above testimony, in substance, negates complete destruction of intelligence at the time of
commission of the act charged which, in the current state of our caselaw, is critical if the defense
of insanity is to be sustained. The fact that appellant Rafanan threatened complainant Estelita
with death should she reveal she had been sexually assaulted by him, indicates, to the mind of
the Court, that Rafanan was aware of the reprehensible moral quality of that assault.

Ratio:
Appellant failed to present clear and convincing evidence regarding his state of mind
immediately before and during the sexual assault on Estelita. It has been held that inquiry into
the mental state of the accused should relate to the period immediately before or at the very
moment the act is committed.

In People vs. Puno (supra), the Court ruled that schizophrenic reaction, although not exempting
because it does not completely deprive the offender of the consciousness of his acts, may be
considered as a mitigating circumstance under Article 13(9) of the Revised Penal Code, i.e., as
an illness which diminishes the exercise of the offender’s will-power without, however,
depriving him of the consciousness of his acts. Appellant should have been credited with this
mitigating circumstance, although it would not have affected the penalty imposable upon him
under Article 63 of the Revised Penal Code: “in all cases in which the law prescribes a single
indivisible penalty (reclusion perpetua in this case), it shall be applied by the courts regardless of
any mitigating or aggravating circumstances that may have attended the commission of the
deed.”

WHEREFORE, the Decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED, except that the amount of
moral damages is increased to P30,000.00. Costs against appellant.

41. Abella v. COMELEC, 201 SCRA 253 September 3, 1991

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